Unforgettable Days

Võ Nguyên Giáp


Part Two
XXXIV


In face of the dangerous situation induced by the French reactionaries in Indochina, Uncle Ho sought, by all means, to check their criminal hands.

On December 6, the Voice of Viet Nam broadcast President Ho’s appeal to the French National Assembly. He reiterated the Vietnamese people’s sincere desire to cooperate with the French people. He denounced certain Frenchmen in Indochina who were betraying the spirit of the September 14 Modus Vivendi and pursuing a policy of strength. He called on the French National Assembly and Government to order the French authorities in Viet Nam to withdraw their troops to the positions they had held before November 20 with a view to facilitating the implementation of the provisions laid down in the Modus Vivendi, thus averting useless bloodshed.

A week had gone by but President Ho’s urgent appeal remained unanswered.

France at that time was witnessing acute inter-party conflict for the post of president of the provisional government.

In the first ballot on December 4, Maurice Thorez, the Communist Party candidate, led the poll, but he did not gain the absolute majority needed to win the election. In the second ballot, no candidate got the necessary proportion of votes. The French Communist Party did not enter its candidate this time and declared that it would not join any government headed by the MRP.

The Socialist Party put forward Leon Blum. Before the voting, Leon Blum expressed his opinion on the Indochina problem: “The one and only way to preserve French civilization in Indochina is to make a just settlement with the Indochinese people, on the basis of independence. The right to decide the Viet Nam problem should not belong to the French military and residents in Viet Nam. It should be in the hands of the Paris Government”. He urged that the French Government be formed immediately in order to solve the Viet Nam problem. The French Communist Party declared: “We shall vote for Mr. Blum, but this does not mean that we shall, later on, invariably support him.”

On December 13, the French National Assembly voted for the third time. Blum won the election but he had only a lead of seven votes over Schumann, the MRP candidate backed by the great monopolies.

On December 15, President Ho sent a telegram to the new French President. Again, he referred to our basic position and set out certain concrete conditions for the settlement of the present deadlock:

— On the Vietnamese side: to bring those who had been evacuated back to the towns, to cease the protective measures taken in self-defence, to restore normal communication between Hanoi and Haiphong and Hanoi and Lang Son.

— On the French side: to bring the French troops back to the positions they held prior to November 20 in Haiphong and Lang Son, to withdraw the reinforcements landed illegally in Da Nang, to end the raids and terror in Cochinchina and southern Trung Bo.

— By both sides: to set up without delay, the projected commissions for the implementation of the Modus Vivendi, to stop hostile propaganda by radio and in the press.

But, like all of his other messages addressed to the French government, this one was delayed in Saigon by the High Command of the French Expeditionary Corps. When it eventually arrived in Paris, eleven days had gone by and the war had expanded.

What would Leon Blum do to fulfil his statements on the Indochina problem?

As soon as Blum won the election, a right-wing paper in France wrote: “Realities will prove stronger than theories. And even though it will be contrary to his stated ideas Leon Blum, after taking office, will not dare to abandon Indochina any more than Clemenceau, when coming into power, dared to abandon Morocco.” We certainly did not lay our hopes on Leon Blum whose Socialist Party was acting counter to the French labouring people’s interests... Despite his occasional progressive pronouncements regarding colonial policy, he was openly opposed to the Communist Party. Half a year before, it was Blum who had been delegated by the big monopolies to go to the United States for negotiations on U.S. loans.

Blum met with opposition from several sides in the formation of the new government. The Communist Party demanded some amendments in his programme. The right-wing parties insisted on a tough political line as regards the question of the French Union. His first cabinet list was rejected by the MRP.

On December 17, Blum submitted for the National Assembly’s approval a Government list exclusively composed of the Socialists. Moutet remained Minister of Overseas France. This was the first time, since De Gaulle had held elections that the Communist Party was not given a share in the Government despite the fact that in the recent general elections it was the Party with the largest number of seats in the National Assembly. One wondered if the rumours about a Blum-US bargain in March were completely without foundation.

Then it was reported that d’Argenlieu had left Paris for Saigon. His appointment as High Commissioner in Indochina had been confirmed. Moutet declared: “I have the impression that Admiral d’Argenlieu has never shown any signs of disagreement with me on the policy we have applied with a view to settling this problem.”

The policy that Moutet referred to was reaffirmed by d’Argenlieu before a large number of journalists: “The Indochinese people must be made to believe that France cares for her presence in Indochina. If France shows indecision or reluctance, they will lose this belief. We should indicate this desire by maintaining our forces there.” The High Commissioner recalled the method of “display of strength” by Lyautey, a French colonialist general notorious for his brutality in the war of aggression in Morocco.

So, we met again the same old hands and the same old policies.

 


 

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