The Dialectical Imagination, Martin Jay A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950 Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1973, \$3.95

This history of the Frankfurt School is a very fine

book, scholastically speaking, and indeed by making a to-tality of the very individualistics (not to mention ego-tistic) disparities **disperimentation** gives a more cohesive view to the "school of thought" that called itself Critical than it deserves. Yet, because the M author is neither a Marxist nor a millosopher but a historian, he leaves out than it deserves. Yet, because the M author is neither a Marxist nor a philosopher but a historian, he leaves out the outstanding contribution on dialectics which is not just imaginative or literary but philosophical. And this especially holds for Adorno who, because his work is di-rectly for dialectics, <u>Megative Bialectics</u>, which was pub-lished after period covered, 1923-50, is not dealt with except supercificusly here. And yet that could be called, as Lichtheim did, Adorno's "testament". cf.TriQuarterly.

"From Marx to Hegel: Reflections on Georg Lukacs, T.W. Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse" by George Lichthelm TriQuarterly 12, Spring, 1968

Horkheimer wrote a brief foreword in which he called the aim of the School "the belief that formulating the <u>megative</u> in the epoch of transition was more meaning-ful than academic careers." And the Adorno as being the most precise at formulating that it was necessary "not to think of claims to the Absolute as cer-tain and yet, not to deduct anything from the appeal to the emphatic concept of the truth." Horkheimer wrote a brief foreward in which he

Martin Jay **inchinization** begins the history with the creation of the Institute in the period it was not fa-mous and when it still had a much more direct relationship to Marxism as the Institute helped David Ryazanov get the to Marxism as the Institute helped David Ryazanov get the early essays of Marx way back when. It was then under Grünberg. But since both the name and the actual content of wanting to be neither in nor quite out of Marxism that gave it its fame, we will Mmit the reinew to the Institute as it developed under Horkheimer, both in Germany and as it emigrated to America, tay in 14 mm gove Willow World ' B 38 w Nevel Int. We mak where the make the formation of the market of Marxism the formation of the market of the market where the market of the market of the market of Jack the market of t plumbio

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hapter 2 roes to the heart of the vision called "The Genisis of Critical Theory." (pp. 41-85) On p. 54 he also draws upon the state of the vision called pecially (p. 162 on Mediation, and correctly co, quoting esent things on Reason both in <u>Negations</u> (pp. 135-136) and <u>R&R</u> (pp. 44-46). I like his dealing with Adorno's criticism of Husserl who wrote, "With phenomenology, bourgeois thought reached its endedisassociated, fragmented statement set against one another, and resigned itself to simple reproduction of that which is." On the other hand, Adorno's criticism of Benjamin (p.71) is all wrong.

Chapter 3, "The Integration of Psychoanalysis", reveals Fromm as the person who introduced the whole School to pyscoanalysis and the "integration" of Marx and Freud.

Chapter IV) "The Insistut's First Studies of Authority", while Ch. V deals with the Institut's analysis of Nazism, but it's Ch. VI which really shows for them going askew which is fantastic since theyknew more on asthetic theory, Hegelian, than anyone else and yet they-were so abyou would think that ads make people do anything they want them to and to chew gum is really knothing short of metanot that chewing gum undermines metaphysics but that it is metaphysics. Indeed, here is how Horkheimer puts itt "It is metaphysics to be and the clear." And even without chewing gum to put Nazistt "idegology" and "mass a learned nothing at all in Amerca, least of all from any mass movement.

1940s and "subordinate the real key to the whole study, Ch. VII deals with the empirical works in the Ch. VIII, "Toward of Philosophy of History: The Critique of the Enlightenment" (pp. 253-280). Before going into th

Before going into this, it's interesting to note that Lichtheim is the superior to the young historian who confronts the Frankfurt Institute from books alone. First, because he recognizes the enduring relevance of Hegel as being the relationship of theory to practice, specifically philosophical theory to political practice; <u>secondly</u>, that he knows precisely the crucial point of dialectics in <u>Herel</u> so that Frankfurt's contribution would be naught if you didn't <u>cosenthal theorements</u>. CL stresses a Lukacs who was not a FI man, his studies in Marxian dialectics, and how that came through in Frankfurt and particularly in Adorno and Marcuse. But is is Adorno that is not grasped in Martin Jay. Therefore, P.23 of CL's what he quotes from the <u>Aspects of the Hegelian Dialectic</u> and on p. 26 the negative dialectic itself, at which point (p. 27) CL writes "If Adorno is Lukacs' spiritual antipode-a critic of idealism for whom in the end Hegel remains relevant because specula tive philosophy has not been 14644