

Questions Answered by Togliatti

The Italian publication *Nuovi Argomenti* (New Trends) submitted a series of questions on the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti. The *Daily Worker* asked for and received a translation and yesterday began publishing the major part of the questions and answers. We continue today:

QUESTION: Do you think the personal dictatorship of Stalin was in the historical and political tradition of Russia, or a development outside of that tradition?

QUESTION: In order to maintain itself in power, the personal dictatorships of Stalin used coercive measures that in the West, at the time of the French Revolution, came to be called "terror." Do you think this "terror" was necessary?

ANSWER: I shall reply to these questions together because to attempt to separate them would do violence to their common theme: the errors denounced by the 20th Congress occurred in Soviet society and therefore arose from it; and that for a long period of time Soviet society endured a situation in which democratic life and socialist legality underwent grave and continuous violations. Related to this is the question of the co-responsibility of the leading political group for these errors; this group includes the comrades who today have taken the initiative in making these denunciations and in facing the consequences of these evil practices.

Two explanations are advanced as regards the questions of co-responsibility. One, the most obvious one, has been offered in the discussions in our party. It has been formulated by Comrade Courtade in a series of articles in *L'Humanite*,* and now if newspaper reports may be believed, by Comrade Khrushchev while answering questions at a reception. It was "juridically possible" to have removed Stalin from position when the gravity of his errors became known, but it was practically impossible. If the question had been raised, it would have resulted in a conflict which probably would have undermined the position of the Revolution and of the state, against which the army of every part of the world were poised. It is enough to have had even superficial contact with Soviet public opinion in the years during which Stalin led the country and to have followed the international situation in those years, to realize that this contention is quite true. Today, for example, the Soviet leaders denounce Stalin's errors and his moment of discouragement at the beginning of the War. But in those days, who in the Soviet Union would have accepted or understood a limitation of Stalin's power not to say his removal? It would have been a shattering blow, if such a thing had occurred or had been suspected, and this was true at other times.

* Note from "L'Humanite" (April 26, 1956). . . . In 1934-1941, when the imperialists were preparing their aggression against the Soviet Union on an ever larger scale, action against Stalin could have produced disturbances that the enemies of communism would not have failed to exploit. Might not such action have led to the outbreak of aggression? Could such a risk have been taken? No honest Communist would venture to say so. Practically it may have been impossible to do anything else than what was done. We had to "grit our teeth" and work for the building of socialism, for strengthening the USSR, for reinforcing the Communist parties of the entire world, and all this despite the tragedies brought about by the cult of Stalin's personality."

therefore explains the situation in which those who might have wanted to correct the errors found themselves; but at the same time such an explanation complicates the picture and in substance aggravates it. It means being compelled to admit that the leading cadres and the country, and therefore the whole people, were ignorant of Stalin's errors, and this does not seem probable; or else they were not considered errors by the mass of the cadres, by public opinion and by those who gave orientation and leadership. I exclude the explanation that it was impossible to change because of a machine of terror which controlled the situation by military and police means. If this had been true the men who led the party apparatus never could have reacted so courageous to crises such as the Nazi invasion.

It seems to me far more accurate to acknowledge that, despite the errors that he committed, Stalin had the support of a very great part of the country and particularly of its ruling cadres, and of the masses. Was this not a consequence of the fact that Stalin not only committed errors but also accomplished many excellent things, "did a great deal for the USSR," "was the most consistent of Marxists and enjoyed the confidence of the people"? Comrade Khrushchev himself recognized this in his remarks quoted above, correcting the strange but comprehensible mistakes that, in my opinion were made at the 20th Congress where Stalin's merits were passed over in silence. The explanation can only be found in a careful analysis of the way in which the system characterized Stalin's errors arose. Only in this way, shall we be able to understand how these errors came into being; what is needed is not a personal critique but a profound investigation.

Khrushchev himself offered another explanation of why necessary corrections were not made in time. He maintains that it was not possible to make these corrections because the approach of the party and state leaders to Stalin's errors were not the same at various periods. Therefore, there were moments in which the others stood shoulder to shoulder with Stalin, and this solidarity was precisely such an expression.

WE MUST RECOGNIZE openly and without hesitation that, while the 20th Congress made an enormous contribution to the exposure and solution of many serious new problems of the democratic and socialist movement, we cannot consider as satisfactory the position adopted by the Congress, and since extended by the Soviet press, in regard to Stalin's errors and the causes and conditions that made them possible.

The cause of everything is said to lie in the "cult of personality" and in the cult of a person who had definite and serious defects: he lacked modesty; thirsted for personal power; was at time blundering and incompetent; lacked loyalty to the other leading comrades; had a mania for greatness and an excessive self-love; was suspicious to the extreme and finally, misused his personal powers, standing apart from the people, neglecting his work and succumbing to a form of persecution mania. The present Soviet leaders knew Stalin better than we (I will perhaps speak about my contacts with him on another occasion) and we must therefore believe them when they describe him as they do. We can only think to ourselves that, seeing how things were, and apart from the impossibility of making a change in time, the Soviet leaders could at least have been more prudent in that public and solemn exaltation of the qualities of this man to which they had accustomed us. It is true that today they criticize themselves, and this is their great merit, but there is no

doubt that in this criticism a certain amount of their prestige has been lost. But apart from this, as long as they limit themselves in substance to denouncing the personal defects of Stalin, the problem remains within the framework of the "cult of personality." At first, everything good was due to the super-human, positive qualities of one man; now, all that is bad is attributed to the equally exceptional, and even staggering defects of the same man. In both cases we are outside the criteria of Marxist judgement.

The real problems escape notice: how and why Soviet society could and did stray so far from the democratic path and from its own standards of legality that it could reach degeneration. We must have a study of the various phases in the development of Soviet society, and our Soviet comrades must be the first to make such a study, because they know far more than we, who might go astray because of partial or erroneous knowledge of the facts.

We should recall that Lenin, in his last speeches and writings, stressed the danger of bureaucratization which was threatening the new society. Without doubt Stalin's errors were made possible by an excessive growth of the role of the bureaucratic apparatus in Soviet economic and political life, and perhaps, above all, in the life of the party. And here it is more difficult to say what was cause and what was effect. One came into being gradually as an expression of the other.

CAN THIS EXCESSIVE bureaucratization be attributable in part to a deep-seated tradition derived from the political organization and the customs of Old Russia? This may be so, and I believe that Lenin's warnings should be taken in this sense. But it should be remembered that the leading personnel changed totally, or almost so; moreover, we are not so much interested in evaluating the residue of the old, as the fact that a new bureaucracy emerged from the new ruling class at the very moment it was fulfilling its completely new tasks.

The first years after the revolution were harsh, terrible years of superhuman objective difficulties, foreign intervention, war and civil war. A maximum centralization of power was absolutely necessary, even including the use of radically repressive measure against the counter-revolution. It was inevitable in this period that things should be done on a war-time basis: if a task was not fulfilled, the person responsible was subject to summary justice! Lenin himself, in a letter to Dzerzhinsky (Translator's note: Felix E. Dzerzhinsky, the first chief of the Cheks, the secret police), now made public, foresaw a change when the intervention and counter-revolution were ended—they were ended in the year prior to Lenin's death. It remains to be seen whether this change was complete, or whether, as if by the force of inertia, what should have been modified or abandoned, did not instead become consolidated.

It was just at this time that the struggle broke out with those groups which challenged the possibility of building a socialist economy; this could not but have a jarring effect on every aspect of Soviet life. This struggle too had the character of a crucial battle on which the fate of the state depended; and, therefore, it had to be won at any cost. Stalin played a positive role in this period, and the healthy forces of the party rallied around him. How we may observe that they rallied around him in a certain way, accepting, under his guidance, modifications in the functioning of the party and its leading organs, as well as new functions for the top echelons of the apparatus. As a result, they were either unable to resist when

they began to be aware of the misdeeds, or they did not know what to do about them. Perhaps it is not incorrect to say that it was the part that gave rise to the limitations of democracy and the gradual substitution of bureaucratic organizational forms.

BUT MORE IMPORTANT, it seems to me, would be a careful examination of what followed, when the first five-year plan was completed and agricultural collectivized. It is here that we touch most closely upon questions of principle. The successes achieved were very great, in fact they were tremendous. A great socialist industry was created without help or credits from the outside world; it was created by great zeal and the development of the internal forces of the new society. The social structure of the rural areas was transformed, though less securely, in the face of tremendous difficulties and with excessive haste and many errors. The results obtained were such as the world has never seen, such as few outside the Soviet Union thought possible. They were an impressive confirmation of the victory of the October Revolution, and of the correct political line sustained against opposition and enemies of all kinds.

It was also the beginning of some mistaken orientations, which were to have serious, evil consequences in the future. In the enthusiasm over the successes, there prevailed, especially in the current propaganda, a tendency towards exaggeration, to think that all problems had been solved, that the Soviet Union had overcome all the objective contradictions, difficulties and conflicts inherent in the construction of a socialist society. In building a socialist society these objective contradictions, these difficulties, these conflicts are often very serious; they may not be overcome if they are not openly recognized and if the great mass of workers are not called upon to tackle and solve them by their labor and creative work.

Instead, in this period, there was the impression in the Soviet Union that the leaders even if they fully understood the reality of the situation, were not presenting it openly to the party and the people, perhaps fearing to detract from the tremendous victories, that had been won.

In a party school to which we had sent students, there was a spirited debate for months on end against those who had praised the "sacrifice" of the Russian worker in the success of the five-year plan. We should not speak of sacrifices, they said, because what would the western workers think? But sacrifices there had been; living conditions in the years of the first five-year plan were very hard, and the working class is not at all afraid to hear that its effort and sacrifices are necessary to build socialism; on the contrary, the class spirit of its vanguard is thereby stimulated and heightened. This episode is a small matter, but it shows a wrong orientation on a matter of principle, because it is an error in principle to believe that, after the first great successes have been achieved, socialist construction will go ahead by itself, rather than by way of the interplay of contradictions of a new type, which must be resolved within the framework of the new society by the action of the masses and the party directing them.

I BELIEVE that two principal results emerged from this. The first was a stagnation in mass activity in the various localities and organization (party, trade unions, factories, Soviets) where the real and new difficulties should have been dealt with; instead it became fashionable to publish statements and made speeches full of pompous declarations and pat phrases which were cold and ineffective because they were divorced from life.

Gradually, genuine creative discussion disappeared, and thereafter the initiative of the masses diminished; directives from above increasingly took the place of individual initiative itself.

But the second result was even more serious. When reality manifested itself and difficulties cropped up as a result of the lack of balance and the conflicts which were still part of the nature of things, a new tendency emerged, and gained ascendancy. This tendency ascribed, always and in every case, problems of food supply, or of the flow of raw materials, problems in the development of industry and agriculture, etc. to sabotage, to the machinations of the class enemy, to secret counter-revolutionary groups, etc. Not that such things did not occur. Of course they did. The Soviet Union was surrounded by implacable enemies, eager to seize any and all means to damage it and check its rise. But the erroneous estimate of the objective conditions in the USSR led to a loss of judgment, and a blurring of the line which separates good from bad, friend from foe, inability or weakness from conscious opposition and treason, from the hostile act conceived for destructive purposes.

Stalin put forward a pseudo-scientific explanation of this frightful confusion with his thesis on the inevitable strengthening of the class enemy as socialist construction advances. This permanent struggle perpetuated and confounded the confusion, herein is the origin of the unheard of violations of socialist legality which were recently publicly denounced.

But one must look for more basic factors to explain why it was that these errors came to be commonly accepted. One of the directions of such research must be the one we have indicated, if the matter is to be understood at all. Stalin was both the manifestation and the author of the situation, not only because he proved himself the most skillful organizer and leader of a bureaucratic type of organization at a time when this took precedence over democratic forms, but also because he furnished an ideological justification for what was really a wrong trend; on these foundations he was able to extend his personal power until it finally assumed degenerate forms. This explains the support which he accumulated and maintained right up until his eclipse, and which has perhaps not completely lost its vitality even now.

IT SHOULD NOT be forgotten that the consolidation of Stalin's power did not end the successes of socialism in the fields of economy, politics, warfare and international relations. No one could possibly deny that the Soviet union was incomparably stronger, more advanced in every way, more unified internally, and more respected internationally in 1953, than it was, for example, at the time of the first five-year plan. How was it that so many errors did not prevent such successes? In this case also it is the duty of the Soviet leaders to provide an answer; they should understand that this question disturbs many sincere militants in the international workingclass movement. To what extent, from what period, and within what limits did Stalin's errors endanger the line of the party, or give rise to secondary difficulties? What was the significance of these difficulties and how were they met in the face of the errors?

On the basis of what we know we can arrive at only certain general conclusions, which we shall be willing to reassess, if necessary. It seems that we must realize that the line followed building socialism continued to be a correct one; even though apparently, the errors under discussion were of such a nature that they did seriously limit the application of that line. This,

(Continued on Page 4)

KHRUSHCHEV'S statement

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY TOGLIATTI

(Continued from Page 2)

however, is one of the points about which the greatest explanation is required, because restrictions, and in some cases, the absence, of democratic methods is an acid test for the correctness of a particular political line. It seems to us incontrovertible, that the bureaucratization of the party, the state organs, the unions, and above all, the peripheral organizations which are the most important, must have hampered, limited, restricted the creative thinking of the party, the creative role of the masses, the democratic functioning of the state, and the advances of the entire society, doing real and obvious damage.

On the other hand, the successes achieved during peacetime, the war years, and the postwar period, are proof of an impressive capacity for work and an enthusiasm and willingness to sacrifice in any kind of circumstance on the part of the masses, and of their loyalty to the goals which the party put before the nation and which were attained through their efforts. It is hard to imagine, for example, any other people who could have matched the accomplishment of the Soviet people in the war, when they resisted, regrouped themselves and finally won, despite the advances of Hitler to the outskirts of Moscow and later to the banks of the Volga, and despite the terrible hardships of those war years. The conclusion must therefore be that none of the substance of the socialist regime was lost, because none of the previous conquests were lost, and above all, because the masses of workers, farmers and intellectuals who make up Soviet society still support the regime. This very support proves that the regime preserved its fundamentally democratic character in spite of everything that happened.

WE HAVE STATED several times that it is the duty of the Soviet comrades to face up to the questions that have been posed and to furnish the basis for a comprehensive answer. Up till now they have elaborated their criticism of the "cult of the individual," correcting, first of all, erroneous historical and political judgments of men and events, and destroying myths and legends created for the purpose of exalting a single individual. This is excellent, but it is not all that we should expect from them. The most important issue today is to reply properly, with Marxist criteria, to the question of how such errors came to be intertwined with the development of socialist society; and if, therefore, there were present at certain periods in the development of this society, disruptive features and mistakes of a general nature against which the entire socialist camp should be put on guard—and I mean in this instance those who are already building socialism in their own way, and those who are still looking for their own road ahead.

We can all agree at the outset that the central problem is the safeguarding of the democratic characteristics of socialist society; we must study, deeply and clarify such questions as the connection between political democracy and economic democracy, between the leading role of the party and the democratic functioning of the state, and the way in which a mistake in any one of these areas can affect the whole system.

QUESTION: The criticism of the cult of the individual was made from above, without prior consultation with the people. Do you consider this fact proof that Stalinism is not yet dead, as many assert?

ANSWER: The opinions I have here set forth and which I have explained in substance lead me to believe that it was inevitable that the criticism of the errors of Stalin and their correction should have come from above. The very restrictions upon party and state de-

mocracy, contained in and resulting from those errors, and the popular support Stalin enjoyed, would have meant that criticism from below could have come only slowly and would have developed in a disoriented fashion and liable to dangerous upheavals. The whole business might appear distasteful but it logically followed from what had gone before. It was the duty of leaders to open the way to the new road ahead with an energetic criticism from above, in addition to correcting in deed the most serious of the distortions. The re-education must involve the party cadre, consisting of some hundred of thousands of men and women, and through them the entire party membership, and then, by this means, everyone in a gigantic country where there are vast differences in living conditions from one region to another. It must be a re-education in the ways of normal democratic procedure, following the model set up by Lenin in the early years of the Revolution—it must be a re-education, that is, in individual initiative in the realm of ideas and in practice; in the use of research; in the exercise of vigorous debate, conducted with that degree of tolerance of the errors of others that is indispensable to the discovery of truth; fullest independence of judgment and character, etc.

All of this is an enormous undertaking one which is not carried out in three years time or by means of a single party congress. I believe, however, that it is an exaggeration to say that the whole matter is simply a question of time. It does not appear to me possible to develop the new course in Soviet life without many new and important discussions, which should clearly define the scope of the errors committed and furnish as well as a precise evaluation of the principles, policies and practices involved. It seems to me, in short, that the errors of Stalin should be corrected in the course of this development with methods completely different from those which Stalin himself used during that period of his life in which he abandoned the accepted norms of party and state life. The greater the degree to which this is accomplished, the greater the benefits. We hope that the corrections are carried out unwaveringly with courage, and that from this will grow, as it should a new upsurge in every area of socialist society, based upon a full-bodied, healthy, democracy with renewed and enriched vitality.

QUESTION: Do you believe that criticism of the cult of the individual will mean a change in the relationship between the USSR and the People's Democracies, between the Russian Communists and the Communists of other lands, and between the USSR and the international workingclass movement?

ANSWER: I hope that there is no one in Italy at least who places any credence in the fatuous tales about Communist Parties receiving instructions, orders and directives from Moscow at every turn. If some such individual should still exist, it is pointless to write for him, since it is clear that he is too thick-skulled and absolutely incapable of even coming near to comprehending the problems of the present-day workingclass movement. We, therefore, write with other persons in mind.

In the first few days following World War I, when the International was founded there is no doubt that the main questions concerning the workingclass movement and concerning the Communist movement were discussed at its headquarters in Moscow, in congress and at other types of international assemblies, from which precise directives emanated. At that time, one may say, there was centralized direction in the Communist movement and the main responsibilities therein rested with the Russian comrades, assisted by comrades from other countries. Before long, however, the movement began to advance on its own, par-

ticularly in countries where there was good leadership. In 1924, for example, the decision of our party to leave the opposition Aventinian Assembly and return to the Parliament was made in the face of advice to the contrary from the leaders of the International. At the time of the 7th Congress (1935) the parties that had grown stronger and which were united and well-led already felt that an international center could do nothing more than draw up general conclusions concerning various situations and the tasks of our movement, but that the practical political decisions and actions should be left to the individual parties, with full respect for their initiative and integrity. During this time there was great activity in France and Spain, particularly during the immense struggles in the years from 1934 to 1939, as well as during the war and afterward. If the Communists advanced in the wake of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, it was because they were convinced that the policy was just, and such it was in fact.

THE INFORMATION Bureau of Communist and Workers' Parties, created in 1947 for purposes quite different from those of the International, was successful in two matters, the first of which was beneficial, the second harmful. The first was to orient properly the entire workingclass movement in its struggle against the war plans of imperialism. The second was the unfortunate intervention against the Yugoslav Communists. It did nothing more, except publish a newspaper, useful only for purposes of information. It never occurred to us Italians, for example, to seek a discussion of our policies in those international gatherings, save at the founding meeting of the Cominform. Every action taken by us after the war was based exclusively upon our own initiative. Since these actions were dictated by the conditions under which we in Italy work, conditions which have their own particular features, leaders of other Communist Parties perhaps did not always comprehend our position. At the present time, however, the Information Bureau also had been dissolved, for reasons that have been amply set forth.

The errors in the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party committed by Stalin certainly played a part in rendering the relations between the Soviet Communists and those of other lands somewhat superficial and formal. But while they confined debate and democratic processes to the party's summit, they did not diminish our mutual trust for we did not have nor could we have any notion of the deeds that are being condemned at the present time. That at least is the case with what concerns us in the matter. In other parties, above all in the People's Democracies, some of Stalin's errors were repeated in a mechanical fashion in the post-war period. There was also no doubt the tendency to transfer and apply mechanically every aspect of Soviet experience and every feature of Soviet practice to those countries, without always giving due regard to particular conditions which would have necessitated, and do necessitate, particular changes, corrections and adaptations of Soviet experience.

The criticism of Stalin made at the 20th Congress, for the most part completely unexpected, have certainly jarred the cadre of the international Communist movement, and, in lesser degree, even its rank and file. The way in which our enemies have seized upon these criticisms so as to use them as weapons against us has drawn the party's militants closer to it. However, it should not be said that our only reaction was one of surprise. There has been grief, and here and there, bewilderment. Doubts concerning the past have arisen, and so forth. These things were not avoidable, in view of the seriousness of the deeds that have been condemned and the manner

SPEAK YOUR PIECE

The Will to Believe

Editor, Daily Worker:

Like Max Gordon, I believe that Herbert Aptheker evades the issue. His complaint about the difficulty of obtaining reliable information about the Soviet Union does not, on a little examination, hold water.

That Communists, in common with many others, were ignorant of the more gruesome aspects of Stalin's regime is understandable; also, their unwillingness to believe unconfirmed reports of atrocities, such as the liquidation of Jewish leaders.

The real offense lay in being blind, to reports that painted the Soviet Union as less than a perfect democracy.

All this despite a mountain of evidence from sources not hostile but friendly to the Soviet Union. Read Walter Duranty's "USSR" where you will find all the evidence needed to prove that the Soviet Union was a dictatorship under Stalin and not a "Socialist democracy."

Or take Joshua Kunitz, an authority on the Soviet Union and a sincere friend. When he was compelled by the evidence of the Soviet press itself to declare that Anti-Semitism existed in the Soviet Union on an official level, did he gain a respectful hearing from Aptheker? Or did the latter join with other "progressives" in ridiculing this great scholar?

And what about dispatches from the Soviet Union itself, passed by the Moscow censor? In 1937 such a dispatch reported the arrest of Bela Klun as an "enemy of the People." From that time he was no longer heard of. A world famous Communist leader could completely disappear, fate unknown (such reports being frequent in the years 1937-1938.) What, to this, was the standard reply? "In the Soviet Union, the only ones who have no civil rights are Fascists."

And what about the fulsome, cloying adulation of Stalin, unthinkable during the time of Lenin? Or the case of the Kremlin doctors, with the multitude of questions it raised about the most hallowed conceptions? Did Aptheker swallow the official explanation given at the time that such a gigantic frameup was the work of a minor official?

That people with a high order

of the condemnation; the Soviet comrades have limited themselves in substance so far to denouncing the deeds and undertaking the proper corrective measures, but they have up till now neglected their duty, from which they cannot be absolved, of facing up to the difficult task of formulating a comprehensive political and historical assessment.

FROM ALL of this I do not think that there will follow a diminution of the mutual trust and solidarity among the various parties in the Communist movement. There does follow, without doubt, however, not only the necessity, but also the desirability, of an ever greater independence of judgment, and such cannot but benefit our movement. The internal political structure of the world Communist movement today has changed. What the Soviet party has accomplished stands, as I have stated, as the first great example of the building of a socialist society, the road to which was opened up by a decisive and profound revolutionary upheaval. Today the front of socialist construction in countries where the Communist Party is the ruling party has become so enlarged (encompassing one-third of mankind) that for them the Soviet model cannot and should not any longer be considered obligatory. In every country governed by Communists the objective and subjective conditions and traditions, exert, and should exert, influence in different

of-intelligence and ability could so completely close their eyes and minds shows the great power of the will-to-believe as well as a heresy-hunting and fear of expulsion for non-conformity.

—Paul Diamond.

Young People And Socialism

Editor, Daily Worker:

Congratulations to the Daily Worker for making its pages available for the healthy exchange of ideas on the American path to Socialism. It has made possible open debate on questions are are vitally important to the welfare and future of our peoples and our country.

A few of us in the Labor Youth League have concluded that we would like to welcome also, ideas and opinions on the role that young people can and must play in the struggle for socialism in our country, from your readers. So far we have noticed only one letter from a "Young Marxist" giving his opinions on the future of youth; how the "new look" affects the Labor Youth League, and the concepts of youth and socialist ideas.

The Labor Youth League, at its National Council Meeting held on May 19 in New York began to open many new questions for discussion in our organization. Such questions as: Is the League the wrong kind of youth organization? Is there any basis for a youth organization with a Marxist educational program? Is there a need for something broader, which young people will be more willing to join? And many others.

The discussion on these and others questions are proceeding in our organization in the liveliest and healthiest direction, and we would like to encourage others not in the League to add their thoughts also to ours.

We have material available that show some of the initial trends in the discussion that we will very willingly supply upon request. Please write us at LYL, 159 W. 23 St., New York 11, N.Y.

—EARL DURHAM,
Acting National Chairman, LYL.

ways upon the organizational forms of the movement. In the rest of the world there are countries where it is hoped that socialism can be attained without the Communists as the ruling party. In still other countries the march toward socialism represents the goals of forces drawn from various movements which have not as yet reached either mutual accord or common understanding. The entire movement is becoming polycentric and within the Communist movement itself one cannot speak of a single guide, but rather of progress attained by following diverse routes. Out of the criticism of Stalin emerges one general problem common to the entire movement—the problem presented by the dangers of bureaucratic degeneration; the eradication of democracy; the confusion between constructive revolutionary force and destruction of revolutionary legality; the separation of political and economic leadership from the criticism and creative activity of the masses.

We would welcome a contest among the Communist Parties that are in power to see which one can furnish the best method for avoiding those problems forever. But it will be necessary for us to work out our own methods and approaches, so that we can avoid the dangers of stagnation and bureaucratization and so that we will know how to work out together the problems of popular liberty and social justice and thereby win an ever greater respect and following among the masses themselves.