

May 1972

Report by Dan Rosenshine on tour in Europe, covering following points:

1. Antiwar formations in Europe.
2. The work of Fourth International groups and their perspectives, in antiwar movement

BELGIUM:

This is the one country (along with Switzerland -- although the CP is less involved there) where the forces around the spring actions gave the appearance of a broad coalition involving ourselves, the CP, and other forces.

Our comrades favored a single national mobilization in Brussels, the place with the largest student population where the large actions have been held in the past. It is also central to both the French and Flemish sections of Belgium. They began arguing for this in the fall, when there were no really organized actions. At that time, emergency Belgian elections had been called which distracted the reformists. By chance, the CP youth had called an action on November 6 against NATO. Our forces joined it, introducing the Indochina war. There were about 2,000 people.

The Versailles conference and the upturn in the war produced a reactivization of the reformist forces. The Versailles delegation was organized by Henri Rolin and Jean Godin, social democrats who head the National Vietnam Committee, and the CP, which operates through the Belgian Union for the Defense of Peace.

After Versailles a discussion took place about when to hold actions. Interestingly, the NVC leaders and CPers had the impression that April 15-22 had been the call of the Versailles conference. And through them, our comrades had the same impression.

The trade union leaders in Liege took the initiative to have the action there. Our comrades thought this was a poor choice and argued for Brussels. The CP said "we must support our trade union brothers' decision," and influenced the NVC leaders accordingly. Thus this decision had two elements: some union leaders (the key one is Jacques Yerna an old co-editor of La Gauche from the entry period) wanting to move into the antiwar movement and responding to the Versailles and NPAC call; and secondly, the CP not wanting a central national demonstration, which would be the largest.

Also the Flemish pacifists had already called a May 6 action for Antwerp. The decision was made to have the National Vietnam Committee be the umbrella for these actions. An additional mass meeting in Brussels on April 20 was added, which our forces played the key role in building through the high school and university committees. The CP initiated the University committee in December and we joined it. They are numerically stronger in it. We initiated the high school committee, which the CP youth are also in -- they share the formal leadership. We are stronger in the high school committee.

One important factor in our work has been the availability of a key comrade to work full time as party "anti-imperialist director." The comrade was basically between jobs and the political bureau decided to have him delay getting a new job until after the antiwar actions. Thus he could spend time on the University campus and in negotiations with the various forces. The Belgian section has no paid full timers.

The office of the Belgian Union for the Defense of Peace (BUDP) was used as the center for leaflet distributions and bus arrangements. We had no comrades working in this office. As the actions

approached, the CP began to cause problems, trying to reverse decisions on speakers and fighting us even within the high school committee. The first time I went through Belgium there was an anti-Trotskyism campaign being carried on in CP public meetings -- at the same time that there were good relations between their activists and ours in the antiwar work. By April 22, this had shifted and they were obviously looking for a way to blow things up.

For instance on the morning of April 22, the CPers cancelled 2 of the 3 buses that had been reserved to go from Brussels to Liege, leaving enough room only for their own people. Our comrades reversed this, taking the independents on their bus. Also, Isabelle Blum (president of the BUDP), began a campaign in the last two days to get me knocked off as a speaker in Liege and this went right down to the wire. Jacques Yerna, the Liege union leader, would not agree to this, and the NVC people went along with Yerna.

The CP also tried to blow things up over an incident that happened at the Brussels teach-in. A play put on by a troupe (whose leaders are close to us) ended the event. This contained indirect references to the betrayal of the CP after the second world war and to some social democratic leaders. Henri Rolin took the mike and disassociated himself from the play, walking out. By the next day, he was convinced (I think prompted by the CP) that his board members were going to resign over this incident and that it was impossible to work with "these people" any more. He is a very conservative figure (and over 80) who has been the figurehead of the NVC. He told me the play had "negative references to our social system and educational system" and had been pro-Palestine and anti-Israel. Actually, on the second point, there had been a large number of Arab students who were chanting "Palestine and Indochina -- One Struggle" and the PRG speaker had solidarized himself with the Palestinian revolution.

The way things were set up, this was a natural conflict. The NVC was given co-decision making ability in all three Belgian actions. This meant the more militant student movement had to work out the Brussels teach-in program with them.

Our comrades position is that there should be a national antiwar conference held in June. They are trying to get agreement now for a Brussels demonstration in the fall.

Isabelle Blum is an old-time Stalinist operative on the executive committee of the World Peace Council. At one meeting she blurted out that she had received a call from the French CP peace organization warning her about the NPAC tour and also to be sure not to have FSI speakers. Our comrades fought for a French FSI speaker, but had an untenable position because the list was already long with the obvious first choices -- Vietnamese, some Belgians, NPAC. There was no open opposition to my speaking until the day before the 22nd of April.

Given the relation of forces, there is room for maneuver, although the CP will be doing everything it can to break things up. For instance, Verstappen (a dissident CPer known for his activism), and Jean Godin (the administrator of NVC) have good relations with our people, going back in Godin's case to the Algerian revolution. But how much weight they have, or how much they would fight, is an open question.

One of the central university figures is a Maoist, Guy Bernard, who blocks with the CP on every occasion. In the actual running of the University teach-in, it was the CP youth who were most around the stage, making announcements etc. But I believe our comrades, although numerically weaker, had had the leverage within this committee.

LUXEMBOURG: I was there a day and a half during a central committee meeting of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire, to which Carol Lipman and I each gave reports. The recent issue of their paper had just printed a picture of an NPAC brochure and appealed for a united front on the basis of the NPAC demands.

Our comrades' antiwar work has been mostly on the level of their own propagandistic meetings and organizing meetings on April 24 (in their own name) and on November 6 (with the Maoists). Last December, reformist forces organized a local meeting with Vietnamese speakers. Our comrades, jointly with the Maoists, intervened in this meeting by reading a statement on the floor denouncing the reformists for refusing to organize a genuine united front. The CPers walked out of the meeting in protest.

The general conception of the comrades is that they want an ongoing organization like the FSI, based on solidarity demands with the Vietnamese revolution. The Maoists, they feel, are the element they should discuss things with first and then approach the other organizations. The Maoist group, Kommunistischer Forbund, may even be a little larger than our comrades numerically. However, they are having internal problems now and they are forced to respond to our comrades. The comrades know the leaders of this group well, since they had a hard fight with them in the radical student movement that led to the formation of the Trotskyist group which began as a minority split of 17 people from another formation (Maoist dominated). Since then our comrades have grown steadily and hold the initiative.

The conception of the comrades -- this is the same in most countries -- is that they will form united fronts on the basis of Immediate Withdrawal and then insist on their right to carry pro-Vietnamese revolution banners. One of the two central leaders pointed out that they would be able to rally the majority of any action between themselves and the Maoists and the demonstration would be viewed as occurring around their slogans anyway. There was a nuance of difference between the two central leaders. One of them thought they could make a concession on doing this if, in fact, there was a real prospect of getting a bloc in action.

Their conception of the united front is to approach the one or two central reformist leaders with a proposal for joint action on a joint slogan. If this is refused, it serves as a basis to issue an immediate statement denouncing the reformists, in hard terms. The idea of building the action and forcing people in, at the same time as you carry out general and continuous polemics, is not an experience they have gone through.

A meeting was set up with the Maoists, the LCR, and the most sympathetic Vietnam Committee leader to discuss prospects for April 22. I was also there. The Vietnam Committee leader did not come. I spoke with the Maoist leader. He was what would be called a "centrist (not a crazy) Maoist." It appeared his group had decided to support Indochina demonstrations. This person is a full-time worker for the Maoists, and also runs a China-Luxembourg Friendship Association, with all the direct and indirect benefits of that. The Maoist group -- like our comrades -- has offices and bookstores in several cities. They even have a telephone in their main office, which our comrades do not yet. Our comrades do not yet have any paid full-timers, although there is a couple who work full-time, apparently on their own means.

After the offensive the Vietnam Committee decided to have an action on Thursday, April 27. Our comrades convinced them to move it

to Saturday, April 29, and the Vietnamese sent a speaker to this event. The Vietnam Committee leaders are the people the Vietnamese have relations with.

HOLLAND: I went to Holland for a day and a half with a few names and no phone numbers. Through a staff worker at Vrij Nederland newspaper I got complete addresses of groups.

I went to the ASVA office (student government at U. of Amsterdam); this is controlled by the CP. They sent me around the corner to the Youth Campaign for Vietnam office, planning a large action for April 29-30. This was formed in January at the initiative of the CP youth and has a broad list of liberal and religious youth groups attached to it. The CP young people run the office and I am sure they are making gains out of this work. They are running a typical Stalinist operation -- distributing the CP youth paper out of this office, etc. Before I came there was an incident where the Young Social Democrats walked out of the committee over a question of slogans. The CPers' sectarian attitude was "good riddance." Vrij Nederland, in turn, ran a gossip piece on this. Their staff worker either didn't know or didn't tell me about the April 29 action.

I had a long discussion with Youth Campaign leaders, who were very impressed with NPAC material. The Dutch CP is somewhat of a maverick in Europe (the strongest pro-Moscow leaders left and are now a section of the leadership of the Pacifist Socialist Party). These youth CPers criticized the Versailles conference, to which they had not gone, as a "no-action" meeting and "Russian-oriented." One of them said the exclusion of the FSI was "stupid and uncalled for."

They asked which "of the 400 groups within NPAC I was a member of. I told them "the SWP" (not saying I was a Trotskyist). They wanted to know if the American CP was in NPAC. I told them no and explained about PCPJ and NPAC. They said nothing direct about the American CP. I had many unity formulations toward PCPJ, while describing its character. They were incredulous.

I raised the question of an NPAC speaker, which they responded favorably to but said they "would have to check with the other groups." By this time, they were on their guard since 1) I was obviously not a CPer, 2) they didn't know what the SWP was, 3) and I told them I had met the editor of Revolte as part of checking in with all groups who are on our contact list. They obviously checked with someone and got filled in, since they told me on the phone that their speakers list was full.

Among the speakers on April 29 were the head of the CP, the head of the Social Democratic parliamentary group, and a PRG rep.

I also met with Martin Van Dulleman of the Vietnam Bulletin. He is an earnest antiwar analyst and has been consistently active since 1955. He is a centrist, with liberal inclinations. He is one of the few figures I met who has European-wide knowledge of the antiwar movement. Although politically naive, he represents a milieu of people who are sincere and consistent activists. The medical and scientific support people and Vietnam Bulletin group have probably done the most highly developed work of their type in Europe. Van Dulleman gets the Guardian airmail, The Militant "irregularly," and picks up Inter-continental Press in a bookstore. He thinks IP is very good.

It was clear that Van Dulleman and the forces he works with are

trying to take some kind of initiative on a national level, to create an ongoing formation for actions. He was the organizer of the Dutch contingent at Versailles. We did not have time to discuss Versailles, except that he indicated it was "a lot of speeches."

On the question of exclusion, Van Dulleman said he was excluded from working with the Youth Campaign. It was unclear if it was a finished job of exclusion or just not inviting forces the CP doesn't like and these forces not making an issue of it. The CP youth claimed they were excluded from the Versailles conference (also they probably didn't want to go). Van Dulleman said this wasn't true, but it doesn't look like he went out of his way to get them.

On the Revolte and De Internationale groups and antiwar work (Revolte is a youth organization friendly to us; De Internationale is the former Pabloite group): their central activity has been in the entry work in the Pacifist Socialist Party. The left wing (Proletarian Links) was kicked out in the fall and now has its own paper. They are now in Proletarian Links. Pieterston of Revolte said they made two initiatives: tried to get groups together in the fall for Nov. 6 -- this was interpreted by PSP figures as a maneuver in the internal PSP fight, also by Van Dulleman, otherwise Pieterston said they might have had some success. Second, in January after the bombing, he made phone calls to a number of groups but this was the exact time the Youth Campaign was initiated by the CP.

I discussed with Pieterston the question of the united front and slogans. He held the position (which I heard many times) that the European antiwar movement does not have an objective importance, but is more important for the politicalization of the vanguard. Revolte will go with its own banners to the April 29 action. Pieterston agreed that if the opportunities presented themselves it would be correct to build a broad action movement on immediate withdrawal and then have a "pro-NLF-wing" that would march with its own banners within it.

GERMANY: The initial phone contacts with the German comrades were not positive. They had attempted Nov. 6 actions in the fall, mobilizing several hundred people in a couple of cities. They said the Indochina work was "under discussion."

I came through for two days. I met with two comrades in the GIM office in Frankfurt. They strongly felt that the SWP's work in the antiwar movement is exemplary and historically important on a world scale. As with many questions, they were completely open on our approach to the antiwar movement, the nature of the united front, etc. They agreed with me on the 7 points. However, any discussion on action was colored by 1) the general relation of forces in Germany, their size, etc., 2) the current problems of building a national organization in Germany, including the fusion of the RKJ and the GIM (the youth organization and the section), and some fights they have with ultra-lefts (their characterization) in the organization over Mandel defense work.

I attended a central committee meeting, held in Speyer, south of Mannheim. I also gave a report to about 25 people in Mannheim at an RKJ meeting. The RKJ meeting seemed somewhat heterogenous -- some of them have heard rumors about the SWP from PLers and even a member of the Communist Tendency, and from the Lyn Marcus group. One person asked about the Proletarian Orientation discussion at the last convention. On the antiwar movement, some of them were very attentive and agreed

with what I had to say, others obviously thought we were some kind of reformist group. Afterwards, two central RKJ leaders explained that some "new members" don't understand the tremendous importance of the SWP's work to build a mass movement for immediate withdrawal, that the German leadership has discussed this and thinks it's absolutely crucial work, etc.

I reported at the central committee meeting. The Vietnamese offensive had begun. By this time they were beginning to think the prospects for actions were better and were discussing which cities, etc. In fact some centrist-Maoists had called our people to see what they were doing. These Maoists had heard about April 22 from their comrades in Luxembourg.

Diana Johnston, an NPAC supporter living in France, spoke at the Berlin demonstration of over 10 thousand on April 22. It was built by an ad hoc coalition of 35 groups. It is unclear what role GIM played in this.

I had a discussion with Hervard, one of the central leaders of the RKJ, about slogans. He put forward the standard analysis about the politicalization of the vanguard, colored by a sense of weakness in front of student ultralefts and Maoists who would attack them if they changed the axis of their work. He said, also by now standard, "of course, if there were the opportunities to force in the reformist organizations around Out Now, this would be correct, but there is no opportunity to do this." He was very hard against the 7 points saying it is a class collaborationist document and it is foolish to have anything to do with it.

SWITZERLAND: I gave a report to a part of the Zurich branch of the Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire, quickly set up, because there had been a communications problem with Switzerland, lack of phone numbers, etc.

All but one of the people at the meeting were in their early twenties. They have had no contact with the American movement and I think some of them were relatively new. They responded positively to our antiwar strategy and asked good questions.

Pia, the one central older comrade, explained a little on their antiwar work. At first the IMR called for April 22 and did all the contacting in its own name. Then they broadened to an April 22 national committee, based on the sponsorship and participation of individuals from different groups -- local groups of the young social democrats, the international war resisters league, the women's liberation movement, the Autonomous Socialist Party, and local leaders of the social democracy and the Swiss CP. For instance, Pia had just had a discussion on antiwar work with some Zurich leaders of the CP where they had come to some agreements. He was bemused by this, saying these same people were "out to kill me twenty years ago." He said PSA helped us initiate the broader committee.

Unfortunately, I got sick while in Zurich and had to cancel the trip to Lausanne where an internal meeting had been organized.

ITALY: I remained sick through the Italian trip and this limited very much any discussions I could have with the comrades. Livio was disappointed with this -- as well as the fact that Italy had only 3 days -- and this should be taken into account in future trips.

Meetings were set up in Turin, Rome and Naples co-sponsored by Il Manifesto and the section. This initiative was taken by the section (GCR) on the basis of the NPAC trip. In each case, several smaller groups attached themselves to the meetings as supporters. This was viewed as a good development by our comrades. The meetings were large as a result of the Vietnamese offensive.

I missed the meeting in Turin due to a difficult travel connection, compounded by the physical condition I was in. This was very disappointing to the comrades. Their meeting had between 200 and 400 people and was cosponsored by Il Manifesto, GCR, Collectivo Lenine (a small group described as near to Workers Vanguard), Grupo Gramsci (Maoists, described as "serious not foolish," a new national formation), and Sinistra Studentesca (a local group, a split from the PSIUP). Each group had a speaker, with the summary given by the section speaker. A representative of the Comitato Vietnam from Milan came to the meeting. This group is dormant.

In Rome, there were three speakers at a meeting of over 800 people -- Il Manifesto, Livio and myself. The reception was wildly enthusiastic. Livio concluded the meeting and received a tremendous ovation. This is taken as an important sign, because the Rome campus has been known for its ultraleft currents who hiss at us, etc. Three groups attached themselves as supporting sponsors and each received time for "an intervention" at the end. This included one "semi-Trotskyist" group, one outright Maoist group, and one terrorist group.

In Naples, I spoke at a meeting of 250 along with GCR and Manifesto. It was more passive than the Rome meeting. I met afterward with a number of the Naples comrades.

I also met with Pellegrini, the comrade who edits Bandiera Rossa, and who follows the US antiwar scene somewhat. In general, I thought most of the discussions in Italy were not as productive because of the physical condition I was in.

On antiwar actions: the facts on April 22 are somewhat confused, mostly because there were no real pre-organized actions of any size. At the Turin meeting, the Comitato Vietnam person was reported to have declared they would organize an action on the 22nd in Milan. In Rome there was a discussion going on between the GCR and Manifesto which I couldn't grasp because it was said that Manifesto wanted to have a big rally on April 15 (two days later!). We wanted something on April 22, as I gathered. Apparently nothing happened on this.

I called Livio on April 23 and he reported that small actions or meetings organized by Comitato Vietnam had been held in Milan, Bari and Livorno. He also said the Metal union (a delegate body of a section of it) in Turin had passed a motion solidarizing with April 22 at our initiative. Later I called the office of Comitato Vietnam, and through a two-way translation, they mostly talked about increased medical and financial aid to Vietnam. They did say an action was planned for April 25 or 26 which was being supported by the CP, one of the "SPs" (I didn't catch it) and local unions in Milan. Their information was somewhat contradictory to Livio's, although I couldn't clear this up through the translation through French.

DENMARK: The Danish Vietnam Committee action of 10,000 was on April 15. Luckily, we got Diana Johnston to speak here also. I came through several days later for one day, during which I met with Soren Otto Jensen, a leader of SUF, the Trotskyist group, two leaders of the

Danish Vietnam Committee (separate meetings) and gave an informal report to about 15 of the Copenhagen comrades.

Jensen works full time for SUF. He gave me what history he could of the antiwar movement -- the politics of which have been totally centered in Copenhagen (half the population lives there).

The Danish Vietnam Committee has a long history. It is the action formation led by people in their 20s who are centrists of different types. Some of them were expelled from the CP. They define themselves as the anti-imperialist, mass action, pro-Vietnamese section of the antiwar movement. The CP has another organization called Vietnam 69. In 1969 there was a split in the movement with the CP forming its own group and expelling some DVC leaders from the CP. The DVC also defines itself as one section of the Danish left, it puts out an analysis of the Common Market, and has relations with Palestinian liberation forces (there was a PFLP speaker on April 15), North Korean diplomats. I believe they also organize Cuba solidarity work. They have their own publishing house, Forlaget Demos, which publishes works on many questions.

Our comrades do not participate as members of the DVC, defining it as one centrist component of the Danish left with a heterogeneous composition. They work with it on an organization-to-organization basis, have their own contingents in demonstrations. On occasion their slogans have made DVC leaders mad and in April 1971 they almost came to blows. The DVC and SUF slogans on that occasion are listed in the slogans summary.

The attitude of our comrades to the DVC is colored by a conflict they had within SUF with them in '69-70. SUF (Socialist Youth League) has been the battleground of all tendencies within the Danish youth radicalization. Through a series of battles it defined itself as a sympathizing group of the Fourth International and everyone else left. This took several years.

Recently our relations with DVC have improved. There was a joint DVC-SUF call for an Irish solidarity committee. Some individuals within DVC are judged to be closer to us than any other tendency -- others are hostile.

The two DVC people I met were very friendly. The office worker made a strong plea that antiwar groups "to the left" of the Communist Party must work together on an international scale. They had sent one leader to the Versailles conference, which he criticized.

Johanna Johannesen was assigned to see me as a member of the International Committee. She is an American who has lived in Denmark for 10 years.

She took careful notes on actions around Europe and on the situation in the American movement. They have been exposed to anti-NPAC propaganda around the 7 point question -- this is one of their slogans. She was able to understand our position -- unlike the Swedish Maoists. The idea has existed that NPAC must be like Vietnam 69 because it gathers broad lists of endorsers, including people they could not imagine really support demonstrations. Also, of course, this must reflect some confusion as to what the character of actions in the US should be. But these people also believe that mass actions both in the US and Europe objectively aid the Vietnamese and they look to NPAC as an organized force.

In light of the escalation the CP is beginning to revive its antiwar activity. The DVC leaders were discussing a joint action with

Vietnam 69 for April 26.

Our comrades feel somewhat isolated in the fact of other forces. Their whole experience has been the factional struggle to define SUF. However, they are now trying to build up a center and increasingly project SUF as a force. How much of an organized approach to antiwar work they have was unclear to me. For instance, do they build the actions, or just march in them with their own banners? I think the latter. Would they approach DVC to commonly plan an action? That's within their realm of possibilities. Would they walk in the door of a meeting that had both DVC and the CP to plan an action? Actually, they probably have the leverage to do this. Whether they do is unclear. For example, one of the SUF leaders commented it was correct for the DVC to deny the CP a speaker on April 15 (not just for the DVC's reason -- that the CP had only decided to support the action two days before) but because "we cannot let the CP revive its influence." (The Danish CP is relatively weak. Not only did it lose the DVC leaders but many of its original forces left to form the Larsen SF centrist party in 1958.) This must all be judged in the context of the newness of the group, however.

SWEDEN: This is one of the most complex situations, with many openings both on an antiwar level and a party-building level as related to antiwar work.

Sweden and Denmark were the only places where a comrade sat down and wrote a report on the antiwar situation as soon as I called them. This was Tom Gustaffson, who is one of the central leaders of the RMF (the Revolutionary Marxist League), and is full time director of this work. Gustaffson was one of the founders of the United NLF groups in '65-66 and also, I believe, a member of the KFML (a Maoist-centrist party), in its first years.

I was invited by the United NLF groups to speak at their Friday evening, April 14, mass rally and at the Uppsala demonstration on April 15. They apparently had some reservation about my speaking at the Stockholm demonstration (which was 11,000 people) and sent me to Uppsala. In the letter they sent me they warned that I should not publicly attack the 7 point program in any of the meetings and said this was a condition of speaking. This was a result of a discussion I had with them during Versailles. When I tried to explain our approach it was obvious the person I was talking to was incapable of understanding the ABCs of politics.

The comrades completely agreed from the beginning that it would be very good if I spoke at their actions. The RMF independently sent a letter to the United NLF groups suggesting I speak.

The United NLF groups have dozens of local chapters. I do not know how many members they have. It is totally dominated by the KFML (League of Communists, Marxist-Leninist), which formed itself as a Maoist party out of the NLF groups in 1967. As the KFML became more and more rigid it transferred this rigidity to the NLF groups. In 1968 the NLF groups formally characterized the Soviet Union as "social-imperialist" after the Czech invasion. In 1970 and 1971 they expelled Trotskyists, quoting Dimitrov and Mao Tse-tung on the united front. Since the Trotskyists, you see, are "against the united front" they cannot be members of the united front!

Many of our members and leaders come out of the KFML and the United NLF groups. They are very political people who have thought

through a lot of questions to come to Trotskyism. The central area of their work is confronting the KFML in the antiwar movement. They have an attitude of "critical support" to the United NLF groups -- support to the actions, and participation in the actions around their own slogans. When the NLF groups were formed in 1965 they had 3 main slogans: US Out of Vietnam; Support the National Liberation Front -- Support the Vietnamese People on their own conditions; and Struggle Against US Imperialism. The two slogans of the April 15 actions were US Out of Indochina and support the 7 point peace plan of the PRG.

Our comrades say the United NLF groups should resume the slogan of victory to the NLF. They argue: It was possible to build a large movement around this in the beginning. It was only because of the rightward motion of KFML it was dropped. "Even the Swedish prime minister has said the NLF should win." Also the healthy people who have left United NLF, been kicked out, or are still in it can be organized on the basis of this slogan, to march in separate contingents.

Our comrades organize contingents in demonstrations with Victory to the NLF, Victory to the Vietnamese Revolution, Defend the North Vietnamese Workers State, etc., banners. In Stockholm they said there were 600 people in this contingent out of 11,000; in Goteborg 400 out of 1,700; in Lund 400 or 500 out of 2,300. This is done in a bloc with independents and other organizations particularly the Communist League, a centrist organization. In Goteborg, our contingent included the CP youth, aligned with us against the Maoists.

The Communist League puts forward the idea that since the United NLF groups are bankrupt you should not support the actions. Our comrades say it is a principled question to support any antiwar action and mobilize people for it and fight at the same time for non-exclusion. They force the Communist League in in this way.

Our comrades also hammer away at the KFML and United NLF groups on the questions of united front and non-exclusion. They even say: alright, you have dropped the Support the NLF slogan. We think you should readopt it. But we will still work with you on the basis of the US Out on Indochina slogan, but we insist on our right to carry our banners. There have been a whole series of editorials in Mullvaden taking up these questions.

Our comrades publish a special bulletin, Vansterns Bulletin (Left Bulletin), oriented to left wing currents within the United NLF groups. The form of our participation varies from city to city, depending on the relation of forces.

In Stockholm, where we are relatively weaker (35 people) and KFML is strong, we address letters to the United NLF groups with concrete suggestions for united front actions, taking a generally fraternal tone and raising political motivation for our arguments. A lot of effort went into building the contingent.

In Uppsala, our comrades participated in the planning committee along with United NLF groups, and I believe the Communist League. This took the form of United NLF groups (sponsor of the action) essentially consulting with these groups and having debates in coordinating meetings. In Uppsala, our comrades did not attempt to build a separate contingent -- every banner in the demonstration was cut of the same cloth.

In Goteborg, the United NLF groups are relatively weaker, because the KFML(R) split has been concentrated here (see below). Our comrades are strongest here (45 people) and they try to force the United NLF

groups into an organization-to-organization situation. We put out our own posters for the actions and this time put up more posters than the NLF groups. The CP youth and Communist League (and some other groups) collaborate with us in this approach.

The comrades in Lund and Malmo have a somewhat similar situation to Goteborg. Although we are not as strong relatively. Again, they put out their own posters with their own slogans calling people to the demonstration, and organized contingents.

There was an incident on the Stockholm demonstration. At first, the NLF group marshalls disputed our right to carry banners but had to accede. Gustaffson with four of our marshalls had a bullhorn and was chanting the RMF slogans. Apparently they wandered forward in the demonstration, ahead of the RMF-organized contingent. 30 NLF group marshalls moved in and took the batteries out of their bullhorn. Also the marshalls told some older people who were marching under "Defend the North Vietnamese Workers State" that this was not part of the demonstration. They became confused and went home. (Our comrades relish this slogan because the Maoists are confused about what the criteria for a workers state is!)

One of the debates is over any slogan that refers to the Vietnamese revolution. The Maoists claim the struggle in Vietnam is not a revolution, but "an entire nation united against foreign aggression, etc." They then adduce that our comrades want to turn the NLF groups into a socialist group, since RMF says there is a revolution in Vietnam. Thus, of course, the RMF cannot be members of United NLF groups. As I understood, "Victory for the Vietnamese Revolution" is not the form of the pro-NLF slogan our comrades raise for United NLF to adopt; they maintain their own right to carry it.

I have concentrated on this particular dispute. The other side of the picture, of course, is that the United NLF groups are one of the most well organized antiwar groups in the world. They have a monthly publication on Indochina which they claim a circulation of 65,000 for. If our comrades doubt this figure, they would put it at 55,000. One example about how organized this antiwar group is the way they count the people on their demonstrations. After a national demonstration, such as this one, they will say "there were 23,500 people who marched throughout the country." And, in fact, they do physically count every single person and are known for accurate figures.

The KFML has trained its people in the idea of reaching out and building a broad mass movement. For instance, they get the formal endorsement of social democratic leaders, etc., for their demonstrations. At the same time, the antiwar group has become increasingly rigid under the control of the KFML, which is experiencing the problems of a Maoist organization.

The KFML people I met (leaders of the United NLF) seemed to be ideal prospects for a Moscow-Stalinist type party except for the attitude to the Soviet Union. They stress breadth, but they get the endorsements of reformists without really trying to get the mass reformist organizations to participate in actions. They have a popular front approach to politics. For instance, while they criticize the Swedish Committee for Vietnam (the Bertil Svanstrom, SP, and CP organization) for not working on the mass actions because they "are afraid to work with communists," they themselves want to exclude other banners because it will "alienate the more conservative forces whose endorsements we want to get." They are so right wing they say things

like "Vietnam will not be a communist state" (they have the two stage theory) in order to get "support" for antiwar actions. They pass resolutions for "set the date" at the end of their mass meetings.

In 1970 they had a split and produced a KFML(R) classic third period organization. This group resorts to violence in the movement and is beginning to turn to terrorism, at least in Goteborg they threw a fire-bomb into the USIA office and led isolated street fights with the cops and fascists. KFML(R) maintains that United NLF groups must come out for the formation of a "Marxist Leninist party." They are also not allowed to be members of the United NLF groups.

In Goteborg, our comrades organized a meeting for me, cosponsored with the CP youth, the Communist League, and an anarchist group ("philosophers"). 200 people came. At the same time, a meeting was going on of 11 groups to plan an emergency action for April 22. United NLF was reduced to the position of being one group of 11. A debate took place over non-exclusion of banners (the key issue, I believe, was whether red flags could be carried) and the Maoists had to retreat. This was the first time an action had been organized on this basis and was viewed by RMF as a sign for the future.

The emphasis of the polemic with United NLF groups is both on the NLF slogan and on non-exclusion, with different weight in different situations. I argued that the central question is non-exclusion and building broad united actions -- and that this was the issue on which they could get the most support, as well as being the most important for the antiwar movement itself. A number of the RMF leaders were receptive to this argument.

Their attitude to the 7 point program was similar to the German comrades, etc. This is not a good program for the antiwar movement and as Trotskyists we shouldn't come out for it either. Gustaffson was surprised when I told him the FSI supports the 7 points.

In general, our comrades are very aggressive, politically serious, anxious for discussion, and well organized.

Two final facts: KFML has (as I remember) 1,500 actual members. The CP is beginning to pay more and more attention to the United NLF groups, which encourages this. The Vietnamese have very close relations with the United NLF groups -- indicated in our discussions in Paris.

There were also a number of immediate response actions on April 22; TV and radio appearances for me. This has been summarized in the report to The Militant.

One general characteristic of the United NLF people is provincialism --they know nothing about the rest of Europe. Recently they've made moves for Scandinavian-wide coordination. Apparently the Finnish and Norwegian NLF groups are also run by Maoist formations. The Danish Vietnam Committee is different and has some criticisms of the Maoists. The four groups meet every two months. Apparently they do not keep in close touch between meetings. One of the big points of the United NLF leaders is "solidarity with the US antiwar movement." Thus they were forced into a certain position vis-a-vis an NPAC representative.

What will be the evolution of this complex situation in Sweden? The NLF groups are buoyed up by the war question itself, their reputation, and the size of the KFML cadre. But in many ways this group is reaching its limits and is additionally affected by the crisis of Maoism. Will the United NLF lose relative position and become defined as one group, a sort of tendency, within the general antiwar

movement? One that is forced to work with other groups on a national scale? They are beginning to feel pressure in this direction and our comrades are the critical factor.

FRANCE: When I returned to Paris on April 23, I began to set up follow up discussions to report on the trip and lay the basis of the FSI to do more work on a Europe-wide basis. I suggested a brief report to the Political Bureau meeting on April 24 to cover general features of the Europe trip and the situation in the US antiwar movement. However they had a lengthy discussion scheduled to analyze the Pompidou referendum and this was not possible.

Stephanie and I were scheduled to report to the Indochina commission on April 25. However only Stern and Bettel (for part of the meeting) came. Stern and Bettel are the two Political Bureau members responsible for leading the Indochina work. We gave a detailed report on the formations throughout Europe and the work of our sections. At the end of this report, we suggested that another meeting be set up to discuss the following points: 1) the 7 point program and our approach to it; 2) the question of slogans in general and the nature of the united front in the antiwar movement; and 3) a clear description of the League leadership's projections on the FSI work. Stern said he welcomed having some general political discussion and said he would contact comrades from the Indochina Commission for a meeting late in the evening on April 27.

It turned out Stephanie was ill and could not make the meeting. Stern was the only French comrade who came and he and I had a lengthy discussion. (Note: I do not think the absence of the other leading comrades in this work at these meetings indicates lack of interest. The main problem seemed that the meetings were decided on but may not have been fully organized.) The following is a resumé of that discussion.

1. History of FSI. Outlined importance of Vietnam in producing the upsurge of the revolutionary left in the '60s. Pointed out the large assignment of our forces to the National Vietnam Committee work in 1966-67. There was a separate Maoist formation which Stern said built base committees and did consistent work. Part of the reason for two formations existing was that the Maoists insisted that the antiwar movement support the program of the NLF, whereas Stern said we argued against this in two ways: 1) strategy for the antiwar movement outside of Vietnam; and 2) as Trotskyists we did not agree with the written program of the NLF.

He had a more rounded analysis than other comrades I talked with of why the post-May-June period saw a decline of this work. It was not just "increased interest in making the revolution in France itself" but that large sectors of the radicalized layers were spontaneists and had neither the discipline or political perspective to carry forward this work.

In the 1968-70 period we did Indochina work by having some small demonstrations, coverage in our press, and mobilizing for CP organized demonstrations. By 1970 a discussion began to take place in the League about resuming this work on a higher scale. Stern said that each stage of this discussion -- and still today -- there have been differences about how much emphasis to put on this work.

Thus there was a concurrent discussion both within the League and in the far left about resuming this work. Stern's evaluation was that the Vietnamese themselves were an important factor in this

discussion. He said that to a great extent the Vietnamese themselves had taken the initiative to establish relations with the League. The sight of this development had general leverage within the far left (presumably within the League as well) and put the League in the position where other tendencies felt they had to follow the CL initiatives. Once the FSI was formed the relations were on the level of Vietnamese-FSI discussions.

Stern stressed the importance of initiating the FSI so that it was broad or at least looked broad. An important factor in this is the CL relations with independent intellectuals and Indochina experts.

There are constant problems within the FSI, particularly with the PSU, the left socialist party, which is under the pressure of the ultralefts. The PSU will not mobilize for an FSI action unless the ultralefts have made a similar decision. The first debate was over whether to have a contingent in the CP initiated demonstration in May 1971. The PSU was against this. We argued that out and won the support of the intellectuals, etc. After this fight the Revolution group (the former Communist League minority) left the FSI.

There has also been a constant fight with the PSU over the structure of the FSI. The PSU wants the FSI to be only a coordinating and service body at the top. The League wants base committees to be formed and has taken the initiative to do this. There are no national membership cards, but the base committees print their own at our suggestion. Stern thought the idea of some kind of national FSI conference would be "laughed at" by the other forces in the FSI because "everyone knows the base committees are controlled by the League."

Stern was very strong on base committees. He said the key role of the FSI is to involve newly politicizing people who have not been through all the fights of the left but who are politicizing on the Indochina question. He said there is a great potential for this -- citing the Catholic left as a source of activists it would be a big gain to involve.

Stern said there is a very uneven approach from city to city, and district to district, toward FSI work. He said that wherever base committees have been seriously done, with the assignment of leading comrades, that a layer of consistent activists has been involved. The fact that some cities have active base committees (not very many) and that others have an FSI just on paper (and some of these too have been able to mobilize large numbers for actions) is totally dependent on the leadership factor.

He said he wouldn't say this was a political factor, but some other kind of factor he couldn't put his finger on. I asked -- how does the League leadership make its orientation clear to the entire organization -- are there resolutions on this work? -- are there communications to the field? He gave me a discussion bulletin he had written. I asked if this was the same as a resolution. He said "no, but it was understood as the line."

He raised the lack of central organization of the FSI as a problem. I had already mentioned this to him and had a more lengthy discussion with another comrade leading the FSI work. He cited the need for: 1) assignment of more of our cadre to national and Paris-wide work; 2) creation of an FSI staff; 3) setting up an FSI office outside the League office; and 4) raising money so that the FSI would be self-sufficient and not run on the finances of the League.

Stern said these points were being discussed in the Indochina

commission in preparation for a discussion that would take place in the leadership. He implied there was not real agreement within the leadership on any of this, but he thought these steps were absolutely necessary. I said the lack of these things made it impossible for the FSI to be properly organized and also the current situation does not help set an example of leadership for our own comrades. I also said that with over 1,000 people in Paris I was surprised that these things were a problem. I said I frankly thought there was a problem of underutilization of talented people in this work, such as Parisian leaders I had met who seemed more than capable of doing such tasks if there was a decision to have them go full-time.

(NOTE: the FSI operates out of the League offices. There is one semi-full time person. She does not attend bureau meetings of FSI since "she is staff." For the last three months Bettel has been director of the work for the League -- this means he also handles negotiations with other forces and basically plans out the overall FSI tasks. However Bettel has other heavy central leadership responsibilities as well as being a part-time doctor. Everyone recognized this was an impossible situation, but for a period of time there seemed to be no alternative. Now Stern, I believe, is also spending full time on this work.)

2. Character of Vietnamese Leadership and the 7 Point Program. We got into the first question because Stern had asked if the SWP had printed an analysis to explain how the Vietnamese CP with origins in the Third International could be leading a revolutionary struggle. Then when we discussed the importance of antiwar resolutions and communications I commented that our tasks are not dependent on the nature of the Vietnamese leadership.

Stern disagreed. He said, "if some comrades have the idea that the Vietnamese are about to betray, they won't be motivated to do Indochina work." I said my frank opinion was that many League members have the opposite problem in how they regard the Vietnamese, citing the HO HO HO Chi Ming chanting on demonstrations, etc.

We then discussed some aspects of the Vietnamese leadership. Here is a summary of some of his points. 1) The Vietnamese are "empirical revolutionaries." 2) If you study their writings of the period 1939 on (from the left turn of the Hitler-Stalin pact) they embarked on a more and more independent course. 3) The general political resolutions of the N. Vietnamese contain the conception of the permanent revolution. 4) From my understanding, he did not know the correct facts of the elimination of the Vietnamese Trotskyists. For example, he said Tau Thu Tau was killed on local initiative of some Vietnamese Stalinists rather than a central decision. 5) There are bureaucratic deformations in North Vietnam but in general you cannot say there is a consolidation of a bureaucratic caste. 6) In general discounted dangers of coalitionism. 7) I offered some general ideas -- how a bureaucracy is forced to defend the existence of a workers state, how there is a broad mass upsurge in S. Vietnam, how the Vietnamese liberation forces are probably not homogenous and empirical conclusions have undoubtedly been drawn by many people from the experiences of 1954 and Soviet and Chinese roles in the current struggle, how we must be very cautious about characterizations of the S. Vietnamese fighters both because of the Stalinist history, their program, weight of world Stalinism, etc. 8) He said this is too "objectivist." He said a Stalinist party is a reformist party that cuts its own throat like in Indonesia or Sudan.

He is very interested in discussing this question. We were able to make a differentiation between this discussion, which I said is an important discussion for the central leaders of the International and sections to have with each other, and on the other hand, discussions on strategy and perspective for building the antiwar movement on a world scale.

We then got into a discussion of the 7 point program. I said, first of all, as Trotskyists, we are not doing the Vietnamese a favor to say we are for a program that calls for a coalition government. He didn't answer this directly but said he agreed the most important influence we could have as Trotskyists was to build the antiwar movement in every country and this would perhaps enable us to have an influence in the future.

On the 7 point program he argued that the "struggle goes on on three levels -- military, world antiwar movement, and the diplomatic struggle. Granted, the diplomatic struggle is determined by the other two factors. Nevertheless, it was important that the diplomatic proposals of the Vietnamese "have an echo around the world to expose Nixon." We argued back and forth.

3. European Antiwar Movement: One thing stressed by Stern is that he believes the European antiwar movement has an objective effect in helping to determine the world relation of forces. That it is not just a question of work among the politicized vanguard. This is a different approach than many comrades have.

He was not as encouraged as I was on the information from the various countries. He pointed to the lack of ongoing formations and did not note the relative improvement of the work of our sections this spring.

SURVEY OF SLOGANS OF EUROPEAN ANTIWAR GROUPS AND FOURTH INTERNATIONAL GROUPS, compiled by Dan Rosenshine

I. FRANCE: 1) The main FSI mass distribution leaflet for April 15 ended with the following:

LONG LIVE THE INDOCHINESE REVOLUTIONARY FRONT!
LONG LIVE THE POPULAR WAR OF VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA!
SOLIDARITY WITH THE AMERICAN ANTIWAR MOVEMENT!
SUPPORT THE P.R.G. PEACE PLAN!
P.R.G. TO SAIGON!

2) The FSI 2-color brochure, describing the week of actions had the following: particular slogans followed portions of text.

After the section "A war which does not cease to intensify"

ENOUGH -- NOT ONE MORE BOMB OVER INDOCHINA
DEMAND:

THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL END TO BOMBARDMENTS OF INDOCHINA
THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL US FORCES FROM
INDOCHINA

After the section "The price of world peace"

VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, LAOS, THEIR STRUGGLE IS OURS. INDOCHINA WILL WIN!
WORLD SOLIDARITY FOR THE PEOPLES OF INDOCHINA, FOR THE TOTAL VICTORY
OVER THE IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS!

After the section "Our responsibilities"

NOT A SOU, NOT AN ARM FOR THE PUPPET REGIMES OF INDOCHINA! RUPTURE
OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SAIGON, PHNOM PENH AND VIENTIANE!
RECOGNITION OF THE GRP AND DRV, OF THE GRUNK AND THE LAO PATRIOTIC
FRONT AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INDOCHINESE PEOPLE!
UNMASK INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GENOCIDE AGAINST
THE PEOPLES OF INDOCHINA!

After the section "The struggle of all the workers and the peoples
of the world"

WE DEMONSTRATE THE 15th
DURING ALL THE WEEK OF THE 15th TO THE 22nd OF APRIL
WE AFFIRM OUR SUPPORT TO THE AMERICAN ANTIWAR MOVEMENT, OUR INTER-
NATIONAL SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLES OF INDOCHINA!
FOR THE VICTORY OF THE INDOCHINESE REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
UNTIL THE FINAL VICTORY -- TOTAL SUPPORT

3) The lead article in the 4/29 Rouge concludes with the following:

SUPPORT THE 7 POINTS OF THE PRG
TOTAL SUPPORT UNTIL THE FINAL VICTORY

4) The lead article in the 4/25 Solidarité Indochine, organ of the
FSI, concludes with:

HELP STOP THE CRIMINAL HANDS OF NIXON
IMMEDIATE HALT TO ALL US BOMBING OF INDOCHINA
IMMEDIATE RESTARTING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE
RISE UP AGAINST THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND YANKEE IMPERIALISM
WITH THE CONDEMNATION OF THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD

II. BELGIUM:

1) There were four slogans on the Liege trade union-National Vietnam
Committee mass distributed leaflet: (from memory)

AGAINST THE INDIRECT SUPPORT BY BELGIUM FOR THE INDOCHINA WAR THROUGH
PARTICIPATION IN NATO DOMINATED BY THE U.S.
FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE AMERICAN FORCES OF AGGRESSION
FROM INDOCHINA
FOR AN IMMEDIATE END OF THE BOMBING
FOR THE RECOGNITION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF NORTH VIETNAM

The leaflet had three sections headed: THE AGGRESSION CONTINUES;
THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES; THE SOLIDARITY MUST CONTINUE

2) The national brochure of the National Vietnam Committee had the
same three headings on sections.

The slogans were the same, except: it omitted the slogan on the
bombing and had two additional:

CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE WORLDWIDE CAMPAIGN OF SOLIDARITY
WITH THE INDOCHINESE PEOPLES AND THE AMERICAN PACIFISTS
SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE PLANS OF THE PRG, THE FUNK AND THE LAO PATRIOTIC
FRONT

3) Among the slogans in La Gauche are:

STOP THE BOMBING
SUPPORT TO THE PRG
SOLIDARITY WITH THE AMERICAN ANTIWAR MOVEMENT
VIETNAM, LAOS, CAMBODIA -- INDOCHINA WILL WIN
LONG LIVE THE INDOCHINESE REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
PRG, ON TO SAIGON

These last two were prominent in the LRT-JGS contingent.

III. LUXEMBOURG:

We don't have any of the materials from the Luxembourg demonstration.

The LRT will participate under slogans similar to "long live the Indochinese Revolutionary Front, PRG to Saigon," etc.

IV. HOLLAND:

The four slogans of the Youth Campaign for Vietnam are:

IMMEDIATE HALT TO THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM AND THE REST OF
INDOCHINA
AMERICAN FORCES OUT OF VIETNAM AND THE REST OF INDOCHINA
DUTCH GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION OF THE DRV
STOP DUTCH SUPPORT TO THE SAIGON REGIME

Their posters have the second and fourth slogans.

V. GERMANY:

1) The slogans of the various actions were done on the basis that all groups would bring their own slogans. However there would be no banners identifying organizations in the Berlin demonstration.

The GIM banner that said "Victory to the Vietnamese Revolution" was on TV in Belgium.

2) The Was Tun of April 1972 had an article concluding with:

IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL HALT TO THE BOMBING!
IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL U.S. TROOPS, BASES
AND WAR MATERIALS FROM ALL OF INDOCHINA!
INDEPENDENCE AND REUNIFICATION OF VIETNAM IN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN
INDOCHINESE SOCIALIST CONFEDERATION!
SOLIDARITY WITH THE AMERICAN ANTIWAR MOVEMENT!

The text continues: "West German capitalism is part of world imperialism and represents its interests. The Federal Republic is the most important ally of U.S. imperialism, tied to it through countless economic, diplomatic and military connection. The military keystone of this alliance is NATO. Therefore: GET OUT OF NATO!"

The text continues: "The only genuine representatives of the Indochinese peoples are the organs of the liberation movements. Therefore:

RECOGNITION OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS OF THE INDOCHINESE PEOPLE!
IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF INFORMATION OFFICES OF THE LIBERATION

MOVEMENTS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY!
VIETNAM, LAOS, CAMBODIA -- ONE STRUGGLE!

VI. SWITZERLAND:

The appeal of the National Committee for April 22 ended with:

FOR A POWERFUL DEMONSTRATION ON APRIL 22
IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL STOPPING THE BOMBING
UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS AND MATERIAL
VIETNAM, LAOS, CAMBODIA -- SAME COMBAT
LONG LIVE THE VICTORIOUS STRUGGLE OF THE INDOCHINESE PEOPLES
SWISS RECOGNITION OF THE PRG AND THE GRUNK AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE VIETNAMESE AND CAMBODIAN PEOPLES
SUPPORT TO THE AMERICAN COMRADES OF THE ANTIWAR MOVEMENT

VII. ITALY:

Any actions were called at the last minute and we have no material.

VIII. SWEDEN:

The main slogan of the United NLF groups is US OUT OF INDOCHINA.
They have a second slogan of SUPPORT THE PRG PEACE PLAN.

The RMF also puts forward various victory slogans.

IX. DENMARK:

1) The Danish Vietnam Committee's slogans include USA OUT OF INDOCHINA, NATO OUT OF DENMARK, STRUGGLE AGAINST AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, SUPPORT THE PRG, NEO LAO HAKSAT AND FUNK, and INDOCHINA WILL WIN. They also call for support to the PRG 7 point peace plan, although I did not see this inscribed as a slogan.

2) In April 1971 Danish Vietnam Committees had a demonstration where the slogans were US OUT, VICTORY FOR THE NLF, NATO OUT OF DENMARK, and FIGHT AMERICAN IMPERIALISM.

The SUP organized a contingent with slogans like FOR A RED INDOCHINA, IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION -- RESPONSE PERMANENT REVOLUTION.

X. SCOTLAND:

The three slogans of the Glasgow Indochina Committee are:

U.S. OUT OF INDOCHINA NOW
END BRITISH SUPPORT FOR U.S. AGGRESSION
SOLIDARITY WITH THE INDOCHINESE PEOPLES FIGHT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION

(This manual is being mimeographed for N.C.)

SUMMARIES OF DISCUSSIONS WITH COMRADES AND OBSERVATIONS

-This covers points not directly related to antiwar-

Dan R. Dan R.
May 1972

BELGIUM: At no time in Belgium did I give a report to any organized body. A political bureau was scheduled and then cancelled due to absences. Then a number of comrades were to come in from Ghent, Antwerp as well as Brussels but this did not come off. This reflected only their level of organization, the comrades in general were friendly and interested in what an SWP comrade would have to say.

Most of the time was spent with Jan Van Kerckhoven and Jo Leeuw (sp). These comrades moved into Brussels from the Flemish part of the country last fall. This move was viewed as a step to reinforce Brussels, as well as Jan was to work in the international center. Jack and MA know the story of this.

Van Kerckhoven conducts himself as a mass leader in the student and antiwar movements and conducts himself as a leader with the comrades. He is very collaborative and follows up on details with dispatch.

There is not one person on full-time paid for the organization in the whole country. Van Kerckhoven was between jobs. Doudou edits La Gauche as well as having a full time job. Gisela is often travelling on her job.

121 Rue d'Espagne is a good headquarters for a group this size. It has a lot of potential but is a total mess. The bookstore is open everyday from 6 to 8 p.m. The bookstore is very well stocked and organized but I think basically services our own comrades and periphery. (See materials summary)

Van Kerckhoven and Jo are concerned with building a real party. They see no professionalism around them. There are constant financial problems - for instance the heat is broken at Rue d'Espagne and they are wondering if it will be fixed by next winter. They have a percentage sustainer system like the League does. They are worried because many comrades (they cited the worker comrades in Liege) will not take finances seriously. Recently the section has acquired its own press which will be run by one comrade and print La Gauche, Rood, as well as the Luxembourg paper which is done in Belgium. They were very interested in how the SWP organizes its finances.

I had the following discussions with Jan and Jo: 1) the ERP 2) entrism 3) the IMG Irish work 4) Holland. All was at their initiative except for #3 - Carol was also there for this.

1. ERP - a very brief discussion. I pointed out that ERP could be forced to kill Sallustro by whatever move the state would make. Jan's answer: "They don't have to kill him, they can just go and kidnap more people - maybe 5 or 6" He implied it would be bad to kill any of them.

2. Entrism. They reflected the general thinking of the Belgian youth on the late 60's period, pointing out how they could not even say they were members of the Fourth inside of the JGS and how comrades were "entered" in 3 different formations with no open section. Of course, they're glad this period is over.

3. IMG Irish work. They said of course a mass campaign should

be around Britain out of Ireland. But this is what the IMG is trying to do. Also there should be an explicit "pro-Irish revolution wing" within the mass campaign. This is how they understood the IMG was to be.

Jan has read a lot on Ireland. He is very concerned with building the Fourth in Ireland and interprets a lot of the IMG articles to be oriented to this. We were at a disadvantage, not having read the recent Red Mole articles, so the discussion was a bit of a seesaw with them granting certain Red Mole formulations were wrong, but the work, so far as they knew, seemed correct.

4. Holland. Jan, speaking the language, follows the situation there. Unsolicited, he criticized Ernest's projections there. I knew nothing about this and just listened. He said Ernest was trying to create a joint Belgian Flemish-Dutch (De Internationale and Revolte) theoretical magazine for the Fourth. He said the De Internationale and Revolte groups are discussing unification but that no documents have been produced. Jan said this is putting the cart before the horse, first there should be unity discussion between Revolte and De Internationale that produce a written basis of unity. This is especially important because De Internationale has been a Pabloite group. Then, once a section has been created on a clear basis, there could be a discussion on a joint theoretical magazine.

Also:

5. Latin American discussion. Jan and No thought the discussion had been "too general and not enough about Latin America." I took this as a reference to Hansen on the Leninist Strategy document. It did not appear he had read the first Hansen document.

6. Youth Group. They said there are not the forces now to have a national youth group with an apparatus. However, the JGS must be kept going as local formations with a clear program. Youth radicalize but they are not always ready to join a party right away, they said.

7. Internal discussion in Belgian section last year. Again on their initiative. "We had a minority last year we fought very hard against. They wanted to orient to only the social democratic unions, whereas we said the social democratic and catholic unions are equally bureaucratized. It's solely a question of which is the more important to work in in a local situation. ~~They were a clique formation, had existed for a period, and sought a political basis. They would not share in the organization's work. We quoted Cannon on the Abern clique.~~ Also this minority proposed our student work be based on "student issues" and wanted to deemphasize anti-imperialist issues. The reason we fought so hard was that they were a clique formation, had existed for a period, and sought a political basis. They would not share in the organization's work. We quoted Cannon on the Abern clique. Now some of these comrades are taking assignments again."

8. Industrial work. Our most important work: Antwerp - photographic factory, docks, refinery; Ghent - Citmar Steel, textile which is in decline; Liege - we have workers in the Cockerel steel who are a factor and have led some strikes. We carry out work in the Teachers and City Workers Unions, → Our slogans: fuse the two, union democracy, against integration. CP is tending to leave industrial work for electoral campaign work in the cities. There is a dispute over this in the CP. Jean Jacques Verstappen has organized Workers Encounters against the policy of the CP. Verstappen wants to collaborate with us.

-3-

Belgium (cont.)

While in Liege I met some comrades. One young comrade was angry about our ERP statement. He expressed himself clearly as supporting the ERP, saying its carrying out the 9th world congress decisions. He said "the workers here in the LRT are good but they have been mistreated by the entry period." This was out of the blue.

Also: Van Kerckhoven did not know about the POT discussion we had. This relates to a point under materials.

LUXEMBOURG:

Coral and I were there for a day and a half. The central committee was meeting. These comrades all speak English, they range in age from late teens to late-twenties/early-thirties. They are all men.

The LCR models its organization after the League. The Central committee meets once a month and takes up points as they come in long discussion. For instance, they said they were taking up Women's Liberation at that meeting. There had been no written preparation for this.

They have the cell system, with cells "oriented to" factories. Recently they recruited two CP steel workers but don't know if they can integrate them. They put out mimeographed factory papers and have discussion classes for worker contacts.

There are 55 LCR members - 15 of them are students in other countries. There are no real universities in Luxembourg. There are another 50-60 people in 3 sympathizing groups: Schulerfront (high school); Spartacus Group (university students abroad) and one or two workers circles. The workers circles are mostly people oriented to but not in industry.

Klassenkampf publishes 1000 monthly. Also there is Bolchewik, the mimeographed theoretical organ. Also the Schulerfront puts out a mimeographed bulletin.

There are 3 bookstore-offices in different cities which they keep open certain regular hours. There are no full time paid people but the Reckingers work full time, apparently on their own means. No phone in the headquarters, but the Reckingers have a phone.

The first Trotskyists (2 or 3) developed in 1969 and 69 through contact with the League. The LCR was formed in September 1970 after a series of fights in student organizations, then in the Gauche Socialiste et Revolutionaire, with the Maoists. The Maoists kept the Gauche Socialiste and Revolutionaire then changed their name to Kommunistische Forbund Luxembourgeois(sp).

Ronald and _____, both older, were among the first recruits and appear to be the central leaders. Ronald was one of the first leaders of the Lux student radical movement. He knows the general radical history. Refer to notes on discussion with Ronald - also the description of the important high school fights our comrades led.

Many of these comrades seemed a bit distrustful of the SWP. Is it not too absorbed in the mass movements of the day? Are there really developed political people in the SWP? What do you do to educate your cadre? Also they had the idea that the branch system is a kind of social democratic, non-Bolshevik system, unlike their Bolshevik cell system. They motivated the cell system on 2 bases: 1) what if there is repression? 2) "you must have free-for-all meetings every week with 50 or 80 people all together. That can't possibly be a centralized system." The discussions on this point were interesting, since they had discussed this among themselves before we came, but some of them were impressed with the idea that maybe the branch system was even more centralized, since we have both branches and fractions.

Luxembourg (cont.)

The ~~general~~ level of seriousness was high among all of these people. They appear to be a very serious group. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF POINTS UNDER MATERIALS.

There were a number of discussions on women's liberation, which Carol has notes on. Also she met with a woman liberation leader who had left the LCR recently to become involved in the womens liberation group.

Ronald wanted to discuss Latin America with me. He thought the majority had been right on Latin America but was very open to discussion and is looking forward to the world congress. He had not yet read the PRT Prensa interview and reacted strongly against any concession to the Cubans, Allende saying we can only build sections as clear Trotskyists who are proud of being this. He was upset with the Bolivians, but was ~~upset~~ wondering if the US action was taken after carrying out discussions with the Bolivians.

These comrades had a very positive attitude toward our visit.

HOLLAND: Again, I was there for a day and a half. I will try and summarize what I heard from Theo Wierink, editor of De Internationale, and G.H. (Herman) Pietersen, editor of Revolte. This is a complex one.

Theo Wierink worked with Sneevliet in the 30's. During the war he was in an outlying part of the country, apparently working with CP in the resistance. After the war he was active in the section until entry was adopted in the early 50's. He was totally opposed to entry and became inactive for 15 years. (It is not clear to me exactly what the Dutch Trotskyists entered. Theo said there were 200 when they went in and by 1965 there was some small number - either 4 or 15) When they came out, Theo got active again. He is in his late 50's or early 60's. His small apartment is lined with shelves of documents (he was reading our documents from the 40's when I was there), magazines etc. He is obviously a totally dedicated Trotskyist, but it was hard to have any real political discussion and learn about his ideas because his English is spotty. *I think Theo translated Ernest's book on economic conditions in Dutch.*

Theo said the De Internationale group was meeting that weekend to reconsider its relationship to the Pablo international. He pointed out that Pablo doesn't have forces outside of France. Then, he said, "I will never criticize a group because it is small but Pablo is funny, he is always turning up with new revolutionary forces. First the Yugoslavs, now this, now that etc." This was about all the discussion I had with Theo, except for demographic and general political information about Holland. His attitude to the American movement was very positive. For instance he regretted that he had not met any of the "great leaders of the ^{great} American movement" since he had met Schachtman in 1937.

Pieterse is the central leader of the Revolte group and the editor of the paper. Between the two groups there are 35 people - I think 20 in Revolte and 15 in De Internationale. Revolte is a youth group. Pieterse is ~~about~~ 21. He had some contact with the Belgian section but has done a tremendous amount of reading on his own. He is a super-serious political person.

Pieterse said he is a formal member of the fourth since last fall, but the "secretariat advised I not make this known since it might complicate relations with the Theo group." Pieterse said he would have been happier if he could have been open about his membership and didn't think the idea was a good one. But he was worried that I or some other comrade coming through would let the information slip and wanted that communicated.

Revolte was a split from the SP in 1967. I think Pieterse was involved even then, when he was 16. They have published a regular monthly. Then the Theo group sent its three youth into the Revolte group. At the same time Pieterse was working from his direction to win the group for Trotskyism.

The Revolte and De Internationale groups have collaborated in an entry tactic into the Pacifist Socialist Party. This is a centrist party that has moved to the right. It is very heterogeneous, including left social democrats, pro-Moscow Stalinists, and diffuse left currents. A left wing opposition developed called Proletarian Links (Proletarian Left) and the Two Trotskyist groups coordinated their intervention into the PL caucus, which then fought as a whole within the pSP. I think this left was actually called "Red Vanguard" while it was in the PSP.

The PSP gets 2% of the vote in national elections. It is a certain kind of pole for centrists and people dissatisfied with the CP and the SP.

Last year

The Red Vanguard got something like 10 or 15 % of the delegates to a PSP conference. They did this by flooding certain constituency meetings, the same people going to several of them etc. Of these several of the delegates were members of either Revolte or De Internationale.

In the fall of 1971 the PSP leadership tried to impose some conditions of conduct on the left caucus which it refused to accept and was expelled. It now publishes a monthly called Proletarian Links. (I have copies of Proletarian Links, Revolte and De Internationale.)

Theo seemed to have a higher opinion of the PL group than Pietersen. Pietersen said "most of these people are totally confused. They want to turn to the workers but don't have a program. Within two years this group has to disintegrate. We will either take the majority or lead a split." He is very anxious that a section be formed. There are about 100 people in Proletarian Links, as I understand. One of the central leaders is a former member of the fourth who Pietersen characterized as moving away from Trotskyism.

I discussed the following points with Pietersen 1. the Revolte groups perspectives in the student movement 2. the US antiwar movement, the European movement, the question of slogans and the 7 point program 3. the ERP.

1. In the fall the Revolte group oriented to propaganda work aimed at the high schools. Their thinking was that since the CP is dominant on the university campus, they cannot buck this. They hoped to build a base in the high schools, lead struggles, and also recruit people who would be in the universities in 2 or 3 years. Pietersen concluded that the Universities are the political center of the student movement and, as difficult as it is, they must figure out a way to gain strength in the universities rather than avoid this arena.

2. Very receptive to our work in the US antiwar movement. He said the Revolte group with its limited forces had tried to initiate a united front around Nov. 6 and again in January. This is described in the Antiwar summary. So also is his ideas on slogans, the European antiwar movement and the 7 points. On the question of whether the European antiwar movement has an "objective" or just "a subjective" importance he listened carefully and I think I made some headway.

3. Pietersen said: It is necessary to make an objective analysis, of whether the ERP approach helps to build a vanguard party and leads to a mobilization of the masses. They say it does, but I need information to make a judgment. In any case it is not enough to say, as some people do, "rah-rah the ERP is picking up guns." This is not a serious approach. He obviously had questions about the ERP.

SOME NOTES ON MATERIALS.

GERMANY: I was in Germany for a little over 2 days. In Frankfurt, I had a three or four hour discussion with Erik and Ditta, who live in the apartment which is the GIM office. Erik recently was recently moved into Frankfurt from Hamburg. When he got there they made him national secretary, which means taking care of the office.

One of the questions facing the German section is where its national center will be. At present the GIM (party) office is in Frankfurt, the RKJ (youth office) is in Mannheim. This discussion is apparently a difficult one since there is no obvious city that is the political center of the country. Berlin is too far away from the rest of the cities.

The GIM and RKJ are going to be fused into one new section, with a new name. At present the central committees meet jointly, a formal fusion of leading bodies will occur in June, with a congress based on political documents in September.

At present Was Tun is published monthly by the RKJ leaders in Mannheim, De Internationale is a theoretical magazine published infrequently in Frankfurt - these are really like little books on a particular subject, Imprekker (sp) is published monthly in Stuttgart as an international press service, then in Berlin - there is Permanent Revolution, a quarterly theoretical magazine, Permanent Revolution Aktual, a monthly paper. The pamphlets are printed in the Hamburg printshop; Mannheim and Stuttgart also have small presses. When I was in Speyer for the CC meeting I noticed they have two local papers: one factory paper oriented to the steel industry and a high school paper. There are about 300 people between the RKJ and GIM. So the question of building one national center weighs heavily upon the leading comrades.

The history on the youth-party fusion is this: the section was doing entry work in the German social-democracy until ~~1968~~ 1968. This also meant the youth were doing entry work in the social democratic youth; they were never in German SDS except for a little while in 1961 when they withdrew from it in favor of the entry in the SP.

The section discussed creating a Trotskyist youth group in 1968, but decided against it. They did not do so until 1970, by this time German SDS had fallen apart and there was not as much happening on the campuses. The decision not to create a youth group in 1968 is now viewed as a major error. It has meant that the RKJ has had a character of a junior party. Seeing this, and the lack of forces for two national organizations, the decision has been made to merge the two. The comrades I spoke to motivated this on the basis of the specific situation; and only wished they were strong enough to have both a section and a youth group.

Erik and Ditta recently worked with John for several weeks on the Mandel defense committee perspectives. I think this had a big effect on them. They referred to the Americans and the Canadians as the "same tendency" in a very friendly way. In describing the history of the German section, Ditta said "unfortunately our older comrades did not think they should study Cannon." This was in the context of describing the carry-over characteristics from the entry period still present in the German section.

They were very attentive to the U.S. antiwar strategy. They then put forward the standard argument that the antiwar movement in Europe can only be a vanguard movement and not a mass movement. "It has a subjective

and not an objective importance? Thus slogans must be oriented around victory to the Vietnamese revolution. I answered their arguments and they listened carefully, responding favorably to the idea that ^{our} line should be to organize a mass movement around the immediate withdrawal demand and this did not contradict carrying out propaganda for the Vietnamese revolution. They then said they only wished they were strong enough to carry out such a perspective.

These two comrades were very pro-SWP in this discussion, the main elements being respect for continuity and tradition and the building of mass movements. We did not get into Latin America. We did discuss Mandel defense strategy. They talked about the Hamburg opposition, which they characterized as ultralefts about to leave. These people counterposed a general repression organization taking up all cases including that of the RAF terrorists. The majority comrades think this is stupid. However, they also do not have the concrete experience of building a defense committee in the past.

In Mannheim I stayed with Herman, one of the RKJ leaders. He said the same things about the German situation as the Frankfurt comrades. He raised the question of the ERP, saying "yesterday there was a demonstration of 15,000. When I see this I begin to think the other way is possible." *Handwritten: 15,000*

The report I gave to the local RKJ group in Mannheim revealed a certain heterogeneity. Some comrades vigorously agreed with our antiwar work, others had questions. They have been subjected to rumours from members of PL, the Marcus group, the Communist Tendency and god knows who else traveling through. The amount of pro-SWP sentiment is surprising given THE LACK OF OUR MATERIALS GOING TO GERMANY. SEE MATERIALS LIST.

There had been a discussion among the Mannheim local comrades about whether or not the SWP is a "petty bourgeois tendency." The leading members tend to apologize for this, especially on the antiwar question. But they themselves had questions on our position on a black party (Herman and Gisela.) One of the local comrades kept asking about the P.O.T.

At the CC meeting there was little chance for discussion. I did have a discussion with Hervard on antiwar. He spoke out strongly against adaptation to the 7 points. We had a big debate about antiwar strategy in Europe (summarized in the antiwar summary). It ended with Hervard conceding some general points, but saying the relation of forces on the left would not permit them to carry out such an orientation. He was not referring the CP here, but to the Marxist, student centrist and ultraleft groups.

The CP in Germany has been growing greatly in the recent period. In particular in the student field. Also, reportedly, among young workers.

I rode back to Frankfurt with Jakob Meneta. He is the editor of the Metal Workers union newspaper with a circulation of one or two millions. He is an older comrade who has had a close relationship with various figures in the German student left. He is also a personal friend of Victor Reuther, who comes to see him to discuss trade union questions while in Germany. There are other union officials from the states who also visit him.

ITALY: The Turin branch has an ample two room headquarters, with one room large enough for a meeting of 60-70. They are considered to be the most organized local group in Italy and making the most gains. There is a full time organizer, Antonio Carogna, who I had a discussion with on the American antiwar movement. He left another meeting in order to do this - this was a fraction meeting of Fiat comrades. We have a number of young workers in Fiat who are comrades say are able to make some impact. There were about 10 or 12 people sitting around the table.

Mary _____, is formerly from Australia. She became involved in the movement in Italy and is married to an Italian comrades who is in the army. She is a leading comrade - IP and the Militant come to her house. They had just decided to order a second subscription to IP since one copy is not enough. *I believe*

In Rome I spoke to only Livio and Edgardo Pellegrini, the editor of the paper. These were not substantial discussions because of my headcold. Livio explained his formulations^{over} to the Italian press on the ERP question and was personally taking abundant releases to the papers. He had been interviewed on television. His formulations were so complex and winding-around I hesitate to try and write them down.

The group in Naples are people out of the student movement, and also some out of the CP. The two central figures appeared to be Elio (28 and out of the student movement) and Lydia (mid-20's) and out of the CP. Elio speaks some English, Lydia does not. I think she is the organizer of the group, during the mass meeting I spoke at she took the floor and gave a very forceful speech.

The Naples groups has existed for two years. I would guess it is a couple dozen people. Their understanding of the situation in the U.S. seemed the most remote of any group I encountered. But they are very interested in discussion with us.

While in Rome I was taken up to the Il Manifesto central office by Livio who had some business there. This is a big and seemingly well organized operation.

NOTES ON MATERIALS.

SWEDEN: While in Sweden I gave internal reports to groups in Stockholm, Uppsala, Goteborg and Malmo. I also had discussions with a number of individuals.

The RMF seems to function as a coherent organization, more so than anything else I encountered after leaving France. There are some unique features to this group: a large section of the cadre has come to the RMF through a highly-politicized debate around the Indochina work; they are a growing and confident organization; they have headquarters and bookstores in Stockholm, Uppsala and Goteborg which are well-run and equipped with machinery.

In Stockholm I stayed with Bo Kuritzen (sp.). He informed me about Tariq's rumor-spreading against the SWP, such as that we call police to have NLF flags kept out of demonstrations. He said Tariq was "acting crazy" while he was in Sweden and that Mary Alice made a very good impression. Bo particularly presented himself as a partisan of the SWP. For instance, on the ERP he said: "You people are probably the only ones who know what's going on. The ERP-PRT is probably not a Trotskyist group, they are probably

isolated. But why, oh why, did you publish a public criticism. This is just going to inflame the debate etc." He said there are still many questions among Swedish comrades about the SWP and as I would leave his place he would say "you should explain your position on question x,y, and z this way in order to have the most positive effect."

Tom Gustaffson works full time in the Stockholm HQ, especially assigned to the Indochina work. Apparently, earlier this year there was a debate over the situation in the war and Gustaffson had predicted heightened military conflict and called for an intensification of the work. I think he has been central to developing the polemics with the KFML. I found him in the headquarters at all times between 9 A.M. and midnight.

He asked me about the public statement on the ERP. I argued 1. Individual terrorism was condemned by Lenin, serious people know this, have conditions changed since then? We must be open about our position because the whole Trotskyist movement is confronted with a question of basic perspective. 2. Other sections are running articles with their opinions. Is this just an implementation of the 9th W.C? Did it endorse such actions? He thought these were good questions and asked what the secretariat would be saying. I said I wasn't sure but that it might be along the lines of saying each section determines its own tactics to implement a general line. He thought this was disappointing since the strength of the Trotskyist movement is that it takes clear positions. I did not get to learn exactly what he thought about Argentina itself.

In general, Swedish comrades seemed to be talking among themselves about the statement we made. Some who said they were angry with us started to back down when I talked to them.

I spent several hours talking to the comrades in Uppsala. They have about 20 people and 3 cells. One or two of these are workers cells (one is directed to the staff of a hospital). When I say "workers cells" I mean cells directed toward not in the specific industry. These comrades were very eager for discussion and many of them obviously think they can learn some things from the SWP. A key comrade in Uppsala is Ken Lewis, an American who left for Sweden 8 years ago, and is married with a child there. He tends to identify with the majority in the international discussion. For instance, he is an ERP fan. The others would listen carefully to what I had to say, indicate these were good arguments, but that is not what Ken said. A number of these comrades, Ken Lewis included, are very serious people who read all kinds of publications etc.

Goteborg is our strongest area. Both numerically and vis-a-vis our opponents. They have both a local headquarters and a bookstore, which is the best stocked of any I saw in Europe. While there I met Rene Coeckelberg, head of the Partisanforlag publishing house which prints Deutscher, Trotsky, Mandel etc. He is a comrade.

In Malmo I stayed with Frederick Rodho. There are just a few comrades in Malmo, more in Lund the big student center nearby. Malmo and Lund had just as much notice as Goteborg, but had not really organized anything. A note on this should be made for the future for when a comrade on tour arrives in Stockholm.

I had two interesting discussions with Rodho. One was on how they choose their national leadership. I just listened while they des-

cribed to me what a nominating commission is in the same way we would describe it. They now have a 13 person C.C. (national/committee) whose members seem to have a strong sense of national leadership responsibility.

The second discussion was on the IMG Irish work. The IMG has been in Sweden quite a bit, and their publications are read. The discussion indicated only that this comrade was confused about what the IMGs real line is, he had Van Kerckhoven's general conceptions.

Rodho said it is unfortunate that the IMG says so many bad things about the SWP. But then he wasn't totally sure the bad things weren't true. One of the areas of rumors has been the gay liberation movement. He didn't say what all of the rumors are.

A certain pattern was present in the Uppsala, Goteborg and Malmo discussions. The SWP is an important force, very well organized, but maybe a little bit rightist. As Rodho said "I wouldn't say right-opportunist, just a little rightist." Or in Goteborg, the comrade I stayed with thought some of our election campaign material, he mentioned gay liberation, (he was really referring to the many democratic and transitional demands) were a diversion and did not stress anti-capitalism enough. The same comrade wondered why our analysis of Vietnam was not more explicit in the Militant. as a socialist revolution etc.

In Uppsala, a women comrade who had met with Carol and Mary-Alice was still grappling with our perspectives in the womens movement. The comrades seemed to have an open attitude toward this and listened attentively.

Also Roger, an Uppsala comrade, referred to some differences in the organization over workers work. He thought they had had some opportunity (I forget the specifics) but the central leadership had said we do not have the forces, other work is more important etc. He was angry about this but I didn't get into it.

DENMARK: I was in Denmark for less than 1 day - about 12 working hours. I had one brief discussion with Soren Otto Jensen, the PB member who had sent off a quick antiwar report at my request, and gave areport to about 15 of the Copenhagen comrades. The 15 comrades were very interested in the antiwar work and indicated their agreement with what we're doing. The one general question they asked was on workers work in the U.S., where they liked the answer.

In general the Danish comrades I met were very open. The history of the battles within SUF is recorded in the Jensen discussion notes. Aside from what is in the antiwar summary, the only thing to report is some requests on MATERIALS.

MATERIALS LIST, compiled by Dan Rosenshine

-Observations made as to which of our materials are being received and not received. Also includes expressions of interest by the comrades

BELGIUM:

Van Kerckhoven, a member of the political bureau, had not known about our P.O.T. discussion. He stated the following problem: Ernest, Emile and Doudou receive materials. Ernest is usually traveling or writing, Emile apparently has some physical problems now and is not in close touch, Doudou edits La Gauche from her house, she also has a full time job. Van Kerckhoven said Doudou keeps materials "in a complete mess" because of her schedule etc., and that she has often borrowed materials from him that she actually already had and then he has had to retrieve them from the mess. He did not suggest a solution for this problem. It should be looked into.

Jack, the comrade who runs the bookstore, says they have not received anything from PATHFINDER since The Coming American Socialist Revolution. They do display what they have. He did not have the most recent catalog. They sell their sea-mail bundle of the Militant in the bookstore. They do not sell IP there, as I remember.

I did not see any evidence of our educational bulletins.

LUXEMBOURG:

This should be taken in the context of the high percentage that speaks English.

They receive IP copies and read them. They do not sell it in their store.

They do not receive THE MILITANT, do not receive the ISR, do not receive Internal Bulletins, do not receive Educational Bulletins.

ENGLAND:

They receive the Militant by sea mail, the IP I'm not sure how. I believe that Pieterseon reads them at Theo's. Theo spoke highly of the IP, I'm not sure if he was raising the question of an anti-IP sub.

I'm not sure about the ISR. I assume they do not receive internal bulletins. I saw no evidence of educational bulletins.

GERMANY:

- Dita and Erik would be interested in some copies of materials from our various defense committees in the past -

The Frankfurt GIM office receives the IP. I believe because John Riddell had it sent there. They DO NOT receive the Militant. I'm not sure on the ISR and Internal Bulletins. I saw no evidence of educational bulletins.

The RKJ comrades in Mannheim read the IP. I think they also do NOT receive the Militant. For the rest - the same as Frankfurt.

ITALY:

Mary in Turin was in the process of writing for a second IP sub. They get the Militant. For the rest - I don't know.

In Naples, I don't think they get anything. In Rome, I had no chance to see.

SWEDEN:

The Goteborg bookstore sells the IP and a lot of Pathfinder material. ~~xxxxxx~~

The Stockholm headquarters and Uppsala comrades receive the Militant and IP.

I saw no evidence of our educational bulletins. I don't know on internal bulletins.

This should be taken in the context of the high percentage that speaks English - the highest in continental Europe. For instance, when I spoke to 200 university students in Goteborg nobody needed translation.

DENMARK:

SOREN OTTO Jensen asked that 50 copies of our International discussion bulletins be sent to Denmark. He said that practically all comrades can at least read English and they do not have the means to translate into Danish. This is different than what John R. was told by other comrades two months ago: that they had "enough" of our international bulletins. In fact, John said he thought these comrades were speaking only for themselves, since he thought *only* 5 or 6 copies were being sent.

I was there such a short time I saw no evidence of any of our publications.

NOTE: In using the term "internal bulletins" above I am referring to SWP internal bulletins. *Nobody I met ever referred to having read our convention documents. J. F. Godchau is translating the political resolution into French, he says, for Quatrieme Internationale.*

SWITZERLAND:

Von Steiger receives the Militant, IP, and I believe the ISR airmail. I did not see what they receive at the ^{subject} headquarters. A certain percentage of the ^{subject} members know English, a minority.

I was not in French-speaking Switzerland.