

PLP

CONVENTION

BULLETIN # 3

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Why did the Vietnamese lost the political struggle against U.S. Imperialism?

In my study group, with five or six young non-English speaking latin workers, we spent a whole session of our study group discussing the reasons behind what happened in Vietnam. We based ourselves on dialectics and reached the conclusion that the internal contradictions inside the NLF were primary in the defeat. The main reason that the NLF and the North Vietnamese Workers Party sold out to U.S. imperialism and buckled down to pressure from the Soviet and Chinese revisionists was because there was not a real Communist Party in South nor in North Vietnam. The CP in South Vietnam did not really represent the interest of the South Vietnamese wokkers. They never tried to play an independent role as Communists. They did not have an independent line and were completely submerged in the United Front (NLF). They did not have their own newspaper. They did not even win their own members or base towards a Socialist outlook (even as a distant possibility after the Neutral Govt. pushed by the NLF). Their opportunism went even farther than that of Mao's New Democracy (at least Mao put forward socialism after New Democracy). Their line was that of the rest of the NLF. They did not differentiate themselves from the Buddhists, nationalists, national capitalists, etc. inside the NLF. This line led them to agree to anything to end the war. At the end, they were mostly pacifists and not really believer of people's war against the bosses' war.

The Workers Party in North Vietnam was not different. They have always been revisionists. Ho Chi Minh was denounced during the Cultural Revolution as a revisionist. Ho Chi Minh called himself a communist but never put forward a Communist line (even the old line of the Comintern). The CP in North Vietnam sided with the worst scum of the earth (Krushchov, Breshnev and now Kissinger). During the Cultural Revolution, they tried to be part of the so-called third camp (along with Kim Il Sung, Castro), but really sided with the Soviet revisionists. Their line was that of national reunification without any principles (just like Kim Il Sung in Korea). They have not learned from their past mistakes. First in 1946 with the French and the British, then in 1954 (with the French and the American) and now in 1973. The CP in North Vietnam did not support the NLF until 1960 after four years of fight against Diem in South Vietnam.

As it can be seen, the "Aid" by the Soviet and the Chinese was only secondary in the sellout. If the Vietnamese people have had a truly Communist vanguard (representing the interest of workers and peasants), and not those of the national bosses and monks and punks, etc. There would not be any justifications for selling out (justifications such as national salvation, "peace" under capitalism, etc.).

A final point towards the revisionist crap inserted inside the North Vietnamese Workers Party seemed to be their support of the right wing of the NLF during the uprising by a couple of batallions of the "Vietcong" led by leading members of the South Vietnamese CP (as reported by Le Monde--see latest Canadian Worker, page 3). These batallions were revolting against a negotiated settlement of the war. They attacked the leadership of the NLF and were finally defeated. The Politburo of the North Vietnamese CP sent immediate support to the leadership of the NLF.

Dialectics teaches us to learn from history and its contradictions. The North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese CPs have not even tried to use a little dialectics.

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The Revisionists in Vietnam also have made an art of negotiating with imperialists. They have made negotiations their strategy towards selling out. Marxism-leninism teaches that negotiations are a tactical weapon. The NLF acceded to negotiations (whether they were pushed by the Soviet or not) when they were winning because that is their strategy.

A NYC PLP Member

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REPORT ON BB N.Y CITY
CNTEE.

Bob's section consists of six clubs. Except for Carol's club, they will all will be responsible for the 30/40 referendum campaign. Carol's club will be doing some of that work but mainly will be taking part in local elections for positions in local school boards etc. In our work in this referendum campaign, the main question to be answered is - Will we have built a base for the party? To guarantee that the next eight months of activity will win people to the party, we must evaluate who is the base and how do we win them closer.

What is a base?

The base of the north B'klyn club is the sum total of the people with whom we have ties. We should act like a magnet-pulling them closer to our side. The side of working class revolution. Those in our base who are closest are most affected by the line and activity of our party but all those with whom we have relationships should and can be drawn closer at all times.

For my club, the closest base consists of three people,

~~She~~ works in a housing authority community center.
~~He~~ is now unemployed. ~~He~~ works for the manpower and career development agency.

They are all currently in a party study group. For them, consolidation means winning them to base building for the party and to membership in the party.

In other words the ir recruitment should be part of our plans for carrying out the ~~the~~ referendum initiative.

There are several people around the club who occasionally sell papers, come to demonstrations, and attend social events with us. This group consists of six people- welfare clients, are medical workers, and are industrial workers. This group of people should be encouraged to join a party study group which might concentrate on discussions relating to the work of the 30/40 coalition.

Several organizations in B'klyn that we have been working with have a relationship to the party such that they might co-sponsor the referendum. They

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are the Ocean Hill Brownsville Tenants Assoc. (OHB), the Black, Latin, Asian Coalition (BLAC), and the Ramar Shoes collective, and the People's Liberation Army. Marshall and Alice work in BLAC and Lucas in the Ramar Shoe factory. In OHB there are several people who are somewhat friendly to the party. They are Bob Brown and Frank. In the past they were asked about study groups but were not interested. They both are now interested in the referendum. In the Army, Santana, the leader of the group approached us about the possibility of a study group for members of his group who are mainly Spanish speaking. He has agreed to work in the 30/40 campaign.

The above plus a few contacts constitute the base of the club. Finally there are the personal friends of the club members and of the friends of the club. They may become part of the base at some time.

Build Collectives to consolidate the base politically and organizationally.

The work of the party appeals to people because it answers the needs and aspirations of the working class- our line has developed from the struggle of the masses and speaks to their need to win. This is good but will not move further if we don't encourage and build collectives of many types ⁱⁿ which we can (1) struggle with people around the party's political line and its relationship to the mass movement. (2) struggle for accountability on the part of the base for work within the united front. When we win people to the coalition for a shorter work week, we want to have a forum where we can discuss regularly the functioning and line of the party while differentiate it from the coalition. At the same time we want to be known as active and responsible fighters, not only for the party but also for the mass organization. We should encourage this type of responsibility in the base.

The main way we have to put this into practice is the party study group. Our building of the coalition should emerge as the largest collective around the club and should serve to build more study groups.

Make an estimate of the situation. What are the needs of the WC? What holds it back?

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The communities in N.Y. have undergone serious deterioration which parallels the attack upon the unions. This attack upon the living standards of the WC as a whole has increased the level of struggle and has led to the emergence of many more ongoing community groups. In addition to fighting back around housing, schools, health care, and safety, the issue of a shorter work week is emerging as an issue which affects all aspects of community life. It is also one which groups fighting for any one issue can relate to. Our work with the OHB tenants assoc. has been one of supporting their demands for decent housing and for preferential hiring. How do we differentiate ourselves from the leadership of this group which is basically good. We can put forth socialism. We can also put forward the coalition for a shorter work week not as an either/or proposition but rather as part of a strategy which can help win adequate housing and jobs. In other words, we can struggle in such a way so that our leadership builds the struggle. Our initiative can broaden OHB and increase its effectiveness.

Accountability in our relationships with people.

If we are to have a struggle attitude with the base. If we have hatred for the bosses and their system, then this should reflect itself in the relations we have with people. People should be able to judge our actions by the yardsticks of our ideas. We are working in the B'klyn tenants alliance, an organization led by the CP. We have tried to analyze the ways in which their revisionism manifests itself. If we understand how revisionism holds back this organization we must understand also how to fight it. Likewise we must look at our own actions, recognize our errors and correct them.

By the same token we must be open to the criticism of the base and also their ideas. We didn't invent class struggle and we have a lot to learn about it.

Build Mass organizations- Build Class Struggle

The key to our effectiveness is the extent to which we build the mass organizations- the coalition for a shorter work week or any other. These organizations are the collectives from which consolidation proceeds quickly.

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Our experiences

Our main experience with base building is that we have a lot to learn. That is meant in all seriousness. Of the groups that we are and have been working with, our contacts have been mainly with the few people who seem most friendly to our ideas. When we first met people from OHB, it was not Bob but Inez (who has long since left) that we worked with. If we had investigated the situation a little more we would have been in a good position to struggle more effectively and helped the organization more. Several of the members of OHB might have been in a party study group if the work had gone better.

Our experience has also been one that proves that the party's line is not something to hide but rather something that brings people to us. This has been the case with the Ramar Shoes workers and the members of the Army. No one in these groups is now in a study group and it's our fault.

Our experience has also been that when we do bring workers into collectives closer to the party, that these workers more often than not join the party.

Neal

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I would like to take issue with the Cleveland Club's student section on the question of nationalism. I believe the spirit of the report is wrong, although it does make some good points. It seems to me that the source of the nationalist errors, such as shuffling feet and so on, is still rooted in the party's failure particularly among students to build a base.

black

I'd like to recount some of my own experiences to show what I mean. When I was in high school in Virginia, I went to a segregated school, defended the genetic inferiority argument of blacks argument publicly and vigorously, and even participated in throwing a burnt cross onto the lawn of a liberal English teacher who was mildly anti-racist. In college I gradually learned where I had been wrong through SDS, began selling C-D, etc. My early attitude towards some of these nationalist leaders was, "If anyone ever deserved to be called nigger, it's them." This statement was criticized by fellow SDSers as racist, and I feel that that was true. In other words, although I had been intellectually convinced that fighting racism was extremely important, I still had something of a contemptuous attitude towards black students. This was reflected in my knowing no black students personally, and in having a condescending attitude towards black workers and welfare recipients whom I worked with. My senior year I finally managed to talk to black students in my dorm, visit them in their rooms, etc. By doing this I discovered that most of the politically active black students thought the nationalists--i.e., those who attacked vigorously whites for being white--were full of shit and they felt embarrassed by them. Unfortunately, I had not overcome my racist attitudes enough to become really tight with any of them, so that when lines were drawn on a couple of occasions, they went with their friends. There was no alternative political leadership available in practice because no one in our chapter had sufficiently made friends with black students. Many black students liked SDS's actions in support of black campus workers and welfare recipients; but they didn't know anyone in SDS so they worked just with the BSA.

I believe it is this phenomenon, which is primary in ~~building~~ holding back the development of SDS among black students. It is this phenomenon which is the basis for a "nationalist" reaction to racism by black students. I put nationalist in quotes because in general the black student reaction is not based in a full capitalist analysis of nationalism, but it's more a question of going with your friends, the people you trust to some degree.

The correct approach to correcting this important weakness in SDS is not to put the emphasis on NSA-CIA style exposes, not to come roaring into a nationalist-run meeting attacking the leadership. These things can be done, and must be done, to be sure. Similarly, we must put forward a clear anti-racist program in SDS, as we are doing. But to correct the error of a lack of base among black students, it's that same old refrain, build a base, personal and political.

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If SDS had included a fair number of black students at the SU Conference, the nationalists would have been much weaker, and could be actively and confidently opposed both by "their own" people, and by white students who wouldn't feel insecure about attacking black nationalists because they are sure through their day-to-day experience that blacks do want to fight racism, not just bullshit about fallen martyrs. I think there is probably a parallel between the SU conference and our baselessness among blacks, and the 1970 NPAC conference and our baselessness within that organization. In 1970 at NPAC, we roared in and blasted the leadership as a prime goal, instead of trying to correct our past error of baselessness, and put our emphasis on working in the workshops. It sounds like what happened at the SU conference was that, baseless again, we took the tactic of opportunistically staying in our place. We should not "correct" that error by doing more of the '70 NPAC stuff. We should push for more social ties between white SDSers and black student activists as a way of building up SDS'S base.

I do not want to appear one-sided in my evaluation of the Cleveland report. Most of what they say is true. We should expose Ford Foundation BSUers. We should stand up for the need for whites to fight racism and not be excluded on nationalist bases. We should all struggle to understand how racism hits us all, and prepares the way for getting hit harder. We should explain to SDSers why nationalist leaders attack them. We should point out how nationalism is reactionary, and how campus rulers have built it carefully over the years. But it seemed to me that the spirit of the report would lead people towards more research ~~on BSAs~~ on BSAs instead of making friends with the BSA members.

Comradely,

Rad Green

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Article for the Pre-convention Discussion

This article is being written in response to the articles from the Cleveland student section of PLP. We would like to relate some of our experiences in Seattle in dealing with the BSU at the University of Washington. Also, we feel that there was an error of one-sidedness and blanket condemnation of all BSU's in the US.

First of all, we disagree with the conclusions reached by the Cleveland comrades concerning the position that the weakness in fighting nationalism is the main weakness in student work. We feel that it is a weakness, but not the primary one right now. It may be the main struggle in the not too distant future, but it isn't right now.

We think the big problem in the fight against racism has been developing a program, campus by campus, that effectively fights racism. Examples of good struggles that can develop are UCLA (brain surgery), Berkeley (Jensen) and a few others. When campus organizers for the Party fail to win the SDS chapter to developing a concrete, long term program of fighting racism, this gives fuel to the nationalists - and it becomes very difficult in the context of non-struggle to defeat nationalism. Without a campus strategy, PL organizers come off as "sweet-talkers", but deliver very little in winning anyone to fighting racism, white or black. This is how sellouts and revisionists in the past have operated. Nationalists can seize upon this and, while it should be opposed, the only way to be in a position to really defeat nationalism is to be in an active struggle against racism on campus.

If a struggle against racism is going on, if students are joining SDS and the campaign is starting to "takeoff", then the nationalists can and will attack - but they are defeated more easily. After all, you are delivering in the struggle against racism. Nationalists will then expose themselves by "sweet-talking" and doing nothing, or they will try to divert the struggle into something else. That's when the struggle against nationalism is meaningful, is much more serious and has the best chance of winning.

Second. In the description of the Southern U. situation, we agree that the co m-

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rades who went were weak in fighting nationalism. Especially since SDS and the Party nationally have done a great deal to fight racism, we could have argued from a position of strength. There was no excuse for succumbing to nationalism in this situation.

Third. We do disagree, and quite strongly, with such statements as labeling the BSU as the Bull Shit Union. This is "cute" but its politics verge on bullshit itself. We don't think that the comrades around the country have investigated the BSU's enough to see if they are progressive, reactionary, idle, active etc. It's not true right now that BSU's are being funded as much as before. As a matter of fact, Nixon is cutting EOP, OEO and other grants that will eliminate many minority students. The California State University system is raising tuition 1700%! That doesn't seem like an attempt to buy off minority students. There probably are BSU's like Tri-C Metro that are led by reactionaries. There are others that are not. An example is the Univ. of Wash. BSU.

(a) Ten BSU-ers attended the Jan. 20th conference in San Francisco, including one of the leaders of the BSU.

(b) Three BSU Central Committee members have subs to Challenge.

(c) Regular Challenge readership in the BSU is about ten.

(d) BSU formed an anti-racism committee to work with SDS and MECHA at UW.

(e) BSU, SDS and Asian Student Coalition jointly sponsored a speaker who came to UW to speak on the Phillipines. We have a CIA-professor at UW who advises for the Marcos government. BSU members were very outspoken in attacking this prof. This was done because many BSU-ers want to fight this agent. The speaker we funded had spoken at the SDS Jan. 20th conference and came to oppose this prof.

(f) The president and many members of the BSU attended our last PL forum and claimed it was a good thing.

This is not to say that this is heaven on earth at UW. There are nationalists in the BSU, and they are putting pressure on the leadership (Panthers and independents) to break their associations with SDS. We are not only opposing the nationalist

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ideas, but also we are starting to implement a concrete program of fighting racism on the campus. We think we can win the struggle. #

Now if we used the Tri-C Metro BSU as a standard, then all BSU's are reactionary. If we use the UW BSU as a standard, then all BSU's are more or less progressive. What is the actual picture? And how does it compare with a couple of years ago? We don't know but we tend to think that the situation is in a state of flux. Money is not as plentiful now (it may be in the future). Many of the nationalist leaders of '67-'69 have graduated to soft jobs.

We propose that comrades at each school investigate the BSU (and also MECHA, Indian Puerto Rican Student Unions, Asian Student Coalitions and American Student groups) and approach them about the fight against racism. In some cases we may find some allies. These reports could be sent to the national student leadership and we would be in a better position to estimate the BSU's and to estimate how strong the organized nationalists are. We would also know if the ruling class starts to actively increase funding of the nationalists.

In summary, we say that:

(1) Lack of concrete struggles against racism on each campus is the main weakness - not fighting racism is the main weakness, not fighting nationalism.

(2) The fight against nationalism is a weakness and is most easily won when concrete struggles against racism are in progress.

(3) The true situation of the BSU's is not known. We cannot generalize from either the Tri-C Metro or UW BSU. Therefore, investigate and attempt to involve the BSU's in the struggle against racism.

Seattle
Student
Club

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This report raises some criticisms of the line of our Party on the relationship of the 30 for 40 movement to the fight against racism. There seems to be some unclarity around the need for the Party to raise preferential hiring and upgrading for minority workers as the main anti-racist battle around which the entire working class must be united in the fight for the shorter work week is going to win, and not be turned around and smashed by the ruling class.

The history of the U.S. labor movement from pre-Civil War days up to the CIO drive for industrial unionism has been one of "resolutely supporting" Black and other minority people's struggles against racism while in practice doing very little to unite the whole working class in fights against the main tool of the bosses, then as now, instead "concentrating" on the 8-hour day and building unions that still had very few minority rank-and-filers because the bosses didn't hire blacks - they needed racism to bust strikes and attack organized labor. Would the ruling class have been able to smash the 8-hour movement time after time from Reconstruction through WW I if the working class leadership of that period had seen the need to wage an all-out fight for minority hiring?

The CP had the outlook of organizing the unorganized and getting white and minority workers to fight for industrial unionism, which was the only way they could have been successful in building the CIO and consolidating the 8-hour day throughout industry. But this movement didn't advance; it was turned around by the bosses and the piecard "center forces" the CP was working with. Racism and anti-communism as always, were the main tools used to halt the CIO drive. The bosses were able to get away with it because, for one thing, the CP never had a consistent anti-racist line, despite the work they did fighting jim crow, the Scottsboro case, etc.

PL is the only party in the history of the communist movement with the line that racism must be fought and defeated by the entire working class, not just by minority workers with whites just lending "moral support." But ~~xxx~~ it seemsthat comrades don't yet realize how crucial it is for working people that a revolutionary communist party have this line and carry it out. Do we as communists think it is "adequate" for working people to win 30 for 40 and call that the fight against racism? Do we think that the 20,000,000 or so jobs created by the winning of 30 for 40 will just "take care" of racism all by themselves? What if the bosses try to turn 30 for 40 around by continuing to give minority workers the shittiest jobs at the lowest pay? This could very well happen if the Party doesn't put foward preferential hiring and upgrading and have the outlook of winning the majority of workers who will eventually be members of WAM to it at some point.

Comrades from Chicago had an article in Challenge-Desafio: # 30 for 40: Answer to Steel Bosses Racist Murders. It was a very sharp article, shwoing how 89% of Black and Latin workers are assigned to "killer" jobs in the coke ovens, how THREE TIMES as many minority ~~was~~ coke plant workers died of lung cancer as white. The article points very clearly to the cause: RACISM. But 30 for 40 ~~is~~ is 30 for 40 alone going to change that? Why wasn't preferential hiring and upgrading coupled with 30 for 40 put foward by the Party as a fight that has to be won to stop racist murder in the coke plants? Why ~~asn't~~ preferential hiring and upgrading raised in our 30 for 40 pamphlet as the main way to guar-

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antee that the fight for the shorter work week won't be turned around by the rulers' racism?

I think the main cause of our failure to put our ideas foward to working people on this question can be traced to survivals of racism and nationalism within the Party. White workers see it as a threat to their job security so we don't struggle with them around it because it would be "sectarian" Minority workers say, "OH, you know those white folks will nver go for that," so we don't raise it with them. The outlook that preferntial hiring and upgrading will hurt white workers and whip up animosity within the working class is wrong. White workers would have the benefit of minority workers' numerical strength and militancy fighting alongside them in the skilled divisions rather than watching them die around the coke overns, assembly lines, etc. A policy of preferential hiring with the 6-hour workday would probably fulfill the employment needs of white workers, especially younger ones, while making massive inroads into the unemployment rate among minority workers. Againx this benefits the entire working class by reducing the slave labor force (scab threatx) and adding to the numerical strength and fighting militancy of working people, better enabling them to fight against layoffs, speedup, forced automation - and for socialism.

Comrades in TU work should be very clear that it is not possible to talk of 30 for 40 winning without an aoutlook of fighting for preferential hiring. White workers should not be won to the illusion that, "if we get together with Black and Latins, we'll win a shorter workday and more jobs." That's true of course, but it glosses over the fact that fighting racism is a "pork-chop" issue - a matter of life and death for our entire class, not just minority people.

I propose that:

1. The 30 for 40 pamphlet be re-issued with a section on the need for preferential hiring and upgrading.
2. That a "Dear Reader" column be devoted to explaining why it will benefit all working people.
3. That wherever possible comrades and friends of PL be responsible for forming committees to fight racism on the job (like MAD at Lynn GE) and make a fight for members of WAM to join.
4. That the Party guarantee that a discussion on fighting racism takes place at the upcoming WAM convention, with some focus on preferential hiring and upgrading.

Proposals 3 and 4 should be carried out in a positive way, in the context of how particular fights against racist hiring and firing can strengthen the 30 for 40 movement NOW, giving concrete examples where this has happened. Fighting racism whould not be raised in an abstract way and have the effect of making WAMmers feel defensive because they don't agree with the Party.

comradely,
Willard G. Cleveland

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This is a report based on our club's discussion of the opening article in Pre-Convention Bulletin #1.

- I. First we summarized the article's main points; then raised three questions:
 1. Why is there such a gap between our line and our practice?
 2. How did our sectarianism effect our line on nationalism, Vietnam, etc.?
 3. What are the problems in carrying out our work today with our correct line?

Our discussion of these questions fell into two general areas: first, history, examples, and different aspects of sectarianism; second, some of the ideological sources of our sectarian practice and the need to study revolutionary communist (r-c) ideology and history in order to correct this practice. These are points II and III below.

II. Discussion of history, nature, and various aspects of sectarianism in our practice.

1. In SDS, fighting sectarianism ^{sometimes} has taken the false form of joining coalitions (say, around the war--the Nov. 4 demos. last fall is an example) where we united with other radical or "left-liberal" forces, mainly under revisionist leadership (not necessarily the mistake) and around a revisionist line (support 7 pt. peace plan; probably the mistake). Meanwhile, the center ~~was~~ which had dropped out of the anti-war movement was ignored. Since our line is to unite with the MASSES of center students, and not just with other radicals of a slightly different stripe, this was really very sectarian. (also probably opportunist since the line we united around tended to be revisionist, and tended to not be attacked.)

2. In every area of work our sectarianism has been similar -- we went to the reform movement, the TU organizations, built UF's, not in order to seriously build the reform movement itself, but in order to ferret out and unite with (i.e., recruit) other radicals. When the Party was expelled from the New University Conference, we were accused of having joined NUC as a "fishing expedition" for new PL members. Regardless of the obscene grossness of this attack, and the decadent swinishness of the perpetrators of the attack--it contained a grain of truth. (And only a grain, as the subsequent history and death of NUC makes abundantly clear.) But that grain of truth is devastating because it results in our leading the "mass" organization into its own sectarian line, so it fails to build a genuinely mass reform movement. The constant tendency for UAG to become an elder SDS is a good example of this. (A report from Boston on how this problem is working out in UAG now would be a welcome addition to the anti-sectarian struggle.) The struggle to reverse this in SDS around the anti-genocide bill is another good example of the problems we create with this sort of practice.

3. Business relationships in base building. A "business relationship" is one which is limited to the immediate, pressing business at hand; in our case this means radical politics. One member--a teacher--pointed out how he would socialize with students in order to discuss SDS or the current SDS/PL campaign. These relationships seldom developed into a lasting friendship; even those few students that he did win to working with us are not in touch with him since he is not in SDS. And those friendly but un-won students we have no way of winning now since the relationship was ~~xxxxxx~~ too shallow to sustain itself after the end of the term, or the school year.

This shallowness infects the Party too. How many of us have virtually lost touch with a comrade because of a reorganization of clubs, or because of a move to another city, or even neighborhood? How many good people who have left the Party are simply dropped like a hot potato? How many ex-SDS-students are still in touch with the Party as teachers, lawyers, doctors, etc.? This

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shallowness means that we don't know what the center people around us are concerned about, so we cannot develop a realistic mass line (which can then be linked up to our vanguard, and independent lines). It also means that we have very serious problems with consolidation and recruitment.

4. Our style of work is another aspect of sectarianism. Our style of work is often too frenetic --this builds the image of PL'ers as superhuman and is based on bosses' theory of history. A frenetic style of work means that we appear busier than we are. There is ~~no~~ way for a Communist to avoid appearing busy, because we should be doing more consistent political work than our base. So, even when our style of work is good, there will sometimes be a tendency of our base to leave everything to us because history, including the history of their union, PTA, block club, is created by great individuals. But this is the bosses' view, which will kill us in our UF work and which we do not need to build by appearing frenetic.

our base is allowed to leave

Another aspect of frenetic activity is that it is often the result of undisciplined work (as Milt points out in Bulletin #2). Among other things, this often means that we don't create the time to do base building except in the most limited way--back to business relationships instead of taking time to develop real friendships with good center people.

III. Some ideological sources of sectarianism and the need to study revolutionary communist ideology and history.

1. We too often take an idealist rather than materialist approach. Fear of people's narrow self-interest leads us towards moral (i.e., idealistic) commitment and missionarism rather than learning to transform narrow self-interest into class consciousness. ~~Against~~ This is related to our tendency to lack strategic thinking, lack analysis--ie, to be pragmatic. Pragmatism--the tendency to deal with things only as they come up, to be inactive except in an emergency situation--is characteristic of the center; it should not be a characteristic of the left. With this ideological combination, it is no wonder that we tend to vacillate between opportunism and sectarianism, with sectarianism being the dominant ~~tendency~~.

2. The political cure for this is to study dialectal materialism (d-m). This is no good, of course, unless we are deeply involved in the REFORM movement. But reform work without SERIOUS STUDY of d-m will lead us into more pragmatism. further failure to analyse where the center is at, and failure to know where to apply what force in order to bring about the (at first) quantitative changes in the center masses and then the qualitative changes: (1) reaching the point where workers do have a long-range reform strategy (bust the union busters; 30/40; smash racism); (2) reaching the point where workers have a long range revolutionary strategy. Just as we have to know how to heat ice to turn it into water (gaining long term reform outlook) and thence into steam (gaining revolutionary outlook), so we also must learn how to do this to the masses of workers, teachers, students, etc. The line and strategy we are now working out (30/40 and anti-racism; gaining leadership in UF, esp. in TU) IS long range, and will be difficult.

How are we going to sustain ourselves if we do not know the dialectics and the materialism that helped to develop that strategy? If we go into 30/40 because it sounds great (which it does), but without any understanding of how it fits into a total revolutionary strategy, can we stick with it, let alone fight for the leadership of it, for the 10, 20, 30 years, make the life-time that it will take?

More important, if we do not fully grasp the nature of the relationship of this reform program to our revolutionary program, how are we going to move millions of 30/40 workers over to being revolutionary communist workers? How do we deal with the contradictions in the various UF's we build in such a way

as to avoid becoming the world's best reform movement and become the genuinely mass r-c movement we need to be? One point in the article that was not elaborated on was precisely this question: what is the nature of the contradiction in a UF? Most of our members did not have much of an idea of how to answer this.

What all this amounts to is the urgent need for serious STUDY. A recent C-D article on SDS made the point that radical students must be serious about studying all the bullshit put forward by their courses, and then go on to study still more to know how to expose this bullshit. The Party needs even more serious study than SDS! This is a problem that has been recognized repeatedly, for years. Many plans have been put forward and agreed upon to raise the theoretical level of our cadre; most have been abandoned in a short time, if they even got started in practice.

The Party leadership must struggle much harder to make serious study of d-m a regular part of Party practice at all levels. Leadership is still too liberal on this point. For example, in the Convention Call, there was a call to study--followed immediately by a reminder that we should unite study with practice. What this probably translates into--in practice--is, "throw ourselves into the day-to-day struggle ever more vigorously, and have one or two discussions on the Convention Bulletins." In other words, don't study. Now practice is not PL's weakness; we do not tend to engage in abstract study unlinked to any serious attempts to organize workers, etc. So we do not need to be constantly admonished to link theory to practice. We should be admonished to link practice to theory! Also, there was not enough emphasis in the first Bulletin on the need for all cadre at all levels and in all areas to contribute to the thinking of the Party in this Pre-convention period. Again, our problem here is not that members spend too much time discussing line and writing reports and articles, but that we spend too little time engaged in this activity.

We all agree that study of d-m is important; why don't we carry it out? Because we use any excuse we can find to avoid doing our homework--which can be difficult, can be boring, even! The correct idea of linking theory to practice is the dominant excuse to have no theory at all. Another common excuse is that we do not yet understand how to run study, or work-study groups. It all amounts to bullshitting ourselves. We do not have a correct theory of how to study, of how to link theory and practice, because we have little or no practice in the area of study. We believe that it is necessary to stop this and absolutely require every club to establish regular study. This should be emphasized especially in the pre-convention period. The first bulletin made faltering steps in this direction, but the second bulletin makes no mention of it at all. What kind of follow-up is taking place to guarantee that at least the various articles and books recommended for reading in the first bulletin are in fact being studied by every club nationally? (we would also suggest that some works on economics be included, since this seems to be the biggest gap in everybody's reading.)

IV Misc. points

1. There may be some confusion due to the use of the terms "mass," "vanguard," and "independent" line. It might help to think, instead, in terms of short-run and long-run, of reform and revolutionary. Thus, what we have called a mass line is a short-run reform (a struggle over shop conditions, for extra lights on the block, to get a particular administrator fired, etc.). What we have called a vanguard line is a long-term reform struggle (30/40 and smash racism). And what we have been calling our independent line is a revolutionary struggle (dictatorship of the proletariat); this is also a long-run struggle.

2. We have also seen a tendency to call for the formation of groups--caucasus and other rank-and-file groups--as if that were the line around which we wanted to unite. Rank-and-file control is not a line; it is a strategy. The center does not have a strategy, and will not see the need for a strategy until it is won to a long-run reform (not necessarily the ones which we are saying they should fight for, by the way--any long-run reform will teach the need for having a strategy). So some of the time our difficulty in putting together rank-and-file groupings is due to our putting the cart before the horse. The experiences in Cleveland and Detroit seem to be the opposite of this--committees or caucasus growing out of some people being won to a long-run reform, in this case 30/40.

3. We touched on the question of criticism, self-criticism and inner-Party struggle. We all felt that there was a big weakness on these points. Our club--and two of our members--are quite new, so we don't know quite how this will work in the present situation. But all of us have experienced weaknesses in other situations, in other clubs, in other areas, in and out of the Party, so we suspect that this is another national weakness. Since criticism, self-criticism and inner-Party struggle have been a part of our outlook just as long as being involved in the reform and TU movement have been, we think it would be fruitful to also have some discussion in the Party of why there has been difficulty carrying out this part of our line. Lack of inner-Party struggle and of criticism, self-criticism may be a partial cause of our other problems, or may be a result of some common root.

V Summary

1. Basically, we attribute our failure to put a line which has been generally correct for many years into practice to a combination of sectarianism and pragmatism (lack of knowledge of d-m).

2. We suggest two cures: a. serious involvement in the mass reform movement--this means working on problems other than 30/40 and racism! That's right! the mass reform movement is not at this level yet. 30/40 and smash racism are our vanguard line; we must also work in the area of our mass line, which is largely determined by the level of the masses themselves, not by our level. b. serious study of r-c ideology (d-m) and history to enable us to analyze the center and work out tactics appropriate to relate their daily struggles to our over-all strategy. This will also help us to develop and sustain our long-term strategies.

3. There are many other causes and sources of sectarianism, but we think--at this point in our discussion--that these two causes are key.

4. Finally, we have over-simplified somewhat in order to make our points as sharp as possible; this over-simplification should not extend to our practice. This program of reform work and study is not a call to abandon all that is good about our Party. CHALLENGE sales should not be abandoned; we should never cease to build the Party--even in the most low-level of reform struggles; we should never, as a Party, retire to the libraries and abandon a vigorous practice. All of the study in the world means nothing if our Party is not involved in struggle; all the reform struggle in the world means little if it does not lead to revolution. Sectarianism must be defeated. But it must not be replaced with right opportunism--with revisionism. Failure to engage in struggle, to raise the dictatorship of the proletariat, to win people to communism, to recruit people to the Party--in short, failure to build the Party--these are all revisionism. We must defeat sectarianism, and build the PLP--fight for socialism!

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WE NEED TO REVOLUTIONIZE OUR INTELLECTUAL WORK.

This article takes the viewpoint that PL's success in developing work among intellectuals, particularly among college teachers, has been too limited. It urges that we develop systematically a new perspective for PL'ers in this work throughout the party.

These bad attitudes have been very obvious in my own work -- in my failure to do much work on my doctorate, specifically -- and overcoming them has been very hard for me. I have a long way to go. Other comrades have struggled with me very hard over this, and still other teachers in PL have shown a much better style of work than I have. These criticisms do not apply to all equally, but I think they have characterized our work among intellectuals as a whole. I'd welcome criticism and comment from other comrades.

M-L'ists have always recognized the importance of intellectuals in capitalist society. Communists have always held that the class battle on the intellectual front is crucial in giving leadership to the working class and rallying allies to its cause. PLP has also followed this line (at least since I have been familiar with it) judging from our early publication MLQ, the many articles on art, science, etc. in early PL mags, etc.

Forged in the fight vs revisionism, however, our concentration was, rightly, on practice. We were alone in defending M-L from the anti-working class, 'scholarly' "leftists" such as Monthly Review, Studies on the Left, as well as the CPUSA's scholarly apologists for social imperialism. During the period of sharper class struggle in the '60's, we turned our attention firmly to the working class. In some cases, students became factory workers; and our line in the student movement, and for teachers was to relate as directly as possible to working class struggles: worker-student alliance understood as strike support; summer (or campus) work-ins. During student uprisings, PLP led the way in advocating boldness, to expose the colleges as the reactionary bastions they are, unreformable.

One result of this style of work in the colleges has been too much concentration on purely agitational issues. Too often PL (and SDS) students and teachers concentrated exclusively on agitation on a high political level with a minority of other students and faculty, and basically never worked in other ways. At times, the student anti-war movement took on a mass character, or seemed to. But even then, the relative ease with which left and liberal phonies, administrations, etc., isolated us and other radical forces from the majority of students and sympathetic faculty showed that our real ties were to a small minority of students, and a (probably) even smaller minority of faculty. In a sharp situation, the result of isolation from the masses of faculty and students was often expulsion or dismissal, very often leaving the remaining forces weaker, not stronger. (There were a lot of other aspects to this work, but I want to concentrate on these).

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During this period, our style of work was in fact to win students and teachers away from their roles in the colleges. Specifically, intellectuals were won away from research, working on degrees, publication. This means that PL was winning people away from doing serious intellectual work in their fields, and among their colleagues, to a narrow activism and agitation. When individual members of clubs worked out their perspectives, little or no priority was given to developing professional or scholarly work or contacts (Again, I do not know whether this was widespread in the party, but suspect that it was from my experience).

There are several results of this:

- (1) Work among intellectuals has not grown as it should have, in numbers of people involved in it, despite the many good struggles we were engaged in;
- (2) many PL intellectuals who remain are not in a qualitatively better situation in their jobs or professions now than they were several years ago;
- (3) the party's base among intellectuals doesn't seem to have grown greatly. And many of those around us several years ago have dropped away, or are inactive.
- (4) So, we have not had the influence we should, and must have, in the colleges and in the intellectual sphere. Pseudo-marxist, left liberal, etc. scholarship is on the increase (I think), in many fields now; such as history; English; sociology; anthropology; psychology. Many, many more intellectuals (and through the publications, students) are becoming open to these ideas. Yet the field is dominated by phonies -- the aging "new" leftists; Trots; the old CP'ers; -- and by various forces which may be honest, but are certainly mistaken in their critiques of American society.

Think of the number of books used in any college today on Marxist art and literature; on "radicalism" in the US; on "radical" or "Marxist" approaches to almost anything (history, religion, English, etc.); much less on the working class (this is a real popular topic now among the liberal ruling-class writers as well, who 10 years ago had discovered there 'was none'); on racism.

While we must understand that the ruling class pushes and fosters the phony leftists, Trots, etc., no intellectual work in these fields has been published by PL people, or people very close to us, except in PL magazine, which only a handful of teachers read, and which therefore doesn't have a mass impact. The ruling class wants to push Tom Hayden or Weinstein down our throats; we ought not to aid them by putting up little or no opposition!

In summary: PL's practice has been to downgrade the importance of both intellectual work and work among teachers and intellectuals; This has been sectarian. Essentially, it is revisionist, in that it says that intellectuals are not indispensable for the revolution.

That is anti-intellectualism. It also says that Communism isn't something that intellectuals need in their lives; that they aren't really oppressed by the ruling class; that they are reactionary and can't be won; and that it doesn't really matter anyway. Obviously, all this is dead wrong. And "we wouldn't say it" (though I have heard these attitudes explicitly from some PL'ers). But, we've been doing it. And we must change.

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"Intellectuals are open as never before", as the 1st Conv. Bull. said. But not unless we struggle with them, integrate ourselves with them, take what they do seriously, will we be able to get anywhere here.

1. We must struggle with intellectuals. In order to do this, we must get involved with them. This means unions, such as the AFT, but it must mean a lot more than that. College teachers still look upon unions as something concerning their working conditions, but not at all involved with the 'professional' aspects of their work (and this is largely true). So, it would be a bad mistake to make unions such as the AFT our sole concentration in colleges. Faculty senates; curriculum, etc., committees; AAUP; all involve many, many more faculty than most unions do, or will do for the foreseeable future. We must be active in them.

2. Ideas are important in the class struggle in the USA. Each teacher should include in his perspective for work in PL that he finish his degree; then, that he write articles, etc., in his field, and struggle to develop an M-L approach in an intelligent, convincing, and non-sectarian way. The only others who do this at all, as far as I can see, are the CP, whose line is so revisionist and opportunist (especially in their writings) that it is almost indistinguishable from independent liberals. The worst models, therefore, are the CP and the various petty-bourgeois groups such as Radical America; the Internationalists (Lit. and Ideology); Socialist Revolutinn.

An additional matter: with the ever-tightening job market in the colleges, degrees and publications will increasingly be necessary even in order to keep a job. This is important, but not the main thing; we don't want merely to stay employed, but to have a wide national impact in every academic field.

On top of this, teachers take these things very seriously. Even those who are sympathetic and 'left'; even those who don't do it themselves really have respect for scholarly achievement and publication. The most respected professors (other things, e.g. personality, being equal) are frequently those who are respected in their professions.

3. Communism is a "life -and-death matter" for intellectuals too. It is something that they need. In the campaign against racist scholarship, we point out that these guys are misusing science; many scientists take this very seriously. But the ruling class misuses, warps everything in colleges! starting with the student, the classroom situation, the grading system, and the job market, and ending in the bullshit, lies, elitism, etc. perpetuated in the academic disciplines themselves. Not to mention the effects of the system as a whole -- racism, oppression, -- on one's personal life, children, town, etc. And these are things from which no teacher has an escape -- as he may have from, say, a sharp sit-in struggle, or from a lifetime commitment to socialism in PL.

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4. Since the Party's specific concentration in intellectual work is the fight against academic racism, we ought to take this issue as part-and-parcel of every teachers' (and grad. students?) perspective.

a) We must have some real knowledge of academic racism. In the 1st instance, responsibility for this rests on PL'ers. We cannot hope to be very successful in making the fight against academic racism broad, involving more than a small, left fringe of faculty, unless we take time to study and thoroughly understand the issues involved. Each PL'er in academic work should make this part of his/her perspective.

b) We should examine the effects of racism in the academic fields we work in. We should write articles (eventually, books) examining and combatting academic and other forms of racism in History; literature; sociology; psychology; the sciences; etc.

Historians could develop articles about intellectual and academic racism in the US and its social effects; show the connexions between Jensen, Herrnstein & Co. and the overt KKK'ers and racial supremacists of the Eugenics Review -Mankind Quarterly schools; the direct parallels (not now convincing to most) between Naziism and Jensenism; the question of academic freedom; racism in the labor movement, etc. -- all from the point of view of exposing how it hurts white and black; how it frustrated reform, etc. Sociologists could write about racism and housing, public welfare, etc.; literature teachers, develop courses on racism in literature; in language.

In conclusion: this means turning party academics and teachers toward a long-range struggle; guaranteeing that these comrades do the work they are best qualified for in the academic field; integrating ourselves, our outlook, in the intellectual field.

Our party, though as yet small in intellectual work, could still exercise an impact far outweighing our numbers in the academic world. Some indications of this are: the resolution in the Am. Anthropologists Ass. meeting last Nov. against academic racism; the initial success of the Storrs petition in attracting a broad following of interested, non-PL intellectuals. We could do a lot more.

The need of Proletarian Internationalism

The call for the unity of the working classes is basic to the tradition of communism. The slogan "Working men of all lands, Unite!" could be the hope of humankind, if the politics of a united working class were understood and consistently put forth.

The bourgeois class is not limited to one nation. The United States based Corporations are not only the largest industrial sector in the world, but American Corporations based in Europe is the second largest surpassing the Soviet Union, and Japan. The capital accruing to the Bourgeoisie is basically unaffected by national events such as devaluations of currencies, due to the fact that what is lost overseas is made up domestically or vice versa. The ruling class uses the controls that is the national governments to force the working class to finance the less competitive industry. The devaluation of the dollar forces Americans to buy American products.

This is not to say that industries not owned by American Corporations are not in competition with it. The Soviet Union, Germany, Japan, China, et al are in sharp struggle for world markets. In spite of "peaceful co-existence" the potential for national wars among capitalist powers is great.

The point of the above is to point out that the bourgeoisie is beyond the power of any national group. Even if national governments were independent of the Corporation, they are not, those governments could not control the bourgeoisie. The same is true of unions, national and locals. The Corporations can easily shift capital and work internationally.

Proletarian Internationalism is the only possible way to ensure that a capitalist war does not start among the national bourgeoisies. We are now in a position similar to that preceding WWI in which loyalty to class, instead of nation, could have prevented that war.

Being that Proletarian Internationalism is the direct opposite of nationalism, advocacy of principled Internationalism is the best way of fighting nationalism. It avoids the traps of purely destructive criticism which turns people into cynics; this is done by putting forth the advantages and necessity of Internationalism, not just the exploitation that is nationalism.

Not to put forth a consistent line of Proletarian Internationalism is a concession to nationalism, provincialism, religions, racism, sexism, and all the other devisive devices of the Ruling class. The reason for this is that Proletarian Internationalism is directly related to the life blood of revolutionary communism, class conception of society and class motivation of society. Ending exploitation using the criteria of class is the duty of every revolutionary communist. A class extends beyond a nation, race, sex, province.

Proletarian Internationalism is the key in the unity of the working class for a unity with "foriegners" will make unity with "nationals" easier to bring about. The people who were in soldarity with the Vietnamese were, I feel, not provincial, tolerant of religions, anti-racist, and anti-sexist. Class conciousness leads to Internationalism and Internationalism increases class conciousness.

The advantages of Proletarian Internationalism are almost to profound to list.

1. Increase the affectiveness of strikes and other progressive actions.
2. lessen the potential for capitalist wars.
3. increase in class conciousness

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Brpaden our Trade Union Outlook

In two ways our trade union program is too narrow:

1) "turn towards the trade unions" does not address itself to the large number of unorganized workers, and 2) "30 for 40" in and of itself is very narrow.

For example, if 30 for 40 is won does this necessarily mean increased employment. Couldn't capitalism just increase the amount of automation, thereby using the same number of workers and more machines. Likewise, we could win 30 for 40 and the bosses could increase speed-up. Can we show historically that when the 8 hour day was won this led to an increasing employment? Also, why does winning 30 for 40 fight racism? The bosses could either not hire more workers (as explained above), hire just white workers if they need too, and still they can always pay Black workers less. The argument against this might be that we could never win 30 for 40 unless we go along way towards defeating racism in the working class T.U. movement. But this argument is true for any trade union struggle. It is hard to win a strike if the workers are split by racism. All this is not to say that 30 for 40 is wrong but to warn against confining ourselves to a single reform struggle or rather, to a single way of carrying out this reform struggle. That is, the point was made in a previous convention document that our initial approach to the worker-student alliance strategy was too narrow; we saw supporting workers strikes, etc. as THE

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way of carrying out this strategy and didn't really see how the struggle against racism in the classroom could be part of the WSA.

What we should mean when we fight for 30 for 40 is a whole constellation of militant trade union demands - unless ~~we~~ we consciously fight for more jobs, against all aspects of racism, against speed-up I don't see how the movement for 30 for 40 can willy-nilly win them.

One other point about 30 for 40 needs to be discussed. In certain service industries, in particular, teaching and hospitals the 30 for 40 demand might not be primary, and in fact could turn into its opposite and even become reactionary. The primary T.U. demand for teachers should be for more teachers, period. This will not only improve teaching, lower classroom size, but will also lessen the work load per teacher. Likewise in hospitals, more jobs are needed - really more man-hours. That is, if 100 men work 40 hours a week at a hospital that is 4,000 man-hours. 30 for 40 might lead to, say, 133 men each working 30 hours a week making again 4,000 man-hours. However, this may not be enough ~~if~~ for adequate patient care (this might especially be an issue at a hospital that cares for working class patients). Another way of looking at it is that the work load per worker might still be too much, only now he's overworked for 30 hours instead of 40. To be sure, we could fight for 200 workers working 30 hours a week but it seems that the primary demand has to be for more workers to lessen the work load and take better care of patients.

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The main, primary demand for teachers at this time should not be for the shorter work week but for more teachers, smaller classrooms, and against budget cuts. Likewise, hospital workers should be fighting for more hospital workers to improve patient care and ease their work load and also to fight against the budget cuts.

The last point I want to make concerns a program for organizing the unorganized. Certainly this struggle has an historical tradition second only to the fight for the shorter work week. In addition, the last time I counted, there were more workers out of trade unions than in them. Needless to say our outlook of turning the Party towards the trade unions is not mutually exclusive with organizing the unorganized. On the contrary, unions are a natural base from which to launch such an organizing drive. Its just that I felt it was conspicuously absent from many of our documents which dealt with the strategy and tactics of T.U. work.

The main point I wanted to make here is that we should not interpret and carry out our slogans stiffly and with blinders on.

I think too many times in the past we have come up with a correct idea but have boxed ourselves into a corner and out of involvement with a lot of good forces because of a dogmatic, inflexible and uncreative application of that idea, some of our early experiences with the WSA in SDS, with the community control battles in the PTAs, and with the nationalism

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Black forms of organizations of students and workers. Hopefully our future in the T.U. movement and in other movements will not be hamstrung by a mechanical approach towards fighting racism and building a militant trade union movement.

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Suggestion for Challenge:

The Party has two main FOCUSSES: The 30 hr. week and Fighting Racism. C-D should be organized to reflect this concentration.

Specifically: Let each issue of the paper have a SECTION called "The Shorter Work Week - 30 for 40" In this several page section, include all the news articles about different locals adopting 3-/40, news of the referenda, etc. AND ALSO, have one or more presentations about 30/40 explaining it to new readers. This could be in the form of an editorial about some aspect of 30/40 or related to news events or clippings.

For instance, last week a Calif State Assemblyman introduced a "32 hr legal work week" bill into the legislature. We should report this event and editorialize on its shortcomings and possible positive uses. Or, the clipping from the Wall St. Journal a week ago where they say that firms dropped the 4-day 10hrs /day a week because of the increased accidents and reduced efficiency during those last 2 hrs each day.

A similar approach would apply to a Section on the Fight against Racism.

The advantage of this format would be:

- 1) Easier to read the paper and learn of PL's concentrations.
- 2) Easier to sell the paper. All sellers would approach people and point out the party's main organizing efforts.
- 3) More educational. Regular educational articles on the shorter work week and fighting racism. More continuity. Easier to assign articles.

This was discussed and endorsed by LA city committee.

An additional suggestion: Change the FRONT PAGE HEADLINE from the vague generalities and commands, like "War on the 'Big Bosses'" to specific headlines about the major articles or editorials in the paper.

Perhaps the most glaring example of sexism in the party is the fact that we really don't have a line on it at all -- except that we're against it. We certainly have no outlook toward the women's movement such as it is, and not the merest strategic notion as to how to fight women's oppression. Every other group on the left at least pretends to fight it, and the ruling class is dredging up a passel of racist "feminist" misleaders to keep the movement within their camp -- sometimes it appears that the party doesn't consider women's oppression important enough to even pretend to fight.

At the peak of the nationwide struggle to legalize abortion, we were still running a debate in Challenge as to whether legal abortion wasn't against the interest of the working class because we need all the revolutionary fighters we can get -- this while thousands of women were dying each year at the hands of illegal abortionist butchers.

The fight against sexism -- the special oppression of women -- is crucial to the fight for socialism. Unless our party takes the lead in smashing all divisions within the working class, that class will never be united and will be ultimately defeated. If a vigorous offensive is not launched against male chauvinist ideology, as well as social and economic inequality, millions of women will not be won to socialism and will not be mobilized behind the revolution -- no matter how strongly they may support our programs in the trade unions, against racism, etc. This would be true whether or not there ever was a women's liberation movement. What I am saying is very simple and very obvious: we will not be able to win an oppressed section of the working class without leading the fight against the oppression of that section.

Hitler was acutely aware of this in his "Kinder, Kirche, Kuchen" campaign (children, church, kitchen) for women.

We probably don't have the forces presently to launch a strategic offensive on a level with 30/40 and Smash Racism. However let us begin immediately to do the ground work to build those forces. Toward this end, I propose:

1) We begin by raising sharply the anti-sexist issue in the areas where we are already fighting its economic consequences -- at Met Life, among teachers and substitutes, office workers, etc. To fight for better conditions for women does not, by itself, fight sexism unless such a fight builds ~~the~~ consciousness of the special oppression of women. Articles in Challenge should continuously relate to how these battles are specifically anti-sexist. For instance, substitute teachers are continuously screwed over because, according to how the Bd. of Ed. would see it, they "are mostly women working part-time to supplement their husbands income." We should point out how this attitude hurts men subs too, even though, in another divisive aspect of sexism, men subs are given more work.

2) Reviews of cultural events -- books, movies etc. should expose sexism as well as racism.

3) Each club should hold discussions immediately about ~~their~~ its work in relation to sexism, e.g. a good anti-sexist reason to fight for 30/40 is that it will allow many men to take more responsibility for their children and other domestic tasks; it could free housewives for another 10 hours a week. We shouldn't shy away from such arguments -- they will help us win 30/40.

4) Discussions at all party levels should begin, with the goal of developing our theory of women's oppression (following from the excellent article in the Feb 71 PL, "The Political Economy of Male Chauvinism") and ultimately a strategy for

defeating sexism. For instance we could encourage the development of anti sexism committees in SDS and WAM (if we're not already doing so). We ~~xxx~~ should investigate the possibility of joining NOW (which is open to men by the way) or local groupings like Union Wage, A bay area group which may or may not have a base among women workers

Far from dissipating our our forces, such moves could pave the way to winning hundreds of women to fight not only for their own "liberation" or for their ~~men~~ men, but to fighting racism and forging an invincible unity of the whole working class.

Henry Hitz
MARCH 1973
SAN FRANCISCO

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Proposed 15 week curriculum of study

This study group should have one meeting every two weeks. Most members could read some or all of the articles; however, the club leader could ask specific people to prepare reports on some of the longer books so that everyone would not have to read them (for instance, in meeting 2, Ervin and Mark, Violence and the Brain). Hopefully, this reading study program could be adjusted to emphasize books or topics which members are using in their courses, or which SDS is involved in fighting. The program however is much broader than this--it seeks to lay the basis for party members dealing competently with this whole racist attack. As such, it represents a substantial amount of work.

Meeting 1 I.Q. testing and racism
Annotated Herrnstein

October 72 Fortune--"Social Engineers in Retreat"

The Jensenist resolution and our counterresolution

2 short articles by Jensen: The Phylogeny and Ontogeny of Intelligence, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Jan., 1971

Ethical Issues, The Humanist, Jan-Feb 72.

Meeting 2--Lobotomies

Fortune, Jan '73, "Violence"

Ebony, Feb., '73, article on lobotomies

UCLA leaflet on Ervin (and pamphlet as soon as it is produced)

Breggin, statement on the international movement to revive lobotomies in the Congressional Record

Ervin, Frank R. and Mark, Vernon H., Violence and the Brain

comment: the revival of lobotomies is a direct offshoot of the campaign around Jensenism internationally. Rosenthal, chief of laboratories at the National Institute of Mental Health, wants to fund both--the NIMH is funding Ervin's colleague Dr. Sweet to the tune of \$500,000.

Meeting 3: the "lower class culture" argument

Banfield, The Unheavenly City

UAG pamphlet on Banfield

UCLA leaflet from course by Ellinson pushing The Unheavenly City

Meeting 4--Jensen

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Jensen, Harvard Educational Review article "How much can we boost Scholastic Achievement?"

someone might also report on Jensen's article in Dockrell, ed., On Intelligence.

UCLA AfroAmerican Students Center reply to Jensen (I will get author's name for this)

Newspaper reports on Congressman 'Hicks' investigations of the Kitty Hawk (the "riots" were lead by "low mentality" sailors, "all blacks") from San Francisco

unpublished reply by Prof. John Hurst, Ed. Psych at Berkeley, to Jensen (Richard Cates has this--someone might read this and report on it)

Berkeley pamphlet on Jensen (when it comes out)

leaflets on Jensenism and tuition cuts (Cal State)

Meeting 5--PL pamphlet on racism (if when it comes out)

Dear Reader column from Challenge on eugenics (

Al Tumolillo's article on eugenics

Either Mao, On Contradiction, or something from Plekhanov on role of ideology in the class struggle.

Meeting 6--history of class struggle in US

not sure what would be good readings for this

Brecher, Jeremy, Mass Strike

Linder, Great Flint Strike

selections from Aptheker, Slave Revolts

Meeting 7

Moynihan Report

Yancey and Rainwater, Politics of Controversy (introduction explains how Moynihan pushed this argument in government, following Harlem rebellion; also has IBJ's speech at Howard University first pushing this crap)

Meeting 8

Jencks, Inequality

Dear Reader column from Challenge on Jencks.

Possibly articles from fall or winter, 72, The Public Interest (4 articles by Bell, Moynihan, Wilson and Lipset pushing this line)

Meeting 9 "reverse racism"

we should probably assemble newspaper articles pushing this.

ax

Could also have meetings on Eysenck and Shockley, though they both depend entirely on Jensen.

The student work nationally is weak. Perhaps it is in a crisis (for instance, calling off the conference on the East Coast suggests that it is). There are also 2 different lines on this work. In the East, we said: the lack of preparation and reliance on the people around this conference was so bad that we had to call it off. (ie it would encourage revisionism and left-wing hack mentality to hold it). On the West Coast, we held the conference, and upon evaluation, decided it was a success.

I don't think the work is qualitatively different on the East Coast from what is on the West Coast. But I think there is a sharply different emphasis--at present--in the line of the student work.

The main reason the conference on the West Coast was a success was that we emphasized building struggles (against Ervin, UC investments in South Africa, expanding nursing programs, lettuce boycotts, etc). Around this conference, there was some effort to win people to this as the main point. Afterwards, there was some effort to follow through on it. This (and was around it) emphasis on struggles against racism differentiates us from all revisionist groups which have no program for building a serious student movement.

On the East Coast, at least as far as the report goes (and this seems to reflect an emphasis in line) building campaigns is given relatively little weight. The struggle in the classroom is characterized as the struggle at the academic point of production. Combined with overall campaigns against Ervin, Jensen, etc, this

would be a healthy emphasis. By itself, it is not.

To give an example; at Cal State, we brought about 30 people to January 20. We met them mainly in an agitational way though an important component in this was that we took the lead in organizing support rallies for students at Southern. Beyond this, we also got the student government to sponsor a speaker who is a Southern alumnus and friend of the Party at a BB King concert. Secondly, we made some effort to oppose the use of Banfield's book in a course and it was withdrawn. We have only been active at Cal State this term (the chapter started mainly with 4 pl members, all before anything but one of whom joined before doing anything at Cal State).

Since we got back from conference, we have fought the tuition hike of 1700%, and especially reverse racism. Campus newspaper published a racist cartoon of a "middle class working student" with a screw through him (the tuition hike), and money dropping out of his back into a bucket market welfare students. Editor refused to print counter cartoon. We got 100 people to student gov. meeting over this and President of college coming. Since Jan 20, 6 people (2 minority students) have been consolidated to the chapter--all of whom are serious students. Others are working with us some. The growth of this chapter comes totally from struggle--Southern, Jan 20, and mainly building something against the tuition hike. None of these people were won thru classes (we

(though we are also planning increased action in classes to stress then this work). Main point--struggle against racism is building this chapter. In terms of Cal State we would not have gained ground by calling off the conference.

Launching these campaigns is also the basis for getting people more interested in study. Struggles could be accompanied by consistent program of study in the party (and in base groups and SDS committees) which could lead to a good conference in the East on April 28-9.

But the report is also wrong--and probably sectarian and arrogant toward PL members and friends--in its proposed correction for weaknesses. We have been fighting this ideology off and on ~~for~~ since last year. As a result of struggles that we have engaged in, we have some knowledge of the nature of the rulers' racist campaign, etc/ We are however a long way from being an anti-racist party, tested in struggle and having a membership of organizers trained in struggle. We make many ~~sectarian~~ mistakes (for instance, at UCLA we were only feebly involved in struggle led by bsu against all-white cheer leading squad; we aren't that vigorous in taking on racist ideologists --for instance we had no plan at Berkeley to fight Jensen until fall even though he is in town, circulating the ad, etc, etc. Engaging in mass struggle, fighting for amore life and death approach to these atrocities like Ervin, medical experimentation in prisons, Jensenism, etc. will lead over time to the development of more

experience and knowledge. We can further this through study and through doing more in classes. But report expects to change this overnight or very shortly (rather than expecting that it will change over the next 1-3 years with consistent effort). It demands serious articles for new left notes in 2 weeks as its only concrete proposal. At UCLA we are now (3 1/2 weeks later) in a position to write something serious about Ervin and psychosurgery. At Berkeley, we are not yet ready to write a good report on Jensen -- as of a week ago, no one in PL or the SDS chapter had read Jensen's main article. This can be corrected through consistent program of struggle and study--but not by demanding and expecting articles in 2 weeks (by the way, even the PL pamphlet on racism which has been discussed ~~for~~ for months is still not out).

As for classes, I was involved last year in a struggle against Banfield in a class. In context of opposing Jensen and Shockley coming to campus and building antiwar struggles, this had a very good effect. On its own merits, however, though there was controversy in class and prof was defeated politically (he could not use the book), if the movement had been confined to that class, it would not have built SDS (no one joined out of it). It has had benefits in terms of long term support (for instance, MECHA members from class work with us some now). Serious struggle in classes has been done to some extent and will go forward gradually if we put more stress on it. It will not come

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overnight. The report says we have not done it while emphasizing it for over a year--then insists that we make it the mainpoint right now. Done in this way, it will not work.

The essential weakness in the report in terms of self-criticism around calling off the conference is first that it provides no serious plan for correction either in terms of struggle or of study. Sec nd, since it asks for more than can be expected (and ~~is not~~ ^{so qui} ~~to be expected~~) ~~that it asks for more than can be expected~~ ~~so quickly on the heels of calling off the conference, the likely effect of this "correction" is to build demoralization and cynicism in comrades and friends. This error can be corrected by developing specific plans for struggle, following them up, and winning people to carry out more study and agitation in classrooms in this context.~~

A. B. C.
L. M. N.

D. Grey

FOR THE INTERNAL BULLETIN

Comments on RR III:

- I. Fundamental Ideas of Revisionism 1
- II. Capitalist Restoration in the Soviet Union 6

I. Fundamental Ideas of Revisionism

In using the presence of a standing army and bureaucracy as indices of the absence of the D. of P., the lead article in Convention Bulletin #1, makes a step backward from the understanding represented in RR III. By that criterion, we would have to say that the D. of P. never existed in Russia or China, since the standing army and a large state bureaucracy were features of those cases from the beginning. But our analysis in RR III is that capitalism can be restored only through a lengthy struggle; a struggle in which army and state organizations of a bourgeois kind are indicators of the underlying ideological weakness of the proletariat, effects and not the primary causes of its defeat. Using them as mechanical indicators that the proletariat has already lost the struggle to move in a socialist path prevents us from making a truly dialectical analysis of the forces in the struggle and their strengths and weaknesses; it is as if a doctor trying to cure his patient looked only at symptoms and not for causes.

What is needed is an analysis of the root ideas of revisionism since it is the hold of these ideas over the Party's ideology that is the primary factor in the class struggle after the revolution. Revisionism in the communist movement can be viewed as the continuation, in more advanced forms appropriate to conditions of proletarian dictatorship, of the ideas of social-democracy. The social-democrats of late 19th century Germany and Russia saw socialism as coming about automatically and mechanically through the developing contradictions of capitalism as it became more and more mature. In their view, the revolution could come about only in those countries where capitalism had brought about the fullest development of the productive forces of which it was capable. They saw the technology of capitalism as the necessary pre-requisite of socialism. The eventual contradiction of capitalist property relations with the need for further socialisation of production would bring about a series of increasingly sharper economic crises in the most advanced countries and the collapse of bourgeois rule. Only the proletariat, because of its technical ability to command the advanced technology capitalism bequeathed it, would be in a position to rule and remove the capitalist monopolistic barriers to further economic development.

In this framework, ideology and political consciousness were decidedly secondary. The Party

existed mainly to wage electoral campaigns and trade union fights so as to gather the proletariat together in anticipation of the final crisis of the system. Socialist consciousness was seen as developing within the framework of trade unionism, and the maturing economic crisis of capitalism, its inability to develop the economy past a certain point, would make a peaceful transition to socialism possible as the vast majority of the population came to recognize the bankruptcy of capitalism and the technical superiority of socialism.

It was against this body of ideas, known in the Russian movement as "economism", that Lenin and the Bolsheviks struggled. In Lenin's view, capitalism never entered an economic crisis from which it could not emerge successfully. Depressions, in fact, acted as purgatives, destroying part of the existing capital values, further concentrating and centralizing ownership of capital and thus preparing the way for the resumption of capital accumulation on an ever larger scale. Moreover, the development of imperialism constantly brought new supplies of exploitable labor under capitalist domination and fed the dynamism of the system. The revolution would be most likely not where capitalism was simply most advanced economically but in those countries, like Russia, where there was an accumulation of political contradictions. The chief factor in whether the revolution was made turned out to be the conscious political organization of the proletariat and allied classes by a vanguard Party, within whose ranks the ideas of social-democracy had been decisively defeated.

My thesis is that social-democratic ideas were not, in fact, decisively defeated within the Bolshevik Party but lived on after the revolution, and in the thought of Lenin, under new forms, since the original forms had been thoroughly discredited by the victory of the revolution itself. Modern revisionism is the further development of economism and rests on the the same fundamental premises:

1) a failure to distinguish the relations of production from the legal forms of property ownership, which in turn makes correct definition of capitalism and socialism impossible. Revisionists tend to equate capitalism with private, individual ownership of the means of production. It is therefore impossible for them to recognize the possibility of capitalism existing in a framework of state or collective property ownership. Relations of production are correctly defined not in terms of the identity of the owner(s) of capital, but in terms of whether the

working class is or is not deprived of control over the process of production. Under capitalism, the workers do not have power over the application, management and results of the production process nor do they dispose, as a class, of the products themselves. Capitalism is, in other words, wage-labor, a system in which the working class is separated from the means of production and possesses only its own labor-power, which it must put at the disposal of an alien force. Revisionism believes that the formal control of the proletarian state over the means of production, i.e. nationalization of industry, is socialism, not realizing that socialist relations of production must be fought for and created through a protracted struggle; a struggle during which capitalist production relations continue to exist and may even dominate, despite proletarian state power. (As I shall argue later was the case in Russia during the 1920s).

2) a false theory of the "forces of production" and of the relation of technology to production relations. This is a central point, recognition of which led the Left forces in the Cultural Revolution to characterize the revisionism of Liu as "the theory of productive forces". We have seen that "relations of Prod." refers to the question of which class has power to manage and allocate the means of prod.; what then does "forces of production" refer to? To some extent, we are here the victims of bad translation. "Forces of prod." sounds like it refers to things, tools, machines, etc. but the Marxian term in fact refers to a type of relationship in the process of production, not to physical objects. It defines a second type of separation of the workers from the means of production under capitalism. Not only does the working class not have power in the system but capitalism has created a technology and division of labor in which no individual worker or small group of workers is technically capable of using the means of production to produce his subsistence and maintain his life. The worker on the assembly line produces a saleable product only through the joint action of literally millions of workers all around the world (supplying steel, glass, rubber, etc.). Moreover, because of the fragmentation and division of work in capitalist technology, a separate managerial and co-ordinating function is required, which naturally falls to the class which has possession of the mammoth-scale means of production the workers need to work on to live: the capitalist class and its appointees.

It is typical of revisionism that it speaks of the "development

of the prod. forces" without pointing out that there are no such thing as prod. forces independent of a particular system of prod. relations (i.e. of class rule). There are no "forces of prod." as such; there are only capitalist forces of production or socialist forces of production. By leaving off the modifier, revisionism presents a view of linear, progressive, quantitative technical progress through history; a sequence in which the victorious proletariat, rather than qualitatively transforming the technology of production and the division of labor, simply takes over and expands the productive apparatus of capitalism. To the revisionists, "a machine is a machine" and the fundamental fault of capitalism is that it doesn't use its enormous productive potential efficiently or fails to distribute its fruits equitably. Revisionism never questions the existence of that technology itself nor sees how it is an integral part of capitalism and developed in forms appropriate to the maintenance of capitalist class rule. (This is a case where the so-called "dialectical law of the transformation of quantity into quality" turns out to be a cover for revisionism, since no degree of quantitative development of capitalist technology will give rise to methods of production appropriate to socialism; what is needed is a complete break under conscious political leadership).

3) On the basis of the above concept of productive forces, revisionism cannot conceive of dispensing with the functions of a separate, specialized body of managers and planners. Capitalist division of labor maintains a strict ~~se~~ separation of manual and mental work and without a struggle to create new socialist methods of production, such a separation will inevitably be maintained and strengthened. The role of the "experts", those trained in bourgeois techniques, is the other side of lack of confidence in the masses and their ability to jointly dominate the production process. This leads further to lack of confidence in the workers' ability to control the state apparatus. The failure of revisionism to view the D of P as a united front stems from the continued subordination of the workers in the economic sphere. The Party is seen as a bringing together of the "political experts", those with organizing skills, who have to keep a close grip on the planning and implementing of economic and political life. Given the view that socialism requires the further development of capitalist technology, the Party's primary role is then to direct that process, to manage, to give the orders which are carried out in a co-ordinated way from

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the top down. The Party must, therefore, have a virtual monopoly of positions in the state and economic apparatus, as well as the army, in order to efficiently carry out these tasks of command.

In our Party's conception, the role of the Party after the seizure of power remains fundamentally that of ideological leadership in the fight for socialism. Since socialism is won only through a protracted struggle in which capitalist political forces continue to exist, the Party could exercise a monopoly of power only at the price of absorbing bourgeois elements and destroying the distinction between its mass and independent lines. With every action of the state organs reflecting the relative strength of proletarian and bourgeois ideas, the Party must be in a position to publicly oppose these actions where it disagrees with them and must be in a position to organize opposition among the masses to the re-emergence of strong bourgeois tendencies. This it cannot do if it has a monopoly of state positions and is identified with the state.

Moreover, it is not sufficient to think of the state organs of the D. of P. as left-center coalitions, if that means that only the Party is organized while the masses are present only as atomized individuals. The masses of workers must maintain and develop the fullest range of organized activities, including other political parties which will compete with the revolutionary party for ideological hegemony. This is a problem which RR III does not explicitly consider. What do we think of the Bolsheviks' outlawing of all other political parties after the revolution? Doesn't our Party's growing understanding of the role of the U.F. in our day-to-day work lead to the conclusion that the D of P will be a coalition of organized parties, trade-unions, etc.? What would be the concrete meaning of proletarian democracy and the role of elections? How would out-and-out counter-revolutionaries be dealt with? We need more discussion on these questions. It seems clear to me, in any case, that, given our view on the possible re-emergence of a "red" bourgeoisie, the most important task for the Party after the revolution is to maintain its freedom of action to organize a Cultural Revolution and to keep out those forces who wish to enter the Party simply as a road to position and power.

4) Revisionism must maintain friendly relations with some of the capitalist powers if it is to receive the technical assistance and capital imports that it considers vital to the "construction of

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socialism". Only the advanced capitalist nations can provide the knowledge and equipment necessary. From this it follows that a policy of diplomatic alliance and state-relations is called for.

The concept of peaceful co-existence and competition is a corollary of these ideas. If socialism is, above all, the more efficient and equitable application of technology, then it will win the masses around the world primarily through its demonstration effect. The victory of the revolution in the capitalist countries does not, therefore depend on the internal class struggle within them but rather on the example of progress provided by the socialist camp. Consequently, defense of the socialist countries becomes the primary responsibility of communists throughout the world, even if that defense requires cooling down of the internal class struggle for the sake of a military alliance of the socialist country and some of the capitalists. This was the explicit rationale for the class-collaborationist line of the 7th World Congress. ~~(The...)~~

To sum up: revisionism rests on a theoretical basis of concepts about the fundamental categories of Marxism. Our Party cannot oppose the political line of the old communist movement without putting into question the received interpretations of Marxist theory and the concepts of dialectical and historical materialism. (As was shown also in Al Strelzoff's piece on Mao's On Contradiction in Bulletin #2). Revisionism has, in the end, three main aspects:

- economism: continuous technical development through the borrowing and imitation of capitalist methods.
- absence of a mass line: lack of confidence in the masses, reliance on experts, Party monopoly of the state and discouragement of mass political organization and participation
- abandonment of proletarian internationalism: subordination of the international class struggle to the defensive needs of the socialist state, operating with bourgeois military ideas.

II. The Restoration of Capitalism in the Soviet Union

RR III does not directly take up this question, but in several passages it implies that the turning point comes in the 1950s and that up until that time the Soviet Union plays a generally positive role in the world. I would like to challenge that view and show that bourgeois rule in Russia dates from the 1930s and is the internal

correlate of the opportunism of the 7th Congress (1935). This, I hope, will also give a correct explanation of collectivization, the purge of the Party in 1936-38 and the Second World War.

Two fundamental objections can be lodged against the 1950s as a turning point in Soviet history. First, no decisive change takes place in economic organization. The tentative steps that are characteristic of the 60s toward more use of the market and market-price mechanisms do not qualify as decisive for two reasons: 1) they are in fact greatly limited and have even been somewhat reversed in the last few years with a move toward more centrally planned allocations using computers and, much more importantly, 2) the Soviet planning system has always been, in its essence, a system of financial planning. Most enterprises operate under the so-called Khozraschet (economic calculation) system in which the separate enterprises are given a financial plan and credits from the state budget or the State Bank for use in meeting the plan. All transfers between enterprises and with the public are made by means of centrally or regionally determined prices and indices of profit have always been part of enterprise evaluation. The Soviet planning system was never a system of social planning according to socially determined calculations of needs but was always based on monetary calculations and payment of wages in money. Changes in the locus of authority within the system, such as giving plant managers more access to funds earned within the plant, more control over bonus payments, and more accountability for growth of productivity and profitability, which have marked the 50s and 60s, simply streamline and rationalize the existing system and do not represent fundamental change.

Secondly, no great political upheaval or conflict marks the post-war period. Stalin's death and Khrushchev's rise and fall were handled without great changes in party structure and membership. We have analysed, in RR III, how the restoration of bourgeois rule in China could come about only as a result of a major struggle over party leadership and mass political action. Where, in recent Soviet history, do we find anything similar? Finally, there is a remarkable continuity ~~between~~ between the foreign policy and international line enunciated in the 20th Party congress (1956) and those of the 7th Comintern congress. The very same ideas and themes are present. (Revolution by emulation, alliance with the progressive section of the international bourgeoisie.)

Before making a complete analysis of the events of Soviet history, a number of facts can be pointed to which indicate the 1930s as the

period of capitalist restoration:

1) wage differentials in Soviet industry widen tremendously. Material incentives are broadened and strengthened with piece-work (payment by individual effort) becoming dominant. Discipline over the workers is exercised by a system of pass-books designed to counter the immense turnover of workers moving from job to job in search of better conditions,

2) the collectivization of agriculture is carried out not through a mass movement of poor and middle peasants but essentially by an expeditionary force of urban functionaries and the armed forces. The resistance of the peasantry is ferocious and extends to all strata including the poor. The slaughtering of livestock and the deportations lead to famine on a wide scale and millions of deaths. Millions move into the cities and factory work at extremely low wages.

3) the Party is completely shattered in the great purge, turning over almost 80% of its membership and replenishing itself primarily from the ranks of the new managers and technicians of the industrial sector.

4) education is narrowed considerably by the introduction of fees and the removal of preferential entrance for children of workers and peasants.

5) internationally, the Franco-Soviet pact is signed and the line of the Popular Front is established in the Comintern, abandoning the perspective of world revolution. The purge extends to large numbers of the cadre of foreign parties.

NEP and the Class Struggle in the 1920s

The most important feature of the class struggle in the 20s was the tremendous hold that revisionism had on all factions of the Bolshevik party. The so-called "Left Opposition" of Trotsky and Zinoviev based itself just as much on the fundamental economic ideas sketched above as did the "Right-Center" alliance of Stalin and Bukharin. Their differences were not over the correctness of this outlook but were only tactical differences within a common framework. The Right advocated favoring the richer peasants in order to increase agricultural production and technical progress and developing industry gradually on the basis of supplying capital and consumer goods to the thriving peasantry. The "Left", as exemplified in

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in the Trotskyite Eugene Preobrazhensky's influential book The New Economics, advocated suppressing the rich peasants (kulaks) through discriminatory price policies in order to mobilize the agricultural surplus for a rapid industrialization using imported capital and technical know-how from the Western capitalists. Both major factions believed that the peasantry could not be mobilized for socialist organization and both saw the development of socialism as depending on the formation of a technically advanced sector which would grow to encompass the entire economy. Their difference was whether that development would be based on supplying agriculture with modern equipment or on heavy industry (iron and steel, chemicals, etc.)

When NEP was introduced in 1921, the revolution had just gained control of the country after a period of civil war. The peasantry, amongst whom the Bolsheviks had built virtually no base, was thoroughly alienated by the system of forced requisitions which the Red Army had used to feed the cities during the previous period. The urban workers had sacrificed many from their ranks, especially the most class-conscious elements and the urban proletariat was being re-built through the incorporation of new workers of peasant origin, who were much less familiar with proletarian ideas. The organization of the factories remained essentially capitalist in character, even though property was state-owned. When Lenin analyzed the structure of relations of production after the revolution, he pointed to the co-existence of private capitalist state capitalist and socialist enterprise. His mistake was to think that the act of nationalising a sector of the economy, such as finance or iron and steel, and bringing it under state control necessarily made it socialist in character. But the workers still worked with the traditional techniques and were paid wages in money which they had to spend on a free market and the hierarchy of management in the plants was the same as before. Very little had been done to politicize the relations at the work-place, except that the Party committee and the trade-union organization were given some consultative role. Within the so-called troika arrangement (manager-Party committee-trade-union) the division of tasks was fairly strict, with the doctrine of one-man management preventing the political representatives of the workers from exercising any real authority in the management process.

But it would be historically incorrect to think that the introduction of NEP (New Economic Policy) with its incorporation of certain capitalist features (more than simply concessions) represented the end of class

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struggle. There was still the objective possibility of launching a sharp struggle for socialism, within the framework of NEP, which would progressively transform production relations in a socialist direction and prevent the re-emergence of the bourgeoisie from amongst the "experts" and officials. And, in fact, at various times during the 1920s, the class struggle showed signs of proletarian influence: wage differentials were narrowed in the middle 20s, increasing numbers of workers were trained in more skilled jobs, political commissars within the factories and the army at times increased their influence as against professional managers and officers and many workers were recruited to the party and exposed to the idea of socialism.

But there was no group of any importance, as we have seen, in the party to lead such a fight consistently. The influence of revisionist ideas was all-pervasive. Nowhere was this more clearly expressed than in the failure of the Party to build a base in the countryside. Even by the end of the decade of the twenties, virtually no party presence existed among the peasants. The only Party members in the rural areas were urban-born officials in the larger towns responsible for tax collection, grain collection, machine and tractor allocation and the judicial and police systems. Among working peasants, there were only a minuscule number of Party members; and they were often richer peasants who saw Party membership as a way of protecting their interests.

As a result, no progress was made in winning the poor peasants to a collective consciousness, nor were any organizational steps taken to bring poor peasants and landless workers into trade-unions or committees to defend their mutual interests. For these reasons, the kulaks had virtually unchallenged ideological authority and political power over the poor peasants, an authority which the isolated islands of Soviet state authority in the countryside were powerless to match.

At all levels of the state organs, the Party failed to involve the masses in political life. At the highest levels, the Council of Peoples' Commissars, the highest state body, was literally co-terminous with the Party Central Committee. Even in regional and city Soviets, Party representation reached 75% or more. No other political parties were allowed to organize, as a result of which largely petit-bourgeois elements entered the ruling Party for thoroughly opportunistic reasons, since Party membership was a pre-requisite for entry into the growing state bureaucracy, in which earnings were significantly higher than in industry.

During the 20s, then, a new bourgeoisie was simultaneously emerging in two sectors: in industry and the state apparatus, the functionaries and managers were rapidly increasing their privileges and power; and in agriculture, the pro-kulak policies of the Party were slowly developing a rural capitalist class. Nevertheless, the proletarian forces still had state power and the Party still played a revolutionary role in building a world communist movement, despite serious errors of a sectarian kind. In 1929-30, the new "red" bourgeoisie was ready to make a decisive bid for power, faced as it was with the threat of foreign domination (the rise of the Nazis and new threats from British imperialism)

Collectivization of agriculture was the key link in the bourgeois strategy. The generally low level of agricultural technology and the need for massive mobilization of surplus for industrial investment prevented the kind of gradual development of rural capitalism that had characterized English industrialization. Collectivization accomplished two goals: it smashed the rival kulak bourgeoisie, which siphoned off funds needed for industry, and it brought the mass of peasants into a framework in which the surplus value they produced would be easily transferred to the industrial sector by means of pricing of products and inputs. As was mentioned earlier, the poor and middle peasants had never broken the hegemony of the kulaks and followed their leadership in resisting the collectivization battalions but after a brief and violent campaign they were successfully incorporated into the new collective farms at standards of living which often verged on starvation and occasionally went over that line.

The reduction of rural standards of living and the ending of the traditional rural underemployment sent millions of new workers into the factories, where the freezing of wages at a lowered level, reinforced by massive inflation of the prices of manufactured goods and speeding-up of the pace of work, generated large surpluses which could be plowed back into industrial capital accumulation and military expenditures. The trade unions, possible defense organizations of the workers in these new conditions, were severely weakened through the elimination of their leadership in 1929. The only possible response of the working class to this forced-draft industrialization was the tremendous absenteeism, labor turnover and occasional sabotage which led to constant under-achievement of the planned goals for productivity

increase and led the new ruling class to resort to more and more repressive labor legislation, including the establishment of a fairly significant network of forced-labor camps.

In 1931, Stalin launched a major ideological campaign against egalitarian tendencies in the wage-payment structure, very similar to the campaign presently being waged in China by Chou en-lai and the bourgeoisie. Wide wage differentials were praised as necessary to stimulate maximum output and provide an incentive for workers to invest in training themselves to reach higher-skill jobs. Self-interest was to be harnessed to the needs of the state. In the same speech, he announced that the managers were to be freed completely from interference by Party or trade-union committees in order to solidify their one-man authority over industry. The Stakhanovite movement of the middle 30s, which superficially appears to be a movement for reliance on moral incentives, was, in fact, a cleverly designed movement to make speed-up ideologically acceptable. Stakhanov, a skilled coal miner, was given the most advanced equipment and worked at a pace, for a period of time, which he could not have maintained regularly day-in and day-out. The amount of coal he cut in this demonstration was widely publicized and used as a norm for all miners, who were of course unable to come anywhere near it without intensification of effort and grave danger to health. Stakhanov himself was rewarded with bonuses and soon reached supervisory status. "Stakhanovites" appeared from then on in many industries and in every case raised piece-work norms and were rewarded by preference in promotion and monetary bonuses.

The planning mechanism which was established was completely bureaucratic; with the workers having no part in the decision-making process. Moreover, the plan was in no way a guide to the allocation of resources, since the degree and pattern of under- and over-fulfillment of its various targets were so variable as to make it almost unworkable. What planning really was, given the goal of rapid industrialization, was the maximum application of pressure on the lower echelons of managers and supervisors who were forced to transmit that pressure to the workers in order to meet the absurdly unrealistic targets which were established.

In the political sphere, the major occurrence was the elimination of clear political differences within the party. Up to 1929-30,

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clear political tendencies can be distinguished: the Right under Bukharin and Rykov; the Center, under Stalin and Molotov; and the Left, under Trotsky and Zinoviev. But after that date, all lines blur, as the new bourgeoisie rallies around Stalin and his program of industrial development. The leading Trotskyites, such as Radek, Piatakov and Preobrazhensky, as well as many followers of Zinoviev and Kamenev, abandon opposition and take responsible positions in the new effort, which they see as the implementation of their own program. Even Bukharin and Rykov forswear active opposition and pledge allegiance to the new Central Committee. This obfuscation of political differences is one of the surest signs of the ending of proletarian dictatorship.

With all this unanimity of leadership, then, why is the massive purge of the late 30s required, with its millions of deaths and exiles and replacement, in a few short years, of the vast bulk of party cadre, including many of Stalin's closest confidantes. The fact of the matter is that the new bourgeoisie could take no chances on the continued socialist consciousness of many of the party members, especially those who had lived through the revolution and the ideological struggles of the 20s. There must have been many party cadre who protested in various ways the severity of the exploitation of the workers and peasants, even if they did not have a correct understanding of the nature of the historical change they were living through. Only a thorough destruction of the power of the "old Bolsheviks" and their replacement by younger men (like Khrushchev, Malenkov and Brezhnev) whose ideological horizon was defined by Stalin could eliminate the potential danger of an uprising against the consolidation of the capitalist system. It is a mistake, in examining the purge, to focus exclusively on the show trials of a few discredited figures like Bukharin and Zinoviev. The main job of the purge was the much less dramatic but much more thorough pruning of the Party rank-and-file and lower-level leadership. Finally, the needs of the political counter-revolution that was the party purge leads to the formation of a fascistic secret police apparatus which acts to stifle all dissent from the working class or sympathetic intellectuals.

The ideological consolidation of bourgeois rule continues even more strongly during the War. Great-Russian nationalism is revived, along with the Orthodox Church, and becomes the main agitational device.

David Levey, FLP, New York

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A Criticism of the Challenge Editorial --

"Viet Deal -- Peace Will Come Only When Int'l Workers Unity Dooms Imperialism."

Recently our club in Buffalo met to discuss the Feb 22 editorial summing up the lessons to be learned from the Viet war. We think that the editorial was opportunist in its treatment of the revisionists (particularly the Hanoi, PRG bunch) and that this opportunism made our line on nationalism weak.

It was opportunist in failing to give a very sharp class analysis of revisionists and nationalism -- the kind of analysis which would make it clear why more than 1000 NLF soldiers (who were, according to the Le Monde article, disgusted with the "passivity" and "defeatism" of the NLF and PRG leadership) led a heroic military attack against the revisionist leadership headquarters with "rifles, automatic rifles, and even B-40 type bazookas." Those troops understood that the revisionists were not in any way "friends gone astray with wrong ideas" or "fellow revolutionaries with a mistaken, opportunist line" -- they were the enemy, 100%.

The editorial, however, (unlike the much better editorial from Jan 25: "Liberal Politicos and Revisionists Ally With Imperialism on Vietnam") obscures this crucial point. It refers to the Hanoi lizards as "revolutionary leaders with a right opportunist line" or simply "revolutionaries" whom the Soviets convinced to negotiate. The revisionists are viewed not as our enemy, but rather as revolutionaries who failed: "Their own opportunist line of fighting for 'national liberation' rather than socialism proved their undoing," according to the editorial. The point is, however, that while the working class was undone, the revisionists, on the contrary, did very well for themselves. In exchange for maintaining the new "peace", the revisionists will be allowed junior partnership not only with the Soviet, but now also with the new U.S. imperialist penetration of North Vietnam, the details of which were probably in Kissinger's briefcase when he went to deliver the \$2.5 Billion "aid" to Hanoi.

If anything is to be learned from the war, it is the truth of the following passage from RR11(2) :

Road to Revolution--II

148, 149

Revisionism is the main ally of U.S. imperialism. In fact, revisionism is imperialism and its ideas camouflaged within the ranks of the revolutionary movement. The main goals of revisionism are to crush existing revolutionary movements, to prevent the development of new revolutionary movements, and to subvert socialism and restore capitalism where the revolution has triumphed.

Actually, all the work of revolutionary fighters should be measured by their efforts against revisionism and whether, in practice, they pursue a revolutionary path. Any battle is lost to the extent revisionism is obscured or not fought in an all-out way.

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Yet many people within the revolutionary movement, or allied with it, who recognize that revisionism is wrong, do not clearly understand its counter-revolutionary nature. Because of this, the fight against revisionism is partial and is not viewed as a life-and-death matter. Revisionism and imperialism are not equated. Instead, revisionism and revisionists are viewed as "the lesser of

two evils." Revisionists are considered as somewhat better than imperialists, and the attitude is fostered that you can do business with them.

The Hanoi revisionists are the political representatives of the Vietnamese national bourgeoisie. Their role in the war was always to USE the mass movement as a battering ram against the U.S. in order to get for themselves (as junior partners of Soviet and Chinese Imperialism) as large a slice of the pie of capitalist exploitation as possible -- NOT to abolish or even lessen that exploitation. In the period from 1954 to 1961, they tried to prevent the NLF from even forming, lest it upset their cozy deal with the U.S. Today, they "stopped the war" when they figured they'd gotten from the U. S. about as much as they could. As RR 111 says, Pg. 70 :

"In the former colonial world, which is still dominated by imperialism, the local bourgeoisies stand to gain from the conflicts between the imperialists. In general it is to the interests of the whole [local] bourgeoisie to unite against the main imperialist dominating a given country; they do so by allying with weaker imperialists, chiefly with the rising imperialist power which is globally challenging the dominant imperialist power.

"When the communist movement can work out an alliance against the ~~the~~ "main enemy" between the workers and peasants on one side, and the bourgeoisie on the other, it is objectively forming an alliance with all the secondary imperialists fighting the same "main enemy". In today's ~~market~~ world that means ~~uniting~~ uniting with Soviet, Japanese, German, French, and Italian imperialists against U.S. imperialists."

Some people argue, and the ~~the~~ editorial implicitly agrees, that Ho Chi Minh and his cohorts may have been opportunist~~s~~ towards the local bourgeoisie, but that doesn't mean they are, themselves, the local bourgeoisie. This is why the ~~the~~ editorial should have made a class analysis of the revisionists along the same lines as Marx in his analyses of the class struggles in France. In his "18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" he discusses a certain political party -- the "Montagne" or "Social Democrats" -- which, in 1849 came to represent an alliance of the petty bourgeoisie (shopkeepers etc.) and the proletariat against the big bourgeoisie. Marx's method of analyzing the Social Democrats can be used to analyze the present day revisionists, and future C-D articles should reflect this analysis. The following is from Marx's "18th Brumaire..." :

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The peculiar character of the Social-Democracy is epitomized in the fact that democratic-republican institutions are demanded as a means, not of doing away with two extremes, capital and wage labour, but of weakening their antagonism and transforming it into harmony. However different the means proposed for the attainment of this end may be, however much it may be trimmed with more or less revolutionary notions, the content remains the same. This content is the transformation of society in a democratic way, but a transformation within the bounds of the petty bourgeoisie. Only one must not form the narrow-minded notion that the petty bourgeoisie, on principle, wishes to enforce an egoistic class interest. Rather, it believes that the *special* conditions of its emancipation are the *general* conditions within the frame of which alone modern society can be saved and the class struggle avoided. Just as little must one imagine that the democratic representatives are indeed all shopkeepers or enthusiastic champions of shopkeepers. According to their education and their individual position they

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may be as far apart as heaven from earth. What makes them representatives of the petty bourgeoisie is the fact that in their minds they do not get beyond the limits which the latter do not get beyond in life, that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same problems and solutions to which material interest and social position drive the latter practically. This is, in general, the relationship between the *political* and *literary* representatives of a class and the class they represent. |

Likewise, the politicians in Hanoi are not necessarily all overt businessmen, and according to their education and their individual position (son of ~~the~~ a wealthy landowner, or daughter of a poor peasant) they may be as far apart as heaven from earth. But what makes them representatives of the Vietnamese Bourgeoisie is the fact that in their minds (their line of all-class unity for national liberation) they do not go anywhere except where the Vietnamese bourgeoisie wants to go in its efforts to use the masses to play the imperialists off against each other. The revisionists have state power; they use it to carry ~~the~~ out a line which represents the interests of the local bourgeoisie, and consequently, as in the Soviet Union and China, they have the same relationship to the exploiting local bourgeoisie as Nixon has to the U.S. bourgeoisie.-- they're bosses, not "revolutionaries."

Had the editorial made this point clear, and explained that nationalism isn't just a wrong idea that doesn't seem to work, but an ideology invented by the bourgeoisie to maintain their rule, then all the other points in the editorial would have been clearer.

For instance, one comrade in our club discussion raised a question about the statement in the editorial that "Their sellout was insured because the strategy of socialism was ~~the~~ never put forward." He asked, "why are you a sellout just because you don't call for Socialism. A lot of our friends in WAM, trade unions, SDS etc are honest reformers who don't call for socialism -- are they therefore sellouts and/or revisionists?" We decided the

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answer is "no". The editorial is confusing. It seems to imply that the revisionists fought the U. S. for reforms and for the "national interest" but that somehow these "revolutionaries" were good, but not good enough because the failure to call for Socialism "proved their undoing."

But this is wrong. The revisionists, contrary to popular myth, are NOT reformers who fight for reforms but stop short of Socialism and go for "national liberation" instead. Revisionists not only oppose Socialism, they (as all bosses) oppose reforms that benefit workers too!! The sharpest illustration of this fact in Vietnam is to consider: If the NLF-PRG-DRV leadership had any concern WHATSOEVER for the quality of life of the workers and peasants under capitalism, then why didn't LeDuc Tho and Co. demand in Paris, in exchange for an end to the war, AT LEAST a 10% raise for the workers in South Vietnam, or a 10% reduction in taxes on the peasants??* Surely all the years of fighting, nearly ripping the U.S. army to pieces, could have won at LEAST that, if not Socialism!

In our club discussion, a good deal of confusion resulted from viewing revisionists as simply reformers who claim to be communists but don't fight for Socialism. Experience shows however that most reformers, in spite of their opposition to revolution, are interested in winning reforms by fighting for them -- which means raising the level of struggle, something communists are very much for also, hence the basis for a united front with them. Revisionists on the other hand actually lower the level of struggle -- for instance telling students who are militantly burning down ROTC to work for the Democratic Party INSTEAD. When the reform movement reaches the fighting level of Vietnam in 1967 or the 1968 General Strike in France, in other words, when millions of reform oriented workers and others are faced with the IMMEDIATE CHOICE of either going one step further and overthrowing the bosses' government OR retreating by allowing the government to stand, that's when a real communist party can win millions from reform to revolution and Socialism; and that's exactly when the revisionists show their completely reactionary essence by calling for anything and everything EXCEPT REVOLUTION FOR SOCIALISM. In this sense, it is true that "their sellout was insured because Socialism was never put forward."

In conclusion, we feel that Challenge-Desafio should always stress that revisionists represent a section of the international bourgeoisie, that they are in no way whatsoever on the side of the revolutionary or even pro-working class reform movements of the world, and that, following the example of the 1,000 NLF anti-revisionist soldiers, the international workers movement must also fight the revisionist bourgeoisie with peoples' war for Socialism.

* Instead, they only argued over the form of government for capitalist rule.

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New York City, Feb.

To Progressive Labor Party

Dear comrades,

about/

These are my comments / the pre-convention bulletin #1.

Very adequate and correct in the analysis of the great movement inside it, and of the tradeunionism that younger workers are pushing forward, a more militant tradeunionism. But I don't think that that by itself is not a revolution, nor I think it is revolutionary to spark a socialist revolution. But it is helping to bring about the changes that are taking place in the young workers of the future, which along with the capitalist crisis that is nearing, and with the following imperialist war that is coming, makes possible such revolution.

The issue is not whether if it is this or the other worker, or even the whole of the working class, what he is considering at this actual moment, what are its goals and purposes. The question is: What is the proletariat? And for its consequences, for being a worker, it will be compelled to act, to carry out and to realize the mission of its task.

I celebrate very much that a great ideological party, PLP, repudiates "economist opportunist", to win over an easy acceptance, or opportunist recognition by fighters just because of dollars and pennies. PLP has known how to avoid the distortion created by this, by means of militant ideological unity, that avoids the political alienation and degeneration. Something completely different from the pseudo-communist parties like the "C" P, etc. But we know that we have to win over those members plainly, so that they know that we are not the beasts that the "C" P says we are, ferocious doctrinaires that bite all the ideology; an ~~ax~~ accusation that reflects the failure of those that have not reached that selfrealization, that shows the fury and irritation of the sarcastic revisionism: Communism is more goulash (Krushchev)

Warm greeting to the national committee in the convention. Lots of triumphs and ideological accuracy, and of course, also in the political.

Gabriel

a friend of PLP