

RAYA DUNAYEVSKAYA

EVANSTON, IL 60202

July 3, 1986

Dear Louis Dupre:

Suddenly I remembered when we first met at Yale University, where I talked on Philosophy and Revolution. We continued the dialogue after the formal talk. I believe it set the ground for my paper on "Hegel's Absolute Idea as New Beginning", which was accepted for the 1974 Hegel Society of America conference. Don't you think that in a way we have had a continuing dialogue since? At any rate, I consider you a very good friend. I hope you agree. Or do you think that the sharpness of my critique of Hegel scholars who are non-Marxists goes beyond their critique of Marxism? I seem always to get friends -- Marxist as well as non-Marxist-- who consider me a friendly enemy rather than a friend. That friendly enemy relationship continued, for example, with Herbert Marcuse for three long decades, and we still never agreed, specifically on the Absolutes. That's where I want to appeal to you, even though we do not have the same interpretation either.

Along with the battle I'm currently having with myself on the Absolutes (and I've had this battle ever since 1953, when I first "defined" the Absolute as the new society), I am now changing my attitude to Lenin-- specifically on Chapter 2 of Section Three of the Science of Logic, "The Idea of Cognition". The debate I'm having with myself centers on the different ways Hegel writes on the Idea of Cognition in the Science of Logic (hereafter referred to as Science), and the way it is expressed in his Encyclopedia (smaller Logic), paragraphs 225-235, with focus on ¶233-235. The fact that the smaller Logic does the same type of abbreviation with the Absolute Idea as it does with the Idea of Cognition, turning ^{that} magnificent and most profound chapter of the Science into paragraphs 236-244, and that ¶244 in the smaller Logic was the one Lenin preferred to the final paragraph of the Absolute Idea in the Science, has had me "debating" Lenin ever since 1953. That year may seem far away, but its essence, without the polemics, was actually given in my paper at the 1974 Hegel Society of America conference.

* I don't know whether Yale University has the microfilm edition that Wayne State University Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs made of my archives, (the Raya Dunayevskaya Collection, 12 vols.), so I am enclosing an excerpt from my May 20, 1953 letter on Absolute Mind.

** All the references to Lenin are to his Abstract of Hegel's Science of Logic, as included in Vol. 38 of his Collected Works, pp. 87-238. Concretely the subject under dispute here is on the Doctrine of the Notion, Section Three, Chaps. 2 and 3, "The Idea of Cognition" and the "Absolute Idea".

11228

Whether or not Lenin had a right to "mis-read" the difference in Hegel's two articulations in the Science and in the smaller Logic, isn't it true that Hegel, by creating the sub-section β , "volition", which does not appear in the Science, left open the door for a future generation of Marxists to become so enthralled with Ch. 2, "The Idea of Cognition"-- which ended with the pronouncement that Practice was higher than Theory-- that they saw an identity of the two versions? These Marxists weren't Kantians believing that all contradictions will be solved by actions of "men of good will".

There is no reason, I think, for introducing a new sub-heading which lets Marxists think that now that practice is "higher" than theory, and that "Will", not as willfulness, but as action, is their province, they do not need to study Hegel further.

Please bear with me as I go through Lenin's interpretation of that chapter with focus on this sub-section, so that we know precisely what is at issue. Indeed, when I began talking to myself in 1953, objecting to Lenin's dismissal of the last half of the final paragraph of the Absolute Idea in the Science as "unimportant", preferring ¶244 of the smaller Logic-- "go forth freely as Nature"-- I explained that Lenin could have said that because he hadn't suffered through Stalinism. I was happy that there was one Marxist revolutionary who had dug into Hegel's Absolute Idea.

Now then, when Lenin seemed to have completed his Abstract, and writes "End of the Logic. 12/17/1914." (Vol. 38, p.233), he doesn't really end. At the end of that he refers you to the fact that he ended his study of the Science with ¶244 of the smaller Logic-- and he means it. Clearly, it wasn't only the last half of a paragraph of the Absolute Idea in the Science that Lenin dismissed. The truth is that Lenin had begun seriously to consult the smaller Logic at the section on the Idea, which begins in the smaller Logic with ¶213. When Lenin completed Chap. 2, "The Idea of Cognition", he didn't really go to Chap. 3, "The Absolute Idea", but first proceeded for seven pages with his own "translation" (interpretation). This is on pp. 212-219 of Vol. 38 of his Collected Works.

Lenin there divided each page into two. One side, he called "Practice in the Theory of Knowledge"; on the other side, he wrote: "Alias, Man's consciousness not only reflects the objective world, but creates it". I was so enamored with his "Hegelianism" that I never stopped repeating it. Presently, however, I'm paying a great deal more attention to what he did in that division of the page into two, with these "translations". Thus, 1) "Notion=Man"; 2) "Otherness which is in itself= Nature independent of man"; 3) "Absolute Idea= objective truth". When Lenin reaches the final section of Ch. 2, "The Idea of the Good", he writes, "end of Ch. 2, Transition to Ch. 3, 'The Absolute Idea'". But I consider that he is still only on the threshold of the Absolute Idea. Indeed, all that follows p. 219 in his Notes shows that to be true, and explains why Lenin proceeded on his own after the end of his Notes on the Absolute Idea, and returned to the smaller Logic.

Thus when Lenin writes that he had reached the end of the Absolute Idea and quotes ¶244 as the true end, because it is "objective", he proceeds to the smaller Logic and reaches ¶244, to which he had already referred.

Although he continued his commentaries as he was reading and quoting Absolute Idea from the Science, it was not either Absolute Idea or Absolute Method that his 16-point definition of the dialectic ends on: "15) the struggle of content with form and conversely. The throwing off of the form, the transformation of the content. 16) the transition of quantity into quality and vice-versa. (15 and 16 are examples of 9)." No wonder the preceding point 14 referred to absolute negativity as if it were only "the apparent return to the old (negation of the negation)."

Outside of Marx himself, the whole question of the negation of the negation was ignored by all "orthodox Marxists". Or worse, it was made into a vulgar materialism, as with Stalin, who denied that it was a fundamental law of dialectics. Here, specifically, we see the case of Lenin, who had gone back to Hegel, and had stressed that it was impossible to understand Capital, especially its first chapter, without reading the whole of the Science, and yet the whole point that Hegel was developing on unresolved contradiction, of "two worlds in opposition, one a realm of subjectivity in the pure regions of transparent thought, the other a realm of objectivity in the element of an externally manifold actuality that is an undisclosed realm of darkness", (Miller translation, p. 820), did not faze Lenin because he felt that the objective, the Practical Idea, is that resolution. Nor was he fazed by the fact that Hegel had said that "the complete elaboration of the unresolved contradiction between the absolute end and the limitation of this actuality that insuperably opposes it has been considered in detail in the Phenomenology of Mind". (The reference is to p. 611ff. of the Phenomenology, Baillie translation.)

In the original German the above sentence reads: "Die vollstandige Ausbildung des unaufgelosten Widerspruchs, jenes absoluten Zwecks, dem die Schranke dieser Wirklichkeit unuberwindlich gegenubersteht, ist in der Phanomenologie des Geistes (2 Aufl., S. 453ff.)".

Nothing, in fact, led Lenin back to the Idea of Theory and away from dependence on the Practical Idea, not even when Hegel writes: "The practical Idea still lacks the moment of the Theoretical Idea... For the practical Idea, on the contrary, this actuality, which at the same time confronts it as an insuperable limitation, ranks as something intrinsically worthless that must first receive its true determination and sole worth through the end of the good. Hence it is only the will itself that stands in the way of the attainment of its goal, for it separates itself from cognition, and external reality for the will does not receive the form of a true being; the Idea of the good therefore finds its integration only in the Idea of the true." (p. 821, Miller translation).

In German this sentence reads: "Der praktischen Idee dagegen gilt diese Wirklichkeit, die ihr zugleich als unüberwindliche Schranke gegenübersteht, als das an und für sich Nichtige, das erst seine wahrhafte Bestimmung und einzigen Wert durch die Zwecke das Guten erhalten sollte. Der Wille steht daher der Erreichung seines Ziels nur selbst im Wege dadurch, dass er sich vom dem Erkennen trennt und die äußerliche Wirklichkeit für ihn nicht die Form das wahrhaft Seienden erhält: die Idee des Guten kann daher ihre Ergänzung allein in der Idee des Wahren finden."

I cannot blame Hegel for what "orthodox Marxists" have done to his dialectic, but I still want to know a non-Marxist Hegelian's viewpoint on the difference of the two articulations on the Idea of Cognition and the Absolute Idea in the Science and in the smaller Logic. What is your view?

To fully follow out this question we need, in one respect, another journey back in time-- to 1953 when, in the parting from Lenin on the vanguard party, I had delved into the three final syllogisms of the Philosophy of Mind. You may remember that in my paper to the Hegel Society of America in 1974, where I critique Adorno's Negative Dialectics-- which I called "one-dimensionality of thought"-- I said that he had substituted "a permanent critique not alone for absolute negativity, but also for 'permanent revolution' itself." I had become so enamoured with Hegel's three final syllogisms that I was searching all over the "West" for dialogue on them.

Finally in the 1970s, after Reinhart Klemens Maurer had published his Hegel und das Ende der Geschichte, which took up those final syllogisms, I tried to get him involved, his sharp critique of Marcuse notwithstanding. Maurer was anxious to establish the fact, however, that he was not only non-Marxist, but not wholly "Hegelian". In any case, he clearly was not interested in any dialogue with me, and he told a young colleague of mine who went to see him that "I am not married to Hegel". But as I made clear at the 1974 HSA conference, I do not think it important whether someone has written a serious new study of those three final syllogisms because of a new stage of scholarship, or because the "movement of freedom surged up from below and was followed by new cognition studies".

The point is that as late as the late 1970s, A.V. Miller wrote me calling my attention to the fact that he had not corrected an error in Wallace's translation of ¶575 of Philosophy of Mind. He pointed out that Wallace had translated sie as if it were sich, whereas in fact it should have read "sunders" not itself, but them. That, however, was not my problem. The sundering was what was crucial to me; the fact that Nature turns out to be the mediation was certainly no problem to any "materialist"; the form of the transition which was departing from the course of necessity was the exciting part.

In introducing those three new syllogisms in 1830, Hegel first (#575) poses the structure of the Encyclopedia merely factually-- Logic-Nature-Mind. It should have been obvious (but obviously was not) that it is not

11231

Logic but Nature which is the mediation.


Paragraph 576 was the real leap as the syllogism was the standpoint of Mind itself. In the early 1950s I had never stopped quoting the end of that paragraph: "philosophy appears as subjective cognition, of which liberty is the aim, and which is itself the way to produce it." It justified my happiness at Hegel's magnificent critique of the concept of One in the Hindu religion which he called both "featureless unity of abstract thought," and its extreme opposite, "long-winded weary story of its particular detail." (§573). In the following §574 we face Hegel's counter-position of what I consider his most profound historic concept -- and by history I mean not only past, or even history-in-the-making, the present, but as future-- "SELF-THINKING IDEA".

My "labor, patience, and suffering of the negative" those 33 years hasn't exactly earned me applause either from the post-Marx Marxists, or from the Hegelians, who are busy calling to my attention that the final syllogism (§577) speaks about the "eternal Idea", "eternally setting itself to work, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind," fairly disregarding what is just a phrase in that sentence: "it is the nature of the fact, which causes the movement and development, yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition."

It is here that I'm in need of your commentary both on Absolute Idea in the Science of Logic and on Absolute Mind in the Philosophy of Mind. The "eternal Idea" to me is not eternality, but ceaseless motion, the movement itself. Far from me "subverting" Hegel, it is Hegel who made Absolute Method the "self-thinking Idea". George Armstrong Kelly, in his book, Hegel's Retreat from Eleusis*, said that "for the complex linkage of culture, politics and philosophy, within the matrix of the 'Absolute Idea', Mme. Dunayevskaya proposes to substitute an unchained dialectic which she baptizes 'Absolute Method', a method that 'becomes irresistible... because our hunger for theory arises from the totality of the present global crisis'".

The "eternal Idea" in Philosophy of Mind not only re-inforced my view of Absolute Method in Science of Logic, but now that I am digging into another subject for my new work on "Dialectics of Organization", which will take sharp issue with Lenin, both on the Idea of Cognition and on the Absolute Idea, I consider that Marx's concept of "revolution in permanence" is the "eternal Idea".

*I submitted my reply to Kelly, and used it in the Introduction to the 1982 edition of Philosophy and Revolution. I offered him space to answer, but he let my answer stand. Indeed, we then lunched and continue to correspond.



Yale University

Department of Religious Studies
P.O. Box 2160 Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-2160

Campus address:
320 Temple Street
Telephone:
203 432-0528

September 15, 1986

Ms. Raya Dunayevskaya

Evanston, IL 60202

Dear Raya:

I have finally found the time to study the texts to which you refer in your long letter as well as your interpretation of them. Let me preface my own reflections by admitting that you know the Logic far more thoroughly than I do. So what I present here as my conclusions should be read with a critical mind.

1. I must confess that I had never paid much attention to the discrepancy between the end of the minor and of the major Logic. Yet I still do not see any conflict between the two. The "Idea of Cognition" does indeed lack the section on the will of the minor Logic. And in § 235 Hegel does state that the practical will overcomes the one-sidedness of the theoretical: "This life which has returned to itself from the bias and finitude of cognition..." But he does not claim that the Absolute Idea consists in the achievement of the practical will; merely that it leads to the Absolute Idea. At least that is how I interpret § 236: "The Idea, as unity of the subjective and objective Idea..." and "[only] this unity is the Absolute and all truth". Hence neither Logic supports Lenin's interpretation. *edz*

2. Your own interpretation of the Absolute Spirit is a more complex issue. I do not think, though some interpreters do, that the Absolute Spirit can be so readily identified with the Absolute Idea as I thought you were willing to do. Be that as it may, I certainly agree that the "eternal Idea" is "ceaseless motion, the movement itself". But I no longer follow you when you call the eternal Idea "revolution in substance". Your social interpretation is, in my opinion, not supported by Hegel's text. The entire concept of social revolution belongs to the practical order which itself is never absolute. I suspect that the real answer to your questions lies in the Philosophy of Right. In it Hegel clearly explains the full practical significance of the Idea (the State is the Idea) as well as the limitation of the practical order to the Objective Spirit. All Marxists tend to bring one into the other. But to do so requires a reduction of what Hegel places within the Absolute Spirit to a mere "ideology" -- as Marx openly admitted. At that point, however, interpretation becomes transformation. *V.R. orb*

V.R. orb
Sayff
22.11.15

11233

✓ For all these reasons I would have difficulty accepting the conclusion of your letter on § 577 as being an entrance into "the new society". I would rather read it as an entrance into philosophy.

Sorry you had to wait so long for an answer -- and one that is so inadequate to the complexity of your questions. Yet I have had an incredibly busy period behind me and am at this point involved in the teaching of four courses as well as feeling totally overworked.

With kind regards,

Louis Dupré



LD:sm

11234

RAYA DUNAYEVSKAYA

EVANSTON, IL 60202

Feb. 16, 1987

Dear LD:

Thought it might interest you that I've turned over my "Theory/Practice" column in N&L to your critical review of Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution, (which actually "looked in on" most of my writings), because I wanted to give your views a new readership which, if not fully proletarian, is definitely non-academic. I'll follow any comments that arrive and turn them over to you.

My next question may seem to have no relevance to your review. I have never mentioned to you before that I have been following your struggles with the Absolute. The reference you make in your review to Chapter 3 of your Marx's Social Critique of Culture made me recall one of your other writings -- "Hegel's Absolute Spirit: A Religious Justification of Secular Culture" in Revue de l'Universite d'Ottawa, Vol. 54, no. 4, Oct-Dec. 1982. I believe that my attraction to your writings has always been that, though you view the "transcendent dimension" in Hegel differently than I would, you nevertheless feel it needed for the secular age-- and theologians should collaborate in that effort. As you put it: "God constitutes the transcendent factor in the creative process without ever coinciding with it."

Inherent in this is my other great preoccupation: why does Hegel, in the Logic version of the Encyclopedia, summarize all the myriad attitudes to objectivity through the centuries into just three attitudes?

I can't hide the fact that I'm enamored with that early section of the Encyclopedia outline of Logic, because it was written after Hegel had already developed Absolute Knowledge, Absolute Idea, Absolute Method. In a word, by no accident, History makes its presence felt not only before, but after the Absolutes have been dialectically worked out both in Phenomenology and in the Science of Logic, as well as in anticipation that he is finally ready to trace the dialectic flow in the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Mind. Indeed, that, to me, is what made possible the very form of compression of those innumerable polemical observations on other philosophers and philosophies into just three attitudes to objectivity.

Though an atheist, I've never gone in for joining a "society" of atheists; to me that is only one more form of godliness without God. Put differently, my passion for Hegel's category of the Third Attitude to Objectivity was not merely due to the fact that it was directed against those who place faith above philosophy, the Intuitionists. Rather, the attraction for me continues to be the Dialectic. Far from expressing a sequence of never-ending progression, the Hegelian dialectic lets retrogression appear as translucent as progression, and indeed, makes it very nearly inevitable if one ever tries to escape regression by mere faith.

Here again, history enters, this time to let Hegel create varying views of Intuitionism, depending on which historic period is at issue. Intuitionism is "progressive" in the period of Descartes because then

11235

empiricism opened the doors wide to science. On the other hand, it became regressive in the period of Jacobi.

As early as Paragraph 63, Hegel had lashed out against Jacobi's faith, in contrast to Faith: "The two things are radically distinct. Firstly, the Christian faith comprises in it an authority of the Church; but the faith of Jacobi's philosophy has no other authority than that of personal revelation." As we see, Hegel has now equated Organization to Principle, Doctrine: "And secondly, the Christian faith is a copious body of objective truth, a system of knowledge and doctrine; while the scope of the philosophic faith is so utterly indefinite, that, while it has room for faith of the Christian, it equally admits belief in the divinity of the Dalai Lama, the ox, or the monkey..."

Hegel proceeds (Para. 75): "And to show that in point of fact there is a knowledge which advances neither by unmixed immediacy nor unmixed mediation, we can point to the example of the Logic and the whole of philosophy."

In a word, dear LD, we're back at the Dialectic, and it's only after that (Para. 76) that Hegel uses the word "reactionary"* in relationship to the whole Intuitionist school, that is to the historic period of "The Recent German Philosophy": "Philosophy of course tolerates no mere assertions or conceits, and checks the free play of argumentative see-saw." (para. 77).

Freedom and Revolution (the latter word I borrowed from Hegel's very first sentence on "Recent German Philosophy" in the History of Philosophy) will hew out a new path. In this I see the dialectic flow in the "Third Attitude to Objectivity" from a critique of the one-sidedness of the Intuitionists to organizational responsibility for the "self-determination of the Idea"-- as "I" would call it, thus committing the great theft of Hegel's original category. It is this same "self-determination of the Idea" with which I see Marx** shouting down determinists and vulgar materialists-- those post-Marx Marxists, beginning with Engels-- as he develops "revolution in permanence".

Despite your rejection of my interpretation of "revolution in permanence", may I hope to hear your comments on "Third Attitude to Objectivity"? Why has academia made so few serious commentaries on this section of the Logic?

Yours,
Pojia

* The German original has no such word, and in general that 1892 Wallace translation is altogether too loose. I cannot for the life of me understand why a 1975 English publication would still use that translation. I'm in correspondence with A.V. Miller on this subject. I'm wondering whether Findlay was the one who suggested still using Wallace.

** People may die, but ideas don't. I keep up communication with a number of people, and none more so than Hegel and Marx.

11236

Yale University *New Haven, Connecticut 06520*

DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES

24 Mansfield Street 320 Temple Street
Hammond Building

March 26

Dear Raya,

Thank you so much for sending me the reactions of your readers to my review of your 'Rosa Luxemburg' book. I found them remarkably perceptive and intelligent. Your readers obviously take ideas seriously. They see their practical impact - perhaps better than academic people do. I had never believed Marx's word that philosophy would provide the "head" for the social action of the "proletariat". Your readers are obviously not "proletarians", but if they are "workers", Marx is still right and I wish I had some of these "workers" in my Yale classes!

With kindest regards and gratitude

Louis D.

11237

typed copy of handwritten

March 26

Dear Raya,

Thank you so much for sending me the reactions of your readers to my review of your "Rosa Luxemburg" book. I found them remarkably perceptive and intelligent. Your readers obviously take ideas seriously. They see their practical impact-- perhaps better than academic people do. I had never believed Marx's word that philosophy would provide the "head" for the social action of the "proletariat". Your readers are obviously not "proletarians", but if they are "workers", Marx is still right and I wish I had some of these "workers" in my Yale classes!

With kindest regards and gratitude

Louis D.

11238