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Editorial Note

The material published in this bulletin was submitted by the SWP leadership in accordance with the decision made by the United Secretariat at its September 1974 meeting to put out an *International Internal Discussion Bulletin* in which the SWP could explain its "demand for an extraordinary world congress."

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The Need for a Special World Congress

A Statement by the Steering Committee of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction

The internal situation in the Fourth International has deteriorated badly since the world congress was held. The International Majority Tendency has excluded the minority from participating in the day-to-day work of the international. Grave factional moves have been made against the Canadian section and the Argentine PST. A split has been engineered in the SWP. The possibility has been increased of a public split on an international scale. It is clear that extraordinary measures are required to correct this situation.

Where Things Stood at the Close of the Congress

In the pre-congress discussion and at the congress itself, the debate centered on the consequences of the "turn" adopted at the 1969 congress—that is, the concessions made to guerrillaism—and the departure this represented from the methods outlined in the Transitional Program for building a mass revolutionary party.

In the process of debating the balance sheet of events in Bolivia and Argentina, which provided an objective test of the application of the Ninth Congress "turn," other political differences arose. These included such issues as the alleged appearance of a "new mass vanguard" in Europe and elsewhere and what kinds of political initiatives should be taken by the Fourth International in order to win the newly radicalizing students and young workers.

Despite the number of documents submitted, the discussion remained incomplete and unsatisfactory because of the delays in translating and circulating the material and the slowness of some sections and sympathizing organizations in initiating discussion. Nonetheless, it was recognized by both sides that the major differences between the two sides hinged on the "turn" adopted at the Ninth World Congress and its subsequent development, which the Leninist Trotskyist Faction characterized as an adaptation to the ultra-left pressures faced by our movement at the time.

On the level of theory, deeper differences were adumbrated. Leaders of the International Majority Tendency questioned the validity of characterizing the policies of the North Vietnamese leadership as "Stalinist." They advanced comparable positions in relation to the Maoist bureaucracy (denying that it was a caste and labeling its policies as merely "centrist"), and cast doubt on the correctness of the Fourth International's analysis of the stages in the revolution that led to the establishment of a workers state in China. Not stopping here, they brought into question the analyses made by the Fourth International of the development of the workers state

in Cuba and of the overturns in Eastern Europe that took place immediately following World War II.

The differences on this level, which still remain to be probed and discussed in detail, are extremely important. They involve nothing less than the main theoretical acquisitions of the Fourth International since the death of Trotsky. There can hardly be any question as to the necessity of giving top priority to resolving these differences. (Up to now only a discussion on the nature of North Vietnamese Stalinism has been started, and the initiative in this was taken by the editors of the *International Socialist Review* after a leader of the IMT published a book containing inadmissible concessions to the Stalinism of the North Vietnamese leadership.)

It was agreed at the congress to continue the discussion on other important points of difference. These centered on the relation of party-building tasks to the youth radicalization, the women's liberation movement, and the national liberation movements that have emerged on all continents.

At the last session of the congress, the delegates voted by an overwhelming majority for a nine-point agreement on measures to help maintain the unity of the Fourth International. The agreement was based on a common assessment by the Leninist Trotskyist Faction, the International Majority Tendency, and the Mezhrayonka Tendency that the differences as they had developed up to that point did not justify a split. The nine-point agreement was intended to provide an opportunity for the majority to further test its line of the issues voted upon at the congress, to provide for further discussion on designated issues that had not been taken up at the congress (an internal bulletin of up to forty-eight pages being provided for this purpose), and to counter the tendency observable in some parts of the Fourth International to engage in unjustified splits.

On the latter point, a previous agreement was reaffirmed "That in those countries where two or more groups exist because of splits or other reasons, the united moral authority of the Fourth International be brought to bear for the earliest possible fusion of the groups on a principled basis."

If it had been lived up to, the nine-point agreement would have made it easier to avoid or to handle in a responsible way the subsequent errors that have arisen on the political level such as the IMT's upholding "minority violence" in Spain, the IMT's following an ultra-left course in combating protofascist groups in Britain, and the IMT's course in the May presidential elections in France, which included the opportunist error of urging the workers to vote in the second round for the candidate

of the incipient popular front.

But instead of conducting their stewardship of the leading bodies of the Fourth International in accordance with the nine-point agreement, the leaders of the IMT took an opposite course following the world congress.

Narrow Factionalism of the IMT

In the final session of the world congress, they announced that they were setting a ratio of 60 for themselves and 40 for the minority in the number of members to be included in the incoming IEC. This was their right as a majority even though their political resolution was adopted by a ratio of only 53 to 44 mandated votes.

In the International Executive Committee meeting held the day after the congress, the IMT decided on a still more lopsided proportion for the United Secretariat—66 to 33 (with one seat for the Kompass Tendency). This was still their right, although it was an unwise decision.

But then they violated Bolshevik norms by insisting on determining in their caucus which individuals the Leninist Trotskyist Faction must include among its representatives on the United Secretariat.

The IMT even went so far as to specifically exclude any representatives of the PST in Argentina from participating in the United Secretariat in any regular capacity whatsoever.

The IMT carried this arbitrary procedure still further in determining the composition of the Bureau. The IMT allocated 10 members for itself and only three for the LTF. Moreover, the LTF was not free to determine the composition of the three. At least one had to meet specifications laid down by the IMT.

The decision was accompanied by an ultimatum. If the LTF did not meet the specifications laid down by the IMT, then the IMT would set up a "homogeneous" bureau, excluding the LTF from participation in the day-to-day leadership of the international. In this way the IMT, in its push for monolithism, declared a lockout against the LTF.

This course revived the tensions in the Fourth International that had been allayed at the final session of the congress. It represented a victory for the wing of the IMT that had pressed for a split at the world congress and that had considered approval of the nine-point agreement to be a setback in the pursuit of their objectives.

The Crusade Against the PST

Pursuing their narrow factional course still further, the IMT opened an offensive against the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores in Argentina. In a certain sense this was no more than a continuation of secret factional moves against the PST made in the previous period (the Domingo letter, for instance); but the attacks now took a qualitative turn.

The adherents of the IMT belonging to the Fraccion Roja in Argentina attacked the PST publicly. This went as far as publishing parts of the IMT world congress resolution on Argentina denouncing the PST as "syndicalist," "electoralist," "legalist," "centrist," "opportunist," and as following "a political line and practices that are too far from the principles and traditions of our movement." The IMT leaders had pledged to confine these character-

izations to internal discussion within the Fourth International. To publish these parts of the resolution, which in effect ruled the PST out of the Fourth International, violated the pledge of the IMT and breached the nine-point agreement.

The IMT offensive has now culminated in a resolution, carried in the United Secretariat by a factional vote, attacking the PST for allegedly signing a class-collaborationist document and participating with several bourgeois parties in presenting it to Peron.

Members of the LTF in the United Secretariat warned of the consequences that could follow from publishing an attack of that kind, since it would force the PST to reply in public. They urged delaying an action of such gravity until further information was obtained and any explanation that the PST might want to make could be heard.

The IMT paid no attention to the warning, and proceeded to publish the resolution. They did so even after the PST had publicly made clear that the facts were altogether different from the assumptions of the IMT and after the PST had made a public correction of material in *Avanzada Socialista* that gave a contrary impression.

The IMT even published a postscript to the resolution, acknowledging the public rectification made by the PST but brushing this aside as immaterial. The IMT represented their postscript as having been passed by the United Secretariat although it was not considered at all by that body.

What are the objectives of this offensive against the PST? They are transparent. The IMT is seeking to divide the Leninist Trotskyist Faction into pro- and anti-PST wings, and to read the PST—at present the largest Trotskyist organization in the world—out of the movement.

Tour Against the Canadian Section

The IMT leadership has pursued a similar factional course in Canada. At the beginning of July, Alain Krivine made a tour of that country. He stated flatly that the purpose of his tour was to publicly help the Revolutionary Marxist Group, his factional cothinkers, in opposition to the League for Socialist Action/Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière, the official Canadian section of the Fourth International.

Krivine rejected addressing even a single public meeting sponsored by the LSA/LSO. He rejected addressing a joint meeting called by the LSA/LSO and the RMG. And he pointedly refrained from appealing to the Canadian workers to vote for Kate Alderdice, the candidate of the LSA/LSO in the July 8 federal election. He endorsed only the candidates of the RMG.

Krivine's refusal to support Comrade Alderdice, who was campaigning on a program of revolutionary socialism, caused some astonishment. However, it was only the obverse of his readiness in France to call on the workers to vote for Mitterrand, the popular-front candidate in the second round.

The Canadian public thus witnessed the spectacle of an international leader of the IMT working to deepen the split between two Trotskyist organizations that had been officially recognized at a world congress of the Fourth International less than five months previously. This was how one IMT leader observed the pledge to

bring "moral authority" to bear "for the earliest possible fusion of the groups on a principled basis."

Krivine's action in Canada laid bare the real attitude of leaders of the IMT toward the nine-point agreement passed by the world congress to help maintain the unity of the Fourth International. To them it was a scrap of paper.

The IT Split in the United States

The IMT followed a similar course on another front. The American cothinkers of the IMT, organized in the Internationalist Tendency in the Socialist Workers Party, decided to move toward an early split. Among other things, they continued their previous course of failing to maintain their financial obligations to the party and failing to live up to its norms of activity. They went further and decided to disregard party discipline in carrying out trade-union activities and in contacting and working with outside groups, including opponents like the Maoists. Their policy was to recruit directly to their line—on both American and international questions—and to keep these recruits outside of the party until they were thoroughly prejudiced against it. They engaged in a public nationwide action of their own on May 11 in open defiance of a tactical course decided on by the Political Committee of the SWP in relation to Chile solidarity work. They set up a complete party structure for their own group, ranging from local branch committees to a political committee and a delegated national convention. They characterized the SWP as "deadly sick" and its cadres as "politically incapable of either understanding or putting into practice a revolutionary line."

All this was done in secrecy. Through "security" measures, the IT sought to deceive the SWP and the YSA as to its decision to flout discipline and to form a separate party structure. Their entire three-month internal pre-convention discussion, which was begun immediately after the world congress, was concealed from the party.

The IT split was consummated at its convention. Their course boiled down to practicing "entryism" in relation to the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance.

When the IT engaged in its own nationally coordinated action on May 11, the SWP Control Commission was asked to investigate the matter. The Control Commission uncovered some of the secret discussion documents of the IT stating their objectives and decisions.

The documents themselves showed that the top international leadership of the IMT had discussed these secret documents and the course decided on by the IT. It has been claimed that the IMT leadership disapproved some of the IT's tactics, particularly their holding a delegated national convention. However, at no time did the IMT leaders inform the leadership of the SWP of the split course their cothinkers in the IT had decided on. They maintained strict silence about it, including in the United Secretariat.

The reason for the cover-up was that they agreed with the political objectives, if not all the tactics or the entire organizational course of the IT. They even participated in setting up a secret "North American Bureau," which was placed in charge of coordinating the

factional activities of the IT and the RMG.

Some supporters of the IMT political positions in the SWP resigned from the IT prior to its split convention because they knew the IT's actions were incompatible with membership in the SWP. However, the IMT decided to maintain relations with the IT despite its split convention, and despite the fact that the IT convention voted overwhelmingly to reject the position of the IMT Bureau "on the American situation, the SWP, and the perspectives of the IT. . . ."

The IT's actions were, of course, incompatible with membership in the SWP (or, for that matter, with membership in any section of the Fourth International that abides by the rules of democratic centralism). After the Control Commission had completed its investigation and reported its findings, the Political Committee of the SWP took cognizance of the fact that the IT in furtherance of its split course had set up a dual party structure, placing itself outside of the SWP.

The contrast could hardly be greater between the IT's organization of a split in the SWP and the Tendency's loyal efforts to maintain the unity of the International Marxist Group, the British section of the Fourth International. Despite violations of their democratic rights several years ago, the members of the Tendency have maintained their financial obligations, faithfully carried out assignments, and in all other ways tried to hold to an exemplary standard in abiding by the discipline of the IMG. They have not practiced double recruiting, nor set up sympathizing circles outside of the IMG, not published a secret intra-tendency discussion bulletin with the intention of hiding their real views from the rest of the IMG, nor organized their own delegated convention, nor taken any political initiatives whatsoever that did not accord with the official positions of the IMG. When several members of the Tendency grew tired of spending years in a small minority and resigned from the IMG, all relations with them were cut off at once, and the IMG leadership and the United Secretariat were immediately notified of this step.

Importance of Correct Organizational Methods

The course followed by the IMT in relation to the elected leadership bodies of the international, the PST in Argentina, the LSA/LSO in Canada, and the SWP in the United States has brought the "organizational question" to the fore on an international scale in the clearest and sharpest way. The issue existed previously—it first emerged with the discovery of the secret Domingo letter—but it was subordinated by the LTF for the sake of maximum clarity in the political discussion preceding the congress.

The issue was subordinated at that time not because it was unimportant but because of the difficulty of making clear what was involved. It is possible for cadres anywhere in the world to decide where they stand on clearly developed political differences. "Organizational" questions, which most often involve specific actions, are generally difficult to clarify because of the extremely concrete circumstances in which they occur. They frequently involve charges and countercharges that are not easy to document in such a way that those in other countries can

see precisely what is involved.

The situation has now changed in that respect. Material has become available in such quantity and in such incontrovertible detail that it is possible for every cadre in the world Trotskyist movement to make an independent judgment as to the facts and how they affect the main task facing the Fourth International—providing decisive aid in building mass parties capable of guiding the socialist revolution to success.

Moreover, the situation has changed in another way. The centrifugal tendency observable in some sections for the past few years has been gaining in force. It threatens to poison and embitter relations, thus jeopardizing an objective discussion on the questions left pending by the Fourth World Congress Since Reunification. And of course, as we noted above, it signifies heightened danger of an international split.

The "organizational question" as it has emerged since the world congress involves party-building methods and democratic centralism in the most concrete way. The IMT has demonstrated in practice what it means by the term "democratic centralism." It is not democratic centralism as taught by Lenin and Trotsky.

The IMT leaders have usurped the Bureau, converting it into a monopoly of their faction. They have reduced the United Secretariat to a formal body that meets in a perfunctory way and that cannot even be relied upon to furnish accurate minutes of its own proceedings.

The IMT leaders do not separate the responsibility of conducting the affairs of the international from their own factional interests. Instead, they equate the two. That is why they fall into the most vulgar factionalism

as in the case of Krivine's trip to Canada, or into gross errors as in the case of their public attack on the PST, or into operating behind the backs of national leaderships as in the case of the SWP.

Such methods, which are alien to the traditions of Trotskyism, are highly destructive—witness the IMT's abrogation of the nine-point agreement, and the way the IMT has escalated tensions and advanced centrifugal tendencies in the international, all in the brief time since the world congress!

The correct practice of democratic centralism—of the Leninist method of party building—which has been of central importance in the program of the world Trotskyist movement since the Fourth International was founded in 1938, has now emerged as a key issue in the current crisis in leadership.

That crisis has now become so acute that only a special congress offers hope of a solution. The Leninist Trotskyist Faction concurs with the opinion expressed by the Political Committee of the SWP and proposes convocation of a special congress in accordance with the provisions made for this in the statutes of the Fourth International. Only a congress is capable of enacting the measures required to offset the IMT's repudiation in practice of the nine-point agreement that was passed by the last world congress.

The LTF will collaborate in every way possible to help assure the success of such a congress. It urges every cadre in the world Trotskyist movement to join in supporting this call.

August 28, 1974

On the IT Split from the Socialist Workers Party

By Gus Horowitz

This article will concern itself solely with a response to the IT document entitled "The Myth of the 'IT Split'—Purge Politics of the LTF," and with additional material pertaining to the IT split. It will not discuss the IMT document of September 7-8, 1974; as far as the IT split itself is concerned, the IMT document simply backs up the IT document. Discussion of the additional material in the IMT document will be taken up in a future article dealing with the organizational norms of the Fourth International. Discussion of that subject will be opened up at the IEC meeting of January 1975.

I. The IT "Defends" Itself: A Document of Self-Exposure

The document of the IT entitled "The Myth of the 'IT Split'—Purge Politics of the LTF" contends that:

1. The IT did make some errors while it was inside the SWP, but these have now been acknowledged and a self-criticism has been made.

2. Even though the IT made some errors, there were extenuating circumstances—namely, the extremely factional and undemocratic conduct of the SWP leadership.

3. Most of the accusations of indiscipline against the IT, for which the IT was expelled, are false, particularly the most serious accusations.

To back up these contentions, the IT has produced a very long document, consisting mostly of its own version of numerous incidents. To comrades in other countries who are unfamiliar with the internal situation in the SWP prior to July 4, 1974, it must surely seem difficult to judge whether the SWP's discipline had been violated in this or that instance, or to assess whether the IT was the innocent victim of SWP factionalism on this or that occasion.

The difficulty can be overcome, however, if one re-examines what the SWP Control Commission and Political Committee actually said about the IT, and what the evidence was that formed the basis for their conclusions.

The report of the SWP Control Commission quite clearly states how it regarded the voluminous material dealing with specific incidents—material from both the IT and from elected leaders or leadership bodies of the SWP. The findings of the Control Commission were not based on any of this material. The findings were based solely on the evidence contained in the secret internal discussion material of the IT. *The entire case rests upon this documentary evidence.* It comprises the overwhelming bulk of the 146-page bulletin of the SWP dealing with the IT split (SWP *Internal Information Bulletin*, No. 6 in 1974). Yet the two very lengthy replies of the IT and IMT pay scant attention to this material. Why? Because the evidence in the secret IT documents is damning, and the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence is inescapable.

What do these documents—written by the IT itself—show? Let us single out the two key points.

1. The documents show that the IT did not see itself as a tendency or faction within the SWP, and loyal to the SWP despite dissenting views. To the contrary, they show that the IT conceived of itself as a separate, rival organization to the SWP, attempting to displace the SWP as the acknowledged representative of Trotskyism in the United States. As a top IT leader and fraternal observer on the IEC, John Barzman put it, the IT was "not merely an ideological tendency, but the nucleus of a future section." This assessment was the official position of the IT.

Combined with this self-estimate of the IT was the evaluation of the SWP as "deadly sick" and the assessment that "the cadre of this party are politically incapable of either understanding or putting into practice a revolutionary line." This evaluation also was the official position of the IT.

This perspective is not the perspective of a legitimate tendency or faction within the SWP and loyal to the SWP. It is the perspective of a rival organization.

2. The IT documents show that the IT rejected the organizational principles of the SWP on every count. It functioned as an opponent organization doing entry work within the SWP, while also carrying out its own external work.

Internally the IT was structured in accord with the needs of a group doing entry work in the SWP, not in accord with the needs of a loyal tendency or faction. It functioned secretly—in violation of the SWP's organizational principles. It carried out a secretwritten internal political discussion—in violation of the SWP's organizational principles. It violated the SWP's organizational principles regarding party-youth relations. These points are all proved by the facts contained in IT documents themselves.

Regarding external work, the IT rejected the SWP's organizational principles which clearly insist that *all* political work of all comrades must be carried out under the direction of the authorized units of the SWP. It was official IT policy to carry out its own independent public work, including work in the labor movement, work with other groups in the mass movement, and work with opponent political groups, without authorization by the SWP and in violation of SWP discipline. This too was proved by the IT documents themselves.

The official policies and perspectives of the IT in these two areas were incompatible with membership in the SWP, as defined by the organizational principles of the SWP. These policies and perspectives could only be characterized as those of a group that had in fact split from the SWP and formed itself as a separate rival organization to the SWP. The fact that the IT did not explicitly describe itself as a party or say that it had consummated a split is immaterial. The words "party" and "split" were

avoided in order to help preserve the IT's entry tactic inside the SWP.

Today the IMT has issued a statement asserting that "we are faced with the undeniable fact that the comrades of the IT most strongly deny ever having 'split' or having had the intention of splitting from the SWP. . . ."

It was not too long ago, however, that the majority of the IMT Bureau held quite a different position (kept secret from the SWP and the United Secretariat). The IMT itself held that the IT was on a split course, and was deliberately attempting to provoke its expulsion from the SWP. This is proved by the IT report on its May convention, in which the IMT Bureau is said to have disagreed with the IT leadership's perspectives document on the grounds that the IT document "viewed the degenerative process of the SWP as completed and in that context seemed to set in motion a series of events leading to the expulsion of the IT and the establishment of the IT as a flimsy group outside the SWP."

This assessment was also shared by some IMTers within the SWP who resigned from the IT prior to its May convention, where the split was consummated. Berta Langston and Bob Langston stated that the logic of the IT line was "precisely to build a rival organization to the SWP." They stated that the IT sees itself as "an organized grouping essentially independent of the SWP and linked to the FI as the nucleus of its 'future' and 'true' section in the United States." They stated that the logic of the IT line was to "begin to combine the exercise of political leadership of groupings outside the SWP and YSA with an entry tactic inside the SWP and YSA." And they resigned from the IT, prior to its split convention in May 1974, saying that "to continue to struggle within the IT—with its internal bulletin, a possible tour, election of delegates, a convention—would be in practice precisely to cooperate in helping make the IT become what we urgently hope it doesn't."

Thus it is not only the SWP Control Commission and Political Committee that had such an assessment of the IT, but leading members of the IMT itself!

Today, the IT claims that "these characterizations [of the SWP as 'degenerated'] were made by individuals and never adopted by the Tendency as a whole. . . . Thanks to these discussions and the firm but patient advice of the IMT leadership, the IT was able to overcome the dangers that could have led to a split mentality and actions which would then flow from such a mentality. This was the real outcome of the May IT conference. . . ."

This is a blatant lie. The IT's own report on the proceedings of its conference says the opposite. (See "First National Conference of the Internationalist Tendency," by Alec, reprinted from the IT Newsletter of June 6, 1974.)

Was the position of the IMT Bureau adopted by the IT? It was not. According to the IT, a four-point motion was adopted by the IT conference, by a vote of 19 to 4, of which the first point was "rejecting the position of the IMT Bureau."

Furthermore, according to the IT description of its conference proceedings, "the section of the Rahdnick-Estreugal amendments on the nature of the SWP were passed as the beginnings of a discussion within the IMT. . . ." These amendments repeat the essential characterizations contained in the perspectives document of

the IT Political Committee. They call the SWP a "sect." They say that the IT "is the nucleus of the future section of the Fourth International in the United States." They claim that "the present party program plus 500 workers would still equal a degenerate organization because these workers would have been recruited to a degenerate line."

Additional proof that the IT never changed its policy toward the SWP is provided by the IT's report on the greetings given to the IT conference by the representative of the Canadian RMG. She called for "active collaboration between the RMG and IT in 4 areas." One of these areas was "the struggle within the IMT to break it of illusions concerning the SWP."

The IT's own report of its convention also proves that the IT reaffirmed its policy of rejecting the organizational principles of the SWP. This included maintaining and strengthening its organizational apparatus, continuing its boycott of SWP activity and finances, continuing and expanding its secret discussion, and continuing to violate SWP principles on party-youth relations. The IT convention also reaffirmed IT policy of continuing independent and unauthorized work in public. The trade union resolution, which included this perspective for public work was adopted unanimously.

Thus, the IT's claim that it turned away from the split course at its May conference is disproved by the documentary record.

The IT documents—particularly the IT report on the IT conference—show that what actually happened at the IT conference was not a change in the IT's fundamental orientation, but only a discussion over tactics.

The IT documents show that within the IT there were differences over the tactical implementation of the IT line. These tactical differences were in two main areas:

1. Whether to move quickly to set up an independent public organization or whether to preserve the entry tactic for a longer period of time. The former position was defeated.

2. Within the majority that favored preserving the entry tactic for a longer period of time, there were differences over how far to go in blatantly violating SWP discipline. This was essentially a question of determining the guidelines for the IT's "security policy" *vis a vis* the SWP. The outcome of this dispute has not become available in documentary form, but it appears that the more cautious proposals were adopted.

Whatever the exact details of these tactical arguments, one thing is obvious. These were not tactical differences within a legitimate tendency or faction, arguing over how best to advance their views while loyally building the SWP. These were tactical differences by a rival organization debating over how best to conduct entryism, with the goal of displacing the SWP. Even if the IT adopted a more cautious policy, it was the cautious policy of a group fundamentally hostile to the SWP, of a group that had in practice split from the SWP but was conducting entryism within the SWP.

The IT documents also show that there were differences between the IT and the IMT. The exact nature and full extent of these differences still remain secret, but the IT report indicates that they fall into two areas:

1. The majority of the IMT Bureau thought the IT was wrong in viewing "the degenerative process of the SWP as completed." The IT rejected the IMT Bureau posi-

tion and upheld its original evaluation that it was completed.

2. The majority of the IMT Bureau evidently disagreed with some of "the initiatives of the IT comrades" and was fearful that the IT would provoke its own expulsion in such a way that the IMT could not easily place the blame for the split on the SWP.

In particular, the IMT Bureau "proposed rejection of the H. W. [Bill Massey] document, cancellation of the [upcoming IT] conference and the opening of a discussion within the IT." The first two parts of this proposal were overwhelmingly rejected by the IT while the third part was accepted. The perspectives report given by John Barzman [Vincent] did include some IMT recommendations, but retained the main line of the Massey [Hank Williams] document. This report was adopted.

Thus, all the documentation available up to now proves the falsity of the claim that the IMT succeeded in convincing the IT to turn back from its split. All that the IT did was to make a few tactical adjustments—a small price to pay for the opportunity to get a better hearing in its "struggle within the IMT to break it of illusions concerning the SWP."

Furthermore, there is not a shred of evidence yet presented that would back up the claim that the IMT even tried to convince the IT to turn back from a split. Where is the IMT Bureau report? Where are other documents by the IMT Bureau which might be offered in evidence to back up such claims? Today, six months after the SWP Political Committee decision of July 4, 1974, these documents have still not been made available to the membership of the Fourth International.

Even in the absence of these documents, the proof of the IMT's complicity in the IT split is unassailable. The IMT had advance knowledge that the IT planned to consummate its split, knew afterwards of what had transpired at the IT conference, yet chose to keep silent and maintain its relations with the splitters. By refusing to expose the IT split, the IMT took responsibility for the splitters. Now it finds itself in the position of openly defending the splitters and of trying to cover up the facts in order to do so.

* * *

Other aspects of the IT reply are far less substantial than the points dealt with above. However, several points should be noted.

Although arguing in guise of a defense, the IT reply, describing how the IT functioned, confirms that it was IT policy and practice to reject the organizational principles of the SWP, both with regard to internal functioning and external work.

On matters related to internal functioning—from the IT's boycott of SWP activity and finances, to the IT's secret internal discussion, to its policy in regard to party-youth relations—the IT does not deny conducting itself in the way described by the SWP Control Commission. It merely asserts the right to act as it did, citing alleged extenuating circumstances. But no tendency or faction within the SWP has the right to violate the SWP's organizational principles, under any circumstances.

The IT reply goes so far as to say: "As for the [Con-

trol Commission] statement that 'faction discipline must be subordinate to party discipline,' it is rendered all but meaningless in a situation where every party and YSA officer is a member of the LTF and/or YSA MF; in these situations *party or YSA discipline is identical with faction discipline.*" This is merely an acknowledgment that they did not recognize the right of the party to impose any discipline at all.

The IT quite openly asserts that it had the right to violate the SWP's discipline in matters related to internal functioning.

The IT reply also reconfirms that its policy was to reject the discipline of the SWP in public. The Control Commission findings in this area were also based on the secret documents of the IT. Several sources are quoted to prove that it was IT policy to reject SWP discipline in external work. The IT reply chose to discuss only one of these documents, the trade union resolution adopted unanimously by the IT conference. The IT reply claims that the Control Commission quoted this document out of context, and claims to set matters straight by quoting all of the relevant passage. However, the longer passage cited by the IT still confirms the fact that it was IT policy to violate SWP discipline in public work.

As for the charge of quoting out of context, the IT "forgot" that the Control Commission appended to its report two full pages of context—the *entire* section of the IT's trade union resolution in which the IT outlined its tasks in trade union work. What about the IT's "correction" of the Control Commission quote? The "uncut" passage cited by the IT omits the key sentence cited by the Control Commission to prove that it was IT policy to build groups in the labor movement behind the backs of the SWP, the sentence saying, "It is entirely possible that concentrations of potential recruits [to the IT] may desire to coalesce in some organizational form." The full documentation on this is available for all to judge for themselves. (See pp. 99-101 of SWP *Internal Information Bulletin*, No. 6 in 1974.)

* * *

All of the essential material upon which the Control Commission based its findings—that is, the evidence contained in the secret IT documents—stands up 100 percent in the face of the lengthy reply by the IT. These documents were published in a lengthy bulletin, and can be studied by all.

The overwhelming bulk of the IT reply concerns itself with material that was not essential to the findings of the Control Commission, that is, specific incidents presumably illustrating how the IT policies were carried out in practice. The purpose here is to shift attention away from the documents, which can be studied and evaluated by everyone, and instead focus on specific incidents, which most comrades have no opportunity of checking.

It would be fruitless to try to discuss each specific incident in detail: first, because comrades from afar could not be expected to judge the rights and wrongs in each case; and second, because the specific incidents were not the basis for the Control Commission findings and Political Committee actions.

However, even if one accepts the IT version of each

incident, they still confirm the main point made by the Control Commission: that it was IT policy to reject SWP discipline and organizational principles in external work.

Even the IT version of May 11 shows that the IT rejected the SWP's organizational principle that all public political activity by all members of the party must be conducted under the direction of the official party units responsible for such activity.

And even the IT version of its work with other political groups shows that the IT had some form of political relations with these groups that was not authorized by or under the direction of the SWP. The IT now says that in some cases it made a mistake in not informing the SWP about what it was doing. But it is not sufficient to "inform" the SWP. All such work must be under the supervision and control of the duly authorized units of the SWP.

There is only one specific incident that the IT denies outright. The IT denies that a person who was not a member of the SWP or YSA had attended the IT conference. (The Control Commission had cited two reports from comrades who stated that this person had said that he had been at the IT conference.) This is the only incident in which the IT version, taken at face value, does not itself verify the findings of the Control Commission.

In all other cases, the IT merely asserts the right to act as it did, under the claim that the SWP's discipline and organizational principles did not apply. But the IT did not have the authority to decide unilaterally that the SWP's discipline and organizational principles did not apply to the IT. The SWP national convention and the elected leadership bodies of the SWP, and they alone, have the right to decide on the applicability of the SWP's organizational principles. It was in accordance with this authority that the SWP Political Committee made its decision on July 4, 1974.

The IT reply concludes with an appeal for readmission to the SWP, asserting that if readmitted it would continue to operate as before. This appeal is a patent fraud. It is an appeal for the "right" to function inside the SWP, without regard for, and in direct violation of the SWP's organizational principles. It is an appeal for the "right" to conduct an entry operation inside the SWP.

II. Additional Documentation Pertaining to the IT.

Since July 4, 1974, when the members of the Internationalist Tendency party were stricken from the rolls of the SWP, additional documentation has shown that the IT has not changed its policies.

On October 17, 1974, John Barzman, on behalf of the IT, wrote a letter to the National Committee of the Socialist Workers Party. The letter is written in the guise of an appeal for "reintegration" into the SWP. But the heart of the letter is a series of seven conditions that must be accepted by the SWP before this proposed "reintegration" could occur. As the IT letter states, "we think these clarifications of the norms of democratic centralism must be accepted by all parties concerned." Among these "clarifications" are many that run counter to the SWP's statutes and organizational principles. Thus the IT letter is not in any way a bona fide appeal for "reintegration" in the SWP. In reality it is a demand by the IT that the SWP throw overboard the organizational principles that have

evolved over 46 years of American Trotskyism, and that have been affirmed and reaffirmed at succeeding conventions of the party. These principles are codified in the resolution "The Organizational Character of the Socialist Workers Party," adopted by the 1965 SWP convention and reaffirmed at the 1973 convention.

Furthermore, the IT asserts in the concluding paragraph of this letter that "if reintegrated, we will consider these clarifications to be our rights and will act accordingly." Thus, the IT baldly pledges that if it is "reintegrated" it will act as it sees fit, including taking actions that would violate the SWP's organizational principles.

A brief glance at the IT "clarifications" shows that they are a formula for dissolving the SWP as a Leninist combat party. For example, under "clarification" number 7, the IT states that "whenever the SWP violates the Statutes [of the Fourth International] and presents publicly positions at odds with the line of the FI or its member sections in other countries, we will publicly disassociate ourselves from such actions and defend the line of the International."

This is a formula for no discipline at all in public, for under this formula individual party members or groups within the party would be free to issue public statements whenever they wanted; all they need do is claim that the line of the SWP was "at odds with the line of the FI or its member sections in other countries." In fact, in its letter, the IT has already hinted at certain areas in which it would plan to issue such public statements attacking the public positions of the SWP, if it were "reintegrated." These include "the Allende government and military coup in Chile, revolutionary strategy in Latin America and Europe; the nature of the detente; the peace accords in Vietnam; and the character of the French Union de la Gauche." This is quite a wide-ranging list. It leaves the door open to issuing frequent public statements on most of the important questions of world politics.

This formula is completely contrary to Leninist organizational norms. The SWP, like any other Leninist party anywhere else in the world, has the unconditional right to regulate all public political activity of all party members. There are no circumstances whatsoever that enable individual comrades or groupings to decide unilaterally to issue their own public statements contrary to the line of the party. And there is no room in the SWP for those who reject the SWP's norms and "act accordingly."

The underlying rationale of the IT formula is that national parties bear the same type of relationship to the Fourth International as individual party members do to the national sections and sympathizing groups to which they belong; and that therefore the SWP does not have the right to take positions publicly that are "at odds with the line of the FI or its member sections in other countries."

This rationale is specifically not applicable to the SWP, because the SWP is barred by reactionary legislation from affiliating to the Fourth International, or being bound by its decisions or those of its member sections. More generally, this rationale is false and contrary to the norms of the Fourth International as a whole.

All parties in the world Trotskyist movement are expected to adhere to fundamental Trotskyist political principles but each has the right to analyze world events

as it sees fit. There is no requirement whatsoever that there be monolithically uniform analysis of world events. Nor has such monolithism ever been the practice of the world Trotskyist movement.

For example, consider the public position to take on the Boston struggle against the white racists. *Red Weekly*, expressing the views of the British IMG, published an article on the Boston event which opposed the call for federal troops to protect Black students from the white racist mobs — a position "at odds" with the position taken by the SWP. *Rouge*, the newspaper that expresses the views of the French FCR (now newly renamed as the LCR), also published an article "at odds" with the SWP position (*Rouge*, however, has since changed its line on Boston).

The SWP, of course, thought that these positions taken by the British and French sections were incorrect. But it was their right to publish their own analysis of the Boston situation. Furthermore, the British and French sections have the right to regulate the public functioning of all British and French comrades with regard to this question. No individual member or group within the British or French sections had the right to unilaterally issue public statements attacking the line of their section on Boston, and defending the line of the SWP.

Contrast this with the IT position with regard to the French Union de la Gauche. The SWP's analysis of this important political phenomenon differs from that of the French comrades. According to the IT formula, this would give any member of the SWP the unilateral right to issue public statements attacking the analysis of the SWP.

The IT formula is completely contrary to the norms of the world Trotskyist movement. These norms must be upheld if we are to preserve the goal of constructing an international of Leninist combat parties.

The IT letter also lays down a series of "clarifications" concerning the application of democratic centralism to the internal functioning of the SWP.

The IT's basic position is that if "reintegrated," they alone would have the unilateral right to determine their conduct inside the SWP. They reject the right of the duly elected leadership bodies of the SWP to regulate the internal affairs of the party. Some of the specific IT "clarifications" in this regard are explicitly contrary to the resolution codifying the organizational principles of the SWP.

The report of the Control Commission of the SWP itemized a series of examples showing that while the IT was inside the SWP, it was IT policy to violate the SWP's organizational principles with regard to internal functioning. The "clarifications" contained in the October 17 letter of the IT, assert, in essence, that it was the right of the IT to function as it did, and that if "reintegrated," it will "act accordingly" — that is, act in the same disloyal and undisciplined manner as it did before.

In one important area of internal functioning — party-youth relations — the IT letter of October 17 is noticeably silent, although this was one of the main areas in which the IT violated the SWP's norms while it was inside the SWP.

Two other important areas of internal functioning are worth singling out as illustrations of how the IT letter of October 17 explicitly rejects the norms of the SWP.

The first concerns internal discussion inside the party.

The IT letter of October 17 claims that if "reintegrated," they alone would have the right to determine all aspects of their internal discussion. This is explicitly contrary to the SWP's 1965 resolution on organizational principles, which states that the SWP, through its duly authorized leadership bodies, has the right to organize its internal discussion and to determine the forms and limits. As the report of the SWP Control Commission states, "The time, place, and extent of all internal discussion are determined by the democratically elected leadership bodies of the SWP, not by an arbitrary group of individuals within the party. A faction has the right to circulate drafts of proposed documents among faction members for the purpose of preparing material for presentation to the party as a whole. But an organized faction can circulate its own internal discussion bulletin only on the condition that it receive the prior approval of the party and that its bulletin be made available to the party."

The SWP Control Commission pointed out that "the IT has violated this principle of Leninist organization." The IT letter of October 17 asserts that if "reintegrated," the IT would again violate this norm of the SWP.

A second area of internal functioning concerns finances. The IT letter of October 17 states that "until the SWP decides to give financial assistance to all significant tendencies and factions, we must have the right to finance our faction's activities. Inasmuch as none of us are independently wealthy, this inevitably means a much reduced financial contribution from our individual militants to the SWP." This "clarification" of the IT is simply an assertion that if "reintegrated," it will boycott financial obligations to the party, just as it did when it was inside. Thus, the IT asserts that it would have the right to be exempted from the financial obligations of SWP members that are specified in the SWP constitution.

It has never been the policy of the SWP to finance tendencies or factions. Factions in the SWP do have the right to raise funds to finance faction activities, but not at the expense of their obligations to the party as a whole. Financial obligations to the party must come first. Any contributions made to factions must be over and above the normal contributions that all members are obligated to make to the party.

Some of the "clarifications" in the IT letter are already the established practice of the SWP, but are included in the IT letter in order to give comrades in other countries, who do not know the SWP, a false picture of how the SWP functions.

For example, one of the "clarifications" says that factions have the right to hold meetings and the right to faction privacy. This is already the established policy of the SWP. One of the "clarifications" says that it is necessary to "integrate minority comrades into all areas of work." This has long been the practice of the SWP. In the case of the IT, however, it was the IT itself that decided to conduct a systematic boycott of party activity on all levels. While inside the SWP, IT policy was to place faction activity above party activity; because of this, IT members refused to accept or carry out responsible party assignments. The IT members were among the most inactive members of the party. In fact, the IT members in general maintained a level of activity that was below the constitutional requirement for membership in the party.

One point in the IT letter is particularly scurrilous, that is, the charge that the SWP "conducts a total financial boycott of the Fourth International." It is well-known that the SWP is prevented by reactionary legislation from contributing any financial aid whatsoever to the Fourth International. To imply the opposite is not only false, but an irresponsible provocation.

The IT has made this charge in order to try to create a scandal by conveying the impression that the SWP does not have an internationalist outlook in its work. This is completely false. Many of the projects of the SWP, such as assuring the publication of *Intercontinental Press*, publishing international discussion bulletins, and other legitimate SWP expenses, are also of objective value to the world Trotskyist movement. The resources devoted to these projects are of very substantial magnitude, and in the past the SWP has been given moral credit for these projects. To deny this moral credit now could only stem from a narrow, factionally motivated outlook. (For further discussion of this point, see SWP *Internal Information Bulletin* No. 8 in 1974, Appendix VI: "Correspondence—Resources of the Socialist Workers Party and the Finances of the Fourth International")

The main points of the IT letter of October 17 can be summed up succinctly as follows: 1. The IT rejects the organizational principles of the SWP; 2. The IT asserts that if "reintegrated" into the SWP it will refuse to abide by the statutes and organizational principles of the SWP; 3. The IT has its own conceptions of what its rights are under democratic centralism, and it pledges to "act accordingly."

Individual party members or groups within the SWP do not have the right to unilaterally determine what is proper according to the SWP's statutes and organizational principles. The only bodies that can determine this are the SWP national convention and the duly authorized leadership bodies of the SWP. Changes in these statutes and organizational principles can be made only by the national conventions of the SWP.

The IT, of course, has the right to its own peculiar notions of democratic centralism, and it has the right to "act accordingly"—outside the SWP. But anybody who wishes to be a member of the SWP must abide by the SWP's norms.

Clearly, the IT letter of Oct. 17 was not really designed to facilitate the readmission of people who wish to be loyal members of the SWP. It is rather just a further sign of the bad faith of the IT, of the IT's continuing determination to function as a separate rival organization to the SWP. Why did the IT write such a letter? The answer to this question will become clear after examining several new items that have come to light.

Further evidence of the IT's bad faith is shown by its relations with three small groups outside the SWP, the Baltimore Marxist Group, the Revolutionary Marxist Collective, and the Socialist Union. As one of its conditions for "reintegration," the IT letter demands that these three groups be immediately admitted into the SWP.

These three groups applied to join the SWP in July 1974. Although the SWP had previously known these groups as public opponents of the party, we considered their applications in good faith, and proposed to them a period of close political and organizational collaboration to facilitate the dissolution of these groups into the

SWP. Our proposals included asking them to participate in such activities as *Militant* sales, support for SWP election campaigns, making financial contributions to the SWP, joint work in several areas of the mass movement, etc.—that is, activities that are obligatory on all members of the SWP. But these groups rejected our proposals, and rejected abiding by the organizational principles of the SWP, thus exposing their "applications" as nothing but a cynical maneuver. (Documentation on this is contained in SWP *Internal Information Bulletin*, No. 9 in 1974.)

There is evidence that proves that this maneuver against the SWP was carried out in collaboration with the IT. The July 19, 1974, letter from Jim Collins of the Revolutionary Marxist Collective to the IT national office shows how the maneuver was planned and coordinated, and shows that the IT lied when it pledged not to discuss internal SWP or YSA matters with persons outside the Fourth International.

The Collins letter outlines how these three groups planned to coordinate their stories with the IT and IMT. Collins fabricated a series of lies for these groups to tell when they met with SWP representatives to discuss their membership applications. Their concern was that the SWP be kept unaware of the prior collusion between these groups and the IT.

Collins even says that this July 19 letter was being sent to the IT "in lieu of minutes." Furthermore, his letter outlines some proposals for the RMC "to work closely during this whole period with members inside the SWP," and asks that the IT approve this proposal provided it is carried out "under adequate security precautions of course."

The Collins letter clarifies much about the way in which the IT functioned with outside groups while the IT was inside the SWP, and how the IT continues to do so. It also reveals more about the IT "security policy" *vis a vis* the SWP. And finally, it exposes the duplicity of the IT letter of October 17, 1974.

Further evidence of the bad faith of the IT is revealed by the fact that the IT includes Russell Welch and Cheryl Clark among those for whom it demands "reintegration" in the SWP. (In a letter to the IMT Steering Committee dated Oct. 25, 1974, Welch and Clark state that they were expelled from the IT at the IT party plenum on Oct. 12-13. Yet the IT letter of Oct. 17 to the SWP includes Welch and Clark among the 65 IT party members demanding "reintegration.")

An earlier letter from Welch and Clark to the German Kompass Tendency (dated Sept. 3, 1974) included a document that Welch and Clark submitted to the IT plenum. In that document, Welch and Clark characterize the SWP as "rotten and reformist," and "a party of betrayers." They go on to say that "a complete political break is both politically justified and necessary." Despite being aware of this, the IT has demanded that Welch and Clark be admitted into the SWP.

The Welch-Clark letter gives further insights into the evolution of the IT's policy toward the SWP. "Our attitude toward and our evaluation of the SWP," they say, "has been a political question that has racked our tendency for over a year. A number of differing opinions have been expressed: the SWP is centrist; it's not quite centrist yet; the SWP is a right opportunist sect; it's not quite

a right opportunist sect yet." Welch and Clark number themselves among those who held the position "for quite some time that the SWP is a reformist party."

A somewhat less extreme view—"that the SWP has not yet met a definitive test"—is attributed to Comrade Langston during the time that Comrade Langston was a member of the IT. This view was presented at the December 1973 IT national steering committee meeting and, according to Welch and Clark, "it was totally rejected by the leadership then and rightly so." Thus, as early as December 1973, the IT had decided on a policy which led it ineluctably to split (even though the split was to be temporarily camouflaged by the IT tactic of conducting entryism within the SWP).

The split logic of the December 1973 decision of the IT was clearly understood within the IT, according to Welch and Clark. "Before the May conference [of the IT], it was often said and the opinion was overwhelmingly held that a long-term perspective within the SWP would mean our destruction." Thus, Welch and Clark confirm in their own way the assessment held by Berta Langston and Bob Langston when they resigned from the IT prior to the May conference. (At that time, Berta Langston and Bob Langston said that "the logic of the ITPC's [IT Political Committee] position is that the IT, defining itself as the nucleus of a section in the U.S., would begin to combine the exercise of political leadership of groupings outside the SWP and YSA with an entry tactic inside the SWP and YSA.")

Finally, Welch and Clark confirm that this perspective was consummated at the IT conference in May, when a motion was passed "to take a hard stance on the question of our perspectives." (This is the four-point motion discussed earlier, in which the IT rejected the position of the IMT Bureau.)

However, Welch and Clark complain that the IT's tactical maneuverings within the IMT have led it to be "diplomatic" toward the IMT leadership and to proceed more slowly than Welch and Clark would like toward full-scale functioning in public. This is an ineffective tactic, according to Welch and Clark: "We are caught up in a game on an international scale and as things stand, we are only passive, observer-victims." Welch and Clark state that in their opinion, "diplomacy does not solve political problems." Welch and Clark also do not think that the IT diplomats are very effective in their relations with the IMT. (A Canadian RMG leader described this at the IT convention in May as the "struggle within the IMT to break it of illusions concerning the SWP.")

Welch and Clark single out two occasions on which they feel that the IT leadership was unjustifiably "diplomatic" toward the IMT.

The first was during the period after the IT's May conference, but prior to July 4, 1974—when the IT was still inside the SWP. The May conference rejected the IMT Bureau position, decided on "a hard stance" on IT perspectives, and reaffirmed the widely held view that "a long term perspective within the SWP would mean our destruction." But shortly afterwards, the IT leadership chose to be "diplomatic" toward the IMT, and opt for a longer-term entryist tactic in the SWP, rather than a tactic leading more rapidly toward an open split, as Welch and Clark would have liked. This entire entryist

operation against the SWP was cut short, however, when it was discovered by the SWP. As Welch and Clark interpret this, "we were saved from our death then, not by our own doing, nor by the IMT, but by the SWP, through our expulsion."

The second case of bungling IT diplomacy, according to Welch and Clark, occurred shortly before Sept. 3, 1974 (the date of their letter to Kompass)—that is, after the IT was outside the SWP. They state that "at the recent expanded PC meeting [of the IT] (all but 6 members of the national steering committee were present) the position was taken that come hell or high water we will become an independent organization. But the PC has since taken a position that opens the door for our capitulation to the IMT once more." Obviously, one of the points of this "capitulation" was the decision to continue the tactic of appealing for "reintegration" into the SWP.

Thus, Welch and Clark throw light on the IT letter of October 17 ostensibly demanding "reintegration" in the SWP. The letter on the face of it, is not a bona fide appeal for readmission, as has been shown already. Welch and Clark now expose the real purposes of this letter. It is merely a "diplomatic" ploy to enhance the IT's bargaining position with the IMT. But behind this "diplomatic" maneuvering lies the real position adopted by the IT: "that come hell or high water we will become an independent organization."

Welch and Clark pull no punches in their perspectives for the IT: "We must split openly, publicly, completely with the SWP." Nor do they pull their punches about their perspectives for the Fourth International: ". . . a revolutionary international cannot include the SWP!"

These are two of the people whom the IT demands be "reintegrated" in the SWP. How many other members of the IT hold views similar to those of Welch and Clark? Evidence that there are many more is contained in internal bulletin vol. 2, no. 11 of the Canadian RMG. This bulletin contains material from cothinkers of Welch and Clark within the RMG, who complain about the expulsion of Welch and Clark from the IT. In an article entitled, "Two Weights, Two Measures?", the IMT Supporters Caucus within the RMG replies to the cothinkers of Welch and Clark. Included in their reply is the following statement: "Then there is the allegation that the comrades [Welch and Clark] were requested to withdraw from the IT because they oppose the fight for reintegration into the SWP. Once again, this is absolute poppycock. There are numerous other comrades on the Steering Ctte. of the IT who opposed this perspective (some still do, others have changed their positions)."

It is still not known, however, exactly who are the "numerous other comrades" of the IT who oppose the "diplomatic" maneuver of applying for reintegration in the SWP, and who prefer to move more rapidly to full-scale public activity.

How widely shared within the IMT are these views of the "numerous other comrades" of the IT? This is not yet known. Welch and Clark do confirm that there is a wing of the IMT in Europe which holds the position "that a revolutionary international cannot include the SWP!" If true, this is a grave danger to the unity of the world Trotskyist movement.

Furthermore, the Collins letter indicates that the fake

unity maneuver of the three small groups against the SWP was to be coordinated, not only with the IT, but also with the IMT. If this is true, it would be an instance of the IMT not only functioning behind the back of the elected leadership of the SWP and the Fourth International, but doing so in collaboration with groups outside the SWP.

Finally, the Welch-Clark document raises new questions about the role of the IMT in the IT's split from the SWP. This occurs in the context of discussing how the IT should have responded to the SWP bulletin "Materials Related to the Split of the Internationalist Tendency from the Socialist Workers Party." (SWP *Internal Information Bulletin*, No. 6 in 1974)

Welch and Clark write: "A recent letter from Comrade Charles [for the IMT Bureau] to the IT called our response to the SWP's split document remiss and weak. Further we should admit and self-criticize ourselves for:

- "1. being too highly structured
- "2. being too forward on the May 11th actions (The IMT denies any responsibility for the distribution of the USEC statement on Chile)
- "3. not telling the SWP we were dealing with outside groups
- "4. not long ago declaring ourselves a faction. These charges are unbelievable! The IMT has politically condoned all these actions. . . ."

The Welch-Clark statements thus offer more evidence that the IMT leaders are responsible for condoning violations of SWP discipline by the IT. This is one of the gravest possible breaches of the norms of the world Trotskyist movement.

* * *

The IMT's complicity in the IT split from the SWP helps explain one of the obvious questions posed by this split: How was it possible that the leaders of the IT, many of whom had been members of the SWP for several years and who were familiar with the SWP's organizational norms, thought that they could get away with such flagrant rejection of those norms? The answer is clear: the IT leaders were convinced that they had the backing of the IMT leadership. The IT leaders thought that because they were ideological supporters of the IMT, which had won a majority at the world congress, this gave them the right to reject the organizational principles of the SWP, and to reject the decisions made by the SWP convention and the duly elected leadership bodies of the SWP.

This conception is completely contrary to the organizational norms of the world Trotskyist movement. It is specifically in contradiction with the statutes of the International, which state that the national sections determine their own statutes, and that no leadership bodies of the International have the power to alter the majority rule of the regularly elected leadership of the sections or sympathizing groups.

The IMT's complicity in the IT split precipitated a crisis that in the opinion of the SWP could best be resolved at a special world congress of the Fourth International. The IMT rejected the suggestion. This did not resolve the crisis; it did make more imperative an international discussion on the norms governing the world Trotskyist movement.

January 1975

Appendix I

October 17, 1974 Letter from the Internationalist Tendency Party to the National Committee of the Socialist Workers Party

Internationalist Tendency of the Socialist Workers Party
c/o John Barzman and Bill Massey
Chicago, Illinois

October 17, 1974

To: National Committee, Socialist Workers Party

Dear Comrades,

On July 17, 1974, a letter signed by sixty-five members of the Socialist Workers Party who had been purged on July 5, 1974, was sent to the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party. The letter also spoke for comrades who were purged without being named in Cde. Barnes' letter listing "known members of the Internationalist Tendency Party". Our July 17 letter demanded our immediate reintegration into the SWP. A statement by the Political Committee of the Internationalist Tendency of the Socialist Workers Party, which was appended to it, explained that this reintegration should take place on the basis of the "normal criteria for membership in the Fourth International, the SWP, and the YSA—agreement with the general program of the F.I., acceptance of the discipline of the Fourth International, the SWP, and the YSA, and commitment to work as active militants in these organizations". Although this letter was submitted prior to the 15-day constitutional deadline for appealing disciplinary procedures, we have received no answer, or even acknowledgement that it was received.

The statement appended to our letter explained that until a decision of the United Secretariat had been made, we would continue to regard ourselves as disciplined members of the SWP. We stated: "a) we will not publicize our expulsion b) we will not discuss internal matters of the SWP or YSA with persons who are outside the Fourth International c) we will not intervene against the SWP or YSA in public forums or meetings d) in mass work, we will place ourselves under the discipline of the appropriate SWP or YSA fraction". Since that time, the United Secretariat has met and taken up the question of the expulsion of the Internationalist Tendency from the Socialist Workers Party. The expulsion was condemned as a bureaucratic act and the SWP was urged to immediately and collectively reintegrate the IT. Resolutions passed by the national leadership of numerous sections of the Fourth International have taken the same stand. In addition, the Internationalist Tendency's answer to the charges contained in the "Materials. . ." document have been made available to you at the United Secretariat and will be printed in a forthcoming International Information Bulletin. As you are aware, this answer contains a series of refutations of the accusations against the IT, acknowledgement of certain minor errors which were not subject to expulsion, and a recapitulation of our general view of the situation and the proper functioning of democratic centralism.

Since the meeting of the United Secretariat, we have received no word from you. In fact, the efforts which various comrades of the Internationalist Tendency have made to collaborate with the SWP in its activities have met with hostile responses. For example, two comrades in Oakland, California, requested to sell the Militant. The branch organizer answered them that they would have to sign a statement saying that the "Internationalist Tendency Party" had split from the SWP, before they would be allowed to sell. In other instances, comrades who asked to collaborate with party fractions were summarily dismissed. It has become impossible for the comrades of the Internationalist Tendency to attempt to guess what the current national orientation of the party is toward the handling of any number of issues, or how the party branches have decided to prioritize such orientations in terms of allocation of forces to various areas of work and specific directives for intervention. Therefore, although we refuse to believe that the leadership of the party will persist in refusing our reintegration, and although we do not wish to become a public faction, in order to carry out our revolutionary duties in the mass movement we have been forced to devise applications of the general line of our movement to interventions, mass work, and the recruitment of new militants to Trotskyism, through our own limited means. This in no sense implies the setting up of a rival organization to the SWP, a rival press, or written public attacks on the present course of the SWP. It is merely the recognition that without all the rights of party membership, not all the responsibilities of party membership can be carried out. We sincerely hope that this undesirable situation will be resolved as rapidly as possible so that we can assume fully our responsibilities as party members.

In line with our stated desire to resolve the situation created by our expulsion as rapidly as possible, the Steering Committee of the Internationalist Tendency recently met and instructed us to explain to you our view of the situation. In our view, a step toward resolving the situation in the American Trotskyist movement by agreement of the two parties involved can be taken prior to the meeting of the International Executive Committee which is scheduled to take up the question in late December, 1974. We believe such a step would be a significant contribution to lessening the tensions which exist within the International. It is with this goal in mind that we send this letter. A common initiative on our part can only help the work of the International Control Commission and of the International Executive Committee.

We believed at the time of our expulsion and we still believe now that the differences between the Internationalist Tendency and the SWP majority do not warrant a split on a national scale, any more than the differences between the International Majority Tendency and the International Minority Faction warrant one on an international level. In our opinion, the single most important

factor which led to the situation where the I.T. was purged from the SWP was the unduly factional and monolithic conception of internal party life and relations with the International which guided the actions of the SWP leadership. Such factional behavior by the leadership of the party was made possible by the ambiguity of the 1965 Organizational resolution. As you are aware, we believe that its interpretation of the Party Constitution and democratic centralism is grossly lopsided in not indicating the rights of minorities, and in implying that all minorities rapidly become the toy of alien class pressures rather than positive contributors to the process of political clarification through ideological struggle. At present what must be established to insure a functional and lasting reintegration of the IT into the SWP is the willingness by both sides to abide by the norms of democratic centralism as defined by the founders of the international communist movement, and as enriched by the practice of our world movement. We think the following clarifications of the norms of democratic centralism must be accepted by all parties concerned:

1. The Rights of Tendencies and Factions to Hold Internal Discussions and Meetings

This is a right the LTF claims for itself but rejects for other tendencies and factions within the International and the SWP. We believe such a right must apply universally. It includes the right to hold faction meetings on both a local and national scale. It includes the right to internal literary discussion and communication within the faction, not merely oral discussion and personal correspondence. We reject the conception of the SWP leadership that minorities are automatically obliged to submit all such materials to the leadership for approval. Such a conception contradicts the very purpose of a faction; i.e. to be a *separate, organized* formation to conduct political struggle inside the revolutionary organization. We claim the same right of faction privacy for our faction that the LTF claims for itself. Finally we reject any conception that organized minorities have no right to exist except during pre-convention discussions.

2. Faction Structure and Leadership Bodies

We believe that factions have the right to elect executive bodies at the local and national level to lead the faction, to speak for it within the revolutionary organization and, where necessary, to determine faction policy between collective meetings and conferences. We accept the principle that the composition of such bodies should be announced to the SWP majority. We also believe that the faction has the right to hold delegated conferences at the national level. Given the numerical size and dispersion of our faction and the geographic reality of the United States, this is a basic precondition for our democratic functioning.

3. Representation on SWP leadership bodies

Representation of significant minorities on the leading bodies of the revolutionary organization is not a privilege. It is a *right*. In fact, it is one of the most elementary aspects of democratic centralism. We do not hold

a rigid position on the question of *proportional* representation, but we think the denial of any representation on the National Committee to a minority of nearly 10 percent is inexcusable, particularly when this minority represents the views of the majority of the Fourth International. We realize that the present composition of the NC was determined by a convention and can only be changed by a convention. We propose as interim measures that members of the minority be named as *ex officio* members of the NC, to be formally seated at all NC plenums with voice and that the SWP leadership at this time explicitly commit itself to recommend minority NC representation to the next SWP convention.

4. Finances

The financial policy of the SWP leadership is purely factional. The official finances of the SWP (which includes both LTF and non-LTF comrades) are used to finance factional activities of the LTF, both within the U.S. and abroad. At the same time, the SWP refuses to give any financial assistance to minorities (unlike most sections of the FI) and conducts a total financial boycott of the Fourth International. Until the SWP decides to give financial assistance to all significant tendencies and factions, we must have the right to finance our faction's activities. Inasmuch as none of us are independently wealthy, this inevitably means a much reduced financial contribution from our individual militants to the SWP.

5. NonFactional Recruitment

Membership in the world Trotskyist movement must be open to all those who agree with the basic program and adopted positions of the Fourth International. While faction members are obliged to avoid contravening the positions of the SWP majority on U.S. questions or other questions as yet unresolved by the F.I. in discussion with non-members of the F.I., they have every right to engage in contact work on the basis of the positions of the F.I. Militants who agree with those positions have every right to membership in the SWP. Specifically, those members of the Baltimore Marxist Group, the Revolutionary Marxist Collective (San Francisco) and the Socialist Union (Los Angeles), experienced militants who completely support the program of the F.I. and the decisions of the Tenth World Congress and who have applied for membership, must be immediately admitted.

6. Majority-Minority Collaboration Inside the SWP

In order to maximize the possibility of both factions working together to build the Trotskyist movement in the United States, in order to reduce tensions which are not directly related to differences over questions of political line, it is necessary for the SWP leadership to integrate minority comrades into all areas of work, not just organizational or administrative assignments. In the past, minority comrades have been largely excluded from anti-imperialist fractions, presentation of internal educationals and public forums, selection as candidates in the SWP's numerous election campaigns, etc. Minority comrades who are union members have not been permitted to develop union interventions under the direction of the SWP leadership. This discrimination has con-

tributed to the development of incorrect attitudes among minority comrades in relation to the unity of American Trotskyists. In order for such attitudes to be corrected, it is necessary for the SWP leadership to make specific and concrete commitments to insert our faction into the SWP's political interventions and campaigns. The general model for the content and implementation of such commitments should be the recommendations in the report of the IMG fact-finding Commission.

7. The Norms of the Fourth International

The SWP's indiscipline, disrespect, and outright disloyalty in relation to the statutes and decisions of the Fourth International is notorious throughout our world movement. Our faction accepts the discipline of the SWP on all questions where the FI has not adopted clear positions. We do respect the right of the SWP leadership to determine the tactics for implementing specific decisions of the F.I. in the USA. We will not consider ourselves to be a separate organization if reintegrated. Therefore, even when the SWP refuses to implement decisions of the International to build specific actions or campaigns, or does so on a different political basis (as is usually the case) we will not seek to execute this implementation ourselves, but will struggle inside the SWP to insure that decisions of the International are respected. But on questions of program and political line, the authority of the Fourth International remains paramount. We will continue to support and advocate *all* adopted positions of the Fourth International, *inside and outside the SWP*, particularly in cases of issues such as: the Allende government and military coup in Chile, revolutionary strategy in Latin America and Europe; the nature of the detente; the peace accords in Vietnam; and the character of the French Union de la Gauche. Whenever the SWP violates the Statutes and presents publicly positions at odds with the line of the FI or its member sections in other countries, we will publicly disassociate ourselves from such actions and defend the

line of the International. Until the SWP begins to fulfil its obligations to distribute *Inprecors* as an organ of the United Secretariat, we will continue to assume certain responsibilities in relation to its sales as well as those of publications from other sectors of the International. (We note here the precedent of the IMG Fact-Finding Commission recommendation that the British minority be given special responsibilities to distribute Intercontinental Press).

The above points of clarification are not a "special arrangement" to alleviate organizational problems. They are the basic norms of democratic centralism. They are universal criteria for the functioning of a Trotskyist organization (except under specific conditions such as clandestinity). Such criteria are common place in the vast majority of organizations of the F.I. They thus constitute part of the principled basis for membership in the American fraternal organization. The IEC should assign the International Control Commission or an ad hoc committee (on a parity basis, for instance) to supervise the implementation of these norms in the SWP, in order to really solve the crisis marked by the expulsion of the IT. If reintegrated, we will consider these clarifications to be our rights and will act accordingly. Otherwise it is impossible for us to assume our responsibilities as a minority: that is, our duty to help to build the SWP under the direction of its leading bodies; to accept majority rule; to avoid obstruction of the implementation of the majority line; and to contribute to the political clarification of the SWP and its adoption of a correct revolutionary Marxist orientation.

Comradely,
s/John Barzman

cc: United Secretariat, International Control Commission,
Files

Appendix II

Letter from Jim Collins to the Internationalist Tendency Party Political Committee

July 19, 1974

Comrades,

This letter is in lieu of minutes about the recent activities of the RMC and particularly our relations to the SWP and the IT.

After the discussions with Charles, the RMC had a number of meetings where we discussed carrying out the mandate of the IMT as outlined by Charles about the specific way of applying to the SWP. Three of us decided to carry out this way if that became necessary at the end of our outside group discussion; SK decided against; CA and EB were not in town at the time, but EB is leaving the country and CA is not returning until the end of August (?). Neither was likely to agree to the perspective of the IMT in any case.

On hearing of the expulsion of the tendency, the three of us who had decided to comply eventually by the IMT perspectives agreed to carry out the application in that manner immediately. A letter was written and sent yesterday; also the first personal contacts with SWP members indicating our decision was made by JC in Berkeley yesterday.

As expected, the only thing the SWP was interested in was "Who we talked to in the tendency and the IMT". They said that all other considerations would be handled by their national office in New York. We have decided to tell them that we spoke to the following people on the following occasions, who tried to convince us to join the SWP:

Massey at the regional Chile conference in May

Garth at the meeting described in the SWP split document

Charles at the Chile Solidarity Committee film
None of these was prearranged; there are no letters; the other interchanges that have taken place were at public meetings of various types (particularly Chile), etc. It is important that this information be understood and accepted by the Tendency here (Garth) and nationally (Massey) and by the IMT (Charles). Also that Jim received letters with Zaslow and Rich in Baltimore if they demand that type of information; but the letters were thrown away; and we don't volunteer the information.

We intend to follow up our application with appearing and perhaps intervening at SWP public meetings; and discussing the applications with individual members and sympathizers of the SWP and the YSA. We are going to contact the tendency here about also indicating our knowledge of the expulsion of the IT from the SWP and our disapproval of that. If okayed, we will start discussions on this next week in private discussions with SWP and YSA members.

We also intend to work closely during this whole process with members inside the SWP, particularly Garth and Carlos. We would suggest the tendency approve joint meetings under adequate security precautions of course; to refuse such meetings in the guise of security seems incorrect given our current need to coordinate strategy and

tactics closely. We would also hope that in future the tendency leadership would contact us directly about any big change in the situation nationally; we can be conveniently reached at Barry's office or personal phone number, which we believe is in the hands of the IT.

For the next month, at least, we have defined our main area of work as being in and around the SWP-YSA and with the IT on this question. We are also continuing our work in the Chile Solidarity committee and NICH though little happens in either at the present time. A full discussion on Chile perspectives will take place this Sunday.

Our study group has been going now for two weeks; we are hoping to continue this as a permanent thing with a stable and growing number of supporters. A copy of our subject matter is enclosed (this is an abbreviation and alteration of suggested study matter from an outline for the IMG by Blackburn).

At the present time, we are trying to get together some analysis of the other forms on the far left, notably the Maoists and the anti-Leninists (SR, RA, NAM). This will be for some newspaper or journal articles as well as for internal discussion.

We are sorely in need of sufficient and timely publications of the FI. We would like to know if Chicago can handle these for us or if we should order directly. We intend to send in a check for INPRECOR subscriptions shortly; in the meantime we must report that we have only been getting ten copies of cc 0 and "1" which is entirely insufficient; we want 30 cc an issue please.

Secondly, our RMC postal address works if addressed not to any individual or another person than RMC. We would like mail to be readdressed to this PO Box.

Thirdly, we have received no copies of the OLD MOLE since May. We have not even received the Chile supplement as yet. Can Chicago check on this or are we to deal directly with Toronto?

Fourthly, we have not received the new copy of *International* as yet. Have these been sent out?

Fifthly, are we to receive copies of the IT internal mailings? In particular, we would like to receive all the information everyone else in the tendency gets about the recent expulsion from the SWP. We would also like to be included in any preparations for a Central Committee meeting which may be planned in the future, and some information about our representation in such a meeting now that we have applied to the SWP.

As a personal aside, I would hope that documents would be prepared for the eventualty that the tendency will not be allowed back into the SWP; and also some statement from the leadership of the tendency for the joint functioning of the tendency and the outside groups in the interim, as well as afterwards.

Yours,
s/Jim Collins

P.S. As indicated by phone, cd. SS has joined the RMC and is applying with us to SWP and also YSA.

Appendix III

Letter from Russell Welch and Cheryl Clark to the Kompass Tendency

Russell Welch and
Cheryl Clark
Houston, Texas
Sept. 3, 1974

Herbert Obenland
Frankfurt, Germany

Dear Comrades:

As members of the Internationalist Tendency for the past two years we have become increasingly concerned over the IT's position on the nature of the SWP and our subsequent attitude toward it. Seeing the SWP as reformist, we think the only principled conclusion is an open, immediate political break with it, notwithstanding Comrade Germain's opportunist organizational maneuvers. We also think the IT has tended to rubber stamp IMT political positions in the past with little discussion internally, passively accepting their politics as a lesser evil to those of the SWP.

We are enclosing a document we have just submitted for adoption at the upcoming IT plenum. Also, we recently went through Winnipeg, Canada on a vacation and found some comrades in the RMG who we discovered to be in political agreement with ourselves. We are also enclosing a copy of their recent declaration of tendency which we intend to solidarize with and submit for consideration to the IT at its upcoming plenum. We would be anxious to hear any comments or observations you have on the documents.

Another problem we face in the IT is our lack of information on the actual practices of the European sections. They've always been held up as models to us, but we've never had access to any substantive information as to their actual political practice. Any information in this regard you think significant would be greatly appreciated.

Communist greetings,
s/Russell Welch
s/Cheryl Clark

* * *

Our attitude toward and our evaluation of the SWP has been a political question that has racked our tendency for over a year. A number of differing opinions have been expressed: the SWP is centrist; it's not quite centrist yet; the SWP is a right opportunist sect; it's not quite a right opportunist sect yet. These differences are quite serious, because they should, for principled Marxists *determine* our policy toward the SWP. But to date we have yet to undertake any serious attempts to resolve this question. The seriousness of this question has increased greatly in our relationship with the IMT, which has always had an incorrect analysis of the SWP, and has led to completely inadequate practical conclusions on their part for us and our relation to the SWP.

To date the debate has mostly been a tactical one, the point of departure has been how many recruits we

can get and from where. This is insufficient. There are fundamental political issues at stake. If we are serious about winning the proletariat to Trotskyism we will not stand before them and tell them they must join an SWP that is *rotten and reformist*. We were wrong to think this in the past and it would be criminal to continue to function with this position.

If we purport to be Trotskyists we cannot tell workers, we cannot tell any politicized elements we are in political contact with, to join a party of betrayers. The SWP has not merely failed to carry out its revolutionary responsibilities in every arena it intervenes in, not just recently, but for a number of years. Its approach to work in the anti-war, women's and Black movements, its trade union work, work in CLUW, its election campaign, etc., reflects not tactical, secondary political differences, but fundamental political differences of a principled character in each arena. The SWP has functioned as shameless attorneys, defending every kind of bourgeois liberal and mainline trade union bureaucrat.

That Comrade Charles can come here and tell us, as the IMT's representative, that we should "recruit organizationally to the SWP, but politically to the IMT (or FI)" indicates major political disorientation on the part of the IMT itself, or worse, simple cynicism. There is but one correct political answer to the reformism of the SWP. To build a Trotskyist party in the U. S. it is necessary to counterpose ourselves politically and organizationally to the SWP, whose concrete politics are the antithesis of everything the Fourth International stood for under Trotsky. It is necessary to break completely from the SWP and break now. It might be argued that the SWP expelled us, we want to expose them and their organizational degeneration. In reality, this is a trivial point. The SWP's degeneration is also and *primarily* political. A complete political break is both politically justified and necessary.

It has been our (the authors) position for quite some time that the SWP is a reformist party. It constitutes a roadblock to the socialist revolution in this country. It is not a question of centrist confusion or of occasional opportunist deviations on the SWP's part. The politics of the SWP are consistently and fundamentally counter to those of the Transitional Program and the heritage of Leninism. The IMT leadership has long claimed ignorance of what the SWP's policies really are (even though it is their political responsibility at all times to know)—we cannot. We have been implementing their reformist policies for years. We will cite just a few examples.

For many years the SWP pursued a class-collaborationist policy in its anti-war work. This was not primarily because of Vance Hartke's presence in NPAC, though this was indicative. In the earlier days of the movement the SWP toyed around with a bloc around "Peace Now," they went through a "Bring the Boys Home" phase. Their call to bring the troops home from Vietnam to enforce law and order in Mississippi was despicable as was their publicizing of the slogan "Bring our Black GI's

Back Home."

It's been said many times in our tendency that there were two tasks for revolutionaries on the Vietnam question: 1) to build a mass anti-war movement; and 2) build a left wing within this movement. It's been further stated that the SWP did an admirable job in one respect and failed dismally in the other; then somehow we conclude since they carried out one they can't be so bad. This approach is wrong comrades, terribly wrong. What were the politics of this mass anti-war movement? They were bourgeois pacifism and bourgeois defeatism.

The two cannot be separated. On what basis do we build the anti-war movement, except upon the same basis that we would build the left-wing—upon class struggle politics? How do we put the mass movement together, to have something in which to build our left-wing? Do we have demands for the movement and separate demands for a left-wing?

The demand of "Out Now," outside the context of a revolutionary program, was easily twisted in the hands of the "dove" bourgeoisie. The SWP lent itself to this end. It's often been said that "Out Now" was a principled demand. That is true in the abstract, but that's not how we approach the question. There are instances where the demand for a constituent assembly will be a principled demand. But if a party in a revolutionary situation in a colonial country raised this "principled" demand and failed to raise all the other demands flowing from the concrete situation we would hardly praise their actions as exemplary. They would be betrayers despite their raising of one isolated "principled" demand.

The SWP blocked with any and all and raised no politics. This wasn't just a mistake of a secondary nature. It was a consciously political act on their part, they raised no politics precisely to create such a bloc. This is where their class collaboration really came out. Because NPAC openly sought an ongoing class bloc with the bourgeoisie on its terms it lent itself to the subversion of the anti-war movement. This is why the ruling class by pulling American troops out of Vietnam could completely undercut the mass anti-war movement. Yet American imperialism's counterrevolutionary struggle against the Vietnam revolution has not ceased and the question of the Vietnamese revolution retains all its significance for revolutionaries today, even if the SWP's "defense" of the revolution has ceased.

If we have learned anything from Lenin and Trotsky, it is that every struggle *must* be linked to the general struggle of the proletariat for power. Every struggle must be used to raise the consciousness of the participants of the true nature of class society and the necessary road forward, led by the working class and its vanguard; because the reformists will use every struggle to triumph with their line. A left-wing is merely an embryonic base to reach out to with our politics, to fight against other tendencies, to broaden itself, and vie with the reformists for leadership of the movement, on the basis of a revolutionary program.

The SWP's work in WONAAC was no different. At one time the SWP stood for free abortion on demand. But their program had to be lowered in order to bloc with NOW and Congresswoman Bella Abzug. The point here is not that you cannot march with bourgeois lib-

erals to obtain a democratic demand but that the SWP chose their issue precisely to obtain this bloc.

On the abortion question this amounted to betrayal on the SWP's part. The heart of the abortion question focused around the working women and women of the ghetto subject to the butchery of illegal, back-alley abortions. The "democratic right" to abortion has little content for them. Only the demand for "Free Abortion on Demand" had any relevance to the vast majority of women the abortion issue affects.

At the national CLUW conference in Chicago the SWP did nothing about the rotten compromise arranged by the union bureaucrats to keep the conference from backing the Farmworkers. In Houston we've been following a series of sellouts in CLUW by Debby Leonard on a nurses struggle at Jefferson Davis Hospital. A resolution calling for rehiring the nurses was tabled to a committee set up by Leonard, composed of herself, 2 AFSCME bureaucrats and 2 independents, to be approved without being subject to rank-and-file approval and this most elementary demand ("rehire the nurses") was deleted, on objections from the AFSCME leadership. We could cite numerous other examples of the SWP's treachery in their Black work, trade union work, election campaigns, etc.

It's often said, "Well, their day to day politics may be lousy, but on paper that [sic] are still for revolution". What are the SWP's politics if they are not what they call on the workers to do in the class struggle? These are not just practical mistakes, divergences from their program, in each case they have been theorized by the SWP and flow from their political analysis.

It's been said that the SWP still defends revolutionaries around the world. But what kind of defense? They vehemently opposed any attempts to raise slogans that would have taken sides in the civil war in Vietnam within NPAC, they refused to raise any such slogans themselves. Another good example is their defense of the ERP-PRT and more recently the Spanish section. Their "defense" was to publicly denounce them. How did the SWP defend the Internationalist Tendency from attacks in the bourgeois media? Can we expect better in the future? And what of their "exemplary" defense of the MIR in Chile.

Some comrades feel that as long as the SWP continues to talk about Trotskyism you can't say they're reformist; it has not yet met a definitive test. This is ridiculous, the SWP is not a mass party; its opportunities for real betrayals are limited. If it occasionally exhibits what appears to be centrist traits it is only because it has yet to find the final vehicle for its betrayals. Occasionally it may be able to come off sounding very left in the abstract on some questions but only because it has nothing going for it in the particular arena. On the evidence, it is only because it does not constitute enough of a force for the bourgeoisie to worry about that prevents it from betrayals such as entering into popular fronts. The idea that the SWP has not yet met a definitive test was introduced by Comrade Langston at the December 1973 IT national steering committee meeting. It was totally rejected by the leadership then and rightly so. Yet when the IMT's representative in June imposed this incorrect idea on us we all passively accepted it.

The IMT's perspectives for the IT raises real ques-

tions about its motives. Comrade Charles says the SWP is "revolutionary with right deviations." It is quite clear that this is the IMT's analysis. Yet at the same time they "have no illusions about the SWP leadership being reformable." Further, most of the ranks are not reformable. This is a very obvious contradiction to anyone with any basic understanding of Trotskyism. If the SWP is "revolutionary with right deviations," then we should view it as our party, further we should really believe that we can win this party over. The truth is the SWP is reformist; a complete political break is a clearcut necessity.

We are caught up in a game on an international scale and as things stand, we are only passive, observer-victims. Before the May conference, it was often said and the opinion was overwhelmingly held that a long term perspective within the SWP would mean our destruction. That was our political evaluation. Yet when Comrade Charles came and gave us the IMT's incorrect perspective for us we capitulated.

The four-point motion introduced by the comrades from D.C. at the May conference and which passed overwhelmingly was somewhat diluted by our leadership shortly afterward and the whole sense, the whole spirit behind the motion at the Conference, which was to take a hard stance on the question of our perspectives was lost. We chose to be "diplomatic." But diplomacy does not solve political problems. When our leaders accompanied Comrade Charles on his national tour of the IT a couple of weeks later, they did not represent the position we had taken at the conference, they were there to reinforce the IMT's position.

We were saved from our death then, not by our own doing, nor by the IMT, but by the SWP, through our expulsion.

We've known for some time Comrade Germaine's [sic] perspectives for us. Sell INPRECORs and do nothing else while a control commission spends months investigating and the USEC tries to pressure Barnes into taking us back. We have all generally agreed this will destroy us. At the recent expanded PC meeting (all but 6 members of the national steering committee were present) the position taken was that come hell or high water we will become an independent organization. But the PC has since taken a position that opens the door for our capitulation to the IMT once more.

A recent letter from Comrade Charles to the IT called our response to the SWP's split document remiss and weak. Further, we should admit and self-criticize ourselves for:

- 1) being too highly structured
- 2) being too forward on the May 11th actions (The IMT denies any responsibility for the distribution of the USEC statement on Chile)

3) not telling the SWP we were dealing with outside groups

4) not long ago declaring ourselves a faction

These charges are unbelievable! The IMT has politically condoned all these actions and when the question of a faction was posed to the International Majority *Tendency*, they opposed the idea. The PC met and voted to accept the essence of Charles' letter before our representatives went to Europe. This is in sharp contrast to the position taken at the expanded PC meeting.

It's often been said the IMT does not know the truth about the SWP. How many plane trips do Comrades Massey and Barzman have to make to Europe to explain? Comrade Charles' comments in June (political line didn't count in France in '68, what counted was apparatus and in the U.S. the SWP has the apparatus) clearly indicates the IMT wants to keep the SWP in the USEC, for its apparatus, to preserve the unity of the Fourth International. Why is it the IMT continues to subordinate fundamental political questions to organizational "unity"? If the IT goes down the drain, so what! If we're dedicated revolutionists, we'll take it all in stride. The IMT's attitude can be summed up very clearly as *better more, but worse*.

The IMT position is that:

- 1) a working class radicalization will go through the SWP, therefore, that is where the IT belongs
- 2) if there is not a working class radicalization in the foreseeable future, then the problem is one of preserving Trotskyist cadres and the SWP is the most viable place for this.

This approach is totally incorrect. They seek unity through diplomacy, politics be damned. Diplomacy will not solve the political problems.

Our differences with the IMT at this point can not be called organizational. They are very clearly political. Their key difference being on our analysis of the SWP. Our own political position on this in the past has reflected our diplomatic relations with the IMT (which have been somewhat analagous [sic] to those of the IMT with Barnes) more than political reality. We must take the correct position on the nature of the SWP; that it is a reformist party, a roadblock in the path to socialist revolution. *We must split openly, publicly, completely with the SWP.* That is the only correct political conclusion. We do not want to imply that there is a common political outlook between ourselves and the Jebrac or Ali groups in the FCR and IMG respectively, we do not agree with their basic strategy. But we wholeheartedly agree with them that a revolutionary international can not include the SWP! That is the political reality. *We must split now, immediately and put the political onus on the IMT to act as principled Trotskyist internationalists!*

Appendix IV

Letter from Russell Welch and Cheryl Clark to the IMT Bureau

Russell Welch and
Cheryl Clark
Houston, Texas
October 25, 1974

IMT Steering Committee
c/o Pierre Frank
Paris, France

Dear Comrades:

We are writing to inform you of our recent expulsion from the Internationalist Tendency. Our positions placed us outside the bounds of the IT, therefore we were expelled; that was the motivation given, quite similar to Barnes' justification for the expulsion ("split") of the IT, without trials, without charges.

As members of the IT's national steering committee Cheryl and I submitted a document on the nature of the SWP in August for consideration at the IT plenum held October 12-13. At the end of August, we were on vacation in Canada, and met and discussed the positions of the Bolshevik-Leninist tendency in the RMG. We later came to independent agreement with their document after careful consideration and submitted it to the IT national steering committee for discussion.

On their return from Europe, Cdes Massey and Barzman talked with us both on a number of occasions. Initially, we were told the documents would not be circulated for security reasons. Later, Cde Massey called to inform us the plenum was being postponed and asked again if we still wanted our documents distributed as documents would be distributed prior to the plenum. He said they would be sent out at that time, two weeks prior to the plenum. He also informed us we would have 20 minutes reporting time on the first point on the agenda. We agreed to this even though we knew then the first point (The nature of the International) was only on the agenda to politically isolate us prior to the discussion on perspectives for the IT as Cde Massey had already informed us. We also stated we wanted extended time under the discussion on the IT's perspectives, which Cde Massey agreed to at that time. A week later we sent a letter to the PC requesting minority reporting time on this point which was never responded to.

Two days before the plenum we called again on the

status of our documents and were told they weren't out yet as the PC had decided that they had a low political priority.

At the plenum itself, we were expelled after the first point on the agenda. The ITPC handed out the Bolshevik-Leninist Tendency document and gave comrades 25 minutes to read it, then presented a short report recommending our exclusion for technical. The IT, you see, is only a tendency, differences could exist in a party, but not a tendency. An examination of the CLA after its expulsion from the CPUSA in 1928 exposes the incorrectness of their method. In our own report and summary, we made it clear we were not submitting the BLT document to a vote, rather we thought there were significant questions raised by certain actions of the IMT that warranted a much closer study of the FI, its history and practice, to enable us to draw the correct historical conclusions for our future development. We added that we support the BLT document but see it as just an initial step toward beginning this most important discussion.

We emphasized that while we had some differences with the IMT, we agree with the Transitional Program and adhere to the principles of democratic centralism and had and would uphold the program of the IMT in practice while fighting for our positions during discussion periods. Nevertheless, with the exception of Cheryl and myself, only one alternate member of the IT's national steering committee voted against our being excluded. The IT made it very clear both before and at the plenum they would prefer that we go to the Spartacist tendency than raise our viewpoint on the SWP inside the IT. The IT's action effectively suppressed our position on the SWP (that the SWP is reformist), as comrades were never allowed to see the document and we were barred from participating in the perspectives discussion.

This action reflects the worst traditions of the bureaucratic fetishism of Cde Barnes of the LTF and sets an extremely dangerous precedent in the IT, i.e., bureaucratic suppression of political disagreements, which can only hinder the development of our international movement. While we do not think this act represents the August 4th of the IMT, we think it is most indicative of tendencies in both factions of the USEC.

Comradely,
s/ Russell Welch
s/ Cheryl Clark

cc: United Secretariat
Herbert Obenland

Appendix V

Extracts from the IT Resolution on Trade-Union Work; from IT Bulletin VII

IV. TASKS

Our tasks in relation to the trade union movement must flow directly from our general political perspectives and be consonant with those tasks. Our work in the unions and around union struggles should be seen as an integral component of our longterm strategic goal of achieving a sufficient base in the American working class that will enable us to exercise an influence beyond our numbers and actually have an impact in the process of advancing the class struggle in the United States. In order to achieve this goal we must necessarily have a "proletarian orientation," that is we must always keep in mind that all of our work is directed toward building a base in the class. How we implement this strategy, however, is a tactical question. We cannot afford to be locked into a sterile debate over whether we should orient toward vanguard elements wherever they might be or begin to implement a "proletarian orientation" by colonizing every available comrade in basic industry. Such a debate would neither reflect the reality of our current situation nor serve to place the discussion of urgent specific questions facing us in a meaningful framework. The counterposition of "vanguard orientation" to "proletarian orientation" more properly belongs among the schema and methodological contortions of the LTF.

Let us make it clear at the onset that we seek to relate to vanguard elements wherever they may be. To do less would be sectarian madness of the worst sort. The only inhibition on our part with an orientation to vanguard elements is our size and organizational imprisonment.

How then should our trade union work fit into this perspective? We must begin with a clear appreciation of the factors delimiting our work. The relative paucity of available cadre necessarily dictates that we evaluate where to invest them with a good deal of circumspection. The fact that we are in the SWP automatically poses the question of what to do with potential recruits that we are able to draw around us. Although the SWP is not the most congenial organization for working-class militants, we should attempt to induce them to join. Should the SWP refuse to admit them for factional reasons (either blatantly or via the imposition of long waiting periods, impossible assignments, etc.) or if the potential recruits find joining the SWP an uninviting alternative then we have the duty to help sustain their interest in the politics of the Fourth International through a variety of means including study classes, reading programs, action interventions, and social functions (tavern raps, dinners, parties, etc.). It is entirely possible that concentrations of potential recruits may desire to coalesce in some organizational form. In order to initiate contact with such individuals, however, we must first delineate a line of intervention for our union work.

Given the smallness of our members our work must occur on three planes: (1) Strike support work, (2) on-the-job, day-to-day, one-to-one recruitment, and (3) organized interventions.

Strike support work should be the province of the tendency as a whole. Work of this nature can be carried on by comrades who are students, unemployed, or working in union situations that are relatively dormant compared to the actual strike struggle that is occurring. The actual character of strike support work obviously flows from the particular strike situation. Strike support work involves not only an opportunity to reach the more advanced workers active in strike struggles but also an axis around which we can coalesce vanguard elements outside of the class. In situations where strikes assume a national importance, support work should be coordinated directly from the center. Responsibility for work in support of local strike actions should be assumed by the local tendency units in consultation with the center. In either case questions of line, strategy and tactics cannot be predetermined outside the context of the particular strike.

2) On-the-job, day-to-day and one-to-one work is an aspect of our trade union work so elementary that it scarcely requires mention. Ordinarily, once comrades are established in job situations and have familiarized themselves with the conditions of their particular work place, one-to-one recruitment ought to be an integral component of everyday life. Individual sales or even initially free distribution of the Red Mole, International, Imprecor, pamphlets and other materials should be a norm. Work breaks, lunch breaks and punchout time should be utilized for discussion of a wide range of issues including working conditions, union democracy, contract evaluation, etc. It is essential, however, that such discussions transcend economic issues and include such topics as Chile, Vietnam, racism, women's rights, etc. Out of our initial one-to-one work we should be able to draw around us a periphery that will be useful as we begin initiating larger interventions. One-to-one work is especially important in those job situations where union meetings are held infrequently or are poorly attended.

3) Action interventions is a category of work that is broad in scope and includes a variety of possibilities. In situations where we have only one comrade in a workplace, it might include joining an established "left" or even an "out" caucus with the idea of ultimately building a pole within the caucus. Another activity we can undertake is the preparation and distribution of bulletins either on the workplace level, the union level or acity-wide level within the same industry. Preparation of such bulletins depends, of course, upon each individual situation (relationship of forces, SWP presence, potential receptivity, etc.). The political character of such bulletins should include a mix of economic and political topics. The type of interventions our comrades make at union meetings themselves is a tactical question. We must be careful, however, not to emulate the self-isolating presentation of the full transitional program at the drop of a hat as practiced by the Spartacist League, nor succumb to the "deep entry" economist practices of the International Socialists. In general, we should attempt to function as the best militants at the work-place. Whether or not we assume positions as stewards or grievors is tactical depending on whether it inhibits or enhances our political functioning, whether it identifies us too closely with the union bureaucracy, etc.

AN OVER-ALL APPROACH

It would seem from an examination of our resources that our comrades in such tendency units as Boston, Philly, Minneapolis, the Bay Area and Los Angeles would necessarily be limited to strike support activities and possibly some one-on-one recruitment work in the coming period. Opportunities exist, however, in the D.C. area, Chicago, Houston and St. Louis for the initiation of work on a broader level in a systematic and coordinated fashion. We must proceed initially from the reality of our existence rather than embarking upon grandiose and utopian colonization schemes. In the D.C. area for example, we already have a small base in local 1199. This base should be extended and reinforced through the tendency as a whole in this area. In Chicago we already have a concentration in two areas: rail and the public sector. The rail comrades should be brought together into a functioning cell/fraction. It is imperative that the other comrades work with the rail cell in the interim period as we attempt to broaden our base through contacts. In Houston we are developing our base in oil but have a toehold in steel there as well as in St. Louis with some contacts in Chicago. We should have the perspective of building up these tendrils, in line with a special orientation to the developing situation in steel, and participation in the Steel-workers for Change caucus.

On a national level, the tendency must organize educational series on the labor movement in the U.S., and make on-going studies of the situation of the trade unions in their area. These should be co-ordinated by a trade-union division in the center. With these steps we can develop a limited but politically indispensable intervention in the trade-unions.