

RECENT LITERATURE ON MARX AND MARXISM

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A survey of recent Marxist literature raises a host of practical problems. A considerable number of good or at least useful studies on Marxism appear every year. A selection holds always a good deal of arbitrariness and personal preference. Should recent translations of works previously published be included? Or older works which in a new edition or translation only now "hit" the English-speaking world? My combination of compromises can claim little objective support, particularly for the negative decisions, except that what is offered here fairly represents the spectrum of recent Marxist scholarship in the West.¹

One can hardly expect to find a unifying theme in such a variety. Yet all the works discussed here owe their origin to a direct or indirect confrontation with Hegel's dialectic. This is fairly obvious for the ones considered in the first part, "Problems of Marxist Dialectic." But the entire theme of "Alienation" to which the second part is devoted, was also introduced by Hegel. Even the "Historical Developments" of the third part were mainly determined by the emphasis or deemphasis of Hegel's influence on Marx. The authors of the first part all consider Hegel's dialectic indispensable, while Louis Althusser, the last one to be considered in this survey, dismisses this dialectic as a foreign body that merely obscures the clarity of Marx's thought. Some regard Marxism as a "system," even a philosophical system; others as a non-philosophical anti-system. For some it is a humanism, for others a science. But all these views, however contradictory, were mainly determined by their attitude towards Hegel's philosophy. If there is anything that characterizes present day Marxist scholarship in the West, it is its concern with the relation of the ideas of the great German idealist to those of Marx.

1. *Problems of Marxist Dialectic.*—Of all the philosophical studies of Marxism in recent years Klaus Hartmann's *Die Marxsche Theorie* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970) raises the most basic questions. Hartmann no longer assumes that Marx's primary concern was philosophical as many non-Marxist philosophers do. Nor does he accept a discontinuity between the early "philosophical" writings and the mature "social-economic" ones, as French existentialists did. To him Marx's essential contribution consists in a transcendental critique of political economy, performed on the basis of a dialectical interpretation of history. Unlike philosophy such a critique does not

¹Some important studies appeared after I had completed my survey, most notably David McLellan's intelligent biography, *Karl Marx. His Life and Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). Cf. Sidney Hook, "Marxism," *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, ed. Philip P. Wiener, 5 vols. (New York: Scribners, 1973-74), III, 146-61; R. K. Kindersley, "Marxist Revisionism," *ibid.*, III, 161-70; George Lichtheim, "Historical and Dialectical Materialism," *ibid.*, II, 450-56; and J. P. Nettl, "Social Democracy in Germany and Revisionism," *ibid.*, IV, 263-76.

remain purely speculative. Yet it uses philosophical methods and concepts, and a final judgment on Marx's achievement must evaluate the consistency of this usage.

It is well known that Marx's dialectic is based on a different foundation than Hegel's. For the logic of the concrete universal Marx substitutes an empirical anthropological representation of man as a "species being." What initiates the dialectical movement is not a logical necessity but an historical negation of man's original condition. So the question arises: Can such an empirical foundation support a dialectical necessity allowing Marx to make *certain* predictions about the future development of history? It is the considerable merit of Hartmann's study to consider this problem from an original and comprehensive viewpoint. His conclusion is a critical one.

Marx's dialectic proper moves entirely *within* the negative. It is initiated by the intrinsically negative concept of alienated labor or, in the economic terminology of the later works, "surplus labor value." How could this ever result in a positive state? Marx *assumes* throughout a positive vision of man, but this assumption forms no integral part of the dialectic. The negative impression generated by the comparison between the assumed idea of man and his present situation is logically inadequate to justify a dialectic, especially a dialectic in which the negation itself must be negated. Marx has applied the dialectic from without to an essentially nondialectical concept for the sole purpose of strengthening his critique of the present (424). How would the emancipation of man be necessitated by a dialectic which develops entirely by means of negative concepts?

Marx's anthropological image of man remains outside the negative process and this process, in turn, fails to provide any certainty about its eventual conclusion. The actual dialectic begins with concepts which are *assumed* to be forms of alienation but which are not logically connected with that from which they are alienated. Both the principle of interpretation (alienated labor) and what is to be interpreted (the economic process as a whole) remain negative throughout. But since the dialectic is at the same time a critique of itself, it must be measured by a positive standard, the concept of "true" human labor which is always in the background. Thus, at the beginning of *Capital*, Marx relates the exchange value of commodities to his anthropological concept of human labor as a source of use value. Yet the latter is never integrated with the dialectic. "An anthropological concept of labor has been surreptitiously added to the capitalist industrial process of production, whereby the difference of labor time for the reproduction and surplus labor in the industrial process attains a negative meaning" (319).

An historical succession of social structures attains dialectical necessity and predictable certainty *only* if an inner logos determines the historical stages into moments of a rational process. Hegel's theory of the Absolute Spirit fulfilled this function. Marx, of course, rejected such an abstract ideological concept, but his own theory of practice fails to provide an alternative form of necessity. Instead of rendering history intrinsically intelligible he presents us with a succession of economic states connected mainly by their increasing deviation from an assumed concept of labor. Marx's basic assertion that the economic process

is the ultimate source of alienation and that this alienation will be overcome by an inevitable reversal of the process, remains unproven. Since no intrinsic link connects the anthropological idea of man with his negative social-economic development, it is impossible to decide whether this development alienates man from himself, as Marx claims, or whether it contributes to such an alienation, as some sociologists claim, or even whether it constitutes no essentially alienating factor at all though it may well be an early and still defective state of human development.

Marx's unproven equation of economic periods with logical stages makes both his theory and his understanding of history doubtful. Facts which do not fit the theory are declared "unessential" and "prehistorical." The remarkable historical presentations of *German Ideology* and *Capital* can be no more than ideal, well selected *models* for the interpretation of history. Only for the last three centuries does Marx try to prove the existence of a causal connection between a particular state of the economy and a corresponding state of social disharmony. Even for this final period essential difficulties remain. For there is a discrepancy between the general theory of *Capital I* and the specific economic analyses in *Capital II* and *III*. In the latter the anthropological concepts which support Marx's dialectic and his prediction of the future, are seldom used. Instead we find exclusively economic concepts which, as in classical economic theory, shed some light on the present and allow, within well-defined conditions, some determination of the future, but nothing comparable to the sweeping, inevitable dialectic of the general theory. (An example is the theory of surplus labor yielding to traditional reflections on price and cost as determining factors in the economic process.) How relevant is Marx's theory in *Capital I* for a proper understanding of his important theory of competition? Again, it never becomes clear to what extent the anthropological concepts have been admitted as integral parts of the dialectic itself. It is the particular merit of Hartmann's book to have stated clearly the ambiguity of the relation between Marx's anthropological representations and his dialectical method.

Another study on Marx's dialectic of considerable importance, though somewhat older and of lesser scope, is Alfred Schmidt's *The Concept of Nature in Marx* written more than a decade ago and in 1971 translated into English by Ben Fowkes (London: Pantheon, 1973, reedition). Schmidt's work stands out by its balance and perceptiveness. Most interpretations of Marx's concept of nature fall into one of two categories. *Either* nature is regarded as an essential attribute of man, even though he is estranged from this part of himself in capitalist society—with various shades of difference, Bloch, the early Lukács, and some of the French existentialists adopted this position—*or* man is reduced to an ontological (albeit a very special) part of nature. This position was prepared by Engels' later writings and developed by Lenin and Stalin.

The problem is complicated by the fact that Marx himself uses expressions which, if isolated, distinctly favor either one of those interpretations. Supporting the idealist interpretation Marx mentions the "slumbering potentialities" of nature and, in the *Paris Manuscripts*, he hints at a general resurrection of nature after the demise of the capitalist mode of production. Yet, despite ambiguous expressions, in his mature works Marx invariably

viewed nature as opposed to man and as bound to remain so. The so-called "potentialities," then, are not teleological structures but objective data which man *because of his own universal nature* may convert into use values. Nor will such a conversion eventually humanize nature entirely. Labor will remain necessary and hard, even in the socialist society of the future. Underscoring this point Schmidt calls Marx one of the great pessimists of the West who, like Freud, believes in the continued need for self-denial.

On the other side, since nature refers to *both* the objective pole of human practice *and* the totality of all that exists, including the subject of that practice, the interpreter may be tempted to conceive of it as a monistic concept, a physical equivalent of Hegel's Spirit. Such a monism of nature need not be a univocal materialism, as it was for d'Holbach or Moleschott, since nature itself may contain irreducibly different forms. To the very end Engels upheld the qualitative distinction between mechanical and psychical motion (53). Even so, a materialist interpretation implies a homogeneous stratum, an identity of subject and object which Marx never accepted. To him the emergence of man meant irrevocable opposition, to the point where the original unity of nature can be grasped only through the present duality. This excludes the possibility that Marxism will ever become a truly monistic system: it must remain dualistic, that is, dialectically unfinished.

The entire development toward dialectical materialism, completed by Stalin, was inspired by a desire to "close" what Marx had left open. Engels' role in it was important. Yet he was by no means "the man who misunderstood Marx," as many Western commentators of Marx seem to believe. Marx knew what Engels was writing; he read it, and for all we know, approved it. Moving in an entirely different direction he may not have noticed all the implications of Engels' thought. But why did he not even suspect a possible misinterpretation? Schmidt's study points out how Engels' "deviating" ideas were intimately connected with some of Marx's own.

In Marx also we find elements of an "ontology." Schmidt refers to his discussion of the relation between the general laws of social formation and the specific laws of historical development of societies. This might easily have led to the theory of one substance with two juxtaposed modes of reality, which we find in Engels and, before him, in Spinoza. Indeed the notion of "nature" itself suffers from an inherent ambiguity which allows it to be interpreted in a monistic as well as a dualistic sense. Engels was clearly aware of the dangers of an ontology. Yet he felt the need to give the dialectic a more objective foundation by extending it beyond the compass of the mind. Thus in his *Anti-Dühring* he developed an all-comprehensive theory of nature covering the human as well as the non-human worlds. Nature in this frame of thought becomes a single absolute ruled by a dialectic that "applies" differently to the human subject and the physical object.

Such a view basically alters Marx's theory of practice. To Marx a dialectic of nature may have a limited meaning (and one which differs from Engels') for the pre-capitalist processes of production where man's productive activity is insufficiently differentiated from nature's own, so that his labor may be regarded as "nature's self-mediation." But in the capitalist stage this situation

ceases to exist altogether, and it never existed in the sense of a dialectic *independent of man*. "Nature for itself is devoid of any negativity. Negativity only emerges in nature with the working subject. A dialectical relation is only possible between man and nature" (195).

Schmidt's work shows the complexity of Marx's concept of nature. It reopens the discussion between the two main interpretations of Marx: the materialist and the idealist-existentialist one. Both are wrong in their one-sidedness, but each has more right on its side than its antagonist has been willing to concede.

In the preceding discussion of Klaus Hartmann's study we have noted how crucial to the understanding of Marx's dialectic is the interpretation of the final "negation of the negation." Is there a definitive dialectical *Aufhebung* by which the communist society moves beyond the abolition of capitalist structures into a new, permanent state? This is one of the most controversial questions in the twentieth-century interpretation of Marx's thought. Each different interpretation of this final twist of the dialectic has given rise to a different concept of the future of Marxist society. It depends on the quality of the final negation whether the Marxist revolution must be conceived as an unending one (Mao's China), or as resulting in a stable but negatively defined non-capitalist society (U.S.S.R.), or as giving birth to a new humanism with norms entirely different from those of both capitalist and anticapitalist societies (the revolutionary movements against communist State capitalism in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland). In her *Philosophy and Revolution* (New York: Delacorte, 1973), Raya Dunayevskaya considers the humanist interpretation the only authentically Marxist one. She does so while fully realizing that Marx no longer uses "humanist" language after the *Paris Manuscripts*. Yet her case is not based upon a preference of the early "philosophical" writings to the mature "social-economic" ones (she accepts a full continuity in Marx's development), but rests on the nature of the revolutionary dialectic. That dialectic, she claims, is essentially Hegel's own, that is, a dialectic in and through which the human subject develops. Rather than a pre-established objective law, as in Stalinism or Maoism, the revolutionary dialectic is the life of the subject itself. It is essentially human in the sense that man is both its beginning and its teleological end.

To be sure, Hegel's dialectic occurs within the Notion. But as Lenin pointed out in the *Notebooks*, Hegel himself at one point substituted the term "subject" for that of Notion. I shall not concern myself here with Lenin's (or Miss Dunayevskaya's) reading of Hegel, which appears to me strongly influenced by a strictly Marxist theory of praxis, but I shall instead follow the author's interpretation of Marx's dialectic in its own right, for it well deserves our attention. What is at stake in the dialectical negation is much more than a vision of the society of the future. The nature of the dialectic defines the methods and goals of the revolution *even*, and particularly, *at the present stage*. Without the ever new impulse of the living subject the revolutionary dialectic spends itself, and its anticapitalist movement comes to stagnate in a State capitalism that merely replaces the fetishism of the commodities by the fetishism of the State. Such a judgment may seem surprising in the face of Trotsky's "permanent"

revolution and Mao's "uninterrupted" struggle. Yet, the author shows in an illuminating and highly critical chapter on Trotsky (whose secretary she was), how the Russian revolutionary leader even after his exile, was never able to surpass the idea of a Russian State socialism. As for Mao, his continuous attempts to rekindle the revolutionary spirit, far from being romantic, are hard-nosed attempts to initiate a true State capitalism by large increases in production.

Only Lenin, to whom Miss Dunayevskaya devotes her most inspiring pages, understood the subjective and therefore ever original character of the revolutionary dialectic. Even he did so only after the inability of traditional Marxism to cope with the problems of the first world war compelled him to rethink his entire theory. By rereading the first chapter of *Capital* in the light of Hegel's *Logic* he finally understood that dialectic is not an objective scheme "applied" to a variety of situations and worked out beforehand. The human subject invents its revolutionary dialectic forever anew. For Trotsky this dialectic always remained an objective abstraction to be adjusted to the circumstances but never to deviate from preconceived definitions. Even Mao envisions the revolution entirely in terms of an objective historical necessity. For Lenin, on the contrary, the revolution is a subjective event, or rather an integration of the object by the human subject. The creation of the workers' State is not a permanent acquisition of the revolution, for such a State may develop into a genuine socialist society or it may degenerate into State capitalism. One of the ironies revealed by Miss Dunayevskaya's study is that those who preached the permanent revolution were precisely the ones who never completed the dialectical movement.

After reading her provocative work one cannot but wonder whether it represents a "scientific" or "utopian" socialism. Today's communist leaders will certainly dismiss her interpretation as "utopian." Engels might also have done so. Nor am I entirely sure that the author would have received Marx's own support. Yet in the long run that may not be too important. For this intuitive study at least brings into the open the difficulties of the traditional interpretations of Marx and overcomes them in a creative way.

Theodor Adorno's *Negative Dialectics* also deals with important issues of dialectical philosophy, but since this work clearly deviates from Marx's theses both in fact and in intent, I prefer to discuss it among the post-Marxian developments of the third part.

2. "Alienation" Before and After Marx.—The concept of alienation has probably received far more attention than it deserves in recent literature. It has degenerated into an uncomfortably vague formula in which each user condenses his own negative views on the present. Yet one good side effect of this disproportionate interest has been a series of investigations of the concept's original meanings in Hegel and Marx. Among the most noteworthy ones we mention Koenraad Boey, *L'aliénation dans la "Phénoménologie de l'Esprit" de G. W. F. Hegel* (Paris-Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1970); Friedrich Müller, *Entfremdung. Zur anthropologischen Begründung der Staatstheorie bei Rousseau, Hegel, Marx* (Berlin: Duncken und Humblot, 1970); Istvan Meszaros, *Marx's Theory of Alienation* (London: Merlin Press, 1970); Bertell Ollman, *Alienation. Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society*

(Cambridge: University Press, 1971); Richard Schacht *Alienation* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1971). I also recall but shall not discuss the older collection edited by Herbert Aptheker, *Marxism and Alienation* (New York: Humanities Press, 1965).

In his stylistically obscure but exegetically enlightening study, Böey draws an important distinction between the meanings of *Entfremdung* (alienation) and *Entäusserung* (externalization) in Hegel's *Phenomenology*. The former appears only in the second stage of the Spirit and consists in the tragic split between consciousness' inner self-possession and its self-expression in the outer world. Alienation originates after the mind "has become consciously aware of itself as its own world and of the world as itself" and has subsequently become unable to recognize itself in its expressions. Alienation, then, clearly differs from the more comprehensive *Entäusserung* (objectification) which contains neither the note of self-identity in the otherness of culture nor that of separation from oneself. Marx's celebrated critique of Hegel in the *Paris Manuscripts* is based entirely on his overlooking the distinction: he accuses Hegel of considering all objectification as an alienation of man, an equation which Hegel clearly avoids making, since objectification appears at a much earlier stage than alienation.

Yet as Richard Schacht shows in his more general study on *Alienation*, the fault is partly Hegel's own. For although he never confused the two categories, his terminology is neither clear nor consistent. Thus he occasionally refers to the new *Entäusserung* process through which the alienated mind attempts to redeem itself, as *Entfremdung*. Still, I do not believe that *Entfremdung* is ever entirely "interchangeable" with *Entäusserung* as Schacht claims (55). The temptation to equate the two terms increases because of Hegel's transparent allusions to Rousseau's *Social Contract*. Rousseau uses the term alienation (suggesting *Entfremdung*) to refer to the act by which the individual surrenders certain of his rights to the society of which he becomes a member (*Veräusserung*). Still, as Friedrich Müller proves in his monograph *Entfremdung*, Rousseau may have influenced the content of Hegel's theory of "Entfremdung," specifically by his descriptions of man's unfortunate social state in modern society in *Du Contrat Social* (and perhaps by certain passages in *Emile*, Bk. IV), but he was never the source of confusion in Hegel's terminology, for what Rousseau refers to as *alienation* does not enter into Hegel's passage on "Entfremdung," and wherever Rousseau's concept of alienation appears it is rendered by "Entäusserung" (Müller, 26-34, 60-61).

After this terminological clarification, I shall consider two authors who deal with the content of Marx's concepts: Meszaros and Ollman. Istvan Meszaros, a disciple of Lukács, who fled Hungary in 1956, traces the concept of alienation from Marx's early to his mature work. In addition he uses the concept for an analysis of present-day capitalist society which goes far beyond the letter, if not the spirit, of Marx's writings. Meszaros posits (rightly I assume) that the concept of *Entfremdung* extends beyond the term which Marx seldom uses in his publications after *German Ideology*. Some have concluded from this diminished use of the term and from Marx's own ironic references to it that the concept itself ceases to play a role in his later thought. Meszaros argues, to the

contrary, that it remains the central idea of Marx's *oeuvre*. The term even reappears in the unpublished *Grundrisse*.² To Meszaros the term is a synthetic formulation of a basic vision which is used frequently when Marx outlines a new development, but which recedes in the concrete presentation of the subsequently published writings. At any rate, Meszaros considers Marx's entire philosophy of history as dominated by the concept of alienation.

He is convinced, as a disciple of Lukács, that Marx's theory remained philosophical, albeit not *purely* philosophical, to the very end. "Indeed, Marx's general conception of the historical genesis and alienation of the social relations of production, together with his analysis of the objective ontological conditions of a necessary supersession of alienation and reification, constitute a system in the best sense of the term. The system is not *less* but *more* rigorous than the philosophical systems of his predecessors, including Hegel . . ." (96).

Bertell Ollman (*Alienation*) shares many views with Meszaros. He defends a full continuity between Marx's early and more mature works. Rejecting all social and economic determinism he interprets Marx as advocating a pluralism of modes of production—cultural as well as economic. Moreover, Ollman posits that for Marx there are no facts without evaluations and that human nature develops according to an immanent teleology. Yet despite those similarities, his basic thesis differs substantially from Meszaros'. His work is essentially an attempt to interpret Marx's theory in terms of a philosophical theory of internal relations. Capital, labor, value, and all the central Marxist concepts contain *within themselves* all other concepts with which they are connected. Thus interaction becomes inner action. Marx accepts the restrictions of a particular determination only as essentially relative. Names stand for functions, not for absolute entities. Although common sense definitions distinguish each name adequately from all others for practical purposes, the name changes as soon as the underlying reality adopts a new function. Thus "capital" becomes "interest" when it starts functioning as what common sense describes by the term "interest."

Once again we witness a move away from a materialist interpretation of Marx toward a Hegelian one. Indeed, Ollman claims that Marx's criticism of Hegel's theory was never directed "against the relational quality of his units or the fact of system which this entails" (34), but exclusively against the view that "the interconnections . . . in the material world are mere copies of relations existing between ideas" (54). (Of course, Hegel never held the latter view.) On other issues *Alienation* falls more in line with the Marxist orthodoxy. Thus the author rejects the existence of any basic distinction between Marx's theory and Engels' so-called laws of dialectic. That Marx's theory was a "system" is, of course, an interpretation rejected by all the authors discussed in the first part of this article. Though Mr. Ollman sheds some welcome light on some of Marx's

²David McLellan has published a well-edited, carefully selected partial translation of Marx's text: *The Grundrisse* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). Although this edition contains most of the important philosophical discussions, it constitutes hardly more than one-tenth of Marx's 893 compact pages. Meanwhile a complete translation has appeared in England (Pelican Press, 1973).

basic concepts, his method of interpretation, taken from another philosophy and then "applied," places Marx's thought in a perspective which is not its own.

3. *Historical Developments.*—Interpretations have a history of their own. In Marx's case that history is nearly as complex as the development of his own thought. In discussing Raya Dunayevskaya's *Philosophy and Revolution* we followed some of those developments in the orthodox communist camp. I shall now turn to some recent Marxist interpretations in Western Europe.

Iring Fetscher's older *Der Marxismus* (1963), recently published in English as *Marx and Marxism* (New York: Herder, 1971), still remains the classic survey of that development. Yet no study provides more insight into some of the key figures than the collection of the late George Lichtheim's essays *From Marx to Hegel* (New York: Herder, 1971). As the title indicates, the common bond between the most original interpreters of Marxism is the attempt to return Marxist theory to the source from which it drew its original strength: Hegel's dialectic. Even Lenin, whose early writings are responsible for the kind of scientific materialism which left its heavy mark on official Marxism, later considered a thorough acquaintance with Hegel's *Logic* indispensable to the understanding of Marx's method. Thus, paradoxically, the leader of the party that was to become the main adversary of the return to Hegel, is also the one who stood at the beginning of the movement. Both Korsch and Lukács were severely punished by the Leninist faction for their "idealist deviationism." But once Hegel was in, it turned out to be most difficult to exorcize him from the Marxist movement.

Before the publication of his famous *Marxism and Philosophy* (1923, recently translated and published by Monthly Review Press, 1970), Karl Korsch was a party member in excellent standing. He had supported Lenin's denunciation of the reformist Second International and had strongly condemned the "renegade" Kautsky. Yet Korsch's ideas in *Marxism and Philosophy* made him forever *persona non grata* to orthodox theoreticians. Korsch condemned the entire nineteenth-century development of Marxism as a fragmentation of what was essentially united in Marx's own mind. Thus theory in that development became disconnected from the practice of class struggle; the materialist conception of history was transformed into a heuristic principle, while the dialectic became a sociological dogma, and Hegel's philosophy in which the dialectic has its roots, is simply assumed to be "superseded," hence no longer active in Marxism. To Korsch, on the contrary, theory and practice are united and they can remain so only within a concept of dialectic to which Hegel alone holds the key. True enough, Hegel's philosophy expresses the bourgeois society in which it developed and must therefore be *surpassed*. Yet Marx surpasses Hegel not by substituting a new philosophy for an old one, but rather by dialectically criticizing this final, powerful ideological expression of capitalist society. For Korsch, then, as for Althusser in our own time, ideologies are far more than illusions: they are *realities* on the basis of which Marxism must build its own theory. This interpretation clearly conflicts with the non-dialectical scientific materialism of the Soviets, for which Korsch was bitterly attacked by Lenin himself. In his *Anti-Critique* (included in the present volume) Korsch counterattacked. Marx, he claimed, felt nothing but contempt

for those who imagine they can "supersede philosophy (in practice) without realizing it (in theory)." According to Korsch, Lenin never attempted to "overcome" Hegel's philosophy: he simply reversed it.

Korsch's work appeared around the same time as Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness* (translated and published by M.I.T. Press, 1971), which met the same fate from the party officials. Here was a clear attempt to transform Marx's critique of dialectical philosophy into a dialectical philosophy of its own. Notwithstanding the rejection of the primacy of mind over matter, Lukács fully restored the Hegelian priority of theory over practice. The change was not lost on the watchdogs of Marxist orthodoxy and the entire pack was released on the wayward sheep.

Orthodoxy prevailed, but not for long. No sooner had Lukács reentered the fold when another group of independent Marxists reintroduced Hegelianism in an even more deviant manner. The original members of the Frankfurt school, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse asserted the dialectical nature of the interaction between conscious activity and the material conditions of life. Adorno rejects the traditional Marxist subordination of theory to practice. Those who keep theory in a servant's role deprive practice of the very change for which it calls. In his rich but opaque and somewhat rambling *Negative Dialectics* (1966; translated by E. B. Ashton. New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), Adorno, contrary to Marx's famous word that the time has come to stop interpreting the world and to "realize" philosophy, fully reinstates independent speculation. He justifies his heresy on the basis that the moment to "realize" philosophy was missed and that the political systems that presently claim the priority of revolutionary practice merely suppress all critical thought which that practice so urgently requires.

Yet Adorno's return to dialectical philosophy is not simply a return to Hegel. While Hegelian dialectic originates in an assumption of total identity of concept and reality and, via the negation of negation, regains this identity, Adorno's remains permanently critical, a consistent "refusal to . . . sanction things as they are." In his view the basic impulse of the dialectical movement comes from non-identity and Hegel erred in setting as goal to the dialectical process an identity which the very principle of contradiction excludes. Dialectics is a logic of disintegration in which the negation of the negative, far from leading to an affirmation as in Hegel, merely proves that the original negation was not negative enough.

Hegel's positivity in the beginning and at the end results not from the dialectical principle, but from the absolute primacy of the subject expanded into an all-absorbing absolute spirit. This claim to priority of the subject must be abandoned and the object must be given equal status. In Adorno's dialectic, subject and object presuppose one another from the beginning. The subject itself can be understood only as an objective social fact; yet this very understanding requires subjectivity. Reacting, then, against the idealist monism of the subject, Adorno emphasizes the primordial presence of the object.

This might lead one to expect an affinity with Heidegger's thought. Yet Heidegger is the main target of Adorno's attacks. His ontological primacy of Being brings the dialectical movement to a complete standstill. To Adorno the

existentialist ontology means a return to a pre-critical immediacy of the thus-and-not-otherwise, an attempt to restore a primeval given order along with its unquestioned authority, a mythologizing of the cognitive object which eliminates the contradiction inherent in all reflection. Adorno admits a surplus of being over individual facts, but its explanation lies in their relatedness, not in any transcendent hypostasis. "What echoes in the word 'Being' as opposed to *ta onta*—that everything is more than it is—means entwinement, not something transcendent to entwinement" (106).

For all his emphasis on the critical role of philosophy Adorno has no intention of returning to Kant. The lengthy discussion of the notion of freedom in the third part of his book may be read as a fundamental attack upon the formalism and what he considers to be the countless subjectivism of Kant's ethical system. Instead of an insurmountable opposition between a fully determined phenomenal world in which freedom must make an incomprehensible impact and a rarified noumenal sphere from which it draws its sole strength and motivation, Adorno proposes a socially conditioned, object-oriented man who is entirely rooted in the real world rather than torn between the opaque universe of physical facts and his own pure but inappropriate intentions. Here perhaps more than elsewhere Adorno shows his continuing adherence to Marx's social view of man. Despite his reinstatement of philosophy, Adorno remains a Marxist albeit a thoroughly Hegelianized one.

Eventually a reaction against the Hegelian interpretation of Marx was bound to come. Yet it came in a form which Marx would hardly have welcomed: as a new, more static philosophy. With Louis Althusser's attempt to interpret Marx's thought in structuralist terms we find ourselves at the opposite side of the "Hegelians." According to Althusser's curious reading in *For Marx* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), Hegel's dialectic was no more than a reminiscence of Marx's philosophical youth, totally unnecessary to, and occasionally interfering with his mature message. While for Hegel the contradiction requires no extrinsic determination to produce change, for Marx the essential contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production is in itself insufficient to generate revolutionary change. The revolutionary contradiction is determined by the total social structure which it determines, or, in Althusser's terminology, it is "overdetermined." Thus, according to him, the Russian revolution resulted not from a mere class contradiction but from a contradiction "overdetermined" by such extrinsic factors as the Czarist State, the Orthodox Church, and even the geography of Eastern Europe. Such a concept of mutual determination between economic and other factors escapes the usual Marxist oversimplifications of infrastructure and superstructure. Amazingly Althusser ascribes those oversimplifications to Hegel's influence upon Marxism, and claims that economic determinism is merely the mirror image of Hegel's one-principled dialectic. In actual fact economic production is the determining factor only "in the last instance." Even the oversimplification of the relation between theory and practice in vulgar Marxism is explained as an inversion of Hegel's relation between Idea and reality.

In *Reading Capital* (1968; transl. Ben Brewster, New York: Pantheon, 1971), Althusser goes even further by claiming that Marx himself was mistaken

about the nature of his theoretical achievement. In describing his method as an inversion of Hegel's logic, Marx failed to recognize that, unlike Hegel, he was a scientist and consequently unable to work with concepts in continuous flux. Thus to Hegel's "historicism" Althusser opposes Marx's "structuralism" in which logical structures exist independently of one another and on various time levels. Moreover, logical structures exist in total independence of real ones. While Hegel conceives of knowledge "as a real part of the real object" (38), for Marx the real object exists independently "outside the head." The production of thought takes place entirely within thought, while economic production occurs exclusively in the economic realm. To connect them in some way Althusser recurs to Spinoza's psycho-physical parallelism. Aside from being totally foreign to Marx's thought, such an interpretation leads to unanswerable questions concerning the appropriation of reality by thought. Marx's clearly stated priority of the externally real over the ideal of thought becomes impossible to maintain within a Spinozistic theory of their parallel coexistence. Nor do I see how Marx's dialectical necessity can be maintained without incorporating the various determinations within a Hegelian type of dialectic. An accumulation of empirical observations can never provide the certainty which the theory of historical materialism claims for its interpretation of history. After having dismissed the Hegelian dialectic Althusser fails to prevent a valid substitute of his own. What is Marx's dialectical method, we must ask, if it is not essentially Hegelian as Marx himself claimed it was? Dialectic is always a logical structure, even in what Althusser would call the order of reality. As such, a dialectical reality must be essentially intelligible. But to sever the relation between ideal and reality is to withdraw the only support to dialectical necessity. At that point the basic tension between consciousness and nature on which Marx's entire theory is built, loses its foundation.

Yale University.

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for
nonviolent
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1967

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PHILOSOPHY AND REVOLUTION, Raya Dunayevskaya.

(Dell Publishing Co USA. Obtainable from Bob Potter, 98 Addison Road, Hove, Sussex). £1.75.

The name of Raya Dunayevskaya is well known to the libertarian left. She was secretary to Leon Trotsky during the period of the infamous Moscow Trials, but broke with him at the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, declaring that Russia, far from being a "degenerated workers' state" was in fact "state capitalist". This break stimulated Raya to "dig deeper" into the philosophical problems of revolution, and her work is consummated in her latest book, *Philosophy and Revolution*. It's a book that cannot be ignored by the serious student of revolutionary politics.

Raya begins her study by looking again at Hegel, and asking the questions:

"Why is it that now, in the 1970s, everyone is re-discovering Hegelian dialectics?"

"Why do the enemies of 'freedom' go out of their way to de-bunk Hegel?"

"What is the positively revolutionary basis of Hegel's philosophy that both Marx and Lenin found so essential to an understanding of capitalism and socialism?"

The text is not easy going, and Ms Dunayevskaya is inclined to assume much knowledge in her readers, but she succeeds in demonstrating quite clearly that, right or wrong, Marx's

Capital is incomprehensible without familiarity with Hegel's philosophy of "the dialectic of negativity".

Trotsky, Mao and Sartre are each subjected to ruthless criticism before she moves on to the problems facing the third world and the "dialectics of liberation". The positive achievements of the grass-roots movements against the ruling classes of the world (Hungary 1956, Paris 1968, Black Power, etc) were possible only because they were independent of all political organisations, all of which are part of the "total" apparatus of exploitation.

Her interpretation of the dialectic sees *everything* in motion, "becoming" its opposite, "transcending" itself, or in concrete terms, all organisations of liberation (trade unions, political parties *everywhere*) becoming instruments of, part of, the ruling class. The very first step in the liberation of humankind depends on the realisation that *any* support for *any* of these institutionalised structures serves only to strengthen the ruling class.

Bob Potter

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REVIEW

Philosophy and Revolution: From Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao, by Raya Dunayevskaya. Delacorte Press \$8.95 (h.b.) \$2.95 (p.b.). 372 + xix pages.

This engrossing book by a prominent and doughty Marxist humanist falls into three distinct parts. The first deals with Hegel and an exposition and estimate of his influence upon both Marx and Lenin; the second part deals with the thought of Trotsky, Mao and Sartre; finally there is a discussion of various revolutionary movements within modern society, from Black power to Women's Liberation. It is Dunayevskaya's thesis that since the death of Lenin there has been a theoretical void at the centre of left wing liberation movements. Where theories have been propounded people have been lured by the seductive but deadly siren voices of Maoism and Existentialism. This theoretical void may be overcome, Dunayevskaya argues, by a reappropriation of the Hegelian dimension of Marxism.

Of course the committed revolutionary, beset by the practical and urgent problems of politics and organisation, may well dismiss such a proposal as useless and pedantic. Can't we make up the theory as we go along? It is central to the argument of the book that such a view is profoundly mistaken. To those who revel in the image of the practical revolutionary despising the vice of excessive theoretical deliberation, Dunayevskaya points to the figure of Lenin, shattered by the betrayal of social democracy during the first World War, sitting in Bern library avidly studying Hegel's *Science of Logic*—in the middle of the war!—a study which led to a revision of his epistemology and his views on the relationship between the party and the proletariat. Practice and theory are central; the former without the latter is likely to be both futile and dangerous.

Not unnaturally Dunayevskaya stresses Hegel's account of alienation and the Unhappy Consciousness preparatory to her study of Marx and Lenin's relationship to Hegel. She stresses not just Hegel's particular discussion of the Unhappy Consciousness in *The Phenomenology* but also recounts the fertility of this typology of social experience for thinkers as diverse as Royce and Marcuse. The tendency to read Hegel as providing a reconciliation to a brute and given reality, by showing that what is is as it ought to be, is resisted. Reconciliation is central to Hegel's philosophy but a reconciliation to a transformed reality: the breakthrough in the transformation of the world being the French Revolution, itself the culmination of a process of gradual self-emancipation, religious, economic and moral, achieved by Western Man since the time of the Greeks. Freedom,

emancipation, transformation, all achieved by human activity lie at the heart of Hegel's philosophy in Dunayevskaya's view. This dialectical overcoming of a situation which has come to seem an imposed straightjacket on the possibilities of human self development is what makes Hegel's philosophy so contemporary:

Our contemporaries are, of course, more concerned with the self determination of nations than of the Idea but the goal—Freedom and self construction by which to achieve it, is not far removed from the self determination of the Idea.

The reference to Hegel's Absolute Idea is important here because there is no really serious discussion of the ontological status of the Idea or its relation to the finite minds of individuals. Dunayevskaya wishes to minimise the metaphysical/transcendental dimension of the Absolute and certainly if one shares her ideological, humanistic position one may wish to demythologise Hegel in this way. However, one may remain concerned as to whether this is an authentic delineation of the historical Hegel. The kinds of difficulties which I have in mind are rather glossed over in passages such as:

Because Hegel's Absolutes emerged from the French Revolution, even if you read *Geist* as *God* the Absolutes have so earthy a quality, so elemental a sweep and are so totally immanent rather than transcendent that every distinction between notional categories, every battle between Reality and Ideality is one long trek to freedom.

Fine sounding stuff no doubt: but surely it throws very little light on some of the central ambiguities of Hegel's view of the ontological status of the Absolute, and fails to do justice to the Hellenic and Christian influence upon his conception.

Dunayevskaya does pay attention to the question of whether Hegel's own explanation of the structure of human experience and history and the natural world is to be taken as fixed and final—the celebrated problem of the 'end of history'. She argues against this. The dialectical process arises out of some kind of unity of opposites, this very unity in difference producing tension which is the engine of dialectical advance, and this model applies equally to Hegel's own 'final' reconciliation. So the Absolute, come to its most mature articulation in Hegel's hands, is still a unification of opposites and thus contains within itself the seeds of its own dialectical self transformation. However much Hegel may have thought that his own Absolute knowledge could not be superseded, in Dunayevskaya's view it is provisional, revisable and is in fact revised in the subsequent history of the struggle for freedom.

Hegel's ideas are seen as central and incremental to the later development of Marxism and Historical materi-

alism. This influence is traced in Marx through the Paris manuscripts of 1844 and through the *Grundrisse* to *Capital*. Dunayevskaya takes decisive issue with those who, like Althusser and Balibar, wish to minimise the importance of Hegelian ideas within the development of the Marxist tradition. Of course such a thesis is now commonplace although still controversial. She does not really take into account the figure of Engels, whose work is the most difficult problem to reconcile with an attempt to see Marx in terms of his Hegelian dimension. Too often those who stress the centrality of Hegel's ideas to Marx commit themselves to the view that Engels was some kind of idiot positivist who for decades failed to understand a central point of the theoretical basis of his friend and collaborator's ideas. It is a gap in her book that Dunayevskaya does not sufficiently take account of this problem.

The influence of Hegel on Lenin has not been at the centre of recent concern, and it is perhaps in this section that Dunayevskaya's book is most interesting. Lenin's reading of Hegel's *Logic* is regarded as having a major effect on Lenin's subsequent thought leading him to largely break with his rather passive epistemology of 1908, substituting instead the idea that mind and intention have a role in shaping the world through human praxis. Nor is this a merely epistemological change. Miss Dunayevskaya tries to show that this more active account of mind led him to abandon the views on revolution put forward in 1903 in *What Is To Be Done* which stressed the way in which the proletariat needed to be led to socialist consciousness by the vanguard party. In place of this view it is argued that Lenin put the idea of the transformation of society by the proletariat as *subject* and she interprets several of Lenin's moves in this light (p.147). In the same way as the Hegelian-humanist reading of Marx raises the problem of Engels as intimated earlier, a similar stress on Hegel's influence on Lenin raises the problem of the views of Rosa Luxemburg and Trotsky. Rosa Luxemburg would, I think, have been surprised by Dunayevskaya's reading of Lenin. She maintained her thesis about the necessity of the proletariat's transformation of society being spontaneous and not organised by a vanguard party from 1903-4 in her articles critical of Lenin in *Neue Zeit* until her death in 1919 (i.e. after Lenin's supposed transformation). Trotsky was also critical of Lenin's idea of the vanguard party because he thought it elitist: much more legitimate in his view would be the possibility of the proletariat developing from *below* a centralised party which, because it would have its roots in the working class, would be more sensitive to proletarian aspirations. Trotsky later modified his view after the revolution and he thought that subsequently they came nearer to those of Lenin; but by this

time, according to Dunayevskaya, Lenin had largely abandoned his earlier views under the influence of Hegel's less passive epistemology/ontology.

In the final section on alternative theories which have tried and failed to fill the theoretical void left by Lenin's death Dunayevskaya castigates Trotsky, but as I have indicated her account of Lenin as a kind of counterpoint to Trotsky seems to require more argument than she has given it here.

Raymond Plant
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Jean-Francois Marquet: *Liberté et existence. Étude sur la formation de la philosophie de Schelling.* (Editions Gallimard, 1973. 550 pages.)

This is an announcement, not a review. A review would require a study in depth, an item by item checking of all passages in a widespread literature to which the 1550 footnotes refer and, above all, a thorough familiarity with the work of Schelling and a lot of his contemporaries. I believe it would mean the work of a year. Then only could the reviewer offer a reasoned though perhaps concise evaluation of this book, whose printing was finished September 18, 1973.

In my opinion Marquet's study is much too important to wait for a documented review. Students of the effects Kant had on his time and ours, deserve to be told at once that we have now this scholarly book as a guide to our own study of Schelling, and of his time and ours. Marquet writes a lucid and fluent French and is so thoroughly at home in German that it is a pleasure to read his brilliant translations from Fichte and Hegel and Schelling, whose respective German is often not as transparent as the reader might wish. To me, Marquet's book looks like a must for anyone desirous to know what really happened in that first half of the nineteenth century and is happening again, now.

Marquet takes the title of his book from the first page of the *Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism* of 1795, where Schelling stresses the problematic contrast between freedom (*Selbstmacht*) and existence (*Dasein*; see Marquet p. 58 and Schelling I, 284f). That problem can indeed furnish the Ariadne thread through the evolutions of Schelling's thought. The jacket of the book rightly says: "Beyond the mere individual thinker, Schelling, a much vaster question faces us: What is a philosophical work anyway?"

Marquet says he started his research fifteen years ago and from 1962 on worked under the direction of Jean Hyppolite and, after his death, under Paul Ricoeur. In

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eventually to achieve a position of strategic economic dominance over the Middle East" and a "level of political authority as predominant power" in the region. This, in turn, would enable the Kremlin "to exert pressures upon capitalist states by threatening their strategic interests, which include the unhampered flow of petroleum from the Middle East." Ideologically speaking, "the U.S.S.R. would be working toward a world energy delivery system within a world socialist planned economy" (p. 121).

Thus the major intrinsic inadequacy of Landis's book, given his own framework, is the failure to appraise the chances for Moscow's likely success or failure in the light of the objective obstacles to Soviet expansion. As a result, his work is based on a number of questionable assumptions concerning Russia's ultimate intentions in the Middle East which have not been tested against the realities of regional politics and economics or against Washington's obvious determination not to abandon the area to the mercy of the USSR.

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PHILOSOPHY AND REVOLUTION: FROM HEGEL TO SARTRE, AND FROM MARX TO MAO. By Raya Dunayevskaya. New York: Delacorte Press, 1973. xix, 372 pp. \$8.95, cloth. \$2.95, paper.

If one seeks the central idea of Ms. Dunayevskaya's work, it may be found to be that of *praxis*—but the idea used as backdrop rather than analyzed in depth. I have in mind not what Marxists have said about it and made of it in translating it as "practice" but what Karl Marx himself understood by the term: "ce tout de l'activité réelle de l'homme, cette activité ouvrière, que Marx oppose à l'idéalisme comme au matérialisme," as the French philosopher Jean Lacroix put it twenty-five years ago, or, in Dunayevskaya's phrase, "an activity both mental and manual, [a] 'critical-practical activity,' which Marx never separated from its revolutionary character" (p. 265). But from the moment when Marx's thought became transformed into an ideology, that is to say into a doctrine whose practical purpose is *political*, supported by a conception of the world and an ethic which claim to conform to a *scientifically* established order, and when this ideology became the doctrine of an agency in power (party or state), there was substituted for the *praxis* of Marx a voluntarism more or less uprooted from the analysis of the reality and the movement of a society.

It is around this issue that Dunayevskaya organizes her analysis of the relations between philosophy and revolution. In the first part of the work she places on the same footing Hegel, Marx, and Lenin, considered as philosophers in search of the concrete universal. In the second and third parts, she shows why recent Marxists and philosophers (Trotsky, Mao Tse-tung, and Sartre) have been unable to fill the theoretical void of the Marxist movement and how examination of the different liberation movements of the last two decades in Africa, Europe, the United States, and elsewhere suggests that "the filling of the theoretic void since Lenin's death remains the task to be done" (p. 266). That is to say how necessary it is both to the theoreticians and the revolutionary movements of our time to return to Marxian *praxis*: "It has always been my belief that in our age theory can develop fully only when grounded in what the masses themselves are doing and thinking" (p. xviii).

In the latter half of our century revolutionary groups, wherever they begin,

whenever they are free from partisan conformism, are realizing that they can do nothing durable without a theory, as they can accomplish nothing without acting themselves. In Dunayevskaya's view, of particular importance are the different resistance movements which from 1956 to 1970—in Warsaw and Budapest and Prague, Gdansk and Szczecin—have united workers and youth from various countries of Eastern and Danubian Europe in revolt against the inhuman oppression of local Marxist-Leninist regimes. They have embarked upon a movement for the liberation of all men: "All sorts of nonstatist forms of social relations emerged in every field, from newspapers and parties . . . to underlying philosophies of freedom and totally new human relationships" (p. 252). She asks, "Is it not time for intellectuals to begin, with where the workers are and what they think, to fill the theoretic void in the Marxist movement?" (p. 266).

From Dunayevskaya's vantage point the question is urgent, for neither Mao, nor the post-Stalinists, nor the Trotskyists, nor the disciples of Sartre can fill the void: "Rather, the void existed because, from Leon Trotsky down, the discontents failed to face up to the movement from below" (p. 125).

The fundamental question is nevertheless not that but a different one. It lies in the philosophical equating of Hegel, Marx, and Lenin, from the viewpoint of the dialectic of negation. There is no need to dispute the characterization of philosopher given Marx by the author, following Karl Löwith and many others. Marx is really a great philosopher, one of the most penetrating critics of Hegel. The chapter devoted to the manuscripts of 1844 and to the *Grundrisse* is among the most interesting in the book. Proper treatment is given to the fallacious "epistemological cut-off" which Louis Althusser located first in 1845, then recently transferred to the 1870s. This "cut-off" is doubtless only the rendering into philosophical form, for the benefit of Western readers, of the conclusions of the Soviet philosophers who, during the 1950s, studied the formation of Marx's ideas. Marxism-Leninism is, however, unaffected, as one sees in the *Réponse à John Lewis* (Paris, 1973).

In returning to Hegel when he read the *Science of Logic* in 1914–15, Lenin seemed to overturn the ideas which he had expounded a decade earlier in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. Dunayevskaya is doubtless right to challenge the "reductionism" of B. M. Kedrov, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Nevertheless a more detailed study of the written work and later actions of Lenin would be required in order to conclude that these new ideas of his, which he recorded only elliptically, governed his work in 1917–24. One must reserve judgment, for several of the decisions taken by Lenin during this period—especially as concerns the role of the opposition in the party and that of terror as instrument of class justice—would find their logical consequences in the day-to-day Marxism-Leninism of Stalin.

No more than Marx's dialectic of negation can that of Lenin be equated with that of Hegel. In Lenin as in Marx other philosophical elements are also present which radically alter the configuration of the whole and no more arrive at a concrete universal that does Hegel's dialectic. It is probably only in exploring other paths, which Hegel called "the seriousness, the suffering, the patience and the labor of negativity," that it will be possible to arrive at the *real* liberty of all men. Dunayevskaya's book may aid in this discovery as a result of the questions it raises.

HENRI CHAMBRE
Paris/Vannes

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FROM: TELOS, Number 22, Winter 1974-75

Raya Dunayevskaya, *Philosophy and Revolution, From Hegel to Sartre, and from Marx to Mao*. New York: Delacorte Press, 1973.

Throughout *Philosophy and Revolution* Raya Dunayevskaya never loses sight of freedom and revolution which is the driving force of Hegelian Marxism in its clash with historical and political institutions organized upon the separation of theory and praxis. "We may not be on the threshold of revolution, but the fact that the *idea* revolution simply refuses to be silent even when we are not in a prerevolutionary situation speaks volumes about the philosophical-political maturity of our age. We may not have a Hegel or a Marx or a Lenin, but we do have what no other age has had in such depth—the movement from *praxis* whose quest for universality does not

stop with practice but hungers for a uniting of theory and practice. It is this—and therein lies the uniqueness of the dialectic—which resists any retrogression within the revolution. Retrogressionism seeks to particularize tasks, to 'fix' the universal, to confine the tasks of the masses to 'making' the revolution and not bothering their heads about 'self-development' " (p. 285). This is the critical legacy from which revolution can always draw in order to expose alike conservative, liberal and left authoritarian ideologies and state-systems. "Marxism," she says, "is a theory of liberation or it is nothing." In *Marxism and Freedom* Dunayevskaya revealed the foundations of this theory of liberation in Marx's critical analysis of classical political economy, French revolutionary socialism and German Idealism, understood against the historical background of the period from 1776 to 1831. She made clear the continuous development of the class struggles and civil wars from the time of the Paris Commune, the American Civil War, and the Russian revolution to the latterday events of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Africa and the Black revolts of America. Everywhere she has an eye for the forces of liberation and oppression, indifferent to left and right, where human liberation is at stake. Where others are disoriented, or prefer to read history piecemeal, more like an idiot's tale, Dunayevskaya gives history and politics a plot, a movement which is always there so long as some men are without freedom and others pretend to offer it, or else blindly refuse it. Dunayevskaya understands that history is made by men and women in the streets more often than by men in their studies. For this reason, she never loses sight of what is going on around her. Of course, not everyone will see what she sees—some closer, some further, some more skeptically than her, but what is at stake is not the problem of illusions so much as the need for vision in the contemporary political world.

As early as 1958, Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* made abundantly clear the relevance of Hegelian thought for Marxist politics. This message has now been absorbed to suit both the slow pace of academic Marxist discussion and the cruel swiftness of Soviet counter-revolution in East Central Europe. Surely, if anyone stood Hegel on his feet it was Hegel himself, rooted firmly in the ground of revolutionary history where Marx could meet him. It took *Dialectic* to separate Marx and Hegel in the upsydownsy land of Soviet state oppression. Dunayevskaya tirelessly exposes the collapse of the Second International as the real context of the separation of revolutionary theory and practice. Commenting on the fate of Marx's early writings, she remarks, "It is that actual world of Russia with its forced labor camps that compels this Russian attack against Marxism. It is not the idealism of Hegel that threatens their existence in theory even as the working class does in life" (*Marxism and Freedom*, p. 65). Dunayevskaya speaks clearly where others, Sartre, Camus, and Merleau-Ponty, for example, agonized for the longest time. In the context of the cold war, the French Left might be excused for hesitating between American and Soviet imperialism. In the new context of detente, the need to speak clearly is even more imperative—and in this the bond between Hegel and Marx is the strongest link in the chain of human freedom and revolution. Since the struggle for the human mind outweighs the significance of the orientation of the Marxist mind bent to Party directives and academic prejudices, Dunayevskaya's faith is in the praxis of the people, which is there beneath the twist and turns of doctrine, state oppression and economic exploitation and calls for an end to *pre*-history: "No concept of Marx's is less understood, by adherents as well as enemies, than one of his most original ones—the

concept of *praxis*. It is true that Marxists never stop talking about it. But, first, their very translation of it as 'practice' robbed *praxis*, as an activity both mental and manual, of its 'critical-practical activity,' which Marx never separated from its revolutionary character. Second, as each historic period following Marx's death reinterpreted the concept to fit its specific situation, the alleged obviousness of the concept of practice of the class struggle, of revolution, did not stop so-called Marxists from confining the class struggle within the bounds of reformism. Third, up to 1914—and this is the most crucial factor in the vitiation of the concept of *praxis*—it was not only the reformists who proceeded to remove 'the dialectic scaffolding' of Marx's philosophy of liberation. Revolutionaries also considered philosophy, if not as a mere adjunct to the theory of proletarian revolution, certainly not as calling for a split in the Second International. The only revolutionary who felt a compulsion to return to the Hegelian dialectic as a preparation for proletarian revolution, as a method for merging with the self-activity, self-movement, self-development of the masses that became the 1917 revolution, was Lenin. Naturally, once 1917 became fact, theoreticians followed, but they never stopped thinking that they initiated it" (pp. 264-265).

The genius of Lenin, as of Marx, is to have dealt with everyday events in terms of a theoretical concern which made it possible to discern overall trends in the profusion of facts and details with which history overwhelms us. The merit of Dunayevskaya's *Philosophy and Revolution* is that it never loses its grip upon the central revolutionary impulse of proletarian politics, whatever the stage and context of their development. Some will find criticism with her vision of a global revolutionary movement from Peking to Detroit, embracing workers, women, students and blacks. The analysis of particular revolutionary situations surely gets lost in such a canvas. Yet, however it is determined in particular cases, the core of Dunayevskaya's argument is its orientation to the actuality of the proletarian revolution. This is the ultimate test of Marxist thought in times when so many are disoriented, either adjusting to the repressive tolerance of the left in the advanced capitalist world, or else adjusting to the brutalization of Soviet politics—in either case, marginalizing or romanticizing the Third World, idolizing Mao.

What provides the strength of *Philosophy and Revolution* is the very same thing as its weakness, namely, its vision of human emancipation. Despite Althusser's recent efforts, there can hardly be any question now of the suppression of the philosophical basis of Marx's economic and political writings, except as the praxis of state socialism or as a failure of individual nerve. Apart from such ideological distortions, there is perhaps a middle ground of dispute between Marxists in the humanist camp over the revolutionary praxis of the proletariat. Thus Marcuse, for example, is more skeptical than Dunayevskaya of the revolutionary potential of the working class, whether black or feminine, with the ideological organization of monopoly capitalism. The integration of the working class into advanced industrial capitalism has, of course, turned many analysts to look at the external proletariat of students, blacks and women to achieve an orientation to the everyday events of the capitalist and socialist worlds which will not sacrifice the basic Hegelian Marxist striving towards human emancipation.

Dunayevskaya has a keen sense of the political movements that keep philosophy alive. The claim to greatness in politics is often a matter of historical vision: he who lacks it is lost. Yet the same is true of the wholly visionary politician. The great

politician, therefore, must belong to his times—not slavishly, but openly inspecting its demands. This is the appeal of Lenin and in this he has served as a model to many thinkers who have felt the need to achieve a basic orientation within the drift of Marxism and world politics. In this regard, Raya Dunayevskaya's appeal to Lenin joins with similar efforts by Lukács, Merleau-Ponty, and Althusser, whom she rightly dismisses (pp. 302-303), though of course, they all come to different ends. Merleau-Ponty turned to Lenin when reflecting upon the problematic of the relation between humanism and terror. The context of this argument was the eve of the cold war imperialisms of America and the Soviet Union. Although many will not understand his argument, Merleau-Ponty tried to save Marxist humanism from the partisans of liberalism and Communism: it cost him, and Camus later, the friendship of Sartre. Sartre's voice is, as Dunayevskaya argues, a far cry from Lenin's attempts to explain to the people the necessity for shifts in the strategy of the revolution in a way which employed dialectics as the living expression of consciousness and freedom, transcending provincialism and chauvinism.

In his *Lenin*, Lukács has argued that Lenin's practical ingenuity or political genius must be understood in terms of his superior theoretical abilities. "The basis of this theoretical superiority is that, of all Marx's followers, Lenin's vision was least distorted by the fetishist categories of his capitalist environment. For the decisive superiority of Marxist economics over all its predecessors and successors lies in its methodological ability to interpret even the most complex questions which, to all appearances, have to be treated in the most purely economic (therefore, most purely fetishist) categories, in such a way that behind these categories the evolution of those classes whose social existence they express becomes visible." The theoretical brilliance of Lenin's analysis of imperialism lies in his grasp of national liberation movements as products of the world economy created by monopoly capitalism which, provided the proletariat can transform imperialist wars into civil wars, becomes a genuinely revolutionary period. Thus, Lenin was able to reject Revisionism and Opportunism in the International because they failed to understand how the class implications of imperialism, when grasped in their specific dialectical implications, were favorable by means of civil war to the proletarian revolution in Russia and elsewhere. Lukács has the same view as Merleau-Ponty of Lenin's political practice, separating it entirely from what others might regard as *realpolitik*: "Above all, when defining the concept of compromise, any suggestion that it is a question of knack, of cleverness, of an astute fraud, must be rejected. 'We must,' said Lenin, 'decisively reject those who think that politics consists of little tricks, sometimes bordering on deceit. *Classes cannot be deceived.*' For Lenin, therefore, compromise means *that the true developmental tendencies of classes* (and possibly of nations—for instance, where an oppressed people is concerned), which under specific circumstances and for a certain period run parallel in determinate areas with the interests of the proletariat, are exploited to the advantage of *both*."

In the postscript to his essay on Lenin, Lukács repeats the argument for the unity of Lenin's theoretical grasp of the political nature of the imperialist epoch and his practical sense of proletarian politics. In trying to express the living nature of that unity in Lenin's own life, Lukács describes how Lenin would learn from experience or from Hegel's *Logic*, according to the situation, preserving in himself the dialectical tension between particulars and a theoretical totality. As Lenin writes in his *Philosophic Notebooks*: "Theoretical cognition ought to give the Object in its

necessity, in its all-sided relations, in its contradictory movement, in and for-itself. But the human Concept 'definitively' catches this objective truth of cognition, seizes and masters it, only when the Concept becomes 'being-for-itself' in the sense of practice." What Dunayevskaya makes abundantly clear is that it was by turning to Hegel that Lenin sought to find a way to avoid making theory the mere appendage of state practice, while reserving to practice a more creative political role than the retroactive determination or revision of ideology. But this meant that Marxist materialism could never be the simple enforcement of political will, any more than political will could be exercised without a theoretical understanding of the specific class relations it presupposed. Thus Lenin remarks that "The standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge. . . . Of course, we must not forget that the criterion of practice can never, in the nature of things, either confirm or refute any idea *completely*. This criterion too is sufficiently 'indefinite' not to allow human knowledge to become 'absolute,' but at the same time it is sufficiently definite to wage a ruthless fight against all varieties of idealism and agnosticism."

Of course, in these later Hegelian formulations Lenin is modifying his own revision of Engels' dialectical materialism as set forth in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, thereby rejoining the challenge set to this work by Lukács' own *History and Class Consciousness*, as well as Karl Korsch's *Marxism and Philosophy*, both published in 1923. Lukács' essay on Lenin was published on the occasion of Lenin's death in 1924. What died with Lenin was Orthodox Marxism, although its dead hand was to be upon socialism for another thirty years or more. Orthodox scientific Marxism was completely undermined with Lukács' insight into the historically determined praxis of science. But while it is clear that scientific socialism was not ready for Lukács, the same must be said of the West, where only today is the critique of scientific praxis entering into a properly reflexive or critical social science.

What *History and Class Consciousness* made clear was that living Marxism is inseparable from its idealist and Hegelian legacy. This split Russian and Central European Marxism and made Lukács a prisoner of these very events. What emerges from these developments is that the Hegelian concept of totality furnishes a matrix for the integration of ethics and politics through the restless dynamics of man's attempt to measure his existential circumstances against the ideal of his human essence, which he achieves through the struggle against self and institutional alienations. The Hegelian Marxist totality is thus the basis for the integral humanism of Marxist social science.

This much has been established in the academic debate over the early and later writings of Marx. One would have thought that it is no longer arguable that Marxism can be separated from its Hegelian sources. Yet, recently this argument has reappeared in the influential contributions to critical theory developed by Habermas and by the structuralist readings of Marx fostered by Althusser. Although Dunayevskaya does not deal in detail with these developments, one can share her work by extending its argument in this direction. This is necessary because behind the complexity of Habermas and Althusser's arguments over Marxist social science there still lurks the problem of the relation between philosophy and revolution. If Marx can be separated from Hegel then the revolution can be handed over to the Party or else resubjectivised.

Habermas argues that whereas Hegel and Marx in their early work moved beyond Kant into the dialectics of recognition and their mediation through language and work, they respectively fell into the aberrations of the identity of absolute knowledge and reductive materialism. The result is that Marx lacks an adequate ground for historical materialism's claim to provide a critical theory of the process of human emancipation.

Althusser is likewise concerned with the endemic regressions of Marxist Theory due to its alternation between ideological humanism and a positivist conception of material determinism. Both arguments turn upon the nature of the transition from Hegel to Marx, upon which Dunayevskaya is the more reliable guide. Habermas has his own version of the "epistemological break" which Althusser puts between Hegel and Marx. In the first thesis on Feuerbach, Marx corrected previous materialist theories with the Hegelian comment that materialism overlooks that objects are the products of human praxis. But then, according to Habermas, Marx understood praxis solely as the process of material exchange, without any relation to other symbolic synthesis, in particular, ideology, science and politics. Habermas succeeds in cutting down Marx's claim to critical theory by reducing the synthesis of economic, legal and political structures contained in the theory of historical materialism to a crude form of technological and biological determinism. By insisting upon a reductionist account of historical materialism (which, apart from overlooking what is in Marx, totally neglects Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness*), Habermas is able to argue that Marx reduced the reflexivity of sociological knowledge strictly to the processes of material production and thus fell into a positivist epistemology incapable of generating critical theory.

Habermas succeeds in making Marx an intellectual dope by suppressing the connections between Marx's analysis of economic processes and the conduct of class struggle, whereas this is the pervasive feature of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*. But Hegel fares no better than Marx, once Habermas tries to put together what he first separated. Whereas it is obvious that the dialectic of recognition is central to both the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Philosophy of Right*, Habermas restricts its significance to Hegel's early theological and political writings. Habermas' thesis, therefore, turns upon a special version of early Hegel, as well as Marx, each separated from the totality of their work.

Marx's critique of classical political economy, which had already been initiated by Hegel's reflections on Adam Smith and market society, is methodologically in no way below the level of critical theory. It rests upon the same intuition of the formal presuppositions of objective knowledge. But instead of bringing its argument to bear upon mathematics or physics, it deals with economics and the relativity of the institutional arrangements that make the natural sciences an analogue for economics. The error contained in Engels' positivist endorsement of scientific praxis is that he overlooks the alienation of objectivity separated from its subjective sources in the historical decision to treat nature "mathematically," as Heidegger would say. This is an error about which both Engels and Marx were quite clear with regard to the status of the economic "laws" of capitalist society. In other words, Marx and Engels ordinarily understood that the "objectivity" of capitalist conduct depended upon the reification or alienation of the motives for capital accumulation and class oppression internalized as objective vocabularies of economic action.

All this must be kept in mind by anyone approaching Althusser's reading of Marx on behalf of Marx. We leave aside his purpose of stemming the tide of revisionism since the Twentieth Party Congress. What concerns us is the usual attempt to split Hegel and Marx, this time to cut Marx from his "ideological humanism" and to save the "specificity of Marxist theory." Althusser settles the split between Hegel and Marx on what he calls an *epistemological break*. The latter entails a decisive departure from Marx's early dependence upon Hegel's critique of bourgeois civil society, as well as Feuerbach's materialist critique of Hegel which so enchanted Marx and Engels, prior to the *German Ideology* when they "settled" their philosophical consciousness. Indeed, according to Althusser, Marx "was never strictly speaking a Hegelian." This early dependence, so obvious from Marx's doctoral dissertation, and from the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, but also in *Capital*, belongs, if we are to believe Althusser, only to the very early period of Marx's "disordered" consciousness. Even then it functioned only to produce the "prodigious reaction" required for its dissolution! With Habermas and Althusser we have to choose between Marx the dope and Marx the sick lad.

According to Althusser though this is hardly news, and is certainly more Hegelian than he seems to think, the specificity of Marxist theory lies in its theory of the overdetermination of social structures which accounts for their features of simultaneous complexity and unity. Such "structures in dominance" are the only proper referents of the notion of unity or totality in Marxist theory. The theory of the overdetermination of social structures, argues Althusser, has nothing in common either with the Hegelian unity of essence and its alienated appearances or with the monistic causality of material determinism. The Hegelian unity relentlessly negates differences which never exist for themselves and therefore can never determine any practical policy which could materially affect the development of the spiritual unity of its essence.

It hardly bears comment that a simplistic theory of economic determinism and, even more so, an otherworldly idealism makes an enigma of the whole Marxist conception of revolutionary praxis. The curious thing is that Althusser's theory of structural overdetermination, which he believes is what separates Marx from Hegel, is actually due much more to his own gloss upon the political praxis of Lenin. But it is precisely here that we need Dunayevskaya's insistence upon Lenin's relation to Hegel, as well, of course, as her own reading of Hegel. Just as she was one of the first to emphasize the importance of Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, so now we owe to her fresh understanding of Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks*, a work which should strengthen the chain between Hegel, Marx, and Lenin. For, if we follow Althusser's denial of an Hegelian politics, how shall we understand Lenin's study of Hegel and his consequent reorientation vis-à-vis the phenomena of imperialism and monopoly capital, which in turn had such far reaching consequences for his own internal political strategies?

The gist of Lenin's Hegelian re-orientation is expressed in the following two passages from Dunayevskaya, and developed in greater detail her chapter on Hegelian Leninism. Let us consider them in relation to Althusser's account of Lenin's philosophical orientation. "Movement and self-movement (this NBI independent, spontaneous internally necessary movement), 'change,' 'movement,' 'impulse' to 'movement,' and to 'activity'—opposite of 'dead-being'—who would

believe that this is the core of 'Hegelianism,' of abstract and abstruse (difficult, absurd?) Hegelianism? We must disclose this core, grasp it, save, shell it out, purify it—which is precisely what Marx and Engels have done." Upon this Dunayevskaya comments as follows: "When Lenin began his study of Hegel, as his *Philosophic Notebooks* show, he still felt compelled to emphasize that he is reading Hegel materialistically, instead of taking that for granted, and going on to what was new. By the end of his Hegelian studies, he wrote: 'Intelligent idealism is nearer to intelligent materialism than is stupid materialism' " (*Marxism and Freedom*, p. 169).

It was in terms of this reaction to Hegel that Lenin then proceeded to reanalyse the political significance of imperial war and the strategy of proletarian revolution. Lenin's study of monopoly capitalism, which, it will be recalled, Lukacs attributes to his "theoretical superiority," but without mentioning its Hegelian inspiration, in fact followed his *Philosophic Notebooks*. "Once Lenin saw the counter-revolution within the revolutionary movement," says Dunayevskaya, "he felt compelled to break with his former conception of the relationship between materialism and idealism. The keynote of his *Philosophic Notebooks* is nothing short of a restoration of truth to philosophic idealism against vulgar materialism to which he had given the green light in 1908 with his work on *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. Necessary as that book may have been for the specific purposes of Russia—only Russia was so backward that in 1909 one still had to fight clericalism in the Marxist movement—he now includes himself among Marxists who criticized the Kantians... more in a Feuerbachian than in an Hegelian manner."

In his own essay on Lenin's philosophy, Althusser manages to twist these theoretical developments around the notion of *historical delay*, by which he means that Marx, Engels and Lenin, as well as Lukacs and Gramsci, were all philosophically premature (i.e., for dogmatic Soviet materialism, though he doesn't say that) in their views. Indeed, this notion also allows us to argue that the union of Marxist theory with the workers' movements was similarly premature for previous stages of socialist history. Althusser alone possesses the key to the relation between the need for philosophy and the necessity of not advancing it beyond Marxist science. This solution claims to be a restatement of the unity of Lenin's philosophical and political thought. In fact what Althusser does is to interpret Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach so as to deprive philosophy of any proper domain other than as a "primitive practice" (*pratique sauvage*) on behalf of the class struggle in the realm of theory. However, it is easy to miss Althusser's primitive philosophy, which, of course, leaves him open to an equally primitive politics, because by leaving aside history Althusser is able to parade an elegant structuralism which appears to have no blood on its hands. It requires little thought to contrast Althusser's structuralism with Marx's own structural models of simple and expanded reproduction which, by combining history and structuralism, revealed how capital came into the world dripping with the blood of its proletariat and colonials. Althusser cleans up Soviet ideology, only to leave the sorrows of socialist capital accumulation, aggravated perhaps by the cold war entente, without comment.

Dunayevskaya's *Philosophy and Revolution* makes a valuable contribution to the developments of Marxism that have occurred in France and Italy, as well as to the debates of East European revisionists and West German critical theorists. A particular merit of her study is its attempt to embrace developments in the U.S.,

China and Africa. Whatever her success in this, her work suggests the need for a new Communist Manifesto. For today "*ein Gespenst geht um in Europa*"—and it is the spirit of Hegel. This is so because the contemporary problem facing socialism is still to try to understand what it means to change the world.

John O'Neill

Maria Antonietta Macciocchi, *Per Gramsci*. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1974. 427 pages.

Despite its inauspicious title, this book is not an Althusserianization of Gramsci. Macciocchi is not the least concerned with periodizing Gramsci, establishing at what point he became a scientist of the revolution, or with reinterpreting Gramsci from the viewpoint of the present strategy of the Italian (or French) Communist Party. On the contrary: she is primarily interested in vindicating the historical Gramsci from the dogmatic stranglehold of party orthodoxy that has hitherto marketed him as the theoretical missing link between the glory of the Bolshevik revolution and the gloomy bureaucratism of its outcome. Then, why such a title? The Althusserian form contradicts the polemical content. Yet, it is very appropriate since the juxtaposition of an orthodox and uncritical theoretical approach supporting a critical political thrust is not merely a conceptual ambiguity pervading the book, but Macciocchi's own predicament or, more broadly, that of a significant sector of the radical Left today. In recycling Gramsci's Marxism for French consumption (the book was originally written as a series of lectures delivered in Vincennes in 1972), Macciocchi masterfully articulates the problems created by obsolete theory for contemporary political practice.

Her two earlier books, *Daily Life in Revolutionary China* and *Letters from the PCI to Louis Althusser* already moved in this critical direction and have been largely responsible for her purge from the Party's hierarchy. She has no illusions on the matter: "...the most serious fracture between my intellectual commitment and the Party came about with regard to my interpretation of the Cultural Revolution in China, where I went in 1970—still a communist representative to the Italian Parliament—and concerning which I wrote my book which, after the break between the USSR and China...re-examined the new sense and ideological import of China for Marxist doctrine and practice, against the masquerades diffused by the Soviets on the matter" (p. 353). Naturally, her China book was immediately rated in the Communist Index and, judging from a very lively appendix dealing with her appointment in Vincennes, the French Communist Party sought to block her from teaching the course on Gramsci for which she was being hired. Yet, she remains in the Party—caught as she is between the full awareness of the Party's internal bureaucratic decadence and the impossibility of generating a meaningful political alternative to it.

Thus the book's main ambiguity is not merely conceptual, but is ultimately rooted in the very constitution of most of the European Left, and its inability to transcend Marxism-Leninism: a fundamentally sound Marxist-Leninist theory is constantly contraposed to its degenerate manifestations. Although all appearances tend to be

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Raya Dunayevskaya: filosofia e rivoluzione

Raya Dunayevskaya è anzitutto una militante rivoluzionaria. Da sempre legata attivamente al movimento marxista (è stata, per un certo periodo, segretaria e collaboratrice di Trotsky), milita nella sinistra americana animando, insieme ad operai di colore come Sbarles Denby, l'organizzazione di Marxist Umanisti News & Letters Committees, e la omonima rivista di collegamento e dibattito marxista. Gli scritti della Dunayevskaya, anche quelli di maggiore respiro filosofico, sono sempre legati all'intervento politico specifico, e sono spesso l'esito di una elaborazione collettiva, di una collaborazione singolare tra intellettuali e militanti operai, nel tentativo di unificare teoria e pratica e di affermare concretamente un modello rivoluzionario di filosofia.

La sua posizione filosofica potrebbe essere definita di marxismo soggettivo o hegel-marxismo, se la sua ricezione di Hegel non fosse assai lontana rispetto alla schematizzazione in questo campo operata dal marxismo accademico e tutta legata, invece, alla situazione politica del movimento americano di contestazione. La scelta «umanistica», cioè, non deriva da una lettura accademica dei classici, ma da una valutazione politica determinata dall'alternativa mondiale attuale come alternativa tra oppressione o liberazione, totalitarismo o socialismo libertario. Il filo conduttore delle sue ricerche è proprio il concetto di filosofia come strumento politico rivoluzionario, esplicitazione cioè delle condizioni soggettive, di coscienza per la costruzione di un comunismo non autoritario ma libertario, nelle società di capitalismo maturo. E qui che la sua elaborazione si incontra con quella di Marcuse.

Già nel primo libro, *Marxism and Freedom - from 1776 until Today (1958)*¹, la rilettura del socialismo e del marxismo rivoluzionario in

¹ R. Dunayevskaya, *Marxism and Freedom - From 1776 until Today*, New York 1958, prefazione di H. Marcuse. La prefazione di Marcuse è apparsa in francese in

chiave umanistica e libertaria aveva sullo sfondo una prospettiva di rilancio mondiale della lotta di classe. L'autrice interpretava la ripresa delle lotte del proletariato americano (lavoratori delle industrie minerarie e automobilistiche) dopo la crisi di Corea, da un lato, e le insurrezioni tedesco orientale del '53 e ungherese del '56 dall'altro, come sintomi di una progressiva unificazione mondiale non solo del capitalismo (con la fine conseguente di egemonia del comunismo sovietico), ma anche del proletariato rivoluzionario. Il libro (che da questo punto di vista va accostato a *Soviet Marxism* di Marcuse che esce nello stesso anno) è anche uno dei primi tentativi di lettura in chiave oggettiva e non mitologica del marxismo sovietico in rapporto ai reali movimenti di classe in Occidente e in Oriente. Il difetto, rispetto alle analisi di Marcuse, è rappresentato da una troppo accentuata opposizione al comunismo sovietico (legata alla polemica trotskista), e da una enfaticizzazione del distacco di Stalin rispetto alla ortodossia leniniana, che lo stesso Marcuse non manca di stigmatizzare nella sua prefazione. Un'altra critica che Marcuse rivolge alla Dunayevskaya (pur dicendosi d'accordo con le linee fondamentali della sua interpretazione del marxismo) è di rimanere legata a un concetto tradizionale di proletariato rivoluzionario, identificato con gli operai di fabbrica, perdendo così di vista le istanze originali (in direzione della individuazione di nuove forze soggettive) pure presenti nel libro. Va detto però che la posizione della Dunayevskaya rappresentava proprio una risposta polemica alle tesi diffuse della integrazione del proletariato occidentale in cui lo stesso Marcuse si andava adagiando, da intellettuale borghese; e che inoltre essa viene corretta dalla stessa autrice nel corso degli anni sessanta, in una partecipazione diretta alle lotte di liberazione delle donne, degli studenti, dei negri.

Ciò può essere facilmente verificato nel recente *Philosophy and Revolution (1973)*² dedicato, come la stessa Dunayevskaya sintetizza, allo studio della dialettica rivoluzionaria «da Hegel a Sartre e da Marx a Mao». Il riferimento alle nuove forze di contestazione è esplicito, tanto che il libro è costruito in una singolarissima dialettica tra concetti filosofici e pratica delle lotte, e la costruzione della teoria rivoluzionaria viene considerata come il miglior commento e la migliore interpretazione degli anni sessanta (dal Vietnam alla Cina, dai negri agli studenti, ecc.). Vengono così corrette le ambiguità del discorso precedente, e l'umanesimo proposto dall'autrice si rivela come la scelta dello strumento filosofico, l'unico adeguato, per render conto dello «scoppio di soggettività» degli anni sessanta, anziché come residuo della polemica antistalinista.

«L'Homme et la société» 19 1973, con il titolo *Marxisme et liberté*, ma non è stata riprodotta nella traduzione italiana edita da La Nuova Italia (edizione oggi, peraltro, irripetibile).

² R. Dunayevskaya, *Philosophy and Revolution*, New York, Dell, 1973. Precedenti versioni del capitolo su Lenin sono apparse in «Praxis» 516 1970, e in «Telos», primavera 1971.

La chiave di lettura del libro è la rivalutazione di Hegel e della dialettica hegeliana vista come strumento politico e filosofia della rivoluzione, sulla strada aperta da Marcuse, ma con una maggiore attenzione al pensiero maturo di Marx (soprattutto i Grundrisse di cui viene data una delle prime letture in America). Non stupisce perciò il provocatorio accostamento di Hegel alle Pantere Nere, della « assoluta negatività » del concetto alla scoperta da parte di George Jackson, nell'inferno di Saint Quentin, della dialettica della liberazione, che troviamo nella Introduzione! Il filo conduttore è sempre il primato della pratica sulla teoria come via maestra del marxismo rivoluzionario e come cerniera tra politica e filosofia. È il criterio che la Dunayevskaya applica anche al pensiero filosofico di Lenin, che ne risulta fortemente illuminato, contro la lettura dogmatica del marxismo-leninismo e della ortodossia comunista.

Il brano che presentiamo è tratto appunto dalla prima sezione, dedicata al concetto di dialettica in Hegel, Marx-Engels, Lenin, e affronta in particolare la interpretazione leniniana di Hegel (i Quaderni filosofici) in rapporto con Materialismo ed empiriocriticismo da un lato, la pratica politica del periodo pre e post-rivoluzionario dall'altro.

Contro l'interpretazione ortodossa del Dia-Mat, la Dunayevskaya accenna la rottura tra la prima e la seconda opera, la inconciliabilità della assimilazione della dialettica hegeliana, di cui i Quaderni sono la viva testimonianza, col meccanicismo della teoria del riflesso di Materialismo ed empiriocriticismo. Ma, anziché opporre il metodo delle citazioni ai suoi avversari, segue una via originale e convincente. Si tratta di far vedere come la scoperta della dialettica procede in Lenin prima nella pratica che nella teoria, prima nella elaborazione concreta del dirigente rivoluzionario che nelle pagine dei libri. La lettura della Logica hegeliana funziona cioè in Lenin come il catalizzatore di elementi già presenti nella sua pratica politica e diventa la scoperta della teoria coerente con quella pratica. Lo « shock » della scoperta ha in Lenin il sapore di una vera e propria rivelazione, perché è la scoperta di un metodo rivoluzionario già vivo nella sua coscienza di politico e che si rivela come l'unico capace di articolare in maniera coerente una pratica teorica nuova. La ambivalenza filosofica di Lenin consiste allora nel fatto che la scoperta del carattere rivoluzionario della dialettica di Hegel (la affermazione della non-attualità del mondo come via aperta alla sua trasformazione pratica, il concetto di soggetto come motore della dialettica, la legge della negazione della negazione) si fa strada all'interno delle decisioni determinate della lotta di classe (le analisi sull'imperialismo, il contrasto con Bucharin, ecc.) e rimane spesso latente nella pratica politica invece di fissarsi in chiare formulazioni di teoria e di filosofia. È questo contrasto tra il Lenin teorico surgente nel Lenin politico e il Lenin filosofo del materialismo che obbliga a una lettura non dogmatica ma dialettica del suo pensiero.

È facile scorgere, di fronte al rinascere presentarsi di interpretazioni neo-ortodosse di Lenin (si pensi ad Althusser) e frequenti suggestioni scientiste, la rilevanza della posizione sviluppata dalla Dunayevskaya. Il discorso

leniniano non può essere formalizzato in assunzioni dogmatiche, né può essere limitato a un ambito epistemologico definito una volta per tutte. Esso deve piuttosto essere spogliato dalla crosta delle interpretazioni opportuniste e riportato alla sua funzione concreta. Allora si vede che il Lenin pensatore della dialettica non può essere separato da una pratica dialettica specifica, che il Lenin politico non può essere isolato dal Lenin scienziato e filosofo. Ma anche le tesi che tendono a recuperare la politica della posizione filosofica leniniana dentro la sua funzione scientifica devono essere relativizzate. La presa di partito in filosofia non rappresenta una scelta teorica di campo, assoluta e definitiva, ma volta a volta fondata, essa non porta necessariamente dalla parte della scienza contro la filosofia, o dell'oggettivismo contro il soggettivismo, ma richiede una analisi materialistica (storicamente variabile) del fondamento teorico determinato. Si vede allora che il materialismo leniniano (identificato con la sua posizione teorica di fondo) non ha niente a che fare con una visione del mondo (la tesi della esistenza indipendente della materia), ma riguarda piuttosto la coscienza del fondamento materiale della teoria a un dato livello di sviluppo della lotta di classe. Questo è l'assoluto, il rivoluzionario, il resto è il relativo. Per lo meno, va sottolineato che lo stesso problema del materialismo è un problema filosofico aperto dentro il marxismo, che nessuna assunzione scienziata e metodologica può illudersi di dare per risolto. Le spesso provocatorie tesi della Dunayevskaya non esauriscono certo il problema, hanno però il merito di illuminare la sostanza della questione, il suo carattere decisivo, fornendo anche valide indicazioni di soluzione. [Amedeo Vigorelli]

(In Aut Aut of July-October 1974)

As others see us

MARCH, 1975

Italian review of Philosophy and Revolution

(Excerpts from a review of *Philosophy and Revolution in Aut-Aut* by Amedeo Vigorelli)

Raya Dunayevskaya is above all a revolutionary militant. She has always been actively involved in the Marxist movement (was, for a certain period, secretary and collaborator of Trotsky), has now an active and leading role — together with workers of various races, like the Black worker Charles Denby — in the organization of the Marxist-Humanist News and Letters Committees and in the newspaper with the same name that unites the work and the debates of the Committees. The works of Dunayevskaya, those that are principally philosophic, are always tied to specific political questions, are often the outcome of collective work — a unique collaboration between intellectuals and militant workers — in the attempt to unify theory and practice and to concretely assert a philosophically revolutionary pattern.

... HER ANALYSIS is completely tied to the contrasting movements of the U.S. political situation. That is, her "humanistic" choice does not come from an academic reading of the classics but from a specific political evaluation of present day world alternatives: the alternative between oppression and liberation, totalitarianism or a free socialist society. The guiding thread of her research is exactly that of conceiving philosophy as a revolutionary political instrument.

All of this can clearly be seen in the recently published book, *Philosophy and Revolution* . . . The reference to new challenging forces is explicit. This is so true that the book is made up of a very unique dialectic between philosophic concepts and practical struggles . . .

IN READING the book the key is to be found in the re-evaluation of Hegel and Hegelian dialectics in the light of a revolutionary philosophical and political instrument, although it gives much more importance to Marx's

mature works (above all *Grundrisse* that has scarcely begun to be read in the U.S.). Therefore, we should not be surprised by the provoking match-making of Hegel to the Black Panthers, of the "absolute negativity" to the concepts of the dialectic of liberation discovered by George Jackson in the hell of San Quentin that can even be found in the Introduction! The guiding thread is always the pre-eminence given to practice and theory as the high road towards a Marxian revolution and the hinge between politics and philosophy. . . .

... Dunayevskaya accentuates the rupture between the first and second part of Lenin's works . . . showing how the discovery of the dialectic proceeds in Lenin first in practice and then in theory: first in the formulation of the revolutionary leader and then in the pages of books. That is, the reading of Hegel's *Logic* acted on Lenin as a catalytic agent of elements already present in his political practice and becomes the discovery of uniting theory to practice. For Lenin the "shock" of this discovery has a really revolutionary savor because it is the discovery of a revolutionary method already alive in his consciousness . . .

CONSIDERING the renewal of un-orthodox interpretations of Lenin (take the case of Althusser) and certain scholarly theories, it is easy to see the importance of the thesis developed by Dunayevskaya . . .

... The book underlines that the problem of materialism is an open philosophical question within Marxism itself; that is, that no scientific or methodological study can be considered as a final solution. Certainly, the very often provocative theses of Dunayevskaya do not exhaust the question; however, one has to give her credit for giving light to the substance of the problem — its exact nature — and, also, for giving valid means for a solution.

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la obra de Palés. Luis Palés Matos, un poeta puertorriqueño viene a sumarse a la creciente bibliografía palestina sin añadir nada nuevo a lo ya dicho en 1959 por el propio Agraït.

Efraïn Barradas

DUNAYEVSKAYA, RAYA. *Philosophy and Revolution*. (From Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao). Dell Publishing Co. (A Delta Book), Nueva York, 1973.

La conocida pensadora del humanismo socialista Raya Dunayevskaya es la autora de este interesante volumen sobre teoría y práctica marxista (y no-marxista). *Philosophy and Revolution* se distribuye en nueve capítulos, con una introducción general, y trae, además, notas, una bibliografía selecta y un índice.

Está dirigido, como es evidente, al público grueso, al lector común, quien aprenderá mucho de él, si sigue de cerca la argumentación. Este libro puede ser considerado como una introducción a una posible teoría de la revolución, dentro del marco del pensamiento hegeliano-marxista. El lector avezado en cuestiones filosóficas podrá ponderar críticamente los juicios e interpretaciones de Dunayevskaya en torno a Hegel, Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Sartre, Mao-Tse-tung, los líderes de la Revolución africana y del Poder Negro en los Estados Unidos. Para este tipo de lector, el libro ofrece más atracción.

Es difícil resumir un libro que debate tantas cuestiones. Concentraré en los primeros capítulos y haré algunas indicaciones sobre los restantes.

En su "Introduction", Dunayevskaya alude al renovado interés de los últimos años en el pensamiento de Hegel y traza esquemáticamente el plan de lo que sigue. Con las preguntas "Why Hegel? Why Now?", la autora aspira a explicar ese interés y ciertas conexiones entre Hegel, Marx y Lenin.

El primer capítulo tiene como motivación la vigencia actual del pensamiento de Hegel. Lo que lo hace tan actual, se nos asegura, es la fuerza lógica de la dialéctica de la negatividad para un período de revolución proletaria (pág. 7). El punto clave de la *Fenomenología del Espíritu*, según la Dunayevskaya, es que para cada fase del desarrollo fenomenológico siempre existe una etapa histórica correspondiente. El pensamiento moldea la experiencia de tal forma que ya no será posible mantener la oposición fundamental hegeliana entre Sujeto y Objeto, como dos reinos separados (pág. 9). El movimiento, esencial en la filosofía de Hegel, es el Sujeto autocreador y es el principio que subyace al Absoluto (pág. 16). Dunayevskaya destaca en *La Ciencia de la Lógica* el que la contradicción sea la raíz de todo movimiento y vida. El movimiento es de lo abstracto a lo concreto conduce al concepto de lo concreto como totalidad concreta (pág. 30). Para Hegel, el Sujeto es Libertad. Al hablar sobre la *Filosofía del Espíritu*, la autora pone de relieve que en Hegel la libertad es la esencia del hombre (pág. 34). Después de referirse al Espíritu Absoluto y a su objetivación, y al mencionar los problemas que han surgido con respecto a la transición, en Hegel, de la lógica a la Naturaleza, Dunayevskaya sostiene que los impulsos para los nuevos estudios de Hegel han surgido de la práctica, de las revoluciones en el mundo entero (p. 37).

No importa cuál sea el punto de partida para nuestro recorrido histórico, se desprende una lección: el hombre tiene que pelear para obtener su libertad. De tal modo se revela "el carácter negativo" de la sociedad moderna. De acuerdo con Dunayevskaya, Hegel resumió veinticinco siglos de historia y ello hizo posible que él se convirtiera en centro de atención para Marx y que hoy él sea de tanta actualidad (pág. 45).

El segundo capítulo versa sobre el materialismo histórico de Marx y su inseparabilidad de la dialéctica hegeliana. Cita a Marx en el sentido de que el comunismo es humanismo mediado por la transcendencia de la propiedad privada (pág. 54). Según Dunayevskaya, el comunismo establecido o el "capitalismo de estado", que se disfruta de aquél, le teme al humanismo positivo de Marx. (*Loc. cit.*) Marx elogió el carácter crítico y negativo de la filosofía hegeliana pero le hizo el reproche de que no había visto que la esencia humana se materializa como inhumana en oposición a ella misma, en vez de como oposición a pensamiento abstracto. Para la perspectiva filosófica (supuestamente la de Hegel) la existencia no penetra en el mundo de la esencia, vale decir que el mundo filosófico carece de práctica (pág. 58). A partir de los *Manuscritos económicos*, Dunayevskaya persigue al pensamiento de Marx en sus distintas obras, pero aquí me es imposible resumir las etapas. Ella atribuye a Marx el haber descubierto una racionalidad histórica en la esperanza de las gentes, lo cual significa que son ellas quienes unifican la teoría y la lucha por la liberación (pág. 74). El materialismo histórico insiste en la inseparabilidad de los hechos y de las ideas, de las acciones y de la crítica de otras interpretaciones fi-

losóficas del mundo, de la filosofía y la revolución como medio para emancipar al hombre preso tras las rejas del capitalismo (pág. 89).

Ante el hecho de que las expectativas históricas de Marx y de los marxistas no se cumplieron, Lenin se vio obligado a buscar una nueva filosofía. (Estamos en el tercer capítulo, todavía en la Primera Parte). En septiembre de 1914, Lenin se fue a estudiar *La Ciencia de la Lógica* de Hegel en procura de la dialéctica, es decir el principio de la transformación de algo en su opuesto (pág. 97). Bajo el influjo de esa lectura, Lenin rompió con el viejo materialismo ("vulgar") y con el empiricismo, que ponían énfasis en las "leyes férreas de la economía" y en la "esencia" en contraste con la "aparición" (pág. 99). Lenin escribió que es imposible comprender a cabalidad *El Capital* de Marx sin haber estudiado y entendido antes la *Lógica*. En su lucha contra los "traidores" al marxismo, los bolcheviques y otros, asegura la Dunayevskaya, Lenin se mantuvo fiel al principio de la dialéctica. Recomendó a los marxistas el estudio sistemático de la dialéctica hegeliana desde un punto de vista materialista. Al morir Lenin, emergen dos perspectivas: por un lado, el vacío teórico, que los líderes iban a llenar con "alternativas", y, por el otro, el capitalismo de estado (pág. 120).

No me es posible seguir, tan siquiera desde lejos, los acontecimientos significativos que se dan desde la muerte de Lenin hasta los movimientos actuales como la revolución en África, la rebelión negra y la lucha estudiantil contra la guerra de Vietnam y el movimiento de Liberación Femenina en los Estados Unidos. El campo es riquísimo y Raya Dunayevskaya lo enfoca críticamente.

La Segunda Parte de *Philosophy and Revolution* se intitula "Alternativas". Abre con una introducción sobre la emergencia de un capitalismo de estado en la Unión Soviética y adelanta puntos de vista sobre Trotsky, Mao y Sartre. El cuarto capítulo discute a Trotsky como teórico. Dunayevskaya concluye que las teorías de Trotsky estaban aisladas de las realidades de nuestro tiempo, el imperialismo y el capitalismo de estado. El quinto capítulo enfoca a Mao-tse-tung. Cualquiera que haya leído las obras de Mao se da cuenta de que él continúa el pensamiento de Marx pero también se desvía del mismo en varios aspectos importantes. Sin embargo, la deificación del pensamiento de Mao es contraria a Marx y a Lenin. (Y yo añadiría, a Hegel). El sexto capítulo corresponde a Jean-Paul Sartre, "el outsider que mira hacia adentro". La crítica que la Dunayevskaya formula a Sartre se parece, en parte, a lo que dirige a Trotsky. Lo acusa de desconexión con las masas. Carece del sentido marxista de la revuelta espontánea y de la lucha de clases (pág. 195). La metodología de Sartre se opone a la de Marx (pág. 207). (Como Sartre tiene más de una metodología, se refiere a la *Critique de la raison dialectique*). En suma, Sartre ha fracasado en su intento de fundir al existencialismo con el marxismo (pág. 210). (Empresa parecida a la de cuadrangular el círculo, agregó yo).

La Tercera Parte se titula "Realidad Económica y la Dialéctica de la Liberación". El capítulo siete analiza las revoluciones en África (no son todas iguales) y sus relaciones con la economía mundial. Sin poder entrar en detalles y estadísticas, destaco que para la Dunayevskaya la tragedia de las revoluciones africanas consiste en que sus diri-

gentes se hallaban tan oprimidos por la conciencia del atraso tecnológico de sus respectivos países que para remediarlo recurrieron ya sea al capitalismo de los Estados Unidos ya sea al soviético (pág. 218). Al mismo tiempo se aislaron de las masas. Algunos líderes, como Léopold Senghor, hablaban de humanismo pero seguían la política del general De Gaulle (pág. 245).

El octavo capítulo trata del capitalismo de estado y las sublevaciones en el oriente de Europa. Estas se explican por causa del capitalismo de estado "opresivo" que impera en Rusia (p. 249). Este sistema, sugiere la autora, desemboca directamente en la explotación de los países en su periferia: Polonia, Hungría, Checoslovaquia, Bulgaria. Los intelectuales de esas naciones —muchos de ellos perseguidos— no podrán llenar el vacío teórico hasta que se den cuenta de que no se le puede lavar el cerebro a las masas, ya que ellas, según la Dunayevskaya, piensan sus propios pensamientos. Ellas son la Razón (hegeliana) (págs. 264-265). (Esta idea hubiera hecho a Hegel por lo menos fruncir el ceño).

El último capítulo discurre sobre la Black Revolution en los Estados Unidos, la lucha contra la Guerra de Vietnam y el movimiento de Liberación Femenina. Como siempre, la Dunayevskaya presenta críticas, entre las cuales está la de aquellos que quisieran hacer la revolución sin teoría alguna. La verdad es que la autora repudia tanto el activismo acéfalo como la teorización desvinculada de las masas. Lo que nuestros tiempos exigen, nos dice finalmente, es una nueva relación entre la teoría y la práctica una filosofía de la liberación que guíe e impregne la indispensable obra revolucionaria. El supuesto

es que para esa tarea el pensamiento de Hegel y el de Marx son fundamentales.

Una de las críticas que se le pueden hacer a este libro es que pretende abarcar demasiado. Aunque Dunayevskaya parece estar bien informada, no es posible que ella haga justicia a todos los datos en tan pocas páginas. También dudo de que ella esté tan bien compenetrada en los asuntos en Zaire o Tanzania como en los Estados Unidos o Francia. Todo esto introduce desniveles y probablemente faltas de percepción.

Son tan numerosos los problemas que plantea la lectura de este libro que se necesitaría uno tres veces su tamaño para poder discutirlos a fondo. Por ejemplo, sabemos que la interpretación de lo que Hegel dijo y pensó ha llenado volúmenes. La importancia que Dunayevskaya concede a la dialéctica hegeliana podría contar con el respaldo de ciertos marxistas y de pensadores de la talla de Herbert Marcuse y Karl Löwith pero en cambio sería negada por otros marxistas y pensadores de la talla de Walter Kaufmann. Algo parecido ocurre con la tesis sobre el humanismo de Marx. Yo, como Dunayevskaya, creo que el marxismo es un humanismo. Puedo invocar en mi apoyo a Erich Fromm, Rodolfo Mondolfo, Adam Schaff, Maximilian Rubel, Lucien Goldmann y otros. Pero, en cambio, ese humanismo ha sido denegado por Louis Althusser, Alain Badiou y otros. Cosa semejante ocurre con el tan traído y llevado "capitalismo de estado" en la Unión Soviética. ¿Qué responderían Mao, Sartre y los líderes africanos a las críticas que formula la Dunayevskaya? Esto quiere decir que el libro vibra con la discusión y la controversia. Nos llega templado con el fuego de la batalla. De una batalla cuyo desenlace no podemos prever todavía.

Philosophy and Revolution es un libro que recomiendo calurosamente porque nos hace pensar en los problemas del mundo contemporáneo. Y porque al terminar de leerlo nos sentimos angustiados ante las limitaciones de nuestras respuestas y ante la urgente necesidad de aclarar nuestro pensamiento para la empresa de lograr que el hombre sea verdaderamente libre.

José Emilio González

SIN NOMBRE

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Philosophy and Revolution: 'tempered with the fire of battle'

From *SIN NOMBRE*, Puerto Rico, Jan.-Mar. 1975, Vol. V, #3. Excerpts translated from Spanish review.

The well-known socialist humanist thinker, Raya Dunayevskaya, is the author of this interesting book on Marxist (and non-Marxist) theory and practice. *Philosophy & Revolution . . .* is directed, to the general public, to the average reader, who will learn a lot from it, if he follows the arguments closely. This book can be considered as an introduction to a possible theory of revolution within the framework of Hegelian-Marxist thought. The reader who is advanced in philosophic questions will be able to critically evaluate Dunayevskaya's judgments and interpretations in relationship to Hegel, Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Sartre, Mao Tse-tung, the leaders of the African Revolution and of Black Power in the U. S.

One of the criticisms that can be made is that it attempts to embrace too much. Although Dunayevskaya seems to be well-informed, it isn't possible to do justice to all the facts in so few pages. I also doubt that she can be as well-versed on the affairs of Zaire or Tanzania as on the United States or France. All of this brings in unevenness and probably some lack in perception.

So numerous are the problems that reading this book confronts us with, that a book three times its size would be needed to discuss them in depth. For example,

we know that the interpretation of what Hegel said has filled volumes. The importance that Dunayevskaya grants to the Hegelian dialectic can be endorsed by certain Marxists and thinkers of the stature of Herbert Marcuse and Karl Lowith, but would be denied by other Marxists and thinkers of the stature of Walter Kaufman. Something similar happens with the thesis on Marxist-Humanism. I, like Dunayevskaya, believe that Marxism is a humanism. I can invoke in my favor Erich Fromm, Rodolfo Mondolfo, Adam Schaff, Maximilian Rubel, Lucien Goldman and others. But that humanism has been refuted by Louis Althusser, Alain Badjou and others. A similar thing happens with the very worn out "state-capitalism" of the Soviet Union. What would Mao, Sartre and the African leaders reply to the criticisms that Dunayevskaya formulates? This is to show that the book vibrates with discussion and controversy. It reaches us tempered with the fire of battle. Of a battle whose resolution we cannot yet foresee.

Philosophy & Revolution is a book I warmly recommend because it makes us think about the problems of today's world. And because, on finishing it, we will feel distressed at the limitations of our answers and challenged by the urgent necessity of clarifying our thought for the task of achieving the true freedom of man.

—Jose Emilio Gonzalez

unomásuno

MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

viernes 22 de enero de 1979.

LIBROS

Filosofía y revolución

Virgilio Torres

(Filosofía y Revolución: de Hegel a Sartre y de Marx a Maó, de Raya Dunayevskaya. Siglo XXI Editores. Primera edición en español aumentada. México 1977, 311 págs.)

Raya Dunayevskaya nació en Rusia y durante 1937-1938 fue secretaria de León Trotski. A partir de 1939 se dedica a analizar los problemas del comunismo, así como las obras de Hegel y Marx. *Filosofía y Revolución* muestra la importancia del método dialéctico de Hegel y hace énfasis en la noción de negatividad, entendida como el despliegue de los acontecimientos que avanzan siempre para resolverse continuamente atendidos a la inmanencia que cada momento histórico les impone. La autora hace una exposición crítica y rigurosa del sentido de la dialéctica hegeliana y de la influencia decisiva que ésta ejerció en el pensamiento de Marx y Lenin. La dialéctica aporta los elementos para reivindicar la contradicción que no se detiene en estados finales, sino que alimenta el continuo devenir de la historia. Dunayevskaya ve en toda la obra de Marx una continuidad de los principios humanistas y dialécticos, por lo que se opone a la división de un Marx joven y un Marx maduro ("científico"), lo cual le permite polemizar con el filósofo francés Louis Althusser. Con un acopio exhaustivo de información, la autora muestra las vicisitudes Lenin y la ulterior y paulatina degeneración burocratizante del Estado soviético. La práctica efectiva de los llamados países comunistas hace que Dunayevskaya vea en estos un "capitalismo de estado" que no corresponde a los propósitos liberadores, humanistas y críticos del marxismo. La perspectiva dialéctica que vincula teoría y praxis permite a la autora analizar críticamente fenómenos tan importantes como el maoísmo y la revolución cultural proletaria, el existencialismo sartreano y su relación con el marxismo, la lucha de independencia de los países africanos. La historia de los últimos años muestra el deseo creciente por reivindicar las aspiraciones efectivas de los oprimidos, sean estos del este o del oeste; ejemplo de ello son las rebeliones de 1956 en Hungría, de 1968 en Checoslovaquia y París, el movimiento de los negros en los E.U.A., las luchas por la liberación femenina, los movimientos de autogestión y los consejos obreros. Para Dunayevskaya el marxismo es la filosofía revolucionaria que asume la práctica y la conduce, pero nunca la menoscaba ni la oscurece. Marxismo humanista que se opone a la petrificación de la teoría y la praxis.

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AS OTHERS SEE US

Filosofia y Revolucion

Filosofia y Revolucion: de Hegel a Sartre y de Marx a Mao, de Raya Dunayevskaya. (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1977).

Filosofia y Revolucion shows the importance of the dialectical method of Hegel and emphasizes the notion of negativity . . . The author makes a critical and rigorous exposition of the meaning of the Hegelian dialectic and the decisive influence it exerted on the thought of Marx and Lenin . . .

Dunayevskaya sees, in all the works of Marx, a continuity of humanistic and dialectical principles, through which she opposes the division between a young Marx and a mature ("scientific") Marx, which permits her to argue with the French philosopher, Louis Althusser. With an extensive store of information, the author shows us the changes in Lenin and the gradual bureaucratizing degeneration of the Soviet State. The actual practice of those so-called Communist countries causes Dunayevskaya to see in them a "state-capitalism" that doesn't correspond to the liberating, humanist and critical aims of Marxism.

The dialectical perspective that links theory and praxis permits the author to analyze critically such important phenomena as Maoism and the proletarian cultural revolution, Sartrean existentialism and its relation with Marxism, the struggle for independence of the African countries. The history of the most recent years shows the growing desire to regain the actual aspirations of the oppressed, be they of the East or of the West.

For instance, the rebellions of 1956 in Hungary, of 1968 in Czechoslovakia and Paris, the Black movement in the USA, the struggles for women's liberation, the movements of workers' control and workers' councils. For Dunayevskaya, Marxism is the revolutionary philosophy that takes up practice and guides it, but never reduces or obscures it—Marxist-Humanism that opposes the petrification of theory and praxis.

Jan. 22, 1979

Virgilio Torres
Uno Mas Uno, Mexico City

May, 1979

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REVIEW

Raya Dunayevskaya, *Philosophy and Revolution: From Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao*; Dell Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1973, xix, 372 pp., \$2.95.

The recent work of Raya Dunayevskaya is an interesting and scholarly attempt to give a Marxist interpretation to one of the vital ideological and philosophical problems of our time, viz., the relationship of theory and practice.

The author has constructed a remarkably broad outline of the problem, commenting on extensive portions of the works of both Hegel and Marx. In addition, she critically analyzes the interpretations given the insights of these great philosophers by such diverse theoreticians as Plekhanov, Lenin, Bukharin, Stalin, Trotsky, Mao and Sartre. With the exception of Lenin, she finds them all sorely wanting in their understanding of Marx's penetration into the proper relationship of theory and practice, as well as Hegel's special contribution to that philosophically revolutionary insight.

In her iconoclastic assault, the author maintains that only certain anti-establishment developments in China and Eastern Europe, and the revolutionary activities in Africa and other parts of the less-developed world correctly and clearly represent the living *praxis* of the Marxist dialectic of liberation.

Dunayevskaya concludes her work by pointing to the Black Revolution in America, the anti-war youth, the developments in rank-and-file labor and the women's liberation movement as those "new forces and new passions spring[ing] up in the bosom of society" that Marx predicted would bring forth the realization of the "new Humanism." A different society shall arise, grounded in the "absolute movement of becoming" and wherein the development of human power "is its own end."

The reader frequently is astonished by the ease with which Dunayevskaya moves from deep theoretical penetration of the intricacies of the Hegelian dialectic to a tactical analysis of political and revolutionary activity in the

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light of that theory. She has an extraordinary talent which appears to have been fine-tuned through great scholarship, originality of thought and a lifetime of political activity.

Dunayevskaya emphasizes the great importance of Hegel to the development of the dialectical humanism of Marx. The Hegelian dialectic was the crucible wherein materialism was transformed into a world-historic philosophy of freedom, and the proletariat made the "Subject" of man's self-emancipation that was to put an end to all class societies.

Until the proletariat took political action in the 1860's, Marx's analysis remained intellectualist. With the strikes and revolts in Europe, the Civil War in America, etc., Marx saw everything in a new light and began anew to write *Capital*.

The basic contradiction between the worker and the world of machines was concretized in the 'commodity' which took on a mysterious and even divine character. Only freely associated men can destroy the fetish of the commodity because only they know it from the inside, from within the process of production, and thus only they have the power and the true knowledge of reality.

Lenin, even without the benefit of Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* grasped the reduction of human meaning to crude materialist categories under capitalism. He likewise perceived the materialist elements present in Hegel's *Logic*, and the profundity of the transformation of the ideal in consciousness into the real, historically.

The author maintains that the insights garnered by Lenin from Hegel's *Logic* and their implementation in the early years of the Bolshevik revolution in spite of the opposition of Bukharin and others, were negated by Stalin and his 'official' philosophical institutes. The result was the introduction of a special form of 'state-capitalism', that is, a highly organized state-controlled economic enterprise through which the working masses sacrificed their conscious striving for a new relationship to creative free labor, to the demands of ever higher and more efficient productivity. As in classic capitalism, productivity became the end and the human workers the means. The resulting alienation was identical in nature to that described by Marx in both *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* and *Capital*.

Even Trotsky failed to perceive the central overriding perversion of Lenin's thought, argues Dunayevskaya. He concerned himself with the growing personal power of Stalin and bureaucratization of the state under the guise

of "socialism in one country." Mistaking the effect for the cause, Trotsky judged the Soviet Union under Stalin still to be "a worker's state, though degenerate."

Mao Zedong too, failed to grasp the essential distinction between a socialist state of freely associated labor which rejects the fetishism of commodities inherent in the form of the product of labor as commodity, and a society based on the centralization of capital and the nationalization of productive property.

In spite of Mao's rejection of the revisionist clique in the Kremlin, his thought represents no basic theoretical rejection of Stalinism, insists Dunayevskaya. Mao's "protracted class-struggle" condemns generations of peasants and workers to a faceless conformity to the demands of productivity, and continued obeisance to the god, *Commodity*.

With the failure of the "Great Leap Forward" (1958), Mao suffered a loss of personal power. He returned to lead the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (1966-69) against the Party bureaucracy in order to retain his undisputed leadership. Little did he realize, claims Dunayevskaya, that the young Marxist-Leninists would take him at his word not only to "bombard the Party Headquarters" and publicly disgrace the officials of the new bourgeoisie, but also would attempt to restore the power of the people and begin to construct a socialist society. Mao could not tolerate this threat to his theory and power, and loosed Lin Biao's army on the young in order to restore the public order required for the continuation of state-capitalism. Lin Biao in turn became a threat to Mao and fell from power. Mao's thought was then canonized in the new Constitution, and state-capitalism enshrined by the 10th Party Congress. But from the view of the Marxist Humanist, "everything remains the same after much ado."

In her rejection of both the Soviet and Chinese models for creating a Marxist humanist society, Dunayevskaya makes some salient points. Nevertheless her arguments for the most part are overstated on the basis of textual evidence. More importantly, their general thrust represents a serious mis-interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. Her representation implies that no viable socialist movement has existed since the death of Lenin, and nearly a century after the death of Marx, history has yet to produce a politically viable society wherein the economic substructure can be designated in any way, socialist. Such an interpretation of history places her and other holding similar positions outside the pale of Marxism, because in effect it rejects the

dialectical continuum of theory and *praxis* integral to that worldview. In Dunayevskaya's view there has been a void in historical *praxis* and theoretical development between the death of Lenin and the rise of those politically non-viable social forces mentioned in the last section of *Philosophy and Revolution*. This view of the history of human liberation is at least as undialectical and mechanistic as the attempt to interpret *Capital* without the benefit of a thorough knowledge of Hegel's *Logic* -- a position she so correctly castigates.

The notion of viability is central to the understanding of the Marxist epistemological relationship of theory and practice. The term 'viable' connotes the characteristic of being able to survive in the outside world. Marxist-Leninist theory requires for its development *viable* historical practice. Only those interpretations of Marx and Lenin whose adherents have been able to move beyond merely the realm of ideas to seize and maintain political power so qualify. This naturally includes the interpretations of Marxism-Leninism prevailing in the Soviet Union, China, the socialist nations of Central and Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia and Albania, as well as Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Korea and Mongolia. Correct interpretations of Marxism-Leninism also are limited by its own principles to those based upon the actual practice and experience of these politically viable nations. There can be no fifty-year gap between a potentially successful Bolshevik revolution based on the insights of Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks* and tragically aborted by Stalin, and the first rumblings of the new forces of liberation represented by African revolutions, Chinese and East European unrest, black revolts, the anti-war movement, rank-and-file labor disturbances and the women's liberation movement, as Dunayevskaya would have us believe.

One cannot study the theory of Marxism-Leninism independently of an appreciation of its actual practice historically. An attempt to separate the theory from practice, to make the practice irrelevant to an understanding of the present state of the theory, is to violate basic principles of the Marxist-Leninist worldview, and consequently to distort the meaning of the theory. There is no 'pure' Marxism against which one can compare the practice of an alleged socialist nation.

Of course, it is always possible to find discrepancies between socialist theory as it has developed historically, and current practice. Indeed, the extremely serious internecine struggles within the viable Socialist Movement and their resulting polycentrism, revolve precisely on this point. But it is

in these struggles, and only in these that the correct historical development of Marxist theory is taking shape. It is not to be found in the politically sterile (albeit scholarly and intellectually engaging) verbal discourses of the 'Marxist Humanists', nor even in those of adherents to the somewhat more historically 'contiguous' Fourth International.

While certain varieties of 'Marxism' recently have returned to a degree of respectability in the Western world, the interpretations of Marx which prevail in the *viable* Marxist-Leninist world are still generally rejected, in the U.S. at least, across the entire political spectrum from far right to far left. This holds in spite of the fact that such interpretations are accepted by hundreds of millions. The Marxist-Leninist of course already has predicted this occurrence. Indeed, he uses this fact as one factor in the empirical verification of his sociology of knowledge. It is not surprising therefore that Dunayevskaya should find herself in what she must regard as a conundrum: Why is it that 'Marxist Humanist' works are far more acceptable to both scholars and general readers in societies which all Marxists agree are capitalistic, bourgeois-dominated and imperialistic, than in those societies which at least claim to live by Marxist principles? Does Marxism have more meaning for the 'Free World' than for the 'Communist World'? (Along these lines, Chinese well might ask themselves why the policy of the People's Republic appears more enticing and romantically attractive to travellers and to much of the bourgeois media and public in the West, than does that of the Soviet Union and East Europe.)

The Pentagon, the U.S. State Department, and the CIA see far more clearly than 'Marxist Humanists' which forces represent the real danger to the continuation of what Marxist-Leninists consider the imperialist policy of the U.S. and world capitalism. It is not against the 'Marxist Humanists' or the Trotskyists or the remnants of the New Left that they direct their main efforts to protect the 'vital interests' of the nation and those of the 'Free World'. (Significantly, less and less are these efforts directed towards China.) Indeed it is integral to the global strategy of the U.S. to foster 'Marxist Humanism' and other forms of 'safe' Marxism in Eastern Europe in order to gradually 'wean' these socialist nations away from the Soviet Union and into a more neutral position vis-à-vis American and West European foreign policy. Can Dunayevskaya seriously maintain that were Marx and Lenin alive today, they would cast in their lot with her?

Even Jean-Paul Sartre grasps more clearly than she the continuum of

practice required for a growth in human consciousness. Writing about the Hungarian revolt in 1956 and generally condemning the forced dissolution of the Workers' Committees by Soviet power, Sartre nonetheless recognizes that such institutions of direct democracy did not and could not exist in Hungary prior to the first Soviet occupation in 1945.* In other words Workers' Councils and direct democracy cannot arise in any such society that is not adequately protected from counter-revolutionary forces. This ordinarily requires the protective aegis of Soviet geopolitical power.

The struggle for a non-alienated, creative, free society, the goal not only of Dunayevskaya but of all Marxists, cannot take place effectively outside the historical development of Marxism as represented by the viable Marxist-Leninist movement. It is in this context that the stirrings in Eastern Europe and China mentioned by the author must be seen. The question revolves not about the basic direction of socialist society, but about the method, timing and circumstances required for permanent success. Marxist theory requires that correct theoretical judgments concerning these matters arise out of the concrete practice of viable socialist societies - not in an abstract reevaluation of the writings of Hegel, Marx and Lenin done independently of and in basic opposition to that *praxis*.

Of course the liberation movements among the peoples of the less-developed world, American blacks, women, trade union members and the anti-war forces are important events in the process toward the eventual freedom of mankind from the various forms of exploitation. No Marxist would or could hold otherwise. But the Marxist also must maintain that the future success of these movements rests in great part on how quickly their members recognize and accept two principles. First, these movements and their underlying ideas were able to arise because of the ongoing class struggle between the viable socialist movement and the forces of advanced capitalism, and the important shift in geopolitical, economic and moral power and influence resulting therefrom. Second, unless these forces wish to be outmaneuvered and eventually crushed or coopted, they must align their goals and efforts with those of viable Marxism.

This alignment and subsequent assistance is not meant to be one-sided. The struggle of these forces constitute in themselves historical *praxis* which importantly affects the material conditions, and hence the strength and the consciousness of the socialist societies. New opportunities and new perspectives result inevitably. In concert then with the *historical* Marxist move-

ment, these "new passions and new forces" as Dunayevskaya refers to them, will indeed bring forth "a whole new human dimension." But Dunayevskaya utterly fails to comprehend, much less accept these principles. In this lies the fatal weakness of her work as an interpretation of Marxism.

Whatever final judgment the reader makes, Dunayevskaya's arguments cannot be taken lightly or dismissed out of hand. They are cogently and consistently argued, and grounded in a wealth of scholarship. They force one back to a reexamination of the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, regardless of one's ultimate conclusion. Philosophers, historians and political scientists alike should familiarize themselves with this engaging addition to the many attempts at understanding Marxist theory.

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NOTE

* *Search for a Method*, trans. by Hazel E. Barnes, Knopf, New York, 1963, p. 24, and quoted in *Philosophy and Revolution*, p. 198.

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