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HOW THE PARTY WAS SPLIT IN SPAIN

by Peter Camejo

The rapid rise of the class struggle during the late 1960s in Spain offered the Fourth International one of the most favorable objective situations in Europe for building a Leninist Party. At the time of the last world congress there existed no Trotskyist group in Spain only some individual sympathizers. But soon afterwards a small centrist formation called Comunismo began evolving towards Trotskyism. This group later adopted the name Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (LCR - Revolutionary Communist League). It entered the international at the ~~beginning~~ beginning of 1971. The LCR grew rapidly. Although most of its recruits came from the student movement from the very start it involved workers and had a direct tie to the on going workers struggles. By the end of 1971 the organization reached some 300 full members and possibly as many as 1,000 organized sympathizers. During 1972 it declined somewhat.

This promising beginning in building a party nucleus suffered a set back ~~in~~ at the end of 1972 when the LCR split right down the middle.

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At the time ~~of~~ the split ~~which~~ occurred in December of 1972 the LCR had never held a national conference which adopted a political program.~~xx~~ The political differences were not yet clear to the rank and file ^{in Spain while} ~~and~~ the international was totally unfamiliar with the discussion.

Could the split have been avoided ? Was the split damaging to the building of the Spanish section ? What was the role of the international leadership in the process which culminated in the split ?

To answer these questions and be able to draw the necessary lessons, especially those regarding how an international leadership should function in such circumstances it is necessary to review the facts of how the split occurred, ~~and the steps taken by the international leadership.~~

The LCR an Ultra-Left Organization

Looking back both sides in the split recognize that the LCR at the time it entered the Fourth International had an ultra-left political position. It opposed working in the workers commissions, ~~for instance~~, because they were dominated by the CP. It carried out actions in defense of the Vietnamese of a strictly ultra-left nature. For instance, the LCR would pick a block in Barcelona and then proceed to break all the windows both of the stores and cars on the street while painting pro-Vietnamese slogans as their way of showing solidarity.

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~~In spite of this political weakness, the LCR was open to influence by the Fourth International because ^{it} they had confidence that it was essentially correct. Thus, the possibility ~~to correct these errors~~ existed. Also~~

(However,)
pushing the LCR away from this ultra-leftism was the objective development of the class struggle in Spain. The ever deepening involvement of the working class in direct mass actions was a pole of attraction away from the mindless ultra-leftism typical in the student movement of the late 1960s.

A commission to help the new group in Spain was established by the Communist League in France. This committee which became known as the *(by a formal assignment of the United Secretariat.)* Spanish commission was later headed by comrade Germain. The internationalist concern to help the Spanish comrades reflected in the French section is certainly admirable. They recognized their special responsibility to Spain since they are the only country bordering on Spain which has bourgeois democracy. ~~Thus~~ an important responsibility fell on the French comrades to help the Spanish comrades ~~along~~ ⁱⁿ both political and technical problems.

Three Errors of the Spanish Commission

The Spanish Commission right from the start failed in various ways to function correctly with the LCR. Its concepts of how one section can aid

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another and how international leaders should act revealed some serious weaknesses in the Fourth International.

Probably the worst error of the commission was not ^{to} consider itself as representing the Fourth International but only of a faction inside the international and that of a none declared faction. ~~This commission~~ The Spanish Commission failed to keep the United Secretariat as a whole informed on the developments in Spain but instead only informed one sector. It likewise failed to inform the ~~rank and file members~~ ^{Comrades in Spain} of events and discussions in the Fourth International but instead presented only the views of one sector of the United Secretariat. This mistake cut off the possibility to educate the comrades in Spain on our concepts of internal democracy, of how we build an inclusive not exclusive leadership, ~~and~~ It made it impossible for the commission to gain what objectively useful suggestions might have been made by the United Secretariat as a whole.

This factional approach resulted in some rather sad consequences. ~~I was still called "Communist"~~ When the LCR ~~first joined the international~~ one of its members by chance became acquainted with the international discussion on Latin America and read a document by Joe Hansen. This was ~~never~~ not the norm in the LCR which

~~was passed~~

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was never encouraged by the Spanish Commission to become acquainted with the differences in the international nor was the material of the minority made available. Instead leaders of the LCR were given oral explanations of a strictly factional nature.

This comrade developed differences over the line of the LCR and expressed sympathy for the positions ^{of} ~~as written by~~ comrade Hansen. He was denounced as a Lambretist and ~~was~~ given a short period of time to reconsider his views or be expelled. He refused to change his mind was summarily expelled, ^(for his views) along with a small group ~~that~~ of supporters. Later this group ~~was~~ made contact with and became the Spanish Lambretists.

In the United Secretariat, ~~was~~ ^{by comrade Hansen and others} formal requests ^{to see the} internal bulletins of the new group in Spain ~~was~~ were made. Month after month the Spanish Commission refused to comply and allow the minority in the United Secretariat to see the documents or have any contact with the strictly underground organization in Spain.

A second error was the Spanish Commission's adaptation to the political weakness of the LCR. Instead of arguing against the sectarian ultra-left line of not working in the workers commissions the Spanish Commission gave the LCR a theoretical justification for their sectarianism. They

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argued that a united front approach was not correct in Spain where the CP was dominant such as ~~in the~~ ^{most of the} workers commissions because the LCR was still too small. Such an error may have been committed because of the honest opinion of the members of the commission. But again if they had functioned as part of the international and not ~~only~~ ^{as} a faction they might very well have avoided this error.

This error was compounded by the Commission when it itself decided maybe it had been wrong on this question and urged the Spanish comrades to change their position in May of 1972. It is from this discussion that the tendency struggle developed in Spain which led seven months later to a split.

The Spanish Commission again made a political error. They used the same logic of their earlier position except ~~now~~ they argued that the LCR was strong enough to carry out a pro-United Front line with the CP. Along with the incorrect political concept involved, [although the turn towards united front politics was certainly salutary and necessary,] was the method the Spanish Commission used to change the line of the LCR.

Instead of seeing their role as one of trying to advise, make suggestions, and discuss with the LCR so that through their own discussions, central committee meetings and congresses they could determine their own line, ^{and write their own documents} the

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commission had comrade Jebracq a central leader in the French party draft a resolution for the LCR and then urge the LCR central committee to ~~xxxxx~~ adopt it. Jebrac even opposed a request by some of the LCR central committee members to have such a basic change in their line discussed first in the ranks before a final decision was made.

~~These above examples indicate the manner in which the commission~~
(Essentially the Commission)
~~functioned incorrectly. Its functioning was factional, at times substitutionist,~~
~~instead of collaborating with the leadership~~ and it failed politically to present clear ~~xxx~~ trotskyist politics.

The Evolution of the LCR Debate

The first congress of the LCR was held in the early part of 1972 but the organization could not agree on a single political resolution. The congress ended after confused and heated debates by adopting only a set of statutes and electing an out going central committee.

After the ~~suggested~~ turn towards a pro united front policy differences arose around the question of ~~the~~ what is a united front, why was the LCR wrong in the past, and a questioning of the ultra-left errors in the previous period.

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In late spring 1972 two tendencies appeared in the LCR. Each became known by the title of their original documents. The Central Committee of 19 members divided right down the middle. Ten supported the "Encrucijada" tendency while nine backed the "En Marcha" tendency.

The central task of the Spanish Commission ~~was to try to~~ advise the comrades in Spain of the dangers in a debate becoming rapidly heated and factional. They had, of course, to encourage the comrades in Spain to discuss out their differences in a patient and objective manner so as to not only arrive at a line for their organization but to raise their political level. How the discussion would proceed depended partially on the ~~same~~ attitude the Spanish Commission would take ^{since in the eyes of the LCR} leaders it represented the leadership of the Fourth International.

The Commission seeing the leadership divided had to attempt at all cost to keep the organization together, to advise as a team, including both points of views on all leadership bodies.

Recognizing how ~~the~~ new the LCR was to Trotskyism, and the profound need for political clarity the international should have followed the debate carefully while at the same time avoiding any steps which would imply that it ~~was~~ taking ^{sides} factionally ~~sides~~.

The Spanish Commission followed a totally different course. As soon as tendencies were formed it through its full support to the ~~minority~~ ^{minority}, the

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"En Marcha " tendency. The Spanish Commission stopped all objective collaboration with the Encrucijada tendency and by its own actions helped the rapid development of a factional atmosphere.

LCR Reports to the United Secretariat

Under continuous pressure from the minority in the United Secretariat for information on what was happening in Spain reports from the LCR were scheduled for the July (1972) United Secretariat. ~~Max Urrutia and Stan...~~

~~representation~~

At that meeting only the representative from "En Marcha" appeared. This comrade proceeded to give a report for the "majority." It was only in the question period that it was discovered that he represented the minority of the central committee though he insisted his tendency would win the majority of the membership.

The reporter indicated that the differences were primarily over evaluating their differences in the past. He also referred to differences over the PGR seven points.

~~Also present was a representative from EHA VI who expressed general agreement with the report provided by the "En Marcha" representative.~~

Comrades of the Spanish Commission informed the United Secretariat that both tendencies had been invited and that they could not explain why

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the Encrucijada representative had not arrived.

Later we learned that the Encrucijada comrade had arrived in Paris, as agreed, but that the Communist League leadership was unable to inform the Encrucijada delegate of where the United Secretariat was meeting. So the Encrucijada comrade waited for two days in Paris while the United Secretariat met at its usual place in Brussels.

Encrucijada Wins a Majority

In August of 1972 the LCR central committee met after discussions and votes were taken around initial contributions of the two tendencies in the rank and file. The vote established that Encrucijada was a majority in the membership as well as the central committee. The En Marcha comrades accepted the results and proposed that Encrucijada take over the political bureau which was led at the time by En Marcha comrades. Encrucijada refused. Instead it proposed that the same Political Bureau continue to function but only as an organizing bureau to prepare ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ the second LCR congress scheduled at that time for October 1972.

En Marcha accepted the proposal but correctly protesting Encrucijada's refusal to assume its majority responsibilities. Dates

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(in September
were set for the submission of new documents being prepared by
both tendencies.

The Crisis of Encrucijada

After the August central committee meeting a series of events
changed the situation and composition of the central committee.

(with a whole series of arrests)
The LCR was hit by heavy repression in a region in Spain
which overwhelmingly supported the Encrucijada tendency. Also a
central leader of Encrucijada was imprisoned. Although tortured
for three days the comrade remained totally silent. Thus preventing
further consequences.

At about the same time ^{three} ~~several~~ leaders of Encrucijada made
statements from which the majority of Encrucijada disassociated
themselves. The Encrucijada majority felt the positions taken
by the three were conciliatory towards ~~l~~ambretism and they
declared they ^(three) could not be part of Encrucijada while maintaining
such positions. The result was a split at the leadership level
within Encrucijada and a substantial amount of confusion in the
rank and file.

EN Marcha Takes Control

Instead of recognizing the need for further political

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clarification in order for the membership to fully understand the political differences involved and taking the necessary time so the points under discussion could be assimilated ^{by} ~~the~~ the rank and file, ~~with~~ En Marcha chose to take quick factional advantage of the weakening of Encrucijada. ^{Again} [Again,] Instead of indicating complete solidarity before the police attack ~~andxxxxxxxx~~ ~~Marcha~~ which had ~~deblit~~ debilitated Encrucijada ~~here, likewise,~~ En Marcha sought to take factional advantage by immediately proposing to replace the imprisoned Encrucijada comrade in the central committee with an En Marcha supporter.

A new central committee meeting was called. The relationship in the central committee was now En Marcha 9, Encrucijada 7 (one in prison) and 3 non-affiliated. En Marcha declared itself the majority. Due to the lack of attendance of several Encrucijada central committee members En Marcha had an absolute majority at the meeting which took place in September of 1972.

En Marcha reconstituted the Political Bureau with its full authority and placed only En Marcha comrades on it. They moved up a pro-En Marcha ~~ia~~ alternate (he was the first alternate) to replace the imprisoned Encrucijada comrade thus assuring

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themselves an absolute majority of 10 out of 19 members of the central committee and reducing Encrucijada to 6 on the committee. The central committee also voted the need to re-organize one provincial committee where Encrucijada was the ~~overwhelming~~ majority and authorized the political bureau to do so. All these motions had the support of the Encrucijada members present.

After the central committee meeting the Political Bureau removed all Encrucijada members from the province leadership bodies. The three functioning (one was not functioning due to repression) province committees became 100% En Marcha comrades and even Encrucijada central committee members were not ~~pr~~ permitted to ~~attend~~ attend province committee meetings.

They proceeded to ^{prepare for} ~~hold the~~ the LCR's second congress in less than seven weeks, although neither tendency had their documents prepared.

En Marcha's concept of resolving the LCR's crises was to hold a fast congress, ^{and} win a majority, taking advantage of the confusion in the ranks of Encrucijada, ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~leadership~~ ~~and~~ ~~then insist on discipline against what they characterized as a petty bourgeois liquidationist tendency.~~

The New Encrucijada

In October of 1972 both En Marcha and Encrucijada presented new documents to define their tendencies. (Two of these documents one of Encrucijada and one of En Marcha were published in English in 1973 by the SWP in its information bulletin of April 1973, No. 1, 1973.) In the new documents the tie between the international discussion and the discussion in Spain became explicit. En Marcha declared its support to the "turn" of the Ninth World Congress while Encrucijada declared it opposed what it considered an ultra-left adaptation especially around the line for Latin America.

These documents raised new points in the discussion. The Encrucijada leadership felt that their criticisms of the errors of the LCR could only be understood in the context of ~~understanding~~ the mistaken concept of the method of the transitional program reflected in the Ninth World Congress "turn." The Encrucijada tendency felt it had itself evolved in the process of the discussion as it tried to grapple with the differences around the questions of the united front, the meaning of the transitional program, and the Leninist concept of how to construct the party.

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With the appearance of the new documents a shift took place once again in the central committee. Two of the three members who had left Encrucijada rejoined Encrucijada. The third remained ^[formally] ~~formally~~ independent of any tendency but on all organizational matters supported Encrucijada in the central committee.

En Marcha's October 24, 1972 Ruling

[See Appendix no.]

The Political Bureau past a motion on October 24, 1972, (See Appendix no.) three weeks prior to the scheduled congress, instructing the rank and file that they could only consider the documents of En Marcha as resolutions for the congress. Encrucijada's resolutions could only be considered a contribution to the discussion. The "justification" for this motion was that the Encrucijada resolutions were submitted later than the date set by the ~~Political Bureau~~ September central committee.

Actually both tendencies failed to meet the date originally set by the August central committee. A new date was set allowing 14 more days and the congress was moved back to November in the September central committee meeting.

The date of submission was based on the date the document was handed to the En Marcha political bureau. En Marcha claimed it had

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met the second date line. By the statutes of the LCR a 90 day ~~period~~ discussion period after the submission of the resolutions of the political committee must be held. Yet the En Marcha comrades projected only five weeks after its own resolutions were made available ~~(not in print)~~ to the Political Bureau. Encrucijada's document reached the political bureau a little less than two weeks later.

The majority of the membership began receiving the En Marcha documents at the very best 4 weeks prior to the scheduled congress. ~~And in fact~~ The Encrucijada document only began to reach the members at the moment the voting would have to begin. Due to the difficult underground conditions existing in Spain delegates are elected by stages. This requires a minimum of two weeks. En Marcha declared in its October 24 ruling that it would accept no more postponements of the congress. That meant delegates would have to be chosen before the majority of the membership could have time to read the new documents of either tendency and discuss them. Resistance began to develop to holding the voting especially among Encrucijada supporters. In one area of Spain where the repression was severe no documents had been received at the time voting was

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to begin. ~~These comrades~~ These comrades sent a message declaring they would not participate in any congress if they could not see the documents before hand.

To the En Marcha comrades the central problem was not political but organizational. They saw the LCR becoming more and more paralyzed by the internal differences. To them the only solution was to hold a congress as fast as possible.

The En Marcha comrades felt the Encrucijada comrades were failing to meet their obligations of militancy. The En Marcha charge was not totally unfounded. The Encrucijada members finding themselves under a 100% En Marcha leadership tended not to trust the decisions being made and balked at carrying them out. The charge of failure to carry out assignments was met by the accusation of bureaucratic methods ~~derailing~~^{de}trailing the discussion towards purely organizational matters.

The comrades of En Marcha, (and Encrucijada) did not understand that the ~~fix~~ first step needed to overcome the internal organizational paralysis was to include the Encrucijada leaders in the Political Bureau and ~~that~~ begin to function, inspite of the differences, as a team, accepting a certain degree ^{of compromise} on the part of both sides

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regarding immediate tactical questions. In the last analysis the problem was political and could only ~~be solved~~ begin to be solved by an authoritative congress, that is one accepted by both sides, it could not be solved by organizational measures without resulting in a disaster for the organization as a whole.

Even after a majority was established at an authoritative congress it would be the majorities responsibility to make it possible for the minority comrades to feel included and welcomed in the organization. ~~Not~~ This is not always an easy task even for an experienced leadership. Any other course ~~was~~ could lead only to a split, without political clarity, and guaranteed to have a general demoralizing effect in the long run.

In October of 1972 the LCR was moving rapidly to a split. No action was taken or proposed by the Spanish Commission nor the majority of the United Secretariat.

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Comrade Andres Visits Spain

The ~~rapidly degenerating~~ ^{exactly} [exact] situation in Spain was ~~not known~~ unknown to the United Secretariat minority comrades until comrade Andres a United Secretariat member and supporter of the minority position at the last world congress visited Spain. Comrade Andres was invited to visit Spain to attend the second congress of the LCR. The Bureau of the United Secretariat approved formally his trip to Spain.

Comrade Andres arrived in Spain on Friday, October 13, 1972 and walked into what was obviously a rapidly developing split situation.

He ~~immedi~~ immediately held discussions with the leadership of both En Marcha and Encrucijada. He proposed to them that before the rush into ^{poorly prepared} a congress which could lead to a split ~~which would~~ objectively hurt ⁽ⁱⁿ⁾ [in] the development of the Spanish section and the Fourth International that both Encrucijada and En Marcha consider meeting with the United Secretariat and discussing out the situation.

Andres suggested that the two ~~tendencies~~ tendency's leaderships ~~which~~ should meet together and establish a parity committee to organize ~~the convention~~ their convention. That

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they should work together jointly at all leadership levels and that the congress should be postponed to give sufficient time for the rank and file to read the documents and also hopefully to de-escalate the factional atmosphere.

In the discussions in Spain a problem arose over who was the majority, and if they worked together in a political bureau who would have the majority. Both sides claimed they represented the majority of the rank and file. En Marcha pointed out it was the majority in the central committee but this was contested by Encrucijada because they now objected to the removal of one of their votes in the central committee due to the arrest of a comrade.

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During these discussions comrade Andres suggested a parity political bureau as one possible solution. This suggestion was criticized by both En Marcha and Encrucijada as not a workable or correct solution. Comrade Andres later accepted the criticism

(See letter to LCR members from Comrade Andres Appendix No. 110.)

as correct. ~~The suggestion of a parity political bureau from the~~

[See letter to LCR members from comrade Andres Appendix No.]

~~centralized factional~~ Although this was only a passing point in the general discussion on how to begin to work together, avoid a split, organize a authoritative and democratic congress, respect internal democracy, and maintain the centralized

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Comrade Andres explained to both tendencies that in
[tendency]
any ~~factional~~ struggle it is a matter of communist morality
that we can not allow the police to alter the relationship of
forces, much less alter who is a majority. ~~And that~~ the correct
thing to do is to replace the imprisoned comrade by a comrade
holding the same views. En Marcha absolutely refused insisting
the first alternate ~~was~~ to the central committee was the correct
[imprisoned]
person to replace the ~~fallen~~ comrade.

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(IEC Majority Tendency)

functioning of the LCR the ~~IEC~~ later attempted to exploit

this "reformist" proposal for factional reasons, the ~~question~~

point totally out of context

[point totally out of context]

~~cover~~ appears in ~~Pierre Franks~~ [the IMT's] "Old Wives Tale" document.

In any case the comrades of En Marcha rejected the entire proposal except ~~attending~~ attending the United Secretariat meeting scheduled for October 28-29. The Encrucijada comrades accepted the general proposals made by comrade Andres and prepared a six point proposal for the United Secretariat meeting. (See

Appendix No.)

[Encrucijada's]

[modest]

The six points ~~summarized~~ were the following: 1, postpone

the second LCR congress; 2, The CC should elect a Political Bureau

with a majority of the majority on the CC but ~~include~~ including

[should be set up]

both tendencies; 3, a parity commission to prepare the congress;

[secondary]

4, in ~~intermediate~~ leadership bodies both tendencies should be

included; 5, the United Secretariat should be kept informed of all

developments; 6, the next CC should set the exact dates for the

congress.

[leaders]

Following his discussions with En Marcha and Encrucijada

comrade Andres cut short his visit to Spain and rushed to

England to inform comrade Germain directly of his discussions

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and the situation in Spain. That meeting took place October 22, 1972 in London. The very next day comrade Andres went to Paris to likewise inform the central leadership of the French Communist League and the comrades in charge of ~~work~~ Spanish work.

The United Secretariat Finally Intervenes

After the incomplete report of July 1972 the minority members of the United Secretariat became quite ~~concerned~~ concerned ~~offer~~ [to learn] what was ~~really~~ happening in Spain. ~~In~~ At the September 23, 24 United Secretariat the minority comrades requested information on what the situation was in Spain. No one seemed to have any clear information. But a proposal was accepted that a fuller report should be given at the next United Secretariat.

Due to the trip of comrade Anders at the ~~next~~ October 28-29 United Secretariat meeting both Encrucijada and En Marcha were present and a full discussion ensued.

A unanimous decision was reached on several proposals for the LCR to consider. They were; 1, that a Political Bureau be established including both tendencies with a majority decided by the CC; 2 that a parity commission be established to organize the congress; 3, that the congress be postponed at least four weeks

~~from the present original date (November 18, 19)~~ but to be held prior to the end of 1972; 4, that the membership should have the right to vote for Encrucijada documents.

This decision was communicated formally on October 30, 1972 by a letter signed by comrade Walter. In the letter comrade Walter added a few points to clarify some questions the En Marcha comrades had asked. (See Appendix No.)

At the United Secretariat meeting the Encrucijada representative had declared his agreement with the proposal. Likewise the comrade from En Marcha declared the proposals were acceptable to him.

EN MARCHA Rejects the United Secretariat Proposal

However after returning to Spain the En Marcha comrades [changed their] [mind and] accused the majority United Secretariat members of "opportunism" for having voted the above recommendations ~~and set out to~~ ~~boycott their implementation.~~ ↑ This charge of "opportunism" [They declared they opposed the solution proposed by the United Secretariat] was made in a formal letter to the ~~United Secretariat~~ IEC where the En Marcha comrades [support] ~~insist~~ the United Secretariat ~~should~~ [declared] instead of making the above proposals should have ~~shown its~~ ~~weight~~ ^{for} politically ~~behind~~ one or another of the positions.

The letter from En Marcha is dated November 30, 1972 (see Appendix No.)

The ~~xxx~~ attitude of En Marcha was reflected at the first meeting of the central committee, which took place right after ^{the} October United Secretariat. There were 18 members present at the ~~United Secretariat~~ central committee meeting.

Nine comrades supporting En Marcha, (one of the En Marcha central committee supporters had resigned from the LCR) and

nine comrades supporting the Encrucijada proposals. ^{[eight Encrucijada}
^{members plus the one unaffiliated comrade.]}

En Marcha proposed that one member of Encrucijada be added to the political bureau if the comrade made self-criticisms of their previous ~~x~~ "errors." Likewise they offered to add one

Encrucijada member to the province committee in Barcelona where if the comrade made the necessary self-criticisms, the Encrucijada supporters were in an overwhelming majority. They

~~also~~ proposed to replace the En Marcha comrade who quit the organization with another En Marcha supporters. They ~~offered~~ ^[suggested] ~~proposed~~ ^{suggested} December 16-17 as the dates for the congress.

Encrucijada proposed a political bureau of ^{four} ~~3~~ ^[four] for the majority ^(17/20 CC) ~~of the CC~~ and three for the minority. They proposed that province

committees be ~~relative~~ composed proportional to the relative strength in each ~~district~~ province between the tendencies. ~~They~~

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They insisted that their proposal was a majority in the CC because the imprisoned comrade had either to be replaced by an Encrucijada comrade or his vote registered from prison. They suggested holding the congress the last week end in December.

The meeting became hopelessly deadlocked nine to nine around [added to the Central Committee]. the question of ~~who~~ who should be ~~the tenth member~~ the tenth member. This question arose in the United Secretariat also. The position presented by comrade Andres that it was a question of communist morality not to allow the police to alter [composition of] the central committee was not supported by a single member of the United Secretariat majority!

The EN Marcha comrades continued to refuse the Encrucijada proposal thus ~~taking~~ ^(continuing to take) factional advantage of Franco's police repression.

The ~~proposal~~ proposal demanding "self-criticisms" from the Encrucijada comrades was a clear indication of ~~the~~ EN Marcha's refusal to ~~live~~ live up to the spirit of the United Secretariat proposal.

Finally ~~we~~ after endless hours of futile attempts to reason with the EN Marcha comrades the Encrucijada comrades made a final proposal to break the deadlock. They proposed both sides write up their proposals, that a referendum be held in the ranks and that

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the results be ~~propose~~ reported at the next central committee meeting. The Encrucijada comrades declared they would accept the En Marcha proposal if it had a majority support in the ranks. En Marcha rejected the proposal. Instead they declared that since no agreement could be reached and no majority established the previous decisions of the CC continued to hold, that they continued to be the official political bureau and would prepare the second congress.

Encrucijada's final statement was that they urged the En Marcha comrades to reconsider, and that they would hold the referendum even though En Marcha opposed it and report the results to the next central committee meeting.

Results of the Referendum

After a two week period an absolute majority of the membership of the LCR ~~had~~ ^{declared} ~~through signed statements~~ ^{for} supported the proposal ^{was} of the Encrucijada tendency. The exact figures ~~were~~ the following, of the 230 voting members in the LCR at the time ¹²⁷ ~~127~~ declared for the Encrucijada proposal. For security reasons the city by city figures cannot be published but they were shown to En Marcha and later offered to any United Secretariat member wishing to see them.

Encouraged by the results of the referendum the Encrucijada comrades requested that ~~a~~ [the] ~~central committee meeting be held.~~ [convene]. A meeting was held but boycotted by En Marcha, thus no quorum existed to make it an official meeting. At that meeting a report with the results of the referendum was prepared and passed on to the En Marcha comrades. (See Appendix No.) Another date was set for a central committee meeting. That meeting ^(was) scheduled for December 8, 1972. ~~It was the final central committee meeting of the joint LCR~~

En Marcha Begins Expelling Encrucijada Supporters

While Encrucijada was holding the referendum in the cells of the LCR the En Marcha political bureau began announcing the expulsion of various supporters of Encrucijada for "violations" of discipline or failure to carry out assignments.

The expulsions reached their climax with the suspension of a whole sector of the organization in the student movement where every single member was in opposition to En Marcha. The Political Bureau insisted, of course, that the suspended members had no right to vote for the forthcoming congress. Encrucijada refused to recognize these factionally motivated expulsions.

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Under the growing factional atmosphere the political preparations for the congress became paralyzed. While some cells tried to hold discussions others refused. ~~UN~~ Meetings were called that one side or another refused to recognize as official. ~~One whole sector of the organization declared it would not attend any congress if it did not receive the documents ahead of time with time to read them. They had not received a single copy due to the conditions of repression.~~

The United Secretariat Defaults Its Leadership Responsibility

The day after the December, 1972 IFC a special meeting of the United Secretariat took place to discuss the situation in the LCR.

Encrucijada and En Marcha had a representative present. The comrade

from Encrucijada reported out the developments that had occurred. He explained how the preparations for the congress had been paralyzed by the factional struggle and the bureaucratic abuses committed by the En Marcha comrades, including the results of the referendum. He made the following

proposal; 1. That a parity commission be set up to prepare the congress, 2. That the results of the referendum be recognized by both sides and a joint political committee be set up, ~~with Encrucijada~~ 3. That all suspensions and expulsions made by the En Marcha political bureau be lifted and referred to the parity commission to see if disciplinary action was justified on a non factional basis, 4. That ~~the~~ a comrade from Encrucijada replace the imprisoned comrade. In the opinion of the Encrucijada tendency these steps could begin the ~~next~~ process towards a political congress of the LCR and help prevent a split.

The En Marcha comrade stated that they did not recognize the referendum as ~~with~~ being an accurate reflection of the rank and file. He pointed out that the United Secretariat had failed in its duty by not first holding a full political discussion of what the differences were in Spain and express their opinion on those differences.

The En Marcha representative defended the ^[disciplinary measures] ~~expulsion~~ ^(disciplinaria) giving
as an example the expulsion of a comrade in charge of hiding
mimeograph paper. This comrade was an Encrucijada supporter. He
was instructed to turn over all the paper he had to the local
En Marcha province committee. He answered that he would not turn
anything over to anybody until it ~~was~~ became clear who had a majority
at the next congress. ~~xx~~ He
^[declared]
^(defensa)
was expelled.

I After a lengthy discussion it became clear that the majority on the United Secretariat had no proposal to make but they rejected the proposal from Encrucijada. The meeting ended with no decision except an understanding that no public comment should be made by either side against the other if a split developed. It was clear to everyone in the room that a split was imminent.

The LCR Splits

The weekend after the IEC the central committee of the LCR had its final meeting. Encrucijada reported the results of the referendum and proposed they be adopted. En Marcha again made its previous proposal rejecting the results of the referendum. The vote again was 9 to 9. The Encrucijada proposal that the recent political bureau suspensions be lifted was also rejected by En Marcha.

At the end of the meeting Encrucijada announced that it considered that ^{its proposal} it had a majority on the central committee of 10 to 9 because of the imprisoned comrade. Secondly Encrucijada insisted that the referendum indicated its proposal also had ~~the~~ majority support in the membership. Therefore Encrucijada announced it ~~was~~ considered its motions adopted and that it would establish a parity committee and a joint political bureau with four members from Encrucijada and three

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from En Marcha. That it considered all the ~~xxx~~ recent suspensions lifted and that ~~xxxxxx~~ ^{the} parity committee would proceed to begin the serious preparation of the second congress of the LCR. That it would guarantee the circulation of the documents to the entire membership, that they would ^{be} discussed and a fully democratic and authoritative congress ~~be~~ held. Encrucijada urged the En Marcha comrades to reconsider and to take their place in the parity committee and political bureau.

The En Marcha comrades gave their answer immediately after the central committee ^{ended by} ~~was~~ their political Bureau announced ^{INA} the expulsion of all Encrucijada members of the Central Committee. When cells ^{Controlled by En Marcha} of the ~~the~~ met any member that did not support the expulsion of the Encrucijada central committee members ~~in cells where En Marcha had a solid majority~~ ~~these members~~ were in turn ~~declared~~ declared expelled.

One week later En Marcha held its "congress." Encrucijada was not allowed to send delegates. They did permit Encrucijada to send one member and allowed him to make a statement. In that statement the Encrucijada Political Bureau said they would ~~recognize~~ consider the En Marcha gathering a meeting of their faction and still maintained their offer of a parity committee to organize a joint congress.

(See letter to En Marcha congress Appendix No.)

~~2 - Addendum of results of En Marcha~~

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[A whole series of brief but]

Amos series of brief but

[poorly]

The En Marcha congress was ~~totally~~ ~~unprepared~~. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
[and new documents were presented for a vote.]

unknown documents to be given to the delegates

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ The delegates, not to speak of the rank and file, had

never seen the documents they had to discuss and vote on. They

had to take time out at the congress for the delegates to read

the documents. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ In any case

the voted documents did express the general line of the En Marcha

(present)

~~XXXXX~~ tendency which the comrades were acquainted with. The

(not presented) [not presented]

Encrucijada documents were ~~presented~~ for a vote nor any minority

report given on any point.

One interesting point at the congress was that it voted to

changing the statutes ^{so} ~~to be~~ that in the future if ~~there~~

(struggle developed)

~~any~~ tendency ~~developed~~ and a member of the central committee was

would

~~be~~ arrested that member ~~was~~ be replaced by some one of the

e

same tendency. In this indirect manner En Marcha confessed they

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ had not been a majority on the LCR central committee

but that for factional reasons they had maintained a posture

(to alter) [to alter.]

which they now felt necessary ~~before their own membership.~~

~~XXXXXX~~

The full ~~MEMBER~~ voting members of the LCR split ~~HERE~~
more or less evenly with a slight majority for Encrucijada.

The surprise for both sides came in the ^{(was) the} large number of organized
sympathizers. ^{split} City after city they declared ~~in~~ by overwhelming
majorities for Encrucijada. In total Encrucijada may have taken
as much as two thirds of all organized members and sympathizers
of the LCR.

Only in one city was ~~the~~ En Marcha in a majority.

~~the~~ In the other three major areas where the LCR had supporters
[approximately] ^[went] the membership went 80%, 90% and 60% to Encrucijada. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

The explanation why the organized sympathizers split
so favorably towards Encrucijada is ~~explained by the fact~~ that
they understood that En Marcha had split the LCR, ~~not Encrucijada,~~
^[against] ~~the~~ ^{the reacted} ~~to~~ the bureaucratic measures of the EN
Marcha Political Bureau. Precisely because they were not necessarily
clear on the political differences they leaned towards Encrucijada
which sought political clarity as opposed to ~~an~~ organizational
measures.

French Communist League Violates the United Secretariat Agreement

No sooner had the En Marcha congress ended than the French Communist league leadership made a declaration of full support ~~to~~ to the En Marcha LCR even implying the split was an unfortunate but necessary step in building the Spanish trotskyist section. This statement was made ~~available~~ public in Spain (see appendix no. 8). ~~Then~~ reprinted in Paris for the exile Spanish community ^{Communist} ~~available~~ to the public at the ~~Communist~~ League headquarters in Paris.

This factional move was followed by several others on the part of the majority. A campaign was launched throughout Europe at the level of gossip accusing Encrucijada of splitting ~~the LCR~~ from the LCR towards Lambretism. The word was passed on that En Marcha was a majority and that Encrucijada violat^{ed}~~ed~~ a unanimous decision by the United Secretariat ~~by~~ ^{ing} ~~to~~ refuse to attend the second LCR congress. Also, that comrade Andres had promoted the split and had been "sharply criticized for his scandalous organizational intervention" by the United Secretariat.

Although these accusations were spread only orally a more moderate version has finally been put into writing. (See article from Rouge editorial board in Bulletin).

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In this ~~article~~ ^{article} the Encrucijada comrades are accused of going "against the unanimous decision of the United Secretariat, . . ." because the Encrucijada congress was held after December, 1972. The comrades of the IEC majority tendency are careful not to mention what the actual four point proposal of the United Secretariat was, nor provide any information that would give a more objective view of what was involved outside of holding a congress before the end of 1972. They fail to mention, for instance, En Marcha's written rejection of the United Secretariat proposal.

~~But~~ The documents claim that comrade Andres was "criticized" by the United Secretariat is rather curious. Certainly certain individual members of the United Secretariat majority may have been displeased by comrade Andres' visit to Spain but the official record of the United Secretariat indicates no such judgement. (See appendix no. 4).

But the most ludicrous is the charge that "You (encrucijada -PC) refused to participate in the Second Congress of the LCR (meaning the En Marcha congress- PC) that did in fact take place at the appointed time." How could the Encrucijada comrades send a delegation to the En Marcha congress when they had been declared "expelled" from the LCR and instructed explicitly not to send more than one observer who in turn was not allowed to speak on any political point?

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This type of false, and strictly factional information was given wide circulation. To add to the one-sided view presented to their ranks the French Communist League published the En Marcha documents in French with a statement that they would like to have presented the views of Encrucijada but that no documents were available. Yet this was published months after the SWP information bulletin was available with documents from both sides and without any factional comments.

~~_____~~ The documents of En Marcha were printed in Quatrieme International (no. 7,8 May-August 1973) which is supposedly the official organ of the IEC. Neither the IEC, the United Secretariat nor the Bureau authorized the printing of only the En Marcha documents. The article was titled "Resolution on Building the LCR section of the Fourth International in Spain" (Resolution sur le construction de la LCR comme section de la Quatrieme Internationale en Espagne.)

At the following United Secretariat meeting a protest was registered by the minority and the majority accepted that in the next issue of Quatrieme Internationale they would run an equivalent article expressing the position of Encrucijada.

Finally the United Secretariat majority blocked the publication of ~~_____~~ two contributions by Encrucijada in the international debate by placing

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a page limit for contributions from Spain. This is referred to ~~as~~^{an} ~~intitax~~

further at the end of this contribution.

Encrucijada Prepares the Second LCR Congress

The Encrucijada Political Bureau began the preparation of a ^{democratic and} serious politically clear second congress of the LCR. They [democratic and] studiously distributed all documents, including those of En Marcha. They established a ¹⁰ period of discussion which was later [day] extended.

Once again they offered En Marcha to ~~enter~~ participate in a parity committee, to circulate the documents to its members, and to see if a joint congress could be held. En Marcha answered in its public organ blasting Encrucijada as the ~~minority~~ minority splitters who were moving away from Trotskyism etc.

After the public attacks, including the solidarity statement with En Marcha by the French Communist League, Encrucijada answered the public attacks in a long special issue of their paper which ~~raised only what the major political differences were.~~

~~In the Encrucijada extended there~~

Among those who went with Encrucijada were almost all if not all the LCR members who had not declared for either Encrucijada or En Marcha. After the experience with En Marcha, ~~and~~ the French Communist League, and the Spanish Commission a certain ^{Stalinism} ~~stabilism~~ [skepticism]

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regarding the Fourth International

↑ arose among ~~the~~ some of the comrades. This current was led by [regarding the Fourth International]

comrades who had not belonged to either tendency ~~inside~~ including the central committee member who had remained independent.

They argued that the bureaucratic methods of En Marcha and their politics reflected a dead end and ~~that~~ could not be part of Trotskyism. They began to look towards the Lambretist ~~is~~ for answers.

The Encrucijada leadership answered these comrades by carefully explaining what is wrong politically with Lambretism and why it was totally correct to remain in the Fourth International although the En Marcha current represented, at that moment, the majority in the international's leadership. They argued that ~~but~~ the LCR had to fight within the Fourth International to change both the political errors and the ~~method~~ organizational methods which resulted in the split.

Due to the new minority which appeared the congress was again delayed as mentioned above. However, the minority which

[won] *won*

support of [support of] ~~the~~ about 15% of the LCR (Encrucijada) became ~~impatient~~ *impatient* [impatient] and began

to take their position to the public. ~~open~~ *At public meetings they openly* attacking the positions

[At public meetings they openly attacked]

of the LCR (Encrucijada) ~~at meetings. #gierxrepealxwarmingx~~ ~~the~~

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~~minority declared that in their view the Encrucijada LCB had taken a centrist position by not breaking completely with what they saw as "En Marcha" politics. After repeated warnings they central leaders of the minority were expelled.~~

Finally in ^{late} May of 1973 the ~~ENCRUCIJADA~~ Encrucijada congress was held. It voted to change the name of the organization to the Communist League (LC). It drew a balance sheet of the history of the LCa. Discussed the question of lambretism in depth. It presented an ~~outline of the~~ report on the situation in Spain and the tasks of the LC. All in all it attempted to lay a programmatic basis for the LC. As the comrades themselves explained this was really their founding conference since it was the first time a political program was being adopted at a congress. The LC documents tend to be long because they have attempted to codify the principles of the Trotskyist ~~movement~~ movement for the first time in Spain since the 1930s.

No guests were present at the LC congress except a representative for the majority and ~~minority~~ minority of the United Secretariat (such representatives had also been present at the En Marcha congress.) The congress rejected allowing an En Marcha representative to attend

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because they had rejected all the proposals of Encrucijada which would have permitted them to ~~present~~ participate in the congress. The congress recognized that ~~the~~ En Marcha, realizing it was a minority, had split from the organization and had declared its public intention to fight the Encrucijada majority as an opponent organization. ~~That Encrucijada~~ The LC had no choice but to recognize this reality and fight to defend its organization.

Conclusions

The En Marcha faction provoked the split in Spain. They were immediately supported by the entire IEC Majority faction. No leader in the IEC majority differentiated from the action of En Marcha or the public support of En Marcha ^{by} the French Communist League.

At no time did an IEC majority faction leader attempt to discuss with the comrades of Encrucijada to try and help reach an agreement to prevent the split. The attack by En Marcha against the one correct objective act of the United Secretariat, ⁽¹⁹⁷²⁾ its four point proposal passed in October, was not criticized by any IEC majority representative.

We are forced to draw the conclusion that either the IEC majority was being hypocritical when it voted for the four points in October or that there were sharp differences between different sectors of the IEC majority and that those seeking a split in Spain put the others under discipline to remain silent in factional solidarity.

In any case Spain is now added to the growing list of splits where ~~the~~ IEC majority faction ^{finds itself in} a minority.

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These minorities would reconsider splitting if they did not have knowledge of the full support of the IEC majority faction. In Spain this was quite clear. Would the En Marcha comrades have gone against the United Secretariat proposals ~~if~~ unless they knew they had the back handed support of atleast a major sector of the IEC majority faction? ~~It~~ It is very doubtful.

~~The ^{left's} IEC majority faction campaign in support of En Marcha and against Enerueldada which began the very day of the split confirms what their real position was ~~all~~ along.~~

Two Experiences

Since the split the differences between the two organizations have become clearer in their activities. The differences reflect the two opposing international lines regarding the construction of the party in Europe.

The ~~documentxxxxxx~~ positions and analysis of the Spanish comrades are now available, from both sides, in international bulletins. Unfortunately the United Secretariat majority tried to suppress some of the major contributions from Spain. They insisted that there be a total limit of 25 pages for contributions from each side in Spain. Why such a limitation should be put

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on any country is not clear. In any case if there was any country in which such a limit was objectively wrong for the needs of the international ~~xxxx~~ it was Spain. For one ~~Spain~~ the comrades in Spain must function under total illegality and therefore it is ~~diffix~~ difficult for comrades outside of Spain to become acquainted with their positions. Secondly the developments in Spain reflect directly and very importantly on the differences inside the Fourth ~~Internxx~~ International. And lastly the demand by many comrades ~~to~~ for a clear political and organizational explanation of the split in Spain is completely ~~objeet~~ justifiable.

Although the United Secretariat ban on contributions over 25 pages from Spain may prevent ~~se~~ certain documents being available in French and thus reaching the majority of the ranks of ~~the~~ the IEC majority faction they are now available in English.

The documents from Spain available in English are the following:

Argentina Yesterday; Spain Today

~~xx~~ Political differences are usually best understood by

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how they reflect themselves in concrete events, in action. In a certain sense we are now witnesssing in Spain the same process which took place in Argentina after the last world congre s.

In Argentina a split took place. Both sides declared they had a majority. Four year later the political differences became clear not only because of written documents by their own activity.

~~XXXXXXXX~~ One proved not to be Trotskyist and is, today ~~not~~ fighting against the Fourth International outside of its ranks. The other organization is today the largest Trotskyist party in our world movement.

Although it may be hard, at first, to confirm all the facts, as it was in Argentina, partially due to the difficult conditions of illegality, gradually certain uncontested facts become available that help comrades understand the political differences.

In this contribution I have referred to the political differences only to help clarify the organizational process of the split. ~~Certainly the political differences are the underlying~~ Of course, comrades should read carefully the documents of both sides to best understand the differences

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at the time of the split and their later evolution.

To end I would like to refer to the most reason event
~~figures and indicators~~ [gives one indication of] [now]
which ~~makes clear~~ the direction the En Marcha comrades are ~~now~~

heading. The assassination of the Spanish prime minister

Carrero Blanco was a classical example of a terrorist act.

En Marcha

The LCR in Spain not only gave this action "total support"

but justified it with all the arguments of the terrorist.

This ~~terrorist~~ action they hold will be an "impetus" to the

masses, it brought "terror and consternation" to the ruling

classes and the masses "will understand" the "effects" such

"an individual action" has "produced." They even imply this

"sharpen" the "contradictions" in
action will ~~exist~~ for the ruling class in replacing

the individual in the top governmental post.

The question here is not one of tactics but the principles
of Marxism! (see appendix no. 9)

January 20, 1974

Post Script: Several documents ~~re~~ on the recent split in the

ETA VI and its unification with the LCR - LC are included. These

are self explanatory (see appendix 10.)

CARTA A LOS MILITANTES DE LA LCR DEL CDA. ANDRES DEL S.U.

Va a circular entre los miembros de la LCR, la carta del BP dirigida al SU. Yo quisiera presentar una aclaración, no tanto para responder a la citada carta, primero porque no tengo copias y segundo porque me parece mejor hacer una contribución para ver si nos podemos entender mejor todos los cds.

Desde la fundación de la L. con su opción por la IV desde hace 2 años y medio, ningún dirigente del SWP de los EEUU o de la posición minoritaria sobre L.A. en el SU ha tenido la oportunidad de visitar España. Hasta que en julio de este año, 2 miembros del CC, uno de cada tend. me invitaron a mi a visitar España. En Octubre de 1971 el Buró del SU decidió que yo y otro cda. de la dirección de la IV visitarían España en el tiempo de la fiesta, que se suponía tendría lugar a finales de octubre.

Al llegar a Esp. hablé inmediatamente con el BP y discutimos las razones de mi visita. Yo me puse de acuerdo con todas las recomendaciones que ellos me hicieron. Después de una discusión con los dirigentes de las dos tendencias, me di cuenta de la situación un poco tensa que existía dentro de la org.: 1) En España se había formado un grupo de cuadros muy firme e implantado en el mov. de masas con experiencia en la lucha de clases, que daba una perspectiva muy optimista para el desarrollo de un partido trotskista. 2) El grupo, que optó por la IV hace solamente dos años, tenía falta de experiencia en algún aspecto de las normas de un partido leninista a pesar de que tenía mucha experiencia en otros aspectos de la lucha de clases. Una lucha tendencial había aparecido, con repercusiones organizativas y una serie de errores se habían cometido por parte de las dos tendencias en las normas de funcionamiento, en una situación de este tipo. Por un lado, la tend. encrucijada no estaba participando a nivel de dirección en el BP y en este sentido, fallaba su responsabilidad por el funcionamiento de la org. Un error de este tipo tenía que reflejarse en la base de los que generalmente apoyaban las posiciones de la encruc., se reflejaría en una actitud negativa hacia las responsabilidades en la org. Por otro lado, la tendencia "en marcha" controlando el BP estaba tratando de resolver un problema esencialmente político con hechos organizativos, lo cual llevaba a esta dirección a romper con algunas normas democráticas. El problema esencial para la Liga es que todavía no ha tenido una fiesta que vote documentos clarificando su programa, estrategia ó tácticas. Todos los demás problemas tienen que estar subordinados a conseguir claridad política, pero al mismo tiempo hay que lograr que la org. siga funcionando e interviniendo, durante la etapa de discusión.

La dirección "en marcha" empezó a tomar algunas decisiones organizativas contra la otra tendencia. Estas fueron: 1) Quitó miembros de la otra tend. de algunos cuerpos de dirección. 2) Después de la caída de un miembro del CC en manos de la policía, al sustituir a este miembro "encruc." por un "en marcha" cambió la relación entre las dos tend. en el CC, poniendo en duda cual de las dos tendencias tenía la mayoría. 3) Decidió que las tend. no pueden tener reuniones a escala nacional por su cuenta, para clarificar sus documentos para la fiesta.

Llevé a cabo estos tres puntos con el apoyo formal de la tend. "encrucij.". Pero esto no hace que estas tres medidas sean correctas, al contrario, lo que prueba es que las dos tend. tenían algunos conceptos incorrectos. "En marcha" fué todavía más allá en una reunión del BP del 24 de octubre, cuando decidió que los mils. de la org. no podían votar por los documentos de la otra tend. porque había llegado unos diez días más o menos después del día fijado para la entrega de documentos. La tend. "en marcha" había entregado dos documentos en el mes de octubre, que junto con un tercer documento anterior, servía de base para el voto que define su tendencia. Aunque el documento de la "encrucijada" llegó solamente unos diez días tarde, después de los documentos de "en marcha", el BP decide que no se podría votar por el texto "encrucij.".

El BP planificaba hacer una fiesta cinco semanas después de la llegada de sus documentos a la base (en algunas ciudades los textos llegarían incluso más tarde). Peor todavía la votación para delegados a la fiesta y por los documentos, se hacía solamente en tres semanas.

La actitud de las dos tend. y las acciones del BP de tratar de tener una fiesta sin una discusión real sobre las diferencias políticas dentro de la Liga, llevaba a la org. en una dirección muy peligrosa.

La colaboración entre las dos tendencias era cada vez menor y los conflictos se hacían mas y mas organizativos impidiendo una discusión política. Bajo estas condiciones yo hice la siguiente propuesta a las dos tendencias:

- 1) Que trataran de funcionar conjuntamente a nivel de dirección para mantener el funcionamiento y la intervención de la org. antes de la fiesta.
- 2) Que trataran de hacer un plan real para la fiesta, aceptado por las dos tendencias, para tener suficiente tiempo para una discusión sustancial sobre las diferencias políticas y para que la fiesta sea democrática y los resultados aceptados por las dos tendencias.

Para lograr esto yo propuse los siguientes puntos concretos:

- a) Que la fiesta se posponga hasta una fecha de comun acuerdo entre las dos.
- b) Que se formara una comisión paritaria para la preparación de la fiesta.
- c) Que se formara un BP con participación de ambas tendencias. Mi propuesta fué un BP paritario.
- d) Que las dos tendencias participen y asuman responsabilidades en todos los cuernos de dirección (especialmente comites provinciales).
- e) Que las dos tendencias cierren sus filas en solidaridad absoluta frente a cualquier intervención de la policía a cualquier nivel, concretamente, que ninguna de las dos tendencias en esta situación delicada aproveche fraccionalmente la represión. Por ej. cambiar las relaciones tendenciales en el CC.
- f) Que las dos tendencias discutieran estos puntos, los piensen y manden representantes a una reunión del SU, para ver los planteamientos que tendrá el SU en su conjunto.

Entonces me dirigí a Londres para hablar con el c. M. y a Paris para hablar con los cdas. franceses del SU y con los cdas. que normalmente tienen contacto con España, sobre mi propuesta. También hice los arreglos necesarios para que pudieran realizar un viaje los representantes de las dos tendencias para una reunión con el SU. Y debo agregar que este cuerpo está normalmente contra mis posiciones sobre diversos temas. Pero yo hice estas propuestas y traté de colaborar con todos los cdas. porque me parecía que era objetivamente necesario y en interes del grupo de España y de la IV. Me pareció que este tipo de funcionamiento era correcto en este tipo de circunstancias. La tend. encrucijada aceptó la critica que le hice a su funcionamiento y ellos hicieron una propuesta de 6 puntos para lograr el objetivo de un mejor funcionamiento e intervención y una fiesta real, y colaboración con la otra tend. Los cdas. de "en marcha" hicieron un BP el 24 de Oct. y rechazaron el contenido de la propuesta que les hice, excepto en el punto referente a la reunión del SU para discutirlo mas. Las dos tend. rechazaron la propuesta de formación de un BP paritario como propuesta que no podía dar resultados en su practica y fuera de las normas organizativas correctas. La tend. "en marcha" en particular hizo notar que esta formulación y concepto les parecía incorrecto. Yo acepté la critica que me hicieron los cdas. Me parece que su punto de vista sobre este aspecto de la propuesta era correcto.

La reunión del SU promuso unánimemente lo siguiente:

- 1) Que la fiesta se posponga al menos un mes despues del tiempo fijado por el BP, pero que trate de celebrarla antes de fines de año.
- 2) Que los documentos de las dos tend. se consideren en discusión y se voten.
- 3) Que se forme una comisión paritaria para la preparación de la fiesta.
- 4) Que se forme un BP de las dos tendencias respetando la mayoría a la tend. que la tenga en el CC.

Yo creo que estas propuestas son objetivamente necesarias para el grupo de España.

Para terminar yo quisiera hacer notar la actitud responsable y fraternal que han tenido los cdas. de "en marcha", que aunque tuvimos algunas diferencias en la discusión de mi propuesta, estos cdas. me han tratado de una forma absolutamente correcta, y que han expresado su deseo de reconsiderar sus posiciones despues de la discusión con el SU. En una situación de este tipo va a ser necesario un esfuerzo fuerte de los dos lados para mantener el funcionamiento del grupo en su conjunto en Esp. y para preparar una fiesta real, y para poder salir de la fiesta con un voto mayoritario aceptado por las dos tendencias y con una org. unida para continuar la lucha y seguir aprendiendo del proceso de la lucha de clases en España. Y poder formar el Partido de masas trotskista revolucionario del futuro de España.

Con solidaridad revolucionaria

ceda. Andres Octubre

PS. En el espíritu de la discusión del SU y de una propuesta de la tend. "en marcha" yo he terminado mi visita, esperando regresar despues de la fiesta

con un representante del punto de vista de la mayoría del SU sobre IA, para poder discutir las diferencias dentro de la Internacional sobre - América Latina (IA).

NOTA: EL PRESENTE TEXTO ES EL "DOSSIER DEL ULTIMO SENADO", EN EL NO FIGURAN LAS ACTAS -DE NINGUNA DE LAS TENDENCIAS- POR NO HABERSE RECIBIDO AUN LAS DE LA TENDENCIA "NUEVA ENCRUCIJADA", SE ESPERARA UN PLAZO PRUDENCIAL, Y DE NO RECIBIRSE SE EDITARAN COMO SEPARATA - LAS DE LA TENDENCIA "EN MARCHA".

22-XI-72
