

1985 PRE-PLENUM DISCUSSION

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Introductory Note to Pre-Plenum Discussion Bulletin #1

When Raya was writing her Theory/Practice column on the first 15 years of News & Letters,* she noted that --while the objective event of De Gaulle's coming to power in 1958, which had compelled her Call for an International Conference, was fully recorded and analyzed in N&L; and while the ramifications that followed the Conference which was finally held in 1959, including the critique by Jean Malaquais and others, were fully reflected as well -- the Conference itself was not reported in the pages of N&L. Bess' International Report to the N&L Committees Convention in September 1960 is included in this 1985 first Pre-Plenum Discussion Bulletin to fill that gap and give the organization today a sense of both that 1959 trip by the National Chairwoman and the 1958 trip that Bess had herself undertaken to secure a contract for an Italian edition of Marxism and Freedom and to establish the beginnings of an international dialogue. Included with Bess' report are the actual talk Raya presented to that International Conference in 1959, and excerpts from the report Raya sent back from Milan to N&L as soon as the meeting had ended.

A very different period characterizes the 1980s. Because Jim's report to the Detroit local on the December 30, 1984 presentation by Raya to the Expanded REB had caught the new ground that was opened at that meeting for all the developments that took us from there, through the March 21 events, to the coming Plenum, it is included in this first Bulletin which also carries the Call.

Peter's talk to the "Economic Anthropology" Conference in Salt Lake City is included because he so creatively projected, in this talk he was asked to deliver on Marx's Ethnological Notebooks, the concept of Marxist-Humanism as the crucial "mediation between Marx and today," as Peter expressed it in the letter we have asked him to excerpt to include here with the talk itself.

Finally, we include an exchange of letters between Raya and Roy (Bay Area) who, although he was writing on the 1973 work, Philosophy and Revolution, had philosophically concretized precisely what we have focused on ever since the last Convention in the section of our Perspectives called "Not by Practice Alone."

Although all these pieces were written before the Call was issued, they not only form the background for it, but are actually integral to what the Call has worked out for our discussion over the next two months and at the Plenum itself.

-- The Resident Editorial Board

* See July 1985 issue of N&L

OFFICIAL CALL FOR PLENUM

June 28, 1985

To All News and Letters Committees
and Members-at-large

Dear Friends:

This year's Plenum Call needs to give an accounting of a period longer than usual. To do so objectively and subjectively means more than just an accounting of the move to Chicago, which made it necessary to hold the Convention of 1984 in July rather than September, so that this Plenum has to cover two more months. To fully understand the move to Chicago requires knowing the history of Chicago, when a new age emerged once the Russian Revolution had burst forth as World War I was winding down. That world phenomenon caused the rulers of world capitalism to lunge into a counter-revolution, not only against Russia but within each one's own country. This counter-revolution showed itself in the U.S. in the Palmer Raids against all "Reds" as well as against Blacks and Labor. The reason this sounds so very todayish is due to Reagan's getting "four more years" to finalize his counter-revolution both abroad and at home.

He has become the world outlaw in mining Nicaragua's harbors without even consulting Congress, and refusing to recognize the World Court's accusations. He has become a strike-breaker at home, destroying PATCO as the first step in selling his union-busting ideology. He has been rolling the clock back on the Black Revolution of the 1960s and on the gains won by Women's Liberation in the 1970s. One look at the much touted, so-called "prosperity" that Reagan is talking about reveals such pauperization on the part of the American masses that Hunger is by no means characteristic only of the Third World. Reaganism is waiting for the masses at home to display themselves as no more than skin and bones as the result of a famine like Africa's before ever he will accept the simple statistic that no less than ten million people have been added to what are officially recognized as poor. Presently, as a preparation for an excuse to invade Nicaragua he has invaded Grenada; and he has done no little to contribute to the utter fragmentation of Lebanon.

To Reagan, all this is secondary to his Pax Americana world-ruler ambitions, embodied in the nuclear Star War phantasy of a "winnable" nuclear war against the other nuclear Behemoth, Russia. Towards this end he imposes endless militarization upon the American people who must be subjected to pauperization, union-busting, racism and sexism.

Our task this year is to work out how to fight Reaganism with its Pax Americana ambitions, not only as we have always done -- and this year we will be joining in the crucial demonstrations on the 40th anniversary of Hiroshima Day, Aug. 6 -- but with all emphasis on never separating activity from a philosophy of revolution, of true liberation.

Last year's Convention Perspectives Thesis phrased the task philosophically as: "Not by Practice Alone." This year's

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Plenum needs an accounting of how we carried out this task since the move to Chicago and the further concretization it needs now. The shocker came from the counter-revolution arising from within the revolutionary movement. The fact is that the revolution in Grenada in the late 1970s had succeeded and yet it was that new government itself that had made it easy for the U.S. invasion of Grenada. What we saw that was new as compared to the revolutions of the 1960s was that whereas the latter had also relied on only activity and more activity and so subordinated the question of philosophy that they remained unfinished, here is what happened in Grenada: The revolution succeeded. They had already been in power since 1979. It was at this point that the Coard faction shot down the leading face of the revolution -- Bishop. We must face this stark reality. What happened in Grenada is the most recent and most concrete manifestation of what happens when you separate the philosophy of revolution from revolution itself -- that is, from the masses themselves; you thereby make it easy for the outside counter-revolution to invade.

Where Reagan has put his stamp of counter-revolution on the epoch of the 1980s, we have been working out the absolute opposite with the designation that the trail to the 1980s had, in fact, been indicated in the "new moments" Marx had developed in the final decade of the 1880s. Our reconnection with the Marxism of Marx, at a time when we were working out the reality of the Third World's existence, was deepened because in his last decade, when he was studying pre-capitalist societies, he was predicting that the technologically backward lands could experience revolutions before the technologically advanced countries. At no time has this re-integration of a philosophy of revolution with actual revolution been more imperative than in our age. This sets the task for this year's Perspectives.

Once we fully knew Marx's work as a totality and worked that out for our own age, we developed a new category of "post-Marx Marxism" as a perjorative of all Marxists beginning with Engels. As we showed in Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution, Engels was no Marx -- as could be seen in his very first work after the death of Marx, Origin of the Family. While the divergence from Marx may appear to be on the question of Women, the truth is that the question of dialectics is involved, by no means limited to any one subject, but to the difference between Engels' unilinear view of the development of humanity and Marx's multilinear view.

One exception to post-Marx Marxism as a perjorative -- Lenin -- is related to the fact of his return to the Hegelian Dialectic as he faced the betrayal of the Second International as he was preparing for the Russian Revolution. He recognized then that it was a question of any single work of Marx that had not been understood, but that Marx's greatest theoretical work, Capital, "especially its first chapter" could not be understood unless one had gone through the "whole" of Hegel's Science of Logic. This remains a bridge for all Marxists today, but Lenin's unchaining of the dialectic got stuck on the 1902-03 concept of the vanguard party. That was no concept of Marx's. That concept, very nearly word for word, was taken from Kautsky, and the

whole Second International, both reformists and revolutionaries, accepted this.* It is this 1903 concept, though Lenin modified it through the years, especially in revolution -- both the 1905 and the 1917 revolutions -- that he never gave up, not even in his last few years. This was so even though he had sensed the early bureaucratization and saw in Stalin both one who had "accumulated too much power" and one who had no comprehension of the revolutionary nature of the National Question -- especially in the case of Georgia. This becomes the determining question in our age, and not just in Russia's relationship to Poland, but to all of East Europe. And, it is by no means only a question of bureaucratization or the National Question; as the Russian masses are likewise suffering from the class enemy, their own rulers, State-Capitalism.

It becomes imperative to single out the expression, "the new continent of thought," from what we always defined Marx's Humanism to be -- "a new continent of thought and of revolution". It is the new continent of thought that needs a great deal of further development and discussion. There is no other serious way to fight Reaganism, which is moving helter-skelter backwards on all fronts -- Labor, Black, Women, Third World and especially Central America -- constantly universalizing his reactionary ideology. Where he is not engaged in an actual invasion as in Grenada, he is planning one for Nicaragua, and possibly even for Lebanon. He is now both sponsoring counter-revolutions and propping up reactionary regimes like South Africa, as well as interfering with Americans travelling abroad by warning them not to go to Greece in the very period when Greece has been declared to be "the cultural world capital" by the European Community.

The one thing that has arisen over the hostage crisis which has been little noted but is the one important positive fact is the human action which has been able to influence even such a Behemoth of reactionary ideology as Reagan. Here the media is showing how Reaganite they themselves are, notwithstanding Reagan's criticism of them, when they do not reveal that Reagan has been doing more than just toying with military moves (bombing of Beirut?) irrespective of the death of the Americans. What they are not revealing is that it is the ordinary people, aroused over the lives of other human beings, who have stayed Reagan's hand so far. If anyone thinks that philosophy is not involved here, they know nothing of how inseparable life and philosophy are, and will not know how to fight hijacking, kidnapping, bombing and other forms of terrorism.

For this Plenum, we had to return to our 1981 Plenum Call because it was there that we first pointed to the ominous nature of the age because of Reagan's coming to power. It was in our Call that year that we first used the expression "organizational responsibility for the Marxist-Humanist philosophy of liberation." Indeed, what followed ever since that Plenum was Convention upon Convention, all

* The one thing that broke the Social Democrats in Russia into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks dealt not with the concept of vanguard party, but with the question of having to belong to a local and be disciplined by it. (See Marxism and Freedom, Chapter XI, "Forms of Organization: the Relationship of the Spontaneous Self-Organization of the Proletariat to the 'Vanguard Party'")

concretizing that responsibility. In 1982, for example, the focus was on "Methodology and Politicalization" with the aim that we would all become "practicing dialecticians." The Marx Centenary Year, 1983, gained a special importance both because that year witnessed the most extensive lecture tour we ever undertook, with our "trilogy of revolution" in hand, and because it was the last year that our original editor, the Black production worker, Charles Denby, was with us in working out the new amendments to our Constitution and the projected move to Chicago. It was that year that so many new doors were opened to us and we were given both Black Studies and Women's Studies platforms. Indeed, the many new additions written during the Tour that year for "the Rosa Luxemburg book" have become final chapter in our new, fourth book -- Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution: Reaching for the Future.

Finally, the 1984-85 Perspectives Thesis -- "Where are the 1980s Going? The Imperative Need for a Totally New Direction in Up-rooting Capitalism-Imperialism" -- concluded with the expression, "Not by practice alone," which became our point of concentration this year. This is the reason why we considered that, in a fundamental way, the 1985 Plenum discussion actually began on the last day of 1984 -- ^{at} the Expanded Resident Editorial Board Meeting held on December 30.* It was there we showed that even when we focus on a single subject, Women's Liberation, the dialectics of revolution can be concretized as it was developed over 35 years -- which means that it was present in embryo even before we had the category of Marxist-Humanism. Both its American roots and its world Humanist concepts manifested themselves not only in those 35 years but throughout the whole of our Archives. This is why the March 21 events in Detroit at the lecture and exhibit of our Archives on deposit with Wayne State University hold such significance for us. What has now given a totally new meaning to the word, Archives, is the realization that only because we now have all of Marx's archives, which include the Ethnological Notebooks, do we fully understand his very first 1844 Humanist Essays, which included the concept of the Man/Woman relationship.

What becomes the essence is this: the new forces of revolution must not be separated from the Reason of revolution, as well as the establishment of new human relations. It is because Marx's "new moments" meant both the recognition of new revolutionary forces as Reason as well as taking the responsibility for developing these inseparable from developing your philosophy, that we have this year reached a new concept of Archives and of the relationship between an Idea in embryo and that same Idea fully developed and projected.

Flowing from all this -- beginning with a view of Marx's Archives and going through our own Archives, including the move to Chicago -- we find a new dimension to the very word, Archives. That is to say, without knowing Marx as a totality through all of his fundamental writings, it was impossible to understand all the ramifications of the very first of Marx's writings in 1843-44 as a historic break in thought. The point is that this first break with capitalism was not only an opposition to what is but an opening to the future. That is what makes one fully grasp that the birth of Marx's Marxism

* The presentation that was given "internally" to the REE at this meeting was presented publicly and videotaped on Jan. 27-Feb. 3.

in embryo was, indeed, a new continent of thought and of revolution.

The Plenum this year, which is the meeting of the full National Editorial Board members and alternates, opens in Executive Session. Friday, August 30, 1985 at 7 pm. All sessions of the Plenum are then opened to all members and to invited friends, who are given the same privileges to the floor for discussion.

The Executive Session on Friday will be preceded by national meetings of both the Youth Committees and the Women's Liberation-N&L Committees.

The two day Plenum will officially open on Saturday morning, August 31, at 9 am with a Welcome by Dave Park. The Perspectives Report will be given by the National Chairwoman, Raya Dunayevskaya. The integrality of philosophy is seen in the "and" in all of the reports this year. Thus, there will be two Organization Reports: Mike Connolly's on "Marxist-Humanist Philosophy in Readers' Views and in Organization"; and Olga Domanski's on "Organization and the New Book, Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution." Eugene Walker will report on "News & Letters and its relationship to Perspectives," and Lou Turner's subreport to Perspectives will be on "Black Dimension and the Caribbean." Peter Mallory will give the report on "Philosophy and Finances."

The final report, on Leadership, becomes an Executive Session for the membership.

With this Call, we are asking the Chicago local to host the Plenum, for the first time, and to be responsible for a Saturday evening party to greet out-of-towners.

Pre-Plenum discussion begins with the issuing of this Call. The Draft Perspectives will appear directly in the pages of the August-September issue of N&L, which comes off the press on August 2, for full discussion through to the Plenum itself. Discussion throughout the summer within our local committees and with all those we can reach and whom we may wish to invite to the Plenum itself becomes a measure of the inseparability we put between preparation for our Plenum and all our many activities throughout the pre-Plenum period.

-- THE RESIDENT EDITORIAL BOARD

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A REVOLUTIONARY CRITICAL LOOK OVER THE HISTORIC BARRIER

Presentation by Jim (Detroit) on "Responsibility for Marxist-Humanism in the Historic Mirror: A Revolutionary Critical Look," February 10, 1985.

INTRODUCTION

December 30 seems like it was months ago. However so new was the presentation that Raya gave on that day that it will determine all our future work. On December 30 the Resident Editorial Board of News and Letters Committees plus a few others from other parts of the country, including Andy and me from Detroit, heard Raya give this presentation. It was titled: "Responsibility Marxist-Humanism in the Historic Mirror: A Revolutionary Critical Look."

When you look at this bulletin where it was published, or when you look at the excerpts from it in the January-February issue of the paper -- titled "Unchaining The Revolutionary Dialectic" -- you'll see that near the beginning it says: "The dialectics of revolution is our subject." You might say that the dialectics of revolution is always our subject, even when we discuss Women's Liberation or contract concessions or Marcus Garvey. But Raya also says that it is the dialectics of revolution that is the reason for reversing the title of the new book for the final class, making it "The Dialectics of Revolution and Women's Liberation," and that the dialectics of revolution will remain the measure of all we do from now on. In fact, this look at the whole, the method of revolution, is not only what characterized this talk on December 30, but also the talk many of us heard in Chicago on January 27, the final class where Raya indeed made the dialectics of revolution the subject of her talk with all four books of Marxist-Humanism included in the outline. Not only then, but for our actual "Marxist-Humanist Perspectives, 1984-85," revolutionary method was the subject more than any analysis of the world situation at this moment. So look at the last three times Raya has given a major presentation. Each one has taken up the sweep of history from Marx, through Lenin and Luxemburg, through to our own age and the birth and development of Marxist-Humanism. Thus, when it says the dialectics of revolution will remain the measure of all we do, it comes as a major statement of our intentions as an organization.

Turning to this bulletin, there are three parts in it. Briefly, the first part, "Unchaining the Revolutionary Dialectic," tries to grapple with the task that we set out in our classes -- "to become practitioners of the dialectical methodology" -- and presents the way that task was per-

ceived and practiced by Marx, and then by Post-Marx Marxists. I will come back to this section in particular in a minute because it poses some things that we cannot take for granted. For now, hold tight to the sentence around which the whole part revolves: "When you look now, dig deep to the oceans below and you will find you can swim only if you never discount the constant return to Hegel."

The second part, "The Big Move," presents the philosophic designation of a whole new epoch. We say it over and over: The movement from practice to theory that is itself a form of theory. But this time geography, or "where," tells the story of a whole new epoch in another way-- whether it was Marx's big moves from Germany to France to Belgium, back to Germany, and to England, or the American Marxists' move from Chicago and away from Marx's American, humanist roots in the early 20th century, and now in 1985 with News and Letters Committees returning and building on those roots by becoming centered in Chicago. I'll return to this in a different way later, too.

And the third part: "The Dialectics of Revolution and of Reason -- From Marx through the post-Marx Marxists to Marxist-Humanism OR The Continuity and Discontinuity between Absolute Method and Absolute Idea as New Beginning: the New Book and the Whole of the Archives." It has a long title, but it also is a lesson in how to make a summation of one's age and of one's original contribution to revolutionary transformation. Thus, in summing up the new Introduction/Overview to the new book, Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution: Reaching for the Future, summing it up in six moments of the dialectic, the whole story of the long and arduous road "from Marx through the post-Marx Marxists to Marxist-Humanism" is made. You may think the Introduction/Overview is about 35 years of writings on Women's Liberation. But because the writings themselves all have "The missing philosophic humus" (not just the Political-Philosophic Letters, although it is especially true of them), the ever more concrete elaboration of Marxist-Humanist philosophy emerges as a concrete totality, once a summation is made like these six dialectic moments Rays singles out: Women's Liberation, the Black dimension, masses in motion, the return to Hegel at crucial times of world transition, revolution in permanence as ground for organization, and the needed total uprooting of capitalism.

It is these six moments of the dialectic that are made possible by the "labor, patience and suffering of the negative." Yet what it says at

the end of this section is that "presence," not just "Promethian vision," (Marx's genius) is needed (perhaps it is a dialectical element) for the new of the epoch. And it continues: "That is not because Promethian vision and reaching for the future doesn't help the next generation see its task. Quite the contrary. That is when discontinuity is not a revision of, but a continuation with the original New moment when there were all sorts of new voices and listening to them was quintessential."

So with that introduction, I want us to turn to Marx's "original New moment." Then we will try to see what was it that stopped, was discontinuous, and what reached forward into the generation of Post-Marx Marxists and into our epoch that helped us see our task. Since "unchaining the dialectic" is the task of each revolutionary generation, it is the title of Part I of this talk. The first subsection of it is titled "Marx Pinpointing In His Age."

I. UNCHAINING THE DIALECTIC

Marx Pinpointing In His Age

If you haven't noticed, what pervades all of Raya's discussions about Marx is his lifelong return to Hegel, the German Idealist philosopher whose philosophy, we learned in Marxism and Freedom, was the first to unite history and human consciousness. Hegel's recognition that human thought advanced through an ongoing battle of ideas was baptized in the French Revolution itself in 1789. Yet how could a philosophy such as Hegel's be taken over by the Prussian state towards the end of Hegel's life in 1831? This is the scene which Marx enters, and it is Marx who saw the historic barrier in Hegel's philosophy.

The historic barrier between Hegel's age and Marx's, the overcoming or transcendence of which that allowed Marx to achieve a new continent of thought when Hegel could not, rested upon the concept of alienation. "Marx holds that Hegel reduces transcendence to accommodation with the irrational world" is how Raya puts it in Philosophy and Revolution (p. 59). "In the end, perhaps, Hegel's 'Absolute,' far from achieving a unity of thought and reality, only led Hegel to accommodation to reality. And the Other of that world of Beautiful Reason, abstract rationalism, is total irrationality of the true existing world." (P&R p. 58) In other words, the struggles of successive stages of human consciousness, one over the other, ended in a resolution at the Absolute Idea. Marx saw that by showing consciousness

as the history of class struggles, you could show that the enemy against human development was not one idea's fight against another, but was the kind of thinking that places the human outside of consciousness.

You can read in Marxism and Freedom also that the historic barrier that classical political economy ran into was not so different than Hegel's. It discovered that the wealth of a society comes from labor, but it was Marx who discovered the laborers whose consciousness would create a new society by burying capitalism. The advantage Marx had was by seeing the birthtime of revolutions flower and the true actors in history take the stage.

What's very new in "Responsibility for Marxist-Humanism in the Historic Mirror" is the discontinuity of our age from Marx's -- at the moment of his break with Hegel and classical political economy. Did it stop anyone else when they read this in it:

"...where Marx broke off in his first open critique of the Hegelian dialectic, at paragraph 384 of Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, you can understand why Marx was compelled to break off -- because, first and foremost, he had discovered that new continent of thought inseparable from revolution. The revolutionary critique is the beginning of the Marxian dialectic." (p. 2)

How could Marx make an incomplete summation of a philosophy he was transcending, and still discover a new continent of thought inseparable from revolution? Is there something in this of the historic barrier of Marx's own age?

Raya begins at the beginning and says, "So far as I am concerned, the new moments in Marx..begin with the very first moment in Marx, the moment of his break with capitalism." (p. 2) At the beginning, I think there are three achievements in Marx's new beginning that laid the foundation for all future development. But first, it must be said that although Marx in 1841, when he wrote his doctoral dissertation, had not discovered a "new element," a Subject, that is what he was searching for. Thus, Marx's aim in writing about an obscure part of Hegel's philosophy was to show that it was insufficient simply to show how the master, Hegel, accommodated himself to reality:

"One must analyze the accommodation not merely to expose it, but in order thereby to discover the inadequacy of the principle which compelled that accommodation. Only in that way could the critique produce an advance in knowledge which would create the possibility of a new beginning." (Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution, p. 122)

So, the point is he was looking in 1841.

Even before he broke from bourgeois society, Marx brought conflict into the real world by concretizing negation of the negation as critique. (Negation of the negation is the moving principle in Hegel.) As a newspaper

editor of the Rheinische Zeitung, Marx wrote to a colleague, Arnold Ruge, in 1842:

"We must not be afraid to criticize the world ruthlessly. I mean ruthlessly in the sense that we must not be afraid of our own conclusions and equally unafraid of coming into conflict with the prevailing powers..The world has long had the dream of something and must only possess the consciousness of it in order to possess it actually." (M&F. p. 53)

Again, revolutionary critique is the beginning of the Marxian dialectic. That was Marx's first achievement.

Then after Marx's battle against press censorship, in defense of the correspondent from the Moselle region, against the numerous laws against wood theft, he broke from bourgeois society, he committed himself to its overthrow, and he began by going to the workers in Paris and became "practical in the Marxian sense of 'practical-critical-revolutionary.'" (RLWLM, p.125) It reflected Marx's discovery of the worker as that "energizing principle" he was looking for. And in fact, Marx, in the Introduction to his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, made the first open declaration of the proletariat:

"'As philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its spiritual weapons in philosophy; and once the lightning of thought has struck deeply into this naive soil of the people, the emancipation of the Germans into men will be accomplished.'" (RLWLM, p.124-5)

The Introduction was published in early 1844 and signalled Marx's second achievement -- discovering the proletariat as a revolutionary Subject.

The third accomplishment happened at the same time with the publication of "On The Jewish Question." In it Marx held that civil emancipation or equality for Jews would only be the first step at real emancipation which Christian society needed desperately, too. Nothing short of "declaring the revolution to be permanent" would do.

In late 1844, Marx wrote what we call the "Humanist Essays." Engels credits Marx with having laid out the foundation for Historical Materialism in them. So by the time Marx comes to Hegel's Philosophy of Mind in The Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic, he has made a foundation in 1) critique, 2) the discovery of the revolutionary Subject, the worker, and 3) the concept of revolution in permanence.

If these were the foundations for Marx's new continent of thought and revolution which he spent the rest of his lifetime developing, how would completing a critique of Hegel's philosophic system in Critique of the Hegelian

Dialectic serve Marx further? Not that I presume that Raya would answer that, but she did recognize that Marx's goal in breaking off was a conscious one:

"The real question is this: Is it possible for another age to make a new beginning upon Hegel's Absolutes, especially absolute negativity, without breaking totally with Hegel? Marx did not think so." (P&R, p.45)

In other words, one must work out the tasks of one's own age. We missed that in Philosophy and Revolution; so, we may have missed Raya's return to the matter of discontinuity again where it comes up again in the Perspectives. The title of one of the sections in it should have been a strong hint: "The Absolute Method -- the Unchained Dialectic." This is what it said:

"That movement from theory becomes the uniqueness of Marxist-Humanist philosophy and our original contribution to Marx's Marxism. That happens to be exactly where Marx left off in his critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, once he discovered his new continent of thought and of revolution." (p. 23)

I think this is why Raya stresses so heavily that Absolute Method is not Absolute Idea; it is the road to the Absolute Idea. The Idea is Marxist-Humanism. The reason is because, she asserts, "You cannot step over historic barriers even with a Promethian vision." (Responsibility, p. 10)

It would take the birth of new passions and new forces to do that, an idea Marx recognized, but has only come to be with, for example, the youth as revolutionaries. (Here Raya shows that the youth personify a revolutionary Subject taking the historic stage, who represent Marx's bequest to us, a reaching for the future.)

The lapses of time between the periods when revolutionaries made returns to Hegel are noted in this essay. Thirty-one years from Marx's death in 1883 to Lenin's search for a revolutionary way out of the morass of World War I, and 30 years from Lenin's death in 1923 to the breakthrough on the Absolute Idea by Raya in 1953. Those gaps also represent historic barriers. The first return to Hegel by a Post-Marx Marxist in the first generation of them was Lenin. So it is to him and Rosa Luxemburg that I'll turn in the second subsection, "The Half-Way Stop in the Hegelian-Marxian Dialectic by Post-Marx Marxists."

The Half-Way Stop in the Hegelian-Marxian Dialectic by Post-Marx Marxists

For that first generation of Marxists after Marx, it wasn't enough to have an energizing principle. They "listened to the revolutionary unorganized workers" -- yet "held onto the political revolutionary aspect

without any concern for philosophy." (Responsibility, p. 2-3) For Luxemburg, her profound sensing of opportunism in and break from Kautsky was not extended to an understanding of "how total was the lack of comprehension of Marx's philosophy of revolution that would extend beyond any single question" -- like nationalism or the Morocco incident. Her stubbornness on the national question -- holding there is no revolutionary struggle besides the proletariat's -- is obviously not Marx's. But what it paralleled was an attitude to the dialectic not fundamentally different from Lenin's when it came to a universal: organization. Lenin's return to Hegel to discover the revolutionary method in Marx (Lenin turned to criticizing all Marxists for not understanding Hegel's Science of Logic and therefore Marx's Capital) led to the creation of a concrete universal for his age in 1917; the revolutionary government would have to be ruled by all, to a man, woman and child. Yet so indelible was the stamp of the Second, Marxist International's economism that Lenin did not make a category, a concept of his return to Hegel by publishing his Philosophic Notebooks. (Please see item #29 of the Archives exhibit, the first page of Raya's translation of Lenin's Abstract of Hegel's Science of Logic.) An encounter with organization would have followed.

For Luxemburg, though she could come so close to re-establishing the Marxian revolutionary dialectic as to analyze the 1905 Russian Revolution in her own age as a new kind of revolution that Marx foresaw after the defeat of the 1848 Revolutions of his own age, and though she could raise the question of spontaneity of the masses as a necessary ingredient for revolutionary organization, she did not make her own break with Kautsky "into the kind of universal that others could recognize and accept." (RLWLM, p.119) Her universal remained as it was in her summation of the 1905 Russian Revolution. Stepping into the period of open revolutionary struggle depended upon one important condition: unity of the Party. (This is from her address to the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party in 1907.)

That left the 30-year gap in the development of the revolutionary dialectic from Lenin to our own age -- another historic barrier. What Lenin could not see was Stalinism as a new state-capitalist age. His Philosophic Notebooks could even be used by Stalin against Bukarin in factional debates instead of as historic mirror to be held against what he had warned -- a return to capitalism. (See item #23 of the Archives exhibit, the original published analysis of "Russia as State-Capitalist Society by Freddie Forest.)

It was on the question of national liberation that Lenin created another concrete universal flowing from his encounter with Hegel -- that national liberation could be the "bascillus" for revolution by the industrial worker. But if Lenin did not leave the philosophic humus for his political breakthroughs, a new movement from practice to theory, the Third World revolutions today, helped close the 30-year gap. Yet it only brought us to the threshold of the Idea. The third subsection is therefore called "Creating the Idea -- Marxist-Humanism."

Creating the Idea -- Marxist-Humanism

Please go back to Perspectives where the opposition to transcending a historic barrier is revealed at the time of the Bolivian Revolution in 1952:

"A new sense of objectivity cried out to be released, but none were there to embrace it as two kinds of subjectivity engaged in internal tensions, inevitable but nevertheless diversionary from the objectively developing new situation. We were nearing the eve of 1953, that is to say, the philosophic breakthrough in the Absolute Idea, which saw in it not only a movement from theory but from practice which led to recapturing the philosophy of Marx's Humanism and the departure of those who refused to go beyond the theory of state-capitalism." (p. 15)

Yet just because Raya did go on to complete Hegel's system -- into the Philosophy of Mind where Marx had not gone -- it didn't end the matter of meeting historic barriers. When revolution aborted itself in the 1960s -- at its highest point in France, 1968 -- there were those who did not agree on what our unique task is. To those, Raya wrote The Newness of Our Philosophic-Historic Contribution and stated that theoretic preparation is "on the one hand, the strictly philosophic problems in a comprehensiveness never attempted before, and, on the other hand, 'Economic Reality and the Dialectics of Revolution' appearing in so varied, contradictory forms as to fail to measure up to the challenge of our era." What jumped off the page when I read it this time was this:

"..Lenin didn't follow Hegel into the Philosophy of Mind, Marx, who did, left the analysis unfinished as he pursued his thoroughly original discovery of Historical Materialism. It did, of course, reappear as he split the Absolute into two in Capital. But where it concerned 'direct' contact with Hegel as the latter was tracing a process, a philosophic process, Marx happened to have broken off after he reached paragraph 384, though I didn't know this in the exhilaration over Stalin's death, when I chose to begin my analysis of the Philosophy of Mind with paragraph 385. (p. 8)

It is ironic that "Richard" to whom this was addressed was making an equation between Marcuse's and our philosophy. It was against Mao's state-capitalist politics that Raya used the phrase "Two Kinds of Subjectivity." (Please see item #96 in the Archives exhibit, the dissident Chinese translation of "The Challenge of Mao Tse-tung.") But she began by working it out in relation to Marcuse who missed the Marxist-Humanist method behind the recognition of state-capitalism. Although the Frankfurt School, of which Marcuse was one, began as a "critical school," "critical" became an avoidance of Marx's critical revolutionary-practical activity. On the other hand, 1960 was the beginning of the recognition "that theory and philosophy are not the same." (See item #84 from the Archives exhibit, a letter from Marcuse to Raya and Raya's answer in 1960 during a period of ongoing correspondence between them.) Back then, first with that correspondence with Marcuse and then in the addition of "In Place of a Conclusion: Two Kinds of Subjectivity" to Marxism and Freedom in 1964, the ground was set for the "plunge into paths untrodden even by Marx and Lenin." (Responsibility, p. 7)

Practically that revolutionary critique of Mao, of Marcuse and of Richard meant that no longer would we countenance state-capitalist theory without Marxist-Humanist philosophy, a barrier we are only now coming to terms with conceptually. I say that because 1969 when The Newness of Our Philosophic-Historic Contribution was written was also when The Raya Dunayevskaya Collection was assembled and presented for all to participate in -- the Archives. Only now are we having an encounter with Archives in a way that in the most Marxian-practically way advances our contribution in a way that was not possible even in Marx's age, though he founded Historical Materialism and left the humus for all future generations until capitalism is totally uprooted. However our theoretical grasp of the epoch we live in and the new forces as Reason can only represent an unchained dialectic when it is summarized as concrete and universal. For us now, our concrete universal is March 21 and it is to that we must turn. Thus, the second part of this talk is called "The Big Lecture."

II. THE BIG LECTURE

It shouldn't be any surprise now that the next public presentation by Raya will again discuss the whole. Our flyer will say: Raya Dunayevskaya, founder of Marxist-Humanism in the U.S., speaks on "Dialectics of Revolu-

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tion: American Roots and World Humanist Concepts." With this lecture, we are coming into a realization of what Detroit as Subcenter means, as it was posed as part of "The Big Move." First, let's be careful to note that Raya observes that "high tech has now shifted the center (of News & Letters) away from what was the CIO and the UAW: Detroit." Yet what that acknowledges is that a legacy of Black, women's, youth and labor struggles runs through Detroit. Our foundation in four forces of revolution as Reason (a concrete universal) reappears today as youth opposition to a police state in the Detroit schools, and tomorrow as Black women challenging the male chauvenism of Civil Rights leaders at a Martin Luther King commemoration, and the next day as immigrant, white and Black women challenging sweatshop conditions at U.S. Auto Radiator, and the day after that as the unemployed challenging the state bureaucracy. All these appear in the paper and in local activity.

But not only is that Detroit "culture." "How fares the concrete universal philosophically?" is a question we must work out again and again. Put another way, "Dialectics of Revolution: American Roots and World Humanist Concepts" is the concrete universal we must grasp over 30 years since it was posed as our goals in Marxism and Freedom, and we must ask how have they been enriched? The six dialectic moments posed in "Responsibility for Marxist-Humanism in the Historic Mirror" each were there at the beginning, and each has self-developed to the point where, unlike the "Trilogy of Revolution," a fourth one, Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution: Reaching for the Future, presents them as a new beginning, a book about Marxist-Humanism's method.

It should be added here that there is a summation in the minutes by Raya where she reiterates, or rather subordinates the idea of Historic Mirror for "personal responsibility." Although the Big Move and this part of the meeting on December 30 on personal responsibility took up Chicago tasks, the non-geographical nature of "where" as a philosophic designation of the epoch means we can include ourselves -- as members, as a Detroit local, as members-to-be. Can the Detroit local committee grow as a Subcenter in the same way that the whole organization has grown through The Big Move. I mean whether "personal responsibility" or "historic mirror" is the idea in front of us, unchaining the dialectic is our goal. Laying the ground as well as executing technical arrangements for March 21 is our practice of that.

As an example of the ground we want to establish, I want to take

the final dialectic, the need for total uprooting which Raya says we meet in the Introduction/Overview where it takes up the fourth part of the new book, "The Trail to the 1980s." If Marx didn't leave us a path through Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, he did leave us Mind as Action. At the moment he created Historical Materialism, the man/woman relationship was posed as the measure of a truly positive, humanist society, beyond vulgar communism. Marx's activity as a mind in action extended all the way to his last decade where the man/woman relation again was the yardstick for freedom in primitive and modern society. This practice of critique which knows no enclave, no separation between Life and science, today is expressed as a whole Women's Liberation Movement that began its discussion of the dialectic with criticism of the Left -- the male chauvenist Left. Marx's last decade likewise culminated a life of development as Philosopher of Permanent Revolution Creating Ground for Organization to the point where he criticized the Marxists of his day in the Critique of the Gotha Program for posing a program that compromised on its vision of a new society. That legacy meets a Women's Liberation Movement that has seriously posed the question: Can organization be the pathway to liberation?

However it is only Marxist-Humanism which has met Marx's practice of philosophy of revolution. Can there be a single movement uniting critique as both a new movement from practice and the Self-thinking Idea in a new age? Our organization could be the order of the day if we make it our historic responsibility.

The exhibit for The Raya Dunayevskaya Collection and the March 21 lecture, or our view of them, likewise can be the "place" where this goal can begin anew, that is, to bring the age to an understanding of itself. Already, I have tried to illustrate this talk from examples from the exhibit. Of course, it is not merely something that will be in the gallery of Reuther Library and then disappear. It has not come into being merely by appearing, and it will remain Subject or Method for our unique historical organizing before, during and after the lecture. There is not a topic and no revolutionary pathway -- or concrete universal -- that doesn't go through the exhibit. Who will we bring to Reuther Library so that they can merge their own experiences and Subjectivity with Marxist-Humanism's? And how can we reach out to people to make that mergence on March 21 in a way that establishes ground for membership in the organization of the Absolute Idea -- Marxist-Humanism? We have gotten a great assist from Raya in this discussion towards those ends.

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LETTER OF PETER (L.A.) TO RAYA, ON CONCRETIZING THE NEW STAGE

May 20, 1985

Dear Raya,

The past several weeks, from Olga's tour of the West Coast to the recent trip to Salt Lake City, have so illuminated the new stage flowing from March 21 as well as the many enclaves in the way of its actualization that I want to make that the focus of this report on West Coast developments.

The failure to grasp March 21 as THE concretization of 'Not by Practice Alone', is hardly restricted to a question of one local; indeed, each local and each one of us faces anew the problem of so practicing the Idea as Marxist-Humanism as to never again make an abstraction out of Absolute Idea as New Beginning. That concept hit home most recently, in terms of my own preparation for the trip to Salt Lake.

Ted as you know got me a plane ticket by having me speak at a Conference on "Economic Anthropology" on the topic "Marx's Ethnological Notebooks: Women's Liberation in Primitive and Modern Society". As you know I did not want to restrict that talk to merely showing the "new moments" of Marx's last decade, but instead how a serious Marxist philosopher takes responsibility for working them out as a trail to the 1980's. I thus planned on spending fully half of my talk on the development from RLWLMPR to the new book WL&DOR in order to show how only Marxist-Humanism has met that historic responsibility. But just as I was about to leave for the airport the REB Minutes of May 13 arrived; as you moved to pose the "three fundamental theoretic contributions to Marxism for our age" it became clear to me that my conclusion that Marxist-Humanism is the key to working out the trail from the Ethnological Notebooks to the 1980's did not fully flow, for I had not focused sufficient attention upon the specific unique, philosophic contributions of Marxist-Humanism that you singled out in the REB Minutes of May 13. Whereas I was trying to present the new book as "proof" of how Marxist-Humanism jammed Marx's Humanism together with today's realit Marxist-Humanism as THE MEDIATION between Marx and today, that allow that link to be concretely forged and developed, did not come across explicit enough in the paper. The question of absolute method being but pathway to concretizing the Idea as Marxist-Humanism took on new meaning for me.

I thus decided to change the title of the talk to 'Marx's Ethnological Notebooks: its Relation to Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Evolution' and re-wrote some sections of it "in transit" to convey how it requires the re-creation of Marx's Humanism as Marxist-Humanism to even begin to grasp all that is involved in those Ethnological Notebooks for today. Whether or not I succeeded in my aim you can see for yourself; my point is that breaking down the barriers standing in the way of practicing the Idea as Marxist-

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Karl Marx's Ethnological Notebooks:

Its Relation to Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution*

By Peter, L.A.

Today we want to take a "voyage of discovery" into Karl Marx's Ethnological Notebooks by examining its ramifications for today's forces of liberation, women's liberation in particular. Our aim in grappling with Marx's last decade (1875-1883) is to discern the dialectics of revolution--i.e., the pathway of re-creating Marx's Marxism in face of today's realities.

In entering into this discussion of Marx's last decade, we need to be painfully aware of just how long it has taken for Marx's Ethnological Notebooks to reach the light of day. These Notebooks (numbering over 260 pages) were written by Marx between 1880-81 and discovered by Frederick Engels several weeks following Marx's death. Neither then nor later, however, did Engels publish them, choosing instead to issue his Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, a work (as we will see) much at variance with Marx's analysis. It was not until 1923, when David Ryazanov announced their "discovery" that the extent of Marx's work on anthropology began to become known. Even then, they remained buried in the archives until 1941, when one section--Marx's Notes on Henry Lewis Morgan's Ancient Society--was published in Russian only. It was not until 1972 that we finally obtained a full transcription of Marx's Ethnological Notebooks. And yet 13 years later, its ramifications for today's forces of revolution, women's liberation in particular, have yet to be seriously grappled with either by post-Marx Marxists or academic anthropologists.

*Paper delivered at a Conference on "Economic Anthropology", May 17, 1985 in Salt Lake City

Humanism applies to everything we do.

There is no doubt that the talk at the Conference opened some new doors for us, shown in the fact that as soon as the talk ended we sold three copies of RLWLMPR, and ended up staying in the room for two more hours engaged in constant discussions. The best and most enthused were the young "unprofessional" students around Ted. All of this came to a climax at the local meeting the next morning-- at 8:00 a.m.--we were all amazed that 12 attended at such an hour. Most of the not-yet members there were new to the movement but very interested in Marxist-Humanism. I gave a 40 minute or so talk on the new stage flowing from March 21, how we got there and what are perspectives for Salt Lake to concretize; I tried to do so by focusing on the new vol. 11 of the Archives, tracing the process from RLWLMPR to Miners General Strike Pamphlet, to Grenada PPL, to 'Not by Practice Alone', the new book, March 21 again, ending on Bitburg analysis and Salt Lake City tasks. Much of the discussion focused on who could make plenum.

It should not have to be said that making so many new friends when you reach a new stage also means you find out how many former "friends" are now enemies. And yet that also came out at the conference and frankly surprised all the comrades quite a bit. Thus, from the start of discussion we were sharply attacked by several of the "professional" anthropologists for "not seeing that Marx's analysis is irrelevant" because he used "outdated data"! One of our friends openly defended us in discussion, attacking the comment on "insufficient data" by saying "what is important is not the data but Marx's method". One academic who came closer, not more distant, was the editor of Economic Forum, who came over afterwards to discuss the differences of Marx and Engels, and asked me to send my paper into her journal for publication. The proof of the fact that March 21 as a new stage became a new stage for Salt Lake was seen both in the new periphery and the divide from those whorefuse to accept the dialectics of revolution.

What the experience of this week has taught me about the West Coast as a whole, is that sometimes when a local is smaller and younger, precisely because it has less of the "old" in the way, it will be able to catch the new stage quicker IF it has an organizer like Ted who really sinks his teeth into it. That means for me an even more relentless struggle for all of us to overcome the barriers in the way of practicing the idea as Marxist-Humanism. And I think we did make a modest beginning the meeting we had in LA on the March 21 video, when 10 outsiders showed up. I am not trying to claim that LA is "flying" like Salt Lake, but the point is how much we can take off when it is in strict relation to the new stage.

Yours,

Peter

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One writer who has probed into Marx's last decade in order to work out its "new moments" as a "trail" to the realities of the 1980's is Raya Dunayevskaya, founder of Marxist-Humanism in the U.S. In Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution (1982) she analyzed Marx's last decade both "in itself" and as it illuminates the gap between Marx's Marxism and all post-Marx Marxists, beginning with Frederick Engels. Her latest work, Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution: Reaching for the Future (1985) is a collection of 29 essays covering a 35 year period revealing the process by which she has labored to connect Marx's Marxism to today's women's liberation movement. Because the integrality of reason and reality, dialectics and revolution is the vantage point we consider most appropriate for catching the todayness of Marx's last decade, we will examine the Ethnological Notebooks in relation to how Dunayevskaya has posed its "new moments" as a trail to the 1980's in the development of her two most recent works.

I. The New Moments of Marx's Ethnological Notebooks

In Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution Dunayevskaya discusses Marx's last decade in the context of a critique of all post-Marx Marxists, beginning with Engels, for failing to re-create the uniqueness of Marx's "new continent of thought and of revolution" as revealed especially in Marx's last decade. Indeed, a careful reading of Marx's Ethnological Notebooks reveals sharp differences between it and Engels' Origin, particularly on the question of the transition period between "primitive" communism and full-blown class society. Whereas Marx focused on this transition period in order to discern the latent contradictions of caste, rank differentiation, and non-reciprocal man/woman relations present within the primitive commune that ultimately

led to the dissolution of that societal form, Engels treated the emergence of class society as arising outside the internal contradictions of primitive communism, through an alleged "world historic defeat of the female sex" in the conquest of matriachy by patriarchy. Whereas a counter-revolutionary defeat became the point of departure for Engels, a revolutionary-critical analysis of the dualities within primitive communism became the point of departure for Marx.

Throughout his Notebooks Marx issued a relentless criticism of such early anthropologists as John Budd Phear, Henry Sumner Maine, and John Lubbock while displaying reserved appreciation for more serious writers like Henry Lewis Morgan. But Marx displayed neither as uncritical an attitude towards Morgan or the anthropological material he presented in his Ancient Society as did Engels after Marx's death. Marx took note of the more egalitarian man/woman relations of Iroquois society, contrasting it again and again in his Notebooks to the "asinine conventionalities" of the "civilized" West. He did not fail to note, however,

The women allowed to express their wishes and opinions through an orator of their own selection. Decision given by the council: Unanimity was a fundamental law of action among the Iroquois. Military questions usually left to the action of the voluntary principle [underlining is Marx's] - [Ethnological Notebooks, p. 162]

Marx was not about to overlook certain limitations in the greater freedoms enjoyed by Iroquois women simply because communal social relations predominated in that society. Throughout his Notebooks he noted the freer man/woman relations of "primitive" societies without surrendering his critical-revolutionary method of tracing out the dualities within primitive communism. In his notes from Phear's The Aryan Village Marx called attention to the fact that

Wives may not worship the family idol of any visible thakur, except the clay figure of Siwa made for everyday worship. The shastras forbid to women and Sudras all knowledge and use of sacred texts. [EN, p. 259]

Marx traced the existence of such limitations to women's freedom to the division of mental and manual labor, i.e., the social division of labor, especially as manifested in differentiation of chiefs and ranks. After taking note of Morgan's observation that women in Iroquois society had consultative power in the "election" of chiefs, Marx wrote,

Naturally, because he is the chief (and theoretically always elected)...as artificial and mere administrative authority...

This is as normal as everything else: the chief remains only theoretically elective, only independent, within the gens, respectively, within the tribe. [EN, pp. 309-10]

The presence of such divisions between chiefs and ranks not only created limitations upon the actual power of women in that society but also signified, in Marx's view, that the seeds of class society lay buried within the seeming equality of the primitive commune. Marx wrote,

This shows that, as soon as differences of rank between blood relatives of the same gens exist, these come into conflict with the gentile principle and gens in its contradictoriness can petrify into caste. [EN, p. 183]

As conquest became more widespread within a given indigenous group (Marx focused particular attention on the Athapascans in this regard) the social division of labor expressed in the differentiation of chiefs and ranks gave rise to slavery, increased petty-commodity exchange between communities, and conflict between the gens and the family. Ultimately,

Property differences within the same gens had transformed the unity of their interests into antagonisms of its members; in addition, besides land and cattle, money capital had become of decisive importance with the development of slavery. [EN, p. 213]

Marx was not letting excitement at the discovery of "higher forms" of man/woman relations prevent him from discerning the dualities within the communal form. In doing so he was concretizing the very methodology he laid out in the

second German edition of Capital Vol. I when he wrote,

The dialectic...regards every historically developed form as being in a fluid state, in motion, and therefore grasps its transient aspect as well...it does not let itself be impressed by anything, being in its very essence critical and revolutionary. [Capital, Vol. I, p.103]

Engels' Origin, on the other hand, tied the decline of primitive communism to the entrance of an outside force--the 'world historic defeat of the female sex' in the conquest of matriarchy by patriarchy. Though Engels' claimed after Marx's death that his Origin was a "bequest" of Marx, that phrase was Engels', not Marx's. Marx never took as his point of departure any 'world historic defeat' or counter-revolution, and least of all in studying "ancient society". Marx's very impulse to study Morgan's Ancient Society arose from his desire to discern the revolutionary potential of . . . pre-capitalist communal social relations in what we now call the "Third World"--a question that had concerned Marx ever since his 1857-58 Grundrisse first probed into the "Asiatic Mode of Production". Indeed, the direction in which Marx's study of "primitive" communism would lead him was indicated as early as the first (1867) edition of Capital, where Marx wrote in a footnote to the crucial section "Fetishism of Commodities" that "primitive communal property gives rise to different forms of its dissolution." As against any Engelsian search for "root causes" of oppression, Marx focused on the "rural commune as the last period of the archaic formation" because he was examining it in relation to actual revolution.

II. Working out the Trail from Marx's Last Decade to Today in the 1980's.

The full significance of Marx's Ethnological Notebooks is hardly restricted to Marx's meticulous tracing out of the dualities within primitive communism. Recognizing the originality of Marx's Marxism as against ALL post-Marx Marxists, beginning with Engels, is not where the ramifications of Marx's last decade ends, but rather where it first begins. For once grasping the distinctiveness of Marx's Marxism as illuminated by the "new moments" of his last decade, the challenge then becomes to concretize Marx's philosophy of "revolution in permanence" for today's forces of revolution.

What compels us to face this challenge is not so much the subjective motivation of theoreticians as much as the objective reality of our age's aborted and unfinished revolutions, revolutions whose release of elemental mass creativity have all-too-often been shackled by the narrow alternatives imposed by post-Marx Marxists and non-Marxists alike. It is precisely the gaping philosophic void within the Marxist movement that has compelled each new generation of revolutionaries to unearth heretofore unpublished and unavailable writings of Marx. Thus, it was after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution that Marx's 1844 Humanist Essays were first translated into English and reached wide discussion. It was after the 1949 Chinese national revolution renewed interest in Marx's writings on the Third World that Marx's 1857-58 Grundrisse were finally pried from the archives. And it was after the emergence of new forces of liberation in the 1960's and 1970's, particularly those posing questions such as the relation of women to

revolution, that helped spark interest in Marx's heretofore buried Ethnological Notebooks.

Despite the belated discussion these Ethnological Notebooks are now starting to receive, the task of working out its ramifications for today's women's liberation movement has yet to be taken up by post-Marx Marxists, academic antropologists, or women's liberation theorists. Precisely because working out the relation of Marx's last decade to today is so needed, we want to focus our attention in the rest of this essay on the pathway Dunayevskaya has taken to join the two, as expressed in the development from Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution (1982) to her new work, Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution: Reaching for the Future (1985).

In order to grasp what is involved in working out Marx's "new moments" as "trail" to the 1980's it is first necessary for us to grasp that the task is not one of updating Marx, much less dogmatically repeating conclusions he came to a century ago. On the contrary, connecting Marx's "new moments" to today's realities demands that we, one, catch the new in our era that illuminates Marx's Marxism anew, and two, re-create Marxism as a philosophy of revolution to meet the challenges of our era. That both are needed in order to forge a trail from Marx's day to our own is developed in the Introduction/Overview to Dunayevskaya's newest work, Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution.

In the Introduction/Overview to her new work Dunayevskaya presents the newsness of today's women's liberation movement in the context of the novel character of freedom struggles of the post-world war II era. She writes,

What distinguishes the newness and uniqueness of women's liberation in our age is the very nature of the epoch, which signified at one and the same time a new stage of production--automation--and a new stage of cognition. The fact that the movement from practice was itself a form of theory was manifested in the Miners General Strike of 1949-50, during which the miners battling automation were focusing not on wages but on totally new questions about the kind of labor men should do, and why there was such a deep gulf between thinking and doing. [Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution, p. 1]

The conception of our age's "movements from practice being themselves forms of theory" was developed at length in Dunayevskaya's first book, Marxism and Freedom: from 1776 to Today in 1957. Marxism and Freedom traced out the movement from practice of the post-world war II world in the context of the movements from practice of the age of Hegel; Marx and Lenin. It argued that the new stage of workers' revolt in the battles against automation, where the very quality of human relations at the point of production was being questioned, demanded the re-creation of Marxism in light of its American roots and world humanist concepts. The first edition of Marxism and Freedom thus included as appendix the first English translation of Marx's 1844 Humanist Essays. The book as a whole presented Marxism as a "thoroughgoing Naturalism or Humanism" as expressed both in heretofore unstudied writings such as his 1844 Manuscripts and in the new illumination given to Marx's writings by the freedom struggles of the post-world war II era. This manner of inter-relating Marx's Humanism with reality is a red thread connecting all of Dunayevskaya's many writings, including her most recent work, which spans from a 1950 essay on the Miners Wives to articles dealing with the women's liberation movement of today.

Grasping what is new in the freedom struggles of one's era does not reduce the task of the theoretician to being a mere "recorder" of what the masses are doing. Rather, the fact that our age's movements from practice "are themselves forms of theory" compels revolutionists to meet them with a full theoretical expression. As Dunayevskaya says in her Introduction/Overview,

Put another way, new forces of revolution were challenging the theoretician to come up with nothing short of new forms of cognition, a new way of life. [WL&DOR, p. 11]

That challenge was taken up in her next book, Philosophy and Revolution, in 1973. Its first chapter examined Hegel's concept of "absolute negativity" both "in and for itself" and as it illuminated the methodology practiced by

Marx his entire adult life. Philosophy and Revolution argued that grasping Hegel's concept of "absolute negativity as a new beginning" not only "sets the record straight" in terms of Marx's debt to Hegel but also challenges revolutionists to re-create Marx's Marxism for our age as a philosophy of revolution. That challenge is developed in Dunayevskaya's new work as well: its chapter 13 is actually a reprint of chapter nine of Philosophy and Revolution.

The challenge of re-creating Marx's Marxism as a philosophy of revolution in light of the new . . . of our era became the point of departure for Dunayevskaya's critique of post-Marx Marxists in her third book, Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution. In the Introduction/Overview to her new work, she poses this by concluding,

The absolute method allows for no private enclaves--i.e., exceptions to the principle of Marx's dialectics, whether in the theoretical or organizational questions. As Marx insisted from the very beginning, nothing can be a private enclave, neither any part of life, nor organization, nor even science. In his Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts he wrote that 'to have one basis for science and another for life is a priori a lie.' [WL&DOR, p. 15]

It is this inter-relating of Marx's philosophy of revolution with . . . forces of liberation and actual revolutions--what Dunayevskaya calls the dialectics of revolution--that is the red thread connecting the 29 essays of Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution. The point is that the task of connecting Marx's "new moments" to today is not a mere question of updating Marx, nor of trying to "apply" what Marx ^{wrote} a century ago to today. Rather, the trail from catching Marx's "new moments" to working it out for today proceeds along the route of catching what is new in the forces of revolution of our era that illuminate Marx's Marxism anew and . . . re-creating Marx's new continent of thought and of revolution to meet the objective and subjective realities of today.

With this conception before us, we are now in a better position to grasp the actual pathway through which Dunayevskaya has worked to connect Marx's last decade to today's women's liberation movement in her most recent work.

Part I of Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution, like the book as a whole, does not present its various essays in the order in which they were written. Its first chapter consists, not of a 1950 essay on "The Miners Wives", but rather with a 1969 essay, "The Women's Liberation Movement as Reason and as Revolutionary Force." In this essay we encounter an anticipation of what Dunayevskaya develops in 1982 when she writes, "insofar as the enslavement of women is concerned, it occurred within the communal society itself, before the institution of slavery". She adds "[Marx's] dialectic was a great voyage of discovery for all because it let us see the antagonistic duality of opposing forces". Thus, long before Marx's Ethnological Notebooks were even transcribed, Dunayevskaya was presenting the newness of this age's women's liberation movement in the context of the specificity and historic originality of Marx's Marxism.

The last essay in Part I, entitled "The Trail from Marx's Philosophy of Revolution to Today's Women's Liberation Movement" poses the relation of Marx's writings of his last decade, not so much to that of women in "primitive" society, as to women of the contemporary post-world war II world. In this essay Dunayevskaya presents an argument in favor of connecting Marxism and feminism through the concept of revolution, WHEN that means "revolution in permanence" as not limited to objective revolutions, but extended to revolutions in human relations, whether they be in the "state", "organization", or "at home". We have seen how she considers the Reason of today's women's liberation movement to lie in its challenge to sexist relations, not only as existing within capitalism, but in so-called "socialism" and pre-capitalist societies as well. As we have also seen, the cognitive determinant to all of Marx's labors in his last decade was tracing out each social formation in relation to the need for a revolutionary uprooting. As against trying to "connect" socialism and feminism through Engels or other post-Marx Marxisms, Dunayevskaya argues for a new unity of feminist consciousness with the Marxism of Marx on the ground of

the Ethnological Notebooks. Marx's last decade thus is seen as having ramifications not alone for women of "primitive society" but for women in search of a revolutionary theory today.

PART II, 'Revolutionaries All', presents the actual participation of women in revolution as well as the unfinished character of those revolutions, from the 1905 Russian Revolution and its impact on Iran (where women 'soviets' were first formed) to the near-revolutions of the 1960's. One of the major challenges issued by women's liberation to today's unfinished revolution has been its critique of the elitist, overly-centralized parties "to lead". In Part III, 'Sexism, Politics and Revolution-- Is There an Organizational Answer', we encounter the various ways in which women's liberation has raised this critique of organization, whether in Iran or Portugal, Japan or the U.S. Dunayevskaya does not pretend to offer any "answer" for whether there is a "new form of organization" in this section however, precisely because she believes that new organizational forms cannot be created today "unless they are rooted in Marx's philosophy of revolution". The final Part IV: 'The Missing Link--Philosophy--in the Relation of Revolution to Organization' thus presents both Marx's Marxism as developed from 1843-83 and the very process of working out Marx's new moments as a "trail to the 1980's."

The last chapter in this Part IV--indeed, it is the final chapter of the book as a whole--consists of the first piece of writing Dunayevskaya embarked upon once completing her Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution-- responses to questions posed about her book on her Marx Centenary lecture tour. One of her responses to a question concerning whether - Marx's last decade was a break or continuity in Marx's earlier stages of development consisted of the following:

In the 1850's, for example, what inspired Marx to return to the study of pre-capitalist formations and gave him a new appreciation of ancient society and its craftsmen was the Taiping Rebellion. It opened so many

doors to 'history and its process' that Marx now concluded that historically-philosophically speaking, A NEW STAGE of production, far from being a mere change in property form, be it "West" or "East", was such a change in production relations that it disclosed, in embryo, the dialectics of revolution. [WL&DOR, p. 268]

Once singling out the new moments of Marx's last decade, Dunayevskaya began to work out the relation of that last decade to the whole of Marx's development: only thereby could the "new moments" of Marx's last decade reveal the dialectics of revolution. The whole first section of Part IV of Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution thus consists of essays showing how Marx concretized a philosophy of revolution through the four decades of his development--from the 1840's Communist Manifesto to the 1857 Grundrisse to the 1875-83 last decade. The final essay in this section--"Marx's New Humanism and the Dialectics of Women's Liberation in Primitive and Modern Societies"--(also written during the Marx Centenary year) shows how Marx met the empiric concrete of primitive communism in his last decade armed with the fullness of his new continent of thought and of revolution. There is no doubt that the particular conclusions Marx came to concerning whether or not a Third World nation could achieve socialism without having to undergo the vicissitudes of capitalism changed from 1843 to 1883. But far from that signifying any point of break in Marx's development from one decade to the next, it meant instead that in constantly bringing his philosophy of revolution to bear on new realities that Marx was hewing out new pathways to revolution. Marx was not about to follow Mihailovsky who argued that Marx's "accumulation of capital" was a universal for the East as well as the West. Instead, with his eyes glued to the actual possibilities for revolution on a world scale as well as upon the internal contradictions of the communal form itself, Marx insisted on 'leaving the door open' as to whether or not the Third World could "bypass" a capitalist development process. He left the door open, because he concluded that "everything depends on the historic environment" of revolution that a particular nation finds itself in;

what enabled Marx to come to that conclusion was that he so jammed his philosophy of revolution up with reality as to unchain the dialectic. Thereby, the point at which Marx "concluded" his life's work could become, not an end-point, but a point of departure for future generations.

Precisely because Dunayevskaya considers that as the legacy Marx left us, she concludes her work, not with section 1 of Part IV (entitled 'Reality and Philosophy') but with a second section entitled 'The Challenge from Today's Global Crises'. This consists of four chapters, three of them presenting early drafts and letters concerning the creation of her 1982 Luxemburg and Marx book. The reader hereby is made conscious of the process involved in recreating Marx's Humanism for our age as Marxist-Humanism. Just as Marx's jamming together of reality with the philosophy of revolution in his last decade 'left the door open' for future generations to concretize the dialectics of revolution, so Dunayevskaya's jamming together of Marxist-Humanism with today's women's liberation movement opens the door for scholars as well as activists to participate in the concretization of the dialectics of revolution.

It is not then as if "discovering" the new moments of Marx's last decade is where your work as a theoretician ends. That is where it first begins. For only then do you face the responsibility of concretizing those new moments for today's realities. As Dunayevskaya writes,

The trail to the 1500's that Marx left us in his last decade is not something one picks up en route to somewhere else. It requires labor, hard labor, to work out, and the work is never done until once and for all, we're done with capitalism and have achieved new human relations. The dialectics of revolution keep re-emerging in ever newer appearances as new forces and new passions are born anew. And yet the dialectic principle of second negativity never changes. [Marxist-Humanist Perspectives, 1985, p. 24]

What flows from Dunayevskaya's treatment of the ramifications of Marx's last decade for today's women's liberation movement, is that no force of revolution, and women's liberation included, can meet the challenge of its own passions for freedom unless it connects action and theory with a philosophy of revolution, Marx's philosophy of revolution. The pathway she has taken to work out the

"trail" from Marx's last decade to the 1980's has been through the dialectics of revolution. What makes Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution such exciting reading, in my view, is that it presents a pathway each serious revolutionist and theoretician must work out for themselves if we are to truly re-create Marx's Humanism for today's realities.

In concluding, I want to return to a point I raised at the start of this presentation: the fact that despite the 13-year time span since their publication, neither academic anthropologists or post-Marx marxists to our knowledge (with the exception of Dunayevskaya) has attempted to work out the relation of Marx's Ethnological Notebooks to women's liberation. This is in large measure due, there is no doubt, to the widespread neglect of the Notebooks in the century since their creation. At the same time, there are analysts who are increasingly digging into Marx's last decade, particularly as regards the question of the peasantry. Why then, the lacunae on relating these writings to women's liberation in "primitive" and modern society? The reason, in our view, is the tendency of all-too-many writers on Marx's last decade not to dig into the red thread of continuity that links each decade of Marx's development--the dialectics of revolution.* For when the dialectics of revolution is not grasped, the necessity to discern the connection between each concept and fact in Marx's analysis to actual revolutionary forces is all too easily glossed over. Our focus in this presentation on relating Marx's Ethnological Notebooks to women's liberation through the dialectics of revolution, is thus hardly accidental. The dialectics of revolution, whether as expressed in the development of Marx's Humanism or of Marxist-Humanism, is in our view the fertile soil in which to dig in order to work out a new unity of theory and practice, philosophy and action, dialectics and revolution in this period before us.

* See Michael Connolly, "Marx's Last Writings on Russia: New Paths to Revolution and Philosophic Continuity" in News & Letters, June 1984.

P.S.----Because Raya decided to include this paper delivered in Salt Lake City as part of our pre-plenum discussions, I thought it necessary to add that all of that discussion must taken as its point of departure (whether openly stated as here or whether only in the 'back of our heads') the final section of the 1984-85 Marxist-Humanist Perspectives Thesis, entitled "Not by Practice Alone". To deepen that conception for the new stage we are now in is essential if we are to seriously project the new fourth book in this period. I consider, for example, that to leave it at saying that the central focus of the new book--- Women's liberation--- applies to all four forces of revolution, is not enough. THE POINT is that the very concept of a revolutionary force As Reason is Marxist-Humanism's distinctive contribution, and that is in constant need of concretization.

Exchange between Roy and Raya on Philosophy and Revolution

March 11, 1985

Dear Raya Dunayevskaya:

Please let me begin with the fact that ^{the} process of reading Chapter One of Philosophy and Revolution "smashed to smithereens" all concept of Theory, Practice, Nature and Revolution that had gotten me together for a long time. It was possible when I read your letter dated August 2, 1984, at the beginning, where I found myself in the middle of History, Philosophy, Revolution, Organization and Subject.

To me the very central point in that chapter is Nature. Its movement, its theories inherent in its actions are so critical that it has provided a different attitude toward itself and toward the objectivity. Nature and its development demands theoretical expression. But the theoretical expression which develops independently from the source (Nature) will provide a parallel -- for theory and practice, Life and Science, Practical Idea and Theoretical Idea, Nature and Formal Logic, and because they do not co-exist peacefully, one would dominate the other. Your sections on the last paragraphs of Philosophy of Mind show that at each stage where Nature and Mind become mediations, they will have both Objectivity and Subjectivity. That put the end to my revolutionary romanticism and intellectual impressionism as if they were movements from Practice and Theory. Paragraph 576 shows the unification of Theory and Practice. That is very important to me because I had always thought that when I encounter philosophic works I should return to my mind and work them out. But where we talk about Theory/Practice or we talk about Praxis we are not dealing with abstracted concepts, because the philosopher who does not separate her or his mind from Nature and movement writes concrete and Universal; if there be any ambiguity, it would be in the reader's mind, and not Marx's or yours.

Chapter One of P&R has a logic which is also the logic of the whole book: from Hegelian Dialectics to Alternatives, and from the Reality to the forces and passions who want to transform the Reality into the Ideal. Therefore Philosophy becomes the mediation. Now I know better why ^{you} criticize both Kelly and the 1960s youth and their attitude toward Philosophy.

One of the most exciting parts of my readings was the sections on Phenomenology of Mind, where you divided the whole book into two parts: before and after. Did you divide that way in the Lordship and Bondage chapter? Because in that section we read of the destruction of the old and the appearance of Consciousness. When I was reading that section in P&R I asked myself: "Why did these discussions not appear before WWII? Why did we not have these forces and this philosophy 50 years ago?" I had to return to Phenomenology of Mind as well as P&R where you talk about the second half in the Phenomenology ... I saw that the Absolute Movement does not stop at any stage -- it goes from Consciousness as itself to in itself to Reason. It was here when I understood History better. Capitalism has organized not only the workers who have a direct relationship

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to the production line but also the rest of society and the forces which had come a long way in history. Their revolt against this new organization of Society based on fetishism opened a new epoch and the beginning of the New Philosophy. "Leisure time" means nothing. Marcuse thought he could turn to youth because of their "leisure time." But they showed that they create movement not in their "leisure time" but when they have a direct relationship to Society: to education, to militarism.

The process of reading from Science of Logic to Philosophy of Mind created new questions for me. Dear Dunayevskaya, am I right if, after reading the relationship from Universal to Particular to Individual, I come to say that the whole debate on Nationalism and Internationalism -- even in their unification, is half dialectic because what delves even deeper is the recreation of the dialectic for Epoch and Society? May I also ask that, because of the whole History, Philosophy and Movement from Practice as well as Movement from Theory and, especially the sections on Being, Essence and Nation plus the warning of the danger of the Third attitude to Objectivity, are so together and integral in Chapter One; that this chapter is the ground for a Revolutionary Organization?

Dear Dunayevskaya may I also add that what distinguishes you from all other philosophers (Marcuse, Lukacs ...) is in paragraph 577 where they put their logic as the mediation, but you turned to masses in motion and their self-movement and self-liberation to create the workers journal? You also posed the Absolute Idea as a coming together of oppositions, and no longer a triplicity. Does it mean that we, against all Materialists and Idealists, should put an end to the separation between: Material and Spirit, Cognition and Life, Theory and Practice, External and Internal, Objectivity and Subjectivity? Here I want to ask another question and that is: what distinguishes Absolute Mind from Absolute Knowledge? And what distinguishes these from Absolute Idea?

Dear Dunayevskaya, I am not really finished with Chapter One, but since I said once -- in my letter dated July 15, 1984 -- that you laid the groundwork for us to call to fill the theoretical void, and because now I know much better about Marxist-Humanism, I would like to take those words back and instead take a responsibility for Marxist-Humanism and be a part of the movement of Ideas; since P&R shows the integrality of History, Revolution, Philosophy and Organization, there has been a philosophical foundation laid: Marxist-Humanism and its expression News and Letters. And the best place to begin to practice it is in the last paragraph in your 1982 Introduction:

Only when the ideal of a new classless society no longer remains simply an "underlying philosophy" but becomes social practice -- at one and the same time uprooting the exploitative, inhuman capital-labor relations as well as creating totally new human relations, beginning with the Man-Woman relationship -- can we say that we have met the challenge of our age both in philosophy and in revolution.

Yours,
Roy

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April 1, 1985

Dear Roy:

Hurrah! You really leaped 63 years forward, i.e. from 1920-22 (when Lenin wrote his Theses on the National and Colonial Question for the Second CI Congress, and when, at the Congress, he suddenly declared that Roy's Thesis and Zadeh's Thesis were the same and therefore no separate Thesis was necessary as he accepted their "amendment") to 1985 when you fully grasped the philosophy of Marxist-Humanism because it became concrete for you, in relationship to the Iranian Revolution. Here is what I mean:

Lenin did not mean what he has been interpreted to mean, either that they were really the same; they aren't. Or that, as the cynics claim, he knew they weren't and said they were out of pure opportunism. The real truth is that he himself didn't know what would come from these great national revolutions and he was so happy to find voices from those lands -- India and Persia -- that he wanted to leave the door open. It is hard for any dogmatists or cynics to understand that it isn't ulterior motives that compel a revolutionary to say something that isn't beyond the shadow of a doubt, because they really want to see what arises from below, knowing that the dialectics of revolutions will show what has been implicit.

I will begin, not with most of the questions you asked, which you yourself actually answered, but only with the final question on page 2 in the penultimate paragraph: What distinguishes Absolute Mind from Absolute Knowledge? And what distinguishes these from Absolute Idea? In one sense they all -- Knowledge, Idea, Mind -- mean the same, and in fact have been translated interchangeably, depending upon which edition you read. And I use that interchangeability for popularization purposes. In truth, of course, it is no accident when and where Hegel used each. In Phenomenology of Mind the Absolute was Absolute Knowledge, and signified a unity of History and Meaning, i.e. philosophy. In Science of Logic, when he had worked his philosophy out, not just phenomenologically but having created philosophic categories that he considered a science, and others considered a "system", he was stressing the unity of theory and practice and the unity of objective and subjective so tightly that the solution to all the problems then would be in Subjectivity alone, because by then it had absorbed objectivity. To warn all those who from that would have concluded that we had reached the end, he warned in his last two paragraphs that he was not finished, that there was still a philosophy of Nature and a philosophy of Mind to transverse. Now comes the shock. In the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences which supposedly is just to make it easier for students to grasp his philosophy but which includes the Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Mind, he actually has two phenomenal new sections of which there was practically no hint earlier. One is the

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phenomenal "Introduction" which sums up all these "Observations" in the Phenomenology and the many polemics with other philosophers in the Science of Logic. The other is what we have paid the most attention to -- that the Philosophy of Mind in his final Syllogisms (which he added only the year before his death) actually REPLACES THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC SO THAT THE FINAL SYLLOGISM #577 LEAVES THE DOOR OPEN ALL OVER AGAIN, EVEN IN RELATIONSHIP TO ALL THAT HARD LABOR THROUGHOUT HIS LIFE. That is what I mean in my March 21 lecture when I said I had discovered also "a new Hegel", and I feel that we have every historic right in our age to combine what he called "the Self-Thinking Idea" and what we mean by "the Self-Bringing Forth of Liberty" that we have gained from the movement from practice as the need of our age.

Now to return to the beginning of your letter, and take it up paragraph by paragraph. Your 1st paragraph delighted me at once, both because it was a concrete response finally to Chapter One of Philosophy and Revolution, and then, after you had taken so seriously and followed through with my suggestion for further reading in my letter to you of August 2, 1984, because you concluded that all your previous concepts had been "smashed to smithereens," and you found yourself "in the middle of History, Philosophy, Revolution, Organization and Subject."

The first sentence in your second paragraph, however, made me bring out a "caution" sign to myself, which shows you how wrong first negativity can be. I feared that, when you used the word "Nature" as the central point to you, you were not accepting what Lenin had described Nature to be -- "stretching a hand to materialism", practice. You see, there are so damn many Existentialists and Frankfurt School adherents that begin their attack on Engels as if dialectics does not relate to Nature at all, and that that is what is wrong with "materialism." We, of course, accepted Lenin's definition that Nature meant practice, because that is, in fact, what Marxism has been from the beginning -- masses in motion, practice, relating philosophy to reality. But the rest of your sentence made me see that it is not at all a rejection of practice, that on the contrary you stress that all these ideas do not co-exist peacefully. And you follow that up by grasping where Nature and Mind become mediations, so that I put a v.g. (for very good) both at your recognizing that this put an end to your "romanticism" and at your reference to para. 576 and your conclusion: "if there be any ambiguity, it would be in the reader's mind, and not Marx's or yours."

Your third paragraph is magnificent in its realization both of my critique of Kelly in the Introduction to the 1982 edition of P&R, and my critique, at the same time, of the 1960s youth. I believe there are too many who think there is a contradiction in my criticizing both Kelly and the youth, but, in fact, the critique of both is very much needed.

The final paragraph on page 1 is where I consider that your questions are really answers, and brilliant ones at that, as well as concrete. Thus, both the reference to my division

of the whole Phenomenology as well as the division between Lordship and Bondage can illuminate that fundamental question of "before" and "after" a revolution, and before and after consciousness grants meaning to an experience. Your whole concept of History, in the concrete history of the whole period since World War II, shows you are reaching for that specificity of our Marxist-Humanist philosophy that came with the post WWII period when we made a category of the movement from practice to theory, which is itself a form of theory -- a form of theory that is not yet philosophy.

My whole demand for the concrete, concrete, concrete and insistence that only in that way can be get to the Concrete Universal, has gained yet a newer life from your leap forward in that first paragraph on page 2. Please allow me to capitalize your own words as they concretize Universal, Particular, Individual with this conclusion: "I COME TO SAY THAT THE WHOLE DEBATE ON NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM -- EVEN IN THEIR UNIFICATION, IS HALF DIALECTICS BECAUSE WHAT DELVES EVEN DEEPER IS THE RECREATION OF THE DIALECTIC FOR EPOCH AND SOCIETY." I also was most delighted with the question which I considered you answered yourself, that followed that sentence, because you there not only speak of Theory and Practice, of Being, Essence and Notion, but also bring in the warning about the danger of the Third Attitude to Objectivity, and conclude that "this chapter is the ground for a Revolutionary Organization."

In one respect I was so impressed with the question in your penultimate paragraph that my whole letter began with that. Yet, I want to say a few more things on it. Your reference both to Para. 577 of the Syllogism and being able to single out my distinction from all other philosophers, specifically Marcuse and Lukacs, is again magnificently related to the whole question of rejecting the superficiality of relating Hegel to just triplicity. Finally, your profound grasp of Organization as well as Philosophy is again concretized in how you relate the journalism of NAL and the organization of News and Letters Committees to our philosophy of Marxist-Humanism. Welcome!

Yours,



P.S. I'm xeroxing copies of both your letter to me and this answer to you to send to each organizer for our locals. As you know, from the Letter to the Locals of March 27, we intend to include both letters in a new bulletin.

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