

ESSAYS
BY
Karl Marx

SELECTED
FROM THE
ECONOMIC-
PHILOSOPHICAL
MANUSCRIPTS

- alienated labor.
- private property and
communism.
- critique of the hegelian
dialectic.

FIRST ENGLISH TRANSLATION

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INTRODUCTION

The three essays here presented have been selected and translated from the economic-philosophical manuscripts written by Marx in 1844 and collected in the Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 1, Abt. 3 Berlin, 1932.

We do not publish these translations as archives. Far from it. They are far more alive today than when they were written. We publish a selection in this modest form because we are determined to break through the vast conspiracy of silence which surrounds them.

Marx in his student years had mastered the Hegelian philosophy. Here we see the first fruits of his studies of political economy. It was not only Hegel whom Marx stood on his head. He at once put his finger on the philosophical weakness of the classical school of economists - their limited and superficial concept of private property.

The essay on alienated labor shows Marx making his philosophic concepts concrete, in the relation between wage labor and capital in the process of production. With an amazing certainty and confidence he drives home what is essentially new in his discoveries. What distinguishes him from Smith and Ricardo is that he understands private property whereas they do not. Only his own words must speak for him.

"We have, indeed, obtained the concept of estranged labor (of estranged life) from political economy as the result of the movement of private property. But in analyzing this concept, it is revealed that even if private property appears as the basis, as the cause of estranged labor, it is rather a consequence of it. In the same way, the Gods are not originally the cause but the effect of human confusion in understanding. Later this relationship becomes interchanged."

There he broke once and for all with the classical economists. His problem, the Marxian problem, became the analysis of the labor process. As he says triumphantly, "For when man speaks of private property, he believes he has only to deal with a fact outside man. Where man speaks of labor, he has to deal directly with man. This new posing of the question already includes its resolution."

Twenty years later Marx was to begin Capital by saying that the pivot of the understanding of political economy was the fact that, like commodities in general, labor itself possessed a two-fold nature, abstract labor and concrete labor. Here, in 1844, already, he had not only isolated labor from property. He was seeking the contradiction in labor itself. The worker was dominated by the objective results of his labor. It became the private property of someone other than the laborer. Why? Marx leapt generations ahead with his answer. It was because the very type of labor activity that the modern worker carried out was of such a kind that the appropriation of the result by others was inevitable. Smith and Ricardo took the activity for granted and dealt only with the results of the activity. Marx claimed that in the activity itself the result was already contained. The abstract labor of Capital is the labor for value production. The concrete labor is the production of use-value. Value could only take bodily form in use-value but value dominated. When use-value dominated we would have a new society. Many Marxists still see the domination of use-values in a mere multitude of use-values for consumption. They are unaware that they

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are merely repeating the mistake of Ricardo on a higher scale substituting results for activity. The substitution of use-value for value must take place in labor itself. Where, under capitalism, the laborer was valued at his consumption, a new society demands that the use-value of labor itself become the dominant form in production - the full development of the laborer's natural and acquired powers. The laborer must become a fully-developed individual, freedom is an economic necessity and proletarian democracy an economic category. This is no longer a theoretical problem. From one end of the world to the other, today man faces one problem - increased productivity. The rulers of production are helpless before it. Modern man revolts against the very conditions of labor. Except by the forces of men released from capitalist production, there is no solution to the economic and social crisis. All the lamentations and moaning about Bolshevism being a new means of dominating the workers have no meaning for those who grasp the essence of Marx's social ideas of which his philosophy and economics are only a constituent part.

Lenin of all modern men saw this to its last and ultimate conclusion. He took just this and made it revolutionary policy for the masses. He could lead the October Revolution because he saw this mobilization of oppressed humanity as the only solution to the crisis. In Can The Bolsheviks Retain State Power (and The Threatening Catastrophe) he said openly to millions what Marx was writing in the study in 1844:

"The most important thing is to inspire the oppressed and the toilers with confidence in their own strength, to show them in practice that they can and must themselves undertake a correct, strictly orderly and organized distribution of bread, food, milk, clothing, dwellings, and so forth, in the interests of the poor. Without this, Russia cannot be saved from collapse and ruin; whereas an honest, courageous and universal move to hand over the administration to the proletarians and semi-proletarians will arouse such unprecedented revolutionary enthusiasm among the masses, will so multiply the forces of the people in combatting their miseries, that much that seemed impossible to our old, narrow, bureaucratic forces will become practicable for the forces of the millions and millions of the masses when they begin to work for themselves, and not under the whip, for the capitalist, the master, the official."

This was not to come afterwards. This was the revolution itself. Lenin continued without a pause.

"Only then shall we be able to see what untapped forces of resistance are latent in the people; only then will what Engels calls 'latent socialism' be made apparent; only then shall we find that for every ten thousand open or concealed enemies of the power of the working class, who manifest themselves either by action or by passive resistance, a million new fighters will arise, who until then had been politically dormant, languishing in poverty and despair, having lost faith in themselves as human beings, in their right to live, in the possibility that they too might be served by the whole force of the modern centralized state and that their detachments of proletarian militia might be fully trusted and called upon to take part in the immediate, direct, day-to-day work of administration of the state."

The only slogan he could find to express it was, "Workers Control Of Production" but what he meant by that was an uncoiling of creative forces imbedded in the senses of modern man and implanted there by the productive forces and the productive process. Lenin's concept of the party, his

insistence on a rigid discipline, democratic centralism, more than ever necessary today, cannot be for a single moment separated from Marx's economic-philosophic concept of the destiny of the modern proletariat.

That is what Marx began with. His philosophy was a philosophy of the activity of man, of man as active in the labor process. The free individual was he whose labor by its very nature ensured his freedom. If he was not free in his labor he could not be free in any sense. Lenin grasped this not as theory but as practice. The Mensheviks in 1917 saw what he saw but trembled to say that the only forces which could save the country was the "latent socialism", the suppressed capacities of the masses. Today the Stalinists have carried the Menshevik politics to a stage further. That they are tools of the Kremlin and therefore oppose the proletarian revolution is true, but, as with so much that is true, is only a form of appearance. In essence, terrified at the crisis around them and incapable of placing the solution of all economic and political problems upon the powers of the workers, they are thereby driven to cling to the Kremlin with its established state and its established army and its established apparatus of power. That it is the creative power of millions of men which alone can solve the problems of modern society is not only a philosophical concept. It is the very ruin of society which makes it a revolutionary reality.

The proletariat does not make the revolution and then wait for some "plan" to create a new type of economy. To think in those terms is to make a divorce between economics and politics, the repudiation of which was the mid-wife of Marxism. The difference between the proletarian revolution and all others is that the revolution itself releases the new economic forces, the creative power of the people, the greatest productive force history has known. The beginning, middle and end of Marx's scientific analysis of capitalist economy is the conflict between dead capital and living labor. On this hangs the falling rate of profit, the industrial reserve army and the revolution. Without this, one falls into the trap of market economics, underconsumptionism and ultimately, the deepest confusion as to the role of the party. The Mensheviks trembled in 1917 because, among other reasons, they could see neither the economic nor the military forces which could develop and protect Russia after the socialist revolution. Lenin did not tremble because he saw that the socialist revolution in ruined Russia was the creator of forces undreamt of by the bourgeoisie. Thus the most profound philosophical and abstract theories of Marx became the most practical concrete revolutionary policy.

Even the bourgeoisie can babble about the creative powers of atomic energy. Marxism is concerned first and foremost with the creative powers of the masses. That is not Marxian politics and sociology and philosophy. It is Marxian economics. The degeneration of the Russian Revolution has obscured this truth. The revolutionary regeneration of the world proletariat will make it the foundation of every aspect of modern life and thought. Without it there is no escape from barbarism.

Private Property And Communism

How deeply ingrained was this conception in Marx's thought is proved by that masterpiece of social philosophy, the essay on Private Property and Communism.

For Marx, private property was the material expression of that wealth which alienated men from human living. Its movement is production

and consumption. Religion, family, state, law, morals, science, art, follow the "movement" of production and consumption. In a society where private property is transcended, religion, family, state, law, morals, dissolve in the corporate life of the community.

Such fundamental questions Marx never separated from his analysis of capitalist production. Take the question of the family and the relations between the sexes. In his chapter on "Machinery and Modern Industry" (Capital, Volume I, page 536), he gives, almost in passing, a superb example of his method.

"However terrible and disgusting the dissolution, under the capitalist system, of the old family ties may appear, nevertheless, modern industry, by assigning as it does an important part in the process of production, outside the domestic sphere, to women, to young persons, and to children of both sexes, creates a new economical foundation for a higher form of the family and of the relations between the sexes. It is, of course, just as absurd to hold the Teutonic-Christian form of the family to be absolute and final as it would be to apply that character to the ancient Roman, the ancient Greek, or the Eastern forms which, moreover, taken together, form a series in historic development. Moreover, it is obvious that the fact of the collective working group being composed of individuals of both sexes and all ages, must necessarily, under suitable conditions, become a source of humane development; although in its spontaneously developed, brutal, capitalist form, where the labourer exists for the process of production, and not the process of production for the labourer, that fact is a pestiferous source of corruption and slavery."

A few pages before, he drew the dialectical opposition between education under capitalism and as it would be in the new society.

"Though the Factory Act, that first and meagre concession wrung from capital, is limited to combining elementary education with work in the factory, there can be no doubt that when the working class comes to power, as inevitably it must, technical instruction, both theoretical and practical, will take its proper place in the working-class schools." (Capital, Volume I, page 534)

Family, education, relations between the sexes, religion, all would lose their destructive alienated quality in a new mode of production in which the universality of the individual would be the starting point and source of all progress, beginning with economic progress.

The passage in which Marx poses and develops the idea that the cultivation of the five senses is the work of the whole history of the world to date, blows up from below the frenzied fantasies of those who from the psycho-analysts to the Existentialists, cannot understand that the problem of the modern personality is the problem of modern capitalist production. Man's capacity for seeing, touching, hearing, talking, feeling, exist in the multitude of objects of productive wealth and the achievements of science which surround him. The masses of men must appropriate these or perish.

The personality of the modern worker is assailed upon all sides from morning till night (and even in his dreams) by such stimuli that his needs as a modern human being make him and his class the most highly civilized social force humanity has ever known. But the greater the needs of social living, inherent in the socialized nature of modern production, the greater the need for individual self-expression, the more it becomes necessary for the masters

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of society, themselves slaves of capital, to repress this social expression which is no more and no less than complete democracy. Production which should be man's most natural expression of his powers, becomes one long murderous class conflict in which each protagonist can rest not for a single minute. Political government assumes totalitarian forms and government by executive decree masquerades as democracy. The office worker, with black coat and white collar, is transformed into a mere cog in a machine. If the worker is deprived of all the intellectual potentialities of the labor process to the extent that science is incorporated in it as an independent power, the intellectual absorbs knowledge and ideas but is as impotent in the intellectual process as is the worker in the labor process. The intellectual is cut off from the world of physical production and the social organization of labor. The divorce between physical and mental labor is complete. The individual, worker or intellectual, is no more than the sport of vast forces over which he has no control. The senses of each are stimulated without possibility of realization. The resentments, the passions of frustrated social existence take revenge in the wildest of individual aberrations. Before these forces psycho-analysis is powerless, and voting every few years becomes a ghastly mockery. Facing the disintegration of society, capital mobilizes all available forces for the suppression of what is its own creation - the need for social expression that the modern productive forces instills into every living human being. The explosion of this suppression is the motive force of revolution. This is Marxism. These essays will, we hope, remind us of what Marx stood for.

Vulgar Communism as the mere transcendence of private property is denounced by Marx. He had in mind the Communism of Weitling but the analysis is permanently valid. This Communism is not a new form of "appropriation." The level of productivity is so low that in grasping the wealth of society such as it is, the workers do not appropriate a higher stage of culture. Under these circumstances, private property is transcended only in form. This kind of Communism "is only a form of appearance of the destruction of private property." In a passage which reads as if it is a contribution to the contemporary debate instead of having been written over a hundred years ago, Marx says that this type of Communism, whatever its form, "is already recognized" as man once more finding his true place in the social order. But to the degree that it has not yet grasped "the positive essence" of private property in the shape of "human needs" it is still "a prisoner" of property and "infected" by it. The analysis of alienated labor which is the precursor of Capital merely expresses in economic categories the conception of private property and human relations treated in this essay: Realistic observers of the relations between the sexes today, those who stubbornly refuse to be hypnotized by phrases as they probe into the future of the relations between whites and Negroes in the United States, will see in Marx's conception of human needs, the only basis for emancipation and equality.

All this may seem to the wilfully blind as mere theorizing. They are unable to see what is under their eyes: that as modern society develops, religion, education, the state family, morals, lose their separate identity and become fused with the necessity for the mastery of society. This is the totalitarian state. Marx, a master of dialectical logic, saw this ultimate development from the very beginning and posed the abolition of these separate forms of alienation in the complete flowering of all the capabilities of the individual, in all forms of social endeavor. The enemy of this was private property. Later he called it capital. But the economic analysis from start to finish is the material supplement of the philosophical concept. The two

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are in inextricable unity. The only proof he knew was the objective development of society. Despite the modifications that he introduced later in the working-out of the theory, the original structure, even as a bare outline, stands out today as the sole tenable explanation and solution to the collapsing barbarism of modern civilization.

The psychological appeal of totalitarianism, of Fascism in particular, is to transcend all social and individual frustration in the nation, the state, the leader. It cannot be done. In one of these essays Marx says the "We should especially avoid re-establishing 'society' as an abstraction opposed to the individual. The individual is the social essence." A quarter of a century later in Capital he writes the chapter on "Machinery and Modern Industry:"

"Modern Industry indeed, compels society, under penalty of death, to replace the detail-power of today, crippled by life-long repetition of one and the same trivial operation, and thus reduced to the mere fragment of a man, by the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labours, ready to face any change of production, and to whom the different social functions he performs, are but so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired powers." It is a terrible emasculation, in fact a denial of Marx to believe that there was some science called economics and upon this, for decoration, Marx grafted humanistic sentiments. Every fundamental feature of his economic analysis is based upon the worker in the labor process and holds no perspective of solution except the emancipation of the laborer. It is a strange reflection of our times that this conception, that the solution of the economic contradictions of capitalism is the human solution, is opposed nowhere so bitterly as in the movement itself. Where it is accepted, it is accepted as Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin accepted the necessity for the October insurrection - in some distant future.

The Critique Of The Hegelian Dialectic

The last essay, Marx's settling of accounts with the Hegelian dialectic, is very difficult. Our translator, Ria Stone, hopes on a future occasion, to give the notes and other material to the complete essays, which would guide the average reader who seriously tries to master this essay. In fact it is because so much of this work and its associated aspects are crying to be done that we publish this. Our resources are limited, we have tried in vain to awaken particular interests. We hope, we are confident, that somewhere there is a response waiting for us.

But the critique can be read and understood as it is. If the two early essays are grasped, then a working knowledge of philosophy will suffice. What Marx is saying over and over again is that Hegel saw the alienation. He saw its root in the mode of labor. What baffled him was that he could not see in the labor process itself the positive, creative elements which would overcome the alienation. Few moments in the history of thought are more dramatic than that related by Marcuse (Reason And Revolution) when the young Hegel, working out his ideas, wrote down the conditions of the workers in capitalist production, and seeing no way out for them broke off the manuscript which forever after remained unfinished.

Yet alienation had to be overcome or the outlook for man was hopeless. Hegel solved it by making thinking man, the philosopher, overcome it in thought. Instead of getting rid of religion, the state, family, etc. he smuggled them all in again under the guise of philosophy. But to grasp the fact of alienation and the need for reintegration was Hegel's great discovery and his method was the dialectic method. Man was striving for full self-

consciousness and for Marx full self-consciousness was not the insight of a few philosophers, but the active participation of all men in social life, beginning with production, and expressing and developing their natural and acquired powers. That is the essence of the "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic." It is to be noted that one of the three basic books which Lenin studied when preparing State And Revolution was Hegel's Phenomenology in which the orritical attitude of Hegel, the driving necessity to negate the existing order and the existing consciousness by a new order and a new consciousness receives its most vigorous expression. Later Hegel, by his inability to transcend, to negate the existing order by an actual social force, would leave the road open for the re-introduction, not only of religion but of uncritical idealism and positivism which are running wild in modern philosophical thought. But he who grapples with these first two essays and then seriously applies himself to Marx's Critique of the Dialectic, will get an insight not only into Marxism, but into all the various currents of social and political as well as literary and philosophical nostrums that bounce their heads in vain against the problems of contemporary society.

We who introduce these writings owe to them a special debt. It is our belief that precisely because of the unbearably acute nature of the modern crisis, theory and practice are linked in a way that was not thought possible in less urgent times. The most profound of the philosophical concepts of Marx of 1844, abstract clarification for the initiator of a theory, now become the imperative needs of hundreds of millions of people. No other generation could understand this writing as we can. For us practical politics today consist in using the phenomena of contemporary society as a means of illustrating these truths, urging the actions that are demanded for their realization. For us, as dialecticians, the social requirements of the age exist in the needs and aspirations of the masses. That is Marx's historical contribution to the dialectical method, to have demonstrated the affirmations of a new society in the negations imposed upon the proletariat by the old. To believe that these affirmations exist only in the heads of a few is merely to repeat Hegel over again, substituting for Hegel's few philosophers, the few conscious revolutionaries. Every political line that we have written has been fertilized by the concepts contained in these translations and the others we are unable to reprint. We have been stimulated to find that those of our colleagues who work in factories and who share our ideas have found that the great masses of the American workers feel and think in a way that invest these century-old essays with a meaning and significance that they could never have had, however assiduously they were merely read and merely studied. Backward in politics, the American workers constantly manifest a range of social aspiration and depths of creative power which in the not very distant future will shake the world. If these essays have helped us to understand Marxism and them, they too have helped us to understand these essays and Marxism. The political tendency which we represent has therefore a great pride and satisfaction in making available for the first time to American readers these precious antecedents of revolutionary Marxism. We are convinced that nowhere would they have been more warmly welcomed than by Trotsky.

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ALIENATED LABOR

We have proceeded from the presuppositions of political economy. We have accepted its language and its laws. We assumed private property, the separation of labor, capital and land, of wages, profit of capital and ground rent, in the same way, the division of labor, competition, the concept of exchange value, etc. From political economy itself, using its own words, we have shown that the worker sinks to the level of a commodity, to the most miserable commodity; that the misery of the worker is in inverse proportion to the power and the mass of his production; that the necessary result of competition is the accumulation of capital in a few hands, and thus the more terrible re-establishment of monopoly; that finally, the difference between the capitalist and the landlord, like that between the agricultural and manufacturing worker, disappears; and the entire society must fall asunder into two classes of, on the one hand, property and on the other, the worker without property.

Political economy proceeds from the fact of private property. It does not explain this fact to us. Political economy collects into general abstract formulae the material process which private property actually goes through. These then appear to it to be laws. Political economy does not comprehend these laws, that is, it does not investigate how they arise out of the essence of private property. Political economy does not give us any explanation about the basis of the division of labor and capital, of capital and land. When, for example, it determines the relation of wages to the profit of capital, it regards the interest of the capitalist as the ultimate reason. That is, it assumes what it should demonstrate. Likewise, competition enters in everywhere. It is explained by external circumstances. Political economy teaches us nothing about how far these external, apparently accidental circumstances are only the expression of a necessary development. We have seen how even exchange appears to it as an accidental fact. The only wheels which set political economy in motion are covetousness and the war among the covetous, competition.

Just because political economy does not grasp the interconnection of the movement, the doctrine of competition could again be counterposed to that of monopoly, the doctrine of freedom of trade to that of the economic association, the doctrine of the division of landed property to that of big landed property. Competition, freedom of trade, division of landed property, were only conceived and developed as accidental, deliberate, forcibly achieved results, and not as necessary, unavoidable, natural consequences of monopoly, of the economic association and of feudal property.

Accordingly, we now have to comprehend the essential connection between private property, covetousness, division of labor, capital, landed property and exchange and competition, the value and devaluation of men, monopoly and competition, etc. - this whole alienation accompanying the money system.

Let us not go back to a fictitious primitive condition, as political economy does, when it wants to explain. Such a primitive condition explains nothing. It merely pushes the question back into a grey nebulous distance. It assumes in the form of fact, of events what it should deduce, namely, the necessary relation between two things, E.G. between division of labor and exchange. It is thus that theology explains the origin of evil through the fall of man i.e., it poses as a fact, in the form of history, what it should explain.

We proceed from a political-economic and a present fact.

The more wealth the worker produces, the more his production takes on might and scope, the poorer he becomes. The more commodities he produces, the cheaper the worker becomes as a commodity. The devaluation of the world of men proceeds in direct proportion to the increased utilization of the world of things. Work produces not only commodities: It produces itself and the worker as a commodity and in precisely the same relation in which it produces commodities generally.

This fact expresses nothing more than this: the object which labor produces, its product, is opposed to it as an alien essence, as a power independent of the producer. The product of labor is labor which is congealed in an object has been materialized. It is the materialization (Vergegenständlichung) of labor. The realization of labor is its materialization. In the political economic condition, the realization of labor appears as the loss of reality (Entwirklichung) of the worker, the materialization as loss and servitude of the object, the appropriation as alienation, as estrangement (Entäusserung).

The realization of labor appears so much as loss of reality that the worker is depersonalized (entwirklicht) even to the point of starvation. The materialization appears so much as loss of the object that the worker is robbed not only of the objects necessary for life, but also of the tools necessary for labor. Yes, labor itself becomes an object which the worker can only get hold of by the greatest exertions and with the most irregular interruptions. The appropriation of the object appears so much as alienation that, the more objects the worker produces, the less he can possess and the more he comes under the rule of his products, of capital.

All these consequences are inherent in the fact that the worker is related to the product of his labor as to an alien object. For it is clear, according to this presupposition, that the more the worker exerts himself, the more powerful becomes the alien, objective world which he creates, the poorer he himself, his inner world, becomes; the less belongs to himself. The same applies to religion. The more man attributes to God, the less he retains in himself. The worker puts his life in the object; but now his life no longer belongs to him but to the object. Accordingly, the greater is this activity, the more lacking in objectivity is the worker. Whatever the product of his labor is, that the worker is not. The estrangement of the worker in his product has the significance not only that his labor becomes an object, something existing externally, but that it exists outside him, independent, alien to him, and is opposed to him as an alien power; that the life which he lent the object confronts him as hostile and alien.

Let us now observe more closely the process of materialization, the production of the worker, and in this process of production, the alienation, the loss of the object, of his product.

The worker can produce nothing without nature, without the sensuous external world. It is the stuff in which his labor is realized, in which it is active, out of which and by means of which he produces.

However, just as nature, on the one hand, offers the means of livelihood to labor in the sense that labor cannot live without objects to which it applies itself; on the other hand, it offers the means of life in the narrower sense: namely as the means of the physical existence of the worker himself.

Thus, the more the worker appropriates the external world, sensuous nature, through his labor, the more he withdraws from himself means of livelihood in two ways; first, the sensuous external world more and more ceased to be an object belonging to his labor, a means of livelihood for his labor; second, it more and

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more ceases to be a means of livelihood in an immediate sense, as a means for the physical subsistence of the worker.

Thus, in this dual aspect the worker becomes a slave of the object; first, because he receives an object of labor; i.e., he receives labor; and second, because he receives means of subsistence. In other words, first, because he is a worker, and second, because he exists as a physical subject. The apex of this slavery is that he can continue to maintain himself as a physical subject only by working, and is a worker only by being a physical subject.

(According to the laws of political economy, the alienation of the worker in his object expresses itself in this way; the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume; the more value he creates, the less valuable and more unworthy he becomes; the more formal his products, the more deformed is the worker; the more civilized the object, the more barbaric the worker; the more powerful the labor, the weaker becomes the worker; the more knowledge is incorporated in the labor, the more the worker becomes spiritless and a slave to nature.)

Political economy conceals the alienation in the essence of labor, inasmuch as it does not observe the direct relation between the worker (labor) and production. To be sure, labor produces wonderful things for the rich but destitution for the worker. It produces palaces but huts for the worker. It produces beauty but is crippling for the worker. It replaces labor by machines; yet it throws back one part of the worker to barbaric labor and makes the other part into a machine. It produces intelligence and spirit, yet it produces imbecility and cretinism for the worker.

The direct relation of labor to its products is the relation of the worker to the objects of his production. The relation of the wealthy to the objects of production and to production itself is only a consequence of this first relation. And it confirms this first relation. Later, we shall consider this other aspect.

Thus, when we ask: "What is the essential relation of labor?" we ask about the relation of the worker to production.

Up to now we have observed the alienation, the estrangement of the worker only from one aspect, namely, his relation to the products of his labor. But the alienation is revealed not only in the result. It is revealed in the act of production, inside the producing activity itself. How could the worker confront the product of his activity in an alien fashion if he himself were not alienated from himself in the very act of production. The product is only the resume of activity, of production. Thus, if the product of labor is estrangement, production itself must be the active process of estrangement, the estrangement of activity, the activity of estrangement. In the alienation of the object of labor is only crystallized the alienation, the estrangement in the very activity of labor.

In what does the alienation of labor exist?

First, that labor is external to the worker, does not belong to his essence. Therefore, he does not affirm himself in his labor but negates himself. He does not feel contented but dissatisfied. He develops no free physical and spiritual energy but mortifies his body and ruins his spirit. The worker therefore first feels himself to be himself away from labor and in labor he feels remote from himself. He is at home when he does not work and when he works, he is not at home. His labor is therefore not free but coerced, forced labor. Labor is therefore not the satisfaction of a need but is only the means to satisfy the needs outside of it. The strangeness of labor is revealed clearly in the fact that, as soon

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as no physical or other pressure exists, labor is fled from like a pestilence. External labor, labor in which man externalizes himself, is a labor of self-sacrifice, or mortification. Finally, the externality of labor for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own but another's, that it does not belong to him, that he belongs in it not to himself but to another. Just as in religion, the self-activity of the human imagination, of the human brain and of the human heart, operates independently of the individual, i.e., operates on him as an alien, divine or diabolical activity; in the same way, the activity of the worker is not his self-activity. It belongs to another, it is the loss of himself.

Therefore, we have the result that man (the worker) feels himself as freely active more in his animal functions, eating, drinking, procreating, or at its highest, in his dwelling and in his dress; while in his human functions he feels more like an animal. The animal becomes the human and the human the animal.

Eating, drinking and procreating are also, of course, real human functions. However, in the abstraction which separates them from the rest of the range of human activity and makes them the final and only ends, they are animal-like.

Up to now we have observed the process of alienation of practical human activity according to two aspects: 1) the relation of the worker to the product of labor as an object alien to and overpowering him. This relation is at the same time the relation to the sensuous external world, to natural objects as a world alien to and hostilely confronting him. 2) the relation of labor to the act of production inside labor. This relation is the relation of the worker to his own activity as to an alien activity, not belonging to him, activity as suffering, strength as weakness, procreation as impotence, the physical and spiritual energy of the worker, his personal life - for what is life other than activity - as an activity turned against himself, independent of him, not belonging to him. Self-alienation, just as above, we had the alienation of the thing.

There is still a third category of alienated labor to be deduced from the two we have already considered.

Man is a species-essence (Gattungswesen), not only insofar as he practically and theoretically becomes a species, making both his own and other things into his object; but also - and this is just another expression for the same thing - insofar as he is related to himself as a universal and therefore free essence, insofar as he is related to himself as the present, living species.

The life of the species, both in the case of men and in that of animals, consists physically in this, that, in the first place, man (like the animal) lives on inorganic nature; and to the degree that man is more universal than the animal, the sphere of inorganic life on which he lives is more universal. Plants, animals, stones, air, light, etc. form theoretically a part of human consciousness, partly as objects of science, partly as objects of art - his spiritual inorganic nature, spiritual means of livelihood which he must first prepare in order to enjoy and digest. Likewise, they form practically a part of human living and of human activity. Physically, man lives only by means of these products of nature, however they may now appear in the form of nourishment, fuel, clothing, shelter, etc. Practically, the universality of man appears precisely in the universality which makes all of nature into his inorganic body, both insofar as it is (1) a direct means of livelihood and insofar as it is (2) the material, the object and the tool of his life-activity. Nature is the inorganic body of man, that is, nature, insofar as it is not the human body itself. That man lives by nature means that nature is his body with which he must remain in constant consonance in order not to die.

That the physical and spiritual life of man is connected with nature means nothing more than that nature is connected with itself, for man is a part of nature.

Inasmuch as alienated labor alienates from man (1) nature, (2) himself, his own active function, his life-activity, it alienates the species from man. It makes the life of the species into a means of individual life. First it alienates the species life and the individual life; and secondly, it makes the individual life in its abstraction the purpose of the species-life, likewise in its abstract and alienated form.

For, in the first place, labor, life-activity productive living itself to man appear only as a means to satisfaction of his needs, of the needs of maintaining his physical existence. But productive living is the life of the species. It is living producing living. The whole character of a species, its species-character, lies in the character of its life-activity; and free conscious activity is the species character of men. Even living appears only as a means to life.

The animal is immediately at one with its life-activity. It is not differentiated therefrom. It is this life-activity. Man, however, makes his life-activity itself into an object of his will and his consciousness. He has conscious life-activity. Life-activity is not something with which he immediately coincides. Conscious life-activity immediately distinguishes the life-activity of man from that of animals. It is precisely this which constitutes his particular species-essence as man. Or, he is only a conscious essence, i.e. his own life becomes an object to him just because he is a species-essence. Only for this reason is his activity free activity. Alienated labor reverses the relationship so that man, just because he is a conscious essence, makes his life-activity, his essence, into a means for his existence.

The practical production of an objective world, the working on inorganic nature, is the process of proving man as a conscious species-essence, i.e., as an essence which is related to the species as to his won essence, or to himself as a species-essence. Of course, the animal also produces. He builds a nest, builds shelter for himself, as for example, do the bees, beavers, ants. But the animal produces only what is immediately necessary for itself or for its young. It produces one-sidedly while man produces universally. It produces only under the domination of immediate physical needs, while man, even when himself free from physical needs produces and produces freely for the first time when free from these needs. The animal produces only itself while man reproduces all of nature. The animal's product belongs immediately to its physical body, while man freely confronts his product. The animal produces only according to nature and to the needs of the species to which it belongs, while man knows how to produce according to the nature of every species and knows how to apply everywhere an inherent proportion to the object. Man therefore shapes things according to the laws of beauty as well.

Precisely in working on the objective world does man prove himself actually as a species-essence. This production is his practical species-life. Through it nature appears as his deed and his actuality. The object of labor is therefore the materialization of the species-life of man. In it he duplicates himself not only in consciousness, intellectually, but practically and actually and thus looks at himself in a world which he has created. Inasmuch, therefore, as alienated labor tears man from the object of his production, it tears him away from his species-life, the actual objective reality of his species, and transforms his advantage over the animal into the disadvantage that his inorganic, nature is withdrawn from him.

Just as alienated labor degrades self-activity, free activity, into a means, in the same way it makes the species-life of man a means for his physical existence.

Thus, the consciousness which man possesses of his species to which he belongs is transformed through alienation, with the result that species-life becomes for him a means.

3. Alienated labor therefore transforms the species-essence of man, both his natural and his spiritual species-abilities, into an alien essence, a means for his individual existence. It alienates man from his own body, from nature outside him, from his spiritual essence, from his human essence.

4. An immediate consequence of the fact that man is alienated from the product of his labor, his life-activity, his species-essence, is the alienation of man from man. When man is opposed to himself, he also stands opposed to other men. What is true of the relationship of man to his labor, to the product of his labor and to himself, is true of the relationship of men to other men, and to the labor and the object of labor of other men.

In general, the proposition that man is alienated from his species-essence means that one man is alienated from another, and every man is alienated from human essence.

The alienation of man, in general every relation in which man stands to himself, is first realized and expressed in the relation in which man stands to other men.

Accordingly, every man regards others in the relationship of alienated labor to the degree and according to the relation in which he finds himself as worker.

We started from a fact of political economy, the alienation of the worker and of his production. We have expressed the concept of this fact - alienated, estranged labor. We have analyzed the concept and therefore merely analyzed a fact of political economy.

We now proceed to consider how the concept of alienated estranged labor expresses and must express itself in actuality.

If the product of my labor is alien to me, confronts me as an alien power, to whom does it belong?

If my own activity does not belong to me, and is an alien forced activity, to whom does it belong?

To a being other than myself. Who is this being?

The Gods? Of course, in earlier periods, the main production, for example, the building of temples in Egypt, the Indies, Mexico, was in the service of Gods and the products belonged to the Gods. But the Gods alone were never the rulers of labor. Just as little was nature. And what contradiction would there be indeed if - the more man subjects nature to himself through his own labor and the more the miracles of God become superfluous because of the miracles of industry - man should renounce in favor of these powers the joy of production and the enjoyment of the product.

The alien essence to which labor and the product of labor belong, in whose service and for whose enjoyment labor stands, can only be man himself. If the product of the labor does not belong to the worker, but confronts him as an alien power, this is only possible because it belongs to another man outside the worker. If his activity is torture to him, it must be the enjoyment and satisfaction of another. Not the Gods, not nature, only man himself can be the alien power over men.

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We must think over the previously made statement that the relationship of man to himself first becomes objective and actual through his relation to other men.

Thus, when he is related to the product of his labor, to his materialized labor, as to an alien, hostile, powerful object independent of him, he is likewise related to another alien, hostile, powerful man, independent of him and the master of this product. If he is related to his own activity as to an unfree activity, he is also related to it as an activity in the service, under the mastery, force and yoke of another man.

Every self-alienation of man from himself and from nature appears in the relationship by which he surrenders himself and nature to another man differentiated from him. Thus, religious self-alienation necessarily appears in the relation of the layman to the priest, or else, since it is here a question of the intellectual world, to a mediator. In the practical actual world, self-alienation can only appear through the practical actual relation to another man. The means through which the alienation proceeds is itself a practical one. By means of alienated labor, man does not only produce his relation to the object and to the act of production as to an alien man hostile to him. He also produces the relation in which other man stands to his production and to his product, and the relation in which he stands to these other men. Insofar as his own production is a process of his loss or reality, of his punishment, insofar as his own product is a loss, is a product not belonging to him, insofar does he produce the mastery of the non-producers over production and the product. Insofar as he is alienated from his own activity, insofar does he appropriate to the alien an activity not its own.

Up to now we have considered the relation from the side of the worker. Later we will consider it also from the side of the non-worker.

Thus, through alienated, estranged labor, the worker produces to this labor the relations of a man alien to labor and standing outside of it. The relation of the worker to labor produces the relation to labor of the capitalist, whom we call the master of labor. Private property is therefore the product, the result, the necessary consequence of estranged labor, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself.

Thus, private property is the result of an analysis of the concept of estranged labor, that is to say, of estranged man, of alienated labor, of alienated living, of the alienated man.

We have, indeed, obtained the concept of estranged labor (of estranged life) from political economy as the result of the movement of private property. But in analysing this concept, it is revealed that even if private property appears as the basis, as the cause, of estranged labor, it is rather a consequence of it. In the same way, the Gods are not originally the cause but the effect of human confusion in understanding. Later this relationship becomes interchanged.

This, the secret of private property, first reappears at the final climax of the development of private property. The secret is that, on the one hand, private property is the product of estranged labor and secondly, that it is the means through which labor is estranged, the realization of this estrangement.

This development immediately throws light on various collisions heretofore unsolved.

1) Political economy proceeds from labor as the real soul of production and nevertheless attributes nothing to labor, everything to private property. Proudhon-

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has concluded from this contradiction in favor of labor against private property. We have seen, however, that this apparent contradiction is the contradiction of labor alienated from itself, and that political economy has only expressed this law of alienated labor.

We see also that wage labor and private property are identical. For wage labor, like the product, the object of labor, even labor paid for, is only a necessary consequence of the alienation of labor. For in wage labor, labor does not appear as its own purpose but as the servant of the wage. Later we will take this further. Now we only draw some conclusions.

A large enforced raising of wages (leaving aside all difficulties, leaving aside the fact that as an anomaly it could be maintained only by force) would be nothing more than a better paying of slaves and would achieve human characteristics and dignity neither for the worker or the labor.

Even the equality of wages, proposed by Proudhon, only transforms the relation of today's workers to their labor into the relation of all men to their labor. Society would then appear as an abstract capitalist.

The wage of labor is a direct consequence of alienated labor and alienated labor is the immediate cause of private property. They stand and fall together.

2) From the relation of alienated labor to private property, it follows further that the emancipation of society from private property, from servitude, expresses itself in the form of the emancipation of the workers, not as if it were a matter of their emancipation alone, but because in their emancipation is involved that of men in general. The latter is involved because all of human servitude is involved in the relation of the workers to production, and all relations of servitude are only modifications and consequences of this relationship.

Just as we have derived the concept of private property through analysis of the concept of alienated labor, we will be able with the help of these two factors to develop all categories of political economy. And we will find again in every category, for example, barter, competition, capital, money, only a specific and developed expression of these basic foundations.

However, before we consider this formation let us try to solve two problems.

1) The general essence of private property as it has been produced as a result of alienated labor, is to be determined in its relation to truly human and social property.

2) We have assumed this alienation of labor, labor's estrangement as a fact and have analyzed this fact. Now, we now ask, does man arrive at this estrangement and alienation of his labor? How is this alienation grounded in the essence of human development? We have already accomplished a great deal for the solution of this problem insofar as we have transformed the question as to the origins of private property into the question as to the relationship of alienated labor to the process of development of humanity. For when man speaks of private property, he believes he has only to deal with a fact outside man. When man speaks of labor, he has to deal directly with man. This new posing of the question already includes its resolution.

ad (1) General essence of private property and its relation to truly human property.

Alienated labor has resolved itself for us in two elements which mutually condition each other, or which are only different expressions of one and the same relation. The appropriation appears as alienation, as estrangement, and the estrangement as appropriation, the alienation as the true enfranchisement. . . 761

We have considered one side, estranged labor, in relation to the worker himself, i.e., the relation of estranged labor to itself. We have found the property relation of the non-worker to the worker and labor as the product, as the necessary result of this relation. Private property as the material collected expression of estranged labor, embraces both relationships, the relation of the worker to labor, and to the product of his labor and to the non-worker, and the relationship of the non-worker to the worker and to the product of his labor.

If we have now seen that in regard to the worker who appropriates nature to himself through labor, the appropriation appears as alienation, the self-activity as activity for another, and as activity of another, life as sacrifice of living, production of the object as loss of the object to an alien power, to an alien man; now we observe the relation of these men, alien to labor and to the worker to the worker, to labor and to its object.

First of all, it is to be noted that everything which in the case of the worker appears as estranged, alienated activity, appears in the case of the non-worker as a situation of estrangement, of alienation.

Second, that the actual practical relating of the worker in production and to the product (as state of mind) appears in the case of the non-worker opposing him as a theoretical relating.

Third: The non-worker does all the things against the worker which the worker does against himself, but he does nothing against himself which he does against the worker.

Let us consider these three relationships more closely.*

* The next three essays deal with "The Relations of Private Property", "Private Property and Labor", "Private Property and Communism." - Tr.

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND COMMUNISM

However, the opposition between propertylessness and property, so long as it is not conceived as the opposition of labor and capital, is an opposition not yet comprehended as contradiction. It is a still undifferentiated opposition, not in its active relation to its own inner situation. Moreover, where the developed movement of private property is absent, for example, in ancient Rome, in Turkey, etc., this opposition can be expressed only in its initial form. Thus, it does not yet appear as posited through private property itself. But labor, the subjective essence of private property, as excluding property, and capital, objective labor as excluding labor, is private property as its developed relation of contradiction and is therefore an active relation driving toward resolution.

**ad ibidem. The transcendence of self-alienation follows the same course as self-alienation. First, private property is regarded only from its objective aspect - but with labor as its essence. Its form of existence is thus capital which is to be transcended "as such" (Proudhon). Or a specific mode of labor, as uniform, distributed and thus unfree labor, is regarded as the source of the perniciousness of private property and of its existence as human-alienation - Fourier, who, corresponding to the Physiocrats, also regarded agricultural labor as at least the best, while St. Simon, opposing him, considered industrial labor as such as the essence and desired only the exclusive rule of industry and the improvement of the workers status. Finally, communism is the positive expression of transcended private property; to begin with, universal private property. Inasmuch as Communism grasps this relation in its universality, it (1)st in its first form only its generalization and completion. As such, it exhibits itself in two forms. On the one hand, the rule of material property bulks so large before it that it would abolish everything which is not capable of being possessed by everybody as private property. It would abstract by force from talent, etc. It judges physical and immediate possession as the sole purpose of life and existence. Labor is not transcended but extended to all men. The relations of private property remain the relation of the community to the world of things. Finally, this movement of counterposing private property to universal private property is expressed in the animal form that marriage (which, of course, is a form of exclusive private property) is counterposed to having women in common; hence the woman becomes communal and common property. We might say that this thought of communal women is the secret of this quite vulgar and unthinking communism made explicit. In the same way that the woman is to abandon marriage for general prostitution, so the whole world of wealth, that is, the objective essence of man, is to abandon the relation of exclusive marriage with the private property owner for the relation of universal prostitution with the community.

This type of communism, insofar as it completely negates the personality of man, is merely the logical expression of private property which is just this negation. Universal envy, constituted as power, is only the secret guise in which greed has arisen and is to be satisfied in merely another way. The thought of every private property owner, as such, is directed at least against wealthier private property as envy and a desire to reduce all to a common level, so that the latter even constitutes the essence of competition. The vulgar communist is only the consummation of this envy and leveling, proceeding from the prescribed medium. He has a definitely limited standard. How little this transcendence of private property is an actual appropriation is proved precisely by its abstract negation of the entire cultivated and civilized world, and its retrogression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor man free from needs; who not only has not gone beyond private property but has not even attained it.

The community is only a community of labor and the equality of wages which the communal capital or the community as the universal capitalist counts out.Both

sides of the relation are elevated into an arbitrary universality, labor as the category in which everything is posited, capital as the recognized universality and power of the community.

In the relation to the woman as the spoils and handmaid of communal lust is expressed the infinite degradation in which man exists for himself. For the secret of man's relationship to himself finds its unambiguous, distinctive, patent and undisguised expression in the relationship of man to woman and in the way in which the immediate natural relationship between the sexes is regarded. The immediate natural necessary relationship of man to man is the relationship of man to woman. In this natural relationship of the sexes, the relationship of man to nature is immediately his relationship to man, just as the relationship of man to man is his relationship to nature, his own natural determination. In this relationship, there is sensuously disclosed, reduced to an evident fact, to what extent the human essence of man has become that of nature or to what extent nature has become the human essence of man. From this relationship we can judge the whole stage of development of man. From the character of this relationship it follows to what degree man as a species has become human and has recognized himself as such. The relationship of man to woman is the most natural relationship of man to man. In it is revealed to what degree the natural behavior of man has become human or to what degree human essence has become his natural essence, to what degree his human nature has become his nature. In this relationship is also shown to what degree the needs of man have become human needs, to what degree another human being is needed as a human being, to what degree, he, in his most-individual existence, has at the same time a communal essence.

The first positive transcendence of private property, vulgar communism, is thus only a form of appearance of the destruction of private property which seeks to posit itself as the positive communal essence.

(2) Communism (a) still political, democratic or despotic; (b) transcending the state, but at the same time still uncompleted essence and still affected with private property, i.e., the alienation of man. In both forms, (a) and (b), communism is already recognized as reintegration or return of man to himself, as transcendence of human self-alienation. But insofar as it has not yet grasped the positive essence of private property and to the same degree has little understood the human nature of needs, communism remains the prisoner of private property and infected therewith. It has, to be sure, caught hold of its concept but not yet of its essence.

(3) Communism as positive transcendence of private property, of human self-alienation, and therefore as an actual appropriation of human nature through and for man; thus the return of man to himself as social, i.e., human man, complete, conscious and matured within the entire wealth of developments to date. This communism as completed naturalism = humanism, as completed humanism = naturalism. It is the genuine solution of the strife between man and nature and between man and man; the true resolution of the conflict between existence and essence, between reification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself as this solution.

For its thinking consciousness, the whole movement of history is therefore like its actual act of creation - the act by which its empirical existence was born - the realized and recognized process of its development. On the other hand, the former still incomplete communism seeks a historical justification in the particular historical structures opposing private property, a justification in the past. This is the case inasmuch as incomplete communism seizes upon particular moments from the process of development (Gabet, Villogarde, etc. especially ride this horse) and regards these as proof of its historical pedigree. Thereby, incomplete communism

only demonstrates that the disproportionately greater part of this development contradicts its claims and that, if it has once existed, the very fact that it is past refutes its pretensions of being essential.

From this it is easy to see the necessity for the whole revolutionary movement to find both its empirical and theoretical base in the movement of private property, i.e., of the economy.

This material, immediately sensuous private property is the material sensuous expression of alienated human living. Its movement - production and consumption, - is the sensuous manifestation of the movement of all production up to now, that is, the actualization or the actuality of man. Religion, the family, the state, law, morals, science, art, etc. are only specific modes of production and fall under its universal law. The positive transcendence of private property, like the appropriation of human living, is therefore the positive transcendence of alienation and thus the return of man from religion, the family, the state, etc. to his human, i.e. social existence. Religious alienation as such takes place only in the sphere of inner human consciousness but economic alienation is that of actual life. Therefore, its transcendence encompasses both aspects. It is self-evident that the movement makes its initial appearance with various types of peoples according to the extent that the real recognized life of the people occurs more in consciousness or in the external world, is more ideal or real living. Communism begins directly (Owen) with Atheism. The more this atheism is an abstraction, the more remote it is at first from Communism.

At first, therefore, the philanthropy of atheism is only a philosophically abstract philanthropy; that of communism is linked really and immediately to action.

We have seen, how, by presupposing the positive transcendence of private property, man produces man, himself and other men; how the object which is the immediate assertion of his individuality is at the same time his own existence for other men, for their existence and their existence for him. In the same way, both the material of labor and man as subject are equally the result and the starting point of the development. (And it is just the historical necessity of private property that they must be this starting point). Thus, its character as social is the universal character of the whole movement. Just as society itself produces man as man, so it is produced by him. Activity and spirit, both in content and in origin, are social - social activity and social spirit. The human essence of nature is present for the first time for social man. Here, for the first time, it is present for him as his link with men, as his existence for others and of others for him. As the living element of human reality, it is present here for the first time as the basic of his own human existence. Here for the first time his natural existence is his human existence and nature has become human for him. Thus, society is the complete essential unity of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the achieved naturalism of man, and the achieved humanism of nature.

Social activity and social spirit by no means exist merely in the form of direct community activity and direct community spirit, although community activity and spirit, i.e., activity and spirit which are expressed and asserted directly in actual society with other men, are to be found wherever such an immediate expression of sociality is based in the essential content of the activity and are suited to its nature.

However, whenever I am active scientifically, etc., engaged in activity which I myself can pursue in direct community with others, I am social because I am active as a man. Not only the material of my activity is given to me as a social product, - as is the case even with language in which the thinker is active - my own existence is social activity inasmuch as what I make for myself I make also for society

and with the consciousness of myself as a social essence.

My universal consciousness is only the theoretical form of that whose living form is the real communal essence, the social essence. Nowadays, universal consciousness is an abstraction from real life and as such is inimical to it. Hence also, the activity of my universal consciousness - as one such - is my theoretical existence as a social being.

We should especially avoid re-establishing "society" as an abstraction opposed to the individual. The individual is the social essence. His expression of life, although it may not appear in the direct form of a communal-type life carried out simultaneously with others, is therefore an expression and assertion of social living. The individual and the species life of man are not distinct. Thus, also and of necessity, the mode of existence of an individual life is a more specific or more universal manner of existence of the species life, or the species life is a more specific or universal individual life.

As species-conscious, man asserts his real social life and merely recapitulates his actual existence in thought. In the same way, conversely, the existence of the species is affirmed in the consciousness of the species and in its universality, as thinking essence, is for itself.

The more man is a specific individual - and precisely his specificity makes him an individual and an actual individual communal essence - the more he is the totality, the ideal totality, the subjective existence of society, thought out and experienced for itself. Likewise, he is in actuality, both in perception and in the actual spirit of social existence, present as a totality of human expression

Thinking and being thus are of course distinguishable from one another but at the same time in unity with one another.

Death appears as a harsh victory of the species over the individual and as a contradiction of this unity. But the determinate individual is only a determinate species-essence and as such mortal.

(4) Private property is only the sensuous expression of the fact that man at one and the same time, becomes objective for himself and becomes an alien and inhuman object. In expressing his life, he alienates his life; his realization is a separation from reality, an alien reality. Hence, the positive transcendence of private property, i.e., the sensuous appropriation of human essence and living, of objective humanity, of human achievements for and through man, is to be conceived not only in the sense of direct one-sided enjoyment nor only in the sense of possession or a sense of having. Man appropriates himself as an all-sided essence in an all-sided way, hence, as a whole man. Each of his human relationships to the world, seeing, hearing, smell, taste, feeling, thought, perception, experience, wishing, activity, loving; in short all organs of his individuality, like the organs which exist directly in the form of communal organs, are in their objective behavior or in their behavior toward the object, the appropriation of it. The appropriation of human actuality, its relation to the object is the affirmation of human actuality; human action and human passion, for passion, conceived in a human way, is a source of self-enjoyment to man.

Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is ours only when we have it, when it exists for us as capital, or when we possess it directly, eat it, drink it, wear it on our body, live in it, in short, use it. Although private property continues to regard all these immediate actualizations of possessions only as means of life; and the life for which these means serve is the life of private property, labor and capitalization.

For all the physical and spiritual sense, therefore, the sense of possession which is the simple alienation of all these senses, has been substituted. Human essence has to be reduced to this absolute poverty with which it is supposed to give birth to its inner wealth (regarding the category of possession, see Hess, 21 Bogen).*

The transcendence of private property is therefore the complete emancipation of all the human senses and qualities. However, it is this emancipation precisely because these senses and qualities have become human, both subjectively and objectively. The eye has become a human eye when its object is a social human object, proceeding from man for man. The senses in that way have become theoretical in their immediate practice. They are related to the thing for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an objective human relation to itself and to man, and vice versa. Thus, need or enjoyment have lost their egotistic character and nature has lost its character of mere utility, inasmuch as using has become human using.

Likewise the sense and spirit of other men have become my own appropriation. Besides these direct organs, social organs are therefore developed in the form of society, e.g., activity directly in society with others becomes an organ for expressing life and a mode for appropriating human life.

It is self-evident that appreciation by the human eye is different from that of the crude unhuman eye, that by the human ear different from that of the crude ear.

This we have seen. Man is not lost in his object only if the latter becomes his as a human object or as objective man. This is only possible insofar as it becomes a social object for him, he becomes a social essence, and society as essence comes to be for him in this object.

On the one hand, therefore, inasmuch as everywhere for man in society, objective actuality becomes the actuality of human essential capacities, human actuality, and thus the actuality of his own essential capacities, all objects become for him the objectification of himself; objects affirming and realizing his individuality, his objects, i.e., he himself becomes the object. How they become his depends on the nature of the object and the character of the essential capacity corresponding to it. For just the determinateness of this relationship constitutes the specific actual manner of affirmation. For the eye an object develops differently than for the ear and the object for the eye is different from that for the ear. The uniqueness of every capacity is just its unique essence. Likewise, the unique mode of its objectification, its objective, active living being. Not only in thought but with all his senses, man is thus affirmed in the objective world.

On the other hand, from the subjective point of view, just as music first arouses the musical sensitivity of man, just as for the unmusical ear the most beautiful music makes no sense, is not an object because my object can only be the assertion of my own essential capacity; in the same way an object has sense for me, only insofar as my essential capacity is subjective capacity for itself, because the sense of an object for me (only has sense for a corresponding sensitivity goes just so far as my sensitivity goes. Therefore, the sensitivities of the social man are other than those of the unsocial. The wealth of subjective human sensitivity develops for the first time through the objec-

*Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz, Erster Teil. Zurich und Winterthur, 1843, p.239

tively unfolded wealth of human nature. There will develop a musical ear, an eye for the beauty of form, in short, for the first time there will develop senses which are capable of human appreciation, which will assert themselves as human essential capacities. For the first time, these will be created and developed. For not only the five senses but also the so-called spiritual senses, the practical senses (volition, love, etc.), in a word, human sensitivity, the humanity of the senses will be achieved for the first time by means of the existence of their object, by means of humanized nature. The cultivation of the five senses is the work of the whole history of the world to date. Sensitivity preoccupied with crude practical necessity is only limited sensitivity. For the starved man, there does not exist the human form of food but only its abstract existence as nourishment. It would be just as good placed before him in its crudest form, and it is impossible to say what distinguishes this activity of nourishment from the animal activity of nourishment. The anxious, needy man has no sensitivity for the most beautiful drama. The dealer in minerals sees only their market value but not the beauty and unique character of minerals. He has no mineralogical sensitivity. Thus, the objectification of human essence, both theoretically and practically, is a function of making the sensitivity of man human and of creating for the whole wealth of human and natural essence a comparable human sensitivity.

Just as through the movement of private property and its wealth and poverty - or material and spiritual wealth and poverty - the developing society finds the formation of all material things; in the same way the developed society produces man in this total wealth of his nature, the rich and profoundly sensitive man as its permanent actuality.

We can see how subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, first lose their character as opposites under aetial conditions, and therefore their existence as such opposites. We can see how the solution of theoretical oppositions is only possible in a practical way, only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is therefore by no means a project for knowledge but a project of actual living. Philosophy cannot solve them precisely because philosophy grasps them only as theoretical problems.

We can see how the history of industry and the objectively developed existence of industry are the opened book of human capacities, which is human psychology sensuously considered. Up to now industry has not been regarded in connection with the essence of man but has always been regarded only in terms of external relations of utility. That is because, moving within the framework of alienation, we have only known how to conceive as the actuality of human essential capacities and as acts of the human species the universal existence of man, religion, or history in its abstractly universal essence, politics, art, literature, etc. - We have been confronted with the objectified essential capacities of man under the form of sensuous, alien, useful objects in ordinary material industry (which we can regard as a part of the former universal movement, just as we can regard this movement itself as a special part of industry, since all human activity up to now has been labor and thus industry has been alienated activity). A psychology to which this book, precisely the sensuously most concrete, most accessible part of history, is closed, cannot become a really profound and genuine science. In general, what should we think of a science which presumptuously abstracts from this enormous section of human labor and does not feel its own inadequacy? What should we think of a science as long as such an extensive realm of human activity says no more to it than what can be said in one word: "Need, common need."

The natural sciences have developed an enormous activity and have appropriated for themselves a constantly expanding subject matter. Philosophy has remained alien to them to the same extent that they remain alien to philosophy. Their momentary reconciliation was only a fantastic illusion. The will was there but not the capacity. Historical writing itself pays the natural sciences only

cursory consideration, as moments of enlightenment, of utility, of individually great discoveries. But the more practical has been the invasion of human living by natural science, through industry transforming it and preparing human emancipation, the more directly it had to complete the dehumanization. Industry is the actual historical relationship of nature to man and therefore of the natural sciences to man. If it is regarded therefore as the exoteric unfolding of human essential capacities, the human essence of nature and the natural essence of man is also understood. Then natural science loses its abstract materialistic or rather idealistic direction and becomes the basis for human science. Today, it has already become - although in an alienated form - the basis of actual human life. To have one basis for life and another for science, is a priori a lie.

Nature developing in human history - the birth of human society - is the actual nature of man. Therefore, nature as it develops through industry, even if in alienated form, is real anthropological nature.

Sensuousness (see Feuerbach) must be the basis of all science. Science is real only when it proceeds from sensuousness in the dual aspect both of sensuous consciousness and sensuous needs, in other words only when science proceeds from nature. All of history is the history of preparation for "man" becoming the object of sensuous consciousness, and the need of "man as man" becoming the basis of needs. Such a history is an actual part of the history of nature, of nature's development into man. Later natural science will become the science of man, just as the science of man subsumes natural science under it. It will be a science.

Man is the immediate object of natural science because the immediate sensuous nature for man is immediately human sensitivity (a tautology), immediately as another man sensuously present for him; because his own sensitivity first develops for him as human sensitivity through other men. But if nature is the immediate object of the science of man, the first object of man - namely man - is nature, sensitivity and the specifically human essential sensuous capacities, which can find their objective realization only in natural objects and can in general find their self-recognition only in the science of natural essence. The element of thinking itself, the element of the living expression of thought, namely, language, is sensuous nature. The social actuality of nature and human natural sciences or the natural science of men - these are all identical expressions.

It is clear how the wealthy man and the wealth of human needs will take the place of the wealth and poverty of political economy. The wealthy man is at the same time the man needing a totality of human modes of living. Man exists in his own realization, as inner necessity, as need. On the basis of socialism, not only the wealth but also the poverty of men likewise attain a human and therefore social significance. It is the passive link which permits man to feel the need for his greatest wealth, viz., other men. The mastery of objective essence in me, the sensuous outburst of my essential activity, is the emotion which in this case becomes the activity of my essence.

(5) An essence first judges itself as independent as soon as it stands on its own feet. And it stands first on its own feet when it owes its existence to itself. A man who lives by the grace of another, regards himself as a dependent being. However, I live completely by the grace of another when I owe him not only the maintenance of my life but when he has even produced my life, is its source. And my life necessarily has such a base outside itself whenever it is not my own creation. Creation is therefore a concept which it is very difficult to dislodge from the consciousness of people. They are unable to conceive that nature and men exist through themselves, because it contradicts all the obvious facts of practical life.

The theory of the earth's creation has received a powerful blow from geology, the science which presents the formation and development of the earth as a process of self-production. "Generatio Equivoca" is the only practical refutation of theories of creation.

Now it is certainly easy to say to a single individual what Aristotle has already said: "You were produced by your father and mother. Hence you are the coupling of two people. Thus a sex act of men produced man. You see that man owes his physical existence to men. Thus, you must not only bear in mind the one side, namely, the interminability of the series which leads you to inquire further, 'Who has produced my father, his grandfather, etc.?' You must also keep in mind the circularity of the process which is sensuously observable in this progression, according to which a man recapitulates himself in procreation and man thus remains the subject." But you will reply: "I'll grant you this circular process if you will grant me the interminable series which continually drives me further until I ask you who has produced the first man and nature in general." I can only answer you: "Your question is itself the product of abstraction. Ask yourself how you arrived at this question. Ask yourself whether your question does not occur from a point of view which I cannot answer because it is an absurd one. Ask yourself whether that progression exists as such for reasonable thought. Whenever you ask about the creation of nature and man, you abstract from man and nature. You presuppose them as not existing and yet you demand that I prove them to you as existing. I now say to you: Abandon your abstraction and you will give up your question. Or if you hold fast to your abstraction, accept the consequences. Whenever you think of man and nature as non-existent, regard yourself as non-existent; you who are natural and human. Think not, ask me not - for as soon as you think, and ask, your abstractions from the existence of nature and man makes no sense. Or are you such and egotist that you posit everything as nothing and will yourself to exist?"

You can reply to me. I will not presuppose the nothingness of nature, etc. I will ask you about its origin, as I ask the anatomist about the formation of bones, etc.

However, inasmuch as for the socialist man, the whole so-called history of the world is none other than the production of man through human labor, none other than the becoming of nature for man, he has the obvious irrefutable proof of his birth through himself and of his process of generation. Insofar as the essential character of man and nature, i.e., the existence of man for man as the existence of nature and of nature for man as the existence of man, has become practical, sensuous and observable, the question of an alien essence, an essence beyond nature and man - a question which involves the confession of the unessentiality of nature and man - becomes practically impossible. Atheism as the denial of this unessentiality makes no more sense, for atheism is a negation of God and poses the existence of man through this negation. But socialism* as socialism no longer needs such mediation. It begins from the theoretical and practical sensuous consciousness of man and nature as the essence. It is the positive self-consciousness of man no longer mediated by the transcendence of religion. Like real life it is the positive actuality of man no longer mediated like Communism by the transcendence of private property. Communism is positive as negation of the negation and therefore the actual moment of human emancipation and reconquest of humanity necessary for the future historical development. Communism is the necessary form and the energetic principle of the immediate future but communism is not as such the goal of human development, the form of human society.

*Socialism and Communism are here interchanged. - Tr.

CRITIQUE OF THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC AND PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL

This is probably the place to make some remarks both about the understanding and justification of the Hegelian Dialectic in general and more in particular about its exposition in the Phenomenology (1) and the Logic (2), and finally its relation to the new Critical movement.

The preoccupation with the content of the old world and the development of modern German Critical philosophy from the point of view of material was so overwhelming that there emerged a complete unconsciousness of the partly formal but actually essential question: "In what relation do we now stand to the Hegelian Dialectic?" The unconsciousness of the relation of modern Criticism to the Hegelian philosophy in general and to the Hegelian dialectic in particular was so great that Critical philosophers like Strauss and Bruno Bauer are still completely caught, at least potentially, within the Hegelian Logic; the former completely and the latter in his "Synoptiker" (3) (where in contrast to Strauss he substitutes the self-consciousness of abstract man for the substance of abstract nature) (4) and later again in his "Christianity Exposed." (5) For example, we read in "Christianity Exposed": "As if self-consciousness, inasmuch as it produces the world, does not posit the difference and does not produce itself in what it has generated; since it again transcends the difference of what is generated from itself, since it is itself only in the generation and in the movement - as if it did not have its purpose in this movement," etc. (6) Or: "They (the French materialists) have not yet been able to see that the movement of the universe first becomes actual for itself and first arrives at unity with itself as the movement of self-consciousness." (7) These expressions do not show even any verbal difference from the Hegelian conception. They rather repeat it literally.

Bauer (the Synoptist) proves how little consciousness there was of the relation to the Hegelian Dialectic during the development of that criticism. He also proves how little this consciousness arose even after the development of Material Criticism, when, in his "Good Things of Freedom," he dodges the answer to the impertinent question of Mr. Gruppe, "What about the Logic now?" by a reference to the "future" Critical philosophers. (8)

Even now after Feuerbach has subverted the roots of the old dialectic and philosophy, both in his "Theses" in the Anecdotes (9) and, more elaborately, in "The Philosophy of the Future" (10); even after the former Critical philosophy which, although it did not know how to complete the task, yet regarded the task as completed, had pronounced its criticism pure, decisive, absolute and self-clarifying; even after the Critical philosophy with spiritual arrogance had reduced the whole historical movement to the relation of the rest of the world to itself - which world it subsumed under the category of the Mass (11) in antithesis to itself; even after it had resolved all dogmatic oppositions into the one dogmatic opposition between its own wisdom and the stupidity of the world, between the critical Christ and humanity as "multitude;" even after it had demonstrated hourly and daily its own superiority to the unspirituality of the masses; after it had finally announced the Critical Day of Judgment in this form - that the day approaches when all of degenerate humanity will assemble in front of it, segregated into groups, each particular section of which will receive its "Testimonium paupertatis;" (12) even after it had proclaimed its elevation above human feelings and the world, over which it towers in egregious solitude, except for occasional outbursts of Olympian laughter from its sarcastic lips; even after all these amusing exhibitions of this

Idealism (of the Young Hegelians) expiring under the disguise of Critical philosophy it has not even once expressed the suspicion that one must now settle accounts with its mother, the Hegelian dialectic. Indeed, the Critical philosophy has not even been able to trace a critical relation to the Feuerbachian dialectic. In this it stands in a completely uncritical relation to itself.

Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious and critical relation to the Hegelian dialectic, who has made genuine discoveries in this sphere, and who is truly the real conqueror of the old philosophy generally. The greatness of the accomplishment and the quiet simplicity with which Feuerbach has given it to the world stand in a striking contrast to the reverse behavior.

Feuerbach's great feat consists in the following:

- 1) The proof that philosophy is nothing else than religion, translated into thoughts and worked out by thinking, that it is therefore likewise to be condemned as another form and mode of existence of the alienation of human essence.
- 2) The foundation of genuine materialism and real science by making the social relation "of man to man" likewise the basic principle of theory.
- 3) The counterposition to the negation of the negation, which declares itself to be the absolute positive, of the Positive which rests on itself and is positively grounded in itself.

Feuerbach explains the Hegelian dialectic (and thereby justifies the departure from the positive, from sense-certainty) in the following manner:

Hegel proceeds from the alienation of Substance (logically: the Infinite, the abstractly universal), the alienation of absolute and fixed Abstraction: popularly speaking, his point of departure is Religion and Theology.

Secondly, he transcends the Infinite, posits the actual, sensuous, real, finite, particular. (Philosophy, the sublation of Religion and Theology.)

Thirdly, he again transcends the positive, re-introduces the abstraction, the infinite. Re-introduction of Religion and Theology.

Thus, Feuerbach conceives the negation of the negation only as the contradiction of philosophy with itself, as philosophy which affirms Theology (Transcendentalism) after it has denied it, and accordingly affirms it in opposition to itself.

The Positive or self-affirmation and self-confirmation which inheres in the negation of the negation is here conceived as the positive which is not yet certain of itself, and therefore charged with its opposite, something which is doubtful of itself, and therefore in need of proof, something incapable of proving itself through its own existence and hence unacknowledged. Consequently, to it is directly and immediately counterposed the Positive of sense-certainty which is grounded in itself.

But inasmuch as Hegel comprehends the negation of the negation in accordance with the positive relation which is immanent in it, as the only truly positive and in accordance with the negative relation which is immanent in it, as the only true act and act of self-manifestation of all being, he has only

discovered the abstract, logical and speculative expression for the movement of history. This is the not yet actual history of man as a presupposed subject, but only the act of generation, the history of the origin of man. We shall now explain the abstract form as well as the difference between this movement in Hegel, in opposition to the modern criticism, and the same process in Feuerbach's "Essence of Christianity." (13) Or, we might say, that we are to explain the critical form of this movement which is still uncritical in Hegel.

A glance at the Hegelian system. We must begin with the Hegelian Phenomenology, the true birthplace and the secret of the Hegelian philosophy.

Phenomenology.

A. Self-consciousness

I. Consciousness

- a. Sense-certainty or the This and the Mine
- b. Perception or the Thing with its characteristics and illusion
- c. Force and understanding, Appearance and the Supersensuous world.

II. Self-consciousness. The Truth of Certainty of Itself

- a. Independence and dependence of self-consciousness, Lordship and Bondage
- b. Freedom of Self-consciousness. Stoicism, Scepticism, the Unhappy Consciousness.

III. Reason. Certainty and Truth of Reason.

- a. Observing Reason: Observation of Nature and of Self-consciousness
- b. Realization of reasoning Self-consciousness through itself. Desire and Necessity, the Law of the Heart and the Delusion of Conceit. Virtue and the Course of the World.
- c. Individuality which is real in and for itself. The Spiritual realm of animals and the Fraud or the fact itself. The Law-giving Reason. The Law-testing Reason.

B. Spirit

I. The True Spirit. Ethics.

II. The Alienated Spirit, Culture.

III. The Spirit sure of itself, Morality.

C. Religion. Natural Religion in the form of Art. Revealed Religion.

D. Absolute Knowing.

The Hegelian Envelope is (14) begins with Logic, and ends with pure speculative thought, Absolute Knowing, self-conscious philosophic or absolute spirit grasping itself, i.e., superhuman abstract spirit.

Hence the whole Encyclopedia is nothing but the expanded essence of the philosophic spirit, its self-objectification (Selbstvergegenständlichung). In the same way the philosophic spirit is nothing but the alienated spirit of the world, thinking within its self-alienation, i.e., grasping itself abstractly. The Logic is the money of the spirit, the speculative, the value of the thoughts of men and Nature. It has become completely indifferent to all actual determinateness and is therefore unactual essence. It is estranged (entäußert) (15) thinking, thus abstracting from Nature and from actual man. It is abstract thinking. The externality of this abstract thing is Nature, as it exists for this abstract thinking. Nature is external to this thinking, its loss of itself and this thinking also grasps Nature merely in an external way, as abstract thoughts, but as estranged abstract thinking. Finally, there is Spirit, this thinking returning to its own birthplace. It first asserts itself as anthropological, then as phenomenological, psychological, ethical, artistic-religious spirit until it finally finds itself as absolute knowing and relates to itself in the now absolute, i.e., abstract spirit, and thus attains its appropriate and appropriate existence. For its actual existence is abstraction.

In Hegel there is a double error.

The first appears most clearly in the Phenomenology as the cradle of the Hegelian philosophy. When, for example, Hegel considers Wealth, State Power, etc. as Essences alien to Human Essence, this occurs only in their thought-form. They are essences of thought, and therefore merely an alienation of pure, i.e., abstract, philosophical thinking. The whole movement, therefore, ends with Absolute Knowing. It is precisely abstract thinking from which these objects are alienated and to which they stand opposed with their pretension of reality. The philosopher, who is, himself, an abstract form of alienated man, establishes himself as the yardstick of the alienated world. The whole history of estrangement (Entäußerung), the whole re-appropriation of this estrangement is therefore nothing more than the history of the production of abstract thinking, that is, absolute, logical, speculative thinking. Hence, the alienation which forms the real interest of this externalization (Entäußerung) and the transcendence of this externalization, is the opposition between Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself, between consciousness and self-consciousness, between object and subject, i.e., the opposition between abstract thinking and sensuous actuality or actual sensuousness, within the process of thinking itself. All other oppositions and movements of these oppositions are only the semblance, the veil, the exoteric guise of these oppositions which are the solely interesting ones and which constitute the intrinsic meaning of alienation which is posed and transcended is not the fact that human essence materializes itself in an inhuman manner in opposition to itself, but the fact that it materializes itself from and in opposition to abstract thinking.

Thus, the appropriation of the essential capacities of man which have become objectified and objectified in strange objects is, in the first place, only an appropriation which proceeds in consciousness, in pure thinking, that is, in abstraction. It is an appropriation of these objects as thoughts and as movements of thought. Hence, there is already latent in the Phenomenology despite its thoroughly negative and critical appearance and despite the criticism actually contained in it which often far surpasses the later development - the uncritical Positivism and the equally uncritical Idealism of the later Hegelian works. We have here the germ, the potentiality and the secret to the philosophic solution and re-introduction of the extant Empiricism.

Second: The vindication of the objective world for men, e.g., the knowledge that the sensuous consciousness is no abstractly sensuous consciousness but a humanly sensuous consciousness, that Religion, Wealth, etc. are only the alienated actuality of human objectification, of the human essential capacities expressed in deeds and therefore only the road to true human actuality - this appropriation or the insight into this process therefore appears in Hegel in such a way that Sensuousness, Religion, State Power, etc., are spiritual essences. For in Hegel, only the spirit is the true essence of man, and the true form of the spirit is the thinking spirit, the logical speculative spirit. The humanity of Nature and of the Nature produced by history, the products of men, appear in it as products of the abstract spirit and thus as spiritual moments, thought-essences. The Phenomenology is therefore the concealed, the internally still unclarified and mystifying critical philosophy. However, insofar as it holds fast the alienation of man, even if Man appears only in the form of Spirit, all elements of criticism lie hidden in it and are often already prepared and worked out in a manner extending far beyond the Hegelian standpoint. The "Unhappy Consciousness," the "Honorable Consciousness," (16) the fight of the noble and downtrodden consciousness, etc., etc., these individual sections contain the critical elements - though still in an alienated form - of whole spheres like Religion, the State, Civic Life, etc. Insofar as the essence is the object as thought-essence, the subject is always consciousness or self-consciousness. Or rather, the object appears only as abstract consciousness, man only as self-consciousness. The diverse forms of alienation which appear are therefore only diverse forms of consciousness and self-consciousness. Inasmuch as abstract consciousness in itself - as that by which the object is grasped - is merely a differentiating moment of self-consciousness, the identity of self-consciousness with consciousness appears as the result of the movement. Absolute Knowing which no longer goes outside but merely continues within its own process of abstract thinking. That is, the dialectic of pure thought is the result.

Thus, the greatness of the Hegelian Phenomenology and of its final result - the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creative principle - lies, in the first place, in the circumstance that Hegel regards the self-production of man as a process, regards objectification as contra-position, as externalization and as the transcendence of this externalization; that he therefore grasps the essence of Labor and conceives objective Man, true Man because he is actual Man, as the result of his own labor. The true and active relating of man to himself as species-essence or his activity as an actual species-essence, that is, as human essence, is only possible because he actually produces all the capacities of his species - which is only possible through the collective action of men, only as a result of history - because he relates himself to the capacities of his species as objects which is at first only possible in the form of alienation.

We will now present in a detailed fashion the one-sidedness and the limitation of Hegel in the concluding chapter of the Phenomenology, in Absolute Knowing - a chapter which contains both the concentrated spirit of the Phenomenology, its relation to speculative dialectic, and the consciousness of Hegel regarding their mutual and many-sided relations.

For the present we are still assuming: Hegel has the point of view of modern political economy. He conceives Labor as the essence, as the self-preserving essence of man. He sees only the positive side of Labor and not its negative side. Labor is man's becoming-for-self within externalization or as externalized man. The only labor which Hegel knew and acknowledged is

the abstractly spiritual. Therefore, what constitutes generally the essence of philosophy, the externalization of man knowing himself or externalized science thinking itself, is regarded by Hegel as man's essence. And it is for this reason that he is capable of summarizing the preceding philosophy in terms of its particular moments and presenting his philosophy as the philosophy. What all other philosophers have done - viz. that they have conceived particular moments of Nature and of human Life as moments of self-consciousness or rather of abstract self-consciousness - this Hegel knows from the very nature of the activity of philosophy. Therefore, his science is absolute.

We proceed now to our object: Absolute Knowing - the last chapter of the Phenomenology.

Its main subject-matter is that the object of consciousness is none other than self-consciousness or that the object is only objectified self-consciousness, self-consciousness as object. (The positing of Man as self-consciousness.)

Therefore, it is the aim of self-consciousness to transcend its object. Objectivity as such is to be regarded as an alienated relationship of man, not appropriate to human essence, to self-consciousness. The re-appropriation of the objective essence of man as alien and produced under the determination of alienation, thus not only has the meaning of transcending alienation but also of transcending objectivity. That is, Man is to be regarded as an un-objective spiritual essence.

Hegel now describes the movement of transcending the object of consciousness as follows: The object does not show itself only as returning to the Self. (That is, according to Hegel, a one-sided comprehension of that movement which grasps merely one aspect of it.) By this act the very nature of man as Self is posited. The Self, however, is only man abstractly conceived and abstractly produced. Man is Self-ish. His eye, his ear, etc., are Self-ish. Each of his essential capacities has in him the character of Self-ishness. But on this account it is now quite false to say: Self-consciousness has eyes, ears, essential capacities. Self-consciousness is rather a quality of human nature, of the human eye, etc.: human nature is not a quality of self-consciousness.

The Self abstracted for itself and fixed is man as abstract egotist, egotism in its pure abstraction elevated to the level of thinking. (We will return to this point later.)

Human essence, Man, is regarded by Hegel as equal to self-consciousness. All alienation of human essence is therefore no more than alienation of self-consciousness. The alienation of self-consciousness is regarded not as an expression of the actual alienation of human essence, reflecting itself in knowing and thinking. Rather, the actual alienation which appears as real, is - according to its innermost concealed essence, first revealed through philosophy - nothing but the appearance of the alienation of actual human essence, of self-consciousness. The science which comprehends this is therefore called Phenomenology. All reappropriation of the alienated objective essence appears, therefore, as an incorporation into his self-consciousness. Man, insofar as he is taking possession of his essence, is only self-consciousness taking possession of the objective essence; return of the object to the self is therefore the reappropriation of the object.

Multifariously expressed, the transcendence of the object of consciousness is as follows (17):

1) the object as such presents itself to the self as a vanishing factor;

2) the emptying of self-consciousness itself establishes thinghood;

3) this externalization of self-consciousness has not merely negative but positive significance;

4) significance not merely for us or per se but for self-consciousness itself;

5) The negativity of the object, its cancelling its own existence, gets for self-consciousness a positive significance; or, self-consciousness knows this nothingness of the object because, on the one hand, self-consciousness itself externalizes itself; for in doing so, it establishes itself as object, or by reason of the indivisible unity characterizing its self-existence, sets up the object as its self.

6) On the other hand, there is also this other moment in the process, that self-consciousness has just as really cancelled and superseded this self-relinquishment and objectification and has resumed them into itself, and is thus at home with itself in its otherness as such.

7) This is the movement of consciousness, and consciousness is therefore the totality of its moments.

8) Consciousness, at the same time, must have taken up a relation to the object in all its aspects and phases, and have grasped its meaning from the point of view of each of them. This totality of its determinate characteristics makes the object per se or inherently a spiritual reality; and it becomes so in truth for consciousness when the latter apprehends every individual one of them as self, i.e., when it takes up towards them the spiritual relationship just spoken of.

ad. 1. That the object as such presents itself to consciousness as vanishing is the above-mentioned return of the object to the self.

ad. 2. The externalization of self-consciousness posits the category of thingness. Because man = self-consciousness, his externalized objective essence or thingness equals externalized self-consciousness, and thingness is posited through this externalization. (Thingness is that which is object for him, and object is truly for him only what is essentially object, which is thus his objective essence. Since it is not actual man and likewise not Nature as such - man is human nature - which is made the subject but only the abstraction of Man, namely, self-consciousness, thingness can only be externalized self-consciousness.) That a living natural Being, endowed and gifted with objective, i.e., material essential capacities, also possesses actual natural objects of its own essence is quite natural, and it is just as natural that his self-externalization should be the determination of an actual objective world, under the form of externality, thus more powerful than and not belonging to his essence. There is nothing inconceivable and perplexing in this. Rather the reverse would be perplexing. But it is just as clear that self-consciousness, viz., its externalization, could only posit thingness, i.e., only an abstract thing, a thing of abstraction and no actual thing. It is further evident that thingness therefore is not at all independent and essential over against self-consciousness but a mere creature, something posited by consciousness and that that which is posited, instead of being something which confirms itself, is only a confirmation of the act of positing, which momentarily fixes its energy as a product and in appearance apportions to it the role - but only for one moment - of an independent actual essence.

When actual corporeal Man, standing on firm and well-rounded earth, inhaling and exhaling all natural forces, posits his actual objective essential capacities as alien objects through his externalization, it is not the act of positing which is the subject. It is the subjectivity of objective essential capacities whose action must therefore also be objective. Objective essence works objectively, and it would not work objectively if objectivity did not inhere in the determination of its essence. It creates, posits only objects because it is posited through objects, because its home belongs to Nature. In the act of positing, it thus does not depart from its pure activity in order to create the object, but its objective product confirms merely its objective activity, its activity as an activity of an objective natural essence.

We see here how thoroughgoing Naturalism or Humanism distinguishes itself both from Idealism and from Materialism, and is at the same time the truth uniting both. We see at the same time how only Naturalism is capable of grasping the act of world history.

Man is immediately a natural essence. As natural essence and as living natural essence, he is endowed partly with natural forces, with living forces, and active natural essence. These forces exist in him as dispositions and capabilities, as instincts. As natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective essence he is partly a passive (leidendes), conditioned and limited being, like the animal and the plant. That is, the objects of his instincts exist outside him as objects independent of him, but these objects are objects of his needs, essential objects indispensable to the action and confirmation of his own essential capacities. That man is a corporeal, living, actual sensuous objective essence, endowed with natural force, means that he has actual sensuous objects as objects of his essence, of his life-expression, or that he is capable of expressing his life only in actual sensuous objects. It is the same thing to be objective, natural and sensuous, or to have object, nature, sense outside oneself, or even to be object, nature, sense for a third being. Hunger is a natural necessity. Therefore, one requires a nature outside oneself, an object outside oneself in order to satisfy and appease oneself. Hunger is the objective need of a body for an object outside of itself, indispensable to its integration and expression of essence. The sun is the object for the plant, an object indispensable to it, confirming its life. In the same way, the plant is an object to the sun, as expression of the life-producing power of the sun, of the objective essential force of the sun.

An essence which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural essence, takes no part in the essence of nature. An essence which has no object outside of itself is not an objective essence. An essence which is not itself object for a third essence has no essence for its object, that is, does not behave objectively; its being is not objective.

A non-objective essence is not an essence at all.

Suppose there were an essence neither itself an object nor having an object. Such an essence would first of all be the only essence. There would exist no essence outside of it. It would exist alone and solitary. For as soon as there are objects outside of myself, as soon as I am not alone, I am an other, another actuality than the object outside of me. For this third object I am thus an actuality other than it, i.e., its object. An essence which is not object to another essence presupposes thus that no objective essence exists. As soon as I have an object, this object has me

for its object. But an unobjective essence is an unactual, unsensuous essence, merely thought, i.e., only fancied, an essence of abstraction. To be sensuous, i.e., to be actual, is to be an object of sense, to be a sensuous object; therefore to have sensuous objects outside oneself, to have objects for one's sensuousness. To be sensuous is to be passive.

Man as an objective sensuous essence is therefore a passive essence, and since he is an essence experiencing his passivity, he is a passionate essence. Emotion, passion, is the essential power of men striving energetically toward its object.

However, man is not merely a natural essence, but he is also a human natural essence, i.e. an essence which is for-itself, therefore a species-essence which must confirm and affirm itself both in its being and in its knowing. Human objects are therefore neither those objects of nature which offer themselves immediately, nor is human sense, insofar as it is immediate and objective, human sensuousness, human objectivity. Neither Nature taken objectively nor Nature taken subjectively is immediately adequate to human essence. And just as all natural things must emerge, man also must have his act of emergence - history. This, however, is for him a known act of emergence and therefore an act of emergence which is transcended in consciousness. History is the true natural history of Man. (We will return to this point.)

Third, because this positing of thingness is itself only an appearance, an act contradicting the essence of pure activity, it must also again be transcended. Thinghood must be denied.

ad. 3, 4, 5, 6. 3) This externalization of consciousness has not only negative but also positive meaning, and 4) this positive meaning is not only for us or in itself but for it, consciousness itself. 5) The negativity of the object, its transcendence of itself, has for consciousness the positive meaning, that is, it knows this negativity of itself because it externalizes itself. For in this externalization, it knows its own self as object or the object for the sake of the inseparable unity of its for-itselfness. 6) On the other hand, the other Moment is herein implied at the same time, namely, that it has to the same extent also transcended and withdrawn into itself this externalization and objectivity, and that, accordingly, it is in its otherness as such with itself.

We have already seen that, for Hegel, the appropriation of alienated objective essence or the transcendence of objectivity under the determination of alienation - which is to develop from indifferent strangeness into actually hostile alienation - has at the same time, or even mainly, the significance of transcending objectivity, because the stumbling-block in the alienation is not the determinate character of the object but its objective character for self-consciousness. The object is therefore something negative, something transcending itself, a nothingness. For consciousness, this nothingness of the object has not only a negative but also a positive meaning, for this nothingness of the object is the very self-affirmation of un-objectivity, of abstraction of itself. For consciousness itself, the nothingness of the object has therefore a positive meaning, namely, that it knows this nothingness, the objective essence as its self-externalization, that it knows that it only exists through its self-externalization.

Knowing is the way in which consciousness exists and in which

something exists for it. Knowing is its sole act. Something therefore comes into being for it insofar as it knows this thing. Knowing is its unique objective relation. Now it knows the nothingness of the object, i.e., the absence of distinction of the object from it, the not-being of the object for it. It knows this because it knows the object as its self-externalization, i.e., it knows itself - the knowing as object - because the object is only the appearance of an object, an artificial vapor, in its essence no other than knowing itself, which is counterposed to itself and therefore has counterposed to itself a nothingness, something which has no objectivity outside of knowing. Or knowing knows that only insofar as it is related to an object, is it outside of itself, does it externalize itself, that it only appears to itself as object, or that what appears to it as object is only itself.

On the other hand, says Hegel, there is also contained in this at the same time the other Moment, that it has likewise transcended and withdrawn into itself this externalization and objectivity. Hence, that in its otherness it is as such by itself.

In this exposition are concentrated all the illusions of speculative thinking.

In the first place, consciousness, self-consciousness is in its otherness as such with itself. It is thus - or if we abstract here from the Hegelian abstraction and substitute for self-consciousness the self-consciousness of man - it is in its otherness as such by itself. In this is implied, on the one hand, that consciousness - knowing as knowing, thinking as thinking - pretends to be directly the other of itself, pretends to be sensuousness, actuality, life - thinking surpassing itself in thinking (Feuerbach). This aspect is here implied insofar as consciousness as mere consciousness meets an obstruction not in alienated objectivity but in objectivity as such.

In the second place, what is implied here, is that self-conscious man, insofar as he has recognized the spiritual world - or, the spiritual universal existence of his world as externalization, and transcended it, nevertheless confirms it again in this externalized form and proclaims it to be his true existence, restores it and pretends to be with himself in his otherness as such. Thus, after transcending, for example, religion, after the recognition of religion as a product of self-externalization, he still finds himself confirmed in religion as religion. Here we have the root of the false positivism of Hegel, or his only apparently critical position; what Feuerbach characterizes as positing, negating and the restoration of religion or theology - which is, however, to be conceived more generally. Thus reason is by itself in unreason as unreason. Man who has recognized that in law, politics etc. he is leading an externalized life, pursues in this externalized life as such his true human life. Self-affirmation and self-confirmation in contradiction with itself, both in regard to knowing and to the essence of the object, is therefore true knowing and living. Thus, nothing more need be said of Hegel's adaptation to religion, the state, etc., for this lie is the lie of his progress.

When I know religion as externalized human self-consciousness, I therefore know that I confirm in it as religion not my self-consciousness but my externalized self-consciousness. I therefore know my self-consciousness belonging to itself and to its essence to be confirmed not in religion but rather in negated, transcended religion.

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In Hegel, the negation of the negation is therefore not the confirmation of true essence, namely, through negation of apparent essence, but the confirmation of apparent essence, or of alienated essence in its denial, or the denial of this apparent essence as an objective essence existing outside man and independent of him, and its transformation into the subject.

Therefore, transcendence plays a peculiar role, in which negation and preservation or affirmation are connected.

Thus, for example, in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, transcended private right is morality, transcended morality is the same as family, transcended family the same as civil society, transcended civil society the same as the state, transcended state the same as world history. In actuality, private right, morality, family, civil society, the state, etc. remain in existence. Only they have become moment, modes of existence and being of men, which are not valid in their isolation, which resolve and produce one another reciprocally, etc. Moments of the movement.

This, their moving essence, is concealed in their actual existence. It appears and is revealed first in thought, in philosophy. That is why my true religious existence is my religious-philosophical existence, my true political existence my existence in the philosophy of right, my true natural existence my existence in the philosophy of nature, my true artistic existence my existence in the philosophy of art, my true human existence my philosophic existence. In the same way the philosophies of religion, nature, the state and art are the true existence of religion, state, nature and art. If, however, the philosophy of religion, etc. is for me only the true existence of religion, I am truly religious only as a philosopher of religion, and thus I deny actual religiousness and the actually religious man. But at the same time, I affirm them, partly within my own existence or within alien existence which I counterpose to them, for this is only their philosophic expression; partly, in their peculiar original form, for to me they are valid only as apparent otherness, as allegories, as configurations hidden under sensuous husks of their own true existence, which is my philosophic existence.

In the same way, transcended quality is the same as quantity, transcended quantity the same as measure, transcended measure the same as essence, transcended essence the same as appearance, transcended appearance the same as actuality, transcended actuality the same as concept, transcended concept the same as objectivity, transcended objectivity the same as absolute idea, transcended absolute idea the same as nature, transcended nature the same as the subjective spirit, transcended subjective spirit the same as the ethical objective spirit, transcended ethical spirit the same as art, transcended art the same as religion, transcended religion the same absolute knowing.

On the one hand, this transcendence is a transcendence of essence insofar as it is thought. Hence, private property as thought of is transcended in the thoughts of morality. And because thinking fancies itself to be immediately the other of itself, sensuous actuality, therefore its action seems to it also to be sensuously actual action. Thus, this transcendence through thinking, which permits its object to remain in actuality, believes it has actually overcome the object. And on the other hand, because the object has now become for it a moment of thought, this object is also taken by it in its actuality, as the self-confirmation of itself, of self-consciousness, of abstraction.

In one respect, therefore, the existence which Hegel transcends in philosophy is not actual religion, the state, nature, but religion itself already become an object of knowing, dogmatism and in the same way, jurisprudence, the science of the state, the science of nature. Therefore, in this respect, he opposes both the actual essence and immediate unphilosophic science, or the unphilosophic concepts of this essence. He contradicts therefore their accepted concepts.

In another respect, the religious etc. man can find in Hegel his final confirmation.

Now we must try to grasp the positive moments of the Hegelian dialectic, within the determination of alienation.

a) Transcendence, as objective movement withdrawing externalization into itself. This is the insight, expressed within alienation, of the appropriation of objective essence through the transcendence of its alienation, the alienated insight into the actual objectification of man, into the actual appropriation of his objective essence through the destruction of the alienated determination of the objective world, through its transcendence in its alienated existence. In the same way, atheism, as transcendence of God, is the becoming of theoretical humanism; communism, as transcendence of private property is the vindication of actual human living as its own property, which is the becoming of practical humanism, or Atheism is humanism mediated by transcendence of religion and communism is humanism mediated by transcendence of private property. Not until the transcendence of this mediation, which is nevertheless a necessary pre-supposition, does there arise positive Humanism beginning from itself.

Atheism and communism, however, are not a flight or abstraction from nor a loss of the objective world produced by man or of his essential capacities brought to objectivity. It is not a poverty returning to unnatural undeveloped simplicity. Atheism and communism are rather the first actual process of becoming the actualization of his essence become actual for man and of his essence as actual.

Thus, Hegel, insofar as he grasps the meaning of the positive sense of the negation related to itself, even if in an alienated way, conceives self-alienation, externalization of essence, contraposition and the separation of men from reality as a process of self-conquest, alteration of essence, objectification and realization. Briefly, within an abstract framework, he considers labor to be the self-productive act of man, the relation to himself as an alien essence and its manifestation as alien essence as the developing consciousness and life of the species.

b) In Hegel, apart from or rather as a consequence of the perversity already described, this act appears, on the one hand, only as formal because it is abstract, because human essence itself is regarded only as an abstract thinking essence, as self-consciousness; or secondly, because the conception is abstract and formal, transcendence of externalization becomes confirmation of externalization. That is, for Hegel, that movement of self-production, of self-objectification as self-externalization and self-alienation, is the absolute and therefore the final expression of human life, its self-purpose, resting in itself and arrived at its essence.

This movement in its abstract form as dialectics is therefore

regarded as truly human living. Yet, because it is an abstraction, an alienation of human life, it is regarded as a divine process, hence as the divine process of man, a process carried out by its abstract, pure, absolute essence distinct from Man.

Thirdly, this process must have a supporter, a subject, but the subject emerges first as a result. This result, the subject knowing itself as absolute self-consciousness is therefore God, absolute spirit, the Idea knowing and affirming itself. Actual man and actual nature become mere predicates, symbols of this concealed unactual man and this unactual nature. Subject and predicate, therefore, have a relation of absolute inversion to each other, mystical subject-object or a subjectivity extending beyond the object, the absolute subject as a process, a subject externalizing itself and returning to itself from this externalization, but returning it at the same time into itself and the subject as this process; the pure restless circling within itself.

First of all, we have a formal and abstract conception of the human act of self-production or the act of self-objectification of man. The alienated object, the alienated actual essence of man - since Hegel supposes man to be the same as self-consciousness - is nothing more than consciousness, is only the thought of alienation, its abstract and therefore empty unactual expression, negation. The transcendence of this externalization is hence likewise only an abstract empty transcendence of the former empty abstraction, the negation of the negation. The full living sensuous concrete activity of self-objectification, therefore, becomes its mere abstraction, absolute negativity, an abstraction which is again fixed as such and is thought as an independent activity, as simply activity. Because this so-called negativity is nothing but the abstract empty form of the former actual living act, its content also can be merely a formal content produced by the abstraction from all content. There are therefore these universal forms of abstractions, pertaining to every content, therefore also both indifferent to all content and for that reason applicable to any content, thought-forms, logical categories torn away from actual spirit and from actual nature. (We will develop the logical content ^{of} absolute negativity further down in this treatise.)

The positive contribution which Hegel has made in his speculative Logic is this: The definite concepts, the universal fixed thought-forms, in their independence of nature and spirit, are a necessary result of the universal alienation of human essence and hence also of human thinking. Hegel has presented and collected them together as moments of the process of abstraction. For example, transcended being is essence, transcended essence is concept, transcended concept is the Absolute Idea. But what then is the Absolute Idea? It again transcends itself if it is not going to carry out again the whole previous act of abstraction, and if it is not going to be satisfied with being a totality of abstractions or the abstraction grasping itself. But the abstraction grasping itself as abstraction knows itself as nothing. It must abandon the abstraction and arrive at an essence which is its very opposite, i.e., at Nature. The whole Logic is therefore the proof that abstract thinking is nothing for itself, that the Absolute Idea is nothing for itself until Nature is something.

The Absolute Idea, the abstract Idea which "when viewed on the point of this its unity with itself, is Intuition," (Hegel, Encyclopaedia, 3. Ausg. p. 222). (18), which, l.c., "in its own absolute truth... resolves to let the 'moment' of its particularity or of the first characterization and other-being, the immediate idea, as its reflected image, go forth freely as

Nature," i.e.; this whole Idea behaving in such a strange and baroque way which has caused the Hegelians tremendous headaches, is nothing more than mere abstraction, i.e., the abstract thinker, who, made clever by experience and enlightened beyond its truth, has decided under many false and still abstract conditions, to abandon himself and to substitute his otherness, the particular, the determined, for his self-contained being, his nothingness, his universality and his indeterminateness. It decides to release freely from itself Nature which it had concealed within itself only as an abstraction, as a thing of thought, i.e., to abandon abstraction and to observe Nature free from abstraction. The abstract Idea which becomes immediate intuition is nothing but abstract thinking which abandons itself and decides to intuit. This whole transition from the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature is merely the transition from abstraction to intuition, a transition difficult for the abstract thinker to execute and therefore described by him in such a fantastic fashion. The mystical feeling which drives the philosophers from abstract thinking into intuition is boredom, the yearning for a content.

(Man alienated from himself is also the thinker who is alienated from his essence, i.e., his natural and human essence. His thoughts are therefore fixed spirits, residing outside Nature and Man. Hegel has imprisoned all these fixed spirits in his Logic and has conceived each of them first as negation, as externalization of human thinking, then as negation of negation, i.e., as transcendence of this externalization, as the actual expression of human thinking. But since it is still caught in the alienation, this negation of the negation is partly the restoration of this thought in its alienation, partly a remaining in the final act, the relation to itself in its externalization as the true existence of these fixed spirits. (That is Hegel has substituted the act of abstraction, circling within itself, for the former fixed abstractions. Thereby, he has performed the service of tracing the origin of all these improper conceptions of the individual philosophies according to their standpoint. He has collected them and, instead of a determinate abstraction, has created the abstraction in its entire range as the object of the critical philosophy.) (Why Hegel separates thinking from the subject we shall see later. It is now, however, already clear that if there is no man, the expression of his essence can also not be human; hence, that thinking cannot be regarded as the expression of human essence, considered as a human natural subject with eyes and ears, living in society and in the world and in nature.) } Partly, insofar as this abstraction (of the Negation of the negation) comprehends itself and experiences about itself an infinite boredom, there appears to Hegel the abandonment of abstract thought which only moves in thought, which is without eyes, without teeth, without ears, without anything, namely, as the decision to acknowledge Nature as Essence and to apply itself to intuition.)

But also, Nature, taken in its abstraction, for itself, fixed in its separation from man, is nothing for Man. That the abstract thinker who has decided to intuit Nature serves it abstractly, is self-evident. Just as Nature remained enclosed by the thinker, in its concealed and mysterious form, as Absolute Idea, as a thing of thought, so, in releasing it, he has in truth released only this abstract Nature from himself, only the thought of Nature. But now it has the meaning that it is the otherness of thought, that it is actual observed nature distinguished from abstract thinking. Or, to speak human language, the abstract thinker in his intuition of Nature experiences that the essences which he meant to create in the divine Dialectic out of nothing, out of pure abstraction, as pure products of the work of thought, weaving in itself and nowhere looking out into actuality, are nothing but abstractions of the determinations of Nature. The whole of Nature thus repeats

for him the logical abstractions, except in a sensuous external form. He again analyzes it and these abstractions. Thus his conception of Nature is only the act which confirms his abstraction from the observation of Nature, the generative process of his abstraction consciously repeated by himself. In this way, for example, time is like the negativity which relates itself to itself. (p. 238, l.c.) (19). Corresponding in a natural form to transcended becoming as existence, is transcended movement as matter. Light is the natural form of reflexion in itself. Body, as moon and comet, is the natural form of the opposition which, according to the Logic, is, on the one hand, the positive resting in itself, on the other, the negative resting in itself. The earth is the natural form of logical ground, as the negative unity of opposites, etc.

Nature as Nature, i.e., insofar as it still distinguishes itself sensuously from the above-mentioned secret meaning hidden in it, Nature, separated and distinguished from these abstractions, is nothing, a nothing preserving itself as nothing. It is senseless or has only the sense of an externality which has been transcended.

"In the finite-teleological standpoint, we find the correct presupposition, that Nature does not contain in itself an absolute purpose." (p. 225) (20) Its purpose is the confirmation of abstraction. "Nature has shown itself to be the Idea in the form of otherness. Since the Idea thus exists as the negative of itself or external to itself, Nature likewise is not external, except relative to this Idea but Externality constitutes the determination under which the Idea is as Nature." (p. 227) (21)

Externality is here not to be understood as sensuousness expressing itself and revealed in light and to sensuous man. Externality is to be taken here in the sense of externalization, of a fault, of a defect which ought not to be. For the true is still the Idea. Nature is only the form of its otherness. And since abstract thinking is the essence, whatever is outside of it, is, according to its essence, only external. The abstract thinker acknowledges at the same time that sensuousness is the essence of Nature, externality in opposition to thinking weaving in itself. But at the same time he expresses this opposition in the following way, that this externality of Nature is its opposition to thinking, the latter's deficiency and thus, that insofar as it is distinguished from abstraction, it is a deficient essence, an essence which is not only deficient for me, in my eyes, but a self-deficient essence, has something outside itself which it lacks. That is, its essence is something other than itself. For the abstract thinker, Nature must therefore transcend itself, since it is presupposed by him as an essence potentially transcended.

"From our point of view Mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it is the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this, its truth, Nature has vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered into possession of itself, whose object as well as subject is the concept. This identity is absolute negativity - because in Nature the concept has its completely external objectivity which has however transcended its externalization and it has in this become identical with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a return out of nature." (22)

785 "Revelation, which as the abstract idea is an immediate transition, the becoming of nature, is as revelation of spirit, which is free, the positing of nature as its world; a positing which as reflexion is at the same time presupposition of the world as independent nature. Revelation in the concept is creation of nature as its being, in which it gives itself the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is spirit; this is the highest definition of the Absolute." (23)

Notes to the Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic

All footnotes, except those marked "Tr." (translator), are from the Herrn
Hegels Gesamtausgabe.

- (1) Hegel, G.W.F., The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. by J.B. Baillie, New York, The MacMillan Co., 1931 - Tr.
- (2) Hegel, G.W.F., Science of Logic, trans by W.H. Johnston and L.G. Struthers, 2 vols. New York, The MacMillan Co., 1929 - Tr.
- (3) Bauer, Bruno, Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte des Judentums, Braunschweig, 1840; Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte der Synagogen, II Bd., Leipzig, 1841; III Bd., Braunschweig, 1842
- (4) Ibid., p. 154 ff.: 42.1
- (5) Bauer, Bruno, Das entdeckte Christentum. Eine Erinnerung an das achtzehnte Jahrhundert und ein Beitrag zur Krise des neunzehnten; Zurich and Winterthur, 1843
- (6) Ibid., p. 113. In Bauer: "as if it did not have its purpose and first possess itself in this movement, which it is itself."
- (7) Ibid., p. 114 ff.
- (8) Bauer, Bruno, Die gute Sache der Freiheit und meine eigene Angelegenheit, Zurich and Winterthur, 1842. Inexact rendering of a place on p. 193 ff. which concerns not Cruzes but Marbaische.
- (9) Feuerbach, Ludwig, Vorläufige Thesen zur Reformation der Philosophie, published by Arnold Ruge in Anekdota zur neuesten deutschen Philosophie und Publicistik, Zurich and Winterthur, 1843, Bd. II, p. 62 ff.
- (10) Feuerbach Ludwig, Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft, Zurich and Winterthur, 1843
- (11) Cf. Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, a monthly published by Bruno Bauer, Bd. I-II, Charlottenburg, 1844. Cf. No. 1, p. 1 ff.; No. 5, p. 23 ff.; No. 8, p. 18 ff.
- (12) Ibid., No. 5, p. 11 ff.; Hirzel, Korrespondenz aus Zurich, the final paragraph, p. 15, reads: "When finally everything is united against it - and this time is not far off - when the whole degenerate world is grouped about it for the final attack, then the spirit of criticism and its meaning will have found its greatest acknowledgment. Of the outcome we cannot fear. The whole will come to this, that we conclude the accounts with the particular groups and expose the universal incapacity on the part of the inimical knighthood."
- (13) Feuerbach, Ludwig, The Essence of Christianity, tr. from the second German edition by Miriam Evans, New York, 1875 - Tr.

- (14) Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, of which the first and third sections have been translated into English as The Logic of Hegel and The Philosophy of Mind. The second part, The Philosophy of Nature has not been translated. - Tr.
- (15) Entäußerung in this essay is variously translated as estrangement or as externalization. The latter is used when Marx is applying the strict philosophic meaning. In the French, Entäußerung is sometimes translated alienation and sometimes exteriosation. (Oeuvres Philosophique, ed. Molitor, v.6) - Tr.
- (16) Loc. Cit., Phenomenology, IV. B, VI B 16, Cc.
- (17) Here Marx reproduces almost exactly Hegel's own words in the chapter on "Absolute Knowing" in the Phenomenology. See Hegel, Werke, Berlin, 1845, vol. II, pp. 574-575. Cf. English translation, op.cit., pp. 789-790, from which the English translation is taken. - Tr.
- (18) The section reads: "The idea which is independent or for itself, when viewed on the point of this its unity with itself, is Perception or Intuition, and the percipient Idea is Nature." English translation by Wallace, Oxford, 1892, p.379. (Page numbers in the text are those inserted by Marx and refer to the edition he used. The footnotes added by the translator give the section number so that the quotations can be found in the various editions.) - Tr.
- (19) Enzyklopädie, section 258. The section reads: "The negativity which as point is related to space and in it develops its determinations as line and surface, is, however, in the sphere of externality just as much therein for itself and its determinations as at the same time positing in the sphere of externality and appears therefore as indifferent to that resting alongside. Thus posited for itself, it is time."
- (20) Philosophy of Nature; Section 245 - Tr.
- (21) Ibid., Section 247. In Hegel the passage reads: "relative to this idea (and to its subjective existence spirit) but externality constitutes" etc. - Tr.
- (22) Ibid., Section 381 - Tr.
- (23) Ibid., Section 384 - Tr.