## INFORME DEL REPRESENTANTE (DEL BURÓ DEL CARIBE) EN EL PC DE CUBA "JOHNHY"<sup>1105</sup> SOBRE LA SITUACIÓN EN LA DIRECCIÓN DEL PCC

(BC - On Cuba) September 14th, 1933

Dear Friends:

The low political level of the Party leadership is just appalling. One of the most alarming expressions of it is the lack of understanding and resistance to the regular functioning of the high committees. The meetings of the Secretariat, PB and CC are awfully tiresome. Interminable long speeches, frictions which end usually with little practical results. I can surmise these meetings with the following: the leadership stews its own juice. If we look at the social composition of this leadership we find the cause of these interminable discussions. Predominantly intellectuals of low calibre politically who fall into the ecstasy of long speeches. The very few proletarian elements have been

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<sup>1105</sup> Posiblemente, Alberto Moreau ("John Bell"), dirigente del Bureau (Departamento) Colonial del PCEU. Véase la nota 204.

diseased by it; these have been long in the leadership with very little contact with the masses. There is a stubborn resistance to the development of cadres from below. I can safely state that with very few exceptions, this leadership does not read. Some have even expressed an abhorrence to the study of Marxism-leninism. As to the international documents so valuable for the application of the rich experiences of the CI and Profintern, they are safely recorded in the files. A vivid example: the Buro's letters of August 10th and 14th have not yet been studied by the CC. A swift reading of these was forced upon, before my arrival, by Eduardo<sup>1106</sup>. the worse of it is that when the line of the Party during the general strike was under fire by us at the meeting of August 29th and 30th, no one attempted to refer himself to the above mentioned letters.

The self-satisfaction is expressed quite sharply by Reuben<sup>1107</sup> and the majority of the CC when they state that the CI message which outlined the tasks of the Party after the fall of Machado coincided with the decisions made by them previous to receiving of said message. This, I consider with the whole CC line. The correctness of the message is proven again and again in the daily work of the Party which departs from this message. I shall now refer myself to one instance.

Since the coup d'état which deposed the de Cespedes government and gave way to the "Revolutionary Junta" and the metamorphosis of the latter into a "constituted government" to please the dictates of the Washington government, the CC quite correctly adopted the line of differentiating itself and the labouring masses from the new government; this was expressed in the Manifesto issued on the question. But in practice, this line has been beclouded in the united front actions. There is a tremendous pressure from the outside elements under the influence of the Grau's government upon our Party and our student organizations. The anti-intervention campaign initiated by the Party immediately upon the sending of warships by the White House, took the form of the broadest united front called by the Anti-Imperialist League with the specific gravity around which the CNOC is to assume. All arrangements were made to establish the political and organizational leadership of the Party. A Conference was called which was proceeded by a big demonstration already held last Sunday. The Committee in charge which included the new Party Secretary, has failed so far to direct its attack against the new government. Moreover, the united front

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<sup>1106</sup> No identificado

<sup>1107</sup> Rubén Martínez Villena, Véase la nota 1113.

arrangement committee included representatives from the Directorio Estudiantil<sup>1108</sup> which is the group on Mella<sup>1109</sup>.

At today's PB meeting I raised very sharply the question of our independent line. This serious error was made by those comrades who maintain that the CI <sup>1110</sup> message "coincides" with their previous decisions. All communications sent to the press by our committees at work, only show the resistance to our independent line. No attack is made against the Grau government which is playing demagogically with Yankee intervention and is attempting to secure wide popular support, especially now in the face of a threatening armed attack against it by the deposed ABC, and the Menocal faction. Failure in our part to have a clear line on the matter and to pass on this line to the Party Districts, is resulting in government and Directorio Estudiantil interference in the strike struggles in the interior, diverting these into a movement of support to the new government. This is what is happening in Cienfuegos and Santiago de Cuba.

Furthermore, there is a serious disregard to organizational questions which are the only transmitting belts of the Party line and the execution of the decisions regarding it. The Habana Party District is in a complete state of disorganization. In spite of my insistence, the decisions as to the immediate task to gather our forces, see to it that the units and the District Committee function, still remain on paper. True, the lack of Party forces is alarming. The leading comrades are daily engaged in the struggles of wide sections of the proletariat hitherto untouched by us, such as the tobacco workers and the railroad workers. But without the mobilization of the Party forces from below, most of these activities are not capitalized by us and the organizational results almost come to naught. For example, our work among the railroad workers carried on since the general strike has been so anarchic that at the general elections of the Habana railroad workers union this week, we lost out seate only by a vote of six.

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<sup>1108</sup> Directorio Estudiantil Universitario fue fundado en 1927 con el objeto de combatir la prórroga de poderes de Machado; en 1930 se convierte en una organización insurreccional. Parte del DEU luego se separa y forma un grupo más radical, el Ala Izquierda Estudiantil. El DEU no aceptó la mediación de B. Sumner Welles durante la revolución de 1933 y jugó un papel fundamental en el golpe militar del 4 de septiembre de 1933 que derrocó al gobierno de Carlos Manuel de Céspedes.

<sup>1109</sup> Véase la nota 161.

<sup>1110</sup> Internacional Comunista

The Party leadership is now under fire by the renegate group of Junco <sup>1111</sup> -Villareal <sup>1112</sup>. The main contention of these despicable individuals is that the Party called off the general strike and a member of our Commission that went to present the demands of the general strike committee to Machado, shook hands with the assassin Herrera. Unfortunately this is true. But worse of it all is the fact that Reub. and the majority of the CC still maintain that the policy of calling upon the workers to go back that the workers did not listen and obstinately continued with the general strike until the fall of Machado and continued their struggles for their economic demands under Cespedes and great sections still are on strike.

Also, there is serious underestimation of the Junco forces. Our Party leaders maintain that the Federation Obrera de la Habana exists on paper, but in actual fact, it is leading some strikes, among which the very important strike of the imperialist concern the Woolworth 10c Stores and such strikes. Junco, his FOH and his student body came out in support of the Grau government "which is the anti-interventionist government". Our failure to differentiate ourselves from the government and the Directorio Estudiantil, has also weakened the struggle against Junco and Co.

At the next CC meeting, we will definitely settle the still pending question of the Party line during the general strike. In my opinion, the majority will cling to the opportunist line of Reub. The resolution is now being elaborated by the special commission will come up for discussion. The final settlement of the question, will undoubtedly rest before the Latin-American Secretariat. Eduardo, Juan 1114 and myself are working toward the winning over of the vascilating elements, having constantly in our mind the burning question of carrying through the CI message.

Comradely Johny

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<sup>1111</sup> Véase la nota 109.

<sup>1112</sup> Véase la nota 424

<sup>1113</sup> Rubén Martínez Villena.

<sup>1114</sup> Witold Antonovich Lovsky. Véase la nota 385.