Unforgettable Days

Võ Nguyên Giáp


Part One
XXVI


By early March, the negotiations between us and the French had not led to any agreement.

The French colonialists were still stubbornly turning down our fundamental demands. The colonialists still blindly believed that they had reconquered most of Nam Bo as a result of the military operations undertaken during the past few months. On the other hand, they also believed that, with the Sino-French treaty, they had acquired a legal basis and favourable conditions for a return to the North.

General Leclerc and the French negotiators in Hanoi were conscious of the real situation to some extent, and of the peril of a long war if the negotiations failed. But they were still negotiating along the line set by instructions from the French Government in Paris, where the die-hard tendencies of old-style colonialism were still prevailling.

On our side, if the nation-wide resistance should now break out, we would meet with great difficulties, having to face many enemies at one time. But we would not compromise on questions of principle. In a few days, if an agreement was not reached before the French landed at Hai phong port, even if they should do so with the permission of the Chiang authorities, our army and people would resolutely fight them, the situation would become very complicated.

After the official announcement of the Sino-French treaty, pressmen in Hanoi came to interview President Ho. In reply to their questions, he said:

“This treaty can be divided into two parts. One provides for the French giving up their privileges in China. The other concerns our country. The first part not only satisfies the Chinese people but is also welcomed by the Vietnamese people. As for the latter part, it is not the moment to comment yet.” Then he went on to say, “Anyway, almost all the Chinese people have at all times sympathized with our national movement.”

When asked about the resistance war, President Ho said briefly, “Our greatest concern is to get ready, keep calm and maintain our morale”.

A series of articles in the press openly protested against the Sino-French treaty.

The Cuu Quoc (National Salvation) wrote: “No one can bargain away Viet Nam’s independence.” On the economic advantages that the French promised to offer the Chiang clique in North Viet Nam, another article read: “Only the Vietnamese Government is entitled to decide on those interests”. We openly warned the enemy that “between the signing of this treaty and its implementation stand the fighting Vietnamese people”.

All the armed forces, especially in places where the Chiang troops were stationed or where a French invasion was likely, were ordered to be ready for combat and to maintain the utmost vigilance. The most important offices were all prepared for any emergency.

In Hanoi, large numbers of old people and children had been evacuated. Self-defence fighters had put explosive charges in the trees lining the streets and made preparations to fell lamp-posts and overturn tramcars when ordered. To do so they had also reconnoitred important positions of Chiang troops in Hanoi. Self-defence units had worked out operations plans.

In the meantime, a hitch developed between the French and Chiang in Chungking.

On the evening of March 1, Colonel Crepin arrived at the Koumintang Army General Headquarters to sign the protocol on troop replacement. But the Kuomintang commanders avoided seeing him. An aide informed the French delegation that the Chiang army could only accept the troop replacement if an order to this effect came from General McArthur.

The French negotiators in Chungking had managed to sign the Sino-French treaty with the concurrence of Chiang Kai-shek and his Foreign Ministry. But troop replacement was to be carried out by Chiang’s General Staff. Ha Ung Kham (Ha Yin Chia) and the generals here had powers of their own. They were not foolish enough to hasten the withdrawal of their troops from Northern Indochina. Lu Han, called back for consultations, was present in Chungking. It was said that they wanted to stay on until the opium crop was brought in.

The French fleet was sailing north. On the 2nd, Crepin hurrie1dly dispatched a man to report the new situation to Salan, who immediately tried to reach an arrangement with the Chiang authorities in Hanoi.

Chu Phuc Thanh, Lu Han’s deputy, said he had never received any order to let French come to the North for the purpose of replacement. If the French landed in Haiphong, he would order his troops to open fire. Besides, he made up another excuse: as the French had not reached an agreement with the Vietnamese Government, he could not let the French come in for in such conditions, he said, Chinese nationals in the North would be subjected to reprisals (!) from the Vietnamese after the Chiang troops had withdrawn.

The discussions between the Chiang militarists and the French brasshats lasted through the night of March 4 without yielding any results.

On the 5th, the French fleet commanded by Leclerc arrived in the Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf.

Leclerc had Lt-Col Lecomte write to Sainteny a letter with a note of alarm:

“... Seeing that the situation is grave and the conflict that might arise may reach major proportions, I request you to do everything in your power to reach an agreement within the shortest time possible...”

The French brasshats again met with Chu Phuc Thanh and the Chiang army commanders in Hanoi. Discussions and bargaining continued between the two sides. If they failed to reach an agreement, there would certainly be clashes the next day, when the French fleet arrived in Haiphong.

On the same day, March 5, the newly-established National Resistance Committee issued an appeal:

“Fellow-countrymen, rise up to fight the aggressors!

“... A grave hour has struck for the Fatherland.

“... The National Resistance Committee composed of representatives of all parties, is responsible for unifying the armed forces, and leading the army and people in the fight against the enemy for the defence of the Fatherland.

“Fellow-countrymen, let’s support it wholeheartedly, be ready to obey its orders, so as to bring victory to our people and army and to win independence for our Fatherland”.

 


 

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