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DRAFT RESOLUTION ON OUR TACTICS IN EUROPE

[Prepared by United Secretariat as part of discussion for Third World Congress since reunification (Ninth World Congress); held over for further discussion.]

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SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

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DRAFT RESOLUTION ON OUR TACTICS IN EUROPE

[The following draft resolution was prepared by the United Secretariat as part of the discussion for the Ninth World Congress. Owing to lack of time, it was not taken up at the congress, but was held over for further discussion.]

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(1) The turn during the year 1968 first of all marked the end of the period of relative political stability that prevailed in Europe for the past twenty years. The first consequence of this is that from here on out the world revolution will advance not only in the areas of the colonial revolution as in the past period but also in the advanced capitalist countries and in the workers states.

(2) This turn, determined by the maturing of the contradictions of "neocapitalism," was helped along by a new phenomenon of prime importance in the advanced capitalist states, particularly in Europe -- the appearance to the left of the old Socialist and Communist parties of a revolutionary vanguard composed by and large of youth (university and high-school students and workers) who reject the politics and leadership of the old formations. The causes of this phenomenon have been taken up by our movement, along with an analysis of the new vanguard, in a document on the radicalization of the youth prepared in particular for the World Congress.

This vanguard is still a small minority in comparison to the workers movement as a whole and its social composition is still not very proletarian. Nonetheless, it is larger than the old groups (the "splinter groups"), and because its particular base is in the universities and high schools, where the student bodies are rapidly expanding, it has become an appreciable factor in the poli-

tical arena in most of the countries of Europe. In this vanguard, to a degree varying from country to country, the Trotskyist movement already wields influence, or is able to intervene, or has possibilities of growth and action such as it never had before.

(3) These new conditions have thus created new problems in the field of building revolutionary parties. Since 1966, several sections, coming under the impact of this turn which first appeared among the movements opposed to the war in Vietnam, were led to alter their tactics in this field. The IEC plenum in January 1967 began to debate it. In practice the entryist tactic was given up more and more and the sections are now trying to redetermine their orientation in the building of a revolutionary party, taking into account the new circumstances and their current experiences.

It is thus necessary to again take up the question of building a revolutionary party, of drawing the lessons of the former entryist tactic, and of determining the main lines of our tactics in light of the general perspective of the struggles in Europe and the new relations among the political currents in the workers movement.

(4) It is necessary to examine the entryist tactic in retrospect, not only because it can provide us with lessons for the new tactic to be followed, but also because it is at present the main target of criticisms directed against our movement by all kinds of currents in the new vanguard. They avoid attacking our program, our analyses, our slogans; they single out essentially organizational questions in their criticisms, among them being the question of the Leninist-type party, the International, and, more

specifically, entryism at the very moment when, as everybody knows, we are giving up this tactic. Thus we must explain the reason for these attacks and the future implications they may have in building the party.

We will thus examine: (a) entryism, the reasons for it, how it was applied, and its results; (b) revolutionary perspectives in Europe and the problems they raise with regard to party building; (c) the main lines of the tactic to be followed in the coming period.

(5) In the question of building a revolutionary-Marxist mass party, we begin with the fundamental idea that if the party is an essential and, at a certain moment, decisive factor in the class struggle, this is above all because it itself is a product of the class struggle. The party is the political vanguard of the class, arising out of it not by a purely propagandistic and ideological development, but through its experiences. In other words, if a group, whether small or large, begins on the basis of a revolutionary-Marxist program, a party cannot be formed solely or mainly through individual recruitment to the revolutionary organization when it has not yet been recognized by the class. At all times the problem of individual recruitment is posed, but the formation of a party capable of leading mass struggles is almost inconceivable except through political operations -- fusions, splits, regroupments, etc., -- tied in with the big stages of the class struggle in a given country.

Entryism

(6) Let us summarize the history of entryism in our movement.

Before the war, when it was advocated for the first time in 1934 by Trotsky himself, entryism consisted of penetrating for a short time certain Social-

ist parties at a time when tendencies within them were evolving toward the left. To maintain at any cost, at all times, a single independent organization cannot thus be ascribed to Trotsky, who at the time referred to previous positions taken in the classics of Marxism.

The extension of entryism, converting it into a longer term tactic, took place after the war. From the end of the war, the International advocated it for the British Trotskyists, citing substantially in its favor the features characteristic of the British labor movement, among other things the link between the Labour party and the trade unions and the British working class. When this tactic was advocated, the Fourth International as a whole, especially its sections on the European continent, which had emerged from the war numerically strengthened, were oriented toward directly building mass Trotskyist parties through independent activity. It was following the Third World Congress (1951) that entryism was adopted as a more general tactic in Western Europe, owing to a new situation in which the European sections faced a period of stagnation and retreat for various reasons linked to the outbreak of the "cold war," etc.... In the debates of the time conjunctural factors were more particularly cited (a perspective of economic crisis and world war within a relatively short period, a crisis of Stalinism which for quite a long period would not take the form of explosions and splits within the parties, but of the decomposition of monolithism). During the period in which this tactic was applied, structural factors were emphasized. (See L. Maitan's pamphlet, "Rapports entre l'avant-garde communiste et le mouvement des masses" [Relationships between the Communist Vanguard and the Mass Movement].)

(7) The citing of conjunctural fac-

tors proved some time later to have been in error, the economic perspective turning out to be completely the reverse and giving way to a prolonged favorable cycle, the danger of war was postponed. On the other hand the crisis of Stalinism developed considerably faster than had been visualized and it developed in the main along the lines foreseen, that is, through the destruction of monolithism and the appearance of divergent currents within the Communist parties, with few or minimal splits.

The economic cycle that took place was as a whole unfavorable to the massive development of left currents in the old parties. Nonetheless in several countries such currents did form, but owing to the existing conditions on the one hand and the weakness of the revolutionary Marxists on the other hand, large splits were rare. Finally, the weight of the objective situation gained the upper hand and led to a very pronounced shift to the right among the traditional parties and also among the leaders of the left currents. Because of this, in several mass parties, instead of large splits we saw a marginal crumbling or limited splits.

(8) Taking everything into account, despite the error committed with respect to the conjuncture in 1952-53, it was not possible at the time to project any other tactic than entryism. This tactic was justified at the time. Those who stuck to strictly independent activity did not succeed at all in developing numerically during that period. If from the beginning, we had had a perspective of prolonged economic prosperity, with the enormous difficulties which that entailed for our movement, we would have still followed an entryist tactic. But it is certain that in applying the tactic, certain particular forms of work would have been conducted differently.

Finally, when entryist work, begin-

ning in 1963-64, proved unproductive, if our organizations -- while seeking an appropriate milieu of work -- did not raise the question of giving up this tactic, it was because practically no other general tactic was available to take its place.

(9) Despite the completely unexpected conditions, which were very unfavorable for revolutionary Marxism, the entryist tactic is far from having been a failure. On the numerical level, several sections were able to strengthen themselves through it (Belgium, Italy...). It favored propagating Trotskyist ideas within the official organizations, and thus forming young cadres within them. It was above all on the political level that considerable gains were made through entryism. Our members and our sections acquired, thanks to it, an extremely comprehensive understanding of the internal political life of the big working-class organizations, of the nature and the appearance of currents, of their possible development, of possibilities of acting on them. This is a gain extremely difficult to obtain outside of these organizations, and without it the road is opened wider to sectarianism toward the labor movement as it is. This danger threatened our movement for a long time owing to the conditions under which it was formed. It developed to a high degree in organizations like the OCI and the SLL as has been seen during the period of political upsurge.

(10) The first signs of radicalization affecting the youth appeared in the youth organizations of the traditional parties (particularly Germany, Italy, France); but the differentiations within these organizations rapidly led to splits. It was the flexible application of the entryist tactic in France in the UEC that enabled the French section to build the JCR at a given moment.

(11) We must defend the entryist tactic not only for the indicated reasons,

having to do with the past, but also for reasons related to the conditions of building the revolutionary party of the future.

The motives of most of those who criticize the entryist tactic today, and who without doubt exercise pressure even among those who have recently joined our movement, derive from a poor, and sometimes lack of, understanding of the labor movement as it is, of the roles the old organizations play in it, and of the problems of building a revolutionary party. They generally see this question in an ideologically abstract way and not in the light of the development of the class struggle. Such tendencies are nurtured by the social composition of the vanguard today in view of the ideological decomposition of the old organizations. This composition nurtures ultraleftism which is fed by the betrayal of the old parties, as was the case during the first years of the Communist International. These currents advance abstract concepts concerning the relationship between the vanguard, the members of mass parties and the unions, the leaderships of these organizations and the class as a whole. Explanation and defense of the entryist tactic are important not only for the past but for the future, which cannot consist of the indispensable work of recruitment alone to our organizations as they are at present, but will inevitably entail a whole series of political operations. One cannot foresee precisely what these operations will involve, but it is certain that they will be on the agenda, and it is necessary to teach our sections and our members that the future will demand of them an organizational flexibility at least equal to that displayed in the entryist tactic.

The inclination of some people today to condemn entryism will perhaps not prevent them from participating in the

big class struggles, but it will certainly render them incapable of constructing a mass revolutionary party.

The Perspectives for Europe

(12) With May 1968, a new period opened up, characterized among other things by a world crisis of the capitalist system and by a political awakening of the European working-class movement. Prerevolutionary situations have already appeared in certain countries, for example Italy, and a political and social crisis is ripening in Spain. European capitalism will undergo a succession of crises, one feeding another, jumping from one country to the next, and rebounding in the countries already affected. It will be in the course of these crises in particular and the "fallout" from them that the building of revolutionary parties can progress, not by gradual evolution, but by leaps corresponding to the advance of political consciousness among the masses and their vanguard.

In a general way, owing to the current state of political organization of the working-class movement, and in particular, the considerable weight of the treacherous leaderships, capitalism manages to get out of the end results of its political developments and crises. But capitalism today is less than ever a homogeneous entity; to the contrary, a tremendous crisis in leadership exists in most of the capitalist states which will not be easily resolved. For a period at least, it will deepen under the impact of large working-class thrusts. Thus in the coming years there will be a race between the building of revolutionary parties and the efforts of the bourgeoisie to find the forces and the leaderships capable of containing and defeating the revolutionary rise of the masses. We are witnessing only the first battles, including those of considerable scope as in France in May.

As a base, the perspective must be taken of relations between capital and labor becoming worse, of broad, hard-fought battles in the course of which the masses will undergo deeper and deeper experiences with the old leaderships whose policies will be subjected to growing criticism even within their own organizations. These criticisms will be all the stronger from now on since it is possible in practice to a certain degree to advance against reformist policies, policies that are revolutionary in method and objectives.

The contradictions of "neocapitalism" have ripened as yet in only a limited way in the economic field. In addition, political factors may provoke especially important developments for all of Europe. Among them, two should be noted in particular. First the development of the situation in Spain. The Franco regime is highly eroded and Spanish capitalism proved incapable in the preceding years, that is, while Europe was suffering the greatest political apathy, of replacing this worn-out regime with a new government that could associate Spanish capitalism in a better way with the rest of Western Europe. It will be much more difficult to carry out this operation under the new political conditions in Europe; Franco was already compelled to resort to a state of emergency as a preventive measure, immediately arousing powerful resistance among the workers.

The other factor is the international crisis of Stalinism, the ups and downs of which can be completely unexpected. The intervention of the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia is an expression not of the strength but the fear of the governments of the workers states in face of the rising aspirations of the population. Up to now the international crisis of Stalinism has been of greater advantage to the rightist currents within the Communist parties, while the left-wing currents have

developed only outside of these formations among the youth. But when this deepening crisis reaches not only, or not mainly, the intellectual layers of these parties, or the members of the apparatus, but also and especially the working-class base, then much bigger opportunities will open for the left currents, and this is without going into the tendency of the developments that will occur in the workers states.

These two factors, Spain and the international crisis of Stalinism, have all the more importance in view of the fact that the evolution of the European working-class movement following the first world war was profoundly affected precisely by what happened at the two extremities of Europe -- the degeneration of the Soviet Union and the defeat of the Spanish revolution.

(13) Nothing would be more dangerous than to extrapolate the resistance presented by the French CP in May 1968, for example, and thereby conclude that the Communist parties, including the French CP, will not undergo any grave crises in the future. To the contrary, everything within the French CP shows that now, particularly as a result of May 1968 and the Czechoslovak affair, conditions have appeared for the first time favorable to the eruption of serious crises. This party -- the most rigid of all the CPs -- reached the peak of its authority over the working class following the war; since then it has been affected by several crises that nevertheless only touched its peripheral layers (partisans, intellectuals, students), while its working-class base, although uneasy -- particularly over "de-Stalinization" -- remained profoundly attached not only to the party but also to the leadership and to the Soviet Union. But May 1968 and the Czechoslovak affair damaged the authority of both, including in the working-class base

of the French CP.

The example of the Italian CP likewise shows that the mass movement in the country, along with the Czechoslovak affair, gave rise if not to a serious crisis, then at least to differentiations.

The continued strength of the old leadership is due much less to any confidence felt in it by the rank-and-file militants than to the absence, under present conditions, of a promising alternative leadership. The leadership of the French CP, moreover, just recently (l'Humanité, February 5) displayed its fear over the formation to the left of a political organization enjoying a certain audience and having a certain capacity for action.

(14) Despite the fact that the extremely pronounced rightward shift of the Socialist parties has not provoked any serious crises in past years, it would be equally erroneous to conclude from this that the radicalization of the masses, where these parties are based in the working class, will not affect them.

In several countries already, a certain opposition to the policies of these Social Democratic parties has been expressed among the unions they control, including top bureaucrats, who for specific reasons of their own seek to defend their positions within given limits. But such a situation will not fail to find expression on a broad union level. In this connection, the case of the British Labour party is of exceptional importance both for the situation inside the country itself and for the possible repercussions it could have among the other socialist parties. At present the situation is the reverse of the one that traditionally existed in the British labor movement. In the past the leadership of the party based itself on right-wing union leaderships against the currents of the left whose strength was based in the local constitu-

encies of the party; at present the leadership of the party is running into opposition to its economic policies from the leaderships of the strongest union organizations. The present situation can have a positive outcome only if the opposition go beyond the purely economic and trade-union level and carry their struggle to a general level in order to bring about a change in policy and leaders.

(15) Our party-building tactic should be based on the perspective of big struggles, starting from the present reality, precisely in order to create to the left of the old organizations a political force capable of attracting toward it the revolutionary forces that will surge up in such struggles, more particularly within the old formations.

In general, the European sections in orienting themselves in the question of building mass revolutionary parties, should free themselves first of all of any routinist attitude, prepare themselves for sudden turns in the situation, the outbreak of crises passing from one country to another, crisis situations developing very rapidly, intermixed with periods of relative calm, during which new critical developments will mature.

Under these conditions, it is impossible to determine a general tactic for all countries, valid under all circumstances. It is evident that the case of the British Labour party, so strongly linked to the trade-union movement, cannot be compared to that of a mass Communist party which also bears the weight of the international crisis of Stalinism, or that of a Social Democratic party like the Socialist party of Germany. One can only determine the broad lines serving to guide our sections.

The Building of Revolutionary Parties in the New Situation in Europe

(16) It is necessary to openly re-

nounce the entryist tactic as it was established in the years 1952-53 and which was based on the two following elements, among other things, that are now outdated:

(a) The extreme weakness of the vanguard that stood to the left of the traditional parties, a weakness that prevented it from being a factor on the political scene.

(b) Because of this weakness, the main orientation aimed at preparing and aiding the formation of oppositional currents within the old parties that would develop toward the left.

In view of the fact that broad layers of the youth have developed to the left outside of the old working-class parties, it is imperative to orient ourselves, at least for the immediate future, on independent work which will enable us to win to the program of the Fourth International a considerable sector of this new vanguard and to organize it into sections or into revolutionary youth organizations. It would be literally criminal to ignore this vanguard and to let it become politically and organizationally dissipated while waiting for broader layers of the working class to start moving.

Our sections should thus take as their fundamental orientation in the immediate future the reinforcement of the organizations adhering to the program of the Fourth International, whether as sections as such, youth organizations, or more generally a combination of the two.

(17) In the document on the radicalization of the youth, we will return to the strengths and weaknesses of this new vanguard. It is evident that in this vanguard the main present danger, owing to its lack of experience and its social composition, is to be found in the ultraleft currents.

One of the first conditions for an effective struggle against such currents,

and more particularly against their reflection in our own ranks, is to turn very resolutely toward the broadest possible independent action to publicize the revolutionary-Marxist program, and to undertake public actions, within reach of the vanguard forces as they are now constituted, that can provide an example for the masses without isolating the vanguard from them as is so often the case with ultraleft currents. The struggle against these currents above all cannot be conducted on a purely propagandistic level, although this aspect must in no way be neglected.

The struggle against the ultraleft currents must be particularly vigorous in connection with the unions. It is necessary to conduct a merciless struggle against any tendency to withdraw from the unions and to substitute for them formations that at times can play a very important role in periods of very sharp crisis but which can never assume a permanent role of defending the daily interests of the working class.

(18) We particularly stress the need for political and organizational strengthening of the organizations based on the program of the Fourth International. In numerous cases it will specially involve cases of youth not formally affiliated to the Fourth International for reasons indicated in the document on the radicalization of the youth. On the other hand, we are opposed in principle to the creation of intermediary organizations, on incomplete or blurred programs, in a word, centrist. By their nature, such organizations tend to freeze the evolution of militants and to block their way to revolutionary Marxism and the Fourth International.

Under present conditions, such organizations can be neither large in size nor be preponderantly worker in composition. Also, we never take the initia-

tive in creating such organizations. When one is constituted, we must study with special care ways of intervening in order to avoid crystallizing a centrist formation that would only be detrimental to the further evolution of its members. Further on, we will take up the possibility of centrist formations appearing in consequence of the crisis in the old parties. In certain countries, local groups form for specific actions; these groups, which are not organized on a national scale, are generally centrist in character. An active attitude toward such groups is obviously necessary not only to carry out local objectives but to enable the members of these groups to develop politically toward revolutionary Marxism.

(19) The necessity to orient toward strengthening organizations that defend the program of the Fourth International in an independent way, does not at all signify abandoning work on and even in the traditional parties. As we have indicated above, revolutionary crises of society that do not affect the organizations containing the bulk of the working class are inconceivable, particularly the rank-and-file militants of those parties in the unions, who are behind the day-to-day struggle in the factories. It is impossible to think that the working class in its broad mass will become radicalized independently of these militants and that the latter are impervious to this radicalization.

One of the big differences between the present period and the one in which our movement adopted entryism is that it was legitimate to think at that time that the forces of the future revolutionary party would still be found in an overwhelming proportion inside the old parties. Today, because of the important possibilities of organizing youth, and with them militants who have left the old parties over the years, the proportion of

revolutionary forces that will emerge from these parties in the course of crises will be less. It is out of the question to establish the relative proportions today; moreover, they are not predetermined, but depend on the actions undertaken by the vanguard as it now stands.

In any case, this new fact, of primary importance, of a radicalization of the youth occurring largely outside the old parties and against them, must not lead to erroneous conclusions as to the possibility of building a revolutionary-Marxist mass party based essentially on the youth on the one hand, and on the other of unorganized workers lacking any experience as militants. The current features have not destroyed the continuity of the working-class movement.

(20) The tactic to be followed approximates, to a certain degree, that of a minority revolutionary formation seeking to conquer the majority of the working class to its revolutionary policies. In the old formations, it is no longer entryist work with a more or less long-term perspective, but rather fraction work. But numerous differences exist in comparison with the conditions that faced most of the Communist parties in the first years of the Communist International. Our movement is still very weak numerically; the Stalinists, and to a lesser, but not negligible, degree, the Social Democrats do not want to recognize our right to existence in the labor movement, especially in the form of tendency rights in mass organizations of the workers like the unions;* the composition of the vanguard from the standpoint of both age and sociology situates them at the periphery of the working-class movement as a whole,

* In many cases, the Social Democrats have the satisfaction of seeing the Stalinists do the dirty work against our movement and the revolutionary vanguard in general, which enables them to appear democratic on the cheap.

thereby facing them with considerable difficulties in penetrating and rooting themselves in it. They are not supported by any of the material forces at the base of the workers states.

Also, while placing the essential emphasis on our activities in the current period on considerably strengthening our organizations acting in an independent way, with considerably expanded means of expression, we must nevertheless pay attention to work in the mass organizations.

Among the main objectives of our organizations is to deepen the crisis in the Communist and Socialist parties. Under the new conditions, this criticism can be made from the outside, not solely on an ideological level as in the past, but also, in certain fields, having a certain mass dimension, in contrast to reformist actions or mere pressure. This difference began to emerge in some scope during the struggle for the defense of the Vietnamese revolution -- and made it possible to distinguish actions for "peace" and negotiations from actions for the victory of Vietnam. Such actions should be sought in a more systematic way from here on out in fields where it is possible to undertake them.

(21) The question of working within the old formations must likewise be completely reexamined. Under present conditions, it is not possible to elaborate a general orientation applicable to all countries, but it is possible to formulate several broad lines. In applying these, each of our sections must seek to determine with precision its particular tactics in this field.

First of all there is the case of militant workers performing union tasks on a shop-floor level where they work. Whether the union is controlled by the Stalinists or the Social Democrats, in general they cannot continue in such functions unless they hold formal membership

in the old parties. This is generally the case in France in the CGT (in certain cases a PSU card offers a certain immunity) and in Germany in the DGB. It would obviously be absurd to play into the hands of the treacherous leaders and abandon responsibilities resulting from the confidence of the workers, whether because they do not at this time understand the political attitude of our comrades, or because, while understanding it, they are not inclined or able to conduct a fight to defend them. In such cases possession of a membership card in one of the old parties is above all a formal matter. But such a situation must in no case be considered sacrosanct; we should try to change it in order to gain recognition of the right of tendencies in the unions. This is not only a struggle for a formal democratic right, but also a struggle for the transformation, in the workers movement in general, of certain factories into revolutionary strongholds. This could be of great importance in getting our trade-union policies known in opposition to those of the traitorous leaderships, and could become of capital importance in periods of very big struggles such as general strikes, etc. We should constantly examine the possibilities of making the union bureaucracy retreat and obtaining tendency rights in the unions. It would be altogether illusory to think that in the European countries our movement could develop in the working class without gaining recognition for this right inside the unions. It is particularly because of this that we must conduct a relentless struggle against the ultraleft tendencies which try to ignore the union organizations and who offer in their place organizations that are frequently improvised and that do not correspond to the daily needs of the workers, needs that do not disappear in a period like the one Europe has entered.

Being based on the development of

leftward moving currents inside the old organizations, the entryist tactic was viewed essentially as a long-term action. From this standpoint, our members sought to avoid being too much in the forefront, to avoid being expelled prematurely, and distinguished themselves relatively little from the more critical elements who genuinely belonged to these formations.

These left currents -- as was mentioned above -- did not undergo any real mass development. Their old-time leaders were caught up in the general shift to the right of these parties, so that the stage of radicalization we are experiencing at present -- and which naturally affected the youth -- did not pass through these parties. In the future stages when the radicalization reaches the broadest layers of the working class in an intense way, it will affect the old parties. Or will there be only a crumbling and limited breakaways? Will these split-offs move directly toward the revolutionary-Marxist groups or will they give birth to temporary centrist formations? It is not possible to give a reply at present to these questions -- the reply depends on different factors that will appear in the course of events and also as a result of the struggle that we put up. As to the question of relatively long-term perspectives, our organizations must be extremely attentive to the developments that occur and be ready, in case of openings, for tactical operations, taking into account the capacity and cohesion of the organization. But for the immediate future, the essential task within the old parties is to work to strengthen the organization acting directly for the revolutionary-Marxist program as quickly as possible, not only among the youth but also as much as possible among the older workers.

In the former entryist tactic, we determined our activity in the first place in the light of the internal dynam-

ics of the old parties, which obviously reflected in an indirect way the political developments in the working class. At present, the activity which we can carry on in the old parties is determined in the first place by the dialectics of the class struggle, which, in given periods, can provoke processes of radicalization outside the old parties and capable of inducing internal differentiations in them from the outside.

This orientation is imperative where militants or groups of militants in the youth organizations of the traditional parties still exist; we must aim at reducing these formations to their most simple expression for the benefit of the revolutionary youth organizations. In these areas, the turn must be carried out rapidly and vigorously, the only considerations that can be taken into account being those pertaining to inducing the biggest split possible inside these organizations. Experience has shown in many instances that the difficulty consists in knowing where the dividing line will occur and of determining the correct time and size of the split. It must be understood that the maximum is not necessarily the optimum and that a noticeable strengthening of the organization of the revolutionary youth is an indispensable means for later exacerbating the crisis within the traditional organizations.

But will this give rise to important left currents and to massive splits from the old parties?

In the adult organizations, we must no longer orient ourselves according to the perspective of a slow and patient formation of a broad left current, but on the contrary seek to aggravate the crises, without being afraid of being expelled, the only consideration being to avoid isolated expulsions without any political benefit.

The Struggle in the Vanguard

(22) In building the revolutionary party, in addition to work in the direction of the mass organizations of the working class, problems are posed by the existence of other organizations and vanguard currents in certain countries, including organizations in certain countries that claim to be Trotskyist. In this field, too, it is impossible to determine a line that is valid for all countries in view of the very different conditions to be found from one country to the next. Moreover, these conditions can sometimes change very rapidly even in the same country.

With regard to organizations claiming to adhere to Trotskyism, the question of the unity of the movement within the framework of the International must be put to the fore by us but not in an abstract way. In some cases it seems almost completely impossible, while in other cases it seems very difficult under present conditions. We cannot maintain a frozen position in this field either, for events will contribute to assuring regroupments or, contrariwise, divisions leaving behind the generally disputed questions. The struggle for the unity of the Trotskyist movement should not be underestimated; around the movement there are many valuable militants, who have been attracted by the ideas of Trotskyism but who have drawn back because of the divisions in our movement, and who have reached negative conclusions concerning our organizational capacities.

With regard to vanguard organizations holding other concepts than those of our movement, in addition to an indispensable ideological struggle of the most rigorous kind, a struggle must be opened on the capacities of the vanguard to mobilize and engage in action.

The struggle within the vanguard must not be underestimated in relation to

action within the working class because of the numbers involved. The problem of penetrating broad layers of the working class begins with the winning of the narrower layers of the militants and we must win them in a struggle against the ultra-left or centrist currents. The more we can strengthen and extend our positions in the present vanguard, the easier this work will become.

* * *

(23) To sum up, as a result of a turn in the objective situation, we must proceed to a turn in tactics in building a mass revolutionary-Marxist party. We are moving, so to speak, from a war of position to a war of movement. We give up the entryist tactic as it was practiced, beginning in 1952-53. We are now engaged in a tactic aimed at strengthening as much as circumstances will permit, the independent revolutionary-Marxist organizations, adult or youth. This task has the highest priority by far. Nevertheless, we continue to pay attention to the traditional reformist and Stalinist organizations. We must be careful not to sacrifice uselessly, through a mechanical application of our new tactic, the positions won within the ranks of the trade-union organizations and the existing possibilities of fraction work. In the old parties -- whether it concerns the militants already there or who can be won there as the crisis develops -- we do not orient at present in accordance with the perspective of the formation of left currents but with the perspective of exacerbating the crisis. Nevertheless, we must carefully follow the developments that can occur in the old parties in consequence of transformations of the objective situation and be ready each time to reexamine what may be required in solving the party-building problem as a result of these transformations. Finally, the struggle for the supremacy of our ideas and our organizations within the vanguard must in no way be minimized.