

HUNGARY IN TRAVAIL

by JESSICA SMITH

THE tragic and terrible events in the Middle East and in Hungary bring one compelling lesson home to us all. We had better learn this lesson well if we want to keep this planet earth a home habitable for the human family.

The lesson is that we must at once and with all our strength enter upon an all-out campaign for peace that will never weaken or stop until it is won. This means an ending of the cold war and of all military blocs under which any nation stations troops on another nation's territory or sends them in. Above all it means an ending of the arms race, an unceasing search for disarmament and a supreme effort for the abolition of nuclear weapons. As long as they exist in the arsenals of nations there is danger that any small conflict containing the seeds of a larger one may lead to their use.

More people in the world today are agreed on the necessity for ending tests of nuclear weapons than on any other single issue. This, therefore, is the place to begin, since this decision can be made without any complex arrangements on inspection and control which have been the main stumbling block. No arguments of national security can here prevail,

since any violation, all agree, could be immediately detected.

The ending of tests would end the already perilous pollution of the atmosphere, endangering our own and future generations. It would at the same time open the way for effective steps toward real disarmament and complete abolition of all nuclear weapons.

Adlai Stevenson performed a real service in making the ending of tests a main issue in the election campaign. In doing so he not only responded to the growing demand among all sections of the people, but by centering national attention on this issue helped to intensify that demand. This has created a strong base which must not be dissipated but should be utilized for a broad national movement.

Where Stevenson failed was in not relating the issue of the tests to an over-all peace program. His criticisms of the Administration were not for its cold war policies, but for not pursuing them far enough. He based himself on the sterile and dangerous anti-Communist issue rather than on any constructive new program for world security. Applying this to the Suez situation, he saw the main danger there as "Soviet penetration" into

the area and in effect advocated that the Administration back up the aggressive actions of Britain and France, in which they used Israel as a tool, against the interests of the Israeli people. This encouragement of military actions based on naked imperialist aims, designed both to seize the canal and overthrow the Nasser government, and creating a new danger of world war, largely negated Stevenson's previous position on tests.

The Middle East and Hungary

World-wide indignation at the deliberate aggression in Egypt to perpetuate a dying colonial system was reflected in an overwhelming majority in the United Nations determined to stop the aggression. However at fault our own country in helping to bring about the Middle Eastern crisis and in its later vacillations, Americans were proud to have their country on the side that condemned aggression. With the United States, the Soviet Union, the whole Asian-African world standing together, bright new prospects for peace seemed open. The rift among NATO powers raised hopes for a new, broad, all-inclusive security alliance.

Whether by accident or design of those forces in the world who want no peaceful solutions, at that point the Hungarian situation exploded, providing an opportunity for the West to close ranks again in condemning the Soviet Union.

The two situations are not parallel. Yet since both involve the use of armed force to impose the purposes of the nations resorting to force, however different those purposes, the Hungarian situation was at once seized upon to divert and divide world attention with regard to the

Middle East. The anti-Communist issue was again brought to the fore. It was no accident that the sharpest attacks against the Soviet Union were made by those guilty of the aggression in Egypt and those representing the world's most dictatorial and terrorist regimes.

The whole Arab-Asian world is grateful for the unswerving support of the Soviet Union on the side of colonial liberation and in large measure attributes to its policies the achievement of the cease-fire and the defeat, thus far, of British-French aims. Some of the neutral nations, while seeing the main danger in Western aggression, at the same time regarded the use of Soviet troops in Hungary as violating principles of sovereignty and equality in relations between nations.

This was pointed up in the November 14th communique of the Prime Ministers of India, Ceylon, Indonesia and Burma, who convened primarily to consider the grave situation arising out of the military actions in Egypt, and who also considered the situation in Hungary. They strongly condemned the aggression against Egypt and asked for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces. They expressed deep distress at the events in Hungary, regretted the reintroduction of Soviet troops and said they should be withdrawn speedily. They noted French suppression of freedom in Algeria. Declaring that world tensions are too great to deal with merely by condemnation, they called for world peace through disarmament, an end to military pacts and the stationing of troops on other nation's territory and adherence to the Bandung principles of peaceful co-existence.

In debates on Hungary in the UN,

Indian delegate V.K. Krishna Menon opposed any approach to the Hungarian question requiring it to submit its elections to the UN as though it were a colonial country, and urged that nothing be done to retard the process of negotiations between the Soviet Union and Hungary with regard to troop withdrawal.

The Indian delegation abstained from voting on any of the UN Assembly resolutions condemnatory of Soviet actions in Hungary. While emphasizing his country's belief that no government "should be based upon foreign intervention or upon the armed might of another country," Mr. Menon made clear that he felt that there should be no interference in Hungary's affairs "by any party whatsoever," whether from the East or from the West. In the debate on the deportations question on November 21, India joined with Ceylon and Indonesia in a cautiously worded resolution urging Hungary to permit the entry of observers designated by the Secretary General, "without prejudice to its sovereignty." This resolution noted that while some member states had affirmed that Hungarian nationals had been "forcibly deported," others had "categorically denied" that any such deportations had occurred.

It should be noted that none of the rumors of Soviet deportations of Hungarians have been confirmed. An AP dispatch in the *New York Times*, Nov. 21 said that information from the Hungarian state railways "seemed to cast doubt on reports of deportations," while the *Times* said editorially the same day that "it is not possible to say with certainty that there have been deportations of Hungarians." Both Hungarian and Soviet representatives have officially and categorically

denied that any such deportations took place.

While the situations in Hungary and in Egypt cannot be considered entirely apart from one another, we believe that the issues of naked aggression in the Middle East are clearer to many people than the complex situation in Hungary.

New Efforts for Peace Needed

The situation in Hungary has thrown new confusion into the ranks of believers in socialism and many circles friendly to the Soviet Union, just recovering from the Stalin revelations and encouraged by the many evidences of correction of those evil policies, greater democratization of life within all the socialist countries, greater equality in relations between them.

No one can fail to be deeply disturbed by the use of Soviet troops in quelling the revolt in Hungary, the terrible bloodshed and destruction, the bitter harvest of hatred and resentment that must inevitably be reaped. It should have been avoided.

But no friend of peace or believer in socialism can stop at simple condemnation of Soviet actions. It is necessary to see the picture against the background of world and Hungarian developments, the whole chain of events that led to these tragic happenings. Everyone, including the Soviet leaders, concedes to one degree or another that troubles in Hungary grew out of the evil Stalinist policies not yet sufficiently overcome, that the people had numerous justified grievances requiring rectification, of which the first demonstrations in Budapest were honest expressions. But those who merely condemn, take far too little account of the long and publicly announced efforts of reac-

tionary forces inside and outside of Hungary to overthrow the regime and return to an old order whose likeness to that of Hitler has been too easily forgotten. These efforts are a part of the whole cold war policy for which prime responsibility falls on the West. They do not fully realize the alternative which the Soviet leaders considered inevitable.

Both those who condemn the use of Soviet troops and those who justify it as unavoidable have a duty to try to understand the whole complex of forces and events out of which it grew. Most dangerous of the effects of what has happened is the exacerbation of all the cold war tensions that were beginning to die down. The big job now is to try once again to reduce those tensions and to get on with the main task of restoring the conditions for peaceful co-existence, under which such tragic events would not occur.

The possibilities for achieving this are present in the Swiss proposal for a top-level five-power conference, already accepted by the Soviet Union and India. While turned down by Britain, France and the United States, President Eisenhower has at least left the door open, pending results of current United Nations discussions.

A further opportunity is offered by the November 17 communications of Premier Bulganin to President Eisenhower and the Prime Ministers of Britain, France and India, urging that the five-power summit conference proposed by Switzerland, consider disarmament and prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, with discontinuance of testing as the first step. (The proposal included a partial acceptance of the Eisenhower "Open Skies" inspection plan.) Bulganin also suggested a conference of

the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers to consider the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty.

Among the things that must be understood in relation to Hungary are special aspects of its history, too soon forgotten, which explain certain differences between Hungary and the other People's Democracies as well as emphasizing the guilt that must be shared by our own nation in contributing to its special difficulties of development. We make no pretense of a full understanding of all the complex strands woven into the present situation. We can only review some readily ascertainable facts which we hope may lead to more thorough study and understanding, and equip us better in the struggle for peaceful solutions.

Hungary After World War I

Without prejudice to the Hungarian people as such, who have their own glorious revolutionary traditions of the Kossuth independence movement of 1848, it cannot be forgotten that Hungary fought against the West as Germany's partner in two world wars. Nor can we forget the role of the West in intervening in Hungary's internal affairs after World War I and preventing it from developing the form of government it desired.

After the dissolution of the Hapsburg Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, a Republican Government was set up under the liberal Count Michael Karolyi. But the Allied Council permitted Czechoslovakia, Rumania and other national forces to occupy Hungary, and withheld the financial aid and food which would have enabled the Karolyi Government to endure. As a result, Karolyi handed over power to a combination

of Communists and Social Democrats who set up a Soviet form of government under Bela Kun in March 1919.

The Allied Council continued its blockade, permitted new military attacks, and made a deal with the right wing Social Democrats to oust Bela Kun and form a new government. But the new government lasted less than a week. The Rumanian army entered Budapest, without protest from the Allies, imprisoned the moderate leaders, and opened the way for taking of power by the reactionary Admiral Nicholas Horthy, commander of the Austro-Hungarian Navy at the end of the war.

The role of the United States in this shameful episode is recounted by Walter W. Liggett in the book *The Rise of Herbert Hoover* (H. K. Fly and Co., 1932):

Captain C. C. Gregory, of San Francisco, a close friend of Herbert Hoover and fellow trustee of Stanford University, was the American Relief Administrator who helped engineer this disgraceful deal. He withheld supplies until Bela Kun had been ousted, although the supplies had been purchased with funds advanced by the Bela Kun Government. (p. 255)

Liggett quotes from an article in *World's Work*, June '21, in which Gregory had boasted of this exploit, declaring he was "in constant touch with Hoover in Paris," that the latter took the "most strenuous efforts and the Supreme Council was immediately drawn into a discussion of ways and means," and that "there is no doubt Mr. Hoover was the principal agency responsible for the quick return we received."

To bring the story closer to the present, we should add that Herbert Hoover Jr. has been acting Secretary of State since the Hun-

garian events began. The elder Hoover sent greetings to the Madison Square Garden meeting held this November 8 under the auspices of the International Rescue Committee and sponsored by a group of emigré organizations representing the most reactionary elements of former regimes of Central and Eastern Europe. While ostensibly called to raise money for relief, the full page ad for the meeting quoted an appeal from "Hungarian Freedom Station" not for relief, but for "action, with soldiers and arms." Leo Cherne, IRC chairman, recently rushed to Budapest where he conferred about distribution of relief supplies with Cardinal Mindszenty and other anti-Communist representatives. Mr. Cherne's concern for Hungarian independence may be gauged by the fact that on his return he declared 99 per cent of the Hungarian people would vote for union with Austria. The character of those who attended the meeting may be gathered from the burst of boos which greeted Mrs. Anna Kethly, Social Democratic member of the Imre Nagy regime, when she declared of recent events: "This revolution . . . is not intended to be the beginning of a new war but the beginning of the often-mentioned co-existence," and by the howling pickets who hurled rotten tomatoes and bottles of ammonia at Paul Robeson, Rev. William Howard Melish and Dr. Harry F. Ward when they attended a meeting of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship to urge continued efforts for peaceful co-existence.

The Horthy Terror

Those familiar with the history of Hungary since World War I refer to it as "the first Fascist state" as

indeed it was under the terrorist dictatorship of Admiral Horthy which lasted from 1920 until 1944.

Under the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary had been forced to cede over two-thirds of its territory containing most of its iron resources and a substantial portion of its coal to Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Austria, which also meant a reduction of its population from 21,000,000 to about 9,000,000. It thus became predominantly an agricultural country. Under Horthy's feudal rule, trade and industry stagnated, finances came under foreign control.

The lynch law that flourished under Horthy is described by Dr. Oscar Jaszi, a leading Hungarian Radical of that period, in his book *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary*:

The country was covered with a network of bloody assizes, which wreaked vengeance not only upon the greedy adventurers of Communism, but also upon those whose only offense was their political faith. . . . Thousands of innocent persons, among them women, students, young girls, and even children, were sent to the prisons and the internment camps. But this "legal" retaliation was not enough for them. It was too ceremonious and controllable. Throughout the land there were formed armed detachments of the White forces, and other bands, which hunted down all who had excited their suspicion or ill-will. It may be said that the whole so-called upper class took up arms and joined one or another of the military organizations. Hungary became a veritable Eldorado for the disbanded Imperial Army. . . . This raging of the White Terror makes one of the darkest pages of Hungarian history.

The *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1947

edition), from which the following items are culled, heads a section under Hungary "Establishment of the Counter-Revolution." It describes the limited-franchise elections of 1920 under which Horthy became regent, as bringing a "Conservative Christian, partly anti-Semite majority." Continuing White Terror, reaching out to Social Democrats, Jews and many liberal elements, caused the Amsterdam International to proclaim a boycott against Hungary. Reaction continued under subsequent ministries. All efforts to establish a liberal constitutional regime failed. "Plans for agrarian reform and an amelioration of the miserable condition of the peasantry were never seriously started." In 1932 Julius de Gombos became prime minister. He "represented the strongly fascist element among the younger officers and the lower middle-class intelligentsia who had been responsible for the White Terror in Hungary and had formed a number of militant organizations like the Awakening Magyars." ("Militant" seems a mild term. This was an outright terrorist and rabidly anti-Semitic organization. Ed.)

Fascist Hungary

Under this heading, the Encyclopedia says: "With the Gombos Ministry Hungary entered into a period of progressive fascization of its whole life. Close cooperation with fascist Italy and, after Hitler's accession to power, with national socialist Germany, became a guiding principle of Hungary's foreign policy."

Rearmament was taken up actively. Hungary took part in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, joined the anti-Communist Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan. "New

anti-Semitic legislation was introduced and Hungary's life quickly coordinated with Nazi concepts of policy. Under new anti-Semitic laws Jews were completely excluded from all economic, cultural or political activities in Hungary."

Hungary formally entered the war as Hitler's ally November 20, 1940. It joined the assault on the USSR, helped German troops invade Yugoslavia, and seized some Yugoslav territory "with the intention of incorporating it into the Hungarian state which then definitely formed part of Hitler's 'new order.'"

Hungary held out in the Nazi camp until almost the end of the war. A footnote is added by Emil Lengyel, a Hungarian born American writer, who wrote an article in the April, 1947, issue of *Soviet Russia Today* after a visit to Hungary. Describing the hostile role played by Cardinal Mindszenty at that time against both the Hungarian Government and the Russians, Lengyel said that Mindszenty advocated "forgiving" such organizations as the "Arrow Cross" and their Fascist allies, regarding whom, Lengyel added:

It should be pointed out to outsiders that those very people are guilty of more monstrous crimes even than the Nazis. At the very end of the war they kept on shipping trainloads of victims into the German gas chambers in Poland. . . . I know from some of the survivors of the gas chambers that some of the top Nazi murderers were horrified by the insensate deeds of their Hungarian accomplices. If the Hungarian assassins had not sent hundreds of thousands into the execution chambers up to the last minute, most of the Hungarian Jews could have been saved.

This may serve as a reminder that whatever wartime resistance forces

there were within Hungary had been ruthlessly suppressed. Hungary was not, like the other countries which became People's Democracies, a country liberated from Hitler occupation with the help of its own people. It was an enemy country in which German-Hungarian troops were defeated by the Russians in long and bitter battles. Budapest alone fell only after an eight-week siege by Soviet armies, in which 49,000 of the German-Hungarian troops were killed, 178,500 taken prisoner.

Many who had faced the Russians in battle or had supported the Horthy government in its war efforts fled to the West, later to form the recruits for the anti-Communist "liberation" campaigns. Many remained at home, and undoubtedly helped swell the ranks of the army and police.

The Battle for Budapest, part of the great campaign that ended in victory over Hitler, was only twelve years ago.

Post-war Hungary

Elections were held in 1945 under chaotic postwar conditions with many reactionary elements still in controlling positions. The Smallholders won a big majority, the Social Democrats came next and the Communists third. A *United Press* dispatch of June 8, 1945 by Ruth Lloyd, indicated the nature of the Smallholders Party at that time. They had, she said, "let in all the politically dispossessed members of the old order who had nowhere to go, including the bulk of the old aristocracy and the wealthy mercantile class."

The new coalition government immediately set about the task of reconstruction, put into effect important land reforms which gave five

acres apiece to millions of landless peasants and set in motion a plan for nationalizing the banks, which had owned some 60 per cent of basic industry, for industrializing the country and raising living standards.

In the article referred to above, Emil Lengyel describes the progress that had already been made in early 1947 when he visited there. The country was still nominally under the control of the Allied Control Council. Some 60,000 Soviet troops were still there pending withdrawal following the signing of the peace treaty, except for those who would remain to maintain communications lines with Austria. However, Lengyel found that the country was not under physical occupation by the Russians, who were little in evidence, and all police services were carried on by Hungarians. The old town of Budapest "looked like a miniature Stalingrad," but miracles had been accomplished in digging out of the ruins and restoring public services. "Even the enemies of Russia," he noted, "admitted that the Red Army had had a hand in the performance of this miracle."

He found the land reform the most significant development in post-war Hungary, although the farmers were suffering because the government was too poor to provide needed equipment for them, and economic conditions were still very difficult.

Lengyel also noted the anti-Soviet movements "spearheaded by Cardinal Mindszenty" who described the land reform as a "Godless Act," and mourned the loss of the vast church lands (900,000 acres) to the people. Mindszenty also opposed secularization of the schools.

With the difficult internal situation, and so many reactionaries and fascists around, it was not surpris-

ing that plots should have developed against the regime. Following an outright Horthy plot, in February 1947, Bela Kovacs, a leader of the Smallholders, had been arrested by the Soviet occupation authorities on charges of a treasonable conspiracy directed against both the Hungarian Government and the Soviet occupation authorities. The fascist clique in the country was reported to have turned to foreign reactionary powers for help in forming a counter-government in exile which would be brought back to form a Horthy type dictatorship in Hungary.

In a signed confession, Kovacs implicated eight other Smallholders, including Ferenc Nagy, then Hungarian Premier (not to be confused with Imre Nagy). Kovacs, who spent eight years in jail in Russia, was freed in 1955. In the light of later revelations about the spurious nature of some of those early confessions, we do not know to what extent the earlier charges against him and his implication of Nagy and others were justified. However, that conspiracies or one sort or another existed was attested by many non-Communist sources.

At any rate, Ferenc Nagy, who was vacationing in Switzerland at the time, resigned and has remained in exile ever since, very active in Hungarian exile affairs in this country and in Europe.

Ferenc Nagy has revealed his political views in his book *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain*, published by Macmillan in 1948. In this he deplors the fact that the West did not follow Churchill's plan in 1944 of launching their attack on Europe through the Balkans. (page 82). He expressed his belief that America must lead the way "to eliminate Communism from human

society" (page 458). Finally, he expresses his contempt for the people and his anti-Semitic bias in the following paragraph outlining his ideas for his own country and the world in the period of "reconstruction" after anti-Communist forces have won:

After the guilty are punished, the misled masses must be depoliticized. In the new world order, the masses must have no opportunity or occasion to go astray politically. . . . The people, driven through common danger into common action, must assert politically that duty which was shouldered by humanity two thousand years ago in the creation and defense of the Christian world order. (pages 459-460)

We shall return to Mr. Nagy later.

Advances and Errors

In August 1947 new elections were held in Hungary, the results of which brought cries of a "Red coup" in the U.S. press. Actually the principal adults disfranchised were the former adherents of some 29 fascist organizations, and 280,000 more people voted than in the 1945 elections. A government coalition of Communists, Smallholders, Social Democratic and National Peasant Parties won the elections. The Communists this time came out ahead with 1,113,050 votes, five per cent more than in the previous elections. In March 1948, the Social Democratic and Communist Parties merged. In 1949 Party Secretary Matyas Rakosi became Premier and the country moved quickly toward socialism under a program of nationalization, economic planning for industrialization, farm collectivization and a vast program for social welfare.

That they moved much too fast

will be clear both from the past history we have recounted which indicates that the people as a whole were far from ready for a full socialist program, and from the deep-rooted dissatisfactions of the people revealed in the current events.

It cannot be denied that there was much progress during the period. In the tempo of industrialization more was accomplished in the past ten years than in the whole preceding century. Education advanced as never before. Much was done for children, medical and welfare services.

Over the years our magazine has published many accounts of these advances from non-Communist sources. We do not believe that this record need be thrown out. The error was in its on-sidedness, the failure to note the many negative features that were accompanying these advances, a failure for which the regime itself, for concealing much of the truth, must be held chiefly responsible.

For side by side with the advances, the Hungarian version of the Stalin cult was carrying out its own unjustifiable repressions and violations of socialist legality, a vast secret police apparatus was, as in the Soviet Union, doing great damage as an invisible government, while the USSR's own policies in that period did much to retard progress. In 1948 came the break with Yugoslavia, and all its evil consequences, culminating in the trial and execution in 1949 of Foreign Minister Rajk and his associates, falsely charged, as Khrushchev revealed in his famous speech, of treason and espionage on behalf of the West, of plotting with Tito for the overthrow of the Hungarian Government and murder of its leaders.

Continuing economic difficulties were of course basic in enhancing the people's discontent. Part of these stemmed from the large reparations asked by the Soviet Union as a result of Hungary's role in the war, and from the Soviet share in the joint stock companies, (through which, in part, the USSR had realized its share of German assets in Hungary, assigned under the Allied reparations agreement), although much Soviet economic aid had also been forthcoming. Some of the pressures had already been eased, and the joint companies were dissolved after Stalin's death, but injustices in economic relations remained. The people did not sufficiently share in the returns of industrialization. Work norms remained too high, wages and living standards too low. Poor crops and floods in the past two years meant depressed farm conditions and increased peasant dissatisfaction with cooperative farming and with government taxes and obligatory deliveries. Added to these was the need for diverting larger funds to arms production in the developing cold war atmosphere.

A brief respite from economic difficulties was promised the people when Imre Nagy became Premier in 1953, following Stalin's death. He promised greater attention to light industry, more consumers' goods for the people, a slower tempo in the forming of agricultural collectives. But this movement was reversed when the Soviet Union itself reversed Malenkov's policy and insisted that emphasis on heavy industry must remain, and Nagy was replaced in February 1955 by Anton Hegecius, who restored the policy of following the Soviet pattern under Hungary's very different conditions.

But while the terrible mistakes

of the Party and the regime are incontrovertible, its bureaucracy, its separation from the people and lack of attention to their most vital economic needs as well as the repressions and the drive for conformity, the situation in Hungary cannot be considered apart from Western cold war policies of the post-war period which were helping to build up tensions in the whole socialist orbit and ever-ready to take advantage of them.

Western Policies and Hungary

It cannot be forgotten that the internal troubles that plunged Hungary into turmoil in 1947 coincided with the promulgation of the Truman doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey, which meant the beginning of American political and military intervention in the affairs of Europe. As Walter Lippmann put it:

The reason for intervention in Greece and Turkey is that of all places in the world they are best suited strategically for the employment of American military power to check the expansion of Soviet military power. (*New York Herald Tribune*, Mar. 29, 1947)

During 1948 Hungarian emigrés began to coalesce their activities for the formation of a "shadow government," to take over when the time was ripe. According to C. L. Sulzberger, (*New York Times*, Aug. 8, '48) "The Hungarian coalition was organized at the end of July with the tacit approval of the State Department." He mentioned the Hungarian National Committee as the over-all organizing body "regarded as the Parliament," and among its leaders the Rev. Bela Varga, former Catholic parish priest, Ferenc Nagy and the notorious Tibor Eckhardt.

During this period John Foster Dulles was already paving the way for the rearming of Germany.

These policies culminated in April 1949 in the signing of the North Atlantic Pact, a military alliance directed against the Soviet Union, providing for a whole string of U.S. military bases surrounding the USSR and the People's Democracies.

But not until May, 1955, following ratification of the Paris treaties, providing for the rearming of Germany and its entrance into NATO and the refusal by the West of the Soviet offer for an All-European Security Treaty, did the USSR make the counter move of organizing a mutual defense system under the Warsaw Treaty, but with the express condition that it would be dissolved whenever a general European collective security system should be formed. Without NATO and a remilitarized Germany there would have been no Warsaw Treaty, and hence no Soviet troops still stationed in Hungary.

In 1950, the Republican foreign policy plank expressly provided for "liberation" of the Eastern European countries, which thus became official Republican policy under the Eisenhower Administration.

In September 1951 this policy was implemented by the passage of the Mutual Security Act authorizing the President to spend up to \$100,000,000 to finance:

... any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia or the Communist occupied areas of Germany and Austria, and other countries absorbed in the Soviet Union, either to form such persons into elements of the military forces of

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or for other purposes. . . .

Additional appropriations for such purposes have been made each year. While such activities have been played down in the press recently, much has been published in the past about the activities of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Project X in promoting sabotage and subversion in these countries. Well known is the State Department's direct encouragement and aid to the many emigré groups in Germany and elsewhere in Europe as well as their encouragement to the Crusade for Freedom and other private organizations which raise vast funds for subversive activities in socialist countries, for radio and balloon programs and the like.

What Was Behind the Revolt?

We have tried thus far to indicate some of the many complicated strands that wove the pattern of Hungary's present travail. Many have expressed the opinion that the reason events exploded as they did in Hungary in contrast to the way they are working out in Poland is that Poland moved more quickly in overcoming the evils of the Stalin era and in putting liberalization policies into effect. We are inclined to think the matter is more complex. What we have recalled of Hungary's Fascist past may be more pertinent. Perhaps a part of the explanation is also that, although many mistakes are admitted in Poland, the Stalinist repressions there were not quite so complete—at least Gomulka was merely jailed, not framed and executed as a traitor as in the case of Rajk and his associates. Poland, too, seems to have found stronger and wiser leadership.

While the Khrushchev revelations about Stalin had a shocking effect among the people in the Soviet Union, there had been some preparation for them in the three years since Stalin's death, and the corrective process was well under way. But while some slight reforms had already taken place in Hungary, there was no such preparation for the revelations, which must have struck like a bombshell among people who already had many legitimate grievances. At the same time, the constructive decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR with regard to differing roads to socialism and improved relations among socialist countries had not yet been fully implemented.

In February came the posthumous rehabilitation of Bela Kun, who had been executed in the Soviet Union as a traitor, presumably sometime in the '30's. In March, the rehabilitation of Rajk, about whose guilt questions must have arisen earlier, at the time in fact of the Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation in 1955, which absolved Tito of the conspiracy in which Rajk was supposed to have taken part. The revelation of the perfidy of those leaders and police officials who had a part in the framing, extorted confessions and executions must have made a profound impact on the people. (Their passions must have been deeply inflamed with the exhuming of the bodies of Rajk and three others and the mass funeral, reported to have been attended by 200,000 people, at the time of their re-burial with full official honors this October 6.) Much of the popular resentment was directed against Rakosi, who was replaced by Erno Gero as first Party Secretary in July.

While some of those responsible

for the repressions and frame-ups had been arrested, others remained in office.

Meantime, many thousands of political and other prisoners were being released from jail. While in the Soviet Union this process was carried on over a considerable period, all cases being carefully reviewed in order to insure correction of injustice, the process took place much more hastily in Hungary, and along with the innocent who had been unjustly punished it is said that many were released with fascist backgrounds and questionable records as well as outright criminal elements, and that their absorption into a discontented population inevitably created new problems.

In addition, ever since the spring of 1955, Hungarians abroad were being invited to return to their country "with no questions asked," which provided a perfect cloak for the entry of many fascist elements. Further opportunities were afforded by the opening of the Western border with Austria last spring. Tens of thousands of fascist and other counter-revolutionary elements, including many officers of the former Horthy army, are said to have taken advantage of these opportunities.

While liberalization may not have moved as quickly as in Poland, the process seems to have been well under way. Although not yet reflected in the official press, much free criticism was published in literary journals and many meetings were held where criticism of the regime was freely expressed, especially in youth and literary circles. Such criticism began among writers over a year ago. It reached its culmination last June when 8,000 people attended a meeting of the Petofi Circle in Budapest, where leading writers made

sharp attacks on Party and Government leaders.

Both the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party, in its Central Committee meeting last June, and government leaders, had mapped extensive measures to meet the people's grievances through higher living standards and greater democracy. These promises, however, were too little and too late and too slow in fulfillment.

Just before the dam burst, John MacCormac wrote from Budapest (*New York Times*, Oct. 19) that "the thaw" that set in in Hungary when Matyas Rakosi was deposed . . . continues unabated." On October 21 he wrote that the tempo of change was very rapid. He cited government announcements regarding revision of the five-year plan in favor of increased consumers' goods and higher living standards, wage increases and an end of any coercion with regard to collective farms.

It is perhaps not without significance that the uprising started on the very eve of the convening of Parliament. As in Poland, reforms had already been made in parliamentary procedure to provide for freedom of debate and questioning of government ministers by deputies. This session of Parliament, which the uprising prevented, was slated to put into effect many of the reforms being demanded by the people.

The day before the demonstration that sparked the revolt, student meetings were held which issued a series of demands to the Government. These meetings led to street demonstrations by students, joined by many others on October 23, until that night tens of thousands converged on the Budapest radio station, where Party Secretary Gero had just been broadcasting. The people demanded Imre Nagy

as premier. Many workers now swelled the ranks of the demonstrators.

How Did the Violence Start?

Just how the first shooting began is not entirely clear. Most of the reports declared that as the crowd pressed against the doors of the radio station to find out why a delegation they sent inside had not returned, the police threw tear bombs, and then opened fire, killing one and wounding one demonstrator. Other accounts said the first shots came from armed persons in the crowd itself, and that members of the radio station staff had been wounded. Practically all accounts agree, however, that it had all started as a peaceful demonstration based on justified demands.

The next morning the government announced the replacement of Hege- dus by Imre Nagy as premier. Martial law was proclaimed, and Soviet troops stationed nearby called in to help. Nagy broadcast an appeal to the people to keep order and oppose the provocations of "enemies of the people who tried to convert peaceful demonstrations . . . into an attack on the Socialist system itself."

Nagy has since blamed the calling of Soviet troops on Gero alone. However that may be, it was Nagy who signed the decree, and who according to an editorial in the *New York Times*, called upon the people to "welcome our friends and allies." Indignation against Gero was so great that on October 25 he was replaced as Communist Secretary by Janos Kadar, who had spent several years in jail for alleged espionage and treason, and was recently exonerated and released.

The opinion is held rather gen-

erally that the first grave error was the calling in of Soviet troops, which inflamed the people, and that without this action the continuing tragic bloodshed might have been averted.

In this connection, it is pertinent to note the first reactions in Washington. In a dispatch to the *New York Times* (Oct. 27) Edwin L. Dale Jr., said the view of the State Department was "that there is little doubt that the troops have a right to be there," since the Warsaw Pact under which Soviet troops are in Hungary is a Soviet version of NATO. He continued:

But a question might be raised about the legitimacy of their use to put down an internal rebellion. Even this raises a problem, however. The Soviet troops are being used at the request of the Hungarian government. There is little effort in Washington to deny that the United States forces abroad could be used in the same way if there were a Communist-led revolution in, say Italy. In 1944 and 1945, for example, British troops, on the request of the Athens Government, fought Communist rebels in Greece. Furthermore, any possible United Nations approach is at the moment clouded by French threats to use force in Morocco and Tunisia to protect Europeans there.

As rioting and bloodshed mounted in the days that followed and spread throughout the country, Premier Nagy displayed the greatest vacillation and weakness, changing his cabinet constantly, acceding first to the just demands of the people, and then later to all demands without distinction.

Soviet Government Statement

On October 30, the Soviet Government issued a statement on the basic principles of its relations with other

Socialist states. It said "the countries of the great commonwealth of Socialist states can build their relations only on the principle of full equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's domestic affairs."

It admitted that there had been many downright mistakes and violations of these principles in the past which had been condemned by the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party, and that steps were being taken to correct them.

Recognizing its own responsibilities in Hungary's economic difficulties, the Soviet Government said it was ready to discuss the development and strengthening of economic ties among Socialist countries with a view to eliminating any violations of sovereignty and of mutual advantage and equality. It raised the question of the expediency of the further stay of Soviet economic advisers in the People's Democracies.

It expressed its readiness to discuss the whole question of the stationing of Soviet troops in other socialist countries under the terms of the Warsaw Pact.

On the question of Hungary, it said the people had rightly raised the question of eliminating serious shortcomings in economic development, and advancing the struggle against bureaucracy and for increased material well-being, but that this movement had been joined by forces of "black reaction and counter-revolution" trying to restore the old landlords' and capitalists' order.

Expressing regret at the development of events leading to bloodshed, the Soviet Government said it considered that the further presence of Soviet Army units, "can serve as a cause for an even greater deterior-

ration of the situation," had instructed its military command to withdraw from Budapest "as soon as this is recognized by the Hungarian Government to be necessary," and at the same time was "ready to enter into negotiations with the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other participants of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the continued presence of the Soviet troops in Hungary." It expressed confidence that the people of Hungary would defend their socialist achievements.

President Eisenhower greeted this statement in his broadcast of October 31 with the words:

. . . If the Soviet Union indeed faithfully acts upon its announced intention, the world will witness the greatest forward stride toward justice, truth and understanding among nations in our generation.

There is no question that the Soviet Union intended to act on the basis of this statement, as they subsequently did in the agreement with Poland. The Soviet troops began to withdraw from Budapest. But other forces determined a very different outcome.

Had there been any sort of firm government, the situation might have been saved. But Nagy at once told the rebels they had won "full victory," gave in to all demands, including those leading to restoration of capitalism. He changed his Cabinet again to include not only the Smallholders (Zoltan Tildy, Bela Kovacs) already taken in, but opened the way for the inclusion of representatives of outright reaction. At this point, as the *New York Times* reported (Oct. 31): "Premier Nagy's weak national front government hav-

ing failed to defeat the national revolution even with the help of Soviet tanks and heavy artillery, apparently decided to join it." The Nagy government extended recognition to the Revolutionary Councils. A terrible blood bath started.

As the Soviet Troops Withdrew

As the Soviet troops completed their withdrawal from Budapest, the Nagy Government appeared to be in a state of collapse. John MacCormac wrote: "Now that the Russians have left Budapest, no one seems to know who rules Hungary." (*New York Times*, Nov. 1). An AP dispatch from Budapest (*New York Post*, Nov. 1) described what was happening:

. . . Vengeance squads of young revolutionaries still prowled the streets of Budapest and the city's sewers, hunting members of the hated Hungarian secret police. When they found them in sewers, they shot them and dumped their bodies. When they found them in the street they hung them up by the feet. When they shot them in the streets, they poured gasoline on their bodies and burned them.

The same issue of the *Times* carried a picture, brought back by Leo Cherne, showing a Hitler-like scene of citizens heaping Russian and Communist books and literature on a huge bonfire. "The fires," said Cherne approvingly, "burned all night." Many world classics fed the flames.

The rebels opened all the jails, releasing many criminals to join the reckless slaughter. Other reports made clear that while the main target of the people's wrath in the beginning was the secret police, it was extended to all who were suspected

of being Communists, and whole families, including children, were dragged from their beds and shot.

Life magazine of November 12 carried a ten-page spread, with pictures and text, of how "the flames of liberty and revenge against tyranny" rose high in Hungary in those three days.

The opening photos by photographer Timothy Foote shows a group of young Hungarian security police officers emerging from a building with hands raised in surrender, their collapse and death as they are met with a hail of machine gun bullets. Subsequent pictures show a crowd surrounding and a woman spitting upon a mangled body hanging by the heels from a tree and other lynching scenes. One picture is captioned "Soviet atrocity." Hospital doctors and nurses are examining a blood-spattered crib in a children's clinic. (For days there were press stories describing how the Russians had brutally shot their way through this children's clinic in an attack on a barracks beyond, killing many of the children. But the *New York Times*, Nov. 13, carried a joint dispatch from AP, UP, and Reuters correspondents in Budapest, saying the Russians had been unjustly blamed for this, that the clinic still stood, "and none of the 300 or more children had been injured.")

In the text accompanying the photos, *Life's* John Badovy described how he and Timothy Foote had joined the assault on the building held by the secret police. He said the rebels kept on shooting everyone who tried to surrender, shouting "No prisoners, no prisoners!" After he had watched this for about forty minutes, he wrote:

Then my nerves went. Tears

started to come down my cheeks. I had spent three years in the war, but nothing I saw then could compare with the horror of this.

The role of anti-Semitism in the outrages that were occurring has been indicated in several reports. Some of MacCormac's dispatches had attributed part of the unpopularity of Rakosi and Gero to the fact that they were Jewish. A dispatch from Sidney Gruson to the *New York Times*, Nov. 1, said:

Some of the reports reaching Warsaw from Budapest today (Oct. 31) caused considerable concern. These reports told of massacres of Communists and Jews by what were described as "Fascist elements" amongst those fighting against Soviet intervention.

Seymour Freiden wrote in the *New York Post*, November 2, of anti-Semitic speeches and cries of "Down with the Jews" in Budapest streets.

Jewish religious leaders in New York reported that they had received cables from Vienna about anti-Jewish pogroms in Hungary. *The Day*, Jewish journal, published an item: "A cable received by the Satmar Rabbi from Vienna reports the alarming news that Jewish blood is being shed by the rebels in Hungary."

Reaction to the Fore

Who emerged as the leaders of the "revolutionary forces" during these days of lynch law and anarchy?

The name of a certain Josef Dudas began to appear prominently. The *New York Times* of November 1 carried a dispatch from John MacCormac, which reported that "A pamphlet issued by a revolutionary committee and signed by Josef Dudas, its president, has summoned all national revolutionary organizations to

an assembly in the Budapest Sports Palace." The same day the *Herald Tribune* reported that Dudas had "emerged as a rival to Premier Imre Nagy," and two days later that he was the head of the "Budapest Revolutionary Committee which now controls the Hungarian capital."

On November 3 (before the return of the Soviet troops) MacCormac cabled the *Times* from Budapest:

A promising revolutionary career was cut short today when Josef Dudas, the self-proclaimed leader of the most important revolutionary group, was arrested. Mr. Dudas had advertised himself as a revolutionary hero and had demanded to take over the Hungarian Foreign Office by force, and actually had taken over the *Szabad Nep*. Mr. Dudas was now alleged to have compromised himself by Fascist activity in 1944.

After Cardinal Mindszenty was freed from jail, press reports indicated his readiness to help form a new "Popular Christian Party" that would join a new coalition government, that he might consider joining the government himself.

In a series of articles in the *New York World-Telegram and Sun* (Oct. 29, 30, 31) George N. Shuster, President of Hunter College, said on the basis of "direct information" he had received from unrevealed secret sources, that "There can be no doubt that the key to the solution of the nation's problems is in Cardinal Mindszenty's hands. . . . He is the Kossuth of this movement." Shuster said that after the opening up of Hungary's frontiers to the West after the Austrian peace treaty "the highest organs of the state were infiltrated"; that Bela Kovacs, whom Imre Nagy had included in his regime, was a "faithful and ardent

supporter of Cardinal Mindszenty," who would be the power behind the "Christian Democratic regime" which the national resistance forces expected to set up.

In his fuller study of Mindszenty *In Silence I Speak* (Farrar, Straus, N. Y., 1956), Shuster says of the Cardinal, "Talking to many who heard him, . . . one gathers that the hope he evoked in their breasts, without perhaps overtly suggesting it, was that the Christian people of the world would, without firing a shot, through the irresistible impact of their commitment to liberty and justice, send the Russians packing home." Shuster goes on to say of Mindszenty, "that sometimes he did not avoid giving the impression that he himself was committed to the 'myth of St. Stephen'—that is, to the view that Hungary had been given a special mission to safeguard Christendom against the assorted tyrannies of the East."

Writing of Mindszenty as "one of Hungary's foremost leaders" in the *New York Herald Tribune* (Nov. 17) Barrett McGurn, in reviewing the recent events, said:

. . . It soon became clear that what Russia faced in Hungary was not the prospect of a Gomulka, a nationalist Communist of the stripe of Poland's premier, but an Adenauer, a militant Catholic *athwart natural tank routes into as well as out of the Soviet Union*. (Italics added).

He went on to say some Western friends of the Hungarian Government were horrified at the idea of a "Mindszenty Government," since the Cardinal's political ideas were of "the sixteenth century."

Ferenc Nagy, of whom we have written above, is perhaps more to the liking of these Western friends.

The *New York World-Telegram and Sun* (Oct. 29) had reported:

Even now nationalist leaders were reported in the West conducting negotiations with the exiled Hungarian leaders. In Paris, Ferenc Nagy . . . said he was willing to take over the reins of an anti-Communist government if called. And in Lisbon, Admiral Nicholas Horthy . . . cabled appeals for help. . . .

In Paris for the Congress of the International Peasant Union, Ferenc Nagy called on "the great powers of the free world to intervene at once." Next day he arrived in Vienna "hoping to get in touch with resistance forces at the frontier, but the Austrian Government ordered him to leave." (*New York Times*, Oct. 31). All this lent substance to the Moscow Radio broadcast (*New York Times*, Nov. 11) quoting a report from Vienna that Nagy had met with Hungarian emigrés in Munich "not long before the beginning of the rebellion in Hungary," and told them he had just come from the United States where "plans for the revolt had been agreed upon in the highest circles," and he had worked out plans for supporting the revolt with arms and supplies with "American organizations."

Ferenc Nagy's concern for Hungarian "independence" may be gauged from the fact that on his way to the United States (*New York Herald Tribune*, Nov. 11) he urged that the United Nations not merely send observers, but "a security force to take over Hungary" (italics added). He said the Soviet Union should be expelled from the UN if it did not allow this.

Was there Outside Incitation?

While the Republican "truth squads" and Vice President Nixon

proclaimed during the election campaign that the revolts in Poland and Hungary were the result of the Eisenhower foreign policy, James Reston wrote in the *New York Times* (Oct. 25) that the only reservation in Washington was that "they may be moving too fast" and that the feeling among the best informed experts in Washington "is that whatever the United States does must be done quietly and without claims that the new situation was created by the United States."

The *New York Herald Tribune* (Oct. 25) reporting on a press conference at New York headquarters of the Hungarian National Council held by former U.S. Ambassador to Hungary Christian Ravndal, just returned and on his way to a new post, quoted him as saying:

. . . The only thing surprising about the revolt was its timing. Western observers had anticipated an anti-Russian uprising, but it came sooner than we had thought. *We had expected something of this sort around the end of the year.* (Italics added).

A similar comment by C.I.A. head Allen Dulles was reported.

As to other evidences of outside incitation to revolt, John MacCormac reported in the *New York Times* (Nov. 3) that General Bela Kiraly in an interview in Budapest, had regretted the lynchings that had been taking place, and

. . . In this connection he deprecated recent broadcasts of Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America. He said they had been inciting Hungarians to further revolt and to strike, whereas what the revolution now needed was to have workers return to their jobs.

In the *New York Post*, Nov. 5, Pet-

er Hoffer, writing from Vienna of a trip from Budapest, quoted refugees met along the road as saying:

Where is NATO? Where are the Americans? The British? The French? We listened to your radios. We believed in freedom. There is no time now for conferences and discussion. Give us arms. Send the bombers. . . .

An AP dispatch from Munich to the *N. Y. Times* (Nov. 13 said:

West German and French newspapers are publishing charges that Radio Free Europe stirred up the Hungarians to revolt and by having promised help from the outside kept the fight going after all had been lost. . . . A West German Government spokesman in Bonn said an investigation had been started on the radio's broadcasts to Hungary during the revolution. Radio Free Europe is supported by private contributions in the United States. . . .

The same dispatch quoted Michael Gordey, just returned from Budapest, as writing in *France-Soir*:

We heard on Radio Free Europe programs whose impassioned tone and desperate calls to revolt certainly did a lot of wrong. During these last days, numerous Hungarians told us: "These broadcasts have provoked bloodshed."

Evidence of the direction in which some of the outside incitements were leading was furnished in another dispatch by Barrett McGurn from Budapest (*New York Herald Tribune*, Nov. 3):

At Hegyshalom youths were distributing freshly printed leaflets asserting that Russia's own people should follow Hungary's example and rebel now against Communism in the

name of God and freedom. The pamphlets urged that Hungary carry its liberation eastward to the Russians. To let the Russians read, too, part of it was printed in their language.

Before the Troops Returned

While all these things were going on within Hungary the Middle East burst into flames.

On October 29 Israel launched its invasion in force of Egypt, fought its way through Egyptian territory and approached the Canal Zone.

On October 30 Britain and France issued their ultimatum calling on both Israel and Egypt to withdraw their forces to a distance ten miles from the canal or face Anglo-French military occupation of the Canal Zone. Since this ultimatum in fact sanctioned the Israeli invasion and arrogantly ordered the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from defense positions *within their own territory*, no one in the world could have expected Egypt to accept it.

On October 31 British and French bombs started dropping on Egyptian territory and people.

On November 1, British and French troops invaded Egypt.

And just at this point Imre Nagy took the hostile action of unilaterally denouncing the Warsaw Pact, called on the United Nations to intervene to protect Hungary's neutrality. This was followed by calling the people to arms against the Soviet army, although negotiations *were already under way* for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and the Soviet Union had already agreed to negotiations on the question of any further stationing of troops in Hungary under the Warsaw Pact.

The sense of guilt in the West, as Soviet troops returned to Budapest, was emphasized in a dispatch

by Harold Callender from Paris (*New York Times*, Nov. 6) :

There were many troubled consciences in Europe today. It was not easy to explain the coincidence of an attack by the two principal Western European parties on a small nation in Africa. . . . Objective diplomats in Europe insist that the West will not solve its problems by emphasizing the sins of the Soviet Union so as to divert attention from its own.

All this—the rise of those forces in Hungary determined to destroy all socialist gains and who had direct connections with circles promoting German remilitarization, the blood-bath already raging, the frightful vengeance being wreaked against the Communists and their supporters in Hungary, coupled with the new dangers of world war arising out of the invasion of Egypt, were the immediate occasion of the return of Soviet troops to Budapest.

Kadar Government Formed

A new Government was formed on November 4, at the moment of full collapse of the Nagy regime, by Janos Kadar and several other ministers of the Nagy Cabinet, leaving places open for representatives of several parties and non-party people. This government took the responsibility for the return of the Soviet troops, which happened the same day.

The new government took the name of the Revolutionary Workers and Peasants' Government. It appealed to the people for support and for an end to the fighting. It proclaimed a program with the following main points:

1. Unconditional insurance of national independence and sovereignty.

2. Defense and further advances of the People's Democratic and Socialist system.
3. Liquidation of fratricidal fighting, re-establishment of order, no prosecution of workers who have taken part.
4. Close brotherly and friendly relations with socialist countries on the basis of full equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and economic ties on the basis of mutual benefit and aid.
5. Peaceful cooperation with all states irrespective of their social systems and form of government.
6. Rapid improvement of living standards; more housing.
7. Re-examination of national economic plans and methods of administration.
8. Liquidation of bureaucracy, democracy for all sections of the working people.
9. Workers' administration in all factories and enterprises on the basis of wide democracy.
10. Raising of agricultural production, reductions in obligatory deliveries, aid to individual working peasants, an end of all illegalities in relation to agricultural cooperatives and guarantee of voluntary principle regarding entry.
11. Insurance of democratic elections of local authorities and revolutionary councils.
12. Assistance to small individual craftsmen and traders.
13. Consistent development of Hungarian national culture on the basis of its progressive traditions.
14. The Hungarian Government has appealed to the Soviet forces to help our people bridle the dark forces of reaction and help re-establish the socialist system.
15. As soon as order and calm have been restored, the Hungarian Government will enter into negotiations with the Soviet Government and other Warsaw Treaty members concerning the stationing of troops on Hungarian territory.

Peace and Disarmament the Only Solution

The Soviet Government has officially stated that its troops will be withdrawn when order is restored. At this writing, the bloodshed has

stopped, but the workers continue to remain on strike.

No friend of peace or of socialism can feel anything but regret at the terrible bloodshed that ensued as the Soviet troops put down the rebellion, at the suffering and death, and devastation of Hungary, the long time and difficult period of recovery before its people. We hope our country and our people will participate generously in aid, without strings, to hasten this recovery.

We have no wish to minimize the mistakes of the Soviet Government or Hungary's own Communist leaders. But, we repeat, condemnation is not enough. There must be a full understanding of the alternative that was faced. There must be a full assessment of the guilt of all the forces that went into the making of this tragic situation.

We believe it is wrong to attribute what has happened in Hungary to any revival of Stalinist policies on the part of the USSR. What has happened is that reaction stepped in to exploit the reaping of the dreadful whirlwind of those policies before the corrective process was given a chance to get fully under way. The West now has the responsibility to help create the conditions for these corrections to be resumed.

There must be full awareness of what it would mean to the USSR and the whole Socialist world, and to ourselves as well, to have a wedge thrust into the heart of the People's Democracies in the form of a neo-Fascist Government in Hungary, bordering directly on the Soviet Union, surrounded by Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, and also with a border open to the West through Austria leading directly to a remilitarized Western Germany where former Nazi officers command

divisions to be integrated into the NATO forces.

In his speech at the UN Assembly, November 22, Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov declared:

But Hungary is not the only country concerned. The victory of reaction in Hungary would have created in the heart of Europe a Fascist state that would have become a focal point for the international reactionary forces that seek to revive fascism and take revenge on a European scale. Thus, the victory of the counter-revolutionary putsch in Hungary would have meant the formation of a most dangerous hotbed of war in Europe.

It is essential for Americans to realize the threat to our own security from any such outcome. Walter Lippmann has underscored this in several recent columns urging that it is not in the best interests of the West to have anti-Soviet regimes in Eastern Europe. He wrote:

Had the Hungarian rebellion succeeded, and had it spread by the contagion of its example, the satellite orbit would almost certainly have not been Titoist and neutral but anti-Communist and anti-Russian.

(*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Nov. 9)

Lippmann advocated strong measures against propaganda from "our side of the iron curtain which could be treated by the Soviets as provocation. . . ."

President Eisenhower, in his November 14 press conference, denied that it is or ever has been U.S. policy to incite armed revolt. But it is necessary to stress again that the cumulative effect of the constant hammering of the Voice of America and other U.S. agencies on the "liberation" theme could not but have had the effect of such incitation, and the encouragement given by the

State Department to groups openly urging revolt is incontrovertible.

Such activities cannot be the basis for peaceful coexistence. We must rather base ourselves on the President's reference at the same press conference, to the "hope and desire of the world that some way can be found to settle disputes around the conference table." We need through such efforts to safeguard the accomplishments of Geneva rather than jeopardize all its gains in a new anti-Soviet drive and a new intensification of the cold war.

What can be accomplished when the United States and the Soviet Union act together was exemplified in the passage of the UN resolution which achieved a cease-fire in Egypt, and when they later again joined in calling for the withdrawal of all for-

eign troops from Egyptian soil.

Renewed efforts for peace, for disarmament and an end to atomic weapons, for an end of all aggression, for an end of all military blocs, of all stationing of any troops anywhere on the territory of another nation, is the only answer that will bring peace to Hungary and the Middle East, and prevent a repetition of violence and bloodshed as a way of settling the world's or any nation's problems.

Two main avenues are open to work toward these ends—unceasing efforts to end nuclear weapons tests as the first step toward disarmament and unrelenting pressure on our government to strive for these solutions both through the United Nations and a five-power Summit conference.