Formal negotiations between the Vietnamese and the French delegations did not start till July 6, in the palace of Fontainebleau, 60 km from Paris.
D’Argenlieu hastened to return to France coming one week before President Ho Chi Minh’s arrival in the French capital.
D’Argenlieu felt that, with the Gouin Government’s downfall and Bidault’s recent coming to power, he now had a good chance to realize De Gaulle’s policy towards the colonies. He made every effort to meet the leaders of the new Government in order to win their approval for his course of action in Indochina. He was said to have requested the French authorities to let him lead the French delegation to the negotiation. The High Commissioner wanted to show that his power extended beyond Indochina, as far as this conference. The new French authorities while not in fact opposing D’Argenlieu line on Indochina, refused his request to lead the delegation. They did not want to incense public opinion during President Ho Chi Minh’s stay in Paris. Moreover, they were afraid our delegation might refuse to deal with him; they were aware of our dislike of the man after our experience in Dalat. They advised the High Commissioner to keep out of the way. D’Argenlieu went back to Saigon disappointed.
The nomination of the French delegates to the negotiations was not approved by the French Government until July, 5, one day before the beginning of the conference. Leading the French delegation was the same Max André, head of the French team to the Dalat preparatory meeting. The French delegation was largely composed of the same people who had been in Dalat: Messmer, Pignon, Torel, Gonon... A new military personality, Admiral Barjot was appointed to the delegation in addition to General Salan. The Admiral was one of De Gaulle’s close associates. In an attempt to defuse possible criticisms, the French Government included in the delegation three deputies from the three principal Parties in the Government: the Communists, the Socialists and the MRP. Professor Paul Rivet, a progressive personality who represented the Socialist Party, withdrew after the delegation’s caucus meeting to prepare for the first session, saying that he did not want to become an accomplice in the scheme to betray the provisions signed on March 6, 1946 by the representatives of France. Max André later admitted that before going to Fontainebleau he had been instructed by French Premier Bidault to make sure by every means possible that Viet Nam “would not become a new pawn in the Soviet world chess game”.
At 10 a.m., our delegation and the French delegation entered the court of honour of the palace of Fontainebleau.
Vietnamese and French flags were hoisted over the palace, Max André delivered an opening speech, congratulating the representatives of Viet Nam and wishing the conference good success. The French delegation was resorting to the tactic of talking generalities, avoiding discussion of any concrete questions.
In his reply, Comrade Pham Van Dong said:
“(...) While the Vietnamese people were striving to resist the Japanese invaders, the Vichy government sold out Indochina to the enemy. In August 1945, the Vietnamese people rose up to seize power and founded the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. Since that day, Viet Nam has been an independent country. Under the leadership of President Ho the Vietnamese people have set about their national construction in peace.”
Our delegation pointed out that it was the dispatch of the French expeditionary army to Viet Nam which had rekindled the war. Later, France signed the March 6 Agreement with the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam...
“However, has France respected this Agreement? It is with deep concern that we have to tell you that a number of provisions related to the cessation of hostilities have not been implemented by the French authorities in Viet Nam...”
Our delegation denounced France for continuing the war in Viet Nam, sending troops to encroach upon the Tay Nguyen Highlands and perpetrating acts of violence in North Viet Nam, of which the most glaring was the recent seizure of the former governor-general’s residence in Hanoi. Our delegation emphatically protested against the design to divide Viet Nam, the appearance of an “autonomous Cochinchina” rigged up by the French authorities in Saigon and their recognition of its self-styled “provisional government”.
At the end, our delegation stated, with complete frankness:
“The March 6 Agreement was not designed to provide for the French troops’ safe entry into North Viet Nam, and the policy of fait accompli adopted by the French in Indochina can in no way facilitate the negotiations...”
Our delegation’s firm statement showed clearly what was the actual situation in Viet Nam and had a resounding echo in France. The reactionaries branded this statement undiplomatic and unfriendly. The progressive people saw in our delegation’s attitude a determination to defend our national independence and national unity and, at the same time, a desire to find a satisfactory solution to the relationship between Viet Nam and France.
It took the two sides quite a few days to reach mutual agreement on the agenda which included the following main points:
— The status of Viet Nam in the French Union and its relations with other countries;
— The reunification of the three parts of Viet Nam by negotiations and a referendum;
— The drafting of an Agreement between France and Viet Nam.
Besides a sub-committee to work out an agenda the conference set up committees to hold specific discussions on political, military, economic, financial and cultural affairs..
In these discussions, the French delegation revealed the policy adopted by France as regards her overseas territories. Despite some modifications in name and organization, this policy remained, in essence, one of maintaining the former colonial system. In Indochina, it would mean putting the peoples of the three countries of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia under the control of a federal government headed by a governor-general.
As to the urgent problems raised by our delegation such as a cease-fire in Nam Bo, the timing and modalities for the holding of a referendum there, the French delegation adopted an evasive attitude. The conference was in an impasse for several days. For some sessions, half of the French delegates failed to turn up.