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In Defense of Trotskyism

by Nat Weinstein

The spring 1982 IEC meeting was marked by a deepening of the attack on the theory and program of Trotskyism by the Usec. [United Secretariat of the Fourth International] minority. While this minority gave counter reports on every point on the agenda, it failed to indicate its positions in writing. This Usec. minority thus functioned as an international tendency or faction without a written platform.

Members of this international grouping, however, circulated to all IEC participants two documents that strongly suggested the ideological foundation for its presentations:

1. A polemic against Trotsky and the Permanent Revolution by Doug Jenness titled "Our Political Continuity with Bolshevism," and;

2. A report by Jack Barnes adopted by the February-March, 1982 plenum of the SWP entitled, "Draft Report on the Workers and Farmers Government in the U.S."

The thesis advanced here is that the American workers will somehow establish a "workers and farmers government" without benefit of soviets or any other such organs of workers power. Barnes, in his report, faithfully follows the trend of Jenness's rejection of permanent revolution by counterposing the "workers and farmers government" to the dictatorship of the proletariat. These two documents constitute an ideological foundation for a liquidationist and neo-reformist current in our world movement. The line of the Barnes-Jenness documents points to an interpretation of the social revolutions and other events following World War II that breaks with Marxist theory.

The FI [Fourth International] up to now has not found it necessary, in explaining post WWII events, to alter basic theoretical and programmatic conceptions. The Trotskyist world view stands up as the most comprehensive and consistent guide toward understanding the complex events since Trotsky's death.

The turn away from Trotskyism is in the final analysis the expression of a loss of confidence in the historical capacity of the workers to emancipate themselves and all humanity from capitalist anarchy.

The perspective laid out in the two documents circulated by the Usec. minority as a de-facto platform places the hopes of humanity in another class — the petty bourgeoisie. This thesis implicitly dumps the Trotskyist analysis of major world developments at least since WWII — and takes a giant step toward the theoretical camp of Stalinism.

Hiding behind a camouflage of tendentiously selected quotations from Lenin, the Usec. minority challenges the theoretical model provided by the Russian Revolution as well as the lessons of the Paris Commune. To this, they counterpose a two-stage model. Tailending the Castroists, they follow a path previously beaten by Social Democracy and Stalinism.

Jenness discovers Trotsky underestimated peasantry

Doug Jenness, for instance, attempts to resurrect Lenin's for-

mula of the Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry, counterposing it favorably to Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution. His effort reduces itself, in the final analysis, to a juggling of quotations designed to deceive the unwary reader.

Under the guise of a response to Ernest Mandel, Jenness sets out to prove that Trotsky's "pre-1917 strategy" was wrong, that it dismissed the alliance of the working class and the peasantry as a whole by dissolving the democratic-peasant revolution into the class struggle of the workers (the Stalinist charge of "underestimating the peasantry" was right all along!). Trotsky's "pre-1917 strategy," in Jenness's view, lacked a transitional approach and amounted to nothing more than a "centrist amalgamation" midway between Bolshevism and Menshevism. Jenness, in fact, goes as far as asserting that the Bolshevik Party would have led the Russian workers and peasants to defeat if they had adopted Trotsky's "pre-1917 strategy" — which Jenness cannot bring himself to call by its right name — Permanent Revolution.

We are assured that after the death of Lenin, Trotsky became "the foremost proponent of the revolutionary continuity of Marxism and of Leninism." But this was possible, according to Jenness, only "because he had dumped the worst of his pre-1917 positions, not in continuity with them."

Doug Jenness may have dumped the theory of permanent revolution but Trotsky certainly never did. Jenness knows too well that Trotsky continued to defend the strategy of permanent revolution until the day he died.

Trotsky, of course, hardly needs our defense. In *My Life* (1929) Trotsky cites Lenin in his own defense: "Lenin said that after Trotsky had become convinced of the impossibility of union with the Mensheviks there has been no better Bolshevik. And in this he proved very clearly — and not for the first time, either — that it had not been the theory of permanent revolution that had separated us, but the narrower, though very important question of the attitude toward Menshevism."

The same year Trotsky offered this blunt observation in *The Permanent Revolution*, "If a basic antagonism existed on the peasant question between the theory of permanent revolution and Lenin's dialectic how then does Radek explain the fact that *without renouncing my basic views* on the course of development of the revolution, I did not stumble in the slightest over the peasant question in 1917, as did the majority of the Bolshevik leadership of that time?" (emphasis added).

Radek couldn't answer that, and neither can Jenness, except by challenging Trotsky's assessment of "Bolshevik leadership of that time." Jenness "reveals" for us the *real* leadership in the ranks of the Bolshevik Party. They understood Lenin, they did not "stumble over the peasant question," he tells us. This sophism can only be plausible to those ignorant of the struggle in which Lenin engaged the leadership of the Bolshevik Party at a conference the day after he arrived in Petrograd from exile in

Switzerland.

Lenin introduced his April Theses literally to *change* the Bolshevik program which had been based on Lenin's *former* strategic view. The April Theses began with the concrete reality that the soviets of workers and peasants, embodying an embryonic government coexisting next to the bourgeois provisional government, had voluntarily ceded power to the bourgeoisie. The "democratic dictatorship" born in the dual power of the soviets revealed the complete inability of the petty-bourgeoisie to play an independent role in the revolutionary struggle. Lenin now saw that only a determined anti-capitalist struggle by the proletariat could break the hold of the bourgeoisie over the peasantry. The bourgeois revolution, which had hardly begun, had gone as far as it could. The "algebraic" class relation in the "democratic dictatorship" formula — which class program would dominate the worker-peasant alliance? — was spelled out. Life proved to Lenin that only a proletarian class struggle could draw behind it the peasant masses and carry out the bourgeois agrarian revolution. Lenin had now adopted the perspective of the dictatorship of the proletariat. As for the "democratic dictatorship," Lenin concluded, "The formula is obsolete. It is no good at all. It is dead. And it is no use trying to revive it."

Lenin's strategic line now paralleled Trotsky's — which had maintained from 1905 on that only a dictatorship of the proletariat could lead the peasantry to a successful completion of their tasks. It was no wonder the April Theses, which shocked the leaders of the Bolshevik Party, were condemned as Trotskyist!

The grain of truth contained in Jenness's sophistry, then, is that Lenin succeeded in turning the Bolshevik majority around with the *decisive support he received from the ranks*. They, indeed, had grasped the dialectic of Lenin's thought and under the impact of events were able to make the necessary theoretical and practical adjustments: The "democratic dictatorship" formula was swept into the dustbin of history; in its place stood the dictatorship of the proletariat! This last "detail" vanishes in Jenness's sophistic rendering of Bolshevik history.

The aim of this contribution

The aim of this contribution is to challenge this revision of theory and program. I have summed up our movement's enriching of Permanent Revolution in the light of events since WWII and the consequent reinforcement of the lessons from the Paris Commune and the October Revolution taught us by Marx and Engels, and Lenin and Trotsky.

These lessons pointing to the direct role of the workers and the class instruments they created to seize and wield state power are virtually obliterated by the Usec. minority's thesis. Their thesis erases the qualitative distinction between the Commune and the October Soviet proletarian dictatorships on the one side and the petty-bourgeois anti-capitalist governments arising after WWII on the other. In so doing they remove the independent role of the workers as the central axis of proletarian theory, program and action.

The Trotskyist world view

The following is a capsulized statement of the main lines of the Trotskyist world view:

- The Stalinist betrayals in Europe and Asia in the period before WWII extended a lease on life to dying imperialism and permitted it to drag humanity into the holocaust of WWII.
- Despite the reactionary role of the Stalinist bureaucracy, the Soviet Union survived WWII due to the vitality of the Russian Revolution which surpassed even Trotsky's most optimistic projections. The military victory of the Soviet state proved the Oc-

tober revolution was alive and vigorous.

● This, however, gave an unearned authority to Stalinism which was falsely credited by many with the Soviet victory. This false authority permitted Stalinism to further betray the world socialist revolution in the period immediately following that war. The revolutionary opportunities, lost to a large extent because of Stalinist betrayal in Europe and Asia, in turn, gave imperialism a further extension on life. It opened the door to the imperialist carnage in Korea and Indo-China, to mention only the most obvious results, and to the current mounting threat of nuclear destruction.

● But, despite the post-war capitalist restabilization, imperialism continued to decay and break at its weakest links. And the Soviet military victory over German imperialism resulted in its military-bureaucratic control over eastern Europe.

● When U.S. imperialism moved to roll back the Red Army threatening a capitalist reconquest of the Soviet Union, the Stalinists were compelled to defend their borders. They unleashed controlled partial worker mobilizations in the eastern European "buffer zone" that led to the overthrow of capitalism there. Imperialist counterrevolutionary intervention was foiled by the massive anti-war movement of U.S. troops demanding repatriation from Europe and Asia.

● The traitorous role played by the east European and colonial bourgeoisies, while under German and Japanese occupation, discredited them and undermined their capacity to resist the subsequent mass upsurges. The war-ruined economies led to a sharpening of the class conflict. And finally, the collapse of German and Japanese military power — the main prop of capitalism in the formerly occupied territories — contributed to the monumental erosion of bourgeois confidence and to its utter demoralization and disintegration. All this added up to a balance of forces that, despite its intentions, permitted the petty-bourgeois-led, military-political movements to unleash forces that decisively crushed the military-police-governmental instruments of bourgeois power in the formerly occupied territories.

The example of China

A consistent analysis of how the laws of Permanent Revolution exerted their force in China and elsewhere in the post WWII events are indispensable for clearly comprehending and intervening in currently unfolding revolutionary developments.

In China, despite the prostration of capitalist power, the Stalinist-led military-governmental machine sought to preserve the social and economic elements of the bourgeois state. The coalition government composed of the Stalinist military-bureaucratic apparatus based on the peasantry, in a bloc with the propped-up and feeble political remnants of the defeated bourgeoisie, was more than a mere facade. The inclusion of "puppet" bourgeois forces in the coalition government — even though dominated by the Stalinists — constituted a pledge to imperialism: a commitment to respect private property.

While the meaning was clear to the imperialists — an assurance that imperialist capital was welcome and guaranteed — they abstained from accepting such a *modus vivendi*. They were unconvinced the Stalinist-led regime could honor its pledge to maintain the capitalist framework for imperialist investments.

Mao's pledge was annulled after the incursion into Chinese territory during the U.S. invasion of Korea. In self-defense, the peasant-based regime was impelled further along the anti-capitalist road than they had originally intended. It had become clear that an invading army would breathe new life into the prostrated Chinese bourgeoisie. They constituted a "fifth column" capable of attacking from within in the event of an imperialist invasion of China.

The desperate Stalinist regime toppled the remaining positions

of the threatening Chinese bourgeoisie. The remaining legal base of bourgeois power — private ownership of the means of production — was swept away with a controlled unleashing of the working class.

This partial mobilization of workers to establish control over capitalist production marks the shift over to a workers and farmers government. As predicted in the Transitional Program, it proved to be a “short episode on the road to the actual dictatorship of the proletariat.” After seizing control through worker mobilizations over the remaining capitalist economic institutions, the attenuated Chinese bourgeoisie was easily expropriated and finished off.

The mechanics behind a partial mobilization of the workers

How was the Chinese Communist Party, weighted down by its Stalinist stagist program, traditions and action, able to reverse its pro-capitalist policy of restraining the revolutionary force of the peasants and of suppressing workers struggles? How was it able to go over to a decisive mobilization of these forces to definitively crush capitalist power in China?

Self-preservation, alone, is not a sufficient answer. Stalinist and other petty-bourgeois forces have previously committed collective suicide: in China itself, as well as in Spain and Indonesia, to mention a few outstanding cases.

There is a logic that compels this sort of suicide. It flows from Stalinism’s years of betrayal. The initial non-confidence in the workers’ capacity to defeat a virile capitalist class they endow with omnipotent powers, turns into a deadly fear of the workers they had betrayed.

History testifies to the fact that an intensive and extensive scale of mobilization is required to overthrow capitalism wherever it retains substantial resources. Reformists resist imparting such a momentum to the *proletariat* for fear it will get out of their control. In a sense the Stalinists and their like in Spain, for instance, had no choice but to betray the revolution — committing political suicide. Even if they could see the fatal outcome of their pro-capitalist reformist policy, their fear that they would be politically drowned, in any case, in the course of the proletarian revolutionary flood blocked them from the revolutionary road to socialism. Their past class treason locked them into their downhill slide to destruction.

Stalinism in China, in contrast, took the anti-capitalist option *precisely when, and because*, a partial mobilization — more accurately, a controlled unleashing of a *fraction* of the workers power — was *adequate* to crush an extremely attenuated capitalism. Only under such conditions of capitalist enfeeblement could the workers be safely unleashed. (It should go without saying that capitalism can be overthrown and proletarian property forms put in its place only by the workers themselves.)

The Chinese Stalinist-led peasant army and the bureaucratic apparatus in the territory it administered while struggling against the Kuomintang and Japanese forces, constituted a highly independent peasant force that ultimately was able to break from its capitalist programmatic moorings. The gravitational force of the living conquests of the October Proletarian Revolution proved more powerful than the attractive power of world capitalism. The unconscious force of the revolution proved able to impose itself against the subjective limitations of petty-bourgeois leadership.

The special relation of the Chinese Stalinists with Soviet Bonapartism added its contradictory effect to both sides of the equation upon which the Maoists balanced themselves — accommodation to world imperialism and to the Soviet power. The Soviet bureaucracy, typically, provided material assistance with one hand, strengthening the Chinese Stalinist forces as “border guards” of the Soviet state. With the other hand they imposed capi-

talist limits on the CCP’s goals. The latter encouraging CCP accommodation to imperialism on the condition of peaceful-coexistence with the USSR.

This special relation with the Soviet gravitational force distorted the CCP’s reformist orbit around Chinese capitalism. Later, when the bourgeoisie in China disintegrated under the strains of war and revolution, the CCP, despite its intentions, was swung into a more distant orbit around capitalism.

Finally, Japan’s defeat resulted in the removal of a decisive point of support for capitalism in China. And when U.S. imperialism declined to risk capital investment in China after the fall of the Kuomintang government, the Maoist regime was drawn irresistibly into the Soviet orbit. The final break with capitalism was triggered during the Korean war.

It is not a “dogmatic” distortion of events, as some would have it, to insist on the exceptionalism of the post WWII social revolutions. If we fail to see that these social overturns in Eastern Europe and Asia occurred *despite* the policy of the Stalinists, we will be politically disarmed in the coming struggles for power. The course followed there — and in Cuba as well — would bring certain defeat in Europe and North America. In this sense there is no “new period” as is suggested by the Usec. minority.

The transitional program: still the only road

The task of overthrowing capitalism in the main centers and on a world scale remains as formidable as when the Transitional Program was adopted in 1938. Nothing less than the most scientifically precise guides to action will suffice in accomplishing this task. World capitalism will not be defeated through a series of Chinese or Cuban-style campaigns. A strategy of guerrilla war in the main centers is even more off the mark than in the colonial world. (Besides, when actually translated into European or North American terms, guerrillaism becomes ultra-left political adventurism or rank opportunism.) Only the transitional method as we saw carried to final victory in Russia, and as we see beginning in Poland today, is applicable in the bastions of capitalism — from Argentina to Canada and from Germany to Ireland. Capitalism will not be broken at its stronger links without the sharpest, hardest political weapons in the workers hands.

Poland, besides confirming the Russian revolutionary model, also confirms the indispensability of a Leninist combat party, based on the Transitional Program and method in the deformed and degenerated workers states as well as in the capitalist world.

In the course of the political revolution in Poland the question of the extension of the revolution in east and west will inevitably arise. The Leninist-Trotskyist concept of the workers states as advanced outposts of the world socialist revolution will regain currency in the course of the struggles there. No solution is possible — socialism is not possible — within the boundaries of the existing workers states. This conclusion will be inescapable to the vanguard in Poland and in the other workers states.

Extension of the revolution will follow the course charted by the Comintern in its first five years. Building strong sections of the FI in every country is the main task. The extension of the revolution by essentially military means is a fantasy and more often it is pseudo-revolutionary bluster invoked by class collaborators to rationalize and mask betrayal.

The struggle for socialism, moreover, is at the same time the struggle to stay the hand of the imperialist madmen rattling their multi-armed stockpile of atom bombs. Only through the method of the Transitional Program — a strategy of mass mobilizations — can imperialism’s hands be tied and its nuclear blackmail be countered. This is consistent with, and ultimately leads toward, the only peace possible; the conquest of power by the workers and wresting the doomsday machine out of capitalist hands.

The Usec. minority seeks to reorient our movement toward accommodation with the "pro-soviet" camp. This term is a misnomer. The "pro-Soviet" camp, even according to its best proponents, includes the motley assortment of Jaruzelskis and of capitalist political entities gathered together in the equally misnamed "Movement of Non-aligned Nations." Their "anti-imperialism," not to mention their "pro-sovietism," is more superficial than real and in the final analysis is subordinate to their commitment to the preservation of their caste and capitalist interests.

The "workers and farmers government" according to Barnes and Clark

Steve Clark, in a series of classes he gave at the August, 1982 "Socialist Educational and Activists Conference" on the Workers and Farmers Government develops the "new" concept introduced by Jack Barnes in his *Draft Report on the Workers and Farmers Government in the U.S.*

He contends that the process of socialist revolution has two necessary and inevitable "qualitative turning points":

1. The establishment of a workers and farmers government made possible by the seizure of governmental power, "and the resolution of dual power such as in Nicaragua in July 1979 and in Grenada in March of the same year" (see Draft Report by Jack Barnes).

As the cited models would indicate, a government which restricts itself to measures that fall within the boundaries of the democratic revolution. And;

2. The establishment of a workers state which is marked by the expropriation of the basic means of production. The time scale between "qualitative turning points" 1 and 2 is indefinitely expanded in contrast to our classical view.

This variation on the theory of revolution by stages differs only in wording, not in content. It includes the usual vague references to a "growing over" within stage 1, evolving toward stage 2. While acknowledging two distinct stages, the Clark-Barnes version is *nominally* cast within the overall framework of the socialist revolution. Gone, however, from any of the stagist versions, including the Clark-Barnes variation, is the task of establishing direct forms of proletarian power as the indispensable prerequisite for accomplishing the tasks of the democratic revolution. Gone is the combining of the democratic and socialist revolutions. Gone, thus, are the concepts of workers control over production as well as soviet forms of working-class political rule. Gone, to sum up, is the keystone of permanent revolution. What remains is the Menshevik-Stalinist theory of stages.

There is a subordinate theoretical innovation defended by Steve Clark. He blurs the distinction between the "workers and farmers government" (as "newly" interpreted), and the actual dictatorship of the proletariat. This fudging is effected by drawing an equals sign between the Soviet government established on October 25, 1917, on the one side, and the Algerian regime of Ben Bella, as one instance, on the other. Only a quantitative distinction is allowed.

In the former, the *Soviet*-based workers and farmers government — that is, the *actual* dictatorship of the proletariat — sovereign political power was directly exercised by the workers through democratic councils and augmented by direct workers control over industry. This was backed up, too, by revolutionary decrees not seen anywhere since.

In the Algerian example — the petty-bourgeois form of anti-capitalist governmental power — direct workers rule is essentially absent.

Barnes-Clark, through a roundabout theoretical excursion, reach the conclusion that the theory of stages best explains all the anti-capitalist revolutions; from the Paris Commune to the un-

folding revolution in Nicaragua. They deduce, from the exceptional events following WWII, theoretical conclusions diametrically opposed to permanent revolution. Their generalizations add up to a rejection of a strategic orientation to the working class. This is accomplished by sweeping proletarian methods and institutions of struggle out of their theoretical construction.

Left out of their analysis is the role of unions, factory committees, strike committees, the united front and its highest form, soviets; left out too is the ultimate expression of this dynamic of mass worker mobilizations: soviet power. The class dynamic in the construction of the dictatorship of the proletariat disappears from the Barnes-Clark theoretical exposition. Thus, the central premise of revolutionary Marxist theory, of the permanent revolution and its expression through the Transitional Program — the proletarian road to the conquest of power — is silently conjured away by Comrades Jack Barnes and Steve Clark.

Toward this end, both the Paris Commune and the Bolshevik Revolution are glazed over with the gray colors of stagist theory. All regimes which succeed in conquering governmental power, from the Commune and the Soviet governments on one end of the spectrum to the regimes of the China, et-al variety (after their first anti-capitalist "qualitative turning points") on the other end, are given the gray label "workers and farmers government." In fact, to say as does the Barnes Draft Report, that dual power is "resolved" by the workers and farmers government, is to say that capitalism is overthrown! What then can the meaning be of the *second* "qualitative turning point"?

"Dialectical" sophistry

Clark was assigned the task of accounting for the glaring differences in the two categories of governmental power. His task was to explain away the *unambiguous* Marxist characterizations of the Commune and the October Soviet regimes as the dictatorship of the proletariat. He executed a dazzling "dialectical" dance around the fine distinctions between being and becoming. He delivered a "learned" discourse on the organic interconnection between the workers and farmers government and the dictatorship of the proletariat. His lectures and responses to questions were liberally laced with many "it is, and it isn't's": We were informed in Clark's class, that the Nicaraguan government "is a dictatorship of the proletariat, and it isn't"; that the "Paris Commune was and wasn't the dictatorship of the proletariat." Similarly, the Soviet government in October, the Algerian Ben Bella government, etc., all equally "were and weren't" the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Clark obfuscates the question of *what is* with philosophical vagaries. It is all well and good to indicate the fluid interconnections in the dynamic processes being analyzed. But the dialectic does not free one from differentiating the beginning from the end, nor from making a determination of the stage at which a given process is at any given moment.

Every organism is both living and dying — and while even after death, parts of an organism still live, they are no longer viable and death of all organs is inevitable! In determining the "qualitative turning point" in the birth of a workers state; it is important to know whether capitalism has been dropped through the gallows floor, rope securely in place, or whether sentence of death is yet to be rendered and executed.

Clark's exercise in pedantry is intended to fudge over and conceal the sharp contrast between: 1. a workers and farmers government such as Ben Bella's regime; and 2. the actual dictatorship of the proletariat such as the Soviet government in October 1917. In the first, capitalist power still lives. The hanging verdict is yet to be decided. In the second, the gallows trap door has been sprung, capitalism has been delivered a mortal wound and the still quivering capitalist organism is no longer viable.

How the Soviet government “defended” capitalist property

But before expropriating capitalist property toward the end of 1918, Clark lectured, the Soviet government “defended capitalist property — it remained a capitalist state.” Clark drops his “dialectical” mask, the formalist speaks from his soul. Even the briefest glance at how Soviet society held capitalism in a proletarian death-grip — its capacity to resist already broken by the far-reaching agrarian revolution launched by Soviet power — makes a mockery of the lop-sided and thus false contention that “the Soviet government defended capitalist property.” We can almost hear the bitter laughter of Russian capitalists at what to them would be a sick joke.

In a sense, however, capitalist “ownership” did remain as a rule up to the autumn of 1918. “Capitalist profits” continued to flow into the ledgers of capitalist business accounts. But two decisive facts operated compelling the irresistible demise of mortally wounded capitalism: 1. Workers’ committees exerted veto power over capitalist production decisions and monetary withdrawals from the business accounts. And in many instances these committees seized management powers outright. 2. These spontaneous acts of control by workers committees were backed up with expropriations by the Soviet government despite their tactical policy of postponing nationalization of the means of production.

This is the way a genuine workers government handled capitalist economic sabotage and “decapitalization.”

In sharp contrast, there was no such dynamic set into motion and backed up by the workers and farmers government of the Algerian type. The potential force of upsurging mobilizations never got off the ground. The anti-capitalist momentum was halted with such little effort that most political activists on the scene didn’t realize what had happened until considerably later!

In this connection, the Cuban example, beginning in the fall of 1959, comes closest to the process set into motion in October 1917. The Castroist team was not tied down by the past. They had never betrayed the struggle. But even so there was a significant distinction between the two events, flowing from the different roads traveled toward governmental power. In the first, the Soviet road to *proletarian* power was consciously and organically connected with subsequent Bolshevik policy and trajectory. There was a consistent path traveled by the Bolsheviks under Lenin and Trotsky’s leadership before and after seizing governmental power. The Cuban road to governmental power and the policy afterwards was *not* connected in the same way, by the same logic. The Castro team made a strategic shift toward the socialist revolution some time after conquering governmental power. This difference contributes to the failure so far to establish institutions of workers democracy.

The resolution of dual power — real and fanciful

Let’s take another look at the Barnes-Clark thesis of two qualitative stages. Clark, in his lectures, utilized the analogy figuring in the current attack on abortion rights: conception versus birth (in the determination of when human life begins). His point seemed to be that pregnancy-equals workers and farmers government-equals stage one; and birth-equals expropriation-equals stage two.

The analogy is fatally flawed by their assertion that stage one marks the *resolution* of dual power. If this were so *this* would be the decisive stage, relegating stage two to meaninglessness. There might be some use in such an analogy, however, only if we see the first “stage” as a pre-revolutionary period in which the workers’ instruments of power, dual power, *is being constructed*. The workers and farmers government, correctly understood, is an instrument that can be used to construct the actual

dictatorship of the proletariat. The *decisive* turning point being the suppression of the bourgeois power.

The pregnant-stage one, then, is the period of development of workers power prior to overthrowing and suppressing the capitalist class. We should keep in mind that every attempt to set such a biological or sociological process in motion does not always end in either pregnancy or in birth.

In any case, the test is not in the microscopic fact of insemination, the real test is in the ongoing and *developing* pregnancy — the development of workers power. There is something seriously wrong with a “fetus” that does not grow and develop. It might have died. It may have never existed, the diagnosis of pregnancy simply being an error. Similarly, a “workers and farmers government” that doesn’t show signs of ongoing development toward the dictatorship of the proletariat may have died along the way — if it ever really existed.

The test, again, is not in philosophical introspection, it’s in events. In the October Revolution, the process of gestation had been nine-tenths accomplished in the series of mass mobilizations which were concretized in the soviet institutions of struggle, soon to become the sole ruling power. The decisive confrontations between July and October, with Kerensky and then Kornilov — to stretch the analogy — paralleled the labor pains, the muscular contractions leading up to birth.

The seizure of sole power by the Soviets was the one and only “qualitative turning point” — the birth of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In China, et-al, the conquest of governmental power *preceded* the mass mobilizations of the workers requisite for the actual expropriation of the bourgeoisie. The actual dictatorship of the proletariat could be born only after the yet to be accomplished mobilizations and expropriation. Since Soviet-like institutions of workers power were bypassed, the birth of a new state could only be physically accomplished by mobilizations of the workers consummating in the overthrow of the capitalist power. Until then, a workers and farmers government remains in the context of a relation of dual power — the capitalist class still rules, however attenuated it might be.

If two, why not three stages?

The development of an organism, further, doesn’t end at the qualitative turning point we call birth. It continues its metamorphosis. If we were to follow the Barnes-Clark logic to its end, we might find it necessary to add a third “qualitative turning point” at least equal in weight to the other two; i.e., the political revolution. Without the overthrow of bureaucratic power through soviet-like institutions, the workers dictatorship is incomplete. Economic development is hampered. The extension of the revolution is blocked. The image of the workers state is contorted by deformations, impairing its appeal to the world proletariat.

But this pursuit of the Barnes-Clark logic only brings us to focus our attention on the heart of their error. In their determination to establish the exceptional course of events since WWII as their model for a generalized theory of socialist revolution — in opposition to the Russian model — they must incorporate into it two distinct and necessary stages. This, in turn, compels them to draw an equals sign between the “workers and farmers government” and the workers dictatorship. And in passing, obliterating the function of Soviet-like institutions from the revolutionary dynamic.

For Barnes and Clark, the workers governments of 1871 and 1917 constitute troublesome flies in their two-stage ointment: They must be relabeled “workers and farmers governments.” They must disfigure these two workers republics in forcing them into the post WWII pattern. But the path followed by the Paris Commune and traveled to its end in the October Revolution is the

main road to socialism. Along this road, neither the alleged first nor a third "qualitative turning point" is necessary or inevitable.

In social development as in biology, nature offers many possible forms of gestation — forms of metamorphosis from inseminated egg to adult. Trotsky lived long enough to teach us a few things about this. Trotsky taught us that even after the destruction of the political institutions of workers power, so long as the conquests of that power remain, so does the proletarian state remain.

This prepared him for further unpredictable twists in historical development. History later revealed that another road to the proletarian dictatorship was possible. In his lifetime, Finland and Poland revealed this possibility. After WWII this road was followed by the unconscious revolution and each new workers state exhibited its own peculiar twisting path and unique shape.

But in every case the revolution bypassed the democratic political forms of workers power. *The absence of the democratic political organs of the workers state, and its place occupied by a bureaucratic dictatorship, is what marks the post WWII revolutions as deformed!* In Cuba, we should pause to note, the absence of a hardened bureaucratic caste compels us to make a qualitative distinction between it and the deformed workers states (see *SWP Discussion Bulletin* Vol. 37, No. 18, July 1981, "The Transitional Program and Method: the Road Forward," by Lynn Henderson and Nat Weinstein). Despite the failure thus far in Cuba to establish institutionalized forms of genuine workers power, the Cuban state can be reformed without a political revolution.

The impact of the Paris Commune

The Commune experience shows that none of the socialist currents which stood at the head of the commune played a role equivalent to that of the traitorous social democracy and other petty bourgeois currents in later times. This is to be partly explained by the general failure of its participants to understand the dynamic that had been set into motion. They didn't fully comprehend what it was they were constructing. They couldn't yet fully appreciate the barbaric vengefulness of the capitalists, only fully displayed, later, during the bloody crushing of the Communards. They had not yet developed the fear of the workers held by post-Commune reformists. A fear generated out of their repeated betrayals in the years following the defeat of the Parisian workers. Betrayals that were partly prompted by fear of bourgeois counter-revolutionary terror, traumatically underscored by the extermination of the Commune, and a consequent fear of the logic set in motion by a workers' seizure of power.

The Bolshevik party of Lenin and Trotsky, on the other hand, profited from the experience of the Commune. Those lessons were reinforced by the 1905 "dress rehearsal" for the October Revolution.

The Bolsheviks summed up and gave full vent to the revolutionary process absorbed from these lessons through the simple slogan: All Power to the Soviets. They ignited the fuse of proletarian revolution with the seizure of power. Acting in their role as conscious agents of the blind revolutionary process, they set the earth into motion with the decrees promulgated on the first day after the seizure of power: Workers control of industry, the abolition of private ownership of the land, and peasant control over the disposition of the land.

True, the Commune never got around to "uprooting the economical foundations upon which rests the existence of classes, and therefore of class rule." And the Soviet government took nearly a year to complete the task of establishing the transitional state. But the proletariat's trajectory toward communism in both revolutions was set into motion by the conquest of governmental power by the armed workers *democratically organized as the ruling class*.

The Bolsheviks, standing on the shoulders of the Commune, increased the chances of success by their conscious intervention. Even so, the Bolsheviks never expected to prevail without the extension of the proletarian dictatorship to the west. And, even then, the consolidation would not have been considered completed. The process is not finished, finally and irrevocably, until the workers are victorious in the decisive sectors of world capitalism. The October Revolution will be finally consolidated with the overthrow of capitalism in the U.S. itself.

Trotsky on the Paris Commune and the October Revolution

In fashioning his theoretical structure to replace permanent revolution, Clark seeks to sink piers down to Marxist bedrock. He tortuously, but vainly reaches down, attempting to establish a foundation in Trotsky himself. He quotes passages from a 1933 polemic by Trotsky, *The Class Nature of the Soviet State*. The theme of Clark's selections are contained in the following:

If Marx and Engels called the Paris commune "the dictatorship of the proletariat" it was only because of the force of the possibilities lodged in it. But by itself the Commune was not yet the dictatorship of the proletariat.

With this and quotations like it, Clark unabashedly implies that Trotsky rejected the characterization of both the Commune and the October revolutions as the dictatorship of the proletariat. Barnes, utilizing a larger slice of this quotation in his Draft Report makes the same essential point.

But in the section from which Clark and Barnes quote, Trotsky has quite a different and opposed point to make. Let's look at the complete two paragraphs in question from Trotsky's, *Class Nature of the Soviet State*:

The Dictatorship of the Proletariat as an Idealistic Norm

Messrs. "Kantian" Sociologists (we apologize to the shade of Kant) often reach the conclusion that a "real" dictatorship, that is, one that conforms to their ideal norms, existed only in the days of the Paris Commune, or during the first period of the October Revolution, up to the Brest-Litovsk peace or, at best, up to the NEP. This is indeed sharpshooting: aim a finger at the sky and hit the bull's eye! If Marx and Engels called the Paris Commune "the dictatorship of the proletariat" it was only because of the force of the possibilities lodged in it. But by itself the Commune was not yet (Trotsky's emphasis) the dictatorship of the proletariat. Having seized power, it hardly knew how to use it; it dared not touch the state bank; it did not and indeed could not put through the overturn in property relations because it did not wield power on a national scale. To this must be added Blanquist one-sidedness and Proudhonist prejudices, which prevented even the leaders of the movement from completely *understanding the Commune as the dictatorship of the proletariat* (emphasis added).

The reference to the first period of the October Revolution is not any more fortunate. (It is here that Barnes's slice of this quotation begins.) Not only up to the Brest-Litovsk peace but even up to the autumn of 1918, the social content of the revolution was restricted to a petty-bourgeois agrarian overturn and workers' control over production. This means that the revolution in its actions had not yet passed the boundaries of bourgeois society. During this first period soldiers' soviets ruled side by side with workers' soviets, and often elbowed them aside. Only toward the autumn of 1918 did the petty-bourgeois soldier-agrarian elemental wave recede a little to its shores, and the workers went forward with the nationalization of the means of production. Only from this time can one speak of the inception of a real dictatorship of the proletariat. But even here it is necessary to make certain large reservations. During those initial years, the dictatorship was geographically confined to the old Moscow principality and was compelled to wage a three-years' war along all the radii from Moscow to the periphery. This means that up to 1921, precisely up to the NEP, that is, what went on was still the struggle to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat upon the national scale. And since, in the opinion of the pseudo-Marxist

philistines, the dictatorship had disappeared with the beginning of the NEP, then it means that, in general, it had never existed (! — N.W.). To these gentlemen the dictatorship of the proletariat is simply an imponderable concept, an ideal norm not to be realized upon our sinful planet. Small wonder that “theoreticians” of this stripe, insofar as they do not denounce altogether the very word dictatorship, strive to smear over the irreconcilable contradiction between the latter and bourgeois democracy.

Clearly Trotsky reduces the contention that in 1933 the dictatorship of the proletariat was dead to the absurdity it is by “proving” the even greater absurdity that it never existed! His focus here is on the tentative, incomplete, developing character of the workers dictatorship. Throughout his and Lenin’s writings, on the other hand, the other side of the reality is consistently driven home: The October Revolution *is* the dictatorship of the proletariat — October 25, 1917 *was* the beginning of the socialist revolution!

If the political debate could be reduced to a contest over the number of quotations that could be produced to prove a point, as the Usec. minority strains to do, even then they would have no greater success despite their extraordinarily energetic zeal for finding quotations, tendentiously served up, to support a one-sided and therefore false conclusion.

Just a few quotations will illustrate that the Usec. minority’s method is not unique. Trotsky, in *The Permanent Revolution*, quotes Lenin’s statement against Kautsky:

“Things have turned out just as we said they would. The course taken by the revolution has confirmed the correctness of our reasoning. *First*, with the ‘whole’ of the peasantry against the monarchy, the landlords, the mediaeval regime (and to that extent, the revolution remains bourgeois, bourgeois-democratic). Then, with the poorest peasants, with the semi-proletarians, with all the exploited, *against capitalism*, including the rural rich, the kulaks, the profiteers, and to that extent the revolution becomes a *socialist* one.”

That is how Lenin spoke — not “occasionally” but always, or more accurately, *invariably* — when he gave a finished and generalized and perfected evaluation of the revolution, including October. “Things have turned out just as we said they would.” The bourgeois-democratic revolution was realized as a coalition of the workers and peasants. During the Kerensky period? No, *during the first period after October* (Trotsky’s emphasis). Is that right? It is. But, as we now know, *it was not realized in the form of a democratic dictatorship, but in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat* (emphasis added).

Trotsky develops this point further, a page later:

The proletariat took power together with the peasantry in October, says Lenin. By that alone, the revolution was a bourgeois revolution. Is that right? In a certain sense, yes. But this means that the *true* democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, that is, the one which actually destroyed the regime of autocracy and serfdom and snatched the land from the feudalists, was accomplished not *before* October but only *after* October; it was accomplished, to use Marx’s words, in the form of the *dictatorship of the proletariat supported by the peasant war* — and then, a few months later, began growing into a socialist dictatorship. Is *this* really hard to understand? Can differences of opinion prevail on this point *today*?

It was only *after* the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, *after* the rule of the bourgeoisie was overthrown, that the Russian revolution began to “grow over,” in Lenin’s expression, from the bourgeois-democratic tasks to the socialist tasks. The rule of one class does not “grow over” into the rule of another class. That is an “evolutionary” way of thinking that invariably dissolves the decisive, qualitative point in the revolutionary transformation. The Russian working class established its dictatorship in October 1917 precisely in order to carry out to comple-

tion the bourgeois-democratic revolution. But the workers’ dictatorship was compelled by its position as the ruling class to begin the socialist transformation. This was the position of Lenin and Trotsky! This was the reality of the Russian revolution!

Clark goes on to argue that Marx’s criticism of the Communards for failing to seize the state bank of France was really not aimed against failure to take measures to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, but really (really!) to achieve a lever for *compromise* with the bourgeoisie!!! One can only wonder at where this argument will lead Steve Clark and his cothinkers?

For the moment he has constructed an elaborate lawyer’s brief negating the main lessons of the two workers revolutions that most clearly revealed the historic role of the working class; and upon which the Third and Fourth Internationals were founded. The only thing Clark deduces of note from the historical experience with socialist revolution after a graying glaze is spread over this history is the two-stage version of Lenin’s pre-1917 theory. The dynamic of the workers special mode of struggle, the forms of its revolutionary ascent to power, and the combined character of the revolution itself, are details of little import in Barnes-Clark’s rendering of the lessons of history.

* * *

Nicaragua

How does this theoretical discussion relate to the revolution in Nicaragua?

First of all, our aim is to maintain a dialogue with the Sandinista leadership and ranks to the greatest degree possible. On our part, this dialogue is within the framework of supporting every forward step against capitalism, along with unconditional defense of the Nicaraguan revolution against imperialism.

The question of the present character of the Sandinista government is a not unimportant question. We begin with a different, significantly higher estimation of the caliber of leadership here than of the traditional parties. We also note as an objectively favorable factor the dynamic of events in the ascent to governmental power.

We also are compelled to take note of an unfavorable context: The hardened and even desperate determination of imperialism to block the extension of the socialist revolution, and the more favorable military logistics for imperialism, here, than was the case on the island of Cuba.

We would make a serious miscalculation, too, if we leave out of our picture the predominantly nationalist outlook of the FSLN. We would seriously err were we to equate their level of internationalism with authentic proletarian internationalism. This is not in any way a moral judgment. The evidence, exemplified by Jaime Wheelock’s campaigning for the bourgeois PRI in the recent Mexican elections, indicate this to be a simple statement of fact. (Neither, on the other hand, should we rule out an evolution toward proletarian internationalist consciousness.) But in the meantime support for the PRI reveals the FSLN’s reliance on the “anti-imperialist” Mexican bourgeoisie. To win the favor of the Mexican bourgeoisie they have, in effect, turned their backs on the Mexican workers. Similarly in regard to the developing political revolution in Poland the Sandinistas turn their backs on the Polish workers so as to win the support of the Stalinist bureaucracy.

Perhaps the best way to pose the question regarding the current stage of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua is this: Is the Sandinista regime today still at the stage the Castroist regime was at up to the autumn of 1959; that is, an essentially coalition capitalist government? Or has it indeed made the kind of break with capitalism that we observed in Cuba marking its shift over to a

workers and farmers government in late 1959? Whichever conclusion one draws, the extent of the dispute over the current phase reached is significantly lessened with this more closely defined historical analogy.

Actually, this theoretical question should be essentially one of factual determination.

The evidence brought forward by those who argue that the transition to a workers' state is under way is not convincing. There can be no doubt that serious ruptures with *sectors* of the anti-Somoza bourgeoisie have taken place since July 1979. But it is now over three years since the time marked by the Usec. minority and two years since the Usec. majority determined the workers and farmers government phase had been reached. The documentation since then of forward movement is scanty and contradictory. A "workers and farmers government" conceived as a prolonged stage of marking revolutionary-time is not useful and is misleading. (Just as a "pregnancy" unusually prolonged and lacking the normal physical symptoms of biological gestation deserves at least closer observation.) It opens the door to adopting the concept of an "in-between" revolution which history has shown is not possible and, furthermore, becomes an objective rationalization for maintaining the status quo.

But even so, the label workers and farmers government is a secondary question that changes little if we agree that a program of transitional demands is needed to point and drive the revolution forward in Nicaragua. In the hands of the Usec. minority, however, the term has become a euphemism for the Stalinist version of the democratic dictatorship — the popular front.

The logic of the transitional program in Nicaragua

The most alarming development are the rationalizations for marking revolutionary time in Nicaragua advanced within our movement. This is best exemplified by endorsement of the Sandinista "mixed economy" strategy. It is not the effect on the course of the Nicaraguan revolution that should mainly concern us; our influence there is unfortunately minuscule. It is the consequences of adaptation to the pragmatism of Nicaraguan revolutionaries that can have profoundly disorienting effects on our policy everywhere else!

The rationalizations run along these lines: If the Sandinistas "at this time" took the road toward establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat ("the revolution is not a cup of instant coffee" theme) it would be an adventure that could only end in disaster. First, the argument goes, the "premature" expropriation of Nicaraguan and imperialist capital would land the revolution in a mess because of the backwardness of its economy, the inadequate levels of worker-peasant consciousness, and the workers' technical incapacity today to manage industry. Moving ahead, "at this time," to the actual dictatorship of the proletariat would, accordingly, send the economy into a steep decline; imperialist loans necessary to maintain the solvency of the Nicaraguan economy would be cut off, aggravating and deepening the danger of a counterrevolutionary overthrow in the resulting crisis. Imperialist intervention would be both provoked and eased.

These arguments lead to rationalizing an indefinite postponement of the socialist "stage"!

Can we really expect the Nicaraguan economy to get significantly better on the present capitalist basis? This expectation violates a basic tenet of Lenin's *Imperialism*, not to mention permanent revolution. Imperialist capital, now spoon-fed to Nicaragua, will not lend itself to the economic development of an independent Nicaragua.

We don't wish to quibble; but no one in our movement, to our knowledge, proposes "instant nationalizations." It is true, however, that the mobilization of the workers to establish real control

over industry and the big capitalist farms, as well as a thoroughgoing revolution in the agrarian sector, would certainly set force and counter-force into motion that could only be resolved favorably by the overthrow of capitalism in Nicaragua.

Is imperialism waiting for the propitious moment for decisive counterrevolutionary intervention? Yes, of course! But they don't expect Nicaragua to get stronger. They expect it to get weaker so long as the revolution marks time. Isn't it reasonable to judge that if imperialism thought otherwise, the aid provided by western European imperialism as well as from bourgeois Arab and Latin American regimes would be sharply reduced and even cut-off?

How is the level of worker-peasant consciousness to be raised if not in the course of ascending mobilizations aiming to advance their vital class interests? How will the workers be prepared for self-management of industry and the big capitalist farms if not in the school of workers control?

Perhaps the fear is that workers control will provoke greater capitalist sabotage? That is indubitable. But workers control is the only real means to halt the *current* sabotage and *current* decapitalization by the "patriotic" capitalists. Class consciousness would be heightened by the development of democratic, soviet or Commune-style political institutions of workers power. Of course its logic leads inexorably toward the dictatorship of the proletariat "at this time."

Would all this contribute to triggering overt imperialist military intervention? Perhaps, and perhaps not. That depends on many other political factors like the development, or not of a proletarian internationalist course such as was initiated by the Bolsheviks to defend and advance — more precisely, to defend *through* advancing — the world socialist revolution. In any case, is there any doubt of imperialist intentions to intervene militarily, if they can, and when it suits them?

In any case, too, isn't the revolution in Nicaragua ultimately doomed unless it can find its way forward beyond a "mixed economy" to a thoroughgoing agrarian revolution, through workers and peasants control over production, toward nationalization, planning, and a monopoly of foreign trade? And, finally, toward a genuine proletarian internationalism — a world party of socialist revolution?

In a sense, much of the discussion on Nicaragua is a diversion introduced by those who have lost confidence in the Transitional Program and method and the future of the Fourth International. The outcome of the class struggle in Nicaragua, as important as every battle of the international working class is, is subordinate to a strategy of world socialist revolution. If we see Nicaragua in isolation from the world revolution, the future there would appear bleak. Even the socialist revolution in Nicaragua will not bring instant solutions. Imperialist capital, it must be taken for granted, will be cut off in that event. The Soviet bureaucracy may not be willing to fill that gap as they did in Cuba: They may not be prepared to bear the cost of subsidizing a Nicaraguan workers state. We know they don't want to! They may not at this time be willing to risk challenging the U.S. imperialists on "their" turf. The *fact* is the Soviet bureaucracy is withholding real aid now!

Isn't the key to the revolutionary future clear? Doesn't historical necessity cry out for the construction of the world party of socialist revolution everywhere, including in Nicaragua and Cuba? Won't our perspective, our strategy, of world revolution make eminent sense and point the way forward to the best fighters in Nicaragua, Cuba — everywhere? This may not be an instant solution, but it's the only ultimate solution!

The Usec. minority thesis serves Stalinism

The Barnes-Jenness-Clark revisionism serves the "theoretical"

constructions of another school of politics. It serves the ideological rationalizations of the Bonapartist bureaucracies in the degenerated and deformed workers states. Having chopped the democratic political content out of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Stalinists reduce "socialism" exclusively to its proletarian forms of property ownership. Stalinism could readily embrace a "theory" of socialist revolution based on "two qualitative turning points," but hardly a third — the overthrow of bureaucratic rule, the establishment of soviet forms of workers political power: the political revolution!

It is this Stalinist amputation — both in life and in theory — of the democratic political forms from the workers state that is central to the concept of degeneration and deformation. Only by amputating or suppressing the institutions of political democracy could the Bonapartist bureaucracies subordinate all policy — national and international — to its parasitic caste interests. The state cannot even begin to wither away under bureaucratic dictatorship. It is impossible to *continue the transition* from capitalism to socialism without the direct democratic rule of the workers themselves. Only then is it possible to institute a proletarian internationalist foreign policy.

A "proletarian internationalist" policy conceived *only* as a military extension of the revolution, is neither a *policy* of extension nor is it *proletarian* internationalist.

A proletarian internationalist policy of extending the revolution through a class struggle political program — along with the necessary military measures — cannot truly be developed by a workers government without the institutionalized forms of genuine workers democracy.

Did Joe Hansen inspire the break with permanent revolution?

Barnes-Jenness go to great pains to rationalize the Stalinist version of Lenin's outmoded formula of the Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Peasantry (DDPP). At the same time the concept of "Workers and Farmers Government" is presented as a popular designation for the DDPP, following closely in the footsteps of the Stalinist "Red Professors" who applied this term to the Kuomintang government in the course of the 1925-27 Chinese Revolution.

The Workers and Farmers government, Barnes-Jenness-Clark style, is consequently given a meaning diametrically opposed to that given in the Transitional Program. Barnes-Jenness-Clark claim that the new version of the Workers and Farmers Government concept was initially developed by Joseph Hansen in connection with his writing on the Chinese Revolution. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Joe Hansen was one of the most consistent defenders of Leninist-Trotskyist positions on many fronts. He helped to teach a generation of Trotskyists, in the post WWII period, the invaluable political and theoretical conquests of our movement.

He attempted, before he died, to clarify further some fuzzy links in our theoretical chain. In an SWP convention report and in an educational exchange of letters with Bob Chester, he attempted to grapple with the logic of the transition to socialist revolution in China and in similar social convulsions where the exceptional conditions of capitalist decay enabled petty-bourgeois led forces to go further than they intended. He sought to determine the link between a coalition capitalist government presiding over a capitalist state and its transformation into a deformed workers state without any substantial alteration of the main governmental personnel.

In setting back, from 1952 or 1953 to 1949, the point of transformation of the Mao regime into a Workers and Farmers Government, Joe Hansen sought to provide the key to this theoretical link. Implicitly, by this re-dating he attempts to provide a mate-

rial foundation for his thesis by pointing to the objective anti-capitalist momentum set off in the course of defeating and destroying vital elements of capitalist rule in China: the Kuomintang army, government, and key elements of its administrative apparatus. Hansen explained that "A party or team that gains governmental power thereby gains the *possibility* of smashing the old state structure and overturning capitalism" (emphasis added). This is an important contribution. He even poses a possibility that the "Workers and Farmers" character of the Maoist regime goes back even further than 1949.

Both hypothetical earlier datings pose more problems than they solve from the point of view of a consistent theoretical view. It points away from the essential line that emerges from the post WWII Trotskyist analysis of events: That is, with the exception of Cuba, a programmatic counterrevolutionary political force — Stalinism — was compelled in a series of exceptional circumstances to go further along the road to socialist revolution than it intended.

Joe Hansen's speculative re-datings were never developed by him. It would be an absurdity to believe he was oblivious of the pitfalls flowing from his speculations. He, one can hardly doubt, would not expect us to accept his speculative remarks as anything more than just that. He would have expected us to wait until he, or others, found the time to set down in writing his hypothesis, thought through to the end.

Moreover, Hansen's almost passing comments on the moment of birth of the Workers and Farmers government in China is not in accord with his analysis of Cuban events. Hansen's writings on the theory of the Cuban revolution remain a model of Marxist analysis. One cannot take seriously any implications by latter-day "interpreters" that Hansen dumped his materialist analysis of the dynamics of the Cuban revolution in a few speculative sentences. Most importantly, Hansen's theoretical contributions were intended to explain the *exceptional and distorted* course of events since the second world war, which occurred on the *fringes* of imperialist power, within the framework of the theory of permanent revolution.

But in any case, Hansen, in seeking to further clarify our theoretical understanding of Chinese and similar revolutionary developments, never anywhere suggests or even hints that the Maoist policy up to or after 1949 was other than Stalinist. Neither did Hansen ever, in any sense, justify, support or rationalize the Maoist policy of holding back the Chinese Revolution to the democratic stage up to 1952-53.

Why revise the orthodox Trotskyist view of the workers and farmers government "as a short episode on the road to the actual dictatorship of the proletariat"? Why shift to the Stalinist version of the "workers and farmers government" presiding over a prolonged democratic stage that is in opposition to the dictatorship of the proletariat? Why do Barnes-Jenness-Clark theoretically discount the political necessity of a program of transitional demands to carry the revolution forward today in the under-developed countries — and now with the Barnes Draft Report, in the United States itself? It can only be the consequence of rejecting permanent revolution, the transitional program and method and its organizational expression — the Fourth International.

Events confirm once again that the method of the Transitional Program comes from life itself. The massive Iranian overthrow of the shah, the mass mobilizations that brought the Polish workers to the brink of political revolution are renewed evidence that the Transitional Program and method, properly applied, most effectively raise the sails of revolution to capture the winds of historical necessity.

The world party of socialist revolution: nothing less will do!

The Cuban Revolution and the revolutionary developments in

Central America constitute a confirmation of the conquests of revolutionary Marxist theory preserved and developed by the Fourth International. The overthrow of capitalism in Cuba by fresh non-Stalinist revolutionaries of action confirms the objective decay of world capitalism and its subjective expression: permanent revolution.

The continuing emergence of new revolutionary forces in the Caribbean and in Central America is further confirmation of our revolutionary perspective. On the other hand, the failure of pragmatic revolutionary activists — not to mention Social Democratic and Stalinist reformists — to succeed in the struggle against capitalism in the main bastions of imperialism is equal confirmation of the continued deadly potency of the wounded capitalist tiger. The successes against capitalism at its weakest links under conditions of extreme decay should not blind us to the absolute impotency of petty bourgeois coalitionist strategy in the strongholds of capitalist power. All variations on stagism — coalitions based on “anti-imperialism,” “anti-oligarchism,” “anti-monopoly,” i.e., the popular front — have failed dismally and repeatedly in the decisive centers of capitalism. And even in the colonial and semi-colonial world, defeats resulting from the strategy of coalitionism are far more numerous than victories. Victories, which are in any case, in contradiction to the stagist strategy.

All the evidence points ever more insistently to the need to construct the world party of socialist revolution as the programmatic and organizational instrument without which the socialist future will remain a utopian dream. The construction of Leninist combat parties based on the Transitional Program and method remains our central task.

The factor of time

Time is just as much a central component of the social process as it is in every other physical process. We don't have all the time in the world! The warning: Socialism or barbarism! has apocalyptic meaning today, more than ever before. We will not make it to socialism through empirical trial and error. This can only lead to an unnecessary repetition of the fatal errors of the past. The time thus lost increases the probability of a capitalist-triggered nuclear holocaust.

The construction of national sections in every country in the world based on the Transitional Program and method is the only road to victory for the world working class and to preserve the future of the human race.

The biggest mistake that can be made is to adopt the Cuban road as a *model* for world socialist revolution. When the Cubans elevate the pragmatic course they followed in their revolution up to a model for the guidance of workers everywhere, it may be an understandable mistake, perhaps. But if we were to adopt their stagist strategy it would be more than a mistake; it would be a calamity.

Is the adaptation to Castroism conceived as a tactical maneuver? Barnes sometimes seems to imply that interpretation in his Draft Report. I don't think so. But even were it so, it is a monumental disservice to revolutionaries in Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua and El Salvador — everywhere — to patronize them: To seek to “win” them over by adapting to their misconceptions;

to hold back from giving our opinions because “we haven't led the revolution.” We would default in our duty to our class, to our comrades in the struggle, were we to follow the Usec. minority's slavish tailending of Castroist policies. We need not fear alienating serious revolutionaries and worker militants. They will take our application of historical lessons to current political problems for what they are worth. Only scoundrels like the Stalinists and Social Democrats take umbrage at our “interference” — rejecting our contributions out of hand.

Most importantly, our own cadres everywhere, are invaluablely educated in the course of serious analysis of unfolding events. On the other hand, the miseducation of our own cadres resulting from a policy of cheering revolutionary fighters on with patronizing applause, empty of critical content, far outweighs any gains that might be claimed. It will impress no one, least of all serious militants and revolutionaries. Worst of all, the inevitable extension of the line flowing from the Castroist model beyond Central America would be calamitous in its consequences.

Adopting the Usec. minority line, that one or another variation of the theory of stages is the road to world revolution, will result in the programmatic and organizational liquidation of the Fourth International. The chances for reaching our revolutionary goal would be immeasurably reduced.

* * *

In conclusion: Applying the revised concept of “workers and farmers government” to the U.S. itself is glaring evidence of the direction in which Barnes-Jenness-Clark are racing. The otherwise inexplicable notion that only after the establishment of a “workers and farmers government” can the mobilization of the workers through soviet-like institutions really begin (how is this miracle to be accomplished in the U.S.?), conceals a stagist orientation. It is mere left-sounding phraseology. The intimate and organic connection between soviets and governmental power is broken. The notion of a (Cuba-like?) battle for governmental power is projected in the Barnes report as being carried through by a “workers and farmers government” which

... will still confront the task, under whatever concrete conditions it inherits, of organizing, mobilizing, and educating the working people to expropriate the bourgeoisie, institute workers control, and expand workers management as the basis for economic planning, and govern the country. In the process, (after the capitalists have been defeated in a civil war — N.W.) the class struggle will deepen and differentiations (now there will be differentiations? — N.W.) will take place, culminating in the consolidation of a workers state that will initiate the transition to socialism.

This is in opposition to the Russian revolutionary model. It is opposed to permanent revolution. It is stagism applied to the U.S. itself. This conception, whatever the authors' intentions, serves as a theoretical bridge toward coalition politics.

The SWP now, on the basis of the Jenness-Barnes documents, has made a fundamental revision of our program. This is the course the Usec. minority proposes for the Fourth International. Only bad things can come from this theoretical mischief, if allowed to follow its logic to the end. It must be rejected.

The Revolution in Central America and the Caribbean and Its Place in the International Class Struggle

by Frank Lovell and Steve Bloom

[The following article represents the views of the Fourth Internationalist Caucus, a political tendency in the SWP National Committee comprised of Steve Bloom and Frank Lovell.]

There is a new consciousness among working people the world over as a result of the deepest economic crisis since the 1930s. This has forced austerity programs in the imperialist centers (through threats of layoffs and plant closings, as well as through direct government cutbacks), in the colonial and semi-colonial countries (imposed by the International Monetary Fund as a pre-condition for further credit), and in the bureaucratized workers states (through the state power controlled by the bureaucracy itself).

The struggles, both big and small, of working people against these attacks on their living standards, and against the governments which enforce these attacks, combined with the other fights — for self-determination of oppressed nations, for civil liberties and human rights, and against oppression of all kinds — forms a single, common class struggle on a world scale. The victory of the Canadian Chrysler workers, the toppling of Somoza in Nicaragua, of the Shah of Iran, the continued resistance of the Polish workers, all contribute to an unstable international situation which forces the imperialist bourgeoisie and its allies — the neo-colonial ruling classes and the Stalinist and Social Democratic bureaucracies — to fight a war on many fronts, thus making a decisive counterrevolutionary victory on any one of them much more difficult. Today, more than ever before, it is the interrelationship and interconnections between the three sectors of the world revolution that will be decisive for every struggle.

An understanding of the broad sweep of the international capitalist crisis and its myriad forms and manifestations, the varied opportunities it poses for revolutionary Marxists, its impact on all three sectors of the world revolution, and the links between those sectors, can help us see why it is one-sided to say simply, as the central leadership of the SWP does, that Nicaragua and the Central American revolution are the epicenter of all politics in the world today; why it is wrong to conclude that other struggles are subordinate. Grenada, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, etc. are central, but just as important they are also component parts of a larger revolutionary process. Each element in this process has its own specific dynamics. But each one is related to, and to a large degree dependent on the others.

Events in Central America take place in an international context which creates major difficulties for the counterrevolutionary efforts of the imperialist powers, unlike the days when the U.S. could simply invade a country (Guatemala, 1954, or the Dominican Republic, 1965) or during the beginning phase of the Vietnam conflict. The revolutionary struggles in Central America and the Caribbean contribute to, and gain from, the many other developments in the international class struggle.

By correctly grasping this overall character of the world revolutionary process — the context of the dramatic and important events going on in Central America and in Grenada — we can properly appreciate the specific developments taking place in that part of the world. In Nicaragua and Grenada proletarian revolutionary forces have taken governmental power and are wielding it in the interests of the workers and peasants, against the interests of imperialism and the native ruling classes. The workers' and peasants' governments in these countries have taken measures to consolidate the power of the toilers: organizing, mobiliz-

ing, and arming the masses; and undertaking extensive campaigns to raise their level of cultural and political understanding. Although a decisive showdown has not yet occurred with the still dominant economic power of the bourgeoisie, the general trend is in the direction of the creation of a workers' state resting on nationalized property.

In El Salvador we see similar revolutionary forces in the FMLN-FDR who have a perspective of conquering governmental power as the Sandinistas did in Nicaragua; and there appears to be every likelihood of their success. The revolutionary-proletarian forces in the FMLN-FDR are moving forward with this perspective, and have rejected subordination of their struggle to the more "moderate" interests of their bourgeois and petty-bourgeois coalition partners. It is in this respect that the FMLN-FDR differs qualitatively from popular front coalitions between workers' and bourgeois parties.

Similar struggles, with similar potential, though at a much more preliminary stage of development, are occurring in other countries in the region, such as Guatemala.

The influence and importance of Cuba in all of these revolutions is enormous. The forces leading all of these developments are a part of what has come to be called the Castroist current, and the course of the Central American and Caribbean revolution decisively demonstrates what we have always pointed to as the basic revolutionary character of this current — its determination to fight for the needs of the masses, and its refusal to subordinate those needs to any kind of deal with imperialism.

We have also recognized, and must continue to recognize, that Castroism, as a distinct ideological current, suffers from a number of theoretical and programmatic weaknesses resulting from its specific historical development and the dependence of the Cuban workers' state on the USSR for material assistance. These weaknesses have resulted, in cases like Chile for example, in political support by the Castroists to the Allende regime, which contributed to the political disarming of the Chilean masses. Similar policies have been followed with regard to bourgeois political figures such as Velasco in Peru, Torrijos in Panama, and Manley in Jamaica. But up to now it has not been its weaknesses, but the proletarian revolutionary perspectives of this current which have proven decisive for the specific conditions in Central America and the Caribbean today.

The course of the revolutions in Nicaragua and Grenada, like the Cuban revolution before them, stand as striking confirmation of the theory of permanent revolution as developed by Leon Trotsky, and defended over the years by the Fourth International. Many have charged that permanent revolution is deficient in its understanding of the need for an alliance with the peasantry, and also that it misunderstands the question of whether socialist or national-democratic tasks will predominate in the initial stages of a revolutionary process in the less developed countries. But the difference between permanent revolution and all counterposed strategies for the colonial revolution has, in reality, nothing to do with these questions. These are slanders, first launched by Stalin, and repeated since the 1920s by all opponents of revolutionary Marxism. Such accusations cannot be substantiated, and in fact will be thoroughly refuted by any serious study of Trotsky's

writings, or of the programmatic documents and practice of the Fourth International.

The real difference between permanent revolution and other revolutionary strategies is over what kind of government can forge the worker-peasant alliance and carry out even the national and bourgeois-democratic tasks of the revolution. Since the Russian revolution of 1917 and the Chinese revolution of 1925-27, revolutionary Marxists have definitively answered this question by saying that only a government dominated by the proletariat can accomplish these tasks. This is the *form* that the alliance of the workers and peasants takes. And although such a government may *begin* by concentrating on bourgeois-democratic tasks, it cannot limit itself to these, and will in fact be immediately faced with the necessity of taking measures against bourgeois property.

The validity of this perspective is confirmed by the experiences in Central America and the Caribbean today. As these revolutions deepen and develop it becomes clearer and clearer that the only real alternatives available in the colonial world are between continued subservience to the rule of imperialism and the world market on the one hand, and a decisive break with this tyranny and the establishment of a workers' state based on nationalized property and a planned economy on the other. Only a predominantly proletarian government can clearly and resolutely move forward with this perspective. It is the proletarian revolutionary character of the FSLN and the NJM which makes the further progress of these revolutions possible.

LENIN AND THE THEORY OF "DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP"

A Reply to Doug Jenness

By Les Evans

In the November [1981] issue of the *International Socialist Review* an article appeared by Doug Jenness, an editor of the *Militant*, entitled "How Lenin Saw the Russian Revolution." This article attempted to trace the development of Lenin's views on the problems of revolutionary strategy in Russia from the 1905 revolution through the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 and the early years of the Soviet state. The article is quite strange in a number of respects. Many of Lenin's principal contributions to the Bolshevik victory in Russia are passed over in silence or with cursory mention. This includes Lenin's concept of the democratically centralized combat workers party, traditionally believed by Marxists to be his single most important contribution to communist strategy; his use of the tactic of "revolutionary defeatism" in wartime; his attitude toward the building of a multinational party in the tsarist "prison house of nations"; his electoral tactics in relation to bourgeois opposition parties such as the Cadets; his views on the relationship between dictatorship and democracy; and his stress on the need for a world party of socialist revolution as an essential framework for the activity of national sections.

One glaring omission from the article is any mention of the positions developed in Lenin's famous *State and Revolution* for the construction of the new Soviet state along the lines of the Paris Commune, with the working class having from the outset control over its representatives and state

This does not say anything about the exact tempo of development in any specific case, the exact forms of class alliances, or what concessions might be necessary or desirable for such a proletarian government. But the overall direction in which the revolution must move is clear — it must create a workers' state, or it will be destroyed. The Castroist leadership in Cuba correctly solved this problem. The New Jewel Movement and the Sandinistas show every indication of doing the same. El Salvador, Guatemala, etc. will also be unable to find any other solution to meeting the demands of the masses if the revolutionary forces succeed in conquering power, and this will be the natural course of these revolutions — following the example of the Cubans, Nicaraguans, and Grenadans before them.

Revolutionary Marxists, particularly in the United States, must demonstrate our whole-hearted and unconditional support for the revolutionary process unfolding in Central America and the Caribbean. We can do this by mobilizing direct political and material support, as well as by building the broadest possible united front opposition to U.S. aid for counterrevolutionary forces, or direct intervention by Washington with its own troops. Supporting the struggles of the Grenadans, Nicaraguans, Salvadorans, and other peoples against imperialism and for socialism is an inherent part of fighting for the socialist revolution in the United States of America.

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officials. Parallel to this, no mention is made of Lenin's last desperate battle to halt the rise of the Stalinist privileged caste within the victorious revolution, and his co-founding with Leon Trotsky of the organized opposition to the growing bureaucracy within the Communist Party, which marked the origin of the movement today known as "Trotskyism." In fact, the bureaucratic degeneration of the Soviet Union is not referred to at all and one has to be familiar with other writings by Doug Jenness to be certain that he does not think the present Soviet leadership represents a continuity of Lenin's policies.

This silence would be strange enough from a leader of the Trotskyist movement if Jenness limited his discussion of the Russian revolution to Lenin's lifetime; but he does not do so. He offers an assessment of the legacy of Lenin and the October revolution in the present Soviet state:

"It is precisely because of this change in the relationship of forces made possible by the Russian people that imperialism has not been able to crush the Chinese, Cuban, and Indochinese revolutions, which at crucial moments have received military and economic aid from the Soviet workers state."

This statement is half true, and as Lenin was fond of saying, what is half true is basically false. It is true that the planned economy of the Soviet Union — and not only of the Soviet Union, but also of China and of the other bureaucratically deformed workers states — adds weight to the

worldwide anticapitalist struggle. But it is equally true that the ruling Stalinist bureaucratic caste plays an essentially counterrevolutionary role in world politics, and that the aid it sometimes provides to revolutions against imperialism is a wholly subordinate feature of its foreign policy, which the Russian people had had nothing to say about since the mid-1920s. If, as Jenness says, Soviet aid has saved some revolutions from imperialism, many more revolutions were destroyed as a consequence of the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracies, giving imperialism a new lease on life that it could not otherwise have expected.

Under Stalin, the Soviet government was responsible for the defeat of revolutions in China in the 1920s, Germany and Spain in the 1930s, and France, Italy, and Greece in the 1940s, to mention only a few examples. Moscow *withdrew* its aid from China in 1960, at a crucial juncture in the attacks on China by U.S. imperialism. And as Che Guevara correctly said of the Vietnamese revolution:

"North American imperialism is guilty of aggression. Its crimes are immense and known to the whole world. We already know this, gentlemen!

"But they are likewise guilty who at the decisive moment vacillated in making Vietnam an inviolable part of the socialist territory — yes, at the risk of a war of global scale, but also compelling the North American imperialists to make a decision.

"And they are guilty who keep up a war of insults and tripping each other, begun some time ago by the representatives of the two big powers in the socialist camp."¹

Since then, the Chinese government, which, no less than the Soviet government, still rests on the planned economy issuing from a mighty socialist revolution, has waged war on the Vietnamese workers state in open coordination with the interests of U.S. imperialism. And the Soviet government today is attempting to strangle the socialist aspirations of the Polish working class. Perhaps Jenness has left something out here.

Jenness versus Trotsky

The great majority of the Jenness article is devoted to elaborating one aspect of Lenin's thinking on the Russian revolution: his use of the slogan of a "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry," first put forward by the Bolsheviks in the spring of 1905. Jenness presents this as though it were the very essence of Leninism. Moreover, he insists that from 1905 to the end, Lenin never changed his position on the validity and class content of this slogan. Jenness writes:

"The course projected by the Bolsheviks [in 1905] gave an accurate portrayal of the line of march the Russian workers would follow and how the revolution would unfold. It armed them to participate effectively in the class struggle and to assume a leadership role in the revolution."

Leon Trotsky, in his article "Three Concepts of the Russian Revolution," written in 1939, presented a different appraisal:

"The perspective of Menshevism was false to the core: it pointed out an entirely different road for the proletariat. The perspective of Bolshevism was not complete: it indicated correctly the general direction of the struggle but characterized its stages incorrectly. The inadequacy of the perspective of Bolshevism was not revealed in 1905 only because the revolution itself did not receive further devel-

opment. But at the beginning of 1917 Lenin was compelled, in a direct struggle against the oldest cadres of the party, to change the perspective."²

Can Lenin's views on the class forces in the coming Russian revolution be characterized as simple continuity from 1905 onward, as Jenness maintains, or was Trotsky right that Lenin substantially modified his perspective in the spring of 1917?

Let us begin our examination by restating the terms of the debate among the Russian Marxists in the 1905 period. For more than two decades the Russian followers of Marx had waged a political struggle against their chief opponents on the left, the petty-bourgeois populists, organized first in the "People's Will," the Narodniks, and, after 1900, in the Socialist Revolutionary Party. The populists maintained that the class distinctions between workers and peasants should be ignored, since both classes were "toilers." They insisted that the peasant majority in Russia was a prosocialist class and that Russia, unlike Western Europe, could skip the stage of capitalist development and proceed directly from the overthrow of the semifeudal tsarist autocracy to the creation of a socialist state based on rural peasant communal land ownership, which had survived from medieval times.

The Marxists replied that far from escaping a stage of capitalist development, tsarist Russia was already capitalist, albeit still burdened with a medieval landed aristocracy and bureaucratic state machine of an "Asiatic" type. The development of capitalism had already destroyed the vitality of the peasant commune.

The Marxists made a different assessment of the peasantry on a more fundamental ground as well. They said that the peasants were not a prosocialist class, but a class of petty proprietors, who could, as a whole, be brought into a struggle against the tsar and the aristocracy around demands for land reform, an end to semifeudal survivals, and the creation of a democratic capitalist state, but not in support of socialism as such. These ideas were worked out most fully by George Plekhanov, the founder of Russian Marxism. Plekhanov argued that the coming revolution in Russia, as a result of the numerical weakness of the working class, would be essentially a *bourgeois* revolution like the French revolution of 1789-93. The creation of a modern capitalist republic would set the stage for an economic development like that of Western Europe under which the Russian working class could begin the long process of gathering the forces necessary for a later socialist revolution.

Plekhanov maintained that the natural leader of a bourgeois revolution was the bourgeoisie, and looked to the liberal capitalists to play the central part in the struggle against the tsarist autocracy. In 1905, Lenin and the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party proposed a radical modification of this perspective of the party, advancing the idea that the bourgeois revolution could and should be led by a revolutionary coalition of the working class and the peasantry, not by the half-hearted capitalist liberals.

Jenness basically picks up the debate at this point. But he leaves out of his article any reference to the theoretical underpinning of this discussion — *why* did all the Russian Marxists believe that only a bourgeois and not a socialist revolution was possible in Russia, and what did they mean by this? By omitting this essential dimension of the debate,

Jenness limits his presentation to the tactics employed by the Bolsheviks to cement an alliance with the peasantry between 1905 and 1919. Since Lenin's tactics were always to unite the working class with the peasant masses in struggle, Jenness emerges from his exposition with the appearance of simple continuity in Bolshevik thought and action from 1905 onward.

Jenness seems to pursue his examination on the basis of projecting backward in time the assumption of the present-day Trotskyist movement that socialist revolution is possible in a backward country. This leads him to treat Lenin's 1905 distinction between a bourgeois and socialist revolution as merely two closely interrelated aspects of a single process, as we would see it today, in which the passage from one "stage" to the next is simply a matter of education and organization of the oppressed in struggle, without objective limitations that sharply separate the two stages in time. The "bourgeois" revolution is reduced to a political tactic of alliances: bloc with the whole of the peasantry until the landowners and the monarchy are defeated, then shift to an alliance with the poor peasants, which can rapidly isolate the procapitalist sector of the well-to-do peasantry.

This pattern of successive alliances is, of course, correct and played an important part in the Bolshevik October Revolution in 1917. It is also true, as Jenness points out, that the shift from a bloc with the peasantry as a whole to a bloc with the poor peasants was not completed until the autumn of 1918, and until that time the essential social content of the Russian revolution remained bourgeois in a sociological sense. But that leaves unanswered the question of the class character of the government that issued from the revolution. Was it to be a workers government or a two-class government? How did this key governmental question fit into Lenin's concept of the system of alliances with sectors of the peasantry? Did he have the same opinion in 1917 that he had in 1905? To answer these questions it is necessary to first examine Plekhanov's economic theory of the bourgeois revolution in Russia, a theory that all the Russian Marxists shared in common, including Lenin.

The Plekhanov Framework

George Plekhanov had imbued the Russian Marxists with an outlook that in retrospect we would call an economic-determinist distortion of Marxism — although in all fairness, the socialist movement had no experience in revolutions outside Europe, in relatively backward countries, from which to make a more rounded judgment. In addition, the rapid industrialization in Russia from the 1890s into the first decade of the twentieth century vitiated the plausibility of Plekhanov's prognosis, which was not so wrong in 1884 as it was in 1905. Nevertheless, it took the Russian Marxists some considerable time to rethink the inherited orthodoxy and draw the appropriate conclusions.

In 1884, in his book *Our Differences*, Plekhanov wrote:

"... let us picture to ourselves a country in which large-scale industry is as yet only aspiring to supremacy while commodity production has already become the basis of the economy; in other words, let us transport ourselves into a petty-bourgeois country. What economic task will face the 'self-governing people in that case'? Primarily, and exclusively, the task of guaranteeing the interests of the small individual producers, since that is the class which forms the

majority of the people. But following that path you cannot avoid either capitalism or the domination of the big bourgeoisie, for the objective logic of commodity production itself will take care to transform the small individual producers into wage-labourers on the one side and bourgeois employers on the other. When that transformation has taken place, the working class will of course use all political means in a deadly fight against the bourgeoisie. But then the mutual relations of the classes in society will become sharply defined, the working class will take the place of 'the people' and self-government of the people will change into the dictatorship of the proletariat."³

Plainly, in Plekhanov's perspective, the democratic, bourgeois revolution must be followed by long years of capitalist development to transform the very class composition of the country. Only then will the dictatorship of the proletariat cease to be a utopian and ultraleft idea. He does not conceive of any possible purely political action or bloc of class forces that can move from the bourgeois revolution to a socialist revolution without going through that objective, long-term economic reconstruction of the class relationship of forces.

We know today, and have known basically since the Bolshevik October Revolution, that this prognosis is wrong. But the Russian Marxists, including Lenin, did not know it was wrong in 1905. Jenness selectively quotes from Lenin in the 1905 period in such a way as to blur Lenin's thinking on this question, to make it sound more like the mature Bolshevism of 1917, which had discarded Plekhanov's economic-determinist restrictions on the potential of the revolution. He is able to do this only by omitting Lenin's definition of the democratic revolution, and by dropping any reference to Trotsky, as Trotsky was the first of the Russian Marxists to break decisively with the Plekhanov framework and advance the idea that the direct struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat was possible in backward Russia — his celebrated theory of permanent revolution.

Jenness correctly outlines the difference between the revolutionary Bolsheviks and the reformist Mensheviks over the class forces to be blocked with in the 1905 revolution. But he does not record accurately the significance of the bourgeois limitations of the revolution in the expectations of both sides. Plekhanov and the Mensheviks, as Jenness says, insisted that because the revolution was basically a bourgeois revolution, that its natural leader was the liberal bourgeoisie. They maintained that the Russian Social Democrats, as the Marxists called themselves then, should aid the bourgeoisie in the struggle against tsarism but not enter a provisional revolutionary government that might issue from the struggle. This flowed from Plekhanov's belief that a long historical period of capitalist development was needed before a workers government would be possible. A workers party, Plekhanov maintained, would compromise itself by taking responsibility for administering a capitalist government, even one created in revolutionary struggle.

Lenin rejected this view, but not, as Jenness implies, on the grounds that socialist revolution was possible in Russia.* Lenin in fact strongly denied that. What he did say was

*Jenness succeeds in muddying the waters a bit on Lenin's actual perspective by mixing up together quotations written many years apart at different stages of Lenin's thought. For

that the bourgeoisie was seeking a rotten compromise with the monarchy and would not carry through to the end the fight for a democratic bourgeois republic. Lenin looked for allies to the peasantry. He counterposed to the Mensheviks' strategy his call for a "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" that would lead the democratic revolution and dominate the government created by it. But Lenin still regarded the preponderant weight of the peasantry in Russian society as an objective and absolute bar to the direct fight for a workers government committed to a socialist perspective, without a very complex and possibly very prolonged intermediate stage in which capitalism as an economic system would remain unchallenged. Trotsky, in the 1939 article cited above, spelled out both the advance in Lenin's new position, the "democratic dictatorship" slogan, and its important limitations:

"Lenin's conception represented an enormous step forward insofar as it proceeded not from constitutional reforms but from the agrarian overturn as the central task of the revolution and singled out the only realistic combination of social forces for its accomplishment. The weak point of Lenin's conception, however, was the internally contradictory idea of the 'democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.' Lenin himself underscored the fundamental limitation of this 'dictatorship' when he openly called it *bourgeois*. By this he meant to say that for the sake of preserving its alliance with the peasantry the proletariat would in the coming revolution have to forego the direct posing of the socialist tasks. But this would signify the renunciation by the proletariat of its *own* dictatorship. Consequently, the gist of the matter involved the dictatorship of the peasantry even if with the participation of the workers."⁴

Until April 1917, Lenin functioned in the expectation that there would be two revolutions in Russia, more or less separated in time. The first of these would be fought by the working class in alliance with the peasantry as a whole against the monarchy and the landlords, with the bourgeoisie playing a neutral role. After the first revolution had solved the problems of the bourgeois stage — land reform, the cleansing of medieval survivals, the calling of a constituent assembly that would preside over a modern bourgeois-

example, the main citation from Lenin he uses on the correctness of the Bolsheviks' pre-1917 perspective is taken from "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," written in November 1918. The words Jenness cites are these:

"The alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry *in general* reveals the bourgeois character of the revolution, for the peasantry in general are small producers who stand on the basis of commodity production. Further, the Bolsheviks then added, the proletariat will join to itself *the entire semiproletariat* (all the toilers and exploited), will neutralize the middle peasantry and *overthrow* the bourgeoisie; this will be a Socialist revolution, as distinct from a bourgeois-democratic revolution."

Note carefully that this quotation does not mention the idea of a "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" as an intermediate governmental form, as Lenin advocated in the 1905 period. It also is taken from a stage in Lenin's life, after the October Revolution, when he had become convinced that the working class could dispense with both the multiclass regime and the extended economic transformation of the country in the democratic revolution, both of which he had considered to be prerequisites for the move onward to the socialist revolution in the 1905 period.

democratic republic, preparation for a second revolution would begin, aimed at the procapitalist sector of the peasantry, which would in turn have to be overthrown, along with the bourgeoisie as a property-owning class.

(Lenin occasionally speaks of *three* revolutions, in the event that the temporizing bourgeoisie did succeed in capturing the leadership of the democratic revolution and established a constitutional monarchy that failed to carry through the agrarian reform. This variant is basically what happened in the February 1917 revolution, but by that time Lenin decided to dispense with the "democratic dictatorship" stage.)

In the context of this "two revolution" concept, Lenin at various times expressed different expectations on the pace of the development and the factors that might tend to speed up the transition from the first to the second revolution. His most optimistic variant rested on the expectation that the bourgeois revolution in Russia would spark a socialist revolution in Western Europe, and that aid from the socialist proletariat in the West would give the workers' component in the "democratic dictatorship" a weight out of proportion to what he conceived of as its objective limitations as a minority class in Russia and permit a fairly rapid posing of the second, socialist, revolution. In that very favorable circumstance, the tactic of alliances with progressively poorer strata of the peasantry could be pursued as a purely political dynamic without waiting for the economic transformation of Russian society in the bourgeois stage. This very condensed variant of the two-stage process appears clearly in Lenin's writings only very briefly in the fall of 1905 and early in 1906. More commonly, as in his *Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, written in June-July 1905, and in his writings and speeches from the spring of 1906 onward, Lenin retains Plekhanov's 1884 position, modifying it only by the inclusion of the workers and peasants government, which would be compelled to preside over a long-term transformation in objective class relations, in the numerical weight of the proletarians, before any move could be made to even restrict, much less abolish, capitalism.

Jenness quotes only one side of these contradictory expectations. To indicate the range of Lenin's views on this question, let me repeat the most radical of his formulations from the 1905 period, presented by Jenness as though it was Lenin's definitive position:

"... from the democratic revolution we shall at once, and precisely in accordance with the measure of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organised proletariat, begin to pass to the socialist revolution. We stand for uninterrupted revolution. We shall not stop half-way. If we do not now and immediately promise all sorts of 'socialisation', that is because we know the actual conditions for that task to be accomplished, and we do not gloss over the new class struggle burgeoning within the peasantry, but reveal that struggle...."

"To try to calculate *now* what the combination of forces will be within the peasantry 'on the day after' the revolution (the democratic revolution) is empty utopianism.... [W]e shall bend every effort to help the entire peasantry achieve the democratic revolution, *in order thereby to make it easier for us*, the party of the proletariat, to pass on as quickly as possible to the new and higher task — the socialist revolution."⁵

This statement comes quite close, as close as he ever came before April 1917, to the idea of direct seizure of power by the workers party, drawing the peasantry in under its leadership — which was the course advocated by Trotsky from 1905, and the actual course followed by the Bolsheviks in the fall of 1917. It should be noted here, however, that Lenin is not talking about two sets of *tasks*, carried out in sequence by one revolutionary government, as, for example, we might today describe the pace of socialist vis-a-vis democratic measures after the Cuban or Nicaraguan revolutions. He is speaking of *two separate revolutions*. Now, pedants might tell us that a “revolution” is the transfer of property from one class to another, and that the final nationalization of capitalist property after an interim period following the overthrow of a capitalist dictatorship could be called a “revolution.” Plainly, Plekhanov in 1884 meant a distinct, separate, *real* revolution against a part of the forces that had participated in, and constituted a majority of, the antitsarist revolution. It seems clear to me that Lenin has the same idea in mind. That is, an actual revolution against the procapitalist sector of the peasantry who had participated in the “democratic dictatorship,” not just a sociological definition of a property seizure carried out by a more or less homogeneous revolutionary government. (This idea is spelled out with graphic simplicity hundreds of times in Lenin’s pre-1917 writings.)

Even at that, the above statement is almost unique in Lenin’s thinking before 1917 in its optimism about the pace of possibly moving from the democratic to the socialist revolutions. The quotation, in fact, has a particular history of its own that Jenness seems to be unaware of. It was later used by Stalin to deny that there was an evolution in Lenin’s thought between 1905 and 1917, in order to revalidate the discarded, two-stage, economic-determinist framework for use in class-collaborationist operations by the Soviet bureaucracy in China. As Trotsky wrote in his *History of the Russian Revolution*, after quoting the above words by Lenin:

“This quotation, surprising as it may be, has been employed by Stalin in order to identify the old prognosis of the party with the actual course of events in 1917. It only remains incomprehensible why the cadres of the party were taken unawares by the ‘April theses’ of Lenin.”⁶

In truth, if the above quotation from Lenin represented his finished position in 1905, his twelve-year controversy with Trotsky over the theory of permanent revolution would be difficult to understand. Lenin’s overall presentation of this question, however, did not envisage such a condensed outcome of the revolution and its stages as this one quotation might suggest. Let me offer some additional statements by Lenin to make clear his whole position on the relationship between bourgeois and proletarian revolution in Russia.

Lenin on Bourgeois and Proletarian Revolution

In his *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* Lenin writes:

“Marxists are absolutely convinced of the bourgeois character of the Russian revolution. What does that mean? It means that the democratic reforms in the political system, and the social and economic reforms that have

become a necessity for Russia, do not in themselves imply the undermining of capitalism, the undermining of bourgeois rule; on the contrary, they will, for the first time, *really clear the ground for a wide and rapid, European, and not Asiatic, development of capitalism*; they will, for the first time, *make it possible for the bourgeoisie to rule as a class*. The Socialist Revolutionaries cannot grasp this idea, for they do not know the ABC of the laws of development of commodity and capitalist production; they fail to see that even the complete success of a peasant insurrection, even the redistribution of the whole of the land in favour of the peasants and in accordance with their desires (‘general redistribution’ or something of the kind) will not destroy capitalism at all, but will, on the contrary, give an impetus to its development and hasten the class disintegration of the peasantry itself. . . .

“A bourgeois revolution is a revolution which does not depart from the framework of the bourgeois, i.e., capitalist, socio-economic system. A bourgeois revolution expresses the needs of capitalist development, and *far from destroying the foundations of capitalism, it effects the contrary — it broadens and deepens them*. This revolution, therefore, expresses the interests not only of the working class but of the entire bourgeoisie as well. Since the rule of the bourgeoisie over the working class is inevitable under capitalism, it can well be said that a bourgeois revolution expresses the interests not so much of the proletariat as of the bourgeoisie. But it is quite absurd to think that a bourgeois revolution does not at all express proletarian interests.”⁷

Lenin continues on the following page:

“The bourgeois revolution is precisely an upheaval that most resolutely sweeps away survivals of the past, survivals of the serf-owning system (which include not only the autocracy but the monarchy as well), and *most fully guarantees the broadest, freest, and most rapid development of capitalism*.”⁸

Recall that Lenin is speaking here of a bourgeois revolution carried out under a workers and peasants “democratic dictatorship.” And it must be asked: has such a revolution ever happened in real life, or is Lenin here still speaking from within the framework of Plekhanov’s economic-determinist schema, in which a prolonged period of capitalist development is all that is possible in the aftermath of the democratic revolution? Look at the actual history of twentieth-century revolutions in which the workers and peasants, in any combination, controlled the government, and ask if any of them, from Russia in 1917 to China, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada, resulted in even the briefest period of the “broadest, freest, and most rapid development of capitalism,” or made it possible for the “bourgeoisie to rule as a class,” or in the opposite, in the immediate restriction of the field of capitalism’s operation and its eventual liquidation as an economic system? Ask also if there is a single recorded instance in which a workers state resulted from a revolution in which the proletarian party — or in Cuba, the party that was transformed into the proletarian party — did not have a preponderant majority in the government on the day after the insurrection. (I leave aside here the petty-bourgeois character of the Stalinist parties. Their capacity to create workers states flowed from the fact that they operate in the workers movement and came to define their place in the political spectrum by establishing a relationship, however bureaucratized, with the working class of their respec-

tive countries.) In no case was there a second revolution. Either the party that finished the job had its majority the first time around, or the revolution failed.

My conclusion, to anticipate a possible rejoinder, is not that "Trotskyism" is counterposed to Leninism, but that Jenness misrepresents Leninism when he tries to explain the 1917 revolution as a consequence of and not a break by Lenin with his "democratic dictatorship" theory.

Jenness's approach is to reduce the "democratic dictatorship" theory to one of its aspects, a formula for establishing the workers' alliance with the peasantry. He writes:

"The class forces that the Bolsheviks saw could carry through the democratic revolution most resolutely were the working class in alliance with the revolutionary peasantry as a whole. Thus, they proposed that the monarchy be replaced with a *revolutionary* government to achieve the goals of the *bourgeois-democratic* revolution, in which the *workers* and *peasants* would exercise political power and repress their oppressors. This was the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry." (Emphasis in original.)

Of course! — With the peasantry as a whole against the monarchy, then with the poor peasants in the fight for socialism. But before we can speak intelligently about tactics for alliances with the various strata of the peasantry, we must first resolve the question of whether socialist revolution is possible in a backward country, and the corollary question: which of the two oppressed classes will be dominant in the alliance. Today, all Leninists believe that socialist revolution is possible, and hence the discussion over how to involve the peasantry is on the level of tactics. But Lenin in 1905 had not yet decided that it was possible. This central question of perspectives is entirely absent from Jenness's presentation.

Had Doug Jenness quoted in a more representative way from Lenin's 1905 writings, it would have been clear that Lenin, while excluding the bourgeoisie as a claimant for leadership in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, had not yet come to definite conclusions on the potential relationship between the two remaining classes, and the effect that relationship would have on the possibility — passing through whatever intermediate stages — for socialist revolution. More accurately, Lenin still operated on the basis of a *different* conclusion from the one he would base his strategy on in 1917. Let me cite one more quotation from Lenin in the period of the first Russian revolution, on the workers' relations with the peasantry. In his "Report on the Unity Congress of the RSDLP," written in May 1906, Lenin outlined the following position:

"...the *only* complete guarantee against restoration [of the tsarist monarchy — L.E.] in Russia (after a victorious revolution in Russia) is a socialist revolution in the West. There is and can be no other guarantee. Thus, from this aspect, the question is: how can the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia facilitate, or accelerate, the socialist revolution in the West?"⁹

Why did Lenin think that even a nonsocialist, bourgeois republic could not be maintained in Russia without a socialist revolution in the West, particularly if the capitalists of all stripes were consciously excluded from the government? His answer, given on the same page, hinged on his conception of worker-peasant relations:

"What is the economic foundation of restoration on the basis of the capitalist mode of production...? The condi-

tion of the small commodity producer in any capitalist society. The small commodity producer wavers between labour and capital. Together with the working class he fights against the survivals of serfdom and the police-ridden autocracy. But at the same time he longs to strengthen his position as a property-owner in bourgeois society, and therefore, if the conditions of development of *this* society are at all favourable (for example, industrial prosperity, expansion of the home market as a result of the agrarian revolution, etc.), the small commodity producer *inevitably* turns against the proletarian who is fighting for socialism. Consequently, I said [at the RSDLP congress — L.E.], restoration on the basis of small commodity production, of small peasant property in capitalist society, is not only possible in Russia, but even *inevitable*, for Russia is mainly a petty-bourgeois country. I went on to say that from the point of view of restoration, the position of the Russian revolution may be expressed in the following thesis: the Russian revolution is strong enough to achieve victory by its own efforts; but it is not strong enough to retain the fruits of victory. It can achieve victory because the proletariat jointly with the revolutionary peasantry can constitute an invincible force. But it cannot retain its victory, because in a country where small production is vastly developed, the small commodity producers (including the peasants) will inevitably turn against the proletarians when they pass from freedom to socialism. To be able to retain its victory, to be able to prevent restoration, the Russian revolution will need non-Russian reserves, will need outside assistance. Are there such reserves? Yes, there are: the socialist proletariat in the West." (Emphasis in original.)

Is there any doubt that here Lenin conceives of the "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" — whether he views this as a governmental formula or merely as a class relationship in the general society — with the peasantry completely dominant and determinate? And even more than that: opposed to socialism so strongly that it is "inevitable" that they will restore the tsar rather than permit the workers to establish a workers government! Lenin makes no suggestion here that the Russian workers and their party, even in alliance with the poor peasants, have the power to stop the "small commodity producers" from their inevitable course of successful counterrevolution — *except* through the outside intervention of the socialist revolution in an advanced Western country. But we are still waiting for the socialist revolution in the West, whereas the Russian workers made not only their democratic revolution but their *socialist* revolution sixty-four years ago!

At some point Lenin had to change this estimate of the workers' relationship with the peasantry defined here in his democratic dictatorship theory.

Trotsky's Theory of Permanent Revolution

Let us turn now to Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution, which Jenness does not mention, but which sheds considerable light on Lenin's later thinking.

Trotsky would have been the first, after he finally joined the Bolsheviks in July 1917, to admit that he was wrong in relation to Lenin on many questions in the past. Above all

he was wrong on Lenin's concept of the democratic-centralist combat party, and in his efforts to reunite the Bolsheviks with the reformist Mensheviks, particularly in the "August bloc" enterprise of 1912. But on one disputed question Trotsky always believed himself right, and believed, until he was corrected by Doug Jenness, that he had seen Lenin come over to his position. That was on the question of the theory of permanent revolution.

Now, of course, the theory of permanent revolution is not original with Trotsky. Both the name and the tactics were devised by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels in the course of the 1848 revolution in Germany, and spelled out most clearly in their joint "Address of the Central Authority to the [Communist] League" of March 1850.¹⁰ But their tactic was for driving forward the socialist revolution in a combination of unity and struggle with bourgeois democrats in a country where it was agreed that socialist revolution was possible. As the whole debate in Russian Marxism indicates, that is exactly what was not agreed on. Trotsky's innovation was in being the first to say outright that the Marxist theory of permanent revolution was *applicable* to Russia, that the direct struggle for a workers government was a realistic possibility in Russia.

In the 1903 split between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in the RSDLP, Trotsky had sided with the Mensheviks against Lenin's centralism. By 1905, while remaining an active party member, he stood between the factions. Lenin regarded him as representing a particular, very left-wing, current in the Mensheviks, closer to Bolshevism than the "regular" Mensheviks.

In the revolution of 1905 Trotsky first emerged as a central leader of the Russian Social Democracy, and was the principal figure of the St. Petersburg Soviet, being elected its president after the arrest of its initial leader, George Khrustalev-Nosar.

During that period, Trotsky collaborated closely with Alexander Parvus, and together they worked out the theory of permanent revolution. This set of ideas was first fully elaborated in Trotsky's "Results and Prospects," published in 1906.

At the risk of oversimplifying, Trotsky's theory consisted of three basic points. The first was a frontal rejection of Plekhanov's economic-determinist framework for the Russian revolution. On this Trotsky wrote:

"But the day and hour when power will pass into the hands of the working class depends directly not upon the level attained by the productive forces but upon relations in the class struggle, upon the international situation, and, finally, upon a number of subjective factors: the traditions, the initiative and the readiness to fight of the workers.

"It is possible for the workers to come to power in an economically backward country sooner than in an advanced country. . . . To imagine that the dictatorship of the proletariat is in some way automatically dependent on the technical development and resources of a country is a prejudice of 'economic' materialism simplified to absurdity. This point of view has nothing in common with Marxism."¹¹

Trotsky's second point was his governmental formula:

"In the event of a decisive victory of the revolution, power will pass into the hands of that class which plays a leading role in the struggle — in other words, into the hands of the proletariat. Let us say at once that this by no

means precludes revolutionary representatives of non-proletarian social groups entering the government. They can and should be in the government: a sound policy will compel the proletariat to call to power the influential leaders of the urban petty-bourgeoisie, of the intellectuals and of the peasantry. The whole problem consists in this: *who will determine the content of the government's policy, who will form within it a solid majority?*"¹²

Trotsky's third point was his conception of the relationship between the proletariat and the peasantry. It is implicitly counterposed here to Lenin's assumption that the peasantry will outweigh the workers in a government or state issuing from the revolution against tsarism by virtue of the numerical preponderance of the peasants in the population. Trotsky writes:

"But is it not possible that the peasantry may push the proletariat aside and take its place? This is impossible. All historical experience protests against this assumption. Historical experience shows that the peasantry are absolutely incapable of taking up an *independent* political role.

"The history of capitalism is the history of the subordination of the country to the town."¹³

Although in general both Trotsky and Lenin regarded each other as in the revolutionary camp and better than their mutual Menshevik opponents, there were a number of sharp exchanges between them over the counterposed perspectives of a workers government versus Lenin's democratic dictatorship idea. (I leave aside here Lenin's often very sharp polemics with Trotsky over Trotsky's conciliationist attitude toward the Mensheviks, where Trotsky later conceded he was in the wrong.) I would like to quote one sally from each side to indicate how matters stood on the eve of the February revolution.

In 1909 Trotsky published an article entitled "Our Differences" in the Polish journal *Przegląd social-demokratyczny*. While mainly directed against the Mensheviks' class-collaborationist perspective, he said of Lenin's ideas:

"Whatever the theoretical auspices under which the proletariat seizes power, it is bound immediately, on the very first day, to be confronted with the problem of unemployment. An explanation of the difference between socialist and democratic dictatorship is not likely to be of much help here. In one form or another (public works, etc.) the proletariat in power will immediately have to undertake the maintenance of the unemployed at the state's expense. This in turn will immediately provoke a powerful intensification of the economic struggle and a whole series of strikes.

"We saw all this on a small scale at the end of 1905. And the capitalists' reply will be the same as their reply to the demand for the eight-hour day: the shutting down of factories and plants. They will put large padlocks on the gates and will tell themselves: 'There is no threat to our property because it has been established that the proletariat is at present in a position of democratic, not socialist dictatorship.' What can the workers' government do when faced with closed factories and plants? It must re-open them and resume production at the government's expense. But is that not the way to socialism? Of course it is. What other way do you suggest?

"The objection might be raised that I am imagining a situation in which the dictatorship of the workers is unlimited, whereas in fact what we are talking about is the

...orship of a coalition between the proletariat and the peasantry. Very well, let us take this objection into account. We have just seen how the proletariat, despite the best intentions of its theoreticians, must in practice ignore the logical boundary line which should confine it to a democratic dictatorship. Lenin now proposes that the proletariat's political self-limitation should be supplemented with an objective antisocialist 'safeguard' in the form of the muzhik as collaborator or co-dictator. If this means that the peasant party, which shares power with the social-democrats, will not allow the unemployed and the strikers to be maintained at state cost and will oppose the state's opening of factories and plants closed down by the capitalists, then it also means that on the first day of the coalition, that is, long before the fulfillment of its tasks, the proletariat will enter into conflict with the revolutionary government. This conflict can end either in the repression of the workers by the peasant party, or in the removal of that party from power. Neither solution has much to do with a 'democratic' dictatorship by a coalition."¹⁴

In November 1915 in an article entitled "On the Two Lines in the Revolution," Lenin took up some of Trotsky's arguments:

"To bring clarity into the alignment of classes in the impending revolution is the main task of a revolutionary party. . . . This task is being wrongly tackled in *Nashe Slovo* by Trotsky, who is repeating his 'original' 1905 theory and refuses to give some thought to the reason why, in the course of ten years, life has been bypassing this splendid theory.

"From the Bolsheviks Trotsky's original theory has borrowed their call for a decisive proletarian revolutionary struggle and for the conquest of power by the proletariat, while from the Mensheviks it has borrowed 'repudiation' of the peasantry's role. The peasantry, he asserts, are divided into strata, have become differentiated; their potential revolutionary role has dwindled more and more; in Russia a 'national' revolution is impossible; 'we are living in the era of imperialism,' says Trotsky, and 'imperialism does not contrapose the bourgeois nation to the old regime, but the proletariat to the bourgeois nation.'

"Here we have an amusing example of playing with the word 'imperialism'. If, in Russia, the proletariat already stands contraposed to the 'bourgeois nation', then Russia is facing a socialist revolution (!) . . ."¹⁵

The April Crisis

I think the differences between the permanent revolution and democratic dictatorship theories are clearly established. Let us now examine whether, as Trotsky maintained, Lenin came over to his theory on the April 1917 crisis of leadership in the Bolshevik Party. First let us see how Jenness treats this episode. Doug Jenness tells us:

"Following the February 1917 revolution, many of the older Bolshevik leaders adapted to the Mensheviks who were carrying out a bourgeois-liberal line and supporting the Provisional Revolutionary Government.* This put these 'old Bolsheviks' in the position of giving *de facto* critical support to the capitalist provisional government.

*The government created by the February revolution was called the Provisional Government, not the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

"Lenin fought this tendency toward opportunism. . . ."

"While many of the 'old Bolsheviks' took opportunist positions, the majority of worker-Bolsheviks did not. It was this fact that made it possible for Lenin to win a majority for his line at the April 1917 party conference without a great deal of difficulty."

Reading these lines, one would never guess that Lenin's majority in the party was ever in doubt — or that the dispute hinged on whether or not socialist revolution was possible in Russia, with the "old Bolsheviks" defending the "democratic dictatorship" theory against Lenin's determined proposal to drop it.

Jenness does not report that until Lenin's return to Russia on April 3 what he describes as the position of "many of the older Bolshevik leaders" was the official position of the party and its press. When Lenin laid out his perspective at a meeting of the party leadership in Petrograd that night, calling for the overthrow of the Provisional Government, virtually the whole party leadership stood against him. The Bolshevik Drabkina, who was present at the meeting, wrote in her reminiscences, published in Russia in 1927, that Lenin's speech "produced on everyone a stupefying impression. No one expected this."¹⁶ Alexandra Kollontai, who was also there, later wrote: "I was the only one to stand up for Lenin's view against a whole series of hesitant Bolsheviks."¹⁷

Jenness reports that Lenin's line carried "without a great deal of difficulty" at the April party conference — which opened only on April 24. But in the three weeks preceding the conference a sharp struggle took place in the Bolshevik Party in which Lenin was at the beginning almost completely isolated in the leadership. The first place his "April theses" was put to a vote — on April 8 in the Bolshevik Petrograd Committee, the party center in the nation's capital — Lenin was defeated by a vote of thirteen to two with one abstention. The "April theses" were similarly rejected by the party committees in Moscow and Kiev.¹⁸ Even at the April conference, where Lenin had in effect appealed to the ranks against the leadership, the vote was not so much without difficulty as Jenness suggests. While Lenin's main proposals were by this time carried overwhelmingly, the foot-dragging was apparent in the vote on the main resolution, which was 71 to 39 with 8 abstentions — a 40 percent minority.¹⁹

As for the substance of the dispute, which Jenness also glosses over, it was indicated pretty clearly in a public attack on Lenin on April 8 in the official party newspaper *Pravda*, which declared:

"As for the general scheme of Comrade Lenin, it seems to us unacceptable in that it starts from the assumption that the bourgeois-democratic revolution is ended, and counts upon an immediate transformation of this revolution into a socialist revolution."²⁰

Jenness passes in silence over this controversy regarding the democratic dictatorship theory, which might raise questions about his assertion that this theory "gave an accurate portrayal of the line of march the Russian workers would follow and how the revolution would unfold." He fails to quote Lenin's many explicit repudiations of the old theory and formulas during the April crisis. Let us remind him of what Lenin said at that time.

In his "Letters on Tactics," written in the second week of April, Lenin declared:

"The person who *now* speaks only of a 'revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry' is behind the times, consequently, he has in effect gone over to the petty bourgeoisie against the proletarian class struggle; that person should be consigned to the archive of 'Bolshevik' pre-revolutionary antiques (it may be called the archive of 'old Bolsheviks')."21

When Kamenev and the other Bolshevik leaders objected that the socialist revolution could not be placed on the agenda because the "democratic dictatorship" had never yet come to power and the majority of tasks of the democratic revolution, such as land reform or the calling of a constituent assembly, had not even been begun, Lenin replied:

"Is this reality covered by Comrade Kamenev's old-Bolshevik formula, which says that 'the bourgeois-democratic revolution is not completed'?"

"It is not. The formula is obsolete. It is no good at all. It is dead. And it is no use trying to revive it."22

Now, Doug Jenness, of course, is familiar with this material. Without mentioning these statements by Lenin, or the position held by Trotsky and, until now, by the Trotskyist movement, that these statements marked Lenin's break from the "democratic dictatorship" theory, Jenness offers us a quotation from Lenin that might seem to cast doubt on that interpretation. Lenin, in the quote adduced by Jenness, insists that the stage of the democratic dictatorship has not been bypassed altogether, but has been realized "in a highly original manner," in the form of the Soviets, which embody the alliance he foresaw. But the Soviets remain out of power. At best, they occupy a relationship of "dual power" with the bourgeois Provisional Government.

Let us examine Lenin's thinking on this more closely and see if it indicates continuity of his old theory, or the beginning of a radical break from it.

Lenin's actual governmental slogan in the April theses, it is true, was not for a socialist revolution, but for "All Power to the Soviets." It is also true, as the quote cited by Jenness shows, that Lenin did not initially conceive of a Soviet government as the dictatorship of the proletariat along the line of Trotsky's thinking, but as the realization of his old theory. To give Jenness a helping hand in building his case, let us quote Lenin's explicit denial that he advocated direct socialist revolution in Russia, from the same "Letters on Tactics" cited above:

"But are we not in danger of falling into subjectivism, of wanting to arrive at the socialist revolution by 'skipping' the bourgeois-democratic revolution — which is not yet completed and has not yet exhausted the peasant movement?"

"I might be incurring this danger if I said: 'No Tsar, but a workers' government.' [A slogan coined by Parvus in the 1905 period, generally believed by the Bolsheviks to represent Trotsky's position. — L.E.] But I did *not* say that, I said something else. I said that *there can be no government* (barring a bourgeois government) in Russia *other than* that of the Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies. . . . And in these Soviets, as it happens, it is the peasants, the soldiers, i.e., petty bourgeoisie, who preponderate, to use a scientific, Marxist term, a class characterisation, and not a common, man-in-the-street, professional characterisation."23

If we were to take this at face value, the content of the

slogan "All Power to the Soviets" would be for a government still within the "democratic" stage of the revolution — a "two-class dictatorship" with a petty-bourgeois majority — the original content of the "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry." But it was not just a crude misunderstanding that led the majority of the Bolshevik leadership in Russia to conclude that Lenin was in fact calling for a socialist revolution, and to discount his qualifications of that fact. Lenin says something else in this same letter that shows that, while he has not yet formulated it theoretically, his actual tactics are to *break up* the "democratic dictatorship" alliance within the Soviets *before*, and as a *prerequisite* for, bringing the Soviets to power, transformed into proletarian, socialist organs of government. Here is how Lenin outlines the aim of the Bolsheviks in the Soviets in April:

"The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies' — there you have the 'revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry' already accomplished in reality.

"This formula is already antiquated. . . .

"A new and different task now faces us: to effect a split *within* this dictatorship between the proletarian elements, (the anti-defencist, internationalist, 'Communist' elements, who stand for a transition to the commune) and the *small proprietor or petty-bourgeois* elements (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Steklov, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the other revolutionary defencists, who are opposed to moving towards the commune and are in favour of 'supporting' the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois government)."24

But this meant fighting for the creation of a workers government, with a "Communist" majority, committed to socialism, before the "democratic dictatorship" as a whole had ever taken power. With the peasantry as a whole — but under a workers government, not permitting the political representatives of the "small proprietor" to have a majority in the government that carried out the tasks of the bourgeois revolution. The slogan of the commune, that is, of the dictatorship of the proletariat, has replaced the slogan of the democratic dictatorship as the central transitional demand for the whole period leading up to the October revolution. But didn't Lenin say in the same letter that this was just what he did not intend? Isn't there a gap here between Lenin's tactics, where he operates with absolute certainty as to what needs to be done to move the revolution forward, and his theoretical formulations?

Tactically, the situation Lenin faced was the existence of the long-awaited democratic dictatorship alliance of class forces in the Soviets, but, unexpectedly, an alliance that *refused* to take the power so long as the nonproletarian forces retained a majority. This "stage" had to be bypassed before it ever was consummated in the formation of a government. The "democratic dictatorship" never ruled in Russia for a single day. Nor were the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution solved, as Lenin had predicted for twelve years, in the course of a distinct "democratic" stage of the revolution. They were first undertaken and solved by the dictatorship of the proletariat, as Trotsky had predicted in 1905, and as Lenin came to agree must be done in 1917.

Lenin's Later Views

The most disturbing part of Doug Jenness's exposition,

where he most flagrantly bends Lenin's views to conform to his own, newly arrived at, stagist thesis, is in his handling of Lenin's post-1917 writings. He draws on several sources here, most importantly Lenin's November 1918 pamphlet, "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky."

Jenness cites many quotations from Lenin for this period that quite correctly outline the post-October strategy of the Bolsheviks to maintain the alliance with the Russian peasantry; their well-founded caution in the pace of the introduction of socialist measures, particularly in the countryside; and the necessary series of transitional stages needed to secure a solid base for the new Soviet government. He calls attention to Lenin's indisputable statement that "only when the October revolution began to spread to the rural districts and was consummated, in the summer of 1918, did we acquire a real proletarian base; only then did our revolution *become a proletarian revolution in fact*, and not merely in our proclamations, promises and declarations." (Emphasis in original.)

What Jenness inexcusably leaves out is that all of this was done under a government the Bolsheviks repeatedly described as the *dictatorship of the proletariat*, under an openly prosocialist workers government, not, as the unwary reader might conclude, under the intermediate, indeterminate, multiclass government of a "democratic dictatorship" operating within the bounds of a capitalist bourgeois republic. But wasn't that the essential difference between Lenin's old democratic dictatorship theory and Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution? What Jenness refuses to say outright here is exactly Lenin's new position, that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the necessary instrument for carrying out the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, his radical break from the old, two-revolution formula. The fact that he will not say it naturally raises an important question about where Jenness stands today on the validity of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution as well.

Jenness quoted for us Lenin's April 1917 opinion that the Soviets were the embodiment of the "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry." Why does he fail to cite Lenin's opinion, in "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," from which he takes so many other quotes, that "The Soviets are the Russian form of the proletarian dictatorship"?²⁵ Why does he fail to tell us that, looking back on the pre-October period in 1918, Lenin writes that the Bolsheviks "long before November (October) advanced the slogan of proletarian dictatorship"?²⁶ Why does he fail to cite Lenin's opinion that "the very first day of the proletarian socialist revolution" in Russia occurred, not in the summer of 1918, but "On October 26 (November 8), 1917."²⁷

Do these clear and unambiguous statements by Lenin stand too sharply contrasted to his 1905 positions that direct socialist revolution was impossible in Russia? Do they indicate too clearly that Lenin has abandoned the "democratic dictatorship" theory that Jenness finds so central to "Leninism"? They do indeed. But the inevitable conclusion must be that Lenin *changed* his position on the basis of the experience of real life.

In the same pamphlet on Kautsky's renegacy, from which Jenness quotes so selectively, Lenin goes beyond the mere substitution of the term "dictatorship of the proleta-

riat" for the old "democratic dictatorship" terminology and outlines a new theoretical and practical opinion on the relationship between the proletariat and the peasantry in the Russian revolution. He now writes:

"... the proletariat alone really has carried the bourgeois-democratic revolution to its logical conclusion, the proletariat alone has done something really important to bring nearer the world proletarian revolution, the proletariat alone has created the Soviet state, which, after the Paris Commune, is the second step in the direction of the socialist state."²⁸

A month later, in December 1918, Lenin prepared the second edition of his *State and Revolution*, written on the eve of October. The original of this work had already dropped the democratic dictatorship idea in favor of the idea of the commune state. (By the way, Lenin had by this time also radically altered his 1905 view of the character of the Paris Commune, which he had also in the past seen in the framework of his democratic dictatorship concept.) In the second edition, Lenin added only one thing on the basis of the experience of the Russian October: a section clarifying his view of Marx's theory of the state in the transition period after the revolution. Here Lenin writes:

"The essence of Marx's theory of the state has been mastered only by those who realise that the dictatorship of a *single class* is necessary not only for every class society in general, not only for the *proletariat* which has overthrown the bourgeoisie, but also for the entire *historical period* which separates capitalism from 'classless society', from communism. Bourgeois states are most varied in form, but their essence is the same: all these states, whatever their form, in the final analysis are inevitably the *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie*. The transition from capitalism to communism is certainly bound to yield a tremendous abundance and variety of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be the same: *the dictatorship of the proletariat*."²⁹

But what happened here to the stage of a joint dictatorship with the peasantry? Isn't this a "repudiation" of the peasantry's role" and a view of the working class as "contraposed to the 'bourgeois nation,'" as Lenin said of Trotsky's view as late as 1915?

Key to understanding Lenin's shift of position here is his abandonment, for the first time fully and completely, of the old economic determinist conceptions shared by all of Russian Marxism until 1905. Central to this theoretical rethinking is a different view of the real social weight of the peasantry, no longer based, as was Plekhanov's conception, on raw numbers. Recall Lenin's insistence at the 1906 Congress of the RSDLP that even a bourgeois republic could not avert a monarchist restoration without aid from a socialist revolution in Europe, because "the small commodity producers (including the peasants) will inevitably turn against the proletarians when they pass *from freedom to socialism*."

Lenin's new position is expressed most clearly and consistently in his lengthy address to the First All-Russian Congress on Adult Education on May 19, 1919. There he states:

"The science of political economy, if anybody has learned anything from it, the history of revolution, the history of political evolution throughout the whole of the nineteenth century show that the peasants follow the lead of either the workers or the bourgeoisie. Nor can they do otherwise.

Some democrats may, of course, take exception to this, others may think that, being a malicious Marxist, I am slandering the peasants. They say the peasants constitute the majority, they are working people, and yet cannot follow their own road. Why? . . .

"The economics of capitalist society are such that the ruling power can be only capital or the proletariat which has overthrown capital.

"There are no other forces in the economics of this society."³⁰

Here Lenin defines what was left undecided in the democratic dictatorship theory, and does so in words that are virtually identical to those of Trotsky in 1906. This is his answer to the problem of socialist revolution in a country with a property-owning majority, and his solution, along the lines of permanent revolution, to the undeniable discrepancy between the advanced, proletarian state structure that issued from the October Revolution and the backward, nonproletarian majority of the nation on which it rested. It was this agreement on the essentials of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution, complemented, of course, by Trotsky's recognition of Lenin's overall superiority as a tactician, party builder, and, on most other questions, as a theorist, that provided the basis for their intimate political collaboration from the time Trotsky joined the Bolsheviks in 1917 until Lenin's death, including their last great joint effort, the opening of the struggle against the Stalinist degeneration of the Russian revolution.

The concept of "democratic dictatorship" was never explicitly repudiated by Lenin, but it was radically redefined and, for the most part, quietly dropped. It is not mentioned at all in Lenin's 1921 anniversary article published by the *ISR* along with the Jenness piece. Nor does it appear in most of Lenin's other post-revolutionary writings.

"Democratic Dictatorship" After Lenin

In its pre-1917 formulation, the "democratic dictatorship" theory proved to be a *false start* in the process of working out the strategy of revolutionary Marxism on the potential for socialist revolution in undeveloped countries. As an extenuating circumstance, this was at a time when no such revolution had ever taken place. This wrong theory was revived after Lenin's death by the Stalinist bureaucracy as a justification for class-collaborationist alliances with bourgeois and petty-bourgeois forces in the colonial world.

Reformism in the workers' movement frequently seeks to ground itself on partial, erroneous, or outmoded formulations and concepts employed for a time but later discarded by the great leaders of the Marxist movement as Marxism as a science evolves. The "democratic dictatorship" theory shared this fate. Since all of Lenin's pre-1917 writings on this question denied the possibility of the direct struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat in a backward country, and Lenin himself had to break from the formula and its theoretical underpinnings in order to go forward, it readily lent itself to agreements to subordinate the working class and its party to alliances with "anti-imperialist" bourgeois and petty-bourgeois formations. By convincing the workers in advance that the struggle for socialism could not be initiated before the completion of the anti-imperialist fight, the workers were taught to fear responding to attacks from their nonproletarian allies, on the grounds that to fight back would isolate them from the "democratic

revolution" with no way to move forward through their own class forces or to assert their class leadership directly over the peasant masses. Such assumptions could be bolstered by citations from Lenin's old theory of the social weight of the peasantry, which he had inherited in turn from Plekhanov.

Under Stalin's rule, the democratic dictatorship theory was revived and adopted by the Comintern as a programmatic norm for Communist parties in the colonial world. Trotsky, continuing the fight against the bureaucracy he had begun in collaboration with Lenin, strongly opposed this move. In his 1928 work, *Permanent Revolution*, he wrote:

"The Comintern's endeavour to foist upon the Eastern countries the slogan of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, finally and long ago exhausted by history, can have only a reactionary effect. Insofar as this slogan is counterposed to the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it contributes politically to the dissolution of the proletariat in the petty-bourgeois masses and thus creates the most favourable conditions for the hegemony of the national bourgeoisie and consequently for the collapse of the democratic revolution. The introduction of this slogan into the programme of the Comintern is a direct betrayal of Marxism and of the October tradition of Bolshevism."³¹

The Comintern under Stalin employed this theory, bent, of course, toward stressing the "two-stage" aspect of it at the expense of the "uninterrupted" side, to derail and destroy the Chinese revolution of 1925-27 and the Spanish revolution of the 1930s. It should be recalled that in both cases the bourgeois allies of the Comintern stood to the *left* of the Russian "revolutionary democrats" of 1917, a point that Stalin's supporters never tired of making in reply to Trotsky's criticism: both Chiang Kai-shek and the Spanish Popular Front fought the imperialists and their domestic agents arms in hand, and for a number of years. But, despite Stalin's predictions, in neither case did the nonproletarian "anti-imperialists" wait for the conclusion of the democratic revolution before they savagely turned on their working class allies and crushed them.

Doug Jenness, already under the influence of a two-stage, two-class dictatorship concept, has begun to rewrite the history of the Russian October Revolution, giving greater weight to Lenin's prognosis made twelve years in advance than to Lenin's actual writings during and after the real event. This, if I may say so, is ahistorical schematism. It also appears to be a break from Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution — which means from the essential

*Trotsky distinguished the democratic dictatorship slogan from the Bolsheviks' and the early Comintern's use of the call for a "workers and farmers government," which did not imply a special, bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution. In the Transitional Program, the founding document of the Fourth International, written by Trotsky in 1938, he said:

"The slogan, 'workers' and farmers' government,' is thus acceptable to us only in the sense that it had in 1917 with the Bolsheviks, i.e., as an antibourgeois and anticapitalist slogan, but in no case in the 'democratic' sense which the epigones later gave it, transforming it from a bridge to socialist revolution into the chief barrier upon its path." (Trotsky, *The Transitional Program for Socialist Revolution* [New York: Pathfinder Press, third edition, 1977], p. 134.)

content of Lenin's post-October writings as well, where the same ideas are expressed.

Lenin states categorically in "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky" that the Bolsheviks in October 1917 instituted the "dictatorship of the proletariat," not a multiclass regime, and that it was the openly prosocialist workers government that carried out the tasks of the democratic revolution, forged an alliance with the peasantry under the auspices of the workers revolutionary party and its program, and, by the late summer of 1918, consolidated a workers state in Russia in the full sociological meaning of the term. Trotsky anticipated Lenin by twelve years in predicting this course of development.

But from 1917 onward there were no differences of significance between Lenin and Trotsky, and we have always regarded the Trotskyist movement as nothing more

than the continuation of orthodox Leninism. If, as Jenness claims, the democratic dictatorship theory was correct after all, it seems difficult to escape the conclusion that he also believes Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution to be to one degree or another wrong, that Trotsky was mistaken in his belief that he had reached agreement with Lenin on this in 1917, that Trotsky's lifelong opposition to reviving and revalidating the democratic dictatorship slogan was misguided, and that our movement since Lenin's death has, because of Trotsky's misunderstanding of Lenin's politics, followed a wrong policy.

In his initial presentation of this thesis in the *ISR*, Jenness's efforts to enlist Lenin as a witness for his new position have fallen rather flat. I would urge Doug Jenness to reconsider the implications of what he writes and to retreat from the direction in which he seems to be headed.

January 1982

NOTES

1. Che Guevara, "Message to the Executive Secretariat of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America," *Prensa Latina*, April 17, 1967, translated in *World Outlook*, April 28, 1967, p. 435.
2. *Writings of Leon Trotsky (1939-40)* (New York: Pathfinder Press, second edition, 1973), p. 73.
3. George Plekhanov, *Selected Philosophical Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, no date), vol. 1, p. 327. Emphasis added.
4. *Writings, 1939-40*, p. 59. Emphasis in original.
5. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960-70), vol. 9, pp. 236-37. Emphasis in original.
6. Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution* (New York: Monad Press, 1980), vol. 3, p. 382.
7. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 9, pp. 48-49. Emphasis added.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 50. Emphasis added.
9. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 10, pp. 333-34. Emphasis in original.
10. Marx and Engels, *Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1978), vol. 10, pp. 277-87.
11. Trotsky, *The Permanent Revolution* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1969, third edition), pp. 62-63.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 69. Emphasis in original.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73. Emphasis in original.
14. Trotsky, *1905* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), pp. 315-16.
15. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 21, p. 419. Emphasis in original.
16. Cited by Marcel Liebman, *Leninism Under Lenin* (London: Merlin Press, 1980), p. 129.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
20. Cited by Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, vol. 1, p. 312.
21. Lenin, *Between the Two Revolutions* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), p. 64. Emphasis in original. (Also in *CW*, vol. 24.)
22. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 67. Emphasis in original.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64. Emphasis in original.
25. Lenin, *The Proletarian Revolution and Renegade Kautsky* (New York: International Publishers, 1934), p. 38.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
29. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 25, p. 413. Emphasis in original.
30. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 29, pp. 367-68. First emphasis added.
31. Trotsky, *The Permanent Revolution*, p. 278.