According to the stipulations of the Modus Vivendi, the French Government was to carry out the following main provisions in Nam Bo:
1. Release of Vietnamese citizens detained for political reasons and participation in any activities related to the resistance.
2. Guarantee for Vietnamese citizens in Nam Bo of democratic freedoms such as the rights to free association, free speech and free movement.
3. Ceasefire.
On October 26, our military command in a message to the Supreme Commander of the French Expeditionary Corps proposed that the two sides put into effect a ceasefire from zero hour on October 30. A few days later, Valluy in his reply said he had ordered his troops in South Viet Nam to stop firing on that date.
At the beginning of November, d’Argenlieu in a statement to the press said hostilities had ceased at zero hour on October 30. He also said that more than two hundred “political prisoners” had been freed, that other cases were being considered and that General Nyo had been dispatched to Hanoi to discuss the establishment of a Franco-Vietnamese military commission with the Vietnamese Government. In a letter to President Ho Chi Minh, d’Argenlieu confirmed all this.
On November 4, Morlière took Nyo to call in President Ho at the Bac Bo Palace. With the President were myself and the Vice-Minister for the Interior. Nyo was introduced as Head of the French military delegation appointed by the High Commissioner. Previously, President Ho and his assistants, myself included, had agreed with Morlière to set up, at the earliest possible date, a joint military commission and to hold urgent talks on the implementation and control of the ceasefire in Nam Bo.
However, while Nyo was in the North, it was reported that the French had opened fire in many places in Nam Bo and Southern Trung Bo. Under the circumstances our armed forces had been compelled to take defensive measures.
On November 7, the Franco-Vietnamese Joint Military Commission held its first session at the premises of the former Chamber of Commerce. The French delegation was headed by Nyo. At the session our delegation condemned the French for their ceasefire violations, pointing out that these violations had not been brought to an end: on the contrary, they were continuing on an ever larger scale. We stated that we wished to get the situation stabilized by introducing into Nam Bo and Southern Trung Bo a joint ceasefire Commission. This was turned down by Nyo. We also raised the question of the accreditation of our representative to the French High Commissioner as stipulated by the Modus Vivendi — a point which had been agreed upon by President Ho and the French High Commissioner at their talks in Cam Ranh Bay as well. To this Nyo replied that that question was beyond his authority. The meeting ended with no questions solved. The two sides agreed to continue their discussions later.
The same day, our Government received from d’Argenlieu a message of protest against our establishment of a Provisional Administrative Committee in South Viet Nam saying that this was not in keeping with the spirit of the Modus Vivendi and that the activities of the said Committee could be detrimental to the implementation of the Modus Vivendi.
In his reply, President Ho said:
“The Nam Bo Provisional Administrative Committee was set up in August 1945 and has been functioning under the central Government ever since. Moreover it had official relations with the Allied military authorities and with the French authorities in October last year.
“The fact that Nam Bo is under both the occupation forces and the Vietnamese administrative and military authorities was recognised by the March 6 Preliminary Agreement and the September 14 Modus Vivendi. Under these agreements the status quo is to be maintained in South Viet Nam until a referendum is held. The activities of the Provisional Administrative Committee and the Vietnamese military authorities are simply directed towards the strict implementation of the political and military provisions of Article 9 in the Modus Vivendi concerning Nam Bo. They can only be of help in the policy of goodwill and cooperation which our two governments wish could be carried out unobstructedly.”
On November 12, another message from d’Argenlieu was transmitted to us by Morlière. In this message the French High Commissioner said that, as Nam Bo was a French colony, a change in its political status could only be decided on by the French National Assembly on the results of a referendum. The Nam Bo Provisional Administrative Committee remained “illegal”; although Cédile had entered into relations with it in October 1945 this had been done out of a desire to avoid bloodshed. Now, if the Vietnamese Government meant to implement the agreement it had signed, it should stop forthwith or else disavow such actions.
To d’Argenlieu’s cynical allegations, President Ho sent a laconic reply:
“The government of Viet Nam wishes to remind the French High Commissioner that that Administrative Committee in no way goes beyond Article 9 of the Modus Vivendi whose aim consists in restoring for Nam Bo a just and lasting peace despite any obstacles and difficulties however great they may be and wherever they may come from.
“The President of the DRVN believes that, in order to attain a peace so cherished by the two nations, forceful methods are not only useless but might even block the implementation of the Modus Vivendi. If this happens the Vietnamese Government does not accept responsibility.”
The position of the French colonialists in Indochina with regard to the implementation of the Modus Vivendi had thus been made clear.
According to French historians, d’Argenlieu during the first days of November was busying himself in preparations to meet the adverse situation should the French progressive and democratic forces win the coming elections. In that case, de Gaulle’s policies could only be continued through a large-scale war in Indochina. He was meeting with all the administrative and military officers in Saigon in turn in order to reassert that “only a new military stand could prevent the situation from deteriorating in Hanoi’s favour.”
The man who fully understood the High Commissioner’s intentions was Valluy. In a secret directive to his subordinates, he wrote: “Decent attempts at a compromise are no longer appropriate and a severe lesson is now needed.” On November 21, at the same time as Valluy informed us that he had given orders to French troops in Nam Bo to stop firing he also instructed Debès in Haiphong to seize control of this town and neutralize our resistance there.