

Feb. 7, 1986

Dear Franklin,

Frankly though I like your piece on Mathematical Manuscripts, my first reaction was for it to be only in a discussion bulletin and only as pre-convention time, because I thought that Ron would feel we favor only those at the Center. But on second thought, I am anxious for you to have an essay in N&L with however either you yourself saying something like: The manuscripts when they were first published, were commented upon and indeed broken through on by Ron B. who wrote a truly M-H Analysis, "Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts and the Fetish of High-Tech." It caused wide discussion in which I was a contributor. Then have a star and the name of the pamphlet. Nevertheless I am anxious to ~~write~~ write again. Your essay should be called A Second Look at Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts.

Naturally this means that your first paragraph will have to be revised according to the above. But otherwise you can proceed as is except:

1) I would suggest that you stop short of the least line on page 5. The reason ~~is~~ I want that paragraph in relation to the negation of the negation which ends on page 6 cut, is that it hasn't been concretized within your subject, i.e. mathematics. What I would have called a concretization of "revolution in permanence" in relation to your subject would have indeed been a historic breakthrough and will have some suggestions for you at the end of this which ~~will~~ will have you working out a section of Hegel's Science of Logic all the way up to the Convention. For now I consider the brief cut necessary, because ~~that~~ in any case that ~~is~~ "revolution in permanence" is by no means just a question of "attitude to revolution."

2) Probably the first paragraph on page 6 regarding Karpushin, instead of being a mere ~~xxxx~~ footnote should be written into the paragraph itself by ~~xxxx~~ stating something on 1955 to the effect that: Long before these manuscripts were known in English, but when the objective situation had the Stalinist regime launch a sudden attack on "the negation of the negation" Raya D. ~~xxxx~~ claimed that this was no academic discussion, but rather a continuation of what had been started in 1953 in East Germany in some other East European country. (Parenthesis See RD, We will figure out which reference to put.)

Just cut the single word But in next paragraph on 6. On p. 7 the footnote 6 should be simple Capital and not the commentary by you.

3) p. 8 Not he (D.R.) but the Institute should be damaged.

~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~

4) The only other thing in in last sentence page. 14, should be cut because what is important there I believe is to invite discussion, not to tell them another abstraction about revolution in permanence, and your article ~~is~~ will be ~~xxxx~~ discussion article, and therefore your article should end ~~with~~ after you say significant for Marxist-Humanism, something like: Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts certainly deserve a great deal of discussion; neither we nor anyone else has but scratched the surface. We invite further discussion.

Now then, here is what I would love you to try and tackle in Hegel. In a very important sense, I believe it would be a great contribution to our whole grappling with how to concretize the distinction between

11257

theory and philosophy. The point is that the specific section that I am referring to in Sec. III chapter II ~~of~~ third subsection, "The Theory" of Science of Logic, happens to be on ~~mathematics~~ mathematics, and I felt that we ourselves have not done ~~justice~~ enough in that section. Here is what is important of pages 806-818 of the Miller translation:

Look at that first sentence (806) "1. The stage of this cognition that advances on the basis of the Notion-determinations is the transition of particularity into individuality; this constitutes the ~~transition~~ the content of the theorem... definition contains only one determinateness, division contains determinateness in relation to others; ~~in~~ in individualization the object has gone asunder within itself...." Hegel then goes in to so to speak "examples" and axioms, all of which he hates and all in relation to algebra and geometry on the one hand, and why he will then conclude on the difference between synthetic cognition and Absolute Idea, in which he will reject synthetic cognition because even ~~now~~ though it has related the particular to the universal it has ended, not with proof but remained non-dialectical and "most inadequate of all in the domain of philosophy". It was preceded on page 814 by having said "the reason that ~~gives~~ the "space of geometry is the abstraction and void of asunderness that it is possible for the figures to be inscribed in the indeterminateness of that space in such a manner that their determinations remain in fixed repose outside another and possess no immanent transition into an opposite."

With ~~the~~ the next page when he has at least something good to say on Jacobi, only in order to reject him to, and, my dear Franklin, believe it or not -- and I myself haven't yet developed that -- the last sentence of that section made Lenin so happy that he had skipped the detailing of that whole section which actually ended in not a total understanding of Absolute Idea which he thought, and I objected, that all that was necessary to make it right was to skip the last half paragraph at the end of Absolute Idea. The sentence I am referring to which made Lenin so happy, and I am sure we would all be, but it isn't necessarily so, is "The Idea, in so far as the Notion is now explicitly determined in and for itself, is the practical Idea, or action." (p. 818)

Yours,

11258

Raya

March 11, 1986

Dear Franklin,

Now that you have begun struggling with the assignment from me and will continue for the coming period, I can let you know the "secret" that will help you grapple by showing you how Hegel popularized his own Science of Logic into the smaller Logic of the Encyclopedia. In the specific section in the Idea Para. 213 which ends with the Zusatz page 276 "The stages hitherto considered, viz. those of Being and Essence, as well as those of Notion and of Objectivity, are not, when so distinguished, something permanent, resting upon themselves. They have proved to be dialectical; and their only truth is that that are dynamic elements of the idea."

Actually you need not start till para. 226 which here is called Cognition Proper, but in the Science of Logic the Idea of Cognition and it is only as this point, in the next para. (227) on the Analytic Method in the Zusatz to geometry, commenting "Thought in such circumstances means no more than an act of abstraction or of formal identity. That is the sense in which thought is understood by Locke and all empiricists."

After this it starts on the synthetic method, and it is only at that point paras. 229-231 (pp. 286-289) that there is direct reference to the subject matter-- Definition, Division, Theorem that are directly related/subject that I wanted you to try and break through on. But for heaven sakes, don't go to the next para. 232 dealing with Will, because I myself have yet to figure out why he brings Will in there. It is not in the actual section of the Science of Logic at that point, and the whole question of volition is where Mao took for without knowing anything about it before or after. And even Lenin was all too eager to connect it with practice and very nearly "skipped" it, all the contradictions, especially the 2nd negativity.

Sometime in 2 weeks or so I will meet with you, and / that time I will want you to have questions for me both on the Science of Logic and on the Smaller Logic regarding Synthetic Cognition and Mathematics.

*Yours,
Raya*

P.S. I want you especially to be ready to tell me what the heck curved lines -- pp. 287 "Thus, algebraical definitions of curved lines are theorems in the method of geometry." -- and on and on to something I will tell you about Marx has to do with seeing movement, development in every single element as well as in the whole.

11259