

Indonesian CP adopts "Four Amulets"

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One of the big contradictions in the international campaign of the Chinese Communist party in the world Communist movement is the uncritical support which the Mao leadership has extended to D.N.Aidit, chairman of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist party.

Very little is known, of course, about off-the-record relations between Peking and the Aidit group. The Chinese Communist party leadership consistently follows a policy of publicly criticizing only those Communist party leaderships who have previously "publicly attacked" the Chinese Communist party. Towards other Communist party leaderships, a line of "live and let live," or of "secret diplomacy" is maintained.

Yet it is well known that the Indonesian Communist party leadership is not monolithic and that important differences exist between a completely "pro-Peking" wing and a wing that takes a more conciliatory attitude towards the struggle between the Khrushchev and Mao tendencies. Aidit himself has even been thought to lean toward Khrushchev.

Whatever may be the real internal situation in the Indonesian CP leadership and their relations with Peking, it is a fact that publications of the Chinese CP have been giving full support to the Indonesian CP's opportunistic, class-collaborationist policy of "tolerating" the Sukarno regime.

The Indonesian CP happens to be the strongest Communist party in the capitalist world. It controls trade-union and peasant organizations embracing millions of members. It is by far the strongest political power in a country in which, ever since the conquest of political independence, mass pressure for a complete break with imperialism and capitalism has never let up, where occupation of the land on imperialist-owned plantations and seizure or occupation of imperialist-owned industrial and mining enterprises have repeatedly been initiated by the masses.

At the same time, the economic situation in Indonesia is characterized by stagnation, rampant corruption, increasing inflation and growing reversion among large parts of the population to forms of "natural economy" to eke out a bare livelihood. There is no lack of discontent among the masses over the Sukarno regime, and its popular

base has undergone steady erosion.

Sukarno has reacted to the decline in support by launching one nationalist campaign after another against foreign imperialism, first accusing it of collusion with rebel secessionist forces like the Darul-Islam on Sumatra, Celebes and other islands, then trying (successfully) to again include West Irian (the Papua area of Dutch New Guinea) into Indonesia, finally launching his present campaign in North Borneo against inclusion of the British colonies established there into Malaysia and for their return to Indonesia.

These campaigns have been contradictory. Since they were anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist, they won great popularity and were correctly supported by the Communist party. At the same time, they were used to build up the Indonesian army, navy and air force, so that Indonesia is today by far the strongest military power in South East Asia, while the armed forces themselves constitute the only important obstacle standing between the Indonesian Communist party and its conquest of power.

By collaborating with Sukarno, by accepting his scheme to dissolve the elected parliament and replace it with an appointed "Council of National Guidance," by participating in the Sukarno government, the Indonesian CP has in fact helped strengthen the army around General Nasution, who is the strongest potential counterrevolutionary figure in the country and who maintains close relations with American imperialism. This is an important thread in U.S. policy in South East Asia as was demonstrated when Robert Kennedy in his recent trip there succeeded in initiating tripartite negotiations between Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia to stop the fighting in Northern Borneo.

The Indonesian CP is said to have infiltrated the army and to have some influence in the lower echelons of the officer corps. Nevertheless, the lack of any consistent policy of distinguishing itself politically from the Sukarno regime, of any course aimed at toppling the regime, or of any proposal for an alternative to the existing government, converts the Communist party into a strong brake on the movement to overthrow capitalism and establish a workers and peasants government in Indonesia.

Up until recently, the orientation of the Indonesian CP, at least the orientation in which the leading cadres were indoctrinated, was to prepare for succession to Sukarno -- after his eventual death!

Possible indications of a change of policy have now appeared. At a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist party, held December 23-26, a resolution was adopted which for the first time speaks of a "revolution" in Indonesia, of the "tremendous responsibility of the Indonesian Communists" in the whole "revolutionary situation" developing in South East Asia. And it criticizes the "national bourgeoisie."

The resolution ends on a cryptic note: "In order to achieve

victory in the popular revolutions of South East Asia, the Plenary Session reaffirms the necessity of utilizing the four amulets for overthrowing the four demons: imperialism, feudalism, comprador capitalism and bureaucratic capitalism."

The phrase "four amulets" refers to four "fundamental tasks" previously specified in the resolution: "(1) To rally the masses in the greatest possible numbers and to organize them into a national front. (2) To penetrate as deeply as possible into the villages in order to consolidate the alliance between the workers and the peasants. (3) To strengthen the leadership of the party over the masses and to show adroitness in utilizing all forms of struggle. (4) To strengthen co-operation among the peoples and the Marxist-Leninist parties of South East Asia."

Several interesting aspects of the resolution should be noted. Although national independence was won in Indonesia some time ago, the resolution speaks about the "revolution for national independence." Yet a new note is sounded: "The victory of the revolutions for national independence in South East Asia will be of great importance for the victory of the socialist world revolution."

Nowhere in the resolution is the permanent or "uninterrupted" character of the revolution in South East Asia indicated. The formula "socialist revolution" is not applied to any specific South East Asia country either. But the resolution does state that "in this part of the world, there exists a vast zone where the capitalist system has already been overthrown, and where the socialist system has been solidly established. The revolutionary situation develops and constantly matures there [South East Asia]."

The resolution also puts "compradore capitalism" and "bureaucratic capitalism" [either state enterprises run by private capitalists or mixed enterprises in which private "national" capitalists participate side by side with the state] among the main enemies of the revolution. It also stresses the "weakness" and "ambiguity" of the national bourgeoisie and proclaims that the Communist party should lead the revolution.

In other words, the cryptic language of the resolution reads like a translation of Mao's algebraic formulas of the forties which permitted him to pass from a policy of proposed alliance and collaboration with Chiang Kai-shek towards a policy of outright armed struggle against the Kuomintang regime and overthrow of capitalism, without changing his "theoretical" formulations.

If this is true it could signify that the "theoretical" line of the Indonesian CP has been adjusted so as to make possible either continued support of Sukarno or a turn toward a struggle for power. To determine the true significance of the resolution, the actions of the Indonesian Communist party must now be followed very carefully. Up to now there have been no concrete indications that the Indonesian Communist party is preparing to shift from support of Sukarno to revolutionary opposition.