

MORENO 'TRUTH KIT'

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Introduction

The expulsion of 60 "foreign Trotskyists" from Nicaragua by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) last August made headlines around the world. The deportees (now numbering over 100) were leaders of the Simón Bolívar Brigade, set up by Nahuel Moreno's Bolshevik Faction of the misnamed "United Secretariat of the Fourth International" (USec). So when the USec not only failed to protest, but actually endorsed this repression by a bourgeois government, it sent shock waves through the clique-ridden parody of Trotsky's FI (currently preparing its "Eleventh World Congress"). Subsequent revelations (see "Did Camejo Turn Them In? W/V No. 242, 26 October 1979) that leaders of the American SWP may have been complicit in getting their Morenoite "comrades" deported (and tortured by the Panamanian police) can only reinforce the momentum building towards split in the USec.

These circumstances have contributed to lending Moreno & Co. an image of militancy. Yet for years this current has stood on the far *right* wing of world ostensible Trotskyism. Here is the man who in Argentina in the early '50s helped set up a Peronist "socialist" party—a left wing of *bourgeois* populism. This is the one-and-only Moreno who in the mid-1960s wrote that Castro's stillborn "OLAS ... is the only organizational vehicle for power" in Latin America, yet in 1974 was backing the murderous Perón regime against left-wing guerrillas (whom it scandalously referred to as a "mirror image" of the AAA and other ultra-rightist terrorists). It is the self-same Nahuel Moreno (aka Hugo Bressano) whose financial skulduggery is legendary


on the Latin American left: from allegedly running off with money intended for Hugo Blanco's peasant organizing in the '60s, to raising money for his Simón Bolívar Brigade today by hawking worthless "Sandino Bonds."

Nahuel Moreno is a cynical quick-change artist whose current political stands bear little (and often no) relation to what went before and what will come after. His "left" postures are frequently lifted lock-stock-and-barrel from other tendencies (including ourselves, such as his tardy discovery of the "Eurotrotskyism" of Ernest Mandel et al.). And his seeming orthodoxy on doctrinal questions is combined with "tactical" betrayals so shameless that they leave even the denizens of the USec swamp breathless. But the man is dangerous.

At a time when the USec stabs its comrades in the back in Nicaragua, even arranging their expulsion by the bourgeois authorities, and leads Iranian militants to the slaughter at the hands of Khomeini's clerical-feudalism, any honest would-be Trotskyist will be searching for a revolutionary answer to the treachery of Mandel and the SWP. And it is our duty as revolutionists to warn the workers movement against the fraud of Nahuel Moreno and his "Bolshevik Faction." That is the purpose of this "Moreno Truth Kit."

Be forewarned—this man is a cynical adventurer, political chameleon and financial swindler! And note also that it has been the international Spartacist tendency that has consistently exposed Moreno & Co. while pointing the way forward to the rebirth of an authentically Trotskyist Fourth International.

Militant



Nahuel Moreno (left) and documents distributed by "Simón Bolívar Brigade" boasting of subordination to FSLN.

excerpted from:

“Revolution in Nicaragua and the Left”

—Workers Vanguard,
No. 240, 28 September 1979

SEPTEMBER 24—It took 18 months of bitter struggle, including two insurrections totaling eleven weeks of the bloodiest fighting, before they drove out the hyena of Managua. Almost 50,000 died out of a population of 2.3 million, and today the cities are in ruins, the surviving population on the brink of starvation, three quarters of the work-force unemployed. Those who have sacrificed so much are burning to root out every trace of the hated dynasty which bled the country dry. Laying claim to what is rightfully theirs, the Nicaraguan masses are already infringing on the property of the belatedly oppositional bourgeoisie, which for decades extracted fat profits from the sweat of the working people in Somoza land.

“National reconstruction” is now the watchword of the victorious Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). But on what foundations? With their program for a “government of unity of all anti-Somoza forces” the Sandinista leaders hope to limit the revolution to the replacement of a rapacious family dictatorship by a reformed, “popular-democratic” capitalist regime. As proof of the “generosity of the Nicaraguan Revolution,” they have refused to execute any of the National Guard criminals who tortured at random and rained high-explosive bombs on their own cities. While expropriating the property of the tyrant and his underlings, the new rulers have vowed to protect the holdings of other capitalists.

From the beginning it has been clear to all that the “government” in Managua is highly unstable. The guns are clearly in the hands of the petty-bourgeois radical-nationalist Sandinistas, but a united FSLN was established only at the last minute by papering over a three-way split. While the “anti-Somoza bourgeoisie” are presently pliant, and their influence declined as the fighting intensified, they are not passive nor are they discredited by the stigma of collaboration with the dictator as the Cuban capitalists were with Batista. On the other hand, the working masses are a far more active factor than in the Cuban Revolution, having armed themselves and fought key battles in the streets of the capital and other cities. The common enemy vanquished, it is impossible to stop the class struggle simply by telling the combatants to return home.

The array of forces in post-Somoza Nicaragua has the potential for an

explosive confrontation—within the uneasy ruling coalition, between it and the impatient working masses or between a sector of the radical-Jacobin FSLN and reactionary sectors of the domestic bourgeoisie. This highly charged situation poses an acid test for revolutionists. For while the overwhelming majority of the left to one degree or another is tailing after the popular Sandinistas, the task of Trotskyists, who fight on the program of permanent revolution, is to remain the party of intransigent working-class opposition. Those who proclaim that proletarian-socialist revolution can come about peacefully in Nicaragua by nudging the present bonapartist regime gradually to the left could well be the first victims of their own illusions....

Expulsion of the Simón Bolívar Brigade

The suppression of “disorderly” land seizures is not the only instance of measures to keep the class struggle from “becoming more acute.” The most notable was the expulsion of several dozen foreign leftists, most of them self-proclaimed Trotskyists, associated with the “Simón Bolívar Brigade” which had rushed to Nicaragua in the last stages of the battle against Somoza. The incident was described by *Time* magazine (3 September) at the end of an article praising the “merciful revolution” that was “steering a middle course”:

“Surprisingly, the first serious threat came from the extreme left. Dissatisfied with the government’s plans for building a mixed economy melding public and private enterprise, 60 Latin-American Trotskyites, calling themselves the Simón Bolívar Brigade, incited a demonstration by 3,000 Managua factory workers demanding compensation for wages lost during the revolution. The revolutionary government reacted by ordering its armed forces to put the Trotskyites on a plane to Panama.”

According to the *Washington Post* (21 August), banners at the August 15 Managua demonstration carried the slogans, “The Revolution is in the hands of the bourgeoisie” and “Power to the proletariat.” The expelled Bolívar Brigaders, however, were charged with being “counterrevolutionaries” and “foreign provocateurs.”

This expulsion was clearly a blow struck against any independent leftist agitation among Nicaraguan workers and must be roundly condemned by all would-be socialists. But this is not what the American Socialist Workers Party

(SWP) thought of it. The SWP did not protest at all. In fact, it issued four different "explanations" of the Sandinista repression against the ostensibly Trotskyist leaders of the Simón Bolívar Brigade, one of which consisted of quoting without comment a statement by the Nicaraguan ministry of the interior. Moreover, the SWP's explanations not only shamelessly support the FSLN government against their own "comrades," but they *join in the witch-hunt* themselves. An August 21 SWP Political Committee declaration entitled "New U.S. Propaganda Drive Against Nicaragua" states:

"The Simón Bolívar Brigade was organized by the Colombian PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—Socialist Workers Party), under the direction of an international grouping known as the 'Bolshevik Faction,' led by Nahuel Moreno....

"In the case of the Simón Bolívar Brigade, the Bolshevik Faction never consulted the Fourth International about this project or about the policies the Brigade followed. These policies ran counter to the policies decided by the leadership bodies of the Fourth International.

"Through the Simón Bolívar Brigade the Bolshevik Faction led young militants from several Latin American countries—people who wanted to help the fight against Somoza—into a sectarian adventure. Masquerading as a section of the Sandinista Front (FSLN), the Simón Bolívar Brigade entered Nicaragua from the outside to engage in its own organizing efforts along the lines of 'outflanking' the Sandinistas on the left. Their tactic was to up the ante in what the Sandinistas were saying, trying in this way to build a counterforce to them.

"This grotesque idea—that people from the outside can maneuver to capture the leadership of the revolution from those who have emerged in the course of the struggle—has nothing whatever to do with Trotskyism, revolutionary socialism.

"The unfortunate episode of the Simón Bolívar Brigade was just what the Carter administration was waiting for."

—*Militant*, 31 August

In another article in the same issue of the *Militant*, on "The Facts About the Simón Bolívar Brigade," the SWP labels the Managua workers demonstration a "provocative clash" and accuses the leaders of the Brigade of having "acted irresponsibly." Again, the "fact"-sheet charges that the Brigade's attempts to "outflank [the FSLN] from the left" had "absolutely nothing in common with the position of the Fourth International." And it ostentatiously washes its hands of any association: "The Fourth International is in no way

responsible for the activities of the Brigade." Quite a mouthful coming from people who are formally part of the same "International."

The SWP's response to the expulsion of the Bolívar Brigaders was the most naked stab in the back by a section of the fake-Trotskyist "United" Secretariat (Usec) since its supporters in Portugal found themselves on opposite sides of the barricades in the summer of 1977. But what about the other wings of this pseudo-Fourth International, long accustomed to the dirtiest of factional tricks? Those sections associated with the former International Majority Tendency of Ernest Mandel were less virulent than the SWP in their attacks on the Morenoite-led Brigade, at most clucking their tongues at the FSLN-ordered repression. Thus the newspaper of the French LCR, *Rouge* (24-30 August), felt constrained to condemn the remarks of agrarian reform minister Wheelock, who in announcing the deportations launched a diatribe against "Trotskyism and all those who want to accelerate the evolution of the regime in Nicaragua." Of course, on the next page the editors published a friendly interview with the same Wheelock, remarking favorably on his revolutionary credentials.

As to the expulsions themselves, the LCR statement said only that "It is rather unlikely, whatever may be the political differences, that 60 foreigners could pose a real problem for a revolutionary leadership enjoying immense popular support." Supposedly, then, if leftists did pose a real threat to the Sandinista regime, the LCR would begin foaming at the mouth like the rabid SWP! By the next issue, *Rouge* (31 August-6 September) could only bring itself to complain that "the terms in which the Nicaraguan government decreed the expulsion of 'foreign' militants constitute a disturbing precedent." Finally, a resolution by the LCR central committee (published in the 7-13 September *Rouge*) screwed up its courage to utter the mildest of formal protests, declaring that the expulsions themselves "constitute an unacceptable precedent." Anyone counting on such "militant solidarity" to back him against anti-communist repression had better forget it.

But while *Rouge* was gradually escalating its adjectives from "disturbing" to "unacceptable," its man in Managua was taking a sharply different tack. According to the SWP's *Intercon-*



tinental Press (24 September), a USec delegation including LCR Latin American "expert" Jean-Pierre Beauvais (as well as Hugo Blanco, Peter Camejo, Barry Sheppard and others) handed a statement to the Sandinistas hailing "the revolutionary leadership of the FSLN" and declaring: "All activities which create divisions between the mobilized masses and the FSLN are contrary to the interests of the revolution." Dotting the i's and crossing the t's, it added: "This was the case specifically with the activities of the 'Simón Bolívar Brigade'," which it termed "sectarian." And to top it off the USec delegation explicitly endorsed the expulsion:

"In a political and economic situation that required the greatest possible unity in struggle, the FSLN was right to demand that the non-Nicaraguan members of this group—which defined itself above all as a military organization—leave the country."

It is not reported whether Blanco/Camejo/Sheppard/Beauvais et al. received thirty pieces of silver, although they clearly hope to cash in on their perfidy by becoming the authorized cheerleaders for the FSLN. But the roots of such treachery are political and go back more than a quarter of a century, to the refusal of Michel Pablo, then secretary of the Fourth International, to defend the Chinese Trotskyists jailed by Mao. He called them "refugees from a revolution" for refusing to bow to the new bureaucratic rulers in Peking. For Pablo it was part of his liquidationist program that led to the destruction of the Fourth International as the organized world revolutionary vanguard. In the case of his epigones it is the consequence of their Pabloist policies, which lead all wings of the USec to chase after non-proletarian, anti-Marxist leaderships—from the Chinese Stalinists to Portuguese army officers and now the Sandinista nationalists....

Morenoite Charlatans and Adventurers

So what about the Simón Bolívar Brigade and its parent, Moreno's Bolshevik Faction. Certainly in comparison with the groveling betrayals of the SWP and the more shamefaced Mandelite majority of the USec, the Moreno outfit might seem a militant alternative. A look at Moreno's chameleon-like political track record, his notoriety for underhanded financial

swindles and his ultra-reformist program in his home base, Argentina, will shatter this façade. And, indeed, the SWP is busily dredging up some of this material, filling the pages of *Intercontinental Press* with endless scandal stories about the disreputable adventurer Nahuel Moreno. No doubt Barnes and Mandel are getting ready to expel the troublemaker. But they are in no position to complain. For years they have coexisted in the same International (and in the case of the SWP, in the same faction) with this notorious snake-oil salesman, both after and during his worst betrayals. They have dirty hands.

When they are not echoing the Sandinista leaders' slanders that organizing workers around anti-capitalist demands is a "provocation," the SWP/USec charge that Moreno is an imposter traveling under false passports. According to the USec delegation statement, "to capitalize on the prestige of the FSLN," the Simón Bolívar Brigade "cloaked itself with the Sandinista banner." From news accounts of the August 15 Managua demonstration, it does seem that many of the protesters thought they were supporting a wing of the FSLN (although this does not lessen the significance of several thousand workers demonstrating against the government's pro-capitalist policies). But who do Barnes and Hansen think they are kidding? Their international "Nicaragua solidarity" campaign is intended precisely to drape the USec in Sandinista red-and-black, just as the SWP's Fair Play for Cuba Committee in the early '60s tried to capitalize on the popularity of Castroism. They just prefer to do it at long distance.

Besides, Moreno has a long history of impersonating other tendencies. He got his start in Argentina by pretending to be a left Peronist. In the late 1950s his review *Palabra Obrera* described itself as an "organ of revolutionary working-class Peronism" and carried on its masthead the slogan "under the discipline of General Perón and of the Peronist Supreme Council" (see "Argentina: The Struggle Against Peronism," *WV* No. 24, 6 July 1973). When Peronism was no longer the rage, Moreno fused with a Castroite group and ran endless pictures of Che Guevara on the front pages of his papers. After a brief fling as a crypto-Maoist (hailing the Red Guards), he settled down to a more mundane existence as a social

democrat—and to this end fused with a wing of the historic Argentine Socialist Party, in order to capture its ballot slot. Not one to quibble about small change, Moreno promptly wrote a social-democratic program to correspond to the new label (see *Intercontinental Press*, 13 November 1972). Truly, Moreno is, as we have often described him, a political chameleon.

In a polemic against the Simón Bolívar Brigade, the Colombian Mandeliste PSR charges that the Morenoite undertaking was simply an adventure: "The brigade as such never entered combat. It could not have done so without adequate training and without being prepared to accept the discipline of the FSLN" (see *Intercontinental Press*, 17 September 1979). It does appear that for the most part Moreno's brigade, despite its bombastic propaganda, sat out the fighting in Costa Rica. In fact, its U.S.-based supporters, the Sandinistas for Socialism in Nicaragua, did not even leave for Managua until the day *after* Somoza's fall! So the heroic, gun-in-hand guerrilla image the Brigade leaders would like to assume (Colombian PST "*comandante*" Kemel George reportedly showed up in battle fatigues for a fund-raising rally in Bogotá) is certainly undeserved.


It is not true, however, that the Simón Bolívar Brigade was unprepared to "accept the discipline of the FSLN." Moreno's idea of "discipline" is probably not to the liking of the Sandinistas (or the USpc leaders), but the Brigade was definitely built on the basis of subordination to the FSLN. That makes its present situation all the more ironic. The "Open Letter" by the Morenoite Colombian PST to form the Brigade called for volunteers to go to Nicaragua to fight "under the military leadership" of the Sandinista Front; and it flaunted letters from FSLN leaders Edén Pastora ("Comandante Zero") and Plutarco Hernández Sánchez saying its members were "acting under the leadership of the General Staff" (see illustration). (The real content of the "military" posing, of course, has to be taken in light of the lack of combat activity by these Johnny-come-lately guerrillas.)

Politically, the Morenoites called for "a Sandinista government"—although for form's sake they tacked on that it should arise from supposed "organs of people's power" and be based on a program of "breaking with the bourgeoisie and imperialism" (*El Socialista*, 22 June). Such pious wishes aside, they

got their Sandinista government and—guess what—they get expelled from the country! That's what often happens when you tail after bonapartists. So the Simón Bolívar Brigade managed to acquire a militant image in spite of itself. As for its detractors in the Colombian PSR, they note that sending off the Brigade was essentially a gimmick rather than a real act of proletarian internationalism. That is true—genuine Trotskyists, had they the resources, would seek to build a communist nucleus among the urban workers rather than tagging along after Comandante Zero on the Southern Front. But what the PSR counterposes is not the struggle for an independent Trotskyist leadership in Nicaragua but inoffensive "solidarity" demonstrations in Bogotá. The difference between Morenoites and Mandelites is the difference between adventurers and cheerleaders, between con men and PR men.

The PSR polemic ended by touching on "the most sensitive point of all, the finances of the Simón Bolívar Brigade." Many people "have begun to have doubts about where the funds gathered by the PST are going," they report. And money *is* always the most sensitive point with Moreno. For those who know his past, the involuntary response upon learning that Colombian Morenoites were organizing an "international brigade" for Nicaragua was to say: "Nicaguans, Colombians—keep your hands on your wallets!" But it hardly behooves the USpc to raise this charge *now*. The Argentine Política Obrera group has been complaining for years that Moreno's Editorial Pluma took 50,000 copies of Trotsky works on contract from them, deliberately held off paying for them for months until the March 1976 Videla coup, and then, pleading poverty, refused to pay.

Moreno's financial skulduggery is legendary in the Latin American left. The most sensationalist case concerns allegations that he failed to deliver promised funds to Hugo Blanco's guerrilla operation in Peru in 1962, and his role in the disappearance of several thousands of dollars taken in a bank expropriation by the Túpac Amaru group and destined for Blanco (for a detailed account of this affair, see Richard Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America* [1972]). In a review of Robert Alexander's grotesquely inaccurate book *Trotskyism in Latin America*, Joseph Hansen noted in 1977 that Moreno had never answered these



Open letter of Moreno's Colombian PST announcing formation of the Simón Bolívar Brigade "under the military leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front..." (*El Socialista*, 22 June 1979)

charges. But in view of the scandalous nature of the charges, it is notable that Hansen evidently never bothered to get an explanation from Moreno during the six years that they were co-leaders of the USec minority.

Moreno stands before the workers movement convicted many times over of political charlatanism and breaches of proletarian morality. Yet his operation is such that he frequently puts on a cover of programmatic militancy for purely factional purposes. On several occasions this has led the Morenoites to adopt positions imitating (or borrowed from?) the authentic Trotskyism of the international Spartacist tendency. Thus in polemicizing against an article on Eurocommunism and Soviet "dissidents" by Morenoite Eugenio Greco, SWP hack Gerry Foley noted that the "award for originality" in raising these positions belonged to "sectarians" such as the iSt (*Intercontinental Press*, 5 December 1977). And indeed, the Greco article (*Revista de América*, August 1977) does bear a notable resemblance to our own writings on the subject (except that, funny thing, the Morenoites identify Stalinism with dependence on Moscow gold).

In particular, in founding the Bolshevik Tendency after his break with the SWP in late 1975-early 1976, Moreno adopted positions on Portugal and Angola strikingly similar to those of the Spartacist tendency. On Portugal he denounced the SWP's tailing after the CIA-funded Socialist Party of Mario Soares as well as the Mandelite IMT's political support to the Stalinist/Armed Forces Movement bloc. On Angola he called for military support to the MPLA against the South African/CIA invasion while formally opposing political support to any of the three competing nationalist groups. The principal characteristic of these formally orthodox positions is that they are far from home and they are utterly arbitrary, not derived from a coherent programmatic worldview.

Thus, while Moreno condemns the SWP's shameless support for the Portuguese SP, in Argentina he fused with Juan Carlos Coral's rump social democrats in 1971. While criticizing Mandel's capitulation to the Eurocommunists, his Venezuelan supporters are now deeply embedded in the "Eurocommunist" MAS. While criticizing the IMT's support for the demagogic Carvalho and the Portuguese MFA, Moreno's Colombian PST called for "support to

the nationalist policies of Torrijos" in Panama, calling this demagogic military officer (friend of both Castro and Chase Manhattan Bank) "progressive" in his "confrontation with imperialism" (see "U.S. Out of Panama Now!" *WV* No. 203, 28 April 1978).

Feigning orthodoxy when it is "cheap"—in distant climes and when it suits his unprincipled maneuvers—close to home where it counts, Moreno's opportunism exceeds that of any other wing of the USec. Trenchantly criticizing Bolivian POR leader Guillermo Lora for joining an "anti-imperialist front" with General Torres in Bolivia in 1971 (*International Socialist Review*, February 1973), two years later Moreno himself joined a popular-front Group of 8 together with the Argentine CP and the leading bourgeois parties in pledging support to the bonapartist government of Juan Perón (see "PST Caught Redhanded," *WV* No. 49, 19 July 1974). Today when the Sandinistas are international celebrities, Moreno is a gung-ho guerrillaist; but when the Castroite PRT/ERP (then affiliated to the USec) was stirring things up in Argentina with its kidnappings and attacks on the army, Moreno's PST equated "the guerrillas and their mirror image—the terrorists of the AAA and other organizations of the ultraright" (*Intercontinental Press*, 28 October 1974).

Nahuel Moreno's record is that of a huckster who has put on the garb of virtually every popular trend in the Latin American left—Peronism, Castroism, Maoism, and now Sandinismo. His "left" positions on international topics bear no relation whatever to his rightist positions at home. The only reason he appears militant over Nicaragua today is that he was caught out in the middle of a maneuver with the FSLN—and that while he is up to his old tricks, the rest of the USec has moved distinctly to the right. Until the FSLN took power in Managua the Morenoites call for a Sandinista government was formally to the right of the other tendencies of the USec, which raised various criticisms of the FSLN ties to the opposition bourgeoisie. But as soon as Mandel and Barnes smelled a chance to hook up to a popular cause, they leapt right over Moreno and left him holding the bag in the unaccustomed role of the far left wing.

Finally, it should be noted that in choosing the name Simón Bolívar Brigade Moreno chose a singularly appropriate sobriquet. Perhaps it was



intended to imitate the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War—although Bolívar, himself from a slaveholding landowner family, would be more appropriately compared to George Washington. But militarily the great hero of the wars of independence was a disaster in every way: he lost virtually every battle he fought, literally

dozens of them, repeatedly abandoning his troops in moments of adversity. His specialty, wrote Karl Marx in an article on Bolívar, was “triumphal entrances, manifestos and the proclamation of constitutions.” He was, said Marx in a letter to Engels, “the most cowardly, brutal and miserable scum.” So too Nahuel Moreno. ■

“OCI/ Moreno: Nicaragua Makes Strange Bedfellows”

—Workers Vanguard,
No. 242, 26 October 1979

As events in Nicaragua send the United Secretariat carousel madly whirling, the USec has spun off an unexpected liaison. Suddenly the French Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI) of Pierre Lambert is making common cause with Nahuel Moreno's Bolshevik Faction (BF). Only yesterday it would have seemed to casual observers that Lambertists and Morenoites stood at opposite ends of the pseudo-Trotskyist spectrum, and never the twain would meet. The BF these days lays claim to the USec's left flank, while the OCI represents the closest thing to a chemically pure social-democratic parody of Trotskyism. Yet today they unite to praise the Simón Bolívar Brigade (BSB), recently expelled from Nicaragua by the victorious Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), and to denounce the “reconstituted” (but none too stable) USec majority led by Ernest Mandel and Jack Barnes. Today, but not tomorrow; for this most putrid of rotten blocs is likely to have the lifespan of a mosquito.

At a stormy meeting of the United Secretariat over the weekend of September 30 the USec adopted a series of motions which add up to total liquidation of an independent presence and political line in Nicaragua, in favor of complete subordination to the petty-bourgeois Sandinista Front. The Morenoite-led Bolívar Brigade was unequivocally condemned and the BF ordered to cease operating as a “public faction,” on pain of expulsion. A lengthy political resolution, “Nicaragua: Revolution on the March,” fulminates against a “headlong plunge into ultraleftism” and “adventuristically forcing the rhythm of the class struggle,” while labeling calls to break with the bourgeoisie a “sectarian temptation of applying an abstract schema” (*Intercontinental Press*, 22 October). It ends by calling on all USec supporters to act “as loyal militants of the organization which led the overthrow of Somoza”—

i.e., to dissolve their organizations, join the FSLN, shut up and take orders from the Sandinista leaders.

In response to this treachery, Moreno submitted a counter-motion condemning the USec's scandalous refusal to express even elementary solidarity with its own “comrades” in the face of repression by the bourgeois Nicaraguan government. This Bolshevik Faction resolution “REJECT[S] these measures, which break all rules of democratic centralism,” and calls on militants to “prevent the holding of an anti-democratic world congress.” The threat to split before the USec's “11th World Congress,” scheduled for early November, was clear. In addition to Moreno's BF, members of the Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency (LTT) voted for this motion. (The LTT is a grouping of former supporters of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction—led by the American Socialist Workers Party—who after the SWP's dissolution of the LTF in 1977 wanted to continue the factional struggle against the USec majority under Mandel, and have since politically aligned themselves *grosso modo* with the Lambertists.)

Immediately after the explosion in Brussels, representatives of the LTT and the BF held a private meeting with the leadership of the OCI, which then provocatively published this fact in its public newsletter (*Lettre d'Informations Ouvrières*, 10 October) along with various USec internal documents (“from a dossier given us by Comrade Moreno”). The newsletter politically endorses the Simón Bolívar Brigade and the BF as attempting to “aid the masses in developing their own organizations,” while the 6 October issue of the OCI's newspaper *Informations Ouvrières* announces that refusal to defend the BSB's right to stay in Nicaragua would be joining “the liquidators of the Fourth International” (in the previous month and a half the weekly *IO* had nothing to say on the subject). So the bloc is sealed.

at least for the purposes of a joint wrecking operation against the SWP and Mandel, while the OCI's previous attempts to join the United Secretariat have apparently been shelved for now. Lambert was angling to blow apart the USec, and now that a split is clearly in the offing, he has simply placed his money and picked his horse.

Left or Right on Nicaragua?

In the face of the SWP's outrageous support for Sandinista Front repression against the workers and its alliance with the "anti-Somoza bourgeoisie" in a capitalist government, and in contrast to the Mandelites' more shamefaced and whimpering capitulation, it's very cheap for the Morenoite/Lambertist bloc to look left on Nicaragua. Thus the OCI wrote of the new FSLN-appointed regime:

"This bourgeois government, installed solely due to the conciliationist spirit of the Sandinista leaders... has received, for the accomplishment of its counterrevolutionary tasks, the support of imperialism and the Kremlin bureaucracy...."

—*Informations Ouvrières*, 8-23 August

Similarly, the Costa Rican Organización Socialista de los Trabajadores (OST), a USec sympathizing section which is linked with the LTT and directly tied to the French OCI, wrote in its newspaper *Qué Hacer?* (26 June-11 July) shortly before the fall of Somoza that the opposition by the FSLN's provisional government to immediate elections "clearly demonstrates its intentions of safeguarding the interests of the national bourgeoisie and imperialism..." (translated in *Intercontinental Press*, 1 October). In turn, the Colombian Morenoites of the Partido Socialista

of Castro is very clear: pay up!"

—*El Socialista*, 7 September

These are very left-sounding critiques of the currently popular Sandinista regime. But the real policies of the BF/BSB and the OCI/LTT are considerably to the right of their present posture, and moreover mutually sharply counterposed. In fact, before the FSLN took power on July 20 there was no basis whatever for Morenoites to unite with Lambertists in or over Nicaragua. As we have explained previously ("Revolution in Nicaragua and the Left," *WV* No. 240, 28 September), the Morenoites' present hostility to the FSLN is the pique of rejected suitors. Over the last year they have repeatedly called for a Sandinista government, later dressed up as "a government of the Front and of the workers and people's organizations" (*El Socialista*, 15 June) and similar formulas. But the FSLN, under the pressure of imperialism and "friendly" Latin American capitalist governments, and at the behest of Castro, preferred the company of industrialists and technocrats.

As for the Morenoite policies in the Simón Bolívar Brigade, they were even more opportunist (while also aggressively pressuring the FSLN tops, soon leading to their downfall). Sending an international brigade is a sometimes necessary and valiant tactic for communists in civil war situations; the participation of several dozen European Trotskyists in the POUM's Lenin Brigade during the Spanish Civil War, for instance, was principled and admirable. But since one can't expect to operate independently of an existing military leadership, it is *essential* to establish and defend the proletarian character of such a unit. The Bolívar Brigade was a parody of these principles. Its very name denies a working-class character, and the Morenoite "Open Letter" calling for its establishment says flatly, "the only programmatic point of the Simón Bolívar Brigade is to support the struggle of the Sandinista people..." (*El Socialista*, 22 June). In addition to the Morenoites' usual financial shady dealings—the Colombian PST, which organized the Brigade, raised money by selling bogus Sandino Bonds—they appealed to the Colombian government to "legally recognize the Simón Bolívar Brigade, guaranteeing its papers, transportation and financing."

But if Moreno & Co. tried to capitalize on enthusiasm for the Sandinista-led revolution against the hated tyrant Somoza, and their gim-



"Buy Sandino Bonds"

de los Trabajadores (PST) write that Latin American governments:

"...bought 'life insurance' for capitalism in Nicaragua with their intervention and support for the FSLN.... To sum up, the 'democratic' bourgeoisies have sent the bill to the FSLN; and the advice

mick simply blew up in their faces, at least they stood to the *left* of the petty-bourgeois nationalist FSLN. In contrast, the Costa Rican OST—and by extension its co-thinkers of the Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency—*denounced the Sandinista Front as criminally adventurist and ultra-leftist!* Their chief spokesman on Nicaragua is one Fausto Amador (brother of assassinated FSLN founder Carlos Fonseca Amador), who quit the Front some years ago as a demoralized element. In a pamphlet entitled *Adónde va Nicaragua* (Where Is Nicaragua Going?), published in February by the OST, Fausto Amador and Sara Santiago presented an analysis that was not only 100 percent wrong—it amounted to defeatist propaganda, in effect calling on the Nicaraguan masses to lay down their arms when the showdown with the dictator was almost underway:

"In Nicaragua, the second offensive was rapidly being converted into a myth which no one believed any more.... There will not be a second offensive. That is obvious for everyone, at least in the immediate future.... The lack of a second offensive would reveal the September [1978] action as an ill-fated adventure."

The OST/LTF's "alternative"—peaceful demonstrations for democratic rights—was cretinist legalism in a country suffering under a bonapartist dictatorship (and, moreover, in the throes of a popularly supported insurgency). As we noted when the American SWP printed a similar piece by Amador and Santiago last June: "To present this social-democratic cowardice and demoralization as having anything to do with Marxism is just about the worst thing the SWP/Usec could do to besmirch the name of Trotskyism before the Central American masses" (*WV* No. 234, 22 June). As for the OCI, *its* opposition to the new FSLN regime is based purely and simply on Stalinophobia—denouncing "the sudden resurrection of the moribund Nicaraguan Socialist Party (national branch office of the Kremlin)" and "the excessive weight of its members vis-à-vis the Sandinistas in the government" (*IO*, 8-23 August).

Portugal, Angola, Cuba...

We have dealt elsewhere with the stark contradiction between the abstract "leftism" of Moreno's Bolshevik Faction on Eurocommunism, the dictatorship of the proletariat or popular frontism in far-off Europe and his ultra-

opportunist practice in Latin America (political support to Perón, Torrijos, etc.). But what of its new bloc partners of the Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency (and its mentors in the OCI)? In opposing the dissolution of the LTF in 1977 the future LTFers put forward a face of left-wing militancy: where the SWP called the Mandelite majority ultraleftist, they said centrist; where Jack Barnes said the faction was formed to fight guerrillaism alone, they said it was also to fight popular frontism at home. But by the time it came to formulating a "Call for the Formation of an International Tendency" ([SWP] *International Internal Discussion Bulletin*, December 1978), the future LTF stood on the whole of "programmatic and political acquisitions" of the LTF, and in particular "the texts of the LTF on the Portuguese revolution and on Angola."

This statement definitively branded the Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency as a *reformist* formation, and ignominious capitulators besides. For what did the LTF stand for in Portugal and Angola? At the height of the 1975 polarization in Portugal, when Lisbon workers were taking over factories, the LTF called for a purely "democratic" program of defense of the constituent assembly (at the time the battle cry of the right). As the Socialist Party of Mário Soares was leading a mass anti-Communist mobilization which was burning down CP offices, the SWP proclaimed that the "real vanguard of the Portuguese working class... participated in the SP demonstrations" (*Militant*, 8 August 1975). And the OCI called for a "Soares Government" (*Informations Ouvrières*, 23 July-6 August 1975). Moreno broke from the SWP and split the LTF precisely over this issue, while the future LTFers were at first even harder in condemning the SWP's tailing after Soares (only to capitulate a few weeks later and vote for the LTF's "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" resolution).

For principled Marxists differences of the magnitude that divided the Morenoites and Lambertists over Portugal would make unity *impossible*: like the SWP and Mandel, they would have been facing each other on opposite sides of the barricades in Lisbon. The same on Angola, where at the height of the fighting between the South African-led, CIA-financed imperialist drive on Luanda, the SWP/LTF *refused to take*



Pierre Lambert

WV Photo

sides for the military victory of the Soviet-backed MPLA. (Later they tried to disguise this vile betrayal by some heavy-handed "editing" of a January 1976 SWP national committee statement.) Moreno denounced this in the most violent terms, publishing a whole book on the subject (*Angola: La revolución negra en marcha* [1977]) where he said that, "the best way to aid Vorster and Yankee imperialism was to say what the SWP said...." So how does Moreno feel about uniting today with people who consider the SWP/LTF's stand "historic"?

And Cuba? On Cuba, the LTF supports "the general line of D. Keil's contributions," while three leaders of the Costa Rican OST (Andrés, Rodrigo and Sara) signed together with Keil a document labeling the Castro regime a "bureaucratized workers state" ("For a Change in the Fourth International's Position on Cuba," [SWP] *IIDB*, December 1978). Again, at first glance this might seem a move to the left from the USec's political support to the "unconscious Trotskyist" Fidel (now taken to new lengths by the SWP's latest panegyrics to Castro, the champion of peace and friend of the world's children). But as we pointed out in our article, "For Workers Political Revolution in Cuba!" (*WV* No. 224, 2 February 1979), Keil et al. were attacking the SWP "from the right, arguing in effect for a consistently *social-democratic* position of opposing all Stalinist regimes." We summed up: "Add up the SWP/LTF positions on China, Vietnam, Portugal and Angola and throw in a deformed workers state position on Cuba and what do you get? A fleshed-out program of Stalinophobia." The LTF/OST's openly *counterrevolutionary* positions on Nicaragua, calling the Sandinistas' victorious "second offensive" an "adventure" are a vivid confirmation of our earlier conclusion.

... And the Strange Case of Fausto Amador

These questions—the most basic issues of revolutionary perspective in key recent events—are but the small change in the horse-trading combinations and recombinations of USec factional struggles. There is a basis of sorts for the Morenoite/Lambertist bloc: both are deeply reformist while appearing left today on Nicaragua. Besides there is the attractive bait that the OCI recently broke with Moreno's long-standing opponents in the Argentinian

Política Obrera group (enemy of my enemy makes you my friend, etc.). But there are a few sticky points, even for these consummate opportunists. And one of these is the case of Fausto Amador, already introduced to our readers.

For F. Amador did not simply break from the FSLN. He was interviewed on Somoza's television and spoke to Somoza's press, where he urged other members of the guerrilla organization to lay down their arms in return for promises of amnesty by the blood-soaked dynastic dictatorship. For this the FSLN leaders rightly considered him a traitor. Later, as a Nicaraguan cultural attaché in Brussels—i.e., an employee of Somoza—he was reportedly won to the USec's perversion of Trotskyism. Naturally this caused a certain commotion in Central America, where the case was well-known. Moreno picked this up and was the first to make it an issue in the USec. At a December 1977 meeting of the central committee of the Colombian PST, Bolshevik faction leader Eugenio Greco complained:

"Do you know the name they give in Europe to what Fausto Amador did. It was called collaborationism.... If a very probable combination of circumstances occurs: that Somoza falls; that the Frente Sandinista emerges as a movement of great prestige because of its antidictatorial struggle.... the Frente Sandinista might say: I would like the Fourth International to explain why Fausto Amador Arrieta is in its ranks... and, gentlemen, at that moment Trotskyism will be finished in Central America."

—[SWP] *IIDB*, April 1978

And so it came to pass. But today the notorious Fausto Amador, a leader of the Costa Rican OST, is defended by the LTF and its new allies of Moreno & Co. The BF counter-motion at the September 30 USec meeting explicitly defends Amador against his accusers, "a petty-bourgeois leadership foreign to the Trotskyist movement." Attacks on the personal integrity of political leaders are the bane of the Latin American left, where most splits focus on accusations of stolen money or cowardice and betrayal. In the case of Fausto Amador the charges are essentially proven by his own admission; and yet he remains a recognized leader of the USec. What is destroyed by this fact is not Trotskyism, however, but the revolutionary pretensions of these renegades from Marxism for whom Fausto Amador's hands are only a little dirtier than all the rest. ■

II.

Moreno in Argentina, I: From Left Peronism to Social Democracy

excerpted from:

“Argentina: The Struggle Against Peronism”

—Workers Vanguard,
No. 24, 6 July 1973

The Moreno Group and “Left”-Peronism

The largest group in Argentina claiming to support Trotskyism is the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST) led by Nahuel Moreno. Moreno's tendency has existed since the late 1940's, and at least since 1952 has exhibited the fundamental characteristics of Pabloism in a classic form. Pablo abandoned the struggle for the creation of independent Trotskyist parties: in the early 1950's he concocted the objectivist theory that Stalinism would be “forced” to take revolutionary measures and thus revolutionaries should bury themselves in the dominant workers parties. In Latin America this revisionism was carried to a “higher” level when Pablo ordered the Bolivian POR into the petty-bourgeois nationalist MNR, which was in no way a workers party.

In Argentina the Moreno group had opposed Peronism until 1952 but then rejected this position as “sectarian.” After that “we considered ourselves a ‘de facto’ party of the anti-Yankee front of Peronism” (quote of an “apologist for Moreno” in *Workers Press*, 14 April 1972). According to the same source, “our innovation was that for the first time a Marxist group entered a bourgeois party.” Immersion in this bourgeois party lasted for the next twelve years!

After the “Liberating Revolution” of 1955 Moreno formed the Movimiento de Agrupaciones Obreras (MAO—Movement of Workers Groupings) and put out the magazine *Palabra Obrera*, which referred to itself as the “organ of revolutionary workers’ Peronism” issued “under the discipline of General Perón and the Peronist Supreme Council”:

In the 1958 elections *Palabra Obrera*, while initially opposing a vote for the bourgeois Radical Frondizi,

eventually decided to “save the activist unity” by calling for a “vote for the gorilla Frondizi” (*Avanzada Socialista*, 9 May 1973). During this same period the Moreno group was particularly associated with a group of left-Peronist leaders of the “62 organizations” (the most prominent being Loholaberry) who had won influence during the resistance following the 1955 coup. A few years later the same Loholaberry was directly collaborating with the brutal anti-labor Onganía dictatorship.

After 1964, when *Palabra Obrera* fused with the Castroite FRIP group, Moreno switched allegiances and took on guerillaist feathers (see “Guevarism vs. Social Democracy in the U.S.,” *WV* No. 23, 22 June 1973). While achieving some influence as a result of mass work with Tucumán sugar workers, again in alliance with the “peronistas combativos” of the FOTIA leadership, the Moreno group did not itself undertake guerilla warfare. When some of the members began pushing to implement the program, Moreno split.

The trade-union work of the Moreno group has had a consistent syndicalist character, refusing to politicize the spontaneous struggles of the class. In the general strikes of late 1970 it called for an unlimited general strike for an immediate pay increase, end to the state of siege and recognition of all political parties, and for the formation of factory assemblies to lead the strike (*La Verdad*, 10 November 1970). It did not call for a workers government nor did it advocate the formation of a national strike committee to lead the mobilization. Similarly, the PST (then PSA) call for a workers’ slate in the last elections did not raise any programmatic criteria! Its appeals were directed to locally prominent militants connected with the CP, left-Peronists or syndicalists, and the main demand was for a slate with 80 percent workers with an unspecified “workers’ program.”

Since the March elections, the fail-


ure to present a clear alternative to the Peronists has become actively dangerous. In late May the PST attended a meeting with Cámpora which, according to the PST itself, "was a great meeting of the parties and organizations of the Argentine bosses to give their support to Cámpora's proposals." The PST's position was that all the government's acts which develop toward the workers'

interests would be given critical support. "Without confusing the banners, Dr. Cámpora can count on our proletarian solidarity" (*Avanzada Socialista*, 30 May-6 June 1973). Cámpora-Perón begin gearing up for a crackdown on the "Trotskyists" and PST leader Juan Carlos Coral promises the PST's critical support for the positive measures of the Cámpora government!...

excerpted from:

"Guevarism vs. Social Democracy in the USec"

—Workers Vanguard,
No. 23, 22 June 1973



Moreno's press in the '50s: Palabra Obrera, "Organ of Revolutionary Workers Peronism—Under the Discipline of Gen. Perón and the Peronist High Council"

The "Trotskyists" II: The PST and the Social-Democratic Swamp

Thus the "Trotskyist-Castroite" theories of the PRT/ERP guerillaists have nothing in common with authentic Trotskyism. In the USec faction fight, the opposition to the PRT radical terrorists and their European USec supporters is led by the reformist U.S. SWP, which is backing the Argentine PST of Nahuel Moreno, pseudo-Trotskyist café revolutionary *sui generis*, and until 1969 the leading spokesman of the USec in Latin America. Although the SWP-Moreno wing now seeks to pose as principled defenders of orthodox Trotskyism against Castroite guerillism, the basis of their opposition to the Mandel-Frank-Maitan tendency epitomized by the PRT/ERP is *from the right*, proceeding from an appetite for direct reformist collaboration with their own bourgeoisies.

This can be illustrated by examining Moreno's own history and his current positions on Argentina. In 1961 Moreno wrote:

"Of course, life has brought out the gaps, omissions and errors of the program of Permanent Revolution... The dogma that only the working class can accomplish the democratic tasks is false. Sectors of the urban middle class and the peasantry are, on occasion, the revolutionary leadership... History... has rejected the theory that the proletariat, in the backward countries, is the revolutionary leadership... Mao Tse-tungism, or the theory of guerilla war, is the particular reflection in the field of theory of the actual stage of world revolution... [It is necessary to] synthesize the correct general theory and program (Trotskyist) with the correct particular theory and program (Mao Tse-tungist or Castroist)... [The state] conserves relative autonomy and can maneuver between distinct social classes.... There are revolutionary democratic dictatorships (based on the

peasantry, the people and the proletariat)."

—N. Moreno, *La revolución latinoamericana*, 1961

This is simply an earlier incarnation of the ideology of the PRT/ERP: the revolutionary role of the peasantry, the bankruptcy of the program of permanent revolution, the theory of new democracy—it is all there, perhaps even a bit more crudely worded. It was on the basis of these theories that the Moreno group, which until then had been deeply buried in the Peronist movement—issuing its magazine *Palabra Obrera* "under the discipline of General Perón and of the Peronist Supreme Command"—fused with a petty-bourgeois Castroite group (the FRIP), which had been active among Tucuman sugar workers, in 1964 to form the PRT, official section of the "United Secretariat of the Fourth International."

During the period 1964-68 the PRT continued to follow these guerillaist policies, and without a single word of protest from USec leaders. It would doubtless still be doing so today if some of the well-meaning but naive militants of the PRT had not decided to put Moreno's words into practice, calling for the transition to armed struggle in the north. For a time Moreno went along with the drift, going so far as to announce that "today OLAS [Castro's guerilla "International"], with its national combat organizations for armed struggle, is the only organizational vehicle for power" (N. Moreno, "La revolución latinoamericana, Argentina y nuestras tareas," *Estrategia* No. 7, September 1968):

But "armed struggle" has a way of becoming dangerous, so when it was clear that a sizeable portion of the PRT was actually headed toward the formation of a "guerilla army," Moreno split the party (1968). Until late 1971 the Moreno group retained the name of

the PRT and of its newspaper (*La Verdad*), while the guerrillaists led by Carlos Ramirez became known by the title of their organ (*Combatiente*). However, having already exhausted the policies of deep immersion in Peronism and Castroism, Moreno, sensing a possibility of participating in the elections as a respectable left party (all communist parties are banned in Argentina, and have been both under Perón and the military), began sniffing around for a new swamp in which to bury the PRT (*Verdad*). This was promptly found in the shape of a wing of the old Partido Socialista Argentino (PSA—Argentine Socialist Party, affiliated with the Second International) led by Juan Carlos Coral. The formalities of a common program were tidily dealt with in the form of "Basis of Unification" which has been described by Joseph Hansen and his co-thinkers as "consisting essentially of a summary of Trotskyist positions based on the theory of permanent revolution" (*Argentina and Bolivia—The Balance Sheet*, 1973).

Let us see what the permanent revolution sounds like in the mouths of these social democrats. In the first place, it seems that the party must "tirelessly struggle to bring about a workers and people's government that will assure national liberation and the revolutionary construction of socialism." This is simple enough: if Trotskyism calls for a workers government to achieve socialism, and Stalinism calls for a people's government to achieve national liberation—then just combine the two for the best of all possible worlds! Sixty years of struggle between Stalinism and Trotskyism, the murder of tens of thousands of Left Oppositionists, the strangling of the Chinese, German, French, Spanish and Vietnamese revolutions—these are but mere trifles when respectability can be achieved through painless fusion with social democracy!

And what about internationalism? What of the Fourth International, in particular? It seems that "while recognizing the need for an International," the PSA will not "yield [its] inalienable right to determine strategy and tactics to any leadership or tendency that is not rooted in the proletariat and the Argentine people." And what about the program? As good reformists, the PSA has two: the minimum and maximum programs, which appear in one set of "demands for immediate struggle" and another set for "struggle on a permanent basis" (i.e., socialism). One of

the more interesting immediate demands is "for an end to the repressive role of the armed forces and their use in the service of capital... For the constitutional right of soldiers and officers to take part in politics" [our emphasis]. The PSA envisions reforming the very essence of the capitalist state, thereby avoiding mentioning touchy subjects like armed struggle, workers militias, etc.

Moreno elsewhere referred to this opportunist swamp as "95 percent Trotskyist." Perhaps he can help us to find the five percent. Is it in the "workers and people's government"? In the refusal to recognize the authority of any International which is "not rooted in... the Argentine people"? Or perhaps it is the maximum-minimum program, a hallmark of reformism? Is it the "end to the repressive role of the armed forces" under capitalism? Or the refusal to say *one word* about armed struggle in a country which has been in a pre-revolutionary situation for four years?

Having achieved the necessary respectable cover, the "revitalized" "95 percent Trotskyist" PSA (now renamed the PST) proceeded to throw its total energies into the election campaign. At a time when even the PST characterized the situation as "pre-revolutionary," this exclusively electoral approach can only be called classical parliamentary cretinism. Moreover, instead of running on its own program the PST devised a new tactic, the "workers pole." "Take advantage of our legal status," it declared, offering to put any bona fide worker on its slate. Are you left-Peronist, pro-CP, syndicalist? Never mind, we can all get together in a single slate and, who knows, perhaps one day we can all be part of one great party of the whole class, the kind Kautsky built, the social democracy.

Unfortunately, this is still very "small potatoes" and it still leaves the mass of the working class under the control of Peronism. Instead of calling on the workers to break from Peronism (how crude and sectarian!), the PSA offered to vote for the Justicialista candidates if the FREJULI ticket was made up of at least 80 percent workers, instead of just 25 percent (*Avanzada Socialista*, 22 November 1972)! In response to Perón's return last November, the PST newspaper's front page banner headline read: "Why is Perón Coming? Hopefully it will be to impose fighting workers candidates and not to make deals with the oligarchy" (*Avanzada Socialista*, 8 November 1972)!



Nahuel Moreno


To believe the words of Moreno and his group, one could only conclude that Trotskyism and the whole science of Marxism simply amount to the method of finding the highest bidder to sell out to. In a country where Peronism, a bourgeois movement, is dominant in the working class, it is necessary to pose a sharp class alternative to populism, not offer to vote for it if 80 percent of its candidates are labor bureaucrats! To break the workers from Perón,

revolutionary communists can propose a class united front, even to the traitorous leadership of the CGT; we can demand the formation of a labor party with a class-struggle program; we can demand general strikes to impose the urgent demands of the workers. But a working-class united front against the bourgeoisie can never be achieved by making a bloc (open or secret, it makes no difference) with the leading bourgeois politician, General Perón!...

Build a Legal, Centrist, Bourgeois Party?

Eso es lo que explica que, en el momento actual, seamos el polo de atracción de los grupos de izquierda estudiantil y de la vanguardia obrera. El Partido Socialista de la Revolución Nacional no es más que una etapa en la formación del partido centrista de izquierda legal, nuestro principal objetivo político-organizativo en el actual momento. En ese sentido debemos buscar una solución. El Partido Socialista de la Revolución Nacional debe transformarse en una corriente centrista de izquierda a corto plazo, o debemos buscar otro acuerdo o unión que cree esa organización. Esa organización política legal centrista de izquierda es progresiva fundamentalmente por su legalidad y su carácter nacional. Sabemos conscientemente que esa organización es lo opuesto de una proletaria bolchevique, y que nuestra tendencia, por medio de ella y luchando en ella

31



"The Socialist Party of National Revolution is no more than a stage in the formation of a legal, left centrist party, our main political-organizational objective at this time...."

"This left centrist, legal political organization is progressive fundamentally because of its legality and its national character. We are consciously aware that this organization is the opposite of a proletarian Bolshevik organization...."

—from Nahuel Moreno, 1954: año clave del peronismo

80 Percent Working-Class Peronism?

Esa lista obrera debe formarse en base a los compañeros más luchadores, que han actuado al frente de las peleas contra el hambre, la miseria y los atropellos de la patronal y el régimen. A los luchadores peronistas les hemos dicho que traten de lograr un 80% de candidatos obreros elegidos por la base, dentro del justicialismo y que, en ese caso- los apoyaremos. Nos hemos ofrecido a acompañar a los compañeros peronistas a votar a Perón.

"... We have told the Peronist fighters to try to achieve [a slate of] 80 percent workers candidates elected by the rank and file of justicialismo [the Peronist party FREJULI] and that, in that case—we will support them."

—from Avanzada Socialista, 22 November 1972

"Proletarian Solidarity" with Campora?

regua.
 el apoyo crítico del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores. Sin confundir las banderas, podrá contar, Dr. Campora, con nuestra solidaridad proletaria, pero no para agregar firmas junto a las de aliados sospechosos, sino para sumar nuestra militancia en la lucha cotidiana, que desarrollan las masas movilizadas a partir del Cordobazo".

"... Without confusing banners, Dr. Campora will be able to count on our proletarian solidarity...."

—from Avanzada Socialista, 30 May-6 June 1973

A Workers and People's Government?

II
**Por la plena vigencia de las libertades democráticas
 Fuera los militares del poder
 Asamblea Constituyente, convocada bajo control de
 los trabajadores, que designe un
 Gobierno Provisional Obrero y Popular**



*"For full implementation of democratic rights
 Military out of the government
 For a Constituent Assembly, called under the control
 of the workers, to designate
 a Provisional Workers and People's Government"*

La Internacional
 Reconociendo la necesidad de una
 Internacional, el Partido no abdica de su
 inalienable derecho a determinar sus estrategias y
 tácticas a dirección alguna que no emane de las
 entrañas del proletariado y del pueblo argentino.
**SOBRES LAS BASES ENUNCIADAS,
 EL PARTIDO A LUCHAR**


the workers and their organizations,
 parties and unions.
 That, while recognizing the need for
 an International, neither of the executive
 committees, nor the party, will
 yield their inalienable right to deter-
 mine strategy and tactics to any lead-
 ership or tendency that is not rooted
 in the proletariat and the Argentine
 people.
 That on the basis of these points,
 both executive committees are devot-
 ing their efforts to
**VI. For the democratization of the
 armed forces.**
 For an end to the repressive role
 of the armed forces and their use in
 the service of capital.

VI
Por la democratización de las Fuerzas Armadas

- Por la supresión del rol represivo de las Fuerzas Armadas y su utilización al servicio de los intereses del capital.
- Por la reducción del servicio militar a tres meses

—from "Programa del Partido Socialista de Argentina," 24 November 1972

—from "Basis of Unification of the PSA-PRT," Intercontinental Press, 13 November 1972



Peron's wife Isabelita (Maria Estela) with Hector Campora and picture of Eva, Peron's first wife.

III.

Moreno in Argentina, II: Back to Peronism

"PST Caught Redhanded"

—Workers Vanguard,
No. 49, 19 July 1974

Pact with Perón for "Law and Order"

In recent months rightist terror in Argentina has mounted sharply. This is seldom reported in the bourgeois media, which prefer to dwell on kidnappings carried out by leftist guerrillas. However, in addition to the police "coup" in the interior industrial city of Córdoba during February, there have been a series of shootings, raids, suppressions of newspapers and other arbitrary acts directed against left-Peronist and socialist organizations.

Earlier this year General Perón closed down the left-Peronist newspapers *El Descamisado* and *El Mundo*. Offices of the pro-Moscow Communist Party, of the Maoist Revolutionary Communist Party (PCR), of the UJS (Union of Youth for Socialism, youth group of *Política Obrera*) and of the PST (Socialist Workers Party) and its youth group, the AJS (Vanguard Socialist Youth), have all been raided by the police. Left-wing union offices have been dynamited and attacked with machine guns by bureaucratic goons. And in May three militants of the PST, who had been kidnapped from the office of their party in a Buenos Aires suburb, were murdered by a gang of 15 rightist thugs. Now, with the death of "El Líder" (Perón) on June 30, this wave of atrocities will undoubtedly accelerate.

Under such circumstances, faced with a wave of rightist terror which has tacit backing and often direct participation by the police and army, it is an elementary necessity of the class struggle to call for united actions in defense of the left, with the participation of all socialist organizations as well as left-Peronist union and youth organizations. Such actions would include united demonstrations, armed pickets to defend strikes and the offices of leftist organizations, and the eventual formation of a united workers militia based on the unions. These united-front ac-

tions would in no way compromise the necessary political independence of the various organizations participating.

However, in a display of panic typical of the frenzied petty bourgeoisie, the Argentine PST (a sympathizing organization of the fake-Trotskyist "United Secretariat of the Fourth International") has gone a very different path—toward a political bloc with the Stalinists and bourgeois liberal and populist parties, in defense of the "institutionalization" of bourgeois legality. This craven capitulation was vividly expressed in a joint declaration by six bourgeois parties, the CP and the PST in an audience with General Perón at his residence, "Olivos," on March 21. The declaration promises to adhere to "the institutional process" (i.e., capitalist law-and-order), condemns all those (such as communists) who seek to change this process, and calls for united action (together with the Radicals and Peronists) against imperialism!

This preposterous "Declaration of the 8" is undoubtedly one of the greatest atrocities perpetrated by an ostensibly Trotskyist organization since the Ceylonese LSSP joined a popular-front government in 1964. In addition to implying that the very bourgeois forces which murdered PST militants and deposed the left-Peronist Córdoba government can "institutionalize" democracy and fight imperialism, the Olivos declaration is, in fact, a forerunner to a popular front.

We do not have in our possession a copy of the original statement, but the excerpts from it printed in *Política Obrera* (30 March) are more than adequate for an exact appreciation of its character. The PST now claims, in the 26 June issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, that it never signed the document apparently because it couldn't get a good enough "deal" from the bourgeois parties and the Stalinists on the wording (see *Intercontinental Press*, 15 July). However, at most this can only have to do with a formal signature, since the

PST very definitely did participate in the Olivos meeting (we print a picture of the PST's ubiquitous Juan Carlos Coral along with the rest of the eight at the audience with Perón) whose purpose was to present the declaration to the president. In any case, it is, to say the least, unusual that *Avanzada Socialista* reported the PST as having signed the declaration in its edition of 28 March. Despite the vehement public attack by the Política Obrera group on the PST because of this act AS did not see fit to publish a "rectification" of its "editorial error" until *three months later!*

In the text presented to Perón by the eight parties we read that the participants in the Olivos meeting support "in all instances the institutional process and, at the same time, condemn all those who in one way or another attempt to change it." In the first place the reader notes repeated references to "institutionalization," "the institutional process" and the like. Evidently even the double-talking PST has trouble speaking of bourgeois democracy in Perón's Argentina! And secondly, whom exactly does the declaration condemn? No doubt the "ultrarightists." But, then, not only the right-wing Peronist thugs and fascists wish to change the institutional process of bourgeois democracy—so, too, would any self-respecting Marxist.

As for the tasks ahead, the PST has something quite different from proletarian revolution in mind. According to the declaration:

"The difficult moments which await the Republic, as a consequence of its confrontation with the powers which have subjected it from long ago, can be overcome victoriously with solidarity in action of the sectors which respect the majority and popular will for liberation [as] expressed in the elections...."

"The realization of a true federalism of the national community, Latin American integration, solidarity with the subjected peoples of the world and the fight against imperialism and the oligarchy can be materialized only with the creative agreements [coincidencias] which grow out of the full exercise of democracy in all areas...."

After piercing through the byzantine rhetoric, the only possible meaning one can get from this passage is that the Peronists, Radicals and other liberal/populist capitalist parties, together with the CP and PST, can fight against imperialism and the oligarchy... provided, of course, they achieve those "creative agreements" which result from bourgeois democracy!

Such an open rejection of the Marxist principle of working-class independence from the bourgeoisie, the implicit belief that the bourgeoisie can fight against imperialism (and therefore that Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution is false), and the explicit agreement to abide by the rules of the "institutional process" (not even bourgeois democracy!)—even for the unprincipled USec, such a document is a little extreme. Yet to date, no section of the "Trotskyist" United Secretariat has publicly stated its disagreement!

The USec majority has reportedly sent an internal letter to its sections in which it demands that the PST clarify its position on the document, or else be expelled. This is only natural, since the PST sides with the reformist USec minority led by the SWP. What better way to get at the SWP than to saddle it with this betrayal by its Argentine cothinkers? But what of the militant workers in Argentina itself, who have at least two organizations sympathizing with the United Secretariat to choose from (the PST and the "Red Faction" of the ERP/PRT)? Certainly they might be interested to know where the "Fourth International" stands on this important issue. Not to mention would-be Trotskyists around the world.

As for the SWP, it is prepared to denounce kidnappings of U.S. businessmen carried out by the ERP/PRT, at the time the official Argentine section of the USec, within hours of their occurrence. Yet it took the weekly 40-page-plus *Intercontinental Press* a quarter of a year to even mention the Olivos declaration.

The Spartacist League denounces the declaration by the Argentine PST (Socialist Workers Party), Communist Party and six bourgeois liberal and populist parties as an obscene reformist capitulation. Whether or not the Coral/Moreno leadership of the PST may have had reservations or disagreements at the time (or quite likely only now, after receiving a letter from some unnamed "European *compañero*" asking for "clarification"), they cannot deny that they were prepared in principle to enter a bloc for law and order with the bourgeoisie. The PST is revealed as an enemy of the workers!

We have in the past denounced similar betrayals by the PST as when, at a similar meeting between the Peronist President-elect Cámpora the bourgeois parties and CP, Juan Carlos Coral stated the PST's support for the "posi-



Juan Carlos Coral

tive measures" of the new government and declared his "proletarian solidarity" with Cámpora ("Argentina: The Struggle Against Peronism," *WV* No. 24, 6 July 1973). Like the scandalous Olivos declaration, this "critical support" for a bourgeois government has never been denounced in the public press of the United Secretariat. No doubt, however, after Mandel has

squeezed the last drop of factional advantage from the affair, and the PST is duly expelled or walks out of the USec, he will then turn around and write one of those lucid explanations of his ex-affiliates' betrayals (his article on the Ceylonese LSSP is a model in which he denounces everything... except his own, and the USec's, culpability in the betrayal. ■

Institutionalization: Now and Forever

DOCUMENTS

'Institutionalization' and Rightist Threat

[The following article is from the July 4 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly paper of the Argentine PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing group of the Fourth International). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Our party is the only militant left party in Argentina that has publicly stated that it supports the "process of institutionalization." In line with this, it was the only working-class and socialist current that, in order to participate in this process, did the work necessary to gain the status of a legal party and intervene in the elections.

In October 1972, representatives of our party went to meet with the representative of the military dictatorship to tell him that we supported the "process

of institutionalization" and to demand the withdrawal of the military junta from the government. More recently, in the case of the coup by Navarro in Córdoba, we met with the Peronist government. And, along with reiterating our opposition to military dictatorship, we called for a series of measures such as the repudiation of the Social Pact, democratization of the unions, and expropriation of the oligarchy and the imperialists.

These are the same demands we make today, when once again, in the aftermath of General Perón's death, we have reiterated our support for the "process of institutionalization" against the attacks of the putschist right.

What is the meaning of this process that we find ourselves supporting together with bourgeois political forces?

In Argentine politics, the term "pro-

Intercontinental Press

—from "'Institutionalization' and Rightist Threat," *Avanzada Socialista*, 4 July 1974, translated in *Intercontinental Press*, 22 July 1974

Did They or Didn't They: Three Months Later

¿Cómo que los autores de la resolución del Secretariado Unificado sacaron la impresión opuesta?

Reconocemos que parte de la culpa recae sobre nosotros. *Avanzada Socialista* publicó el texto del supuesto documento conjunto en su edición del 28 de marzo-5 de abril, con una lista de supuestos firmantes. Se trata de un error del que nos hacemos responsables, así como de la demora en corregirlo. Pero el camarada Coral lo rectificó públicamente el 8 de mayo en una entrevista por televisión que tuvo difusión nacional, y el consejo editorial de *Avanzada Socialista* hizo lo mismo en la edición del 26 de junio.¹

¹ El texto en español apareció en *Intercontinental Press* el 27 de julio.

—from "In Defense of the PST and the Truth," statement by Executive Committee of the PST, 20 August 1974, translated in *Intercontinental Press*, 9 September 1974

How then did the authors of the United Secretariat resolution gain a contrary impression?

We acknowledge that we are partly to blame for this. *Avanzada Socialista* did publish the text of the supposed common document in the March 28-April 5 issue. Moreover, it included a list of supposed signers. This was an error—along with the delay in correcting it—for which we take responsibility. Comrade Coral did make a public correction on May 8 in a television interview. A public rectification was also made by the editorial staff of *Avanzada Socialista* in the June 26 issue.¹

¹ For the Spanish text see *Intercontinental Press*, July 27, page 1602. An

—from "En Defensa del PST y la Verdad," statement by Executive Committee of the PST, 20 August 1974, in *Intercontinental Press*, 16 September 1974



Política Obrera

PST's Coral (third from right) at presentation of "Declaration of 8" to Perón (third from left).

What's in a Word

los sectores democráticos puesto que se nos ha llamado la atención sobre el particular, lo estamos estudiando. Llamamos a todos los sectores del movimiento trotskista a considerar también esta cuestión, teniendo en cuenta la situación concreta de la Argentina, incluyendo el significado que ha adquirido la palabra "institucionalización".²

Si es necesaria una corrección,

of democratic fight. Since our attention has been called to this, we have begun discussing the matter. We appeal to other sectors of the Trotskyist movement to also consider this question, bearing in mind the concrete situation in Argentina, including the meaning acquired by the word "institucionalización."²

If an adjustment is called for in the revolutionary

2. Las palabras "institucionalización" y "proceso de institucionalización" han adquirido un significado especial en la política actual argentina.

En 1949, durante su primer gobierno, Perón instituyó la "institucionalización" de los derechos políticos de las mujeres.

En Argentina, las fuerzas reaccionarias tratan de revertir el "proceso de institucionalización". Es por eso que este punto ha pasado a ser uno de los problemas más importantes de la lucha de clases en ese país. — IP

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2. "Institutionalization" and the "process of institutionalization" have acquired a special meaning in current Argentine politics.

In 1949, during his first regime, Perón instituted the "institutionalization" of the political rights of women.

Argentine politics as "institutionalizing" equal rights for women.

In Argentina, reactionary forces are seeking to reverse the "process of institutionalization." Thus the issue has become an acute one in the class struggle there. — IP

—from "En Defensa del PST y la Verdad," Ibid.

If You Believe This...

de Corral y, además, que todo el programa fue un alegato contra el frente popular.

Por nuestra parte queremos aclarar que el error de *Avanzada Socialista* se debió a la siguiente confusión: uno de los ocho partidos propuso que se hiciera una declaración conjunta y presentó un proyecto. Nuestro partido propuso una serie de cambios que fueron parcialmente aceptados. Nuestra redacción creyó, en el momento de cerrar nuestra edición, que el documento llevaba la firma del *Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores*. En realidad, no había sido firmado por subsistir todavía diferencias.

Cumplimos en consignar el error de esta redacción con respecto a la firma del documento.

Corral's public denial, and also the fact that the entire program argued the case against popular frontism.

For our part we want to make clear how *Avanzada Socialista* happened to make the error. It resulted from the following sequence: One of the eight parties proposed that a joint declaration be made, and it presented a draft. Our party proposed a series of changes that were partially accepted. At the time we went to press, the editorial staff thought that the document bore the signature of the *Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores*. Actually, it was not signed because there was still disagreement with it.

We on the editorial staff complete the record by indicating how the error was made with regard to the signature.

—from "El PST No Firmo Declaracion de los 8," *Avanzada Socialista*, 26 June 1974, in Intercontinental Press, 22 July 1974

—from "No PST Signature on Statement Handed to Peron," *Avanzada Socialista*, 26 June 1974, translated in Intercontinental Press, 15 July 1974

"SWP 'Translates' Coral"

—Workers Vanguard,
No. 62, 14 February 1975

The wave of rightist terror which engulfed Argentina following the death of President Juan Perón last July has resulted in more than one political murder per day, a total of 227 in 1974. Many, perhaps most, of these assassinations are carried out by special squads of plain-clothes military and police officials.

In this perilous situation it is vital for revolutionaries not only to call for united-front defense of left and militant trade-union organizations, but also to warn the masses against placing any confidence in the treacherous anti-working class Peronist regime. The Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers Party) has done precisely the opposite, seeking to protect itself by repeated expressions of support for the "process of institutionalization" and for the "continuity" of the government. While seven of its own members were gunned down by pro-government thugs last year, the PST continues to proclaim that the main danger is a coup d'état!

Workers Vanguard was the first publication outside Argentina to publicly call attention to the scandalous behavior of the (purportedly Trotskyist) PST which issued, together with the local Stalinists and six bourgeois parties, a declaration calling for bourgeois law and order on the occasion of a meeting with Perón last March 21 (see "PST Caught Redhanded," *WV* No. 49, 19 July 1974). The declaration supports "in all instances the institutional process" and condemns "all those who in one way or another attempt to change it."

This expression of support for the capitalist state is a betrayal of the most fundamental Marxist principles so gross that even the professional hypocrites of the "United Secretariat of the Fourth International," of which the PST is a sympathizing organization, finally made a public protest. However, for appearance's sake, the USec "acknowledged" the PST's cock-and-bull story that its representative, Juan Carlos Coral, did not sign the document even though the PST newspaper (*Avanzada Socialista*) reproduced the document as having been signed by him. This "editorial error" was not corrected by AS for a full *three months!*

Moreover, only a few days after this "correction" was published the PST attended another meeting of "the eight," this time with the General's wife (and vice president) María Estela, as Perón lay dying. A second declaration was issued, declaring the participants' "support for the process of institutionalization...." Challenged by the USec lead-

ership, the PST again answered that Coral had not actually signed the statement.

The PST supported the declaration's content, however, with the excuse that "the word 'institutionalization' has acquired a meaning in Argentine politics different from the one given in the dictionary. It has become a synonym of fighting to defend or win democratic rights" (*Avanzada Socialista*, 4 July 1974). In fact, "institutionalization" in the mouths of Argentine liberals and the PST social democrats has been used to mean support for bourgeois law and order, as against the terrorism of the police... and of left-wing Peronist and supposedly Marxist guerrillas.

Unable to stay away from these prestigious "summit" meetings of the bourgeois parties, the ubiquitous Coral attended yet another such gathering, called "the multisectorial," on October 8. As we reported in *Workers Vanguard* No. 57 (22 November 1974), he told President María Estela de Perón that the PST "will fight for the continuity of this government, because it was elected by the majority of the Argentine workers and because it permits the exercise of some democratic liberties...."

Coming less than two weeks after the regime's new "security law" outlawing strikes (a measure the PST leader failed to criticize, although he "applaud[ed] without reservation" many clauses of the government's labor legislation), and given his "categorical" denunciation of "terrorist and guerrillaist forms of violence," it is not surprising that Coral's speech to the "multisectorial" was widely interpreted by press and television as support for the government. However, according to the 15 October *Avanzada Socialista* the version of the speech distributed by the government's press office contained "omissions" which altered its meaning; therefore AS published a "textual reconstruction" of Coral's words.

As a "fraternal service" to the PST, its ally in the factional battle raging in the USec, the SWP recently published an English version of Coral's statement (*Intercontinental Press*, 13 January). However, *IP* apparently did a little "reconstructing" itself in order to spruce up the key passage.

For the most part the English translation accurately reproduces the Spanish text. Coral repeats his "firm condemnation of the death of the latest victim of the terror, who happens to be an officer of the armed forces," announces that "all inhabitants of the country should bear the consequences equally" if there is a grave national

emergency, equates guerrillaism to coups d'état ("although the aims are different"), etc.

But when we come to the section in which Coral announces that the PST "luchará por la continuidad de este gobierno" ("will fight for the continuity of this government"), this is rendered as: "... will fight to keep this government's term of office from being cut short illegitimately...": This is something quite different. Apparently Joseph Hansen, like Coral & Co., feels that dictionaries are inadequate to interpret what the PST is saying.

Lenin and Trotsky repeatedly stressed the need to defend democratic rights and oppose bonapartist coups. However, the PST "translates" this into supporting "bourgeois democracy," "institutionalization" (including against leftist guerrillas) and the "continuity" of the present government. Aside from the fact that the "democracy" of the bonapartist Peronist regime is in any case quite limited, such a statement can mean nothing but political support for the government and for the parliamentary form of bourgeois class dictatorship. ■

"For the Continuity of this Government..."

—from text of Coral's statement at the 'Multisectorial,' in Avanzada Socialista, 15 October 1974

la violencia revolucionaria.
El socialismo de los trabajadores seguirá luchando contra todos esos factores que crean el clima golpista, y luchará por la continuidad de este gobierno, porque fue elegido por la mayoría de los trabajadores argentinos y porque permite el ejercicio de algunas libertades democráticas de las que son, a su vez, una conquista de las

We socialist workers will continue to struggle against all these factors that are creating the climate for a coup, and will fight to keep this government's term of office from being cut short illegitimately, since it was elected by the majority of the Argentine workers and since it permits the exercise of some democratic freedoms.

—from "Coral's Statement at the Multisectorial," Avanzada Socialista, 15 October 1974, translated in Intercontinental Press, 13 January 1975

"Mirror Image": A Despicable Statement

—from "Declaración del PST," Executive Committee statement issued at the 'Multisectorial,' Avanzada Socialista, 10 October 1974

mentos, con otra amenaza inmediata y directa: la de una militarización creciente de la vida política provocada fundamentalmente por la acción de la guerrilla y su réplica, el terrorismo de la AAA y otras organizaciones de ultraderecha. A esa militarización que responde objetivamente a dichos sectores, independientemente de las intenciones de los protagonistas, abre una dinámica hacia el golpe mili-

This second threat is represented by a growing militarization of political life prompted fundamentally by the activity of the guerrillas and their mirror-image—the terrorists of the AAA and other organizations of the ultraright.

—from "PST Statement at the 'Multisectorial,'" translated in Intercontinental Press, 28 October 1974

IV.

Moreno's Left Face

Elsewhere in this bulletin we reprint numerous excerpts from materials documenting Nahuel Moreno's decades-long cover for Peronism in his native Argentina; his opportunist support to populist generals from Peru's Velasco to Panama's Torrijos; his chameleon-like shifts of political coloration, from gung-ho guerrillaist to snivelling social democrat; and his scandalous financial dealings. But that does not account for the apparent leftism of the documents of his Bolshevik Faction and its predecessor, the Bolshevik Tendency (BF/BT). For in the case of Moreno the contrast between theory and practice is so dramatic that he has developed a "method" capable of justifying almost any betrayal.

For almost a decade, from 1968 through 1977, the United Secretariat was rent by acute factional struggle between a centrist International Majority Tendency (IMT) led by Ernest Mandel and the reformist Leninist-Trotskyist Faction (LTF) led by the American SWP of Joe Hansen/Jack Barnes and (initially) Moreno's Argentine PST. While the Mandelites chased after a Maoist/Guevarist "new mass vanguard" in Europe and Latin America, the LTF used pseudo-orthodox arguments to attack guerrillism from the right (not unlike the pro-Moscow CPs). After Barnes and Mandel dissolved the factions in 1977, underlying differences remained but a temporary unity was obtained at the USec helm. So simply by standing still while the ex-IMT galloped to the right, Moreno suddenly appears as a "left" critic of the "reunified" rotten bloc:

"Before, it [the IMT] had bent to the ultraleftism of a predominantly student radicalized vanguard. Now, it is bending to the pressures of Eurocommunism and a trade-union and middle class vanguard, which are transmission belts for liberal ideology and the public opinion of the imperialist countries...."

"This capitulation is what has made the convergence between the ex-IMT and the leaders of the SWP, i.e., the ex-LTF, possible."

—"Declaration and Platform of the Bolshevik Faction," [SWP] *International Internal Discussion Bulletin*, July 1979

An uninitiated reader might well confuse such passages with Trotskyist critiques of the revisionist USec by the international Spartacist tendency (iSt). Of course, the iSt and its precursors have been denouncing the United Secretariat as a rotten bloc since its inception in 1963, while Moreno seems to have discovered this fact only in the last two years (after being part of every USec betrayal and unprincipled maneuver for the previous decade and a half). And there is the telltale fact that Moreno's BF/BT consistently described the Mandelite majority as "ultraleft" while we label the IMT *centrist*. But the most striking difference is that the Morenoite attack on the USec leadership consists solely of organizational atrocity stories plus evidence of revisionism at the most general theoretical level. Concrete political *betrayals*, where their line means defeat for the working class, are almost never mentioned.

The Bolshevik Faction has had some pretty harsh words to say against the USec's 1977 resolution on "Socialist Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." In a document endorsed by the BG, Moreno says it "completely revised the revolutionary Marxist position on the dictatorship of the proletariat." Mandel, he says, is "filling the Marxist conception of workers revolution and proletarian dictatorship with a Eurocommunist content and program ..." (*The Revolutionary Dictatorship of the Proletariat* [1979]). Fine, but where do the Morenoites denounce the USec for capitulating to the Eurocommunists in the class struggle? What about the electoral support to popular fronts given by both the SWP and ex-IMT, who call for votes to the reformist workers parties involved in such class-collaborationist coalitions? The BF doesn't breathe a word of criticism, for its own electoral policies are just as (or even more) tailist.

Perhaps the best example of how Morenoite "orthodoxy" in the abstract is translated into opportunism in the concrete is the case of Portugal 1975. During the spring and summer the situation was polarizing rapidly: the ruling Armed Forces Movement (MFA) and its Stalinist allies escalated their leftist rhetoric, in part to co-opt embryonic factory committees and collective farms which were beginning to sprout up. On the other side, the Socialist Party of Mário Soares sided with more conservative officers and civilian reactionaries in mounting an anti-Communist mass mobilization. The SWP, in response, wholeheartedly took up the cause of the CIA-financed Portuguese SP. Not wanting to be tied to this right-wing unholy alliance, Moreno began making trouble in the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction and finally split over the SWP document, "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" (October 1975). This was the origin of the Bolshevik Tendency.

The future BTers were hard on the SWP, accusing it of thinking "the possibility exists that the SP could break with the bourgeoisie and take power in Portugal today!" and that the SP is "no longer counterrevolutionary" ("Letter from Former LTF Members to the International Executive Committee," [SWP] *Internal Information Bulletin*, March 1977). The "Declaration of the Bolshevik Tendency" took the LTF to task because it "did not indicate a single task or slogan in relation to the 'workers commissions,'" and condemned Hansen's "categorical refusal to raise the policy and slogan for centralizing these committees." The SWP, concluded the BT, had "an essentially bourgeois-democratic program" for Portugal ([SWP] *IIDB*, January 1977). These same points were made repeatedly—and much more sharply—in *Workers Vanguard* (e.g., "SWP/OCI Tail Counterrevolution in Portugal," *WV* No. 75, 29 August 1975).

But *WV* emphasized above all the need to fight "class collaboration—tying the workers to the bourgeois officer

corps." On the issue of soviets, we said that for an authentic Trotskyist party the key issue was "calling for independence of the workers commissions and popular assemblies from the MFA..." ("Soviets and the Struggle for Workers Power in Portugal," *WV* No. 82, 24 October 1975). The program of Moreno & Co. was exactly the opposite. Having decided to abandon the social-democratic camp (in the early summer he was for participating in the SP's anti-Communist demonstrations), Moreno simply switched horses and plunked his money down for the MFA. Thus in a long polemic against SWPer Gus Horowitz he argued that this faction of the officer corps of the capitalist army was *not* classically bonapartist and was "Kerenskyist" and petty-bourgeois (N. Moreno, "Revolución y contrarrevolución en Portugal," *Revista de América*, July-August 1975).

Moreno's supporters of the Portuguese PRT went even further, and in an article entitled "A Necessary Rectification: The MFA and the Revolution in Portugal" (*Combate Socialista*, 10 July 1975) discovered a "semi-soviet sector" of the bourgeois officer caste. But they did not come up with this dangerous revision of Marxism by themselves. In an April 1975 report to the PRT national committee Moreno referred to the MFA as "the superstructural expression of the beginning of the formation of soviets in the army" and says that it may be "a petty-bourgeois movement that reflects the revolutionary process"—in which case, "We have to struggle within this process, and understand that there are differentiations inside the Armed Forces Movement itself" (PRT Internal Discussion Bulletin No. 2). So while correctly attacking the SWP for chasing after Soares and raising a purely bourgeois-democratic program for Portugal, Moreno talks about soviets...and runs after the populist MFA with its demagogic talk of "people's power."

Moreno has developed this Janus-faced policy into a veritable science. Thus on the second issue over which he broke from the SWP—Angola—he takes his former mentors severely to task for failing to call for military victory to the MPLA in the crucial months after November 1975, when it was facing a combined attack by South Africa and the CIA-aided FNLA/UNITA coalition. Moreno drew a close parallel between Angola and Vietnam (falsely, for in the case of Angola it was simply an

imperialist invasion, whereas in Vietnam this was overlaid on a civil war which saw two opposing *class* camps). But for Moreno this parallel presented certain problems, for *in Vietnam the SWP also did not call for military victory to the NLF*. Instead its line was bourgeois pacifism, appealing to the defeatist wing of the Democratic Party. And the PST vociferously *defended* the SWP's antiwar policies when they were bloc partners in the LTF. (Moreno also fulminated against the "ultraleft sectarians" of the Spartacist League who said the SWP's coalitions were mini-popular fronts, and who uniquely demanded "All Indochina Must Go Communist!")

What to do? For an old hand like Moreno the trick was simple: to call for an NLF victory was a "world strategy" while "Bring the Boys Home" was its "tactical adaptation" to the backward consciousness of the American masses. Thus, "Some comrades of the IMT severely criticized the SWP for not raising in the U.S. the demand 'Victory to the NLF.' They were wrong in identifying the international policy with national tactics and demands" (N. Moreno, *Angola: La revolución negra en marcha* [1977]). So as long as you vote for a USec resolution, which is buried in the documents section of *Intercontinental Press* (and which no one can pin on you anyway, since both the SWP and PST are only "fraternally related" to the USec), it is alright to fail to call for the defeat of one's "own" imperialism. Glory, hallelujah, the bloc with Democratic Senator Vance Hartke is principled, and there is no need to get beaten up by pro-war workers while distributing defeatist propaganda in front of the factories (as happened to the Bolsheviks in World War I). How convenient. Why didn't Jack Barnes think of that?

Moreno dreamed up a similar subterfuge a few years earlier when the LTF got into a shouting match with the IMT over who supported popular frontism: the LTF said Mandel and his friends did, by supporting the French Union of the Left; the IMT said Hansen/Moreno did, because their Uruguayan supporters called for a vote to the Frente Amplio (Broad Front). (Answer: both support popular frontism.) Moreno argued that the Uruguayans had made an "error, not a betrayal." Furthermore, "it was a good move to enter the Frente Amplio because it helped our work in the mass movement." You see, "It would indeed be a betrayal to electorally support a popular front or a bourgeois nationalist movement without denouncing it as a betrayer of the workers' movement. That is: voting in itself is for us a tactical and not a principled question" (N. Moreno, "A Scandalous Document—A Reply to Germain," [SWP] *IIDB*, January 1974).

Moreno didn't invent that one, however. The author is Andrés Nin. Even after the Spanish POUM participated in the Popular Front coalition during the February 1936 elections, Nin, its most left-wing leader, continued to denounce the Popular Front in the abstract. For example:

"Hence the policy of the Popular Front, by presenting the problem as a struggle between bourgeois democracy and fascism, sows fatal illusions among the working masses and detours them from accomplishing their historic mission, preparing, by this very act, the victory of fascism."

—"La acción directa del proletariado y la revolución española," July 1936, in A. Nin, *Los problemas de la revolución española (1931-1937)*

Not bad, on paper. But the POUM helped put the Popular Front in power, thereafter acting as its left tail while



WV Photo

**Spartacist League took sides in Vietnam war.
SWP refused to call for NLF victory.**

mouthed abstract slogans about "socialism or fascism." And when the showdown came in the Barcelona May Days of 1937, Nin refused to mobilize the workers to overthrow the fragile Popular Front, thereby "preparing the victory of fascism." Presumably Nin, too, thought "voting is a tactical question."

Not so the international Spartacist tendency, for whom opposition to class collaboration is a matter of principle.

This is what distinguishes us not only from the misnamed "Bolshevik Faction" but the entire United Secretariat swamp. Although as a cynical con man Nahuel Moreno resorts to the eclectic "method" of centrism—what Trotsky called "crystallized confusion"—his appetites and real program are those of a hardened reformist. In either case, as the example of Nin shows, the end result is the same, and it is the working class that pays the price.

Portugal

Left Criticism of SWP...

One theoretical consequence of this conception of bourgeois democracy and its relationship to imperialism is directly revisionist: the reformist parties are no longer counterrevolutionary since no one can conceive of these parties without bourgeois democracy. We are not saying they now think these parties have become revolutionary but that, given this conception, they have ceased being counterrevolutionary. If we go very carefully through the two versions of "Key Issues of the Portuguese Revolution" as well as the other writings of the SWP compañeros we shall see that, by omission, there is a clear tendency toward making this theoretical assertion in regard to the Portuguese SP.

—from "Letter from Former LTF Members to the International Executive Committee," SWP Internal Information Bulletin, March 1977

The Crisis in the LTF
As the Portuguese revolution was developing, the SWP was changing its initial, correct position. That position was to develop the embryos of dual power in order to transform them into soviets, in combination with democratic slogans such as "Constituent Assembly," "freedom of press," "Against the MFA government," "CP-SP united front and government." The IMT refused to raise these last slogans.

The change in the SWP's policy was codified in a document entitled "Key Issues of the Portuguese Revolution," which it submitted for a vote in the I/T/F. This document dropped the demands for the development and centralization of the demonstrations and the embryonic organs of dual power—the land and factory occupations, the workers and soldiers committees, etc.—and all the transitional and revolutionary slogans in favor of an exclusively democratic program.

The theoretical basis for this reformist policy and program was expressed in Comrade Novack's

—from "Declaration and Platform of the Bolshevik Faction," SWP International Internal Discussion Bulletin, July 1979

...support to the MFA

—from Nahuel Moreno, "Revolución y contrarrevolución en Portugal," Revista de America, July-August 1975, translated in SWP Internal Information Bulletin, March 1977

...officers toward normal strict military discipline indispensable to the maintenance of the government had brought into being. But the MFA—and we should bear this very much in mind—was not the same as the higher ranks of officers. And it resisted submitting to the discipline of the top officials. It thus reflected within the army the modern middle class, whose expectations were not identical to those of Spínola and the Portuguese oligarchy.

The participation of the Communist party in the government was a... in

Até hoje sempre caracterizamos o MFA como um movimento burguês, defensor, na ausência de qualquer partido estruturado da classe dominante ou sequer de um aparelho de Estado sólido, dos interesses fundamentais do Capital, se bem que também muitas vezes obrigado, pela posição de árbitro «supra-partidário» em que se encontra colocado, a castigar os sectores tradicionalmente mais privilegiados da burguesia, por forma a defender os interesses globais dessa mesma classe.

uma rectificação necessária

o MFA e a Revolução em Portugal

A Necessary Rectification

The MFA and the Revolution in Portugal

"Up to now we always characterized the MFA [Armed Forces Movement] as a bourgeois movement, a defender, in the absence of any structured party of the ruling class or even a solid state apparatus, of the fundamental interests of capital..."

"The product of these traits [of the Portuguese revolutionary process] was, in a way, the MFA. We can understand it as a new phenomenon, that is, a momentary result of a very particular reality, the reality of the Portuguese Revolution. It was initially a movement, a petty-bourgeois reaction of a sector of the officials of an army pounded by war and massacred by the military defeat in Africa.

"In the same way as the working-class parties of the coalition, the MFA participates in and commits itself to the policy of the bourgeois government. But this does not mean identifying the government and the armed forces, nor identifying the MFA with the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, the facts are demonstrating that... the worsening of the crisis deepens the cleavages within the MFA and the semi-soviet tendency implied by one of its poles..."

—from **Combate Socialista** (newspaper of the Morenoite Portuguese PRT), 10 July 1975

fundamentais do processo português. O produto destes traços e, de certa forma, o MFA. Podemos compreendê-lo como um fenómeno novo, quer dizer, um resultado momentâneo de uma realidade muito particular, da realidade da Revolução portuguesa. E inicialmente um movimento, uma reacção pequeno-burguesa de um sector dos oficiais de um exercito martelado e massacrado pela derrota em terra.

Da mesma maneira que os partidos operários da coligação, o MFA participa e compromete-se com a politica do Governo burguês. Mas isto não significa identificar o Governo e as Forças Armadas, nem identificar o MFA com a burguesia. Pelo contrário, os factos vêm demonstrando que para além da tolerância de figuras que são uma garantia para o capitalismo nacional e internacional, o agravamento da crise aprofunda as clivagens no MFA e a tendência semi-soviética que um dos seus polos implica, dão ao MFA uma instabilidade que este transmite ao Governo no seu conjunto, o que leva o bonapartismo no movimento a...



Diário de Notícias

Leaders of the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement. Morenoites discovered a "semi-soviet" sector of the MFA.

Angola

vertido en movimientos traidores, aliados a la invasión imperialista y racista sudafricana. De esta manera, la posición del PST es perfectamente clara: antes había insistido en declarar partidario del fin de la guerra fratricida con el propósito de expulsar al imperialismo portugués; a partir de la invasión sudafricana e imperialista la línea semioficial del PST, tal cual leemos en su periódico *Avanzada Socialista*, (artículo incluido en pp. 111-116 de este volumen) es la siguiente: "El MPLA no merece la menor confianza de los revolucionarios. Ha dado sobradas muestras de que no aspira a ir más allá de un régimen neocolonial relativamente nacionalista su acuerdo con la..."

tesis de que este último, en el caso de vencer militarmente a Franco, pudiera transformarse en un 'régimen fascista'.

"Hasta el 11 de noviembre el principal enemigo de las masas de Angola eran las tropas coloniales portuguesas, y la tarea más urgente era lograr su retiro. Una vez concretado ese retiro, el principal enemigo son las fuerzas proimperialistas de Zaire, Sudáfrica y mercenarios blancos, y no hay tarea más decisiva y urgente que combatirlos y lograr que abandonen el territorio angoleño. La intervención activa de las masas en esa lucha le da una dinámica que puede ser impulsada por los revolucionarios más allá de las intenciones..."

"Thus the position of the PST is perfectly clear: previously we had insisted in calling for the end to the fratricidal war [between the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA] in order to expel Portuguese imperialism; beginning with the South African/imperialist invasion the semiofficial line of the PST, as put forward in its newspaper *Avanzada Socialista*.... was the following: 'The MPLA does not merit the slightest confidence from revolutionaries....'

"Until 11 November [1975] the main enemy of the Angolan masses was the Portuguese colonial troops, and the most urgent task was to obtain their withdrawal. Once they had withdrawn, the main enemy became the pro-imperialist forces of Zaire, South Africa and the white mercenaries, and no goal was more decisive and urgent than to combat them and force them to leave Angolan territory...."

—from N. Moreno, *Angola: La revolución negra en marcha* (1977)

For and Against SWP Antiwar Popular Fronts

Vietnam fue un buen ejemplo

Para nosotros es doloroso confesar una vieja admiración por el SWP, especialmente por la política desarrollada para la guerra del Vietnam. Hemos vuelto a releer su prensa y sus resoluciones con el propósito de comprobar la certeza de lo que hemos aseverado. Las pésimas condiciones de legalidad en nuestro país nos impidieron terminar esa relectura, pero, hasta donde supimos, la política del SWP no correspondía con los lineamientos que hemos enumerado. Por esa razón nos limitaremos a presentar nuestra posición sobre cuál debió ser nuestra política en la guerra vietnamita.

Para movilizar al movimiento obrero y de masas de EE.UU. contra la guerra colonial era necesario comprender su atraso político. Por esta razón, en el caso de la guerra de Vietnam, el SWP formuló sabiamente sus consignas, "Fuera de Vietnam, ahora" y "Que vuelvan los soldados a casa, ahora". Por supuesto, la justiza de estos planteamientos movilizaron a millones de personas.

Sin embargo, una consigna nacional, por justa que sea, no puede reemplazar una política y estrategia mundiales. Por ejemplo, las dos famosas consignas del SWP eran correctas, siempre que se enmarcaran en una política global verdaderamente internacionalista y trotskista. De esta manera, debían constituir la adaptación táctica y de agitación, al nivel de conciencia de las masas norteamericanas, de la consigna mundial y estratégica: "Por la derrota de EE.UU. Por el triunfo total del FNL vietnamita".

Si el nivel de conciencia de las masas norteamericanas...

"For us it is painful to confess our long-standing admiration for the SWP, especially for its policies toward the Vietnam war. We have gone back to reread its press and resolutions in order to corroborate our assertions. The extremely bad legal conditions in our country prevented us from completing this rereading, but as far as we could tell the SWP policy did not follow the lines which we have laid out...."

"In order to mobilize the working-class and mass movement in the United States against the colonial war it was necessary to understand their political backwardness. For this reason, in the case of the Vietnam war, the SWP wisely formulated its demands, 'Out of Vietnam Now!' and 'Bring the Troops Home Now!' Of course, these just demands mobilized millions of persons.

"However, a national demand, however just, cannot replace a world strategy and policy. For example, the two famous demands of the SWP were correct, as long as they were in the framework of a truly internationalist and Trotskyist overall policy. Thus they should constitute the tactical and agitational adaptation, to the level of consciousness of the American masses, of the world strategic demand: 'For the Defeat of the U.S. For Total Victory to the Vietnamese NLF....'

—from N. Moreno, *Angola: La revolución negra en marcha* (1977)

It appears to us that the IMT leaders do have a serious political difference with us. They seem to be opposed *in principle* to limited agreements or public actions involving bourgeois sectors in the struggle against fascism or other ultrareactionary forces. We think that they are not alone in taking an ultraleft position of this kind.

We should like to remind them that at the height of the antiwar movement in the United States, quite a few petty-bourgeois and even bourgeois figures sought to share the platform in the giant rallies that were staged at the time. The Trotskyists in the

United States did not oppose this. In fact, they favored it.

But how the ultralefts screamed! They considered this to be proof positive that the Socialist Workers party had formed an "interclass political bloc" with the liberal wing of the Democratic party, thereby falling into the Social Democratic "policy" of class collaborationism. It is one of the main "proofs" still thrown at the SWP by the ultralefts in the United States (and elsewhere) to bolster the charge that the SWP has "degenerated," turned "reformist," and "betrayed" the working class.

—from PST/LTF, "In Reply to the IMT's Open Letter Number 2," Intercontinental Press, 20 January 1975

Eurocommunism

Finalmente, Rodríguez señala que el levantamiento por parte del imperialismo yanqui de la bandera de los derechos humanos en los estados obreros, y su aliento a los opositores a la burocracia, es parte importante de este plan imperialista contra los estados obreros.

Estas consideraciones, que compartimos, ubican al eurocomunismo o proceso de socialdemocratización de los PC en una dimensión más amplia. Tiene que ver con las dos caras del plan imperialista. Con la de establecer ligazones directas con él para garantizar gobiernos de la "contrarrevolución democrática" tipo Soares que contengan el ascenso del movimiento obrero europeo. Y tendrá que ver, en la medida en que sea profunda.

En este segundo aspecto, la posición de los PC europeos en apoyo a los disidentes soviéticos, sin dejar de tener sus aspectos positivos, contribuye a reforzar el plan imperialista. Mandel ve en este apoyo a la disidencia soviética uno de los fundamentales motivos de fricción entre los partidos eurocomunistas y el aparato stalinista. Así, en su trabajo "Las tres

"Finally, [PSTer Marcela] Rodríguez [writing on 'The Carter Plan: New Counterrevolutionary Policy' in Revista de América No. 3] indicates that for Yankee imperialism raising the banner of human rights in the workers states, and its encouragement of opponents of the bureaucracy, is an important part of the imperialist plan against the workers states.

"These considerations, which we share, locate Eurocommunism, or the process of social-democratization of the CPs, in a broader dimension. It has to do with the two faces of the imperialist plan—with establishing direct ties in order to guarantee governments of 'democratic counterrevolution' a la Soares to hold back the upsurge of the European workers movement....

"In this second aspect, the position of the European CPs in support of the Soviet dissidents, while retaining its positive aspects, contributes to reinforcing the imperialist plan. Mandel sees in this support to Soviet dissidents one of the fundamental causes of friction between the Eurocommunist parties and the Stalinist apparatus."

—from Eugenio Greco, "Eurocommunism: A New Crisis of World Stalinism," Revista de America, August 1977

Greco's arbitrary approach has already apparently led him to flirt with positions that are really different from those of the rest of the Trotskyist movement and would lead him very far astray if he developed them consistently. He does this when he says that the Eurocommunist CPs' defense of the dissidents against bureaucratic repression promotes an "imperialist plan" against the workers states, and when he makes statements indicating that the Eurocommunist CPs are becoming a bat-

tering ram for imperialism against the economic underpinnings of these states.

Greco is not the first to advance these positions. Among those claiming to be Trotskyist, the award for originality goes to such sectarian groups as the Spartacist League in the United States and the Workers Revolutionary Party in Britain. Let us hope that Greco proves capable of seeing the deadly logic involved and that he draws back in time.

—from Gerry Foley, "Eurocommunism, Goldilocks, and the Three Bears: In Reply to Eugenio Greco," Intercontinental Press, 5 December 1977

V.

Opportunist Chameleon Sui Generis

excerpted from:

“World Trotskyism Rearms”

—Spartacist, No. 20, April-
May 1971

The international Trotskyist movement stands before its definitive crossroads. The revisionist currents which have dominated world Trotskyism over the past period are in crisis. In the aftermath of recent developments, most particularly the May-June 1968 explosion of the French working class which stunningly demonstrated anew the bankruptcy of the impressionists who had abandoned the proletarian internationalist strategy for revolution, the revisionists find themselves as challenged by authentic Trotskyism as do the Maoists and other non-Marxist currents. Even the most ardent revisers of Trotskyist theory are now finding themselves compelled to argue on the terrain of Leninism grown rusty and distorted in their minds by years of abuse, abandonment and betrayal. The conglomerations which for years have masqueraded as international political tendencies are forced willy-nilly into reopening the disagreements which had long laid buried by mutual consent. New currents are seeking the answers to the questions: what went wrong with the Fourth International? how can an authentic Trotskyist politics be constructed over the theoretical ruins of revisionism? And such currents are emerging even within the very heart of the revisionist “internationals” themselves!

The arch-revisionist United Secretariat (which prefers to be known as “the Fourth International”) has already seen splits from its sections in Germany, England, Argentina, Ceylon and Belgium. But more serious, in its terms, is the factional war exhibited at its “Ninth World Congress” in early 1969, primarily between the European groups, whose major force is the French Ligue Communiste, and its U.S. political associate, the Socialist Workers Party, between the Ligue’s aggressive *centrism* and the SWP’s deepening *reformist* impulse.

Livio: an Ersatz “Che”

The key dispute at that Congress revolved around the Europeans’ draft resolution on Latin America, whose thrust was that the U. Sec. itself should seek to initiate guerilla warfare in a selected country in Latin America. This proposal was only the logical imple-

mentation of the U.Sec.’s long-time political and theoretical capitulation to Castroism. The U.Sec. maintained that Cuba, after breaking with capitalism under the leadership of a petty-bourgeois radical formation, had established an essentially undeformed workers state despite the lack of any conscious intervention by the Cuban working class as a class and without the revolutionary leadership of a Trotskyist vanguard party. Cuba was, according to the U. Sec., a dictatorship of the proletariat lacking only the “forms” of workers democracy, and Castro was “an unconscious Marxist.” The Europeans now propose to extend this pattern to the rest of the “Third World,” and put forward peasant guerilla warfare as the new strategy for the “Fourth International.” Livio Maitan, the leader of the Italian section and a main proponent of this turn, enthused over the advantages of the “Fourth International” having a state of its own to give it relevance and prestige. And this is perfectly logical, for what relevance can authentic Trotskyism possibly have for these revisionists who have at bottom despaired of *proletarian* revolution?

Hansen Heads Right Wing

A minority at the Congress, led by the SWP’s Joseph Hansen, opposed the proposed turn. Resorting to a rediscovery of “orthodoxy,” Hansen maintained that any form of armed struggle must be seen as a tactic subordinate to the building of a Trotskyist vanguard party. But the Hansen-SWP initiative in the U.Sec.’s capitulation to Castroism, and the class-collaborationist and “Third World” nationalist politics of the SWP domestically, reveal the fundamentally reformist impulse driving the SWP to oppose the guerilla warfare line under the rubric of orthodoxy. Just as the Communist Parties counter the confrontationalist urgings of impatient petty-bourgeois radicals with quotations from Lenin opposing adventurism, for the purpose not of upholding Leninism but of practicing reformism, so the SWP now makes use of its formal Trotskyist tradition while opposing its factional antagonists from the right.

The European U.Sec., which competes with the left Maoists and radical syn-

dicalists in the more radical and class-conscious European milieu, is impressionistically chasing after a more "left" line. But the SWP aims at a different constituency: a base of middle-class youth recruited on the basis of the SWP's "success" in building a reformist, single-issue Popular Front against the Viet Nam war. In the long run, the SWP's competitors are not the other erstwhile Trotskyists, nor the Maoist and semi-Maoist confrontationists, but the ghost of American social-democracy.

Its Young Socialist Alliance in effect fills the niche previously occupied by the YPSL-SP, but is unencumbered by the latter's arid anti-communism which is now a detriment rather than an aid to becoming America's mass reformist party. With such a perspective, more or less consciously recognized by at least a section of the SWP leadership, what could be more disastrous than to threaten its precious legality and respectability by the undertaking of anything so illegal as guerilla warfare?...

"Strictly Subordinate to the Discipline of OLAS..."

"Our 'entryism' in OLAS must not be entry basically into its political organization but rather into its military apparatus. Our party is obliged to take up as its number one task developing a technical apparatus strictly subordinate to the discipline of OLAS for the purpose of carrying out such technical tasks as OLAS may set, pursuant to its strategy of struggle for power. Our entry into OLAS can have no other significance." (The Document quoted by Germain. Nahuel Moreno, "La revolución latinoamericana y argentina...")

Nothing could more clearly show that our position on the stage of continental civil war would be opened up on our continent similar to the one on the indochinese peninsula. Che's guerrilla struggle would be the beginning of this continental civil war. And like the whole international, we believed we had to participate actively and in the front line in this civil war promoted

—from Nahuel Moreno, "A Scandalous Document—A Reply to Germain," SWP International Internal Discussion Bulletin, Vol. XI, No. 4, January 1974

"By its very nature, such an armed struggle will be unable to respect frontiers and will tend to transform itself in a front of continental civil war. If in the past the trade-union was our organisational vehicle for posing the question of power, today OLAS, with its national combat organisations for armed struggle, is the only organisational vehicle for power. We state this, because the democratic or transitional slogans for the struggle for power: Constituent Assembly, workers and peasant government, workers federation with Cuba, transform themselves into party-bourgeois declamatory demands, if they are not ac-

—from Nahuel Moreno, "La Revolución latinoamericana, Argentina y nuestras tareas," 1961, quoted in "In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International," by Ernest Germain, SWP International Internal Discussion Bulletin, Vol. X, No. 4, April 1973

With the Government Against the Guerrillas

8. To continue to oppose guerrillism. In their ignorance of, and contempt for, the consciousness of the masses, for what the masses want and feel, the guerrillas fell into terrorist actions against a government that the workers are not yet ready to abandon, particularly in face of a threat from the ultraright. The majority of the working people either ignore or repudiate the terrorist actions of the guerrillas. Moreover, we will continue to explain how the irresponsible course followed by the guerrillas has helped accelerate the repression and increased the danger of a reactionary coup against a workers movement not prepared politically to see it

Shouldn't Marxist analysis note that if the workers movement does not react against the repression this is because it is being carried out in the name of defending a government regarded by the workers as their own that is being physically attacked by a small irresponsible elite? Shouldn't it be said that this guerrilla activity provides an excuse for accelerating the repression, provoking an unnecessarily early crackdown out of proportion to the level reached by the workers struggles; that this activity enables the bourgeoisie to isolate the vanguard sectors, which cannot find support needed to resist the

—from PST/LTF, "In Reply to the IMT's Open Letter Number 2," SWP International Internal Discussion Bulletin, Vol. XII, No. 4, October 1975

Trotskyism vs. Morenoism on the Popular Front

international Spartacist tendency :

It is the most elementary duty for revolutionary Marxists to irreconcilably oppose the Popular Front in the election and to place absolutely no confidence in it in power. Any "critical support" to the Allende coalition is class treason, paving the way for a bloody defeat for the Chilean working people when domestic reaction, abetted by international imperialism, is ready. The U.S. imperialists have been able to temporize for the moment—and not immediately try to mobilize a counter-revolutionary coup on the usual Latin American model—because they have softened the anticipated nationalization losses through massive profit-taking over several years.

Within reformist workers' parties there is a profound contradiction between their proletarian base and formal ideology and the class-collaborationist aims and personal

appetites of their leaderships. This is why Marxists, when they are not themselves embodied in a mass working-class party, give reformist parties such "critical support"—against overt agents of capital—as will tend to regroup the proletarian base around a revolutionary program. But when these parties enter a coalition government with the parties of capitalism, any such "critical support" would be a betrayal because the coalition has suppressed the class contradiction in the bourgeoisie's favor. It is our job then to re-create the basis for struggle *within* such parties by demanding they *break* with the coalition. This break must be the elementary precondition for even the most critical support....

—excerpted from "Chilean Popular Front,"
Spartacist, No. 19, November-December 1970

As Trotsky remarked in 1935: "In reality, the Popular Front is *the main question of Proletarian class strategy* for this epoch. It also offers the best criterion for the difference between Bolshevism and Menshevism."

The largest purportedly revolutionary organization formally outside the UP coalition, the MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement), was incapable of presenting a class opposition to the popular front. While attracting a layer of militant youth fundamentally from the petty bourgeoisie, and periodically criticizing the Communist Party (CP), the MIR never broke from the Popular Unity. Following the September 1970 elections it called on the masses to support Allende; today the MIR is part of the popular front in exile, seeking to "broaden" the class-collaborationist coalition by including even Christian Democrats. The individual heroism of many MIR militants cannot hide the political bankruptcy of these Chilean Castroites, the left cover of the popular front.

Nor did the Chilean disciples of the several self-proclaimed "Fourth Internationals" present a Trotskyist policy of irreconcilable hostility to popular frontism: The sympathizers of the "United" Secretariat (USec) were either mired in perpetual "deep entry" in the Socialist Party (the traditional graveyard for pseudo-Trotskyists in Chile) or fawningly crawling after the MIR. (In fact, the USec played a central role in creating the MIR, but this did not prevent the Castroites from summarily expelling them two years later for "Trotskyism." Such are the rewards of opportunism!) The USec supporters labeled the bourgeois elements of the UP irrelevant, alibiing the Allende regime with the label "reformist" and calling on it to carry out its own bourgeois program....

—excerpted from: "Declaration of Fraternal Relations between the international Spartacist tendency and the Organizacion Trotskista Revolucionaria of Chile," Spartacist, No. 24, Autumn 1977

Moreno and the PST :

"Nosotros aceptamos que la definición trotskista de los Frentes Populares admite distintas interpretaciones. La que creemos más correcta es la que los caracteriza como alianzas entre los partidos y organizaciones obreras y la burguesía imperialista o sus agentes en los países coloniales. Por eso es que, para nosotros, Perón, Cárdenas, el APRA, Castro, la UP Chilena no son Frentes Populares, aunque sean organismos de colaboración de clase, porque todos ellos, en mayor o menor grado, por una u otra vía enfrentaron al imperialismo. Por eso los definimos como movimientos nacionalistas burgueses o pequeño-burgueses.

De la misma manera, el Frente Popular con la burguesía española era distinto de un frente de los obreros catalanes con la burguesía o pequeño-burguesía separatista catalanas. Este último era un movimiento nacionalista y así lo definió Trotsky...."

"We accept that the Trotskyist definition of the Popular Fronts permits different interpretations. The one we think is the most correct is the one that characterizes them as alliances between workers parties and organizations and the imperialist bourgeoisie or its agents in colonial countries. That is why, for us, Perón, Cárdenas, APRA [Peru], Castro, the Chilean UP aren't Popular Fronts, although they may be organisms of class collaboration, because all of them to a lesser or greater degree, in one way or another, confront imperialism. That is why we define them as bourgeois or petty bourgeois nationalist movements.

"In the same way, the Popular Front with the Spanish bourgeoisie was different from a front of Catalan workers with the Catalan bourgeoisie or separatist petty bourgeoisie. The latter was a nationalist movement, which is how Trotsky defined it...."

—from "Carta Abierta a los compañeros de Política Obrera," letter from the PST to Política Obrera, 6 September 1974

For us, the Unidad Popular present-ly takes the shape of a broad democratic and agrarian anti-imperialist movement with a petty-bourgeois leadership, in which almost the entire working class, part of the peasantry, and important sectors of the middle class play a principal role. The undeniable concessions granted to the workers by the Allende government give it a bonapartist character and content.

—from Ernesto Gonzalez, "Unidad Popular—A March to Disaster on the 'Peaceful Road'," *Revista de America*, March-April 1973, translated in *International Socialist Review*, October 1973

The Uruguayan comrades committed their error in the context of this alternative: remain in the Frente and vote for its candidates (the incorrect orientation), or be obliged to leave it, raising a big hue and cry (the correct orientation). The Uruguayan comrades' opportunism had, at least, a weighty rationale: *their work against the Frente Amplio from inside it*. The French comrades' opportunism was, by contrast, gratuitous: they supported the Union of the Left from outside, without even the excuse that that support was formally necessary in order to work to destroy it from within.

Despite the fact that official sources may have exaggerated these facts, it is obvious that Allende's government should not be thought of as just another bourgeois government, or worse yet, analogous to the Popular Fronts that were formed in imperialist countries such as France or the United States during the 1940s. In *Revista de America* we have attempted to explain the

These two errors, the Uruguayan comrades' and the French comrades', are serious errors, but are not a betrayal in any way. It would indeed be a betrayal to electorally support a popular front or a bourgeois nationalist movement without denouncing it as a betrayer of the workers' movement. That is: voting in itself is for us a tactical and not a principled question; what is principled is the political policy, and this must be to *implacably denounce any popular or nationalist front in which the working class finds itself as a betrayal by the reformist workers parties that promote it*.

—from Nahuel Moreno, "A Scandalous Document—A Reply to Germain," *SWP International Internal Discussion Bulletin*, Vol. XI, No. 4, January 1974

Trotskyism vs. Morenoism on Proletarian Revolution

international Spartacist tendency :

9. The partial character of the anti-capitalist revolutions in the colonial world over the past two decades (China, Cuba, North Viet Nam and North Korea) leads us to reaffirm the Marxist-Leninist concept of the proletariat as the key to the socialist revolution. Although existing petty-bourgeois nationalist-led movements against imperialism must be defended, the task of communists is to lead the active intervention of the working class to take hegemony over the national-social struggle. The struggle by the proletarian leadership for *self-determination* of the oppressed nations is a powerful tool to break the grip of petty-bourgeois nationalist leaders on the masses. The Spartacist League fundamentally opposes the Maoist doctrine, rooted in Menshevism and Stalinist reformism, which rejects the vanguard role of the working class and substitutes peasant-based guerrilla warfare as the road to socialism. Movements of this sort can under certain conditions, i.e., the extreme disorganization of the capitalist class in

the colonial country and the absence of the working class contending in its own right for social power, smash capitalist property relations; however, they cannot bring the working class to *political* power. Rather, they create bureaucratic anti-working-class regimes which suppress any further development of these revolutions towards socialism. Experience since the Second World War has completely validated the Trotskyist theory of the Permanent Revolution which declares that in the modern world the bourgeois-democratic revolution can be completed only by a proletarian dictatorship supported by the peasantry. Only under the leadership of the revolutionary proletariat can the colonial and semi-colonial countries obtain the complete and genuine solution to their tasks of achieving democracy and national emancipation....

—excerpted from: "Declaration of Principles of the Spartacist League," 1966, in "Basic Documents of the Spartacist League," *Marxist Bulletin* No. 9

Moreno and the PST :

"... la vida ha puesto en evidencia las lagunas, omisiones y errores del programa de la Revolución Permanente.... El dogma de que la única clase que puede cumplir las tareas democráticas es la obrera, es falso. Sectores de la clase media urbana y el campesinado son, en ocasiones, los caudillos revolucionarios...."

"... life has brought out the omissions and errors of the program of Permanent Revolution.... The dogma that only the working class can accomplish the democratic tasks is false. Sectors of the urban middle class and the peasantry are, on occasion, the revolutionary leadership...."

—from Nahuel Moreno, "La revolución latinoamericana, Argentina y nuestras tareas," 1961, quoted in "Respuesta de Política Obrera al PST," 8 November 1974

excerpted from:

“Mexican Standoff”

—Workers Vanguard,
No. 131, 29 October 1976

Although the presidential elections in Mexico this summer predictably installed the candidate of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), José Lopez Portillo, they nevertheless had some interesting side effects. For the first time in decades a left-wing opposition slate, whose candidate (Valentine Campa) is a member of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM), received substantial write-in support.

Moreover, the Stalinist-initiated ticket included one self-styled Trotskyist party and was supported by two others, all of them associated with different factions in the so-called “United Secretariat of the Fourth International” (USec). The sharp three-way polemic between these groups is of particular interest since Mexico is the main arena where representatives of all the competing international tendencies in the USec have squared off....

The oldest of the self-proclaimed Trotskyist groups, however, the Posadista Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR), has mainly been active in hailing the “revolutionary government” of former president Luis Echeverría and then voting for the PRI’s Portillo. Consequently, the POR has gone nowhere, and instead since 1972 two USec-affiliated groups have grown and managed to gain influence in a segment of the radicalized students. These were the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista (GCI) and the Liga Socialista (LS) which originated in a 1972 split from the GCI.

The GCI was associated with the International Majority Tendency (IMT) of the USec led by Ernest Mandel, while the Liga Socialista was the local affiliate of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction (L-TF) led by the American Socialist Workers Party (SWP). Characteristically, the GCI oriented itself toward an eternal search for a “new mass vanguard” of Castroite-influenced youth, and the LS sought to implant itself in a more sedate academic milieu.

However, beginning last year there was a spectacular revolt in the LS in which the pro-SWP leadership was toppled by agents and supporters of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST), up until then the second major group of the L-TF. Following the LS split last fall/winter the L-TF split internationally as well, with pro-PST elements heading back toward the Mandelite majority.

In order to oust what it called the

“Marxist professors”—the pro-SWP leaders of the LS—the PST-backed group founded the Militant Tendency (TM), captured a majority of the Liga, elected a new central committee and pushed through new organizational rules. Under these bizarre regulations, the membership was re-registered as candidates for a month’s “testing” period to show their “activism,” resulting in a classic Stalin-style bureaucratic political purge. Then, in typical USec fashion, the deposed leadership, now calling itself the Bolshevik-Leninist Faction (FBL), declared itself a “public faction” and began a fight in the public press. The TM, denouncing the old leaders as mired in abstract propagandism, announced it would go to the masses....

PST/TM: Stalinism and Popular Frontism

For the Militant Tendency, a turn to the masses meant capitulation before the Stalinist PCM, the largest left-wing organization in the country. In mid-1975 the PCM had held a large rally in Mexico City at which Communist leaders called for a “Coalition of Left Organizations.” Almost immediately after taking control of the Liga Socialista last fall, the new pro-PST leadership suddenly published a “joint PCM-LS electoral program” of 17 points.

It appeared surprising that the PCM had decided to form a bloc with an ostensibly Trotskyist party (particularly since in 1940 the PCM organized an attempt on Trotsky’s life before he was finally assassinated by a GPU agent). But the PCM is trying to break out of isolation and for the moment is apparently willing to take any kind of electoral bloc it can get.

The more interesting question is why a so-called Trotskyist tendency should seek an election agreement with a Stalinist party. Hasn’t the bitter struggle between Trotskyism and Stalinism over the past 50 years represented the battle between class struggle and class collaboration—between revolution and counterrevolution? What joint program could unite such opposites?

With its Mexican allies organizationally blackjacked by its international bloc partners, the SWP counterattacked by asking embarrassing questions about the Militant Tendency’s coalition with the PCM. SWP leader Joseph Hansen wrote a letter (25 October 1975) to the Political Commit-

tee of the Liga Socialista pointing out that a joint electoral platform would only serve to mask other differences. "For example," he wrote, "does the PCM stand for the parliamentary road, for 'peaceful coexistence'?" ([SWP] *Internal Information Bulletin*, March 1976).

The explanation of the TM's opportunist behavior is that it has nothing to do with Trotskyism (nor has the SWP) and had no qualms about forming a bloc with the Stalinists. In fact, the TM reveled in it. On the point which Hansen worried about—"peaceful coexistence"—not only did the PCM support it, but it turned up in the final version of the joint electoral program the following January, with of course a vague pro forma disclaimer by the TM.

....

SWP/FBL: Look Who's Talking!

The most "orthodox" arguments against the Militant Tendency's participation in a popular-frontist bloc have emanated from the SWP-backed Bolshevik-Leninist Faction. In an article entitled, "Is the Mexican CP No Longer a Stalinist Organization?" (translated in *Intercontinental Press*, 1 March 1976), the FBL takes the TM to task for the statement in the Coalition election program referring to the "socialist objectives" and "revolutionary method" of the signatories.

The Coalition platform, in fact, openly declared that the Mexican CP is no longer a Stalinist organization and has become revolutionary. Challenged on this by FBL spokesmen, the leader of the Militant Tendency yelled out to a crowd at a Campa campaign meeting that "The Communist Party is more revolutionary than you are!" The TM newspaper went on:

"We do not want to educate the masses, because then our task would be to become good professors of Marxism. Our task is to pose concrete solutions to concrete problems.... Therefore we prefer raising a class-struggle program, even if it is not our own, and achieving unity which makes mass work more possible...."

—quoted in [SWP] *Internal Information Bulletin*, July 1976

To charges that it had betrayed Marxism by signing a document calling for "peaceful coexistence," the TM replied blithely that "foreign policy is a problem that interests the masses least now" (*ibid.*)!

Against this unashamed anti-Marxist drivel, it is not hard for the FBL to look orthodox. But the TM was able to land some telling blows of its own. If the

program of the Coalition of the Left is really reformist, then the Liga Socialista (Militant Tendency) should be expelled from the USec, it pointed out—well knowing that for the SWP and its allies to propose this obviously appropriate step would have meant bringing the whole shaky USec house of cards crashing down.

Moreover, said TM leader Ricardo Hernández, how can they vote for Campa (as both the LCI and FBL did), while claiming that the Coalition is popular-frontist, and consequently Campa is a candidate "not of a 'class' organization but of class collaborationism" ("Reply to an Essay on Sectarianism," quoted in *ibid.*). A good point, since the SWP/L-TF/FBL repeatedly denounce the IMT's capitulation to popular fronts, yet then turn around and themselves vote for popular-front candidates!

The Mexican situation shows in microcosm the bitter triangular polemic now wracking the USec. The fact that the pro-PST Militant Tendency could go from L-TF pseudo-orthodoxy on the popular front into a class-collaborationist alliance in a matter of a few weeks tells a great deal about the reformist character of the L-TF. And the fact that the most right-wing grouping (both in Mexico and internationally) can effortlessly shift from the international minority to accommodation with the majority speaks volumes about the unprincipled nature of all the factions.

Now a new PRT has been born, at a fusion conference in the "Miguel Enriquez Auditorium" at the National University of Mexico. The 1,000 people present at the meeting reportedly named Mario Roberto Santucho, the murdered leader of the Argentine PRT/ERP, honorary president of the congress. Given the ex-Militant Tendency's unabashed rejection of Trotskyist opposition to popular fronts and the TM's naked Stalinist methods, it is entirely appropriate that the unification should take place under the symbolic auspices of Enriquez and Santucho, two leaders of centrist groups set up by the USec who became renegades. As Santucho was taking the PRT out of the USec, he blasted "the Fourth International" composed of "counterrevolutionary adventurers" and based on a "scarcely redeemable tradition." No doubt in short order we will be hearing similar words from some of the more intrepid renegades from Trotskyism in the Mexican PRT....

excerpted from:

"U.S. Out of Panama Now!"

—Workers Vanguard,
No. 203, 28 April 1978

Planteamos entonces la necesidad de apoyar a Torrijos en las actuales negociaciones, y simultáneamente levantamos la consigna

Si bien somos conscientes del carácter burgués del gobierno de Torrijos, debemos tener presente el carácter progresivo de su enfrentamiento al imperialismo.

—from Revista de America,
May 1977

caracterizaciones. Sostenemos que Torrijos es un régimen de los que Trotsky definió como "bonapartismo sui generis"; esto es un gobierno burgués de una semicolonía que enfrenta en forma parcial y limitada al imperialismo, apoyándose, ante la debilidad de la burguesía nacional, en el movimiento de masas. La máxima prueba de ello es que Torrijos es el primer gobernante en toda la historia de Panamá que denuncia el tratado que adjudicaba a perpetuidad al canal y su zona al imperialismo yanqui.

—from Revista de America,
June-July 1977 (see article)

With the "far left" groups awakening mass support with agitation against the imperialist treaties, the question of the attitude toward the Torrijos regime becomes a key issue. In various articles the LSR and its leaders (including Miguel Antonio Bernal, who has been exiled from Panama for the last two years as a prominent left opponent of the regime) have made clear that they oppose giving political support to Torrijos, although they are put in something of an embarrassing position because of their simultaneous sympathies for the Castro regime which praises the Panamanian dictator as an "anti-imperialist." However, another wing of the United Secretariat, grouped around Nahuel Moreno of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST), holds that it is necessary to "support Torrijos in the current negotiations" (article in the Colombian Bloque Socialista's *Revolución Socialista* No. 66 of 10 March 1977, reprinted in the Morenoites' *Revista de América* of May 1977).

The Morenoites' support for Torrijos is explicitly political and far reaching. Elsewhere in the article they call for "support to the nationalist policies of Torrijos," state that he is "the representative of the struggle for the recuperation of the canal." This is backed up by the following analysis:

"Although we are aware of the bourgeois character of the Torrijos government, we must keep in mind the progressive character of its confrontation with imperialism....

"Thus the fundamental enemy of the Panamanian masses in this moment is imperialism and not Torrijos."

This is a Stalinist theory of "revolution by stages" in its fullest flower. The article has so many references to the "principal enemy" that one would think it to be written by a Maoist.

In a follow-up article (*Revista de América*, June-July 1977) the Morenoites characterize Torrijos as a "bonapartist *sui generis* [of a unique kind]" and go on to say that his regime "confronts imperialism in a partial and limited manner.... The ultimate proof of this is that Torrijos is the first ruler in the entire history of Panama who denounces the treaty which handed over the canal and the canal zone to Yankee imperialism in perpetuity." This affirmation is particularly ludicrous because the "in perpetuity" clause was eliminated from the canal treaty in 1936—in response to nationalist agitation among the Panamanian masses—by none other than U.S. imperialist commander-in-chief Franklin D. Roosevelt. Evidently this indicates that he is a bonapartist really *sui generis*.

It is virtually impossible to talk even of pseudo-Trotskyism in the case of this tendency, which holds that in "Bolivia under Torres, Chile under Allende, Peru under Velasco Alvarado" it was similarly necessary to give "critical" political support to the "bonapartists *sui generis*" against the imperialists. The whole lesson of Chile was that the Allende popular front paved the way to the victory of the bloody junta by tying the workers to the "anti-imperialist" sectors of the bourgeoisie. Moreno & Co. do exactly the same toward Torrijos as the MIR did toward Allende's UP in Chile.



Carter and Torrijos: "a progressive confrontation with imperialism"?

Dirck Halstead

VI.

Moreno the Swindler

The history of Nahuel Moreno's dubious financial dealings is long and sordid. In the 1960's, funds from a Peruvian bank "expropriation" by the Tupac Amaru guerrilla group were supposed to have gotten to Hugo Blanco's peasant unions via Moreno (Hugo Bressano); they never arrived. The story was spelled out in detail by Richard Gott in his book *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America* (1972), but Moreno never answered the charges. In Argentina there were allegations against Moreno's PST for refusing to pay US\$19,000 for an order of 50,000 books by Trotsky printed and delivered by a publishing house (El Yunque) associated with the Politca Obrera party.

The money still has not arrived.

In Colombia, he set up a publishing house (Editorial Pluma) with an entrepreneur supplying the cash and Moreno supplying an international distribution network. But when the partner discovered there was no network and only PST material was being published, he sued. Colombian PST members were instructed to buy and distribute Pluma publications on the grounds that it was a party venture; but when the Proletarian Democracy Tendency of the PST asked to see the books, they were reportedly told it was a private publishing house and they could not have access to the records.

What about that Money for Hugo Blanco?

Immediately on arrival in Lima, Martorell sent Pereyra to Cuzco to work with Hugo Blanco. Pereyra was to prepare and organize guerrilla groups, while Blanco was to turn the existing peasant movement into a more solid, cohesive force.

Some time later Hugo Bressano himself, Hugo Blanco's old political mentor and the head of SLATO, arrived in Peru from Argentina. Immediately he began discussions with leaders of various leftist factions. Soon, however, it became clear that there were serious seeds of discord between the group operating out of Cuzco which was thinking in terms of organizing a guerrilla movement, and that of Bressano in Lima which had no intention of supporting anything further than the seizure of land by the peasants and the formation of peasant militias to protect their gains.

The disagreement took the form in the first instance of a refusal by the Cuzco group to consider meeting with the other organizers in Lima. Cuzco, they felt, was the obvious site. The matter was smoothed over by convincing the *Cuzqueños* that it would be worth going to Lima, and eventually Pereyra was sent down to the meetings held in Lima in February 1962.

The first major problem to be solved—indeed the fundamental problem in the whole effort—was that of raising money. In December 1961, one of the branches of the Banco Popular was "expropriated," but all they could secure was 105,000 soles (about \$4000), nearly half of which was in new notes that could not be used since the police knew the numbers.

SLATO had originally offered a subsidy of eight or nine million Argentine pesos (about \$120,000), but Villanueva doubts whether anyone took such a large offer very seriously.¹⁸ However, some time after his arrival in Lima, Hugo Bressano announced his intention of returning to Buenos Aires with a view to winding up the accounts of his organization's branch in Argentina and handing over half a million soles (about \$20,000) to the Peruvian branch as a loan. Bressano arranged that half of this should be turned over in February 1962, and the rest not later than 15 March.

Hugo Blanco's need of the money was becoming increasingly urgent since there were two congresses planned, one of the

peasants of La Convención and Lares, and the other a peasant congress of the department of Cuzco. In both of these there was bound to be a serious clash between the FIR and the Communists. The latter were already planning to expel Hugo Blanco from the Peasants' Federation.

But when it came to the point, no money was forthcoming from Bressano. On 11 March 1962 Alberto Pereyra had to be sent down from Cuzco to Lima to secure the necessary funds from the National Directorate of FIR. The latter, aware that Bressano had no intention of fulfilling his promise, had already embarked on planning a second "expropriation"—this time the branch of the Banco de Crédito de Miraflores, one of Lima's most luxurious suburbs. But the plans for this were not yet ready and in the meantime the organizers in the Cuzco area were getting desperate. At the end of March the Departmental Directorate of FIR in Cuzco sent an ultimatum to Lima calling for a National Congress to be held in Cuzco not later than 5 April. If this was rejected, the Cuzco leadership threatened to take over the National Directorate.

But when this ultimatum reached Lima, it so happened that Bressano had just returned from Buenos Aires. Immediately he accused the Cuzco organizers of lack of discipline, and he ordered that they be expelled from their positions, Hugo Blanco among them.

Meanwhile, on 1 April, FIR's urban group in Lima had at last got hold of the car they planned to use in the attack on the Banco de Crédito, and on 12 April the operation took place. It was a complete success, and the total secured was nearly three million soles (about \$120,000.)

It was decided that half a million soles should be taken to Cuzco straight away. Three hundred thousand soles were to be handed over to Bressano, and the rest were left with a Peruvian in Lima to buy arms.

Apart from the money, a number of important leaders, including Pereyra, Martorell and others, were also scheduled to go to Cuzco. The problem was how to get them and the money safely there. After the assault on the bank in Miraflores, all the roads out of Lima had been closely guarded, and the authorities were so nervous about rumored uprisings in the Cuzco area that it

was practically impossible to get into Cuzco itself without being searched. The obvious solution would have been to send them off in ones and twos by different routes, but instead of this, Bressano decided that they should all go hidden in a lorry.

The Cuzco organizers were firmly opposed to such a mad scheme, and suggested that the lorry should at least go straight to the Valley of La Convención rather than risk entering Cuzco. And they were extremely hostile to the idea of the money accompanying the men. But the SLATO leaders in Lima were equally firm. Men and money would travel in one lorry to Cuzco. Villanueva comments caustically:

It appears really as though the leadership of SLATO rather than finding solutions to problems, took delight in putting the nerves of militants and leaders to the test, playing unnecessarily with fire by placing the entire organization in danger and, what is even worse, jeopardizing the possibilities of the insurrection itself.¹⁴

The words do not seem to be too strong for what subsequently occurred. On the night of 24 April 1962, a hired lorry set out from Lima with a hidden compartment holding nine men. Three days and fifteen police posts later they arrived at Lima-tambo, within thirty kilometers of Cuzco.

Awaiting them there were a number of the members of the Departmental Directorate from Cuzco. These proposed a change of plan. Instead of driving on into the city, the lorry should

stop a couple of kilometers outside and the men should make their way by separate routes, moving at different hours. But the chief of the group from Lima refused and the lorry continued its journey, arriving in Cuzco at 2 o'clock in the morning.

Hardly was there time for four of the nine men hidden inside to disembark before a police patrol suddenly appeared. Pereyra managed to open fire and he wounded a guard, but he and another were soon captured. The others managed to get away, but the police found on Pereyra the sum of 438,000 soles (about \$17,600.)

That same night, 28 April, a few hours after the capture of the lorry, the surviving leaders from Lima had a meeting with those from Cuzco to discuss how matters should proceed. Martorell took over from Pereyra, but since Hugo Blanco and two of his principal assistants had been earlier demoted by Bressano, another man had to be sent from Lima to take over FIR's Departmental Directorate in Cuzco.

The night before the lorry had left Lima, Bressano, in an emotional farewell, said that he would be flying to Cuzco the next day to take part in the SLATO National Congress that was to take place there. The next day, however, saw Bressano on a plane to Buenos Aires....

—from Richard Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, 1972

The "Arlete Affair" in Portugal

excerpted from:

"CP in Deep Trouble in Portuguese Elections"

—Workers Vanguard,
No. 116, 2 July 1976

What could sharply alter the course of political events in Portugal is the building of a Trotskyist party based on a clear program of class independence, breaking with all wings of the bourgeoisie, including the demagogic left-talking officers. A large part of the support for Carvalho comes from workers disillusioned with the Socialist Party's open support for and the Communist Party's cowardly capitulation to Eanes, behind whose dark glasses there lurks a monochrome. A candidate calling for a break with PS/PCP class collaboration, for no confidence in the capitalist army, for the unification of the workers commissions in a national workers assembly, could point the way toward breaking through the vicious circle of "stabilizing parliamentary democracy" vs. military-dominated "people's power."

In Portugal over the last year the two main ostensibly Trotskyist organizations, both allied with the misnamed "United" Secretariat of the Fourth International (Usec), have tailed after the CP and SP. During last fall, the LCI (Internationalist Communist League, allied with the centrist Usec majority led by Ernest Mandel) was part of the "Revolutionary United Front" (FUR) that supported the popular-front Fifth Government of Vasco Gonçalves and

initially included the Communist Party. At the same time, as the Socialist Party was spearheading a reactionary anti-Communist mobilization, the PRT (Revolutionary Workers Party, allied with the reformist Usec minority, and in recent months specifically with the Argentine PST) incredibly called for a Soares government.

However, in the presidential elections, initially neither the Communists nor the Socialists were running a candidate (the Pato candidacy was the result of the PCP's inability to find a general it could support), so with no one to tail after the LCI and PRT decided to launch a joint presidential candidate. This was also part of on-again, off-again "unity" discussions between the two Usec sympathizing groups.

Their choice as standard bearer was one Arlete Vieira da Silva, whose picture was published on flyers above the headline: "Arlete, A Woman, A Worker, A Revolutionary." A biographical sketch proclaimed that she had been a member of the PCP for 16 years and was arrested five times, once imprisoned for more than three years. A note in the Usec international organ, *Inprecor* (27 May), went into the details of torture ("the traces can still be seen on her broken wrists"). Following the over-

throw of Caetano, it said, she resigned from the PCP in opposition to the Stalinists' strikebreaking and class collaboration.



However, three weeks after the PRT/LCI candidate was launched, after the necessary 7,500 signatures had been gathered to put her on the ballot and on the eve of the deadline for registration, *both groups suddenly withdrew their support*. What happened? Readers of the PRT's *Combate Socialista* (2 June) were given nothing by way of explanation but an inside story with the laconic title, "The Only Candidacy of Class Independence Ceased to Exist!" This item's only answer to the "many questions which have been asked" about the sudden withdrawal was to refer to "our communiqués" on the subject, which are not printed. "Arlete Vieira da Silva gave us data about her political past which were not true," it says, "thereby not guaranteeing the political and moral fitness which a revolutionary party must demand in order to support a class candidacy...."

A few days earlier, the LCI had withdrawn its support from "Arlete," declaring that she did "not have the past nor the minimum conditions which would permit her to be an intransigent defender of a program of unity and independence of the workers movement." Placing the main blame on the PRT (which had nominated her also in the April parliamentary elections), the LCI shamefacedly admitted that it only belatedly investigated the background of its "revolutionary candidate." And it also said nothing about what it had discovered (*Luta Proletária*, 2 June).

The bourgeois press was more reveal-

ing. *Expresso* (29 May) reported that it had learned from the PRT that inquiries produced no evidence that its candidate had ever been imprisoned on political charges. In fact, the only court trial of Arlete Vieira da Silva concerned "failure to pay and embezzlement of various household electrical appliances"!! In France, the daily *Rouge* (30 May), newspaper of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR), asked in a headline whether "Arlete" was a "Prevaricator or Provocateur"?

With the information at our disposal it is impossible to say whether the "Arlete affair" was, as the LCI and PRT suggest, a Stalinist provocation. Certainly the PCP did not come forward until quite late with whatever information it had concerning the dubious character of a former member (whose husband is reportedly a Communist Party militant), while at the same time spreading rumors. Moreover, Cunhal & Co. are no doubt already trying to use this incident in order to spread their usual slander that Trotskyists are provocateurs. What the affair definitely shows, however, is that in their congenital tailing after the reformists, the Pabloist liquidators demonstrate a fundamental lack of political seriousness which leads them to grab for an unknown quantity as a presidential candidate simply because she could serve as an advertising gimmick to rip off Communist votes. Their salivary glands are stronger than their brains, and it is clear that in presenting Arlete Vieira da Silva in the elections, the PRT and LCI gave no thought to providing serious leadership to the working masses....



—from *Combate Socialista*, 2 June 1976
(see article above)