

SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE



KALYAN GUPTA



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Following reports about alleged violation of the Indian border by Chinese army, India has been plunged suddenly into a state of veritable cold war with her neighbour, Peoples' China. An opponent of cold war between the U. S. A. and the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Nehru himself is largely responsible for initiating this cold war with China by his initial scaremongering statements about "Chinese aggression against India". Taking the cue from Pandit Nehru, reactionary and chauvinistic elements, including the Praja Socialist Party, have unleashed an unprecedented, vituperative campaign against China, some of them even advocating preventive war against her. What is the real reason for this sudden outburst of hysteria against a country which, till very recently, had an exceptionally friendly relation with the India Government? Can the occupation of a single check-post at Longju or the casualties in Ladakh sufficiently explain it? Border incidents are not new for India. Normally, between two 'friendly' States, such disputes are settled amicably and quickly too. Even the border incidents in East Pakistan frontier, between India and Pakistan that led to occupation of Indian villages by Pakistani army and death of many Indians, did not give rise to any comparable movement in India nor did it make the Nehru Govt. adopt such a stern attitude in regard to Pakistan. Or once again, why the Nehru Govt. which scrupulously stuck to its Gandhian principle of non-violence as regards liberation of Goa and other pockets from the clutches of Portuguese Imperialism, are now talking in terms of recovering the Chinese-held territory by military means? The astonishing rapidity with which the ruling slogan of "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" has been forgotten and replaced by the cry for the Chinese blood, in sharp contrast with the attitude

of sweet reasonableness towards Pakistan and Portuguese imperialism puzzle the common man in India and make him more than suspect that behind this deep-seated animus against China, lie more profound reasons than the Longju and Ladakh incidents. What are they ?

This question cannot be adequately answered without examining, historically, the evolution of Indian's foreign policy with particular reference to the countries of the Soviet Bloc and China and without considering the basic difference in the social character of the regimes established in India and China.

India's Foreign Policy vis-a-vis China :

Being used to the cliches of "Panch Sheel" or to the reiteration *ad nauseum* of the virtues of "Dynamic Neutrality" in the recent past, one is likely to forget that India's foreign policy had any other face at any other time. Yet, on a closer examination of the evolution of India's foreign policy, it would reveal the following phases.

Period of direct imperialist subservience (1947-52) :

Power has been transferred in 1947 by the British Imperialism to the Indian bourgeoisie and its political organisation, the Congress which got its "Independence" in return of a guarantee to defend British Capital investments in India against popular attacks on them. In the international field she entered with hesitancy as an apprentice to the Anglo-American imperialist combination. This is clearly proved by her diplomatic behaviour of that time. During his visit to the Malaya, Nehru condemned the Malayan liberation fighters as "bandits" and allowed the British Govt. to establish military recruitment centres in Darjeeling and Gorakhpur for recruiting Gurkha soldiers to suppress the independence movement of the Malayans. In the U. S. A., Nehru declared, in 1949, that "when freedom will be in danger and justice threatened, India will not remain and cannot remain neutral". In the context in which that speech was delivered and greeted universally by all

the capitalist leaders of America, it could only mean a declaration of fundamental loyalty to the ideal of 'capitalist democracy' against that of "communist totalitarianism". As if to make the real meaning of this statement clear to all, beyond any shadow of doubt, Nehru Govt. cast aside her "neutrality" and supported U. S. intervention in North Korea, branding the latter as aggressor and without making any independent assessment of the situation on her own. India Govt. showed her moral support to Imperialism by sending an ambulance corps to tend the wounded U. N. soldiers. During this period, responsible ministers, often of the India Govt., openly gave vent to their anti-Soviet feelings in occasional speeches. Following the lead of the British Govt., Nehru recognised Mao's Government in China, but did nothing more.

The pattern that emerges unmistakably from the above facts is one of abject subservience to Imperialism and hostility towards the colonial revolution, communism and the workers states.

The Period of so-called "Dynamic Neutrality" (1952—?) :

The complete collapse of the U. S. intervention in Korea and her defeat at the hands of the ill-equipped armies of Peoples' China, forcibly drove home to the Nehru Govt. the stupendous might of the new Chinese regime. India became alert and fearful about her mighty neighbour and conscious of the fact that her heroic example in Korea, is bound to have a powerful attraction for the anti-imperialist minded Indian masses. The danger of blindly kow-towing the imperialist policy dawned on Nehru government.

This new awareness not only led the Nehru Govt. to radically alter her China policy but to re-fashion her domestic economic policy and foreign policy as a whole. This was the period when the Nehru Govt. initiated the five year plans, gradually sought to restrict the influence of foreign capital in the Indian economy and proceeded to expand the economic base of Indian capitalism by building heavy industries.

In international diplomacy also, Nehru tried to extricate himself from imperialist tutelage. Its first sign was evident in the impartial role played by India as Chairman of the Korean Prisoners' Repatriation Commission.

The theory of "Dynamic Neutrality" was gradually formulated and perfected at this time and finally became epitomised in the new doctrine of "Panch Sheel" jointly sponsored by India and China at the Bandung Conference.

This period witnessed gradual improvement in India's relation with the Soviet Union and other Soviet Bloc countries. Numerous trade pacts were signed between them and India have received, to this date, substantial economic and technical aids from them. The existence of an alternative source to which Nehru could turn for help, has increased India's bargaining capacity with the imperialists on the economic and other fronts. All these help the Indian bourgeoisie to expand its base within a shorter period and at a lower cost to itself.

Nehru Govt. seeks to reciprocate these friendly gestures from the ruling castes of the workers states by occasionally supporting them in the U. N. O., by remaining silent over some of their criminal actions as in the case of Khrushchov's atrocious suppression of the Hungarian revolution and lastly, by indefatigably championing the cause of Peoples' China's admission into the U. N. O.

It is during this period that Nehru and Chou-En-Lai jointly sponsored the idea of "Panch Sheel", which, in fact, announced for all the participating governments, a guarantee of *status quo* in the Asian affairs.

Some Significant Contradictions :

Yet, despite this visible shift in India's foreign policy some significant contradictions can still be discerned. These contradictions enable us to have a glimpse at the real face of the capitalist Nehru Govt., quite distinct from the facade of "neutrality" and "pacifism" which it wears and flaunts to the outside world at present. The capitalist class cannot change its exploitative character. The real nature of the capitalist

Nehru Govt., thus, manifests itself in these isolated contradictory events, which, when put together, will better help us in viewing Nehru's present "pacifistic" foreign policy in a proper perspective.

While requesting the British govt. to withdraw their recruitment centres from the Indian soil, the India Govt. still allows transit facilities to the Gurkha soldiers to pass to Malaya through India. This clearly shows that the change in India's Malayan policy is a tactical move to appease the feeling of the Indian masses; it does not signify Nehru's change of "heart", that is, his sympathy for the imperialist cause in Malaya.

Nehru govt. has done precious little to help the colonial people in their fight for Independence, except paying lip service to them. Thus, Nehru has not yet recognised the Provisional Algerian govt. set up by the Algerian 'rebels' and recognised long ago by Yugoslavia, Egypt, Tunisia, China and many other countries. This can be only explained by Nehru's opportunistic desire not to embarrass Fascist De Gaulle and to be on friendly terms with French Imperialism.

Nehru has maintained discreet silence on British atrocities in Kenya in order not to embitter India's relations with the senior partner of the Commonwealth firm of which India still continues to be a "respected" member.

India's attitude towards the anti-Soviet NATO alliance is markedly different from that towards the SEATO or CENTO (the former Baghdad pact). While Nehru has unequivocally condemned the latter pacts as aggressive, he has never clearly expressed his opinion on NATO which he considers primarily a defensive alliance and not a counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet pact. He has occasionally criticised the NATO when only its resources were sought to be utilised against India as, for example, in Goa.

Recently M. C. Chagla, India's ambassador to the U.S.A. permitted himself to make an extraordinary statement. In reply to a U. S. reporter's query, he said that the Calcutta food movement was the sort of unrest that the Soviet and Chinese

govts. would very much like to see repeated all over India. Coming from the lips of a high dignitary of the India Govt. and directed against the U. S. S. R.—which has maintained a friendly approach to the Nehru Govt. even after the Sino-Indian dispute—this is a surprising and very significant statement, all the more so because it has not been repudiated by Nehru. Here diplomatic discourtesey betrays the suppressed class hatred of India's bourgeois regime towards the workers' states. Even when Dulles described Goa as a province of Portugal, the India Govt. did not use such strong language regarding the U. S. Govt., because it was a brotherly capitalist regime.

All this clearly demonstrates that the current period of India's foreign policy signifies a change of mark, not the face, of the bourgeois Nehru Govt.

Genesis of the Present Cold War against China :

From sometime past, a number of conflicts arose between India and China. Indian textile manufacturers have been increasingly concerned over serious competition from Peoples' China. Indian textiles were gradually pushed out from East Asian markets by better and cheaper Chinese products. This gave rise to one point of conflict.

However, this was not sufficient to produce any change in Indian's relations with China. A bigger challenge to the Indian bourgeoisie and the Nehru Govt. came from Peoples' China, not through sporadic business competition, but through her spectacular achievements in the economic and social spheres. Starting in 1949 from an economic level, lower than that of India, Peoples' China has not only caught up with India but has now far surpassed her. Compared to China's explosive rate of development, India's progress appears to take place at a snail's pace. Both in terms of gross industrial production and per capita productivity, China has left India far behind, as is admitted even by the bourgeois economists.

With her present rate of progress, India can at best expect to keep her margin with the advanced industrialised countries of the West constant, while Peoples' China has already made a bid to catch up with Britain, in major industrial production in the next 15 years, and judging by their present achievements this claim does not seem to be an empty boast.

All these practical achievements of Peoples' China are demonstrating to the Asian people, including that of India, the inherent superiority of socialist economy even under bureaucratic planning over capitalist economy under 'democratic' planning. In the competition between the two social systems, capitalism in India is retreating and its ultimate defeat is inevitable. Indian masses will, therefore be compelled to take to the road of socialism.

This is what is worrying Nehru most. He finds himself in a desperate position, no amount of help from his imperialist benefactors can endow the Indian economy with that dynamism which China exhibits to-day. Nehru can only turn to political weapons to confuse the masses and divert the masses from the achievements of China by painting her as an "expansionist" power and arrest the inevitable tendency of the masses from shifting their existing loyalty to the Congress nationalism in favour of communist ideals.

Impact of Tibetan events on India :

Against this sombre background occurred the upheaval in Tibet. Curiously enough, the recent developments in Tibet simultaneously heightened India Govt's fear about China's growing strength and also provided it with a ready-made political weapon, for which it was searching desperately, to turn the minds of the Indian people away from China, in fact, against her.

Till the recent uprising in Tibet, there were three major forces operating there :

(i) *The Chinese occupation army* ensuring the hegemony of the Chinese Central govt. over Tibet. Their only concern

seemed to be to keep Tibet with China. So long as Dalai Lama and the Tibetan vested interests accepted their suzerainty, China's ruling caste actually defended the outmoded social structure of that country in collusion with them. No effort was even contemplated to organise the class struggle of the Tibetan serfs against their 'religious' exploiters.

(ii) *The reactionary lama caste*, headed by the Dalai Lama, as well as other feudal elements. They accepted temporarily the leadership of the Chinese workers' state, but actually waited for a suitable opportunity to throw the Chinese authorities off their shoulder and re-establish their stranglehold over the Tibetan Society.

(iii) *The Tibetan serfs*, exploited through ages, by the lamas and the feudal nobility and now also oppressed by the Chinese occupation army. They alone provided the social base for a progressive transformation of the Tibetan society.

The Tibetan uprising, primarily led by the reactionary lamas, feudal elements and the anti-social Khampa tribes aimed at recapturing their lost power. This attempt was crushed by the Peking bureaucracy not with the help of Tibetan serfs but mainly by military means. Later on, they have sought to broaden their social base by organising the serfs.

The Tibetan events gave a good handle to the Nehru Govt. to pose itself, before the Indian masses, as the champion of the Tibetan people and their struggle for independence, while painting China as an aggressor, trampling the right of a small nation under their feet. In this clever game, Nehru succeeded to a great extent. His sympathies, it must be understood however, was not so much for the Tibetan serfs as for their respectable exploiters, the "learned" lamas.

Nehru's geo-political fear : "Communism at India's doorsteps" :

With the onslaught on the feudal structure of the process of the structural assimilation of Tibet into the new Chinese

social order (that is, Sovietization) has also set in. Nehru Govt. has thus been deprived of a very valuable buffer state that existed between capitalist India and Soviet China. The "Communist menace" has now come up to India's doorstep. The most immediate impulse behind the outbreak of the current anti-Chinese campaigns can be traced to the acute sensitivity of the Indian capitalist to the existence of this danger along her frontier. All the charges and counter-charges of border violation must be viewed in this context. It is well conceivable that some of "our" anti-Communist army officers with or without Nehru gov't's sanction, in their zeal to occupy as much of Snowman's land as was possible, took advantage of the unsettled conditions along Indo-Tibetan border and indulged in forays into the Chinese territories.

Nehru is both aware of India's economic weakness, compared to China's and also of the supreme importance of the Himalayas as India's natural frontier, especially after the loss of Tibet as a buffer State. Here at least is a line where he can and he must cry a halt to any overt and covert effort on the part of the Chinese government to occupy positions of advantage. He must keep the Chinese, at any cost, at bay here. The instinctive desire to shield capitalism has prompted Nehru to reverse the process set in motion at Bandung. As India's economy is shaky, Nehru cannot afford to make her political prestige weaker by giving up her claims on the frontier. Hence Nehru's dogmatic assertion that McMahon line is India's irrevocable boundary. The vital consideration of defence requirement of the Indian capitalist state is involved here. That makes compromise with China so difficult for Nehru.

Ethics of the McMahon Line :

Nehru has repeatedly declared that he is prepared to negotiate with China about the border dispute subject to the condition that China accept the McMahon line as the Indo-Chinese frontier. As this line itself is the main subject of controversy between the two states, how can a quick settlement

be possible if one of them unilaterally dictate terms of settlement to the other and try to coerce her into accepting it? Moreover, since Nehru has taken such an emphatic stand on the McMahon line, it may be worthwhile to ask—what are the arguments for accepting or rejecting this line as India's boundary?

One thing emerges clearly from Nehru-Chou correspondence: The McMahon line did not constitute the traditional boundary between India and China in the past ages. It is a product of recent history (from 1913—14), of the British imperialist machinations to wrest as much part from Tibet and China as possible to extend the borders of her Indian empire. Though this line was jointly drawn up by British imperialism and the representatives of the local Tibetan authorities, it was never ratified by any Chinese central govt. Is the Nehru govt. morally justified in accepting, uncritically, the heritage of the former British govt. in India, simply because it suits the interests of the Indian capitalists? That Nehru is not genuinely interested in any solution of this border dispute except on his terms is clear from his unwillingness to offer negotiation with China without any pre-conditions attached to it.

But it is quite in the character of the Nehru govt. to behave in such a manner, where its vital bourgeois interests are involved, especially in view of the geo-political considerations as stated earlier.

“National Self-determination” of Bhutan and Sikkim :

Certain Indian democrats and political circles have suddenly become alive to the right of the Bhutanese and Sikkimese people to self-determination. For marxists and revolutionary socialists, the right to self-determination of small and exploited nations is, indeed, a vital issue. But in this particular case, the sudden alertness of our “democratic” friends arises not so much out of their concern for democratic ideals as from their hypersensitivity to the ever spreading influence of Peoples' China. In his letter to Nehru, Chou-En-Lai has claimed large parts of NEFA which now belongs to India. It is also reported that

the Chinese maps show parts of Bhutan and Sikkim as belonging to China. It is these developments that have made these Indians overnight champions of the cause of the border peoples. Otherwise how can they explain their silence when Nehru had been waging a war of extermination against the Nagas to bring the NEFA area under the administrative control of the Indian Union? What moral justification has the Nehru govt. in establishing Bhutan and Sikkim as her protectorate? The fact is that India is playing an utterly reactionary role in these border states; in her attempt to stabilize her frontier and have friendly regimes there, Nehru has thrown all principles of liberalism and democracy to the four winds and has been bolstering up reactionary feudal regimes in these states against popular will. Liberalism is a luxury which the capitalists can afford only so long as their vital interests are not affected. Along India's border, Nehru cannot afford to toy with his liberal ideas for fear of jeopardising Indian's defence. This pro-feudal and undemocratic role of the Nehru Govt. has made India so unpopular among the common people of these states.

There is a sinister implication of the Indo-Chinese dispute for the people of these regions. Any democratic movement there would now be looked upon with additional disfavour in New Delhi. Already attempts have been made to dub these movements as Chinese inspired activities, even though the Nehru govt. is well aware of legitimate grounds for mass dissatisfaction in these states. Recently there has been mass migration from Bhutan to Assam to escape utter poverty and feudal repression. Moreover, coming to principles, what objections can there be to Chinese attempts to influence these peoples? Why did Nehru govt. give asylum to king Tribhuban of Nepal and support the anti-Rana movement there? Progressive ideas have no frontiers, they will always spread to other lands and influence people there. Only decaying regimes will seek to prevent it by military methods on the plea of defending border. European nations fighting against their feudal rulers always received moral and material aid from revolutionary America or France in the last century. To-day, Nehru's fear of the spread of

China's influence belongs to the same category as Matternich's fear of Republican America.

There is another aspect of this problem to be considered. The independent role of small bourgeois states in the modern imperialist world is extremely limited and should not be over-emphasized. "Under the conditions of world war, to approach the question of the fate of small states from the standpoint of "national independence", "neutrality" etc. is to remain in the sphere of imperialist mythology. So far as the small and second rate states are concerned, they are already to-day pawns in the hands of great powers. The sole freedom they still retain, and this only to a limited extent, is the freedom of choosing between masters." (Leon Trotsky: "In defence of Marxism"). Nehru has already declared that any attack by China on Bhutan or Sikkim will be considered an attack on India. In case of China's attempt to assimilate Bhutan even bureaucratically, and India's efforts to protect Bhutan as a part of India's general struggle against China, will the struggle for self-determination of Bhutan have any progressive character ?

For revolutionary socialist the question is of course, of a more fundamental nature. Are they not morally bound to defend a workers' state, however deformed it may be, against any feudal or bourgeois state, however "small" or "peace-loving" the latter may be ? In speaking about this issue, Trotsky writes : Just as during strikes directed against big capitalists, the workers often make bankrupt, in passing, highly respectable petty bourgeois concerns, so in a military struggle against imperialism, or in seeking military guarantees against imperialism, *the workers' state—even completely healthy and revolutionary—may find itself compelled to violate the independence of this or that small state.* Tears over the ruthlessness of the class struggle on either the domestic or the international arena may properly be shed by democratic philistines but not by proletarian revolutionists. The Soviet Republic in 1921 forcefully Sovietized Georgia which constituted an open gateway for imperialist assault in the Caucasus. From the standpoint

of the principles of national self-determination, a good deal might have been said in objection to such sovietization.(But) From the standpoint of the self-defence of the workers' State surrounded by enemies, forceful sovietization was justified. *The safeguarding of the socialist revolution comes before formal democratic principles.* (Emphasis ours) (Idid, pp. 170-178). This should sufficiently answer the doubts of those marxists who are feeling a bit confused over the implications of this border dispute for the right of self-determination of the border states.

L' Affaire Thimaya

Despite the Prime Minister's statement to the contrary, it is now generally surmised that General Thimaya's offer of resignation was not simply over his differences with the Defence Minister regarding irregular promotions in the army. The simultaneous threat of resignation by the heads of the three wings of the Defence Forces—army, navy and the Air Force—showed that it was a well concerted move. It was aimed at forcing the Nehru Govt to adopt a sterner attitude towards China. This episode, coupled with General Cariappa's recent utterances and his direct letter to General Ayub Khan, Pakistan's military dictator, indicate that the anti-Communist officer corps of the Indian Army might well have provoked the Chinese Army across Indo-Tibetan border.

Growing Indo-Pak Solidarity :

There would have been reasons for genuine satisfaction at speedy solution of many disputes between India and Pakistan, had this sudden warming up of relations between them not occurred against the background of deteriorating relations between India and China. Faced with a common challenge, Nehru the 'democrat', found a strange bed-fellow in General Ayub Khan, the 'dictator'. There have already been suggestions for common defence arrangement, between India and Pakistan. Evidently it would be directed against Communist China.

There should be no cause for surprise if such a defence pact really materializes, since as bourgeois politicians both Ayub and Nehru are blood brothers and mortal enemies of communism. But the Indian masses must beware of these variety of growing Indo-Pak solidarity.

Is war Between India and China Possible ?

Both the world situation and the relative positions of India and China, do not at all favour this eventuality.

In the world arena, there has been a relaxation of tension between the two power blocks in the past few years. The chief reason for this is the weakening of the position of U. S. imperialism in the world and the frustration of her war plans due to (i) failure to unleash war hysteria in the major capitalist countries (ii) the growing economic and military strength of the Soviet Union as well as parity of strength between the U. S. A. and U. S. S. R. in nuclear armaments (iii) lack of unity among U. S.'s European allies about the war programme and (iv) the continuing colonial revolution.

All these have compelled world imperialism to modify some of its earlier positions and to face a long period of relaxed cold war.

The prospect of India's war with China in this context, seems very remote.

So far as the relative positions of the ruling regimes of India and China are concerned, the Indian capitalists still need a peace-period in order to expand its own base. A realistic estimate about China's economic and military power together with the difficulty of full-scale military operations in the unfractable snowy terrains of the Himalayas are also restraining her from rushing into any military adventure.

On the otherhand, it is also inconceivable that China would launch war against India. Because of the fact that China has been ravaged by civil war and imperialist onslaughts for nearly thirty years, the Peking regime is hardly in a position to risk a fresh war.

However the attitude of the Nehru govt. towards Dalai Lama and the effusive hospitality shown towards the entire emigre reactionary lama leadership of the Tibetan revolt, made the Chinese govt. stiffen their attitude towards the Indian govt. Unlike the imperialist countries, the Chinese socialist economy needs no war. Moreover, both the Chinese and the Indian govts. are incapable of initiating a full-scale war against each other because of the professed policies of the leaders of the world power blocs. But a permanent settlement of the Indo-China Border disputes is unlikely.

Why then this hysteria ?

Although Nehru does not want and cannot afford to have war with China, he does not also want to call off this cold war altogether, as he stands to derive certain substantial benefits by maintaining the anti-Chinese scare within certain limits.

Nehru has to win away the Indian masses from the Chinese influence by painting her as an aggressive country.

He can hope to cover up the bankruptcy of his govt. on the economic, social and political fronts by raising the bogey of "India in danger" and appealing for national unity, just as successive regimes in Pakistan wanted desperately to divert the attention of the masses from their vital economic problems by raising the slogan of "Pakistan in danger".

The chief aim of all these is to destroy the rising anti-capitalist and socialist movement of the Indian toilers. This was clearly apparent in the attempt of the West Bengal Congress Committee to portray the recent mighty food movement in West Bengal as a Chinese conspiracy.

Role of Indian Parties vis-a-vis Indo-Chinese Dispute :

PSP, SP and Jan Sangh.

The Proja Socialist Party occupies the vanguard position in the anti-Chinese campaign. Their "socialism" becomes chauvinism in their hostility towards the socialist states. Shri Deben Sen, a prominent member of the PSP and General

Secretary of the PSP-dominated trade union Hind Mazdoor Sabha, has already volunteered to place the HMS labour at Nehru's disposal for building roads etc. along India's border, that is, for doing coolie service for the Indian capitalists. During peaceful time these gentlemen masquerade as champions of labour by bargaining with the bosses for a 2-anna increase in the workers' wages but during any critical period, they willingly hand over the working class bound hand and foot to the native capitalists. They are worst betrayers of the working class; they are socialists only in name, but lackeys of capitalism in practice. The same thing applies more or less to Lohia's Socialist Party as well.

About Jana Sangha one significant fact has to be pointed out. This organisation which is communal in nature and has all along pleaded for stern measures against Pakistan, suddenly forgets this animosity and it now advocates joint Indo-Pakistani defence pact. This shows clearly inter-communal rivalry is relative whereas their hostility towards communism and workers' states is absolute and universal. Faced with a threat from the proletariat, they quickly make up their communal differences and exhibit their loyalty to capitalism.

Forward Bloc, RSP etc.

It is a pity that these organisations which often participated in anti-capitalist mass movements have also jumped on the anti-Chinese band-wagon.

Their weakness is chiefly ideological. They have no material ties with the capitalist class but they have not yet been able to overcome their loyalty to nationalism, which is the political ideology of capitalism. Their old nationalist moorings are still haunting them. They are not proletarian socialists but petty bourgeois radicals. The Forward Bloc has not progressed, intellectually, a single step further than their preceptor—Subhas Bose—who wanted to combine nationalism with socialism.

The Revolutionary Socialist Party has put itself to eternal shame by declaring to defend the territorial integrity of capitalist India against attack from any quarter whatsoever. RSP's

programme defines the Soviet Union as a workers' state which means that it is obliged to defend her in a fight against any capitalist state including that of India. And still here we find the General Secretary of that party swearing fealty to Nehru Govt. against his own party's programme. Such conflict between theory and practice can be only explained by the fact that RSP's programme represents only academic acceptance, by its leadership, of socialist policies. Trained in the school of petty bourgeois anarchism and later on in Congress nationalism, this old guard of the RSP leadership have never assimilated organically the lessons of the international socialist movement from the days of Marx to this day. Unless a new leadership emerges from the ranks of the younger generation there is every possibility for the RSP veering towards social-chauvinism of PSP Brand.

Communist Party of India.

Under the impact of Indo-Chinese border dispute, rifts have occurred inside the Communist party. The traditional loyalty of this party to Kremlin and later on also to Peking has been put to severe strain of late. Since 1952, the party has been following an abject, pro-Nehru line in order to maintain the Kremlin-New Delhi entente cordiale intact. The result has been complete disappearance of any marxist training among the ranks and the swamping of the party with nationalism, pacifism and last but not the least, Nehru-ism. The party is now paying a heavy toll for that. Thus veteran members of the party like S. A. Dange and E. M. S. Namboodripad have given up ostensibly their loyalty to the Peking regime; while the former has surrendered to bourgeois nationalism for petty tactical gains in Maharastra politics, the latter is hoping to capture the middle class votes in the ensuing Kerala election, by accepting McMahon line as India's boundary.

The other wing, led by Joshi, Sundaraya etc., remains true to their role of rigidly defending the Kremlin and Peking bureaucracy in all their actions. They are supporting China not

out of any genuine internationalist outlook. If it were so, then they would not have betrayed the mighty anti-imperialist 1942 upsurge in India out of false notion of solidarity with the Soviet Union. Till yesterday they were at one with the Ajoy Ghosh leadership in supporting the domestic and foreign policy of the Nehru Govt. and sowed illusions in the popular mind regarding the true nature of that govt. If to-day they are opposing Nehru and supporting China, it is only because the Nehru-Chou axis has broken down and in this situation, unlike the nationalist wing headed by Dange, they have chosen to remain faithful to Stalinism. This may be far better than Dange's position, because after all they defend the Chinese workers' state against the Indian capitalist state and to that extent, they have resisted nationalist pressure. But the motivations that lead them to this conclusion are entirely different from those of genuine proletarian internationalists. In the present dispute, international socialists would support China against India, not out of any illusion about Mao-Tse-Tung or Chou-En-Lai, but because in any war between a workers' state and a bourgeois state it is their moral duty to defend the former against the latter. According to the international socialists, internationalism means faith in the revolutionary capacity of the working class of every country, maintenance of fraternal relations between the toilers of all lands, even under the most trying circumstances ; such internationalism does not signify blind support of every concrete action of the existing govt. of a workers' state but includes the right to criticize those actions of the above govts. which hamper the interest of the working class, nationally or internationally, while defending that very state against any capitalist attack. Such is the essence of true internationalism. It is poles apart from the so called internationalism of P. C. Joshi or other CPI leaders which consists in always supporting the Soviet govt. (and now, also the Peking regime) inspite of whatever crimes they might commit against the working class.

There is no doubt that between the confused and degenerate nationalists and the confirmed Stalinists, there is to-day a growing volume of sincere, militant and genuine internationalist

elements inside the ranks of the CPI. Although for practical reasons, they may be joining hands, at present, with the Joshi wing to defeat the nationalists, they must formulate their motivations clearly and separately, so that at a later stage when it becomes necessary, in relation to other problems, to fight both the nationalist danger and Stalinist die-hardism they may not find themselves politically unprepared. They must also realise that the desertion of such veteran leaders as Dange or Namboodripad to the camp of the bourgeois nationalists is not an isolated phenomenon. When it involves entire provincial units, as in Kerala, Bombay, Maharashtra it indicates a deeper malaise of the organisation. The clue to this nationalist degeneration can be found, in the first place, in its abject subservience to the ruling regimes of Moscow and Peking, and secondly, in its immediate past, in the blatantly class-collaborationist policy of the party for the last seven years. To fight effectively against Dange's policy, whose essential points have now been accepted by the party's existing leadership, the revolutionary elements inside the CPI must start the struggle at its root—that is, against its present pro-Nehru line itself. Without it, any opposition to an isolated decision on the border question is bound to be pointless and futile.

RWP, SUC, DV, RCP etc.

The quality and temper of a working class party is not determined by its numerical strength or mass following at a given moment. but by the depth of their socialist conviction, as demonstrated through practical politics. This means that a genuine socialist party cannot blindly follow the masses in whatever they think and do. This may occasionally make them unpopular. But a revolutionary party is never swerved from its own path for gaining cheap popularity. It is their duty to place before the toilers those policies that would serve their lasting, general and historic interests as opposed to their immediate, sectional and temporary interests. Judged by this criteria, most of the so-called left parties in India have failed the masses

miserably. The present political crisis has once again confirmed this. Only a handful and small, revolutionary groupings like the Revolutionary Workers' Party, Socialist Unity Centre, Democratic Vanguard, Revolutionary Communist Party etc.— have resisted the nationalist pressure and held fast to the ideal of proletarian internationalism. During the first world war, Lenin's Bolshevik Party, was in a hopeless minority in raising its voice against the imperialist war, while the majority of the 'socialist' leaders deserted to the camp of patriotism; yet it is this very Bolshevik Party, which, later on established the world's first workers' state. Similarly, in India to-day because of the relative isolation of these small parties from the masses at the moment, people may not understand that to-day these parties alone represent their genuine interests. We have no doubt that the future course of events will compel the masses to realise this truth.

Fundamental Tasks of the Revolutionary Workers :

Apart from the final outcome of the Sino-Indian dispute, there are certain dangers inherent in the continuation of the present cold war against China.

Parties like the PSP, SP, FB RSP etc. are trying to infect the Indian masses with their chauvinistic fervour. Since all these parties are associated with the labour and other mass movements, the danger to the Indian toilers emanating from these sources, cannot be overlooked or underestimated. The numerical weakness of the revolutionary workers emphasises all the more the supreme need to devote their total energy to keep the mass movement free from this virus of chauvinism. Nehru has so cleverly created an atmosphere of national emergency that most of the left parties have now voluntarily rallied round him ; and the CPI also is being drawn into this vortex. Under normal conditions, it would have been extremely difficult for Nehru to persuade these parties to give up their oppositionist role. The Indian capitalists faced with a rising

mass movement have proceeded to create, artificially, an abnormal situation where national solidarity can be easily achieved.

But this is only the first step. Nehru's real target is the masses. If aided by his "left" friends, he succeeds in rallying the masses also around him, all the achievements of the past years will be soon wiped out and the working class movement will be thrown many a step back. Any attempt to organise the masses on independent class line will be smared as treachery to the national cause, as has been already done during the recent food demonstration in Calcutta by West Bengal congress. Under the pretext of national defense all democratic rights of the masses will be snatched away and the only liberty left will be one of raising chauvinistic slogans. The state machine will become more and more militarized. By supporting Nehru to-day the CPI and other left parties, are not only paving the way for the rise of a police military regime in India but also are endangering their very existence.

It is the task of Marxist revolutionaries to tell the masses that it is a matter of life and death for the Indian capitalists to divert the attention of the masses from the ever mounting problems—unemployment, shelter, famine, high taxes and prices—to an unreal problem and from their real enemies at home—the capitalists, landlords, hoarders and blackmarketeers—to an assumed enemy abroad.

No doubt the bureaucratic handling of the present Sino-Indian dispute by Mao's regime has put the Indian revolutionaries to a disadvantageous position. Nevertheless, it must be realised that to reorient China's approach to border questions is primarily the responsibility of the Chinese masses. On the other hand it is the task of the Indian revolutionaries to wage a relentless struggle against the increasing attempts of Nehru govt. to pit the Indian workers and peasants against their Chinese counter part. Against Nehru govt's cry of "national defence" the revolutionaries must counterpose a referendum on militarisation under the pretext. Only the struggle for this referendum will make it possible for the masses to discern their main enemy.

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