

September 27, 1974

To the Leninist Trotskyist Faction Coordinators

Dear Comrades,

Enclosed are the following items:

1. A letter from Susan Williams to the Executive Bureau of the IMG which was published in the August 1974 internal information bulletin for members of the IMG.

2. An article on the June 15 demonstration in London and the IMG's anti-fascist campaign, submitted by the Tendency Steering Committee and published in the August internal information bulletin for members of the IMG.

3. A statement by the political bureau of the Japanese section concerning the IT split.

4. A letter from the Political Committee of the Danish section to the United Secretariat concerning the IT split.

5. A statement by the political bureau of the GCI in Mexico concerning the IT split.

6. A statement by the Internationalist Tendency Party concerning their split. The statement was given to members of the United Secretariat at the September meeting.

Comradely,

Ed Shaw

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To the Executive Bureau of the IMG: 1 August 1974

Dear Comrades,

I was very surprised to read in this weeks Notes to Organisers which I have just received, the EB's proposed agenda for the forthcoming National Committee meeting.

Given the current political situation and the developing crisis within our movement, it seems hardly responsible to schedule a one-day Sunday meeting which as previous experience has shown, can last at the most six hours. The NC was previously scheduled for a 2 day meeting to take place on July 20 and 21st. The agenda was to include our Autumn campaigns, Ireland, Chile, Anti-Fascist campaign, etc., with a sub report to be made on the elections.

You postponed the NC meeting for two weeks on the basis that more time was required for political preparation. It now turns out that the NC will meet for one day only, with a completely changed agenda. You now propose that the main item on the agenda should be a discussion around our election strategy! Your proposal is that this item take up almost half of the entire meeting! Given the fact that a general election may or may not take place in the Autumn and without minimising the importance of our movement adopting a correct strategy towards it, this question is hardly the most pressing one facing us right now.

Your proposed agenda does not include the projection of a campaign in defence of those persons victimised by the police on June 15th. The police made over 50 arrests that day and a large portion of those arrested were IMG members.

One of the key political questions which the NC should be considering is the best way to defend those members of the IMG who were arrested and charged on the June 15 action. Any other course is to abrogate leadership responsibilities. Such default in leadership can only lead to an increased pessimism and demoralisation within our movement. It will also miseducate our ranks on such a vital question as defence work.

The defence of our comrades cannot be left to lawyers and token picket lines. While everyone is in favour of getting the best legal defence possible, to imagine that solicitors and lawyers can substitute for a broad and vigorous defence campaign is to leave those comrades concerned to the mercy of the bourgeois courts.

Allied to the question of defence is an evaluation of our past activities against the National Front and the way forward for our "anti-fascist" work. Leaders of our movement have characterised the June 15 action as a "military defeat" and a "political victory" for the left wing. Exactly what is meant by this? As you know the British government has been able to utilise the June 15th action and the inquest held on Kevin Gately's death to further its own reactionary aims; i.e. to make recommendations restricting and regulating the conditions under which future demonstrations should take place. To any politically thinking



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person it's surely clear that if these recommendations become law they will be used against the left and not the right wing. Is this part of our "political victory"?

And what does the leadership mean, precisely, when it claims that the left suffered a "military defeat"? What are the implications for the future if this is so? Does the EB see the September 7th and August 24th demonstrations against the National Front as aiming to reverse this situation so that we can turn the "military defeat" into a "military victory"? If so, how and in what way? What is our policy to be on the August and September national mobilisations? A re-run of the June 15th action? Clearly the national leadership has to make an assessment of our June 15 action and to work out a correct policy for the August and September demonstrations.

According to the editorial in the current Notes to Organisers (June 30) "These (anti-fascist) mobilisations are the central priority for all branches." If our "central priority" is to be the anti-fascist demonstrations, doesn't the EB consider it worth even a discussion at the next NC?

You can, of course, decide against the National Committee making an assessment of the June 15th demonstration. You can also put it on the agenda in such a way as to avoid a genuine discussion. You can also eventually end up with a situation where the EB makes all the important political decisions and issues instructions to the membership for it to carry out without question. In the context of the British political situation today such a course, however, would negate the building of a democratic centralist organisation and move decisively towards bureaucratic centralism.

Our organisation is committed, on paper at least, to engage in a half-hour work stoppage on September 11th and a national demonstration on September 15th in opposition to the Chilean military junta. The Chile question is one of the most burning issues before the international workers movement, yet this question originally scheduled for the NC agenda has now been removed from the draft agenda. What is the explanation for this? Is it that the national leadership sees no need to assess our work in this area? That the national leadership does not see the political importance of this issue? Or is it because there are differences within the "majority" leadership on this question?

Given the direct involvement of the British government in trying to maintain the status quo in Cyprus I would have thought that a leadership thinking in a political way would have scheduled at least an initial discussion and assessment of our work so far.

The EB is fully aware of the friction and trends towards disintegration which have developed within our national movement over the past weeks, yet no provision is made for a full report and discussion on this situation at the NC meeting.

The Cowley cell has passed a resolution calling for a control commission to investigate the allegations made by comrade Howard of undemocratic procedures used against him by the FC as outlined in his letter circulated to all NC members and branch organisers.



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This cell has also disassociated itself from the IMG pamphlet "Cowley: Women and the Unions" and has called for the immediate withdrawal of this pamphlet.

As a result of a campaign to inject "discipline" in the Manchester branch several comrades had their voting rights taken away from them for two aggregates. Some NC members support this flagrant bureaucratic practice to the hilt. The EB is also aware that 7 Manchester members have resigned from the IMG.

The crisis in our Irish work has resulted in its two main leaders, Reed and McGovern, resigning from the Irish Commission. They have issued a statement declaring "total War" on the national leadership. Comrade McGovern has also requested a Control Commission to investigate the allegations of misconduct made against him by comrade King. Two IMG members at the TOM conference are alleged to have publicly attacked the line of our organisation and have charges against them.

The East Essex Working Group has passed a resolution of censure against the EB because they consider the EB has made "...an attack on the democratic rights of members."

The North London organiser of the IMG, comrade Corris, writes in the current London Notes that "...the London Bureau has seen fit to start a general investigation of other comrades against whom no specific charges were laid at the meeting. This in my view is an unprecedented and scandalous act, making it impossible for the comrades to defend themselves since they are being investigated without concrete and specific charges and motivations." Comrade Corris is laying charges against comrade Stein and is calling for the Control Commission to hear the charges.

IEC and United Secretariat member, comrade Howard, has had a motion of criticism passed against him for allegedly circulating his document on Chile in an incorrect manner.

Does the EB not consider that the totality of these charges and counter-charges, accusations and counter-accusations to be a very negative development inside our section? What does the EB consider to be the political roots of these problems? How does it propose to solve these problems? By pretending they do not exist, or that the situation can be "cleaned up" by taking disciplinary action against any and all "dissidents." Whatever the view of the EB, is it not conceivable that the NC elected by the last national conference to lead the organisation, might have something to say about these matters? Your proposed agenda makes no provision for this.

I therefore propose that the agenda for this coming NC be changed as follows:

- 1) in place of the item on the election campaign we allocate the same time for the defence of comrades victimized on June 15 and an evaluation of our anti-fascist work. I ask for 20 minutes to present a written contribution on this question.
- 2) the time allocated for the Irish discussion be extended to



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allow me 20 minutes to present a written contribution and for comrades McGovern and Reed to do likewise.

- 3) that another meeting of the NC be called within 3 weeks. The main points on the agenda to be our Chile work, the election campaign and a full report on the organisational points in dispute.

I would like this letter photocopied so that each NC member can have a copy. If you do not have the technical facilities to do this, please let me know and I will put the letter on stencils.

Yours fraternally,

Susan Williams.

An Initial Contribution on the  
June 15th Action and the Anti-Fascist Campaign

by the Steering Committee of the Tendency for the National Committee, 4 August 1974

The most outstanding feature of the June 15th counter-demonstration to the National Front was the vicious police attack on a section of the demonstrators. The degree of police violence is unprecedented since the 1920's. It resulted in the death of Kevin Gately, many injured and 55 arrests -- the majority of whom are our own members and contacts in our contingent. Despite the verdict of the coroner's inquest that the death of Gately was "misadventure," we know it came about as a result of police brutality and we hold the police directly responsible for it. But we should not allow these facts to stand in the way of a correct assessment of the action and of our participation in it.

The government has set up the Scarman Tribunal to report on the demonstration. The jury's recommendation at the coroner's inquest indicates the direction we can expect the Tribunal to follow. As the editorial in the current Notes to Organisers (30/7/74) points out, "the Scarman Tribunal could perform two tasks for the bourgeoisie (a) To propose the banning of certain sorts of demos, etc., and (b) Isolate the revolutionary left at (sic) the cause of these measures i.e. you all have to suffer because of the wreckers." In particular there is evidence that our organisation is being singled out for attack, and there is a serious danger of our being victimised since many of the forces with whom we participated in the counter demonstration have now joined in the attack on us.

In order that we can protect the organisation, our members and contacts against victimisation and aid those who were arrested, it is essential for the leadership to assess the action and make a correct evaluation of it. This is also necessary if we are to set ourselves the correct tasks in the coming period for our work in general, and our anti-fascist and anti-racist work in particular.

First of all we need to examine the facts relating to the June 15th action. The National Front had organised an anti-immigration demonstration and rally protesting the decision of the Labour government to grant an amnesty to persons deemed illegal immigrants under the 1971 racist Immigration Act. In response to this, Liberation, the colonial freedom group having Lord Brockway as president, called for a counter-demonstration. The counter-demonstration was supported in the main by the IS, CP and ourselves and numbered around 1000 persons. Despite the political aims of the National Front demonstration and rally few black people participated in the counter-demonstration. Very few political banners were carried by the left forces and our policy was to keep arms linked throughout the march. After the demonstration had started the police changed the previously agreed route. They turned the counter-demonstrators right into Red Lion Square at the junction of Old North St. and Red Lion Square, instead of left as had been previously agreed. The police concentrated their forces in the northeast corner of the Square behind a cordon at the junction where the change of route was made.



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Thus they were well prepared to enforce their arbitrary change of route.

About one-third of the 1000-strong demonstration turned right as directed by the police and proceeded to hold a meeting in the far corner of the Square. A section of the demonstrators attempted to turn left, as had originally been decided, and a confrontation developed between the demonstrators and the police and Special Patrol Group, who numbered several hundred. The police moved in against this section of the counter-demonstration, which we were leading, in a most vicious and brutal manner, maintaining their traditional role of protecting the right-wing forces. The battles which ensued between sections of the demonstration and the well-organised contingents of club-swinging mounted and foot police ended in the disarray and dispersal of the counter-demonstration. In contrast, the National Front forces who were treated with extreme cordiality by the police, were able to enter Conway Hall as they had planned and to hold their meeting without interruption.

The brutal death of Kevin Gately immediately aroused strong feelings of sympathy throughout the country, although it would be a mistake to assume that this sympathy necessarily reflected support for the aims of the counter-demonstration itself. The police were initially forced onto the defensive. But already right-wing forces have embarked on a press campaign against the left in a determined effort to whitewash the role of the police and regain the offensive. The inquest verdict of misadventure and the jury recommendations for the introduction of measures restricting demonstrations reflect the success they have so far achieved. The government was obliged to set the Scarman Tribunal to investigate the actions but, as has already been indicated, the direction of their findings has been established by the result of the coroner's inquest on Gately's death.

The following questions are pertinent and are posed to the majority leadership:

1. How do we explain the fact that there were so few black participants on this particular counter-demonstration to the National Front?

2. What is the explanation for the lack of political slogans on the counter-demonstration?

3. What motivated our policy of marching on this demonstration, as we have done in all other demos, with arms linked?

4. What were the political aims we had hoped to achieve on the counter-demonstration?

5. Does it not appear that the police consciously changed the route in order to divide the demonstration, anticipating they would be able to get the co-operation of the pacifists and engage other forces in a confrontation?

6. Assuming that the leaders of our contingent were aware of just such a possibility, why did we fall into this trap, knowing the relationship of forces that existed?



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7. Accepting that the forces of the state will be used in the future, as in the past, to protect the National Front, how does the majority leadership propose to avoid further 'military defeats' at the counter-demonstrations projected for August 24th and September 7th?

As yet there has been no collective national leadership assessment of the June 15th action. A "preliminary assessment" was circulated to the membership in the week following the June 15th demonstration. Although unsigned, we can assume that it is the opinion of the EB since it was distributed by the centre before the PC had met. It is in line with the views expressed by leading comrades at base groups throughout London in the week following the demonstration. The essence of this line is that while we suffered a "military defeat" on June 15th we gained a "political victory." This is explained in the preliminary assessment in the following way: "Whatever the shortcomings of Saturday's demonstration in other respects...we have established one thing quite clearly. That the NF (and fascists in general) are not a normal political organisation and normal methods cannot be employed to deal with them. The actions which were taken on Saturday have taken this issue into the broad masses inside the working class. The context of our anti-fascist work has been transferred to a qualitatively higher level."

If we assess that we suffered a "military defeat" it presupposes that we were engaged in a military confrontation on June 15th. If that was the case, who took that decision? Which leadership body was responsible? To our knowledge no leadership body of the organisation made any such decision. Other considerations apart, it would have been the height of irresponsibility to take people into a military operation without their prior knowledge and agreement, and without adequate means of defence against the disciplined and trained police and Special Patrol forces of the bourgeois state. If there is any confusion within our ranks on the nature of our intervention, it should be brought into the open and cleared up quickly--otherwise the organisation will be jeopardised and we will leave ourselves wide open to attack and to the easy infiltration of informers and provocateurs.

Since it was never decided by any leadership body that we were to engage in "military" action, it is politically wrong, confusing and misleading to assess the June 15th action as a "military defeat." But was the June 15th action a "political victory?" On the contrary, the facts show that the action was, for our forces, a political defeat. To assess it in any other way is to make a major political error that if not corrected can seriously hinder our work and even make it impossible for us to build the mass revolutionary party in Britain. Despite the more or less equal numbers involved in the demonstration and counter-demonstration we failed to get across the political issues of the counter-demonstration, whereas the National Front's opposition to the amnesty for immigrants came over very clearly. The lack of leaflets and political slogans on the counter-demonstration taking up the issue of amnesty for immigrants means that we missed valuable opportunities to make propaganda against the racist Immigration Act and to win support for a mass campaign within the labour movement for its repeal. Publicity arising out of the action subsequently focused on the confrontation and not on the issues of the counter-demonstration. Despite the racist



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policies of the National Front, it was able to present itself as the victim of minority violence, demagogically posing as a peaceful law-abiding group who are being persecuted by violence-bent forces out to smash them.

In what sense can we describe the outcome of June 15th as a "victory for the revolutionary left"? Were we successful in stopping the National Front from meeting? No...under police protection the meeting went ahead. Did we smash the National Front? No...it still exists. Were we successful in exposing the totalitarian and bigoted nature of the National Front? No...the National Front has been able to exploit the situation to pose as a proponent of free speech and lawful assembly! Were we successful in bringing out clearly the racist and violence-prone attitude of the National Front? No...the National Front has not found it difficult to demagogically present itself as a victim of so-called left-wing violence.

The dossier that the National Front is submitting to the Scarman Tribunal quotes from Red Weekly and other sources in an attempt to prove that it was not the police but the IMG that was responsible for the death of Kevin Gately. Is this a good defensive position to be in? Obviously not. Has the bourgeois state been thrown on the defensive, forced to make concessions regarding the restrictions on the democratic right to demonstrate? No, the defenders of capitalist law and order are utilising the occasion to do the opposite...to impose further restrictions negating the right to demonstrate without hindrance. If they are successful, it will be the revolutionary left that will be affected the most. Were we able to create divisions among the Stalinists forcing sections of them to identify with our line and tactics? No...the pressures on the Stalinists were to disassociate themselves from our line and tactics and join in the attack against us. They are doing just that when they line up with the bourgeois press to claim publicly that we were indirectly responsible for Gately's death.

The majority leadership is not concerned with whether we were successful on any of these counts. Our "political victory", according to the initial assessment made by the leadership in Notes to Organisers, was limited to the fact that we proved that the National Front is not a "normal" political organisation, therefore "normal" methods cannot be employed to deal with it. If the National Front is not a "normal" political organisation--whatever that means--then it must be "abnormal." Is this the most important political point we want to make about the National Front?

No, far from being a political victory the June 15th action did little to fight racism and reaction. It did, however, succeed in showing in theory and practice how the struggle should not be conducted. Perhaps a confrontation with the police, which is inevitable when we seriously try and put into practice our "no-platform" line, is a practical application of what the majority leadership is talking about when it states that "normal methods cannot be employed to deal with the National Front." Is a confrontation with the police, when the relationship of forces is against us, an example in practice of the "abnormal" methods which the leadership advocates to fight fascism? Does the major-



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ity leadership consider the June 15th action to be an example of "winning hegemony with the mass vanguard" by demonstrating "a capacity for effective initiative" corresponding "to the concerns of the vanguard" without running against "the current of mass struggles"? -- "an exemplary action" in line with the political position of the international majority?

As comrade Smith has pointed out in the current Notes to Organisers, the likely outcome of the Scarman Tribunal will be to blame the revolutionary left for the violence in order to victimise them and restrict or ban certain types of demonstrations. There is evidence that our organisation is being singled out for attack. While we will make our defence against victimisation as effective as possible, is it not a fact that we have more to lose than to gain if repressive measures are taken against our organisation and/or some of our leaders? If there are any erroneous ideas around within the organisation that there is something to be gained from repression, that the bourgeoisie in using repression recognises who their real enemies are, the leadership should take measures to correct them.

How can the majority national leadership seriously hold to its claim that the June 15th action was a political victory?

To understand the roots of the error made by those leaders who assess the June 15th action as a political victory, it is necessary to place this action in the context of our so-called "anti-fascist campaign" which has as its focus the "No-Platform" line to be achieved "by any means necessary."

This line was promoted in Red Mole as long ago as September 1972 at the time of the Ugandan Asians controversy. "The only way to deal with fascist type organisations like the NF is to break up their activities before they grow to the size where they can begin to smash the activities of the working class. We are nowhere near a threatened fascist coup yet but the methods necessary for preventing such a threat must be explained and demonstrated in practice now...we must begin to adopt the right tactics from the start. No Platform for Racists!"

The September 28th 1973 issue of Red Weekly argued that "It is urgent that the National Front be stopped in its tracks now before it can grow into a dangerous force with mass influence" and called for a mass picket by the left and the labour movement outside the annual general meeting of the National Front in Conway Hall, October 13th. To win support for the picket the October 5th Red Weekly explained to readers that "the first principle of anti-fascist struggle" is that of "no public platform for the extreme right wing." A few hundred supported the picket and the police took up their traditional role as protectors of the National Front, arrested five demonstrators and injured many others.

The campaign for "No Platform" was taken up by many students. It reached a high point at the national conference of the NUS in April of this year when an executive-sponsored resolution on racism was amended, largely on our initiative. Amendment 4 refused any kind of help to openly racist or fascist organisations



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and sought to prevent members of such organisations or "individuals known to espouse similar views, from speaking in colleges by whatever means are necessary..." Following the adoption of Amendment 4, representatives of our organisation together with the IS, CP, National Organisation of Labour Students and Militant, signed a joint statement pledging that, despite large differences, all would "work to win students to ban fascist and racist activity in the colleges -- by whatever means are necessary."

The bourgeois press launched a campaign against the student movement in the name of "FREE SPEECH" and got support from right- and left-wing journalists and some Labour ministers. A "free speech" movement developed amongst the students and forced an extraordinary national conference of the NUS in London on June 15th. While Kevin Gately was dying in Red Lion Square, about a thousand student delegates and observers were debating the NO PLATFORM policy in another part of London. Only a few responded to an appeal from a bloodied demonstrator to join the demonstration at Red Lion Square. As outlined in Red Weekly, June 20th, the CP argued at this extraordinary conference that the phrase "by any means necessary" was open to "many interpretations" and "opened the flood gates to ultraleftism." They claimed that "stopping fascism was a tactical question and could only be decided in each individual case." The outcome of the debate was to maintain "no platform" as a principle, leaving it open to general meetings of students unions in each situation to decide on the form of action.

Despite the support amongst a layer of students and the publicity given to the "no platform...by any means necessary" line the two London demonstrations against the National Front were relatively small. They failed to penetrate the labour movement or get the support of the black community despite the fact that the National Front's anti-immigrant campaign has fed off the racist climate created by the actions of Tory and Labour governments since the early 60's.

Although few blacks participated in the June 15th 1000-strong demonstration against the National Front, the past year has seen a rising black militancy against the racist legislation of the Tory and Labour governments, police harassment, and attacks on black workers' rights by employers and trade union officials. On June 16th, 600 Asian workers on strike at Imperial Typewriters obtained the support of 1500 workers and supporters, including IMG members, on a march through Leicester in support of their strike demands. On July 22nd, 1973, more than 10,000 black workers marched through London to protest the retrospective features of the 1971 Immigration Act and police dragnet searches for "illegal" immigrants in the Black communities. A twelve-week strike by 500 Asian workers at the Mansfield Hosiery Mills factory in Loughborough in 1972 set the stage for a mounting wave of struggles by Black workers. The Mansfield hosiery workers, who were striking against the refusal of the employers to train Asian workers as skilled knitters, won their fight despite the scabbing of the white workers and opposition from the National Union of Hosiery and Knitwear Workers.

The victory of the strikers sparked struggles by Asian and other Black workers in several parts of the country, most recently



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a militant strike by 600 Asian workers at Imperial Typewriters in Leicester since May 1. The strikers, who are demanding higher bonus payments, an end to management cheating on the bonus scheme, an end to discrimination against Asians, a move toward equal pay for women, and election of shop stewards, pay tribute in their strike bulletin to "the Asian workers of Mansfield Hosiery who beat out a path of determined and consistent struggle for black workers in Britain." The Imperial Typewriters workers, too, have met strenuous opposition from white workers in the factory and from the lily-white bureaucracy of the Leicester Transport and General Workers Union, which has refused to recognise the Asian workers' picket line. The national union leadership, while it has agreed to call an enquiry into the Leicester union, has refused to declare the strike official.

The facts show that there is no shortage of concrete issues around which Blacks and immigrant workers can engage in struggles. Revolutionaries should be in the forefront of such campaigns, winning support for these struggles, which are in direct opposition to the racist and fascist ideology espoused by the members of the National Front and other reactionary forces. Such issues have to be taken into the universities and colleges and into the labour movement to win support for the struggle of the Blacks against every aspect of racialist oppression and exploitation. This is the way to combat the racialist policies of the bourgeois state and win the masses to a real understanding of the fight against fascism and racism. This is the way we will mobilise the necessary social forces to drive the fascists off the streets.

The "No-Platform" campaign is a substitute for serious consistent work, for building campaigns of support for struggles against concrete expressions of racist and fascist ideology. The anti-fascist and anti-racist campaign as carried out by our organisation over the past couple of years has been diversionary and has led to elitist and vanguardist actions. It is time to reject the concept that an anti-fascist campaign can be built in such a manner. We must develop a serious analysis of the Black struggle and develop a line that will aid the struggle of the Blacks and immigrants in Britain and will win many of these militants to the revolutionary party. Built into the campaign of the "No Platform" policy is a confrontationist orientation. It is an expression of the minority violence line which is contained in the political position of the International majority.

A central theme running through our anti-fascist campaign is expressed through the demand calling on Westminster and local councils to refuse facilities to the National Front when it wants to hold meetings, demonstrations, etc. The demand for the Labour government to ban the National Front has been prominent in our demands. In other words we call for the bourgeois state to help the working class struggle against fascism. What the demand calling on the government to ban the National Front does in reality is to sow illusions in the bourgeois state by giving the impression that it can play a positive role in the fight against fascism. Experience has shown that this is not the case and those who have mistakenly thought so have paid a terrible price for their illusions. In the final analysis bourgeois governments aid and promote fascist movements, not the anti-fascist struggle.



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It is not excluded that the Labour government could place token bans on the National Front or its activities. If this happens it would not be a victory for the left -- no movement with any substance of either the left or the right has been totally destroyed through governments illegalising them. In France, fascist or racist meetings are illegal, but this has not meant that fascism cannot be a potential danger in that country nor that the fascists have not found ways and means around the law to agitate and organise for their reactionary ideas. If legislation was passed by the Labour government illegalising fascist or racist organisation, this would not mean that the danger of fascism or racism would be eliminated. It takes more than laws to crush a reactionary ideology.

The concept that bourgeois parliaments can legislate away reaction is a reformist concept. (This is why the Stalinists can promote the demand calling on the Labour government to ban the National Front.) Reliance on parliament and the bourgeois state does not involve the mobilisation of the masses in an anti-capitalist way and is, therefore, not a proletarian method of struggle. Calling on Westminster to illegalise the National Front does not instil into the working class and its allies the necessity of relying on their own independent power and none other. It does, however, sow illusions in the working class about the real nature of parliament and the bourgeois state.

It is not the concept of making demands on the bourgeoisie or the reformist leadership of the working class that is wrong. What is totally incorrect is the nature of this demand. It is conceivable that the Labour government could do exactly what we suggest -- ban the National Front (or place a token ban on it). If it did this, it could well be used as a cover to ban the anti-fascist organisations. Therefore, to call upon the Labour government to ban the National Front is politically wrong, misleading, and dangerous.

A much stronger political position would be for us to propagandise and educate around the concept that we cannot depend on the bourgeois state and the Labour government to fight the fascists; that the working class and its allies are the only force in society that can accomplish this task; and that what is needed is for the anti-fascist forces to insist on their democratic right to hold counter-demonstrations (adequately defended against right-wing hoodlums if necessary) and to conduct the struggle for socialism -- the only real solution to a fascist danger.

The time, energy and forces the majority leadership have allocated to the anti-fascist campaign is out of all proportion when we consider the real strength of the fascist movement and the actual trends in British politics. The national leadership is not of the opinion that the British working class is about to be crushed and that we are on the verge of a fascist dictatorship. So why have things become so distorted that the EB now believes that our main campaign in the next period is fighting the fascists? It is only possible to explain the leadership's hysteria against the National Front by looking at their overall assessment of the trends in British politics today -- or, more precisely, what the leadership think the dominant trends are.



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While the leadership does not consider a fascist threat to be imminent, it does consider the dominant trend to be towards the right -- towards the strong state, as the EPD explains -- despite the deepening radicalisation in British society today. Consequently, they see the National Front as becoming ipso facto an incipient mass movement that must be crushed in the egg. If the working class is not yet prepared to do this, then, according to the leadership, the responsibility to accomplish this lies on the shoulders of the vanguard. Convinced supporters of the "anti-fascist" campaign will no doubt point to the recently increased growth and influence of the National Front (both electorally and otherwise) as justification for our intense activity against them. To be sure, the National Front's increased activity is not unimportant and Trotskyists would be making a serious mistake either to overestimate or underestimate it. But the actions which we initiate and take part in against the National Front must be carefully weighed from the point of view of their effectiveness. If our counter-demonstrations and other activity are to have any real meaning, then it is necessary first to provide concrete proof that the fascists are on the march. We must also recognise that big social forces are involved when fascism does move forward that require counter mobilisations to be of comparable size and weight. Vanguard-type actions are no substitute for mobilising the masses.

It is not only necessary to determine to what degree the National Front has increased its influence and in which section of the population, but also to put it into perspective -- in the context of a much more important trend, the shift to the left since the late 60's that continues to deepen despite the lull in the class struggle since the election of the Labour government. The recent militant strikes waged by nurses, hospital workers, teachers and other sections of the labour movement (like the Imperial Typewriter workers) involved tens of thousands of workers -- many of whom were young women and immigrants who had never been on a picket line before. Where Trotskyists actively participate in such struggles their ideas can be taken up by large sections of those involved in these anti-capitalist struggles and can influence their outcome.

In response to Kevin Gately's death, around 10,000 persons (mainly students) took to the streets in order to show their opposition to the police brutality and Gately's death. The fact that Gately died on an anti-fascist demonstration is an important factor that prompted many persons to participate in the demonstration. Had it been a National Front activist who had been killed on June 15, the response from the student movement and trade unions, if any, would have been minimal. The broad response is further indication that the swing in British politics continues to the left and is far more important relatively than the polarisation to the right. To think otherwise, as the majority leadership does, is to fall prey to the mistaken notion that the National Front and fascism are immediate dangers.

It is this wrong political analysis of the current direction of the class struggle in Britain that leads the majority leadership to make a wrong prioritisation of our tasks. The "preliminary assessment" of the June 15th action, distributed by members of the majority leadership, points out that Home Secretary



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Jenkins "has taken a hard line against the demonstrators and Heath has called for an amendment to the 1936 Orders Act, obviously with the aim of banning us. Therefore we must commit forces immediately to the principle of a counter-demonstration against the next National Front march in London as well as demanding that it be banned. We have to explain that the demonstration should be held against fascism on the day that the National Front selected and even if a ban applied (unlikely) it still needs to be policed by a mass demonstration especially in view of the fact, confirmed for the masses by the demonstration on Saturday June 15th, that the state is far from neutral."

Our next "anti-fascist" action then will take place on a day selected by the National Front!

Notes to Organisers (23/7/74) informs us that "The dates of the NF demonstrations are as follows and we must begin a counter-demonstration. The first is in Manchester [now changed by the NF to Leicester] on August 24th in defence of free speech, law and order, etc. On September 7th the NF is holding a demonstration in London with Loyalist forces. The latter is the major event for which the people mobilised around June 15th have been waiting."

Notes to Organisers (30/7/74) in its editorial informs us that "These mobilisations are the central priority for all branches. Manchester [now Leicester] 1. limited national mobilisations to include all Scottish branches, Newcastle, York and Lancs branches, Birmingham, Coventry and a London contingent; (to be discussed) Stoke, Nottingham, Leicester, a Wales contingent; this is on the 24th August. 7th September, a full national mobilisation. If the capacity of a branch to mobilise for London is drastically impaired by Manchester [Leicester]; London (the Orange NF march) has priority. A 'practical committee' has been set up to prepare arrangements, Jennings responsible."

A summary of EB/PC minutes contained in the same Notes to Organisers informs us that "the task of the practical commission is to prepare for the demonstrations, and regional meetings are to be held to discuss its line."

To date no information has been received as to the nature of our counter-demonstrations but unless the NC takes steps to correct the wrong line practised in the past period we can anticipate repetitions of the last two counter-demonstrations in which we have participated. Perhaps there are some naive members of the leadership who anticipate that the next two counter-demonstrations to the National Front -- unlike the last two -- will be mass demonstrations since the masses through the vanguardist action on June 15th now understand "that the state is far from neutral."

Absorbed with the question of trying to stop the National Front from meeting we have missed many opportunities to make a positive contribution to the fight against racism and reaction. This is shown most clearly by our actions on the 13th and 14th of October last year.

The leadership called for a national IMG mobilisation to



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prevent the National Front from holding their national conference in London, October 13th. The result of our efforts was a small insignificant demonstration that was confined to a small "vanguardist" layer and ended in shambles when the confrontation with the mounted police began. Concentrating our energies on building the anti-National Front action we failed to notice that the Arab Students Union, in response to the Israeli-inspired war in the Middle East, was mobilising the following day for a demonstration and rally in opposition to Israeli aggression against the Arab states. Over 10,000 people participated in this pro-Arab, anti-Zionist action, but our forces on it numbered no more than a dozen despite the fact that the Israel state is a major bastion of world reaction.

We could have made a much greater political contribution towards the struggle against racism and reaction had we concentrated our efforts on the anti-Zionist demonstration instead of on the vanguardist action of 13 October. We could have been helping to build the anti-Zionist action from the start, winning the confidence of the Arab students. This would possibly have enabled us to put our point of view before 10,000 people. Our anti-fascist, anti-racist literature would have found a ready sale and we could have made important contacts in the Arab community. But we totally missed out on this opportunity. Shackled by the so-called "principle" of "No Platform for Fascists" all our efforts were diverted into trying to prevent the National Front from holding their conference.

A somewhat similar phenomenon took place on June 15-16. While it was correct for our organisation to participate in the counter-demonstration to the National Front (our difference is on how we should have participated in and built it) our main efforts should have been focussed on building the Portuguese demonstration which took place the following day. We should have been in the forefront in building this action of solidarity with the Portuguese workers and peasants. After all a quasi-fascist regime which had been on their backs for several decades had been overthrown and the masses had moved out in a struggle to create a democratic and socialist Portugal! The repercussions and lessons of the Portuguese events do not have to be detailed here. It is enough to point out that the opportunity was given us to show concretely our solidarity with the Portuguese workers in a dynamic way and to hammer home the political lessons to be learned from the Portuguese events. We failed to exploit this opportunity to the maximum because our attention was focussed on smashing the National Front.

With regard to the projected September 7 demonstration, while we identify with the desire of the majority leadership to combat Orangeism in Britain, we consider it would be a mistake to concentrate our forces and prioritise the work of the organisation in the next period to building the counter-demonstrations to the National Front-Orange Order demonstrations at the expense of building the Troops Out Movement.

The most concrete and effective way for us to combat Orangeism and chauvinism in Britain is to allocate sufficient forces and resources to the building of a mass solidarity movement powerful enough to force the Westminster government to withdraw



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its troops from Ireland. It is our failure to do this over the last five years which has largely facilitated the growth of Loyalist reaction in the six-counties. If such a movement had been built, the IMG in a real way could have effectively reduced a major basis of support to the National Front and its reactionary ideas. Our anti-fascist campaign in the abstract has only acted as a substitute for the concrete task of building a truly powerful mass movement against the British government.

Right now a priority task required of our organisation is to wage a massive defence campaign to counter the moves being made against our organisation and to protect and defend the individuals who were arrested and charged as a result of the June 15 police victimisation. Without such a campaign we leave the fate of our comrades in the hands of lawyers, and we will be unable to prevent our organisation from being isolated if repressive action is taken against us. In such a situation more is needed than good lawyers and token picket lines.

A key task for us is to build a defence committee which is broader than the IMG to work for the charges to be dropped and to defend individuals and left-wing organisations against any political victimisation. People need not agree with an organisation's political programme or an individual's political views in order to campaign for their defence. Amongst other things, a broad defence campaign could organise the maximum forces to picket outside the courts, raise money for the defense, produce documentation, and hold public meetings throughout the country to focus public attention on the court and keep the key issue of police brutality at the forefront.

As the political organisation most deeply affected by the police victimisation we have a responsibility to see the building of such a campaign as a priority. Bourgeois courts do not respond simply to good legal arguments, particularly when they are prosecuting left-wing militants. They will only respond to large pressures in society. As a relatively small and isolated organisation we urgently need to work for the mobilisation of those forces which will bring pressure to bear on the bourgeois courts and bring out clearly the issues which are being fought for through the courts.

In order to carry out this task with maximum success a thorough assessment of the counter-demonstration on June 15th and our intervention in it is essential. This is necessary to correct the wrong political line that is now having disastrous results for our organisation.

The growth of the National Front and fascism cannot be stopped by bans imposed by a bourgeois government, nor by vanguardist actions however well-meaning. Fascism will be defeated when the social forces who have the power and historic role to smash fascism are conscious of an immediate fascist threat and are mobilised under the leadership of the mass revolutionary party to defeat these reactionary forces in the struggle for socialism.

We call upon the majority leadership to stop and rethink the line and priority tasks of the organisation before it is too late. We urge the leadership to take up the struggle against the growth



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of fascism and reactionary forces in the manner outlined by Trotsky in his writings, particularly in his advice to the comrades in Spain.



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ON THE PC/SWP EXPULSION OF THE IT MEMBERS FROM THE SWP  
AND ITS CALL FOR THE CONVOCAION OF A SPECIAL WORLD CONGRESS  
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Political Bureau, Japan Revolutionary Communist League,  
Japanese Section of the Fourth International, September 6,  
1974

We received the "Materials Related to the Split of the Internationalist Tendency from the Socialist Workers Party" (Internal Information Bulletin No. 6 in 1974, issued by the Socialist Workers Party) on July 9, 1974.

Cde. XXX, a candidate member of the National Committee, Socialist Workers Party, attended the August 8 meeting of the Political Bureau, Japan Revolutionary Communist League, Japanese section of the Fourth International, together with cde. Roman, a member of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International. Cde. XXX made a report on the July 4 decision of the Political Committee, Socialist Workers Party, to "place" the IT members "outside the constitutional provisions of membership in the Socialist Workers Party" to the PB/JCRL meeting, and the SWP comrade, cde. Roman and members of the PB/JCRL discussed on the question at the meeting.

The Political Bureau of Japan Revolutionary Communist League, Japanese section of the Fourth International, expresses its opinion on the PC/SWP decision of July 4, 1974, to expel the IT members from the SWP as follows:

1) The Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party, based on the "Report of the Control Commission of the Socialist Workers Party" (Internal Information Bulletin No. 6 in 1974) submitted July 2, 1974, decided that "the Internationalist Tendency's status as a separate, rival party be recognized," that "the members of the Internationalist Tendency party be informed that this status places them outside the constitutional provisions of membership in the Socialist Workers Party," and that "each branch" be instructed "to reregister its membership by removing from its rolls as of this date (July 4, 1974) all of the 69 known members of the Internationalist Tendency party" (IIB No. 6 in 1974, p. 15).

The PC/SWP, which made the decision, did not give the IT and its members any opportunity to defend itself and themselves from the charges in the "Report of the Control Commission of the Socialist Workers Party" at any CC and PC meetings before the July 4 decision. But we think that the IT and its members have their absolute right to defend itself and themselves against the charges and to refute them at the official bodies, before any action or actions can be taken against the IT and its members in the SWP. The Statutes of the Fourth International say: (h) of Article 29/"Members facing disciplinary action are entitled to know in advance the accusations brought against them, to present their defence and, except where it is geographically impossible, to confront their accusers," and the last sentence of Article



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43/"The accused must be presented with the charges in writing in advance and have the right to present their defence, and, except where geographically impossible, to confront their accusers in the body having jurisdiction in the case." We think that these provisions should be also applied to a tendency or a faction, and the IT Statement of July 8, 1974, says: "There was no opportunity for self-defence, no trial, and no provision for appeal. . . . We are preparing a detailed response to the accusations of 'an IT split' made in the SWP Internal Document 'Materials Relating to the Split of the Internationalist Tendency from the Socialist Workers Party.'"

According to the July 4 PC/SWP decision, "the members of the Internationalist Tendency party be informed that this status ('as a separate, rival party') places them outside the constitutional provisions of membership in the Socialist Workers Party," so it seems that "the 69 known members of the Internationalist Tendency party" have no right to appeal to any official body, the SWP National Committee or Convention, in their case. By the way, we should like to know whether the PC/SWP would recognize the right of the IT members to appeal to the official bodies of the Fourth International on their case or not.

Even if it is true that "the Internationalist Tendency's status as a separate, rival party be recognized," after having given the IT its opportunity to defend itself at the concerned official bodies, we think it is wrong for the PC/SWP to have decided that "this status ('as a separate, rival party') places them outside the constitutional provisions of membership in the Socialist Workers Party." In such a case, we think, the PC/SWP, if it has such a disciplinary power, should order the IT to change its nature as "a separate, rival party" into a tendency or a faction in the limit of democratic centralist norm of organization or to dissolve itself as "a separate, rival party," and, if the IT would refuse to accept the order, the branches should act disciplinarily over the IT members in the individual basis. The last SWP convention refused to elect members of the IT to the National Committee and there is no IT members at the SWP national bodies, so the branches would be able to act on the IT members individually. But there are some exceptions about the members who are fraternal members of the IEC of the Fourth International, so the IEC should be consulted on those comrades.

Therefore, we conclude that the July 4 SWP PC decision has violated the democratic centralist norms of organization which is formulated in the Statutes of the Fourth International, so we think that the International cannot accept the July 4 SWP PC decision to expel the IT members from the SWP.

As for the charges themselves against the IT in the "Report of the Control Commission of the Socialist Workers Party," we are now not in a position to judge them, at least, because of the lack of the IT's response to the CC/SWP report.



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2) The "Part III" of the "Report of the Control Commission of the Socialist Workers Party" says: "The evidence contained in the internal documents of the IT establishes the complicity of a section of the elected leadership of the Fourth International in the decision by the IT to split from the SWP and form an independent party" (IIB No. 6 in 1974, p. 14).

The charge should be taken up by the International Control Commission.

3) The July 4 statement of the Political Committee, Socialist Workers Party, says: "To avert the danger to the international arising from the actions of the IMT, we call for the convocation of a special world congress of the Fourth International as provided for in the statutes of the Fourth International" (IIB No. 6 in 1974, p. 20). The PC/SWP statement explains the reason: "Most important, out of greater loyalty to its own secret faction than to the Fourth International, the IMT leadership has permitted and helped cover up a split engineered by its followers in the Socialist Workers Party. By taking this course of action, the IMT leadership has broken the nine-point 'Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International' adopted by the last world congress. This places the unity of the Fourth International in the gravest danger" (IIB No. 6 in 1974). Therefore, according to the July 4 PC/SWP statement, it is necessary to convoke a special world congress in order to "avert the danger to the international arising from the actions of the IMT."

Firstly, the charge made by the CC/SWP over "a section of the elected leadership of the Fourth International" should be confirmed in the International whether to be true or not. The International Control Commission should take up the charge and should make a full investigation on the case, first. Only after having received a full report of the ICC based on its authoritative investigation, the IEC will be able to decide whether it is necessary to convoke a special world congress on the question or not. If not, how can the members of the IEC decide their minds to accept the convocation of a special world congress? Or, members of the IEC will decide their minds, yes or not, according to their "factional lines."

Secondly, does the July 4 PC/SWP call for the convocation of a special world congress mean that the internal international discussion as a whole for such a special world congress and the special world congress itself should function directly as a "Control Commission" of the International? If so, it is not a democratic-centralism, but a pure direct democracy, and the results will be sure to be a chaos, which, we are convinced, will never solve the question. We must defend the day-to-day actual building of our International.

Therefore, we are against the July 4 PC/SWP call for the convocation of a special world congress, and we think the convocation of a special world congress in such a way would only serve to deepen the danger of a split of the Fourth International.



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4) The July 4 meeting of the Political Committee, Socialist Workers Party, decided to "immediately make available to the membership in an internal bulletin all the relevant material on the split of the Internationalist Tendency party" (IIB No. 6 in 1974, p. 15). And the letter of July 4, 1974, from cde. Bev Scott, National Office, Socialist Workers Party, to the leaderships of all the sections and sympathizing organizations could say: "Internal Information Bulletin No. 6 in 1974 is now available from the SWP national office for \$2.10. . . . We have already sent you, under separate cover, the number of bulletins usually sent." (emphasis added) We received the voluminous "Internal Information Bulletin No. 6 in 1974" of 146 pages at Tokyo on July 9, 1974.

We cannot understand why the National Office of the SWP could send the voluminous bulletin of "all the relevant material on the split of the Internationalist Tendency party," which the PC/SWP decided to "immediately make available to the membership" on July 4, 1974, on the same day. It seems that the National Office or some other body of the SWP had started the printing of the "Internal Information Bulletin No. 6 in 1974" before the July 4 decision of PC/SWP. If it is so, we cannot understand why the National Office or some other body of the SWP could have known all the contents of the PC decisions and the list of the documents, which would be included in a bulletin, before the PC itself made those decisions, and why someone or some body of the SWP could have ordered to start to print the bulletin before the PC decision of July 4, 1974.

It is a mystery for us, and we hope to have an explanation on the matter.



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30.7.1974

United Secretariat/Bureau

After having received SWP-Internal Information Bulletin, no 6, 1974, the Central Committee of RSF, Danish section of the Fourth International, at its meeting 20.7.1974, carried the following statement to the US:

"The Central Committee recommends that the United Secretariat treats the problems that has developed and escalated inside the SWP. That is, both the formal aspects concerning the expulsion of the Internationalist Tendency, the charges against the SWP-leadership put forward by IT, the charges against member(s) of the international leadership, as well as the political divergences concerning the evaluations of the political development in USA. If necessary through establishing of an international commission."

For the RSF-Political Committee

s/Mogens Pedersen



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Communication from the Political Bureau of the GCI to the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

At its July 15 meeting the Political Bureau of the GCI passed the following resolutions and decided to communicate them to the United Secretariat. Though the Political Bureau had at its disposal only the information contained in the Internal Information Bulletin of July 1974 and reports provided by comrades who had passed through New York only a few days before, given the gravity of the matter that the "split" of the Internationalist Tendency of the SWP poses, it reached this decision:

a) To condemn severely the violent attack on Leninist organizational principles perpetrated by the Political Committee of the SWP in its expulsion of the opposition tendency led by our comrades Massey and Barzman, exemplary members of the IEC and the Fourth International. They were expelled without a trial, without having the chance to defend themselves in front of the ranks of the SWP from the slanderous attacks emanating from the leadership of the Political Committee of the SWP.

All the argumentation by the SWP's Control Commission and Political Committee contained in the cited Internal Bulletin only attempts to fallaciously cover up a de facto expulsion with the word "split." Rather what has happened is an action unprecedented in the history of international Trotskyism (including the precedents of the SWP itself). That is, in the name of (orthodox, etc.) Trotskyism an action of the purest Stalinist type has been perpetrated.

b) In no way to accept the provocation to precipitate a split in the Fourth International, which these acts represent.

c) To reject the proposal of the Political Committee of the SWP to hold an Extraordinary Congress of the Fourth International. To make operative the international bodies that should deal with such cases:

Of course, the United Secretariat, then the IEC, and above all, the International Control Commission should be activated, whose mechanisms will doubtless be forceful in sanctioning severely and harshly these shameful types of acts in the international Trotskyist movement.

For the Political Bureau  
of the GCI

s/Alfonso Ríos



[The following statement was given to members of the United Secretariat at the meeting of September 7-8. It was signed by "the Internationalist Tendency of the Socialist Workers Party."]

#### THE MYTH OF THE 'IT SPLIT' -- PURGE POLITICS OF THE ITF

On July 5, 1974, members of the Internationalist Tendency in both the SWP and YSA were given hand-delivered letters from the SWP Political Committee and YSA National Executive Committee respectively. These letters, in virtually identical terms, informed members of the IT that the Tendency was a "rival party" and that because of their adherence to the "Internationalist Tendency Party" they had placed themselves outside of the SWP and YSA. The letters concluded that SWP branches and YSA locals had been instructed to remove "all known members" of the IT from their rolls.

These expulsions had no real precedent in the Trotskyist movement. The comrades of the IT were given no opportunity to defend themselves, to answer accusations, or to correct the falsifications, innuendos, and slanders which permeate the document "Materials Related to the Split of the Internationalist Tendency from the Socialist Workers Party." So hurried were the expulsions that the lists of expelled comrades contained serious inaccuracies. (Comrade Sandy H., for example, was included although she had resigned from the IT; Don S., Ed H., and Polly C., had resigned from both the IT and the IMT in general. Comrades Mike T. and Lauren C., who had received none of the IT newsletters or internal bulletins cited in the SWP document and taken part in none of the "disciplinary violations" reported, were nonetheless expelled as well.)

The precipitous nature of the expulsions was implicitly recognized in the Report of the SWP Control Commission, issued on 2 July. The Commission stated, "We decided that this evidence was so overwhelming that it was not necessary to spend a great deal of time to examine many of the specific incidents, allegations, and counter-allegations." (Materials..., pp. 5-6.) It was apparently also considered unnecessary to allow the IT to respond to the "incidents, allegations, and counter-allegations" contained in the Control Commission report although Comrade Bill M. was told at the SWP Plenum in June to be prepared to answer questions from the Control Commission "within three weeks," neither he nor any other member of the IT was ever contacted or questioned.

The expulsion of the members of the IT -- an expulsion which included a large number of comrades who had been in the SWP and YSA for years and involved two members of the International Executive Committee, three members of the YSA National Committee, members of branch and local executive committees, all or most of four YSA locals -- marks a qualitative change in the history of the SWP and YSA's organizational norms. During the past period, the SWP's internal life has displayed increasing tendencies toward making monolithic agreement a basic party norm; this has been reflected in the conception of inner-party democracy and the rights and responsibilities of minorities. Beginning with the August 1973 Convention of the SWP in Oberlin Ohio, a declaration of war was issued by Cde. Jack Barnes, National Secretary of the



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SWP, against the International Majority Tendency and its supporters in the SWP, the Internationalist Tendency. Cde Barnes enunciated a policy for the Socialist Workers Party (it is important to realize that Barnes meant the Party and not the faction of the Party to which he belonged. In this sense the SWP became the LTF and those who did not belong to the faction did not really belong to the Party) putting it on a war footing and placing all the resources of the Party (including finances) at the disposal of the war needs. Part of the war plans included provisions against fraternization with the enemy -- the IT. In another respect the members of the IT were to be treated as prisoners of war whose rights were not to be those of full members of the Party but rather those which coincided with the diplomatic necessities of the International Minority. This atmosphere consciously engendered and militarily carried out by the SWP leadership has been the single most important factor leading towards the expulsion of the IT in July of this year. It is not our purpose here to analyze the causes and extent of this process of impoverishment of inner party life, but merely to point out the step which the expulsion of the IT represents. In the case of previous minorities which were expelled, the party assumed full responsibility for determining the political or organizational incompatibility of these groups with the party. This decision was formalized in expulsion proceedings which allowed the minority to present its point of view to the ranks of the party so that the basis of the decision could be verified by the party as a whole. Thus, when members of the Spartacist League were discovered in the YSA, they were not simply taken off the books on command from the leadership, but were expelled with a trial. Even most recently, in the case of Gerry Clark of the Revolutionary Internationalist Tendency (RIT), who was accused of attending a Spartacist summer school -- although he was able to conclusively demonstrate that he was at work at the time -- the party felt compelled to hold a formal trial before proceeding with the expulsion. But in the case of the Internationalist Tendency--whose loyalty to the Fourth International has been questioned by no one -- all norms of party democracy have been thrown out. The leadership simply announced that the IT had "split" (despite its denials) and ordered the branches to take the comrades in the IT off the membership rolls! (The YSA promptly followed suit.) Such a procedure is not in the Trotskyist tradition; it is rather a standard procedure followed by the Stalinist parties to expel minorities without allowing the ranks to hear their case. It is commonly known as a PURGE.

These expulsions are not a normal disciplinary action, nor the recognition of a "split" by a mythical "IT Party," but a purge of dissidents, of supporters of the IMT inside the SWP and YSA (including several not a part of the IT). The explanation for this purge, its timing, and the manner in which it was carried out, can only be found in the escalation of the LTF's factional war inside the international as the pressures of the class struggle on a worldwide scale impose further disassociations by the LTF from the FI and its sections.

It is necessary we feel to readily admit that the IT considers that it made certain errors in relation to its conduct over this past period. They fall mainly into the following categories:



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1. We recognize that we were incorrect in not fully informing the SWP leadership of the attempts of various supporters of the IT to recruit members of the Socialist Union of Los Angeles, the Revolutionary Marxist Collective of Berkeley-San Francisco, and the Baltimore Marxist Group of Baltimore, to the Socialist Workers Party. This error was committed largely on the basis of the fact that contacts of the IT have generally been discriminated against by the SWP and YSA leadership because they are contacts of the IT. Nonetheless we do recognize it as an error on our part not to have given full and complete information of our attempts to convince these supporters of the Fourth International to join the Socialist Workers Party to the Party leadership prior to our letter of June 9, 1974, which did provide such information. It must also be recalled in this regard that we had informed both the SWP leadership and the United Secretariat of our opposition to the factional recruitment policies being exercised by the SWP leadership toward groups such as the Socialist Union in our letter of October 29, 1973, in which we requested an International Control Commission inquiry into this as well as other facets of the factional warfare of the SWP leadership against the IT.

2. We also feel that the self designation of the IT as a Tendency rather than a Faction was confusing at least in light of the reality of things. While the designation of Tendency was correct at its inception, after the declaration of war by Cde Barnes and the formation of the SWP into a faction it was no longer possible nor feasible to remain a tendency inside of a faction if the IT was to survive.

The undemocratic nature of the SWP leadership reflected in their refusal to finance travel by minorities of the Party while at the same time placing all of the Party's resources at the disposal of the LTF is a case in point. This refusal to finance travel costs which in the United States can be quite high due to the size of the country, included the refusal to subsidize the travel costs of comrades of the IMT who toured the SWP and YSA branches prior to the World Congress giving the political positions of the IMT. This necessitated that the IT be self-financed. The Party leadership was informed of these factors.

The use of the Party and the YSA apparatus for the needs of the LTF was countered by the IT in its use of two full-time cadre to carry out its responsibilities. Likewise, in order to assure a democratic functioning of the Tendency, leadership bodies were elected by the Tendency as a whole. Similarly we felt it necessary to carry out internal discussions in order to better prepare ourselves for the political responsibilities we had as members of the FI, the SWP, and YSA. In retrospect we can say, without giving any credence to the ludicrous charges of "secret factions" that it would have been more appropriate to have designated ourselves as a faction rather than a tendency.

The exercise of the right to hold internal discussions among ourselves would have been more understandable, as well as the circulation of internal bulletins and a regular newsletter. The IT did inform the Party leadership of its financial policy, of the designation of a national coordinator and of the holding of its national conference in May 1974. However, none of these facts were ever a secret to the leadership of the SWP and YSA in that these leaderships employ "special methods" that give them



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all the internal documents of minority tendencies or factions.

The designation of the IT as a faction would have also clarified the purpose of our leading bodies, i.e. the IT Political Committee and the IT steering Committee. These would have been more clearly seen for what they were, faction bodies in opposition to the majority faction of the SWP and not the Party itself. (Since the leadership of the Party constituted the Party itself as being at the disposal of their faction this adds to the confusion in this situation). From hindsight the use of the term "IT Political Committee" was a mistake and should have been replaced by a term such as "IT Coordinating Committee." However we are quite confident that this would have been titled a "secret political committee" by the LTF.

3. We wish to make it quite clear that we recognize a number of political mistakes made in contributions to our internal discussion. These are not simply matters of formulation but of political appreciation and judgment. Statements which implicitly or explicitly characterize the Socialist Workers Party as "degenerated" or as having become a sect are absolutely wrong.

It must be pointed out that these characterizations were made by individuals and never adopted by the Tendency as a whole. In fact the characterization of the SWP as a "sect" was explicitly rejected by the IT conference, including the author of the characterization. We make no excuse for these errors in politics as in other sciences precision is the basic necessity.

The internal discussions of the IT were of value in that operating as we were in the highly undemocratic environs of the SWP/LTF, subjective reactions very often could substitute for political wisdom. Thanks to these discussions and the firm but patient advice of the IMF leadership, the IT was able to overcome the dangers that could have led to a split mentality and actions which would then flow from such a mentality. This was the real outcome of the May IT conference and not the absurd fantasy created by the SWP leadership to justify its purge of the IT and to further its factional war against the leadership of the International.

#### The Expulsions in Light of the International Situation

Since the Tenth World Congress, the groups within the Fourth International supporting the Leninist Trotskyist Faction have stepped up their campaign against both the sections and sympathizing organizations of the FI which support the International Majority Tendency, and against the leadership bodies of the Fourth International itself.

This stepped-up attack has taken a number of forms: Joe Hansen's characterization of the FI leadership as "petty-bourgeois"; the refusal by LTF-dominated sections and sympathizing organizations that are not prevented by reactionary legislation from doing so to pay international dues (or to contribute one penny to international campaigns, such as support for the Portuguese LCI); the public attacks on the Front Communiste Revolutionnaire, French section of the Fourth International for supporting Mitterrand on the second ballot of the recent French elections (the culmination being an attack by Art Young of the LSA/LSO before a large audience



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containing a number of opponents); the attacks on the ICR/ETA VI, Spanish sympathizing organization of the FI, as non-Marxist (and lately the claim that it is implementing a terrorist line), etc.

The major crisis for the LTF, however, has been the class-collaboration of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST). The support given by Coral and Moreno to the statement of bourgeois parties in defense of the existing bourgeois institutions is the logical end-product of a process which originated in the PST's legalistic electoral fetishism and gathered strength with its call for the restoration of Obregon Cano, bourgeois governor of Cordoba Province. The SWP at first attempted to cover up for the PST (the numerical backbone of the LTF) by stating that it lacked "sufficient information"; when this information became available, the SWP moved to arguing that the PST did not really sign the statement and that it had made a "self-criticism." The flimsiness of this excuse became apparent when the text of the "self-criticism" became available with its explicit defense of signing such pacts with bourgeois parties in times of crisis. (The PST presently explains that it does not support the Peronist government, but merely the institutions! And this at a time when these same institutions are being used to organize a massive onslaught against the Argentine working class and its organizations.)

The SWP wing of the LTF was faced with a choice: to join with the IMT in condemning this policy and attempting to save the name of the International among the Argentine working class (which would have meant the demise of the factional bloc assembled by the SWP and PST leaderships prior to the 10th World Congress), or to place factional considerations above the needs of the class struggle, above the needs of the International, above the responsibility of educating the cadre of the world party against such class collaborationist and treacherous activity. Unfortunately, the SWP LTF leadership attempted to cover up the facts, to rationalize these class collaborationist practices, and to divert attention from the situation of the Fourth International in Argentina.

In the short run, the response of the SWP leadership was a clever factional maneuver. If they could not extricate themselves from the PST mess, they could adroitly focus attention elsewhere. The expulsion of the Internationalist Tendency (a component part of the International Majority Tendency) for "forming a rival party" would not only serve as a good pretext for continuing the factional hysteria in the SWP and YSA (and cover up the increased isolation of both organizations in the past period), but it could serve as a focus for a counterattack against the whole leadership of the FI, which had encouraged the lunatic "IT splitters." It was to be 1953 all over again, with Massey and Barzman substituting for Clark and Cochran and Mandel for Pablo. At the very least, such a strategy would serve to divert attention away from the PST and force the IMT to defend itself against a series of attacks from the LTF. It was in this context that the expulsions took place.

#### The "Split"

The central allegation of the "Materials..." document is that



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at the May Conference the IT "split" from the YSA and SWP. The SWP Political Committee charges in their document that: "Systematically prepared in the period beginning immediately after the last World Congress, the split was consummated at the May 25-27 national convention of the Internationalist Tendency held in Chicago." (p. 18.) As a result, the Control Commission agrees, the IT "is a separate, rival party to the SWP." (p. 13.)

This charge is a lie.

The Control Commission makes much of a document submitted by Carapace, et al. Yet the Report on the IT Conference included in the SWP document makes it clear that this document was never submitted to a vote. Nor was the Rico document, also stressed in the SWP report. They refer to a document entitled "Unless We Believe the SWP to be Reformable...." without pointing out that the conference record indicates this document, out of 24 full and 10 consultative delegates, received only two votes. They quote the Rahdnick-Estreugal Amendments at every opportunity; yet the Conference report shows that these amendments were rejected.

The actual records of the conference indicate the opposite of the SWP charge. The YSA Report by Inessa, for example, makes it clear that the IT orientation toward the YSA was that of a serious, functioning tendency. The quotations from the Hank Williams document quoted in "Materials..." stress the need to be involved in the "day to day work" of the YSA and note that "All sectarian practices toward the cadre of the party and YSA must become a thing of the past." The Conference Report quotes Hank Williams (Bill Massey), IT Coordinator, as making the following, unambiguous statement: "We need a major orientation to the YSA; we must fight to have the IMT push the democratization of the SWP we are against any split in the SWP and must fight the ITF on this question." (p. 38)

Other material which the SWP Document did not choose to reprint, makes this even more clear. The IT Emergency Newsletter of 6-27-74 dealt with the SWP Control Commission investigation. It stated that the Commission was "first of all a factional act to further intimidate, demoralize, and isolate members of the IT in the Party and YSA. It is meant to cut across any attempt by us to function as real members of the Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance. It is also meant to provoke our ranks into such demoralization that they will take actions that would make it easy for the leadership to repress us even more and if they got their wishes, expel us or better still have us leave the Party and YSA." (Emphasis added, see Appendix No. 1) This hardly sounds like a group which has already split, nor does the statement in the same article -- made, it should be noted, by the leadership of the IT to the IT ranks in an internal document -- that, once the SWP stated concretely the aims and scope of the Control Commission investigation, that "we will be happy to comply -- that being in the best interests of the party..."

This is further stressed in the "Memorandum on the IMT Tour," proposed by a comrade from the IMT and unanimously approved by the IT Political Committee on 7-1-74 (ironically, the day before the expulsions were recommended). The statement is highly critical of the SWP; our views on the SWP were and are hardly a



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secret, however. The Memorandum stresses that the goal of the IT is "the constitution of a national tendency in the SWP and especially in the YSA"; it cites in this context the task of fighting for the "recognition of the rights of members of the IT to speak and act as disciplined members of the FI..." It calls for "an effort to politically recruit to the FI and organizationally recruit to the SWP on the basis of agreement of activists (isolated or in groups) with the program of the Fourth International and its Tenth World Congress, and of their respecting the discipline of the SWP and YSA and of their commitment to behave as active militants." (Emphasis added) The statement concludes that the errors of the SWP leadership are not to be underestimated and are part of a consistent opportunist and sectarian trend, but "the membership of the SWP in the FI -- for whatever reasons -- is a factor which hinders the fullest expression of these trends to an extent which would necessitate a split." Unless the SWP grants that it is planning a split from the FI, this would seem to be the opposite of a commitment to a split from the SWP and YSA, much less recognition of a split which has already occurred.

Thus, the May IT conference did not decide upon a split on either organizational or political grounds. On the contrary, the IT oriented itself purposefully toward its functioning as a serious tendency within the SWP and YSA. At a time when the Argentine situation is a living confirmation of the bankruptcy of the LTF line, and at a time when it is increasingly apparent that the SWP's "new radicalization" perspectives in the USA must be replaced, it is clear that one of the major considerations for purging the IT was precisely the fear that the orientation of the IT as a serious tendency in the SWP and YSA would effectively begin to win comrades away from the LTF.

The SWP Document then goes on to hint that the mere act of holding the IT Conference was in itself grounds for expulsion. If so, it is difficult to understand why the point was not made until July; in the intervening period, the IT was not informed that it had "placed itself outside" the SWP and YSA at any time, even though the SWP leadership had been notified of the holding of the conference and had acknowledged receipt of this notification

The question of whether the IT organizational structure itself constitutes an "illegal" counter-party is raised several times in the "Materials...." document; it must therefore be examined.

#### The IT Organizational Structure

The "Materials...." document focuses attention upon the organizational structure of the IT. At one point it states that "The IT's description of its own structure and method of functioning clearly indicates that it is already a separate party." It goes on to point out that the IT held a national conference, has a National Steering Committee and a Political Committee, a 10 person YSA Commission, etc. (pp. 6-7) It concludes later that "IT has its own highly organized and centralized independent party structure functioning on all levels." (p. 13.)

It is difficult to know what to make of such a charge, especially in view of the fact that the Control Commission itself



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acknowledges reluctantly that "a faction has the right to meet privately and determine its own structure..." (p. 8). The charge in this section is not that the IT had its own structures, but rather that it did not inform the party "as a whole" about these structures; all the rambling about the IT Steering Committee, the YSA Commission, etc., is therefore totally beside the point.

It is necessary to examine for a moment the "secret party" which the IT supposedly constitutes. The SWP is divided into branches, the YSA into locals; "local tendency" organizations are obviously made up of all IT supporters in every local area. These IT comrades have in every case functioned openly as members of the Internationalist Tendency.

The IT exists nationally within the SWP and YSA, however (as well, of course, as internationally as a fraternal body of the IMT); it therefore found it necessary to hold a national conference and to elect a National Steering Committee. It may have been "alien" to Party and YSA norms not to publish the names of the members of the Steering Committee (or the Political Committee when it was elected); if so, it is odd that this point never came up until July 2, 1974. There was never any request for names of national leaders of the IT from the leaderships of the Party and YSA. (As a matter of fact, there was never a request of any kind from the leaderships of the Party and YSA, which chose instead to ignore the IT, in an attempt to demoralize it.) We did make it clear at the very outset of the IT who our leaders were. It was established from the first that Bill Massey was IT National Coordinator; in the YSA Comrades John Holton, Rich Mitten and Cathy Matson all served for a period as YSA-IT coordinator. (Each in turn notified the YSA of his or her appointment as a national leader of the YSA IT). It is unclear how the SWP and YSA thought these comrades were selected; at any rate, it was never a point in contention either at conventions or in correspondence with the SWP or YSA leaderships until it suddenly became grounds for our expulsion.

To state that the mythical "IT Party" operates "both within the SWP and outside the SWP" is totally false (p. 6). Not only every member of the Political Committee and Steering Committee, but every member of the IT is a member of either the SWP, the YSA, or both.

What emerges from a close observation of the internal situation of the SWP (and, of course, the YSA) is the picture of a strongly polarized party, in which the leadership has acted as a divisive, factional body. In reaction to this attitude of the leadership, the IT (which has politically defined itself as a tendency) was nonetheless compelled to organize itself in such a way as to minimize the effects of the factional activity of the leadership (SWP and YSA). The result was a relatively high degree of organization of the tendency, a situation which is definitely not a desirable one, but which was still well within the bounds of minority rights. Both in terms of political perspectives and organizational reality, the IT (except for its open ties to the IMT) functions entirely as an opposition tendency within the SWP and YSA.

It is also interesting to see how the criteria established (rather suddenly and unilaterally) by the SWP Political Committee



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and YSA National Executive Committee apply to their own factions. The YSA Majority Faction did provide a (vague) guideline as a basis for membership and extent of discipline. The YSA MF did not "inform the organization as a whole" of its structure or leadership composition, if "organization as a whole" includes the IT and comrades with third or independent positions. (This, of course, is not surprising in view of a situation in which expulsion proceedings could be planned and put into effect without the three IT comrades on the YSA National Committee being informed of them. Is this within the "norms of our movement"?) Much the same is true of the functioning of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction in the SWP. Members of the IT, one supporter of Kompass, and comrades with positions other than complete support to the LTF have been left completely uninformed as to LTF leadership, organizational structures, and so on. As for the statement that "faction discipline must be subordinate to party discipline," it is rendered all but meaningless in a situation where every party and YSA officer is a member of the LTF and/or YSA MF; in these situations, party or YSA discipline is identical with faction discipline. The actions of the SWP and YSA in expelling the IT without any formal charge or trial, with no opportunity to answer accusations, are a convincing proof of the dissolution of Party and YSA leadership organs into factional agencies.

But we repeat what we have already stated that because of the conditions existent in the SWP and the changes that were forced upon us we would have been far more correct to have designated our tendency as a faction.

#### The "Secret Internal Discussions"

The "Materials..." Document stresses the horrors of the IT internal discussion. The charges focus on two facets of this discussion: (1) The statements made in the discussion, and (2) the fact that such a discussion was held at all without every document being shipped to the SWP and YSA leadership for approval. (This latter charge relates to the lengthy discussion of the use of pseudonyms and false covers for documents in the discussion.)

The "Materials..." Document extracts quotes from the Hank Williams Document in which the SWP is described as having a "petty bourgeois methodology" and the "methodology of a right opportunist sect," and as being "deadly sick" (this last statement in the context of SWPers crossing picket lines in a strike). The Control Commission says of these quotes: "The above statements of the IT are not those of a group that is loyal to the Socialist Workers Party, and that sees the SWP as the nucleus of the revolutionary Marxist party that must be built. They are not the statements of a loyal minority of the revolutionary Marxist party that must be built. They are not the statements of a loyal minority that has confidence in the cadre of the party and that seeks to convince the majority through force of argument, and that pitches in to help build the party while retaining dissident views." (p.13)

Two points must be made in this context. First, the statements from the Hank Williams Document are not qualitatively different from the criticisms made by the IT in both the SWP and YSA internal discussions. In "The Building of a Revolutionary Party



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in Capitalist America," we stated that the SWP could "continue to drift along the path of the new radicalization, and risk being bypassed by the working class, jeopardizing the future of Trotskyism for years to come and degenerating into a sect. Or it can break out of its stupor and return to the road of Trotskyism and the Transitional Program." (p. 28) Other statements were even stronger; yet these statements were not viewed as being a grounds for expulsion from the SWP and YSA and did not prevent four supporters of the IT from being placed on the YSA National Committee. (In fact, the whole method of judging a tendency's orientation on the basis of selected quotes rather than on its overall political thrust is highly questionable.)

Second -- and more important -- these statements do not go beyond the bounds of what the SWP and YSA leaderships have said (and continue to say) about the Fourth International and its leadership. Does Tom Kerry's statement that the leaders of the FI are "centrist muddleheads" make him ineligible for membership in the FI? And how are we to characterize Joe Hansen's remarks on the Tenth World Congress? If the IT is to be expelled for referring to "petty bourgeois methodology" by the SWP leadership, how do we handle Hansen's statement that "Enough evidence is accumulating to make it possible...to offer a convincing analysis so that the term 'petty bourgeois' will appear as a correct label..." (Internal Information Bulletin, April 1974, p. 10.) Are these statements of a "loyal minority that has confidence in the cadre" of the FI, that "seeks to convince the majority through force of argument and that pitches in to build" the FI "while retaining dissident views"? The actions of the SWP leadership and the ITF in general would not seem to indicate so.

The Control Commission and Political Committee of the SWP seemed to regard it as more important that documents were published at all by the Internationalist Tendency for the purpose of regular coordination and internal discussion. They state: "A faction has the right to circulate drafts of proposed documents among faction members for the purpose of preparing material for presentation to the party as a whole. But an organized faction can circulate its own internal discussion bulletin only on the condition that it receive the prior approval of the party and that its bulletin be made available to the party." (p. 9) They do not state whether this provision would apply as well to a tendency newsletter, which is a guide for the tendency on how to present its views on the party.

These provisions not only weaken the ability of an opposition tendency to operate; in the existing political climate of the SWP and YSA, they would prevent it from operating entirely. We should mention in passing here that the 1965 SWP Organizational Resolution from which they quote does not apply to the YSA, making it especially unclear on what basis the IT was expelled from that organization. As the YSA did not bother to issue a bulletin explaining the YSA expulsions, we can only assume that the "independent" Young Socialist Alliance engaged in nothing more serious than a game of political "follow the leader."

In theory, a tendency is a loose grouping united around several (or even one) programmatic points, to which it attempts to



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win the majority of the party. The shining example of Hansen's grouping around Eastern European questions in 1950, which the SWP today upholds as the model (and virtually its only example) of a tendency was such a grouping. But when a tendency merges in the SWP today, it is immediately subject to a vicious assault from the leadership. The fact that the tendency is formed around a relatively narrow range of programmatic points (in many cases) is used to attack the tendency as "unprincipled." ("Where Does Tendency X Really Stand On...?") The example of the unprincipled politics of Martin Abern is dredged up at every opportunity. Leading members of the SWP and YSA, such as Pearl C., the Chicago Branch Organizer, issue remarks such as Comrade Pearl's charge that every opposition tendency in the entire history of the SWP had been on the wrong side of the class line. Bluntly, the SWP leadership now regards any serious oppositional tendency as disloyal; while on paper it issues rhapsodic descriptions of the rights of mythical opposition tendencies, real oppositions are isolated, baited, slandered, and ultimately either expelled or forced to resign.

It was in this environment that the IT was forced to operate. The IT responded, as noted, by organizing itself in such a way as to minimize victimization of its comrades within the SWP and YSA. A major goal of the IT was the democratization of the SWP and YSA; prior to our expulsion, we had made certain limited gains. It was no longer considered grounds for expulsion, for example, to telephone comrades in other branches between pre-convention discussion periods. (Although this "right" may seem absurd to comrades in the International, it must be noted that the Proletarian Orientation Tendency in 1971, for example, had been characterized as an unprincipled clique, threatened with disciplinary measures, and denied representation on the National Committee of the SWP, in large part for doing just that.) Comrades of the SWP who are also in the YSA have also been allowed to operate within the YSA without being bound by Party discipline (i.e., it was possible for IT supporters in the SWP to also be IT supporters in the YSA), in contrast to the practice in previous periods. But so long as IT comrades were continuously attacked as "disloyal", so long as mere support of the IT was viewed as a major political heresy, it was necessary for the Internationalist Tendency to maintain certain minimal precautions to prevent harassment, while seeking simultaneously to correct the undemocratic norms of the party.

It should be noted that another distinction made in the SWP Document seems more than a bit artificial: the SWP and YSA leaderships (theoretically) allow documents to be circulated, as long as the final draft is presented to the entire organization. But how are positions arrived at within tendencies except by a full internal discussion? If any differences, hasty formulations, and first judgments are to be shipped off to the SWP's ITF leadership for approval before they can be ironed out, the entire "unprincipled bloc" attack will be set off again. Under the rules provided by the SWP leadership, the days of any oppositional tendency are indeed numbered.

We also point out again that the leaders of the SWP and YSA have different standards for themselves and minorities. The ITF and YSA MF, after all, are factions; yet surely the "whole organ-



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ization" includes the IT and supporters of Kompass and various nonaligned comrades; yet none of these sectors of the Party or YSA were ever privy to LTF or YSA MF discussions, communication, and so on.

We can take as an example the declaration of the YSA Majority Faction. It is possible that Comrade Welch simply decided that such a declaration would be a good idea, sat down at her typewriter one day, and dashed it off; that she then showed it to the other signers, who approved it on the spot, with no changes; and that they then immediately ran down to show it to the NEC (which was coincidentally meeting at the time) and had them approve it and sent it out to every YSA local. It seems a rather dubious hypothesis, however; far more likely is the possibility that there were a number of discussions and communications between members of the LTF in the YSA (and even those not in the YSA), culminating in the drafting of a statement which reflected the (rather low) political level of the discussion, though not necessarily including every statement, point, or political characterization made during the discussion. None of this prior discussion was ever communicated to members of the IT or to the YSA as a whole; frankly, we never expected it to be. In actuality, it would seem reasonable to suppose the existence of a whole series of international discussions between groups and members of the LTF. We would hope so, anyway, given the well-known differences on a whole series of issues (Popular Frontism, the "progressive role of the colonial bourgeoisie," China, etc) which are found in the LTF. None of these exchanges have ever been made known to the IMT or the IT.

Concretely, we can note that LTF minorities (such as the Tendency in the IMG) in sections of the FI have internal discussion, conferences, etc., as a matter of course without being accused of "forming a rival party" or violating party organizational norms.

The charges made in regard to the "secret documents" of the IT are actually a rather thin smokescreen for the behavior of the SWP and YSA leaderships. Although the IT was not informed of the existence of the SWP Control Commission until the Party Plenum beginning on June 24, it had apparently been secretly functioning for a considerable period before this date. The YSA, for its part, apparently never even bothered to go through the motions of appointing such an investigative body; it made preparations for expulsions without the knowledge of three IT comrades (and one other IMT supporter) on the National Committee -- and thus without the knowledge of the National Committee as a whole -- and without any prior warning to the IT or the YSA membership (outside of factional caucuses). In the case of the YSA, comrades of the IT were actually attending the National Committee Plenum when, as the second session began, they were denied access. They were thus deprived the right -- as elected leaders of the YSA -- to participate in the session which formally expelled the IT (and, of course, the three IT NCers) from the YSA. It is behavior of this sort which is thoroughly outside of the norms of the movement.

A few words should also be included regarding the use of pseudonyms and false covers for the IT discussions. The SWP



regards both as measures aimed at itself: "There is an IT 'security policy' vis-a-vis the SWP. It is designed to hide IT activity from the SWP. This security policy includes the use of pseudonyms that are not party names and deceptive covers attached to the secretly circulated IT discussion bulletins..." (p.

The SWP apparently cannot conceive that the IT has security problems except in regard to itself. The fact that the IT has been the subject of a probe by the House Internal Security Committee (which published several of the IT's submissions to the last party discussion bulletins, along with the names of comrades who signed them), that the IT has been attacked as a "terrorist" group by professional red-baiting sheets such as Philip Abbot Luce's Pink Sheet and other individuals such as the nationally syndicated columnist Victor Riesel, etc., apparently goes beyond them entirely. The IT internal bulletins were mailed around the country and sent to members of the IMT in other countries; it was entirely natural and correct for the IT to adopt (as have the majority of comrades in the FI) working pseudonyms under such circumstances. As for the Party and YSA, their understanding of such security precautions is apparently all but nonexistent; how else can we interpret their printing of the pseudonyms of Comrades Massey and Barzman and their inclusion of Comrade Massey's address and telephone number? Parts of the SWP Document could serve quite well as briefing reports for the local Red Squad.

As a matter of fact they have already provided a briefing for the national Red Squad. This is evidenced in the contribution by Representative John Ashbrook, a reactionary member of the U.S. Congress, in a contribution he made to the Congressional Record of July 24, 1974, pages E4988-89. In an article entitled "American Trotskyites Split on Terrorism" Ashbrook labels the IT as terrorist for its support of the views of the IMT. Specially it lists Cdes Barzman and Massey as having attended the 10th World Congress and having voted for every resolution in favor of terrorism and "armed struggle." It goes on to use the Barzman letter, which it states, "The Socialist Workers Party through their surveillance of the 'Internationalist Tendency' secured a secret letter written from France by Barzman to his comrades in the U.S." It goes on to state that "Barzman's secret letter was published in the confidential Socialist Workers Party Discussion Bulletin and was reprinted by the House Committee on Internal Security in its hearing on 'The Theory and Practice of Communism'." Ashbrook's article went on to mention all the comrades who Barzman had ostensibly received "advice and instructions from." The failure of the SWP to use pseudonyms in its bulletins will unfortunately later be realized in the concrete when the bourgeois courts seek to use this material against both comrades of the IMT and LTF. Further the listing of Bill Massey and John Barzman's home address in the SWP document is now responsible for its listing in the Congressional Record. That the U.S. government obtains this material by the use of spies in the Socialist Workers Party is an invasion of the democratic rights of the Party. It is a violation that deserves a united condemnation as does the attacks on the IT. This would be made easier if these same methods were not used by the LTF in their obtaining of the internal documents (and private letters) of the IT.

The charge in regard to "deceptive covers" is totally absurd;



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we remind comrades again that documents were sent over international borders -- often by mail, but sometimes by individual comrades. The covers were obviously not meant to fool the SWP or YSA, but rather to survive a cursory examination by other, more powerful, third parties.

#### "Unauthorized Work Outside the SWP"

Several times in the "Materials..." Document emphasis is placed upon the "unauthorized" (read "illegal" or "disloyal") work done by the IT with groups outside the SWP and YSA. Unfortunately for the SWP leadership, upon examination these examples dissolve into a pathetic charade; in no case do the facts fit the blaring headlines which precede them.

(1) "Unauthorized IT intervention in the national conference of the Attica Brigade, a Maoist opponent group." The facts here include a letter from Jose Perez of the YSA National Committee and a short statement by Dale G. of the Chicago SWP branch.

The facts are these: the National Conference of the Attica Brigade (now the Revolutionary Student Brigade) was held in Iowa City, Iowa. There is a YSA local in Iowa City; a majority of the members of this local adhere to the Internationalist Tendency. Rather naturally, the Iowa City comrades intended to sell the press and attempt to make contacts at this important conference. Comrade Jose states in his report that for security reasons, these arrangements (i.e., the nationally-planned YSA intervention) were made in as discrete a manner as possible directly in collaboration with the organizers of party branches and YSA locals involved." (p. 118) Apparently the plans were extremely discrete, because (in spite of queries) the comrades in Iowa City were not informed of the plans for a national intervention at all. (This was perhaps because of their support for a "disloyal" tendency.) Rather worried that the small Iowa City local would not be able to intervene effectively, the Iowa City comrades asked Mark L. (a personal friend of the former local Organizer) if he could make the 3-4 hour drive from Chicago to help distribute material and sell the press. In this connection, Mark L. (a member of the Chicago SWP branch and YSA local) went to Iowa City, accompanied by Larry N. and Rob B., both members of the Chicago YSA local. When the three Chicago comrades became aware that there was a national SWP-YSA intervention, Comrades Larry and Mark immediately approached Jose, made their presence known, and had several discussions as to what approach the YSA should take in its intervention. At no time did Jose make the charge of "disloyal" activity or instruct Comrades Larry and Mark to leave. The entire Iowa City problem could have been avoided altogether had the YSA leadership not seen fit to treat the Iowa City comrades (like other IT locals and the IT in general) as political pariahs and outcasts.

(2) "Unauthorized work with the Puerto Rican Socialist Party." The documents here attempt to show that Comrade Massey lied to the Control Commission when he stated that he never met with Alfredo, a New York leader of the Partido Socialista Puertorriqueno (PSP). This is supposed to demonstrate "unauthorized work" by the IT with the PSP! In actuality, Comrades Massey and Barzman stated that they wished their "discussion" with the Con-



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trol Commission (in a hallway during the Plenum, a rather informal setting for a session of a party commission) tape-recorded to ensure accuracy; Comrades Gus Horowitz and Barbara Matson of the Control Commission refused, instead launching into a series of questions. One such question had to do with a meeting with Alfredo L.; Comrades Massey and Barzman indicated generally that they would not answer such questions under such circumstances, at that time and place, until seeing formal charges. So much for the 'denial' of meeting Alfredo L.

As for the meeting itself, Comrade Massey did indeed have a conversation with Alfredo L., a former member of the Proletarian Orientation Tendency whom Comrade Massey has known for years and considers a friend and a comrade. However, at no time did Comrade Massey discuss internal matters of the SWP and FI, nor did Alfredo L. discuss internal matters of the PSP. The conversation was a political one about the positions of the Fourth International. While it can be assumed that Comrade Roberts' report is grossly exaggerated, we know for a fact that Comrade Ivan's is completely false. We call upon him to document his charge; he cannot, in fact, do so. Taken as a whole, this episode reveals more about the frantic efforts of the SWP leadership to add variety to its charges, than to any "unauthorized work" by the IT.

(3) "Unauthorized work in the Emergency Committee to Defend Democracy in Chile in San Jose, California." This matter is dealt with extensively in Comrade Massey's letter "Against the Split Tactics of the ITF", sent to the SWP PC on June 9, 1974 (and reprinted in the "Materials..." Document). The facts are that the San Francisco branch of the SWP refused to allow three IT comrades who live and work in the San Jose area (60 miles from San Francisco) to work in the ECDDC in San Jose, or, in fact, to give them any political assignments at all in the area where they live. The ECDDC is generally under CP hegemony but has a left wing which is hostile to the reformist CP line and is possible to work with. The ECDDC scheduled a meeting for Harald Edelstamm which drew between 400 and 500 persons. (See "Materials...", pp. 137-138) The three reports in this section of the document are almost meaningless, especially the tedious report by Comrade Armen who notes breathlessly that three IT comrades spoke with members of the ECDDC "for over 15 minutes." It becomes apparent from reading the document that: (1) one of these three comrades was eventually assigned to work with the ECDDC, voiding disciplinary charges there. (2) When, subsequently, because of the sectarianism of the SWP and YSA, the comrades were ordered not to work with ECDDC (thus terminating all Chile work in San Jose in any meaningful sense), Comrade H. "agreed not to repeat this breach of discipline." The comrades complied, as the report itself makes clear; no charge is made for any violation of this order by supporters of the IT.

A separate point must be made here. Both the SWP and YSA have a de facto policy of not assigning IT comrades (especially in groups) to areas of work which involve contact with independents; in the case of the ECDDC, this policy coincided with the SWP/YSA sectarian attitude toward anti-imperialist minded youth. The basic point here, though, is that when the order to cease work was given, it was complied with.



(4) "Unauthorized work with the Revolutionary Marxist Collective in San Francisco and Oakland-Berkeley." What emerges from this section of the SWP document is that a group of militants with differing backgrounds have been evolving toward the Fourth International, that they had in their possession public literature of the RMG, IMG, and USFI, that Comrade Massey talked to one of their members with the approval of the Oakland Organizer (Jeff Powers) and that Comrade Garth was seen coming out of a study group led by the RMC. The only point open to some confusion is Comrade Garth's presence at the meeting. The facts, as related by Comrade Garth, are these: the RMC held a study group in Garth's neighborhood. Garth had met members of the RMC after a local demonstration and learned of their avowed support for the FI. Invited to attend a study session, he went to persuade the members of the RMC to join the SWP (in line with the policy of the IT, as shown from appended documents). This visit in no way constituted sustained work with the RMC, but should be seen as an individual initiative to recruit to the SWP in a comrade's immediate milieu.

The IT position on the RMC is no secret. After becoming aware of its existence, we took the position that the SWP should organize to recruit to its ranks. (This is made clear in Comrade Massey's letter "Against the Split Tactics of the ITP.") As Comrade Massey noted in the letter, there are today at least three formations in the United States -- the RMC, the Baltimore Marxist Group, and the Socialist Union in Los Angeles -- which define themselves as supporters of the majority of the Fourth International. (As we shall note later, it is scarcely difficult for members of the "Trotskyist" left in the US to become aware of differences in the SWP and FI; in addition, many of these comrades were members of or in contact with other Trotskyist groupings at one time or other, especially the IMG and the ex-Ligue.) These groups approached members of the IT; they were informed that they should join the SWP as active militants. The Los Angeles Socialist Union (with 19 members) has voted to approach the SWP on this basis. (This was reported to Comrade Wendy R. of the Los Angeles SWP branch by Comrade Aubin of the United Secretariat following a meeting he had with the SU in late June.) Members of the BMG and RMC have since approached the SWP on the same basis; it is somewhat ironic that, in the meantime, the IT has been summarily ejected from the SWP itself. We made no secret of our learning about these groups; Comrade Massey's letter contains two pages on this point. That the SWP -- which is aware of these and other groups which might be won to the FI -- never entertained even a passing thought of approaching these militants, speaks volumes about the sectarianism of the SWP and YSA leaderships.

(5) "Unauthorized work with various opponent groups in Minneapolis." This item seems strangely misplaced. It is worthwhile to clarify what occurred. Comrade Hillery attempts to make the case that the RMG aided groups which are opponents of the SWP. The May 2 Meeting she mentioned was co-sponsored by a large number of groups participating in the May 11 Chile coalition, as Comrade Hillery acknowledges, as a build-up for that event. It centered on solidarity with the Chile movement in other countries, especially Canada. Comrade Peter D. of the RMG was invited to speak as a member of the Defense Committee for the eleven militants



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who were arrested in Toronto while protesting the military coup last September. The SWP was invited to cosponsor the event. To call this, as Comrade Hillery does, "a public insult to the Fourth International," is a grotesque display of sectarian double-think. To include this incident under the heading of "unauthorized work by the IT with various opponent groups in Minneapolis" reflects the haste with which this flimsy documentation was assembled by the Control Commission.

Amidst all the invective directed against the RMG, the only charge made in regard to the IT (the supposed subject) is made in a brief parenthetical note at the beginning. The charge here is that Comrade Jeff M. of the SWP (and IT) "acknowledged being part of the Selby-Dale Freedom Brigade's study classes." There is no documentation, no elaboration, and no explanation of this point. It seems unusual hysterical diatribe against the RMG. This says a great deal about the seriousness of the charge -- which is nil.

(6) "Unauthorized work with various opponent groups in Madison, Wisconsin." The paucity of documentation in this section is not surprising; the LTF and YSAMF have constantly been forced to rein in their overzealous cofactionalists in the Madison YSA. In fact, it is the local LTF leaders who have, on many occasions, deliberately attempted to sabotage decisions of the Madison YSA with which they disagreed. In July, 1973, the YSA voted to hold a forum on Britain, with a comrade of the IMG who happened to be in the area as a speaker. Not only did the local leader, James L., boycott the forum, he was seen by comrades tearing down posters for the forum in his neighborhood. This factional hot-head is the only source for Comrade Finkel's accusations. With regard to the two events cited (a CALA May Day Forum on Chile and the Hortonville Teachers' Strike), the facts are as follows:

Community Action for Latin America (CALA) is in no sense an "opponent organization." It is a committee of independent radicals doing work in a nonsectarian way around Latin American issues. CALA had organized a conference on repression in Chile and Brazil in early April, which drew close to 800 people. The CP was totally isolated at this conference; at the urging of IT supporters, Harald Edelstam (then on a nationwide USLA tour) was invited to speak. The Madison YSA boycotted the conference until Comrade Brian W., the Regional Organizer, arrived and authorized a belated shift in attitude and participation in the conference. Brian W. (and a YSA national leader on tour later in the year) stated that the YSA attitude should be to get closer to CALA people in regard to Chile work. It was in this framework that comrades in the IT spoke with individuals in CALA with suggestions for activities on Chile, including USLA speakers. CALA organized a May Day Forum, with a speaker from the Defense Committee for the Toronto 11. The IT in no way built the CALA Forum as a rival to the YSA forum.

As for the rally on behalf of the Hortonville teachers, Comrade John H. of the YSA IT informed Ted S., the Madison Organizer, at least three times of the need for action on behalf of the strikers in order to pressure the statewide union into broader solidarity efforts, and later, of the fact that such a coalition was forming and that the YSA should participate in it.



Ted S. gave no response on any occasion. The rally, when held, had roughly 100 participants; three YSA comrades were already selling The Militant and three more the Young Socialist, which was the reason for the decision of Comrade Mark K. of the IT to supplement these sales with sales of the Old Mole. At no time were Old Mole sales counterposed to regular SWP-YSA press sales. Comrade Pat Q. (of the SWP and IT) has been active for years in the Madison trade union movement and is often contacted to speak as a member of his union local of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). He has reported his AFSCME activities to Frank Lovell, SWP Trade Union Director, and to SWP trade union panels with no objection raised. His participation in the rally was perfectly in line with his AFSCME work to build solidarity among public employees of different unions. (At the time of the rally, both Pat and Marth Q. had requested transfer to at-large status in Madison, but had never received a reply. The letter from Comrade Finkel is, in fact, the first and only notification either comrade ever had of receiving at-large status. Both comrades were forbidden to attend YSA meetings in Madison, although there is no branch of the Party in the area. They thus had no channel of communication with the SWP except the guidelines already mentioned; to classify his trade union work and participation in the rally as "unauthorized" is the height of hypocrisy. The implication that Comrade Pat have preference to the Spartacists over the YSA is not only totally false -- as noted, the YSA was invited three times to participate -- it is politically nonsensical. In fact, Pat had arranged for the YSA to have a speaker at the rally and personally asked James L. of the YSA to speak. Comrade James L. refused, thus depriving the YSA of the opportunity of presenting its views to a broad representation of trade union militants. It is this sort of sectarian behavior which has characterized the Madison YSA/ITF for a considerable period and prevented the YSA from making any gains whatever in Madison.

(7) "Unauthorized work with the Baltimore Marxist Group and Chile resistance committees." The documentation here is a letter from Bitsy Meyers, Washington (DC) branch organizer. The majority of her letter is filled with a lengthy account of who is in the BMG, proving only that the BMG has members. The entire charge directed against the IT is that they "sat with" members of the BMG at a demonstration and that both sold either Old Mole or Red Weekly. There is no attempt to demonstrate that the IT "worked with" the BMG at all, physical proximity apparently being viewed as synonymous.

The fact that the BMG is led by former members of the SWP and YSA who became aware of the work of Trotskyists in the world (especially with the ex-Ligue) and moved toward the politics of the FI may seem "strange" to comrade Meyers, but this is scarcely a political point. They have no paper of their own, so they sell Old Mole, with which they are in general political agreement. Members of the BMG have since, we understand, applied to join the SWP and YSA.



As we previously stated, we feel that we committed an error in not fully notifying the party of the attempts by IT members in recruiting these comrades to the party and YSA.

"Attendance of a non-SWP or YSA member at the IT conference"

This point, which the SWP leadership chose to stress throughout their document (even giving it an entire page to itself), is not only totally without foundation, it is demonstrably so. The fact that it is made at all reveals a great deal about either the dishonesty or confusion of the SWP leaders. The fact is that the IT had ten (not eight) supporters in the SWP and YSA in Washington at the time of the conference, and that all nine who came to the conference were members of either the SWP, YSA, or both: They include Tom Q. (in Both), Kirk L., Starr B., John B., Sally C., and Max G. (YSA); and Cathy K., Les B., and Marilyn L (SWP). Total nine people. Some confusion perhaps comes from the fact that John B. was subsequently invited to leave the YSA by the YSA organizer as a part of the general campaign to intimidate and drive out IT supporters. A new comrade, unversed in the Macchiavellian maneuverings of the LTF, John B. complied. Comrade Meyers then found only eight (overlooking still another IT member in the shuffle) and began a series of speculations leading to the idiotic charge.

This explanation renders the intricate chain of pseudologic involving D.M. of the BMG somewhat academic. A few words are perhaps necessary on this point; however, to clear up the situation. The IT conference registration and all witnesses confirm that D.M. did not attend the conference at all; considerable doubt was thus placed on the DC organizer's report. Subsequent verifications show that D.M. never claimed to have attended the conference, but merely answered the question, "Were you in Chicago?" with "Yes, it was a very interesting city." The conversation reported by Comrade Bitsy is thus completely untrue. The whole proceedings indicate the unreliability of attempting to entrap people into giving the right answer to questions. The whole matter of the "D.M. incident" could have been avoided had the Control Commission asked us for an explanation of the discrepancy instead of trying out its skills as a secret detective agency.

A word must also be said in regard to the charge, made in several contexts, that various persons not in the SWP or YSA were "familiar with the debates in the FI." The implication is always that the IT is handing out internal documents; significantly, the charge is never made in the concrete, but always through innuendo. It is a fact in the United States that the various vampire sects have had a field day with divisions inside the SWP and YSA. It is almost impossible for a person considering himself or herself a Trotskyist not to be aware of them. In the Spartacist press alone, there has been a series of articles such as "Guevarism vs. Social Democracy in the USec," "Renegades from Trotskyism Battle in the USEC," "Split Momentum Mounts in USec," etc. Other sectlets have held their own in this rush to "expose" the "Pabloites": See, for example, The Torch ("Pabloite International Heads Toward Split"). At the time of the YSA convention virtually every grouplet prepared



its own analysis of internal events in the SWP and YSA. They derived their information from former members of the SWP and YSA, occasional agents inside the SWP and YSA, and from each other. The SWP and YSA leaderships are as fully aware of this as we are; they prefer, however, to conceal this and hint at further "violations" by the IT.

#### "Non-participation in the SWP and YSA"

The SWP document does not attempt to refute the specific evidence of refusal to integrate ITers into the SWP and YSA cited by comrade Massey in his letters of June 9, 1974 -- evidence involving fraction assignments, educational and transfer policies, etc. They simply state that "on the contrary. . .the IT, by its own choosing, does not participate actively in the work of the SWP." (p. 8.) They then seek to show that the IT "boycotts" SWP work.

The charge of "non-participation" in SWP and YSA work would seem a line from the theater of the absurd were it not for the tragic situation which it is meant to hide. We will not attempt to challenge the statistics provided by the Control Commission. We have not been so cynical as to begin a statistical study of the SWP and YSA's factional exclusions against the IT; we had hoped that the situation could be solved in a political way. Comrades of the IT need no defense. Many of them have over ten years of activity in the Trotskyist movement, as youth organizers, party candidates, branch organizers, fraction heads, and trade-union activists. We all joined the SWP and YSA dedicated completely to the building of the organizations and many of us have maintained a high level of activity despite the factional attacks against us. However, it is an undeniable fact that a number of comrades have found it increasingly difficult to continue their work under conditions of unbridled hostility, ostracism, constant demeaning attacks, and assignments based on factional considerations rather than the needs of the party. We have called the party leadership's attention to this situation on numerous occasions, asking for discussions. But such discussions were out of the question with a "disloyal" and "antiparty" minority. Comrade Barzman pointed to this dangerous situation when he spoke at the August 1973 SWP convention on the election of the national committee. But his remarks were not circulated to the membership as had been requested. Instead, the slanders of the nomination commission were reproduced and circulated without an answer. The status of the IT inside the party has been closely tied to the LTF's international factional considerations, and not to the needs of the SWP and YSA, let alone the international as a whole. Thus, prior to the world congress, comrades of the IT were placed on the national committee of the YSA, and some verbal statements were made that the IT could start with a "clean slate -- as if comrades of the IT were criminals on probation. But barely had the world congress ended that the same policies resumed. As the LTF's attacks on the Spanish and French organizations unfolded, as the need to cover up the Argentine PST's orientation became more urgent, and especially as the IT's public defense of the positions of the Fourth International became more embarrassing in the face of the LTF's failure to defend them, the



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IT came under a new volley of attacks with limitations on its right to speak, orders on comrades of the SWP and YSA not to socialize with members of the IT, denial of the right to present counterreports on the business before the branches, exclusion from political assignments, and so on. The activity of a number of comrades in the IT was affected by this. We hold the leadership of the SWP entirely responsible for this situation, and we repeat our offer to participate in a parity commission wherever necessary, to help resolve such problems. On our side, the tendency's commitment to activity in the party and YSA has been clearly expressed and reiterated. The statement "preparing local tendency tasks and perspectives" from the June 6, 1974, IT newsletter (quoted in the Control Commission document) is quite clear on this: "What is needed is to be recognized as political people, with the capacity for judgment and action, and this can only be demonstrated by a steady involvement in the organization alongside those we are seeking to win. We do not refuse 'shitwork' but we demand the right to participate in meaningful political activities. There are a certain number of activities which we can work on whole-heartedly or with relatively minor conflict: Chile work, CLUW, petitioning, Indochina, farm workers support, TU fractions, campus fractions, various facets of election campaign, forums, regional work, educationals." (p. 40-41.) This, it should be noted, precisely parallels the supposedly fraudulent explanation put forward by comrade Massey in his already-mentioned letter to the SWP political committee. At any rate, alleged underactivity or under support is not the same as "boycott" of finances and activities. The tendency has explained in writing to the party that it was recommending to its supporters that their sustainers to the party and YSA be proportional to the contributions to the International as a whole from LTF-dominated groups legally able to affiliate to the FI.

What makes the charges in this area particularly scandalous is the incredible statement found in the SWP "Materials..." document on page 19: the SWP Political Committee maintains here that members of the LTF are "maintaining their activities and financial obligations in an exemplary way." It is uncertain who the LTF is trying to fool here; certainly not the members of the Fourth International, who are perfectly aware that LTF groups not prevented by reactionary legislation from affiliating to the FI have made a complete boycott of all financial contributions since the Tenth World Congress. Not only does this include a refusal by these groups to pay any dues at all to the FI, but also includes a refusal by these groups to pay even a portion of the assessment to help our Portuguese comrades establish a weekly newspaper!

#### The FI and Democratic Centralism

The Control Commission document pushes into dangerous waters -- for the LTF -- on at least one point, arguing that the Internationalist Tendency has violated the statutes of the Fourth International. This point is based on the mendacious claim that the IT attempted to substitute itself for the SWP leadership in determining national tactics for the YSA. It further intended to draw attention away from the fact that the SWP has not followed the political line of the Fourth International's campaigns in any tactical shape or form.



The articles of the statutes quoted by comrade Horowitz, et al. refer to the tactical jurisdiction of national sections over the countries in which they operate, to the fact that the IEC cannot change the leadership of a section, and to the fact that the center should not dictate national tactics. Comrade Horowitz attempts to show that the IT devised its own tactical interpretation of the FI line on Chile work, demanded that the SWP accept it because the IT was part of the International majority, and then went ahead and carried it out on its own. This claim is politically ludicrous and factually incorrect. The IT felt that the Fourth International's line for Chile work in the period following the coup, as expressed in the United Secretariat statement, was to campaign for solidarity with the resistance as long as it lasted, and then with the various struggles of the Chilean workers and peasants, on an internationalist and class basis. The IT considered that the SWP's civil libertarian work in USLA had nothing in common with that line, and the IT offered the suggestion of one possible tactical implementation: to create a left pole within the broader Chile movement, based on clear solidarity positions. The IT was in no position to carry out such a line and never was so foolhardy as to see itself as the agent of such a perspective. Rather, when their proposals were rejected, comrades of the IT confined themselves to circulating the general political positions of the FI on Chile while carrying out the SWP and YSA assignments. They did so with the sales of the special issue of the Old Mole on Chile and the distribution of the United Secretariat statement on Chile. It was this public expression of the political positions of the Fourth International and not any alleged claim of the IT to substitute for the leadership which provoked the ire of the LTF.

It is a grotesque smokescreen to argue, as the SWP and YSA leaderships have done, on various occasions, that the IT felt that as a representative of the majority of the FI it should determine SWP and YSA policy. As the IT pointed out in its reply to the declaration of the YSA Majority Faction (in regard to the FI's campaign of solidarity with the Chilean working class), "The IT never has sought to impose its own interpretation of the solidarity line, but has merely asked that the solidarity line itself be implemented, which is not the case at the present time." What is more, the YSA and SWP leaderships themselves have recognized that this is the case. Our answer to the YSAMF explained this: "the declaration states that there were two public faces of the YSA on May 11. This can only mean that there was one based on the civil libertarian line of USLA and the other based on the FI statement. It would seem that if the USLA civil libertarian approach was consistent with the line projected for Chile work in the FI statement, then there would have been not two public faces of the YSA, but one and the same line. If such were the case, there would be no basis for the charge of indiscipline. In fact, by stating that the distribution of FI statements and the selling of Old Moles constituted an act of indiscipline, i.e., the putting forward of a counter line of 'second face,' the YSA is admitting that its own line stands squarely counterposed to that of the FI. . . It is not the members of the IT who are guilty of indiscipline, but the leadership of the YSA who are indisciplined



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toward the line of the Fourth International, which the YSA orients to and supports although it cannot be an actual youth organization of the FI because of reactionary legislation."

The simple fact is that the SWP and YSA leaderships totally ignored the FI's approach to and line on Chile work, just as they have ignored international discipline by attacking publicly the FCR for supporting a "popular front" in France, just as they have refused to aid the Portuguese comrades in their campaign to build a weekly newspaper, and just as the entire LTF has boycotted the finances of the FI since the Tenth World Congress.

Comrade Horowitz further attempts to show that the IT had a general policy of carrying out its own interventions, regardless of whether there was a difference between the IMT and the LTF on the issue at hand, and regardless of whether the SWP approved such actions. His case is based on the fact that several IT supporters attended a rally in defense of Soviet political prisoners while they were assigned to "other sales locations." This is an interesting case, because it was the first instance of complete and unabashed exclusion of comrades of the IT from a major political activity of the branch. For the first time, all comrades of the IT were specifically assigned not to go to this demonstration. And several of them were not even told of this prohibition. This factional act is surpassed in maliciousness only by the organizer of the St. Louis SWP branch ordering comrade Mark Lause not to talk politics to anyone outside the party. These situations reflected an unprecedented and new stage of the LTF factional attacks and comrades were at a loss as to how to respond. This explains their individual decisions to attend the demonstration rather than appeal the assignments. The rampant factionalism of the LTF is further evidenced by the objections of comrade Pat Grogan, the LTF convenor in Chicago, to the sales of Inprecor, even though it contained a particularly relevant article by comrade Ernest Mandel reviewing Solzhenitsyn's latest book. Rather than an organized IT breach of discipline, we have a case of a massive and unbridled factional attack by the LTF meant to demoralize and drive out the IT. Such factional exclusions, and not sales of Inprecor, are the real departures from the norms of our world movement.

#### Other Charges

A charge which receives a certain emphasis in the SWP document relates to the trade-union document drafted by the IT. The charge here is that the trade-union document calls for work outside the Socialist Workers party. This is the main item meant to demonstrate that work in the SWP and YSA was entry work, and only one area of work among several.

Of prime interest in this section of the SWP document is the deceptive use of a partial quote. In the quotation utilized (on p. 11), the portion which the SWP leadership omits is underlined: "The fact that we are in the SWP automatically poses the question of what to do with potential recruits that we are able to draw around us. Although the SWP is not the most congenial organization for working class militants, we should attempt to induce them to join. Should the SWP refuse to admit them for factional reasons (either blatantly or via the imposition of a long waiting period, impossible assignments, etc.)



or if the potential recruit finds joining the SWP an uninviting alternative, then we have the duty to help sustain their interest in the politics of the Fourth International through a variety of means. . . ."

The implications are clear. The first priority of the IT was to win potential trade-union comrades to the SWP. In many cases, however, the factional nature of the SWP recruitment policy and activity makes this impossible. (For information on SWP factionalism in these areas, see both the Massey "Against the Split Tactics of the LTF" letter in the Control Commission document, and his letter to the United Secretariat of October 29, 1973.) In these cases, the IT would attempt to prevent these worker militants from drifting away from the Trotskyist movement by common union activity ("action interventions"), socializing ("tavern raps, dinners, parties, etc."), and encouragement to continue study in Marxism ("study classes, reading programs. . ."). The IT was governed by the policy of the International Majority Tendency, which was concretely codified in the already quoted "memorandum on the IMT tour" agreed to by the IT and the IMT as a whole, and which contained the reaffirmation of the commitment to "politically recruit to the FI and organizationally recruit to the SWP on the basis of activists' agreement. . .with the program of the Fourth International and its Tenth World Congress, of their respecting the discipline of the SWP, and of their commitment to behave as active militants."

What must be pointed out is that the SWP can find not a single instance of real or alleged violation of party or YSA discipline by the IT in trade-union work. On the contrary, we can cite case after case of the SWP acting to prevent union activity by members of the IT -- actions and instructions which were, of course, protested but were complied with in every case. We can point to the case of comrade Ned M., who was forced to withdraw from a militant trade-union caucus and was withdrawn from a speaking engagement (which had already been publicized) at an SWP forum, the case of comrade Polly C., who was forbidden to take a major organizational assignment in the Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW), the refusal by the SWP and YSA leaderships (following the CLUW conference) to allow IT women trade unionists to work in or even to join CLUW, the dissolution by the Chicago branch of the rail fraction when the IT obtained a majority in it, and so on. At the CLUW conference, where each IT comrade was provided with a personal LTF chaperone, IT members loyally carried out party and YSA discipline even when it entailed voting to curtail the democratic rights of other left tendencies and supporting an incredible "compromise" on the question of support for the struggle of the United Farm Workers. The charge in the SWP document must be viewed as nothing more than a (poor) smokescreen to cover up the SWP's lack of involvement in trade-union activity and its factional acts aimed at IT trade unionists.

A thoroughly absurd charge is to be found on pages 9-10 of the SWP document. The SWP Control Commission states that "The secret circulation of private internal discussion bulletins by the IT has apparently been going on for a long time. They



then refer to a quote from an IT document which mentions a so-called Jules Verne document on Vietnam, drafted in 1972. The Control Commission notes that the Gregorich-Passen split from the SWP (mentioned in the quote) occurred "long before the formation of the IT" and concludes that: "The SWP has never been informed of a 'Jules Verne document.' Nor had the SWP been informed by Bill Massey of the preparations for the Gregorich split from the SWP."

The basic facts are these: Following the 1971 convention, a section of the former Proletarian Orientation Tendency led by Barbara Gregorich and Phil Passen began to develop apart from the rest of the old POT. This grouping (which was to become the Leninist Faction) developed a position that the National Peace Action Coalition and SMC were "popular fronts." Other members of the former POT (some of whom were later to form the nucleus for the Internationalist Tendency) rejected this analysis and circulated a reply ("Jules Verne") to Gregorich and Passen which rejected the "pop front" charges but argued that the SWP had, in fact, made a serious error in the antiwar movement in not utilizing the slogan "Victory to the NLF!" Discussions around this reply led to the formulation of the January 19, 1973, document produced by Comrade Lauren C. (which the SWP refused to allow to be read in branches).

The kicker here is the reference to "advance knowledge of the Gregorich-Passen split" as is clear from the context of the quote, it deals not with the future split of the Gregorich-Passen grouping from the SWP, but to the just-occurred split of the Gregorich-Passen forces from the POT. Following the formation of the separate Gregorich-Passen group, contact between the former POT and what was to become the Leninist Faction was entirely severed. The image conjured up by the Control Commission of Massey, Shaffer, and Smith hiding the knowledge of an impending split from the SWP is revealed as totally false. The authors of this deliberate falsification probably felt confident that the confusion would remain, because the SWP leadership hid from the party as a whole the fact that Gregorich and Passen had broken away from the POT. At the time, the leadership ordered branches not to allow the reading of the declaration of the newly-formed Leninist Faction, thus fostering a climate of suspicion and misunderstanding toward the POT as a whole.

#### The IT Expulsions--a Violation of Party and YSA Norms

Although the charge of an "IT Party" is idiotic, it does serve a purpose for the SWP and YSA leaderships. It enables them to by-pass the clear provisions in the SWP and YSA constitutions relating to discipline. Even the absurd myth of a "split" which the SWP did not discover for more than a month (and of which the IT was unaware until its "existence as a separate party" was "recognized") was apparently preferable for the SWP and YSA leaderships to the established trial systems in both organizations, in which the IT could have exposed the fraud put forward by the LTF leadership.



The provisions in the SWP and YSA constitutions are scarcely ambiguous. Article VIII of the SWP Constitution states in Section 3 that "Charges against any member shall be made in writing and the accused member shall be furnished with a copy in advance of the trial. Charges shall be filed and heard in the branch to which the member belongs, or in a higher body which may decide to act directly in the case. . ." Section Five adds that "Any member subjected to disciplinary action has the right to appeal to the next higher body, up to and including the National Convention. . ." The YSA Constitution echoes these provisions; Article IX, Section 3, for example, states that "Written charges shall be presented to the accused member in advance of the trial. Charges shall be filed in the local unit where the accused is a member and shall be heard by a committee it sets up for the purpose." Section Six parallels Article VIII, Section 5, of the Party constitution.

In the past, at least the forms of the articles on discipline in the SWP and YSA Constitutions were observed. In 1963, for example, the charges leveled at the Robertson minority (the nucleus of the Spartacists) by the SWP Control Commission roughly paralleled those leveled today at the IT; the SWP Political Committee responded by suspending Robertson, Mage, Harper, White, and Ireland. The Robertsonites appealed; a party trial was held. Arguments can be made as to the nature of the charges, trial procedures, etc. But at the very least, formal charges were made, appeals were allowed and there was a trial at which these accused were allowed to defend themselves.

The expulsion of the IT in 1974 was, as we have seen, entirely different. The IT members of the SWP were simply informed that "the Internationalist Tendency's status as a separate, rival party" placed them "outside the constitutional provisions for membership in the Socialist Workers party." There is no precedent for this formulation (which is precisely paralleled by the statement of the NEC of the YSA; it placed the IT entirely outside of the norms provided for in the statutes.)

Actually, even the intricate maneuverings of the SWP and YSA leaderships were inadequate in this regard. The Control Commission report was an accusation aimed at the IT; however well rounded the SWP PC and the YSA NEC may have regarded it, assertion and belief do not substitute for proof. However firmly the leaderships may have believed the split nonsense (and, frankly, it is hard to believe that they take it all seriously), their belief does not allow them to discard at will the statutes of the party.

The de facto purge of the IT was prepared with the greatest secrecy. Not only were members of the IT not informed of the preparations for the expulsions, those SWP and YSA comrades who had taken third positions or non-aligned stances were, likewise kept in the dark. These comrades have almost unanimously denounced the expulsions as a flagrant violation of party and YSA norms.



There is some evidence that the expulsions were planned prior to the formal inauguration of the Control Commission on June 20. At the June SWP plenum, not only two supporters of the IT (present as members of the International Executive Committee), but also comrade C., a member of the United Secretariat, were barred from attending most of the sessions, including a mysterious one devoted to "opponent groups." The justification for this was that only members of the national committee and department heads could be allowed in. This excuse was totally unacceptable on the face of it, as there is no precedent for statutory justification for exclusion of USec members from such sessions. Further, the excuse was openly fraudulent in that members of the Canadian ISA/LSO and the Mexican Liga Socialista were allowed to attend the session in question. Comrade Dick G., a member of the National Committee of the SWP, was somewhat more frank when he stated that the SWP leadership could "discuss more frankly" in the absence of these comrades and that the decision to purge the IT was made at these closed sessions of the SWP plenum (which in fact were faction meetings and not party meetings -- unless we recognize that to the leadership of the SWP their faction is the party and the party is their faction).

As for the Control Commission investigation, it can be viewed as little more than a charade. As noted, the only approach to any member of the IT came during an informal encounter in a hallway during the plenum. No member of the commission ever stated the scope of the investigation, nor the nature of the charges against the IT. As national coordinator of the IT, comrade Massey therefore informed the commission that the IT would answer questions as soon as the nature and scope of the investigation were clarified. No member of the IT was ever approached by the control commission; the charges were never explained; and though comrade Massey had been told that he would be contacted in three weeks, no effort was made to reach him. Instead, on July 4 the SWP PC voted to expel the IT. The YSA NEC obediently followed suit, apparently on the basis of no investigation whatever. Supporters from the IT were removed from the rolls; a membership reregistration process was begun, apparently to catch any ITers who escaped the net the first time. ITers were physically excluded from the second day of the YSA National Committee plenum (at which our expulsion was formally ratified) and all over the country IT supporters were barred from SWP and YSA meetings. Comrade Jeff M. was physically thrown from the premises when he attempted to attend a YSA meeting; two comrades in Philadelphia were dragged out of a branch meeting and down two flights of stairs. Members of other sections of the FI who had transferred into the SWP and YSA were generally treated in the same manner; for example, comrade Adam S., a member of the IMG, was told that he could no longer attend SWP or YSA meetings because "his transfer had not come through yet." (He had been allowed to attend meetings prior to the IT expulsions.) When he asked Pearl C. Chicago branch organizer, how long such a process would take, he was told that the transfer would not be allowed, as he had shown himself to be a supporter of the Internationalist Tendency (in the two weeks he had been in Chicago).



Simultaneously, pressures were placed upon ITF or non-aligned comrades thought to be "shaky"; they were urged not to return phone calls from members of the IT, to meet or speak with them, and so on. An intense propaganda barrage was inaugurated to keep the factional heat at a high level in the Party and YSA, coupled with a massive attack upon other sections of the FI. (In the Plenum reports following the YSA NC, the focus was upon the FCR and the "ultraleft, terrorist, mad bombers" of the LCR/ETA VI. The question of the PST was dismissed as an IMT "witchhunt.")

#### Opposition in the SWP and YSA

In most of the sections of the Fourth International, differences are regarded as both normal and healthy. Opposition tendencies are allowed to exist freely; they are not only allowed to speak to each branch or cell, they are given financial aid to help them to reach as much of the cadre as possible. Proportional representation on leading bodies is taken for granted; supporters of opposition tendencies are allowed to hold leadership positions, give educationals, speak at public forums, run as candidates, and so on. For the past few years, not one of these has been true of the SWP or YSA.

This was shown in 1971, for example, in the treatment afforded the Proletarian Orientation Tendency. The POT was a loose tendency formed around a recognition of the need for the SWP to reroot itself in the working class; it took no stand on international issues as a tendency, allowing its supporters to take different stands. For this, the POT was denounced as an "unprincipled clique." The ghost of Martin Abern was dredged up for the tenth or eleventh time to characterize a tendency. As the discussion progressed, the attacks from the party leadership increasingly turned to vicious personal assaults, such as "Where Does Hedda Garza Stand?" by Comrades Lew Jones and Susan LaMont (SWPDB, Vol. 29 #30, July 1971, pp. 5-8). The form of the criticisms was adequately summarized by Mark L. of the IT: "On and off the branch floor, we have been accused of being apolitical cliquists and of being fanatical automatons, of being too keeply immersed in abstract theory and of being theoretical illiterates, of being based on organizational gripes and of having too many fundamental differences with the Political Committee to merit consideration as a serious tendency, etc. Perhaps this confession could have been broadened to include more of my crimes if I were but sure of their nature." (Confessions of a Cadre Killer, SWPDB, Vol. 31 #31, July 1973, p. 41). The POT was denied representation on the SWP National Committee on the grounds that it did not represent a "clear political tendency."

Worse by far was what followed the Convention. Areas of strength of the POT were systematically attacked by the SWP Political Committee. This was particularly true of the Oakland-Berkeley branch and local, where 40-50 supporters of the majority were shipped in prior to the local Tasks and Perspectives to smash the minority and eliminate it from the leadership in the YSA. Comrade Mark L. in the previously-quoted



document -- which has never been refuted by the SWP leadership -- described his own role in the crusade to crush the Oakland-Berkeley POT. He notes a conversation with the YSA Organizer, who "discussed the tremendous potential of the Bay Area and the real reason for our transfer: to smash the minority." As he puts it, "We arrived in the middle of a meeting. We almost literally walked into the meeting with our hands raised." (p 41) Across the country, supporters of the POT who did not recant were removed from any positions of leadership; slate votes for local executive committees became a common means of eliminating minority representation.

The repression aimed at the POT could not help but have an effect; one result was the formation of the Gregorich-Passon Leninist Faction. As the IT Document "The Building of Revolutionary Party in Capitalist America" pointed out (p.26), "The Class Struggle League-Vanguard Newsletter is partly the result of a subjective reaction by a group of dissident SWP members to drive them out of the party campaign conducted by the SWP leadership." Some comrades became discouraged and dropped out of politics entirely; a larger number remained inside the SWP to continue the fight. (Identical pressures were at work, of course, inside the YSA. Comrade Peter G., for example, was dumped from the YSA National Committee in 1971 for his support of the POT inside the Party.)

The POT however, had been formed around a relatively narrow circle of differences with the SWP and YSA majority. When the Internationalist Tendency was formed, with a much broader and better-defined set of differences with the Party and YSA majority, the campaign of factional hysteria reached new heights. The charges of "unprincipled combinationism" were dredged up again; the ghost of Martin Abern was once again summoned up. (See "An Unprincipled Grouping Within the SWP," Tom Scharett, SWPDB, Vol. 31, #33, July, 1973, pp. 35-42). In branch and local preconvention discussions it was solemnly avowed that the supporters of the IT were racists (or, more modestly, were "bowing to racism"), were sexists, that they hated gay people. Members of the IT in Los Angeles who attempted to defend the right of a comrade accused of being a police agent (arguing that a formal trial was necessary before action could be taken) were called "cop-lovers." The IT was accused of capitulating to liberalism, Stalinism, ultraleftism, of all three at once. Comrade Norman Oliver informed us that we made him sick. ("Ultraleftism in the Black Movement and the Internationalist Tendency's Adaptation to it." SWPDB Vol. 31, #31, July, 1973, p. 8). At the 1973 YSA Convention, one comrade accused us (seriously) of supporting "guerilla warfare in Carbondale, Illinois." At the same convention, Kris V., a leading comrade, compared us to the Ku Klux Klan.

This campaign reached a peak of sorts at the 1973 SWP Convention. Not only was the number of votes in each branch necessary to elect a delegate moved upward from seven to fifteen, cutting down considerably upon minority representation (in spite of a lack of growth in the Party during the preceding two years), the IT was denied any representation upon



the SWP National Committee. The old charge of "unprincipled combinationism" was again dredged up, but to it was added the new accusation that the IT was "disloyal" and an "anti-party group." Reacting to such charges, Comrade Livio, a representative of the USEC FI at the proceedings, was forced to intercede: "We consider the decision to reject any representation of a minority as alien to the traditions and rules of the Fourth International. . . Do you consider the SWP is a special party? Last point: the terminology used by the reporter who spoke in terms of anti-party elements is quite alien to the Trotskyist movement and actually it is in the traditions of the Stalinist bureaucracy." (Appendix to IMT Statement, "Let's Discuss Political Differences, Not Old Wives' Tales," IIDB Volume X #20, October, 1973, p. 28). His point was ignored.

Prior to the Tenth World Congress, the LTF apparently attempted to improve its image somewhat on the international scene; at the December 1973, YSA Convention the IT was allowed two full and two alternate members on the National Committee. At the 10th World Congress, NC member Rich M. of the IT was allowed to attend as a member of the YSA leadership delegation. (Such was the miseducation produced by the YSA leadership, that this decision to include four IT'ers provoked considerable opposition from the LTF ranks, which the leadership (somewhat embarrassedly) had to bludgeon down. Several delegates argued that to include IT members on the YSA National Committee was an "insult" to the party. When ITers asked whether this meant that the IT was no longer considered disloyal, the YSA leadership replied in the negative -- the SWP IT was still "disloyal," but, it was added, nothing was known about the YSA IT yet.)

Following the World Congress, it was decided to grant ITers in both the YSA and SWP token seats on branch and local executive committees. That this was of a purely token nature is shown by the fact that, where the IT was a considerable minority (as in the Madison, Wisconsin YSA local and the Houston SWP branch and YSA locals), IT representation was still kept to one seat. Further, these EC representatives were inevitably the only members of the EC given no organizational responsibilities at all; their stated purpose was to "give the IT point of view" to the other (real) members of the local execs. The policy of preventing IT members from giving educationals, speaking at forums, etc., was maintained.

Nor was there any real change in the increasingly factional atmosphere in the branches and locals; it is difficult to describe this atmosphere to those who did not have to experience it. Any and all motions from the IT were routinely ruled out of order or "referred to the EC"; extensions of speaking time were denied as a matter of course; "informational reports" described in detail the "disloyal" acts of the IT supporters (i.e., sales of the press of the FI). (In many cases, IT comrades were not allowed to reply to these attacks.) IT supporters in both SWP and YSA were carefully guarded; as pointed out Comrade Mark L. was forbidden by the St. Louis Organizer from speaking to contacts at all. A representative sample of IT protest letters in regard to such actions by local LTF groups is appended.



Following May 11 Chile demonstrations, the factional heat increased sharply. A climax of sorts was provided by the formation of the YSA Majority Faction (YSAMF) on an almost nonexistent programmatic basis in June, 1974. The creation of the YSAMF as a disciplined faction (which caused and decided upon actions in advance of meetings) was a de facto exclusion of IT and non-LTF comrades from the YSA: IT supporters and independents retained the duties of membership (dues, attendance, work assignments) but were totally excluded from any share whatever in decision-making. The local meetings were reduced to the level of sterile replays of the prior YSAMF meeting, at which ITers and independent comrades were informed of the decisions already made. A reply to the YSAMF Declaration was made by four comrades of the IT: Cathy M. (YSA IT Coordinator), Rich M., Mark L., and John G. (members of the YSA National Committee) and sent to the YSA NEC with the demand that it be distributed to the locals of the YSA on the same basis as the YSAMF statement. The National Executive Committee refused to comply with this request, in spite of frequent letters and phone calls; as a result, the vast majority of the YSA was never aware that the IT had even made a reply to the slanders contained in the YSAMF statement. (Requests to read the reply in locals where the IT had supporters were denied on the grounds that the NEC had not authorized such action. In Houston, an IT comrade was able to begin to read the reply, but was ruled out of order before he could finish.) It is entirely possible that the YSA NEC had already decided upon expulsion by this time.

The logical follow-up to the growing factionalism was the expulsion of the IT from both the Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance. The June 9th, 1974 letter from Comrade B. Massey (Against the Split Tactics of the LTF) which warned of such a possibility and called for a parity commission to forestall a split, was not sent out until its inclusion in the "Materials. . ." Document.

### Why the IT Was Purged

We have answered the specific charges against the IT. We think the record shows very clearly that the IT had maintained a perspective of functioning as a tendency in the SWP and YSA. After an internal discussion in which a variety of views were expressed, and after the fraternal contribution to the discussion from the IMT Enlarged Bureau, the conference of the IT decisively adopted a course of fighting the organizational obstacles erected by the LTF to its participation in the life of the SWP and YSA. Following the conference, with the help of a tour by a representative of the IMT Bureau the IT was in the process of implementing this perspective. It is precisely at this time that the LTF decided to strike and purge the IT.

The high degree of organization of the IT may seem somewhat strange to observers unfamiliar with the internal life of the SWP. However, it is our contention that this level of organization would be necessary for any tendency functioning under the circumstances: the repressive atmosphere inside the SWP, the international factional struggle, and the need to



centralize information on the political situation inside the United States, so as to present cogent alternatives to the LTF's orientation. The IT was aware of the dangerous dynamic of such organization and constantly tried to fight the centrifugal inclinations, by asking for our integration in the SWP leadership, by calling for a parity commission, by combatting our own subjective reactions. The LTF's reaction to these efforts was always to ignore them and slander the IT, until it finally decided to purge the IT altogether. In attempting to explain this decision, we must turn to a series of internal and international factors.

The IT was a permanent challenge to the SWP leadership's conception of a monolithic party. By introducing the ranks to the method of organization of other sections of the FI, by legitimizing criticisms, the IT threatened to seriously weaken the authority of the LTF leadership. The IT, even with its modest forces, had been able to win over to the positions of the INT a growing number of comrades, including a majority in four YSA locals and a substantial minority in Houston. This ability of the IT to pose itself as an alternative to the present policies of the SWP leadership represented a real threat to the LTF as a drastic reorientation of the Party and YSA became more and more urgent. While all recognize that the present political situation in the USA reflects a definite lull, it is becoming increasingly clear that major struggles by the working class are on the agenda, which will definitively transform the nature of the vanguard. But the present orientation of the SWP and YSA remains fundamentally that of the late 1960's, that of the "Worldwide Radicalization of Youth" document and is increasingly seen as inadequate and bankrupt. In this context, the proposals of the IT on trade union work, Black work, and relations with the vanguard would become all the more relevant. The LTF leadership is eliminating the IT from this forthcoming discussion to prevent a link between American and international questions.

Another problem which the IT created for the LTF was that its very presence permanently exposed the hypocritical relations of the SWP to the International. While arrogantly boasting at the World Congress that the test of the two lines would be made in practice in the coming period -- in Latin America, Canada, and Spain -- the LTF forcefully maintained that the decisions of the Fourth International had no bearing on the United States. This applied not only to the general methodology of the resolution on the world political situation, to the issues settled by the World Congress, but also to the specific campaigns decided by the International's leading bodies. The mere verbal defense of the positions of the FI by members of the SWP and YSA was considered a provocation. This was the case with the Chile solidarity campaign and it had the potential of expanding to a whole spectrum of issues (Portugal, France, Vietnam, etc.) The LTF leadership feared that widespread knowledge in the USA of the FI's positions would lead to members of the SWP and YSA being constantly asked about the discrepancy between the SWP's and the FI's lines, creating severe internal problems. This explains the virulent opposition to sales of the Old Mole and Imprecor by members of the IT, or for that matter, by the membership of the SWP and YSA as a whole.



The move against the IT must also be seen as a reaction of despair in the face of the aggravating international dispute and the increased isolation of the LTF. The LTF made it clear that it considers the question of minority violence to be one on which it is forced to disassociate itself politically. This was evidenced by the public attack on the Argentine PRT (at that time a section of the FI) during the Sallustro affair, and following an attempt by the House Internal Security Committee to implicate the SWP because of its fraternal support to the FI. Since that time, The Militant has published attacks against the LCR/ETA VI by the Spanish IC. In addition, at a time when the SWP is being cross-examined by the government in relation to its civil liberties suit, the LTF leadership finds it increasingly difficult to defend the IMT against bourgeois slanders that it is terrorist. Thus, when the Internationalist Tendency of the SWP was attacked in the American press as terrorist and violence-prone, the leadership remained silent for an extended period, and ultimately made a damaging statement, arguing that there might be police provocations in the ranks of the Party. This eagerness to completely disassociate from all forms of minority violence is becoming a dangerous ritual which can only pull the SWP further away from the International into the swamp of legalism.

But, more importantly, on the questions of the International's own activity and orientation, the differences of the LTF have been duplicated in country after country, constantly narrowing the areas of collaboration between it and the IMT. The LTF is acting as a booster for all rightist and adaptationist currents in the FI and sees its role as assembling a coalition of these currents to overthrow the present leadership. It has used its publishing house as a tool for factional rewards and continued to ship in cadres to prop up the sagging LTF group in the IMG. It has openly attacked the French section and the Spanish sympathizing section in its press, while refusing to say a word about the PST's capitulation to the bourgeoisie's ultimatum that it support existing institutions. It has converted Intercontinental Press into an international factional organ. The LTF sees the publication of Inprecor as a challenge to its monopoly of press in the English speaking world, as it saw the IMG's development as a first breach in this monopoly. It now counter-attacks with the expansion of Intercontinental Press into the Spanish language. At the same time, LTF-dominated groups have not made a single financial contribution to the Fourth International since the Tenth World Congress. It is in the context of this covert deployment of LTF forces that the IT was purged at a time when it was passing through a difficult test.

#### The Purge of the IT is an Attack on the Unity of the FI

The purge of the IT effectively splits one of the major fraternal sections of the International, thereby leaving the International divided in yet another country and threatening to split the FI altogether. The blame for this situation must rest clearly on the shoulders of the LTF which has pursued a reckless factional policy of brinkmanship and blackmail. It is time to call a halt to these split activities.



The unity of the International remains the best framework within which the tendency struggle can contribute to the building of a strong world party. For these reasons, we call on the International to condemn the ITF purge of the IT in the SWP and YSA and to demand the immediate and collective reintegration into the SWP and YSA of all those unjustly expelled. The IT maintains its commitment to act as a disciplined tendency of the SWP and YSA and as supporters of the International Majority Tendency. In addition, we appeal to the International Control Commission, to examine the charges against the ITF leadership of the SWP, against the IT, and against the IMT leadership. We demand the immediate and collective reintegration of the Internationalist Tendency, so that the purge will not become a fait accompli, thereby encouraging further such organizational moves in the Fourth International. For our part, we continue to regard ourselves as disciplined members of the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance.

We are long standing members of the SWP and YSA. For this reason, we reject any proposed plan which would involve our individual application for "readmission," individual selection of which IT comrades can (or cannot) re-enter, and probationary or candidacy periods. The entire IT was arbitrarily and bureaucratically expelled and we demand that all members of the IT be reintegrated into the Party and YSA. All forces who are truly interested in maintaining the unity of the Fourth International will protest this introduction of bureaucratic methods within our movement and refuse to recognize this purge.