

Tito's Speech on Events in Hungary

Following are excerpts from a speech by Marshal Tito as broadcast by the Yugoslav radio:

I would like, first of all, to speak about what is happening in Hungary today and what happened in Poland, in order to enable us to have a clear picture of these developments which are very complicated, especially in Hungary where a very large part of the working class and progressive people fought with arms in their hands against the Soviet armed forces in the streets.

When Hungarian workers and progressive elements started their demonstrations and then also their resistance and armed actions against [Matyos] Rakosi's methods and the further continuation of that course then, I am deeply convinced, it was not possible to speak about any counter-revolutionary tendencies.

It can be stated that it is sad and tragic that the reactionaries were able to find there a fertile ground and gradually to move things into their channels, thus exploiting for their own purposes a justified revolt which took place in Hungary.

You know, in the main, what causes brought about the events in Poland and Hungary. We must go back to 1948 when Yugoslavia was the first to give an energetic answer to Stalin and declared that it wanted to be independent, that it wanted to build its life and socialism in accordance with the specific conditions of the country, and that it allowed no one to interfere in its internal affairs.

Materially, no armed intervention took place then because Yugoslavia was united. Because we liquidated their main force during the national liberation war, various reactionary elements were unable to carry out various provocations.

When the truth about our country prevailed, and the period of normalization of relations with the countries that broke their relations with us following the ill-renewed resolution began, the leaders of the Eastern countries expressed their desire that we should no longer mention what had been done against us, that we should forget what had been done. We accepted that only to improve our relations with these countries as soon as possible.

BUT YOU WILL SEE later that it is most necessary to remind certain people who are today again beginning to slander our country and who are at the head of the Communist parties in the Eastern countries and also in certain Western countries, of what they did against Yugoslavia during those five and more years when Yugoslavia stood quite alone, face to face against an enormous propaganda apparatus, when we had to fight on all sides to preserve the achievements of our national revolution, to preserve what we had already started building, that is, the foundations of socialism—briefly, to wipe away the infamy that they wanted to put on us by various slanders, and to show where the truth was.

We must remind them and say that then those same people accused our country in every possible way that it was a fascist country, that we were bloodsuckers, that we were annihilating our people, that our people were not with us, and so forth.

We must remind them so that they may remember and have this in mind today when again they want to throw the blame for the events in Poland and Hungary on our shoulders. This perfidious tendency originates from those obdurate Stalinist elements that have succeeded in various parties in still maintaining their positions, and which would like again to strengthen their rule and to impose these Stalinist tendencies

upon their peoples and other peoples, too.

NOW I WOULD like only to say to you that today we must consider the events in Hungary in the light of this entire development. And on its own desire and initiative, we normalized our relations with the Soviet Union. When Stalin died, the new Soviet leaders saw that, thanks to Stalin's madness, the Soviet Union was brought into a very difficult situation. It found itself in a deadlock both in its foreign and domestic policies and, by its attitude of a dogmatic preaching in forcing its own methods in relations with other people's democratic countries.

They realized where the main cause of all these difficulties lay, and at the 20th Congress they condemned Stalin's actions and his policies followed up to then, but they wrongly considered the whole thing as the question of the cult of personality and not as a question of the system. And the cult of personality is, in fact, the product of a system.

They have not launched a struggle against that system, or, if they have, they have done it more in silence, saying that on the whole everything was good but that in his late life, since he was old, Stalin began going a little mad and to make various mistakes.

From the very beginning, we said that it was not merely the question of the cult of personality, that made the creation of the cult but rather the question of a system of personality possible; that it was necessary to strike its roots unceasingly and persistently and this is most difficult.

Where are these roots? In the bureaucratic apparatus, in the methods of leadership and the so-called one-man rule, in the disregard for the role and tendencies of the working masses, in Enver Hoxha and [Maj. Gen. Mehmet] Shehu [Albanian Communist leaders], and other leaders of certain Western and Eastern parties who are resisting the democratization and the decisions of the 20th Congress, and who contributed a great deal toward strengthening Stalin's system and who are working today to bring it back to life and to power—here are the roots that must be corrected.

AS FAR AS we are concerned, we have considerably advanced in our relations with the Soviet Union. We have improved these relations and have concluded a whole series of economic arrangements that are very useful for us, which have been concluded under very favorable conditions, and so forth.

Furthermore, two declarations also have been adopted, one in Belgrade and the other in Moscow. Both these declarations should in fact be significant, not only in our mutual relations, but also in relations between all Socialist countries, but unfortunately they have not been understood in this way.

It was thought: "Well, since the Yugoslavs are so stubborn we will respect and implement these declarations but they do not affect the others because the situation there is, nevertheless, a little different from that in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is an organized and disciplined state. The Yugoslavs have proved their worth because they have succeeded in maintaining themselves even in the most difficult times and in not allowing a restoration of the capitalist system, and so forth. This means: They are something different from you in the Eastern countries, where it was we who brought you to power."

WHEN WE ARE preparing the declaration on our party relations in Moscow, mainly on relations between the League of Yugoslav Communists and the Communist party of the Soviet Union, the going was a little more difficult. We could not agree completely, but, nevertheless, the declaration was issued which, in our opinion, was intended for a wider circle than Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.



TITO

We warned that those tendencies that once provoked such strong resistance in Yugoslavia existed in all countries, and that one day they might find expression in other countries too. Then it would be far more difficult to rectify this.

You know that Nikita S. Khrushchev was here for a rest. On that occasion, we had talks here and many more in Belgrade. As I and comrade (Col. Gen. Alexander) Rankovic and (Djuro) Pucar were invited to the Crimea, we went there and continued the talks. We saw that it would be rather difficult going for other countries. The Soviet leaders had a different attitude toward other countries, holding certain wrong and defective views on relations with these countries—with Poland, Hungary, and others.

However, we did not take this too tragically, because we saw that this was not the attitude of the entire Soviet leadership, but only of a section that imposed this attitude upon the other to a certain extent.

We saw that this attitude was imposed rather by those people who stood and are still standing on Stalinist positions. But we believe there were still possibilities that within the Soviet leadership those elements would win through internal evolution which stand for stronger and more rapid development in the direction of democratization, abandonment of all Stalinist methods, the creation of new relations among Socialist states, and development in this same direction in foreign policy as well.

By certain indications and also in conversations, we saw that these elements were not weak, that they were strong, but that this internal process of development in a progressive direction—in the direction of abandoning Stalinist methods—also was hindered by certain Western countries, which by their propaganda and ceaseless repetition of the need for the "liberation" of these countries, are interfering in their internal affairs and hindering a rapid development and improvement of relations among them.

THE SOVIET UNION believes that in view of the fact that this interference in internal affairs has assumed rather extensive proportions through propaganda disseminated by radio broadcasts, the dispatch of materials by balloons, and so forth, unpleasant consequences could result if it left these countries completely and gave them, say, a status such as that enjoyed by Yugoslavia.

They are afraid that reactionary forces might then be victorious in these countries. In other words, this means that they lack sufficient confidence in the internal revolutionary forces of these countries.

In my opinion, this is wrong. The origin of all later mistakes lies in insufficient confidence in the Socialist forces of these people.

When the Poznan affair happened—you know about it—the Soviet people suddenly changed their attitude toward us. They began getting colder. They thought that we Yugoslavs were responsible. Yes, we are responsible because we live in this world, because we are what we are, because we created Yugoslavia as such, and because this Yugoslavia also acts outside its borders. Even if we did not want it so, our country acts, and very positively and usefully at that.

Thanks to a mature thinking and attitude by Soviet leaders, who stopped interfering in time, things have stabilized considerably in Poland at present, and are developing quite well.

I cannot say that this positive development in Poland which is very similar to ours, has met with any joy in other countries of the Socialist camp, as it is called. They criticize it secretly and among themselves, but also publicly to a certain extent. In these countries, Poland has not even found such a measure of support as it found among the Soviet leaders, who agreed to such an attitude.

Among these various leading men in certain countries of what is called the Socialist camp and also in certain Western Communist parties, Poland did not find understanding because Stalinist elements are still there.

For instance, when such a Marxist as Enver Hoxha, who knows only how to say Marxism-Leninism and not a word more, writes an article about Yugoslavia and Poland, he condemns the tendencies of a country's own road and development according to specific conditions, and even goes against what Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders have recognized, that is, that there are separate roads to socialism.

Such a character not only dares to slander and to stand up against Yugoslavia and another great Socialist country, but also hits the Soviet leaders themselves. Such Stalinist elements believe that people of the Stalinist east will help them maintain themselves on the backs of their people. This, comrades, is fatal.

WHEN WE WERE in Moscow, there were, of course, discussions about Poland, Hungary, and other countries. We declared that Rakosi's regime and Rakosi himself did not have the necessary qualifications to lead the Hungarian state or to lead it to internal unity, but that, on the contrary, they might lead it to very grave consequences.

Unfortunately, the Soviet comrades did not believe us. They said that Rakosi was an old revolutionary, that he was honest, and so forth.

Precisely because our policy—both our state and party policy—is contrary to interfering in the internal affairs of others, and in order not again to come into conflict with the Soviet comrades, we were not insistent enough with the Soviet leaders to remove such a team as Rakosi and Gero.

When increasingly stronger dissatisfaction began rising to the surface in the ranks of Hungarian Communists themselves, and when they demanded that Rakosi should go, the Soviet leaders realized that it was impossible to continue in this way and agreed that he should be removed. But they committed a mistake by not also allowing the removal of Gero and other Rakosi followers, who have compromised themselves before the people.

They agreed to the removal of Rakosi on the condition that Gero would have to remain. This was wrong because Gero did not differ from Rakosi. He followed the same policy and was as guilty as Rakosi.

COMRADES, what could we do then? We saw that things were not going well. When we were in the Crimea, Gero was accidentally there, and we met him accidentally. We talked to him. Gero condemned the former policy and de-

clared that it was wrong—that they had slandered Yugoslavia.

We wanted to show that we were not vindictive and that we did not lack generosity, so we agreed to talk to Gero and a delegation of the Hungarian Workers party which would come to Yugoslavia. We wanted to establish relations with the Hungarian Workers Party because we hoped that thus we would more easily influence their correct internal development without isolating the Hungarian party.

But things had already gone too far. We did not know that Gero's visit to Yugoslavia and our joint declaration could no longer help. The people of Hungary were absolutely against Stalinist elements that were still in power. They demanded their removal and a transition to the road of democratization.

When the Hungarian delegation headed by Gero returned to its country, Gero, finding himself in a difficult situation, again showed his former face. He called those hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, who were still demonstrators at the time, a mob and offended almost the entire people.

Imagine his blindness and what a leader he is! At such a critical moment, when everything is seething and all the people are dissatisfied, he dares to call these people a mob—the people among whom were a large number of Communists and youth, perhaps even a majority. This was enough to ignite the barrel of gunpowder and cause it to explode. Clashes resulted.

Now it is not a matter of determining who fired the first shot. Gero called in the Army. It was a fatal mistake to call in the Soviet Army at a time when the demonstrations were still going on. It is a great mistake to call in the army of another country to teach a lesson to the people of that country, even if there is some shooting.

This angered these people even more, and thus a spontaneous revolt ensued in which the Communists found themselves, against their will, together with various reactionary elements. The reactionary elements intervened in the revolt and exploited it for themselves.

However, as soon as they saw that the party was split and an enormous number of party members had risen against the Rakosi clique and remnants of the past, they immediately interfered. These reactionary forces showed their true face very quickly—in two or three days.

IF THE GOVERNMENT of Imre Nagy had been more energetic, if it had not hesitated one time one way and then another, if it had resolutely stood up against anarchy and the killing of Communists by reactionary elements, if it had firmly resisted the reactionaries, and so forth, perhaps things would have moved in a more correct way, and perhaps the intervention of the Soviet Army would not have taken place.

But what did Nagy do? He called the people to arms against the Soviet Army and appealed to the Western countries to intervene. In the West, this intervention was exploited enormously. The imperialists who could scarcely wait to attack Egypt exploited it. They attacked Egypt precisely at this stage of the Hungarian tragedy, hoping that the Soviet Union would be too occupied and unable to intervene against that aggression.

Thus new fighting took place in Hungary. Soviet troops were de-inforced. Nagy fled, and a new Government was formed.

I CAN TELL YOU, comrades, that I know these comrades in the new Government, and that, in my opinion, they represent that which is most honest in Hungary. The program itself, which Kadar published, and which you have read, proves this. However, (Continued on Page 7)

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Soviet intervention is weakening this entire program, and the Government itself is in a very difficult situation.

The question is now raised, as to whether the Soviet intervention was necessary. The first intervention was not necessary. The first intervention, which took place at the request of Gero, was absolutely wrong. The second error lies in the fact that responsible people, waiting instead for the second intervention, failed to do immediately what they did later when the second Soviet intervention occurred, that is, form a new Government and issue their declaration of policy.

Many people are asking why the Soviet intervention took place. It is clear, we have said and we will always say, that we are against the intervention and use of a foreign military force. Which is now the lesser evil: chaos, civil war, counter-revolution and a new world war; or the intervention of the Soviet troops that were there?

The former is a catastrophe and the latter an error. It is understood that if the latter saves socialism in Hungary, then, comrades, we will be able to say, although we are against the intervention, that Soviet intervention was necessary.

However, if they had previously undertaken everything necessary, there would have been no military intervention whatsoever. This mistake has resulted from the fact that they unfortunately still believe that military strength solves everything. But such is not the case.

JUST SEE how a bare-handed and poorly armed people resisted terribly when it had one aim—to free itself and be independent. It was no longer even interested in what sort of independence it would achieve—whether the bourgeoisie and a reactionary system would be restored in the country—but only interested in being nationally independent. This took hold of its mind.

We also told this to the Soviet comrades. We concealed nothing. The Soviet comrades said that their troops would go then. It must be known that the Soviet Union, too, is now in a difficult situation, which has exploded before its very eyes. They see that not only Horthyists, but also workers from factories and mines are fighting here—that the entire people are fighting. The Soviet soldiers go unwillingly, with heavy hearts. This is the tragedy of it.

Accordingly, in our country those rumors must be fought which consider Soviet intervention a purely interventionist act. I am deeply convinced that the bloodshed in Hungary and these terrible sacrifices by the Hungarian people will have a positive effect, that a little light will reach the eyes of the comrades in the Soviet Union, even those Stalinist elements, and that they will see that it is no longer possible to work in this way.

It is our tragedy, the tragedy of all of us together, that a terrible blow has been dealt socialism. It has been compromised.

These irresponsible elements in various Communist parties, elements that have retained their power by Stalinist methods, represent a very bad support for the Soviet Union if they are advising it to act in the way they believe.

I THINK that there are honest Communists in all these parties who see much farther than all these various Stalinists. They see much farther. If they want to see the situation there improve, not in the manner of Hungary, but rather in a peaceful Communist way, then they must criticize negative things and listen a bit to the voice of the masses, the voice of party members and the entire people.

If these prophets and advisers continue acting so destructively and find it suitable only to slander our country and throw more mud at us, then, it is understood, social-

ism still has difficult times ahead.

Work even more to prevent those prophets and advisers from succeeding in their intentions to stop the process which began in Yugoslavia in 1948, and is now continuing in Poland, and to divert it on Stalinist tracks.

On one occasion, I said to the Soviet comrades that this would have happened even if Stalin had not died—that this would have happened even earlier if he had lived. They did not dispute this.

In individual countries and parties of East Europe certain leaders are saying that this will not happen in their countries, that they have a strong organization, a strong army, a strong police, that their members are already informed about everything, and that they will firmly control the entire thing. Gero said the same thing, and Rakosi, too. Now they are reaping what they were sowing from 1948 onward. They sowed the wind and they are reaping the whirlwind.

CONSIDERING the present development in Hungary from the perspective of either socialism or counter-revolution, we must defend today's Kadar government. We must help it because it is in a very difficult situation. We must fight all those elements that now are irresponsibly throwing the entire blame upon the Russians.

Yes, the Soviet comrades are responsible because they failed to see and correct the errors of Rakosi's rule beforehand, and because they failed to make it possible previously for those people to come forward whom the working class and entire people trusted.

Comrades, this struggle will be long and difficult because now it is really a question of whether the new course will win the Communist parties—the course begun in Yugoslavia—and for which a considerable number of elements were created in the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

It is now a question of whether this course will be victorious or the Stalinist course will win again.

Soviet Plan

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forces of the USSR under the Warsaw pact.

5. To end in two years foreign military bases on the territory of other states.

6. To cut arms expenditures together with the arms reductions.

7. To establish "rigid and effective international supervision" of all the above measures.

Concerning the recent Hungarian events, the Soviet statement said: "Attempts are being made to fan a slanderous campaign against the Soviet Union in connection with the fiasco of the counter-revolutionary military conspiracy against People's Hungary, which, as has now been clearly ascertained, was an integral part of the general conspiracy of the imperialists against the peace and security of the peoples both in the Near East and in Europe."

The Soviet statement said reports about troop movements in Eastern Europe were fabrications. If the Soviet government had the aggressive intentions ascribed to it by its enemies, the statement declared, the Soviet Union "could have realized the military aims ascribed to it concerning West Europe without even utilizing present-day nuclear and rocket weapons." It pointed out that the Soviet Union is in a better strategic position than ever before against the Atlantic bloc powers, but nevertheless undertakes no aggressive actions whatsoever.

Differences of social systems and ideology can and must be settled through an ideological struggle and not by force of arms, the Soviet statement said. It concluded:

"The Soviet government has held and holds the view that there are no controversial problems which could not be solved peacefully, taking into consideration the legitimate interests of relevant states. As far as the existing ideological disagreements are concerned, they cannot constitute grounds for the

worsening of relations between states and for war propaganda, especially for the use of force by one state against another state. Such disagreements can and must be solved through an ideological struggle, in which the advantages of this or that ideology and of this or that economic system will be shown by the course of history itself.

"In putting forward its proposals on disarmament, which are dictated by the interests of preserving and consolidating peace among peoples, the Soviet government expresses its confidence that they will be supported by all those who are striving, not by words but by deeds, for the liquidation of the danger of a new war and for the strengthening of universal peace."

Dock Strike

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New York Shipping Association will get together again at 2 p.m. today at the offices of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service at 341 Ninth Ave.

Negotiations Saturday were broken off with both sides reportedly far apart on key issues. Louis Waldman, ILA attorney, suggested that the shipowners were hoping the Eisenhower administration would "pull the chestnuts out of the fire" by invoking a Taft-Hartley injunction against the strike.

On the West Coast, meanwhile, the ILWU will decide today what to do about its own deadlocked wage negotiations. The expiration dates of East Coast and West Coast negotiations have been synchronized in recent months.

Dock Demands

1. COASTWIDE BARGAINING:

Industry-wide pact covering all ports from Portland, Maine, to Brownsville, Texas. N.Y. Shipping Association, which dominates waterfront nationally, wants to keep old port-by-port set-up. West Coast longshoremen have enjoyed coast-wide bargaining since 1934.

2. SLING LOAD LIMIT:

ILA demands 2,240 pound limit, as a major safety issue in an industry whose injury rate is the worst. Shipowners want an arbitration set-up on disputed loads.

3. EIGHT-HOUR DAY:

ILA wanted guaranteed eight-hour pay for dockers called in to work, as against four-hour pay now in force. Union, however, is now willing to accept a guaranteed four hours pay when called to work and another four hours guarantee if asked to come back after lunch.

4. LENGTH OF ACT:

ILA demands 32-cent wage increase and other benefits included a two-year pact. Shipowners want a three-year agreement, but on Saturday, proposed a 20-cent package in two years which ILA rejected. Pact now expired ran two years. Shipowners also offered 32 cents boost in three years, and this also was turned down.

5. GANG SIZE:

Major shipowners' demand is that gangs working on pallet mechanized cargo be reduced from 20 to 16 men, with a proposed 15 cent bonus thrown in to sugar the cut. ILA rejects this, since about 80 percent of all work is palletized, and such a change would eliminate many jobs as well as increase injury dangers.

6. OTHER ISSUES

still disputed include seniority, vacations, paid holidays, and health clinics.

Agreement has been reached on minor issues: dues checkoff, increased employer contributions to welfare fund and a joint committee on wage differentials.

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