

INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS NATIONAL REPORT

Vol. II No. 8

June 3--17, 1974

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NC INFORMATION--IMPORTANT!

Nat Sec Report, 5/22 & 5/29

Letter of Resignation--RG & CRG

NAC Reply to Resignation Statement by RG & CRG

State of the Organization--Presented to the June NC by the NAC

Appendix to State of The Organization--NAC

Discussion Document Submitted to the National Committee by the NAC

NAC Proposals to the National Committee, 6/1/74

FOR MEMBERS ONLY--FOR MEMBERS ONLY--FOR MEMBERS ONLY--FOR MEMBERS ONLY

IMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT

NATIONAL COMMITTEE MEETING INFORMATION, PLEASE READ CAREFULLY!

AGENDA

Saturday, June 22

9-10:30 - cluw fraction

~~11-1pm~~

1st Session: 11-1pm

CLUW

2nd Session 2:30-6:00

MP's document on stalinism

3rd session 8:00-11:00

NAC general perspectives document

Sunday, June 23

~~10:30-1:30~~ 4th session 10:30-1:30

NAC organizational document

5th session 3:00-5:00

NAC organizational document

6:00-8:00 UFW fraction

9:30 Party

Monday, June 24

~~10:30-1:30~~ 6th session 10:30-1:30

Introductory discussion on Macism and Maoist milieu

WHERE TO FIND DOCUMENTS, ETC. REMEMBER TO PLEASE BRING YOUR WITH YOU!!

1. ~~XX~~ CLUW: See National Reports Vol II, #6 Working Paper on CLUW & National Report Vol II, No. 8, CLUW campaign for Organizing the Unorganized
2. Stalinism: MP's stalinism document will be sent out from the NO by June 6
3. General Perspectives by the NAC: Included in this National Report, Vol II, No. 9 which will go out on June 4
4. Organizational document by the NAC: Same as General Perspectives Document

HOUSING, TRAVEL, ETC.

1. Delegates write or phone the NO in advance to let us know when you will be arriving, so that we can arrange transportation if necessary, and find housing.
2. Branch Organizers please notify the NO if comrades other than NC delegates are planning to attend the NC so that we will have enough housing available in advance.

NATIONAL SECRETARY'S REPORT May 22 and May 29

1. NAC: With the exception of the National Secretary reports the entire agenda of the NAC meetings on May 22 and May 29, 30 were taken up in preparing the discussion document and proposals for the general perspectives discussion and on the organizational report and proposals for the NC. These documents are included in this National Report, and are being submitted to the NC on the Weekend of June 22-24.

In the three NAC meetings prior to the NC we will be discussing MP's document on Stalinism, which we will send out by June 6, and CLUW in preparation for the NC. In addition, we will also be discussing recent developments in the AFT and the upcoming national convention, the David Miller discussion pamphlet on capitalism, Carl F.'s piece on nationalization in the current bulletin, and here a report & lx from JW on the UAW Convention being held in Los Angeles. We will also have two discussions on Maoism, one on China, and one on the question of party building, in addition to at least one educational discussion in the stalinism series on Kuron and Modzelewski, A revolutionary Socialist Manifesto.

2. Pamphlets: the pamphlet on Orthodox Trotskyism "Politics as Religion" will be ready by June 7.

3. Louisville: We now have an official branch in Louisville of 6 members. Two friends joined that had just moved there from Bellingham Washington. BM(Detroit) gave a talk on the 18th for the branch on our labor perspectives related to our work in the UAW. It was very successful with about 25 non-members attending. The Louisville branch is well situated in the left milieu there and has good prospects for growth.

4. JG's tour: JG made a trip to the St. Louis, Bloomington and Louisville branches. At the first two he spoke publically on the world crisis. The meetings were well attended and both branches have respectable prospects for recruitment. Both the St. Louis and Bloomington branches have IS study groups going.

5. Chicago: JT spoke in Chicago on the weekend of the 18th to the branch and contacts on the Russia-China split. While it was a relatively small meeting, it was a healthy step forward for the branch in view of the past problems and the recent resignation of RG and CRG (see letter of resignation and the NAC response elsewhere in the National Report) The branch is in better shape organizationally, and is beginning to get a few good contacts around it. Arena work is going quite well.

April 23, 1974

Comrades:

We have informed you of our resignation, and of our hope that it will be accepted promptly. Because we have no regrets about having in the past been part of the IS, and to dispel any notions that we have forgotten the importance of being part of an organized tendency, we take this opportunity to explain our action.

We resign because we no longer believe that the IS is capable of making a significant, independent contribution to the formation of a revolutionary party. We believe that it has been conclusively demonstrated that the IS as a whole, through the workings of its own internal processes, will not transform itself into a useful pre-party formation.

The last and most disastrous faction fight was a final warning that the intellectual and practical stagnation of the IS, apparent since well before the 1972 convention, must rapidly be overcome. This has not happened. In particular, the NO has been unable to present itself to the organization as a leadership to be taken seriously on industrial matters. It has shirked the task of re-industrializing the organization. It has not dealt in a serious, systematic fashion with what is inaccurately called the tradition. This last failure, in spite of the most strenuous demands from all quarters of the organization during the faction fight.

We believe that the consequences of the deepening stagnation and of the rationalizations put forward to excuse or thide it will be conservatism and abstentionism--a tendency already manifest in a number of ways, most recently in our approach to the CLUW conference. Before we elaborate upon this conclusion, which we know will be controversial, let us detail some easily verified observations about the state of the IS.

The figures on industrialization speak for themselves, and so does the fact that the NO has not taken any visible steps to implement the industrialization campaign mandated several times by conventions and NC's. Industrialization has never affected more than a small and unevenly distributed sector of the organization. If carried out on a massive scale it has the possibility of knitting together the most energetic elements of the organization, through the creation of national fractions with an on-going political life. On the present level, it has just the opposite effect.

The education department has issued several pamphlets composed entirely of reprints from New International and similar sources. The documents however do not answer the questions people have about their heritage. If read carefully, however, they do pose them. And it is on exactly these matters that the NO is silent. The consequences of the NO failing to account for our past is that everyone who cares to, the British IS for example, dominates the issue at considerable cost to the confidence of the membership.

In the eight months since the split, there have been no serious discussions, involving substantial portions of the membership, on concrete problems of strategy and tactics in the unions. The national leadership seems determined to maintain things this way. The IS has hardly suffered from an absence of abstract

discussions of the unions, but the NO has scheduled yet another. Such discussions have been inconclusive because the differences everyone concedes exist have never been concretized on the level of counterposed perspectives for a series of unions and union situations. The NO has allowed episodic agreements on one or another tactic to obscure the fact that there appear to be on-going disagreements over how (the method by which) tactics are determined. We predict that the decision to drop auto and replace it with yet another vague discussion of "Class struggle unionism" will simply leave industrialized members unsatisfied, and the NO unable to stand for anything in particular with respect to the concrete problems of industrial work.

One of the main tasks imposed on the IS is competing with other groups and tendencies for influence and support from revolutionary minded elements actually fighting capitalism. The IS has an undeniably inconsistent record in this regard. Lately it has begun to take up the problems posed by the existence of the maoist groups. We do not believe that the IS will have any success in actually winning, if it decides to try, maoists to third camp revolutionary socialism unless it first comes to some definite conclusions about its own past, and about the traditions of trotskyism generally, and inculcates them into the membership with an unprecedented thoroughness.

The chief vulnerability of the maoist milieu is that each leadership group is trying to present itself as the sole alternative to the Moscow oriented CP while maintaining the fundamental politics of the "revisionism" they condemn. The best elements of the maoist milieu find it difficult to swallow the more outrageous distortions of fact or lapses of theory presented by the RU, OL, CL, etc. The fact that they are all competing means that they constantly tend to expose one another. This creates a situation which makes it easy to vindicate the basic ideas of trotskyism which, after all, arose in the struggle with what the maoists call revisionism.

But the IS will not be able to exploit this opportunity unless its members are prepared to handle the controversies within the trotskyist movement which established the basic ideas we sometimes call the tradition. In as much as the IS is not preparing to do so, it will have no choice but to abstain from this struggle, which industrialized comrades will verify has developed nearly everywhere we have industrialized.

These are not new problems in the IS, and many people in the IS have tried and uniformly failed to overcome them. The persistence of these problems manifests itself in more than stagnation in various forms, with which all of us are familiar. It will, as the organization becomes accustomed to failure, result in a certain conservatism and abstentionsim, which grows stronger each time the organization meets a challenge with a rationalization.

We have already alluded to the CLUW conference, and while we are not writing a full evaluation of it at this time, we will make the following points: 1) Left to its own devices, the NO majority would never have developed a practical proposal with respect to women's caucuses. The only general motion with respect to this supposedly fundamental part of our politics was written by yourselves. Though it was accepted by the leadership, it was not vigorously fought for by many comrades in a position to do so. (2) Both the internal reports and the Workers Power

article are virtually uncritical in the evaluation of the conference, although it accomplished virtually nothing. In this context, the IS has put itself in the position of making up excuses for the Farmworkers' leadership whose vacillation is the major reason why the rank and file did not go on to pass a motion in support of the UFW.

Most IS'ers will agree that our perspectives for rank and file work have in general not been successful, and have clearly fallen short of our expectations. In itself, there is nothing disastrous about that, but it does pose problems for the leadership. What will be disastrous is the tendency to simultaneously rationalize the failure and develop a policy of avoiding difficult problems. For example, there is no doubt in our mind that by and large our work with the UNC has been a failure, as has the UNC itself. Clearly all are correct to place less emphasis on building the UNC. But to avoid the responsibility for developing a convincing explanation for the failure of the UNC, and our role in it, and instead to conclude, as seems to be happening, that we should generally put less emphasis on building broad rank and file formations (caucuses, contract committees, stewards committees) which actually participate in the existing political life of the unions, has disastrous implications. The most immediate will be to undercut industrialization. The second will be that our people will get little or no training in the practical aspects of building a workers' movement, collective experiences in which are essential prerequisites to becoming a combat or cadre organization.

Some comrades are aware that we have had a series of battles with elements of the leadership of the organization over a number of practical questions of perspective for some years. For a long time we have been skeptical of the capabilities of the IS leadership who seemed ~~to~~ unable to ever sum up and evaluate the organization's practice in Peace and Freedom, the anti-war movement, the women's movement, or much of anything else.

The consequences of the IS's habit of never collectively summing anything up, is chiefly that the organization as a whole never learns anything from its failures. . . or its successes. The thinking processes of the organization go on in small unofficial groups, or not at all. When policy shifts take place it is usually without a conscious collective decision in which all can participate. This failing of the organization, which is rooted in the history of its earlier development as an intentionally non-cadre group indicates more than anything else that the organization will not transform itself into a leadership of the working class.

In the present period, when organizations like the IS all have yet to develop roots in the working class, membership must be based on more than agreement with a general set of principles. It must be based on an enthusiasm for the perspectives of the organization, and a genuine confidence in the way they are being carried out. We have been losing both of these for some time.

The final factor in our disillusionment in the IS is that we no longer believe that the notion of bureaucratic collectivism-the single genuinely unique feature of the IS's political physiognomy-is valid by itself to separate one kind of anti-stalinist revolutionary from another. In as much as the IS justifies its existence on the basis of that theory alone, it has no further call on our loyalty. In as much as we have repeated practical disagreements which we can expect to intensify, it is best for both of us to go our separate ways.

YFTR,
R.G. C.R.G.

NAC REPLY TO RESIGNATION STATEMENT BY RG AND CRG

The resignation of RG and CRG from the IS is regrettable and, in our view, thoroughly unjustified. Insofar as their resignation statement attempts to put forward a political explanation of their loss of "enthusiasm for the perspectives of the organization, and a genuine confidence in the way they are being carried out", it fails to do so. However, for the most part it doesn't even try. The statement refers in the sketchiest terms to "repeated practical disagreements which we can expect to intensify", and hints at dissatisfaction with some of the theoretical underpinnings of IS politics without attempting to suggest any alternative. Thus, with a couple of exceptions which we will take up here, most of their critique of the IS is at a vague, extremely sketchy level which makes it pointless to attempt to reply to their charges in detail - since they put forward no alternative perspective or implementation.

Both RG and CRG are comrades who have devoted years of dedicated, valuable service to the IS. Their talents and political contributions are a loss to the IS and will be missed. Having said this, we believe it is important to state why we believe RG and CRG developed such major theoretical and practical differences, whether real or imagined, with the IS that they believe they can no longer help to build this organization.

The resignation of RG and CRG comes ~~xxxxxx~~ after a period during which the life of their branch, the Chicago IS, deteriorated very sharply. A huge internal fight nearly paralyzed the branch. During this period it appeared that all common assumptions regarding the external work and internal life of the branch had vanished, to the point where no viable leadership could be formed inside the branch, and exec and branch meetings took on an almost factional character - not in the sense that tendencies were organized but rather that every question, even minor organizational ones, became immediately polarized. The worst aspect of the situation was that no single question could be discussed and resolved, because every conceivable issue was always being debated at once.

Should the branch be involved in UFW support work? Was the Teamster work of the IS (including a bulletin ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ put out in Chicago which ceased publication long before the split) reformist? Is the IS a politically coherent group? Does there have to be regroupment with elements of the Spartacist League and a split in the IS? All these and many more issues - not just in themselves, but constantly coming up all together ~~xxxx~~ at every point - kept being thrown up, without ever being discussed in serious fashion, played the major role in bringing the branch to the point of collapse.

After several months of this, the NAC found it necessary to directly step in and assume responsibility for the functioning of the branch. To do this, we recognized the majority of the branch executive committee as the representative of the political line of the IS nationally, based on its support for the perspectives of the organization which were continually and randomly being challenged, and for the purpose of turning the branch in an aggressively activist direction, based on their UFW support work and the industrial activities of the branch. To assure that there would be no atmosphere of suppressing discussion or comrades feeling that their democratic rights were being violated, the NAC took responsibility for chairing biweekly branch meetings and making sure that the real work of the branch would be central to its political life. We also requested that RG and CRG themselves determine two questions on which to initiate a full discussion in the branch, so there could be genuine substantive debate instead of scattershot quibbling over every issue all at once. RG stated that he was glad the NAC had taken these actions and promised that he and

CRG would submit their two questions for discussion in short order. Unfortunately they never did so. Evidently they saw no value to be gained from a focussed debate over industrial or political perspectives, and decided to resign instead. In fact, long before this they had communicated to many comrades in the branch their view that the IS had no fundamental programmatic agreement and probably would not survive. It is our view, in summing up this experience, that it was essentially the behavior of comrades RG and CRG in the course of their efforts to develop a defined set of political differences with the work of the IS, that led to the serious disruption of the Chicago branch. We also believe that it was their inability to arrive at definable general political differences that made them incapable of settling on two questions for clear-cut debate in the branch; that caused them to elevate their differences over the CLUW convention to the level of principle and ridiculous ~~gax~~ charges of "abstentionism"; and that has led them finally to resign from the IS on the basis of half-formed differences as reflected in the character of their statement.

What we believe comrades will notice in reading the statement through is that, even if every specific charge raised against the IS were valid, they would not add up to much of a political motivation for leaving the IS. At best, they would amount to a descriptive ~~xxx~~ list of some of the weaknesses of the organization resulting from our small size, limited experience, and lack of direct continuity with previous generations of revolutionaries in this country. But RG and CRG fail to provide even that description.

What is most important about the IS is that our work is based on a perspective - a view of what is happening throughout the advanced industrialized countries and how to intervene in it - that is being borne out and proven today both in Britain and other Western European countries and, at a much more elementary level in North America. That perspective, briefly stated, is that growing economic instability and the failure of official trade union leaderships to defend the interests of the working class is creating an independent rank and file opposition, and that this opposition - if organized into a politically ~~organized~~ ~~conscious~~, democratic movement - lays the basis for rebuilding revolutionary parties. That is why the work of the IS in Britain is so important to us - it proves that this perspective on the decay of capitalism today, a perspective that we and the ISGB share, is valid. This is the theoretical context which explains ~~why~~ why we are working to build rank and file opposition caucuses, committees, etc. in industrial unions today - a task which RG and CRG groundlessly assert we are abandoning - and in which our success has to be measured.

There is no need to repeat here what has been stated in several industrial secretary's reports to the NC regarding the long-standing problems of deepening (quantitatively and qualitatively) the industrialization of the IS. No one previously regarded the statistics on industrialization as valid grounds for leaving the IS and the extremely important industrial work that is being done, and we do not accept it as a motivation for leaving now. We believe that at this time, the formation of actually functioning national fraction organizations in the priority industries is the crucial problem facing the NO and the existing local industrial fractions. But RG and CRG have put forward no view of how this should be done.

RG and CRG state that "most ISers will agree that our perspectives for rank and file work have in general not been successful, and have clearly fallen short of our expectations". If this appears straightforward and unquestionable, it is in fact extremely misleading. That results have been short of our expectations - in terms of the formation of stable ~~gxxx~~ groups - is correct. That is because

the last three years have been an unbroken defeat for the American working class since the introduction of NEP. In this period what had been a wave of wildcat strikes and other independent forms of struggle abruptly stopped, and all opposition groups - whether those built by ourselves or others - virtually withered. If we expected another ~~xxxxxxx~~ period like the last three years, we could expect little more visible success than in the last three. But our expectations in the current economic downturn are quite different. In any case, we don't believe it follows from any of this that our perspectives have been a failure. In terms of the experience we have gained, the roots we have established, and above all the qualitative advance in political clarity we have made in industrial work over four years ago, we believe the IS has established a priceless capital for the future. This is not "rationalization of failure", but an objective political fact. In any case, RG and CRG seem capable of raising only tactical questions around our work in the UNC, and again in such vague terms that ~~xxxx~~ a reply is impossible.

The only other important issue raised by RG and CRG's statement is that the IS must make a major effort to resolve issues of controversy inside the Trotskyist or pseudo-Trotskyist movement, which they claim is a prerequisite to winning radicals away from Stalinism and Maoism. We do not have any idea of what particular questions they believe need to be resolved, or why it is necessary to take on the Spartacist League, Workers League or RSL in order to fight Maoism. We believe for our part that the discussion of Maoism is a crucial one, and were hoping that RG and CRG would put their approach forward as one of the discussions to be initiated in Chicago, but it would be futile to try to figure out their views on Maoism, Trotskyism or the political underpinnings of the IS from their document. Much as we would like to clarify whatever differences we may have with the comrades here, it is just ~~xxxx~~ not possible to see where they stand.

Similarly, their statement that "we no longer believe that the theory of bureaucratic collectivism...is valid by itself to separate on anti-Stalinist revolutionary from another" is simply mystifying. We must admit that we have no inkling of what new views RG and CRG may be developing on the nature of Stalinism. In any case, their assertion that the IS "justifies its existence on the basis of this theory alone" is obvious nonsense. What justifies the existence of the IS and the struggle to make it a combat cadre organization rooted in the working class is our perspective for building a revolutionary party out of the developing rank and file workers' movement in this country. It is tragic that RG and CRG chose to resign rather than doing the work necessary to articulate their differences - those differences that are genuine and real - seriously enough to make a genuine discussion of them possible.

STATE OF THE ORGANIZATION Presented to the June NC by the NAC

It is clear that an objective overview of the IS nationally shows a contradictory situation. On the one hand, in all of the major branches the outside active work in industrial arenas and ~~the~~ the UFW support work is going quite well, while on the other hand, each of the major branches has had major internal problems. In many cases the internal life of the branches has stagnated, branch meetings have little life, the most active members feel little sense of an organization, and are not sure how their work relates to building the IS or the revolutionary party. The problems of the Cleveland and Chicago branches which many comrades are familiar with, and which do have their special forms, are not that different from those of the other major branches. Most branches have had difficulty in developing a periphery, although there are singular exceptions. Likewise, recruitment has been quite small, and we have recently lost several valuable comrades who played leadership roles in building the IS in the past. While one can find specific individual reasons for each of these losses, we believe that they are also part of the general problems, and not just isolated actions of disillusioned individuals. What we have is a national problem, which we must begin to come to grips with now in order to grow and develop and to realize our potential to contribute to the building of a revolutionary party in the US.

But, we must put these problems into a proper perspective. They are so clear today, in large part as a result of the real progress we have made since the split. Prior to that time, the most pressing problem, the one that overshadowed all others was the lack of political coherence, and finally of any fundamental agreement. Today, although there are healthy political differences on some issues, few would say that there is no fundamental agreement. Yet there are areas of our theory and analysis that need deepening and clarifying such as the politics of our priority unions, the crisis of stalinism, maolism theory and practice, etc. In addition we also desperately need a systematic educational program for contacts and less advanced members.

Although our growth has been small, it has been significant. We now have functioning branches in St. Louis and Louisville, and with these we are beginning to develop a presence in the south. Organizing committees in Madison and Boston have also been formed as well as IS study groups in Portland and Vancouver BC. Chicago and Los Angeles now have full time organizers. For more specifics and details on membership, including gains and losses since the convention, and industrialization by union please see the appendix attached to this report.

The most obvious example of real progress is the change in Workers Power. Less than a year ago, most members found the paper to be less than useful. Today, although much more improvement is necessary, the overwhelming majority of the organization is proud of the paper and its progress. And for the first time, we can use it effectively with worker contacts. We have an editorial board that functions together, and we have made substantial progress toward developing a professional staff.

The other outstanding example of our progress lies in our publishing program. Our publications program has done well, although it has been more limited than we had originally hoped. In the nine months since the convention we have published four pamphlets and four issues of The Socialist Experience. The pamphlets include: Chile, Road to Disaster, The Emerging Crisis in Capitalism, International Women's Day and Toward Teacher Power. The numbers of The Socialist Experience include: War and the Middle East, The Popular Front of the 1930's, The Chinese Revolution, and Readings in the political Economy of Capitalism. In addition we have reprinted Women in the Chinese Revolution. One more

State of the Organization

pamphlet, Politis as Religion: The Degeneration of the Fourth International, is nearly completed, and another pamphlet on stalinism (as yet unnamed) and #5 in The Socialist Experience series, "The So-called Socialist Countries -- A marxist Analysis" are currently in production.

Toward ~~Some~~ Teacher Power is our first labor ~~paper~~ pamphlet. Another on auto is in preparation, and the first draft has almost been finished. These ~~papers~~ represent a healthy beginning.

There are several more in preparation -- originals, newly authored for us, eg. blacks, revolutionary feminism, and auto; collections of basic peices such as are in the pamphlets on capitalism and stalinism, eg a collection of ISGB articles on China with an introduction that ties them together; classics such as International Women's Day, et a peice by C. L. R. James, who originally published in the NI under the title 'Revolution and the Negro'; and some reprints from the workess movement, eg a series of articles originally published in Solidarity, the UAW paper in the late 1930's, called "Economics for Auto Workers." Future issues of The Socialist Experience will include one on National Liberation and Class Struggle (#6) and one or two on blacks. A publication of Draper's "Yalta" is foreseen at some point.

We have had mixed success in distributing these pamphlets. We printed 2,000 copies of the Chile pamphlet. Our reasoning was that since it was a hot issue, and we had almost the only thing available on it, and it was quite good, we ought to be able to distribute that many. We have so far distributed approximately 1,300 - 1,500.

We printed 1,000 copies each of the other pamphlets. The IWD pamphlet was printed in conjunction with our IWD campaign. The success of the pamphlet distribution is an indication of the success of the campaign: virtually all were sold out by the time of IWD.

Toward Teacher Power is our newest pamphlet, but it has already attained quite a bit of success. Over 700 have been sold already, probably ~~because~~ because people are excited about haveing a labor pamphlet. In some places branches have attempted to sell them at AFT meetings and local conventions. All branches should be doing this even if they have no AFT members. There is little quastion that the pamphlet will go into a second edition.

We have sole 4-500 copies of the Emerging Crisis in Capitalist Capitalism, and about 300 of the newly reprinted Women in the Chinese Revolution.

We had originally printed 300 copies of the Socialist Experience numbers. Happily, this run represented an und4restimation of the demand. We have already sold out of the first three. Numbers 1 and 2 have laready been reprinted - 500 copies each, and f"The Chinese Revolution" will also soon be reprinted. From now on the regular run will be 500.

There is currently no information on the distribution in individual branches. We do not know how many of what have been ordered from the NO have ~~actually~~ actually been sold, nor to what extent there is use of bookstores. This is so despite ~~our~~ previous request for such information.

The publications program currently has no difficulty in getting material written. There is, or course, a shortage of material written specifically for workers. We expect to get more ~~of~~ of this as time goes on. The emphasis has been on getting materials that were easily available - such as the capitalism pamphlet or preivously begun, or especially needed such as Chile. As some of this basic work gets done, more effort will be put into pamphlets written specifically for workers (IWD and TTP are that, or course).

The main problems have been production and distribution. The production process has virtually broken down. There is no typist, and until one is gotten it will be quite difficult to get original pamphlets produced. No one is any longer responsible for lay-out and so it is a catch-as-catch-can proposition. We have a printer who works two days a week and who divides his time between the publications program and the branch printing and other national needs. The branch needs are heavy and they tend to get priority. Consequently, printing of anything which does not get otherwise prepared is quite slow.

Despite all of these problems we've made great strides. We are now for the first time producing a substantial amount of material. We're publishing it ourselves, which, despite the difficulties involved, is the only reason we've been able to publish so much. (In particular, the Socialist Experience series would have been impossible any other way.) We've proven ourselves capable of producing professional material which has increased our ability to intervene credibly in the labor movement. Little pamphlets like the recent CWA Contract Fight 1974 wouldn't have been possible without our set up.

But no one is in charge of distribution, and as a consequence the potential audience for our literature is quite small. This is our gravest problem because without a serious distribution effort it will be quite difficult for our ideas to get spread around beyond our own personal contact. This is another factor seriously inhibiting our growth and general influence on the left.

Our trade union work has been substantially deepened and intensified. Most branches are heavily involved in external work, and for the first time, this work is overwhelmingly of a working class character. A substantial portion of our cadre, for the first time, is beginning to learn to function effectively in a working class milieu - not as outsiders.

The Dump Woodcock Campaign has indicated some of this progress. It was a step forward for the IS in a number of respects. For one thing, it was the first time the NAC had ever proposed an industry-wide campaign that went beyond written or verbal propaganda. It was also the first time that industrialized comrades carried out a joint campaign or effort in all of the various shops where we worked in Detroit. In addition, those at Harvester supported a slate run on the same program and ran an independent. Altogether eight slates were mounted with our participation, most of them initiated by us, most of them on a fairly advanced political program.

The campaigns themselves were aggressive from the start. That is, first we had to convince other militants to run with us and/or support us. That in itself was a job, and it was quite successful. We had to overcome all kinds of fears and conservative attitudes. Most of the slates involved several candidates other than ISers. Enormous amounts of literature, covering political and industrial issues, including racism, the labor party, etc., were distributed. Most of the slates did better than was expected - much better than was expected when the idea was proposed by the NAC last winter. All got respectable votes and a few very good votes, though only one candidate actually won, Edie Fox.

The success of the campaign is proven by the fact that in most shops we have emerged with on-going groups. Again these groups are uneven as to size and consciousness, but all are a step forward. Some groups notably Dodge, Mack and Chevy are now virtually the only organized opposition in their locals.

The auto fraction and the industrial secretary will prepare a full report and assessment of the campaign for the NAC in the near future.

State of the Organization

Every branch of the IS is involved in UFW support work. In most cases it is a small number of comrades, with an additional small number who while not active in the committees are regularly involved in picket activities. Good internal communication exists in the fraction through the exchange of round-robin ~~com~~ type letters. Workers Power constantly carries coverage of the UFW and the issues involved. Through these two sources our members are generally well informed of the issues, sometimes in advance of the staff, and have won respect nationally as hard-working, competent and knowledgeable boycott supporters. Given our criticisms of union policy and the deserved ~~hat~~ hostility to the Spartacist League and the SWP who are labeled as "Trotskyists", putting real Trotskyists at a disadvantage, this respect has been hard won.

The NAC has provided very little direction to our work in the UFW, although internal communication and Workers Power have helped to overcome that lack. Our record on bringing the question of the UFW into our trade union work is mixed.

In general our UFW work mirrors our potential and our difficulties. Our comrades have remained active in the UFW through steady work, without fanfare or glamor, overcoming our previous student movement training of arena hopping. The use of WP for constant coverage and giving a nationality and line to our work shows the potential of our paper in our arena work. It is read and respected. However, we have not been able to recruit out of the arena. While we have a very small periphery of sympathizers in the arena, this has not been able to be translated into any organizational gains for the IS.

The NAC requests this fraction meeting to discuss whether it is the nature of the arena its current level of activity, ~~xxx~~ which we can expect to change over time, or whether it is our failure to develop a systematic approach and strategy to recruitment in the arena. We recognize that direct recruitment from the arena may not be decisive organizationally our gains may come from the bringing of the question into our union work, developing the consciousness of our sympathizers in other unions to broader class questions around the UFW, etc. Nonetheless we wish an assessment of why what is a modest success, our UFW work, does not yet lead to growth and a sense of self-confident accomplishment on our part.

In addition to our national UFW work, the NAC and Women's Commission called for meetings nationally in all the branches around International Women's Day. This modest campaign was itself a modest success. In those branches, most notably Detroit and Cleveland, where a lot of work was put into, the meetings were quite successful, but in many branches were hesitant and did not try to build anything very big. Nevertheless, even in those branches where good meetings were held, we were not able to build on the success of them.

Thus, for the first time, we start to get an unobstructed view of the size of the task still before us. The gap between our resources and capabilities, on the one hand, and the objective task on the other is still an enormous chasm. As the organization has again turned outward, and again become increasingly involved in external work, as the paper has significantly improved, and as we now have a real publications program with real results, we find that these improvements and activities to provide the most accurate and uncompromising yardstick against which to measure our weakness and shortcomings.

We have not yet proven in practice that we can recruit workers or blacks to the organization. We have not yet, even demonstrated our ~~ability~~ ability to develop a periphery of workers or blacks around the IS, a necessary precondition to substantial recruitment.

While we have begun to carry out socialist education directed at workers (through WP) this has not yet yielded observable successes in terms of recruitment. We have made very little progress even, in helping workers ~~we~~ meet develop into self-confident self activating class struggle unionists.

Nor have we shown in practice, that we are capable of effectively combatting our only real competition on the left: the Maoists. They should be vulnerable on the questions of stalinism, party building and its relation to the working class, and trade union perspectives. But it has been years since we have made even limited gains in confronting and defeating Maoists. Some Maoists have shown themselves to be more capable than us in attracting workers.

We believe that the main source of these problems has been our inability to develop a collaborative national ~~ex~~ leadership that is self-confident, that has the respect of the membership and that intervenes politically and organizationally to carry the IS as a whole. Since the convention, there has been little or no national guidance to the ~~most~~ important political work of the IS. The NAC believes that it has been this lack of concrete national leadership that has led to this contradictory situation. So while local industrial work and UFW support activity goes on quite well, it is not reflected in the branches of the national organization. This results in a feeling of isolation and alienation in the the organization. (INSERT OMITTED IN TYPING, PLEASE SEE NEXT PAGE)

A large part of the problem of developing a national collaborative leadership that has the respect of the bulk of the organization has historical roots. And the difficulties we've had so far are put into a real context when this is recognized. Our tendency more than any other in the US was smashed during the reactionary post WWII years of McCarthyism and working class defeat. The total defeat of the international working class following the war was much more devastating here than elsewhere - and as a result we have essentially no continuity with our political tradition in terms of comrades who participated in the revolutionary workers movement prior to WWII. This means that we've had to essentially start from scratch - taking individual comrades most of whom have not worked closely together over any period of time, and who ~~xxxx~~ developed into national leaders during the student-radical movements of the sixties and attempt to weld them into national leaders of an embryonic working class organization. With little or no labor experience, and no experience or guidance from others in leading a national workers organizations these individuals have had many problems in making the necessary changes, for they bring with them not only their positive traits, but the bad habits learned from their days in the student movement and the first years of IS history.

Because the IS arose in 1969 as a coming together of groups with different political pasts and with no real political agreement, our entire short history until the split has been one of internal political discussions and fights. This together with the years of isolation and defeat for the working class and social movements has meant that we did not develop a leadership that perceived of itself as providing guidance for the organization in the outside world, but instead saw itself primarily as organizing internal political differences. It is this history that we are not all conscious of, and now will take steps to overcome.

The faction fight has been over for a year. Our membership is impatient for some kind of breakthrough. The progress we have made over the past year has not yet achieved significant tangible results with regard to growth in the size, or influence or our organization and tendency. This impatience is more than understandable. The leadership has certainly functioned at less than its optimal ability. But the impatience we all feel - and the frustrations and tensions that it creates could still break us. Even if we were to all work to our

INSERT OMITTED IN TYPING FROM P. 5

KKK

Eight months ago our major problem was our isolation from the outside world. Very little arena work went on, due primarily to the faction fight. Now, that problem no longer exists. Our comrades are highly active, and given the lack of real movements have been generally successful in what they've been doing. We have begun to have small but real ~~successes~~ successes in our labor work. But that real activity and organizing that now goes on means that our comrades are called upon to give leadership practically and theoretically, and they need guidance from the national leadership and the NAC. It is here that the weakness of the national leadership really shows. Specifically the minimal trade union experience of most of the NAC, where the bulk of our work takes place now has meant that the NAC has tended to shy away from giving concrete guidance to our actual work. But because of this lack of experience, it will not be easy, and the NAC will have to choose a few arenas to discuss and give guidance to regularly in order to learn how to discuss these and gain an experience in that way. In the meantime those comrades in the arenas not chosen will have to rely on the faction leaderships with the assistance from the industrial secretary. Overcoming this weakness and lack of experience will not be done overnight. It is a process, one that we feel must be handled by carefully choosing our priorities for concentration.

optimal capacity, we could only slowly close the gap between objective necessity and our resources and capacity.

Over the next period, we must carefully choose priorities, marshal resources, set our sights for specific concrete goals, capture them and move on. We must place demands on ourselves without pressing beyond the limits of our capacity. We must avoid over ambitious promises. And we must eliminate the demoralizing tendency of reporting on the work, accomplishments and prospects of the organization through rose colored glasses. The proof of the pudding will be in the eating. Solid results will speak for themselves.

Part of the problem is political - as the discussion on general perspectives will show - political in the sense that the organization has not internalized our general perspectives for building broad rank and file organizations of struggle in industry and the relationship of that to building the IS and the revolutionary party, including its theoretical bases in our conception of the relationship of party and class. And part of it is in concretizing and clarifying some aspects of these perspectives so as to provide more guidance to industrial fractions and help to build real national fractions. These failures lie primarily with the NAC and the national leadership in general. The proposals put forward in the general perspectives discussion attempt to come to grips with some aspects of this problem.

But beyond that there are other aspects of leadership and its relationship to the organization and the membership which must be taken up. The following are concrete proposals that we present to the NC for its approval, and which we believe will begin to lay the basis and start the process of developing the type of collaborative national leadership that can give guidance and direction to the organization and that will begin to bridge the gap between our outside political activity, and the ~~internal~~ internal life of the organization.

PROPOSALS

1. In general, the NAC sees its priorities and those of the organization as coterminous. At this time, that means first understanding what areas of work and functioning are most important. We believe the health and growth of the IS requires the following order of priorities for NAC discussions: 1) labor work; 2) Maoism and the maoist milieu; 3) educational program; 4) evaluation of branch functioning, activity, etc.

Within this general prioritization, however, it is necessary to limit ourselves even more severely. While each of our industrial arenas is important, it would be impossible for the NAC to seriously and successfully provide guidance on a regular basis for all. The first priority for labor discussions and regular review of industrial activity will be the UAW. The reason for this is that the NAC believes that it is here that the most substantial political breakthroughs can be made in the coming months. The success or failure of the caucuses now forming in a number of Detroit plants and our work with a group in Chicago Harvester will inform our work in other industries for years to come. Following the UAW, the NAC will regularly review our work in CLUW and the UFW - largely because of the newness and fragility of our work there and also because of the importance for recruitment of the milieu around the UFW and CLUW. Other labor work will be discussed on a far less regular basis. Naturally, the Industrial Secretary will work with the fractions in IBT, CWA, and AFT and report on important developments to the NAC.

The Maoism discussion is important because it is our assessment that it is from the "soft-Maoist" milieu that our greatest chance for serious growth exists. To win these soft maoists to our full politics it will be necessary for the leadership and membership to be able to politically defeat the various ~~hard~~ hard maoists in the eyes of the softer maoists. We propose to discuss the politics of the leading maoist groups, with various NAC members specializing in fields such as their labor policy, party building, the united front against ~~imperialism~~ imperialism, blacks in the US, China. Reports will be written to inform the membership of the discussions and our political analysis of these groups. Additionally, the NAC must discuss the tactics and strategy ~~of~~ of winning the soft-maoists beyond the question of political ideas. That is, the NAC will attempt to give guidance on relationships with various collectives and groupings.

The development of a consistent educational program for the IS is essential to our long range growth and stability as a cadre. Beyond the specific question of maoism, it must come after labor work because we believe the heart of the way our of the current problems lies in the internalizing of our labor perspective and its increasingly successful execution in practice.

In the past months branch functioning and problems have taken up a growing amount of the NAC's time. While attention to specific branch problems will continue, we now believe that many of these problems flow from the more general problems of the organization. While results may be slow in coming, particularly at first, we believe that the overall approach we are taking will lessen the need to deal in depth with branch problems on the scale we have been. In short, we believe the proposals and ideas embodied in the two major documents presented to the NC by the NAC, will deal more effectively with branch problems than our past case by case approach ever could.

2. One of the key sources of the IS's current situation has unquestionably been the lack of leadership coming from the NAC. This has not simply been a matter of not dealing with labor questions or of jumping in too late, ~~although~~ although we have done both of those. Even more demoralizing for the organization has been the perpetuation of the past IS "traditions" of the star system and non-collaborative, open haggling by the leaders. The "debate" over the CLUW convention in Chicago was the crowning example of this. It was, in fact, this experience which shocked the NAC into realizing that a different mode of functioning was needed.

We ~~propose~~ propose that the NAC actually become a collaborative body, rather than a debating society. Specifically, this must mean that the NAC ~~has~~ has the right to function in an internally disciplined way and the right to select on which questions it will so function. This means that when the NAC decides that open debate would add to confusions rather than clarification, it has the right to arrive at a majority position and discipline all NAC members to defend that position - not simply to abstain, but to defend. A joint, collaborative leadership could then aggressively attempt to win the NC and membership to its ~~own~~ position ~~if there was any disagreement, or to educate the organization in that position if there were no differences.~~ if there was any disagreement, or to educate the organization in that position if there were no differences. The debate and vote within the NAC would not be recorded in the minutes or the National Secretary's political report when the NAC functioned in this manner.

3. We believe that this method of functioning is necessary and ~~is~~ over-due if we are to defeat the "debating society" atmosphere that still pervades the IS. We further maintain that the "debating society" method has completely failed to develop the politics of this organization and has led, for the past several years, to confusion and misdirection. This organizational

When in doubt, command!

State of the Organization

8

step should be understood as a political step toward the transformation of the IS into a revolutionary combat organization based in the working class, from a series of discussion groups based on the campus or in a petit bourgeois milieu.

We do not believe that this method of functioning will suppress discussion of important political questions. We sincerely hope that it will serve as an example of how to throttle ill prepared, unthought out pot shooting over every detail. For a combat organization the major political fights need to be with our enemies, not with each other.

What it really means is ~~that~~ that the NAC will undertake to lead the organization and not attempt to organize differences. Even taking the latter as a goal, however, the old method was inferior. By airing every difference before the organization before serious discussion could take place within the NAC to explore how real differences were meant positions were frozen and every difference seized upon and blown up out of proportion. The new method hopefully will change all of that.

This collaborative approach also means a consultative approach. The NAC will consult with fractions and principle individuals involved in any question before arriving at a position. We urge that NC members and local exec's and fractions begin to consult with the NAC before they make decisions too.

3. The Educational Secretary with the aid of the NAC will be coming out with general proposal on an educational program for the organization. This proposal will include a class series for contacts and new members, and a means of organizing education for other less advanced members. It will be out prior to the NC, however we are not at this time submitting it for a vote to the NC. We recommend that all branches and organizing committees begin implementing it, to see if it is what is really needed, and what, if any, refinements, changes, need to be made. We believe that the process of developing a systematic educational ~~xxxxx~~ program for the entire organization with a national approach is key to overcoming some of our problems. But we do not believe that it can be done without feedback from the branches which requires implementation first. We would hope to be able to adopt a basic ~~xxxx~~ approach and method within the next 4 to 6 months.

4. National Fractions: The industrial secretary with the support of the NAC will assist those fractions that have little or no national network to set that up. National fractions will meet at least twice a year (once at the time of the IS national convention) and one other time to be worked out in the fraction with the industrial secretary, who will attend all non-convention meetings. The NO will commit itself to financially aiding in the ability to hold these meetings.

5. Industrialization: The Industrial Secretary and National Secretary have sent out a memo to branches ~~xxx~~ on industrialization. The heart of that memo states: "Industrialization has long been the priority activity of the IS. As it stands now about 30% of the membership are industrialized. In the midwest branches the percent is much higher, meaning that the burden of industrial work is not evenly distributed throughout the organization. We are aware that in many branches there is no "loose" personnel, and no current members realistically available for industrialization. The NAC believes that the next

leap forward will have to come about as a result of recruitment. Nevertheless, recruits will be all the more reluctant to put their life on the line (assembly) if our current membership does not appear to be as dedicated as our new members." The NAC will continue to implement this policy, although to date it has only heard from 2 branches. The NAC will review the progress of industrialization monthly, and send out regular reports to the membership on the progress of this program.

6. Black work: Serious implementation of motions passed by the NC and the NAC on organizing work in the black liberation movement, and the recruitment of blacks to the IS, have proven impossible to implement with present personnel resources and assignments. The problem, to put it frankly was that these motions were put forward and passed without any serious consideration to what they would mean in terms of the demands on our existing leadership resources. The NAC and the NC must share responsibility for the failure to deal with this assignment of "priorities" in a less than responsible fashion.

What the problem boils down to is this: for the NO to take on the kind of systematic aggressive overall leadership that was demanded in previous motions on the priority of black ~~recruitment~~ recruitment clearly would mean ~~assigning~~ assigning Jack T. to be ~~essentially~~ essentially a full-time black coordinator (in terms of his political responsibilities). This would mean that the publications and education programs, for which JT is currently responsible, would have no one to direct them and would essentially lapse. Although the choice is a difficult one, we do not believe it would be correct to propose the dropping of these programs, which are of first rate importance in sharpening and establishing the influence of our political ideas.

What we are proposing is not another set of "priorities" motions which we have no hope of carrying out. Instead, we set modest goals in the immediate coming period. The NAC will: 1) maintain close contact and provide guidance to our relations and discussions with some small but potentially very important black political groupings and individual black contacts which we have started or are attempting to initiate in several cities; 2) work closely with the leadership of the auto fraction in its efforts to develop and recruit ~~the~~ a black ~~in~~ worker periphery (which in Detroit is effectively identical with the problem of significant working class recruitment from the plants); 3) try to ensure that IS branches take advantage of any openings that arise in terms of ~~participating~~ participation in black struggles, eg. the efforts to build a demonstration in response to the police actions in LA or around issues like the Zebra round-up, or potentially around the struggle in Angola, Mozambique and Portugal.

We believe black recruitment is a life and death question of the ~~the~~ revolutionary movement in the US. We recognize that in the next 6 months, while we are trying to put a leadership together capable of carrying through on agreed responsibilities, it will be impossible for us to undertake any more ambitious projects than those minimal ones listed above.

7. Perspective toward the Maoist Movement: In 1972 the IS convention adopted an orientation toward independent industrialized collectives, usually sympathetic to Maoism but attracted to a rank and file movement among workers which made them open to conceptions of workers democracy in contradiction with their sympathies with the Chinese bureaucracy. The Landy-Tabor leadership did not carry this orientation out. Their perspective was towards other Trotskyist sects - with little if any roots or influence

in the labor movement or industrially oriented sections of the radical movement, but politically more interesting landmarks on the ~~xxx~~ road they were about to travel. The perspective remained a dead letter. After the faction fight, we did not pull ourselves together to deal ~~x~~ with this question, although the intervening years has shown the validity of the original perspective. —

The Maoist milieu is our greatest rival, but at the same time a most important potential for recruitment. Among industrialized radicals, in the left, among some black and some white workers sympathy for W China is widespread. Often it is the most revolutionary, devoted, self-sacrificing, serious and dedicated to the working class, who are most attracted to Maoism which is ~~xxx~~ equated with ~~theoretically~~ proletarian revolution. Trotskyism is equated with the petit bourgeois politics of the SWP, or its sectarian mirrors like the Spartacist League who bring their petit bourgeois approach into the labor movement as well. In the United States it is impossible to ~~xxx~~ build a successful revolutionary organization without being capable of defeating Maoism theoretically and in practical work. Until we do so, it will continue to be the hegemonic, natural pole of attraction to those moving leftward and in a revolutionary direction. Our members have to be educated to be self confident and aggressive in their ability to theoretically defeat Maoist politics, and to show the superior application of our revolutionary perspectives in practice.

At the present time we have a new opportunity to put our old orientation into practice. The turmoil in China, and the collapse at least for the moment, of the regroupment efforts among the Maoists to create a party, has created fierce competition among the Maoist sects for hegemony in their milieu. It has furthered a tendency toward sectarianism among them = to be the real, "orthodox" Maoists in the country - which in turn reinforces the sectarianism of the general isolation of the left, and in the case of the RU (which until now has been the most important) has probably provided an internal crisis. The internal fighting has opened up all political questions, and shows the limitations of Maoist theory and strategy toward building a revolutionary party in an advanced industrial country, and most related political questions. The internal disputes and crisis in this milieu provides us with the elbow room ~~xxx~~ with which to politically intervening with our politics on these questions. With all of our difficulties, the Maoist groups both in theory and practice are on a more primitive level on how to build a party, rank and file movement, the black question, international politics, etc., and the interrelations of these questions with the road to proletarian revolution. This opportunity may not last for long if in the next year or two one of the Maoist groups becomes hegemonic and successful in organizing this milieu around itself and overcoming its competitors. While this is not likely, it is possible, ~~xxx~~ and would enormously set ~~xxx~~ us back.

It is not however to the Maoist sects that we believe an effective intervention can be made, but towards the milieu influenced by them, and in particular to the soft Maoist collectives. These collectives often have an industrial orientation, and a perspective towards a rank and file movement. They usually lack any theoretical or political clarity, and any strategy for the development of either a rank and file movement in the unions or a revolutionary party, or any relationship between the two. Running up against the limitations of their theory, they are often being split by the hard Maoist groups. Some are repulsed by the stalinism and sectarianism of those groups. They also suffer from the collapse of the perspective that a revolutionary organization would be developed by linking up of similar type collectives. This perspective collapsed with

the end of the New Left, their inability to transcend those new left politics, of collectives based on life-style or friendship cliques, unable to translate their work into organizations in the working class, and towards building a party and their splitting due to their lack of political clarity, and the ability of the hard Maoist groups to split them. These groups are often open to and impressed with IS labor work, Workers Power, etc. Our orientation is towards them.

The specific proposal for the NAC's approach to the question in terms of discussion is in the first proposal in this report on priorities. This is ~~not~~ actually a means for enabling us to educate ourselves on Maoism so as to be able to politically take them on in a self-confident fashion. In addition to regular reports from the NAC based on these discussions, the educational Secretary is preparing additional pamphlets and reprints for background. An internal discussion pamphlet is being produced and should be out by the time of the NC which covers the basics of the politics of the hard Maoist groups, and ~~shows~~ some of the issues between them, and this should help membership familiarize itself with the debates inside the movement. The NAC discussions are also a means at arriving at a strategy and perspective more concrete than the one outlined above. Coming from these discussions will be the basis for additional printed material in the form of short pamphlets on some of the issues in the movement, educational inside the IS, and educational articles in WP written in a non-sectarian way which can take up some of these questions from our point of view. This is the beginning necessary to develop what must become a full fledged campaign to aggressively pursue a struggle in this milieu.

Branch/Org. Comm.	Fraction/Activity	Membership	Losses	Gains	Industrialized
Bloomington	ufw, aft	8	0	4	0
Boston		3	0	1	0
Champaign/Urb.	?	4	0	1	0
Chicago	ufw, uaw, ibt, afscme, cluw	11	3	1	2-uaw, 1-ibt 1-afscme (4)
Cleveland	ibt, ufw, usw, cwa, cluw	10	0	0	3-ibt, 1-usw, 1-cwa (5)
Detroit	uaw, cwa, aft, ufw cluw	32	2	2	13-uaw, 2-cwa 1-aft (16)
East Bay	aft, ibt, cwa, ufw cluw, seiu, p.o.	27	0	5	6-aft, 1-cwa (9) 1-p.o., 1-seiu
Los Angeles <i>w/Black Group - High School Kids -</i>	ufw, ibt, Red Tide	14	1	2	3-ibt (2) (3)
Louisville	cwa, aft, scef, cluw	6	0	3	1-cwa, 2-aft (3)
Madison	aft, ufw, cluw	4	0	3	2-aft (2)
New York	ufw, cwa, aft, ibt cluw, taxi	34	1	1	5-aft, 1-ibt, 4-cwa, 1-taxi (10)
San Francisco	ibt, aft (with East Bay)	4	4	0	1-aft, 1-ibt (2)
Seattle	ibt, aft ufw, cwa, cluw	14	0	0	1-cwa, 3-ibt (4)
St. Louis	Ufw, Workers Unity, Hosp. Org.	5	0	3	1-hosp org (1)
MALs		24(?)	3	0	
TOTALS		200	14	26	59

Gains & Losses are since the convention
 29% work in political jobs, 18% in uaw, ibt, cwa
 23% women

DISCUSSION DOCUMENT SUBMITTED TO NC BY THE NAC

In spite of expanded external activity, a growing consistency in that activity, and a sense of outward aggressiveness about our external work, the IS appears to be in crisis. Branch after branch faces internal problems and a sense of malaise pervades much of the membership. Many of the branches are not growing in spite of a high level of external activity, and this fact is affecting the morale of the organization.

While the particulars behind this situation are many, two causes seem to stand out: a lack of clarity about our perspectives and a lack of political leadership, particularly from the NAC.

The NAC feels that the IS may be on the verge of a breakthrough in terms of attracting to ourselves a periphery from which to recruit. A part of this periphery may come from the milieu around industrialized radicals, many of whom consider themselves Maoists. The collapse of the independent collective perspective is now apparent and the personnel of these industrial collectives and other worker-oriented political formations are being pulled to one or another hard political pole. We are one of those poles.

Our success in this milieu depends in large part on our ability to formulate clearly and propagate aggressively our labor perspective--for it is this that is our handle in attracting these radicals. We must place particular emphasis, in working in this milieu, to clarify the close interrelationship between our labor work and our party building work.

But our success among these radicals rests on our success in carrying out our primary emphasis which continues to be the task of building an IS periphery of indigenous worker-militants and recruiting to our organization from this periphery. Here too, the NAC believes, the possibilities for a breakthrough may be opening up. But the IS must be politically prepared to take advantage of these possibilities. To do this, our membership must have a fully internalized understanding of the relationship between our present labor work and our tasks as socialist revolutionaries--and be able to effectively communicate this to worker contacts.

Given the small forces at our disposal, the trade union work carried out by the IS is qualitatively superior to that of any other leftist organization in this country. The members of our tiny industrial fractions have done well in establishing themselves as respected militants and unionists. We have participated in building well read and well respected publications, we have made strides toward establishing real caucuses, we have participated in and have helped lead numerous struggles and campaigns, and our work has had significant influence on the consciousness of broad layers of workers around us. Most important, our trade union work has become the real center of the life of the organization, and for the first time has helped place us solidly on the road toward becoming a workers' organization.

But we have also reached an impasse. Its symptoms are easy enough to identify. Most industrialized members feel little confidence in their ability to recruit indigenous worker-militants to the IS. Many feel an almost schizophrenic tension between their trade union work and the IS. Expressed in political terms, they feel a confusion between their role as trade union militants and their role as revolutionaries--or at least they lack a clear and satisfying understanding of how the two relate in every day life. The clearest symptoms, however, are the empirically verifiable ones. We have not yet experienced any significant recruitment out of our union work, or even any substantial prospects. Nor, in most unions, have we even been able to build up any significant periphery around the IS which either looks to our organization, or even shares with us in a self-conscious way, our full perspective for work in that union.

These symptoms should clearly indicate that a problem exists, either organizational or political--one that we can ignore only at our peril. No one in the IS will long remain satisfied with our being just the "best of the industrialized intellectuals". Our present organization and perspectives have already advanced us to that plateau. We have now, for the first time, gathered the concrete experiences on which we can base fuller and richer perspectives for the road ahead.

We have weaknesses on every single level. Our existing labor perspectives and strategy are sketchy and do not exist in a form which is easy for our membership to internalize, to educate contacts with, or to provide illuminating guidance to our day to day work. They represent the best we were capable of at the time they were written, have helped advance us to our present position, and are basically correct. But further concretization and amplification is needed.

We are also weak in our understanding of the concrete dynamics and tendencies in the unions and industries where we are active. This must be strengthened as a precondition to establishing an aware membership and periphery capable of making the correct tactical judgements within the framework of our strategy and perspectives.

Our newspaper is only now starting to become useful in our labor work and the positive effects of its use, as it improves, have not yet been felt. We still must learn to make systematic use of WP--a precondition for further improvements in it. Our lack of a theoretical journal--one that can be used by a working class organization--is another weakness.

Finally, our labor work is affected by organizational inexperience, sloppiness and just lack of resources. Our membership is not adequately trained to make the best use out of the tools at their disposal. Our general lack of experience is still enormous.

We must move forward in each of these areas. But they can not be approached as a series of disconnected tasks: problem to problem, union to union, branch

to branch. A useful perspective helps show how the pieces fit together and make up a single whole. The problems of recruitment, development of a periphery, educating our cadre in our perspective, developing understanding of the unions and industries, using Workers' Power effectively, establishing effective fraction leadership and guidance etc. We will be overwhelmed if we take them up as separate individual problems to be attacked individually and administratively.

What follows is an elaboration, amplification, and concretization of existing general labor perspectives. It builds on what has ~~be~~ already been established but emphasizes the practical steps to effectively put the perspective into practice while providing a systematic framework from which to attack the various tasks facing us.

This discussion bases itself on our generally agreed to evaluation of the economic nature of this period: economic decline, growing instability, sharp economic fluctuations, possibility of severer economic crisis in the not too distant future, growth of ~~the~~ revolutionary movements internationally. It does not, however, attempt to deal with the specific short term conjuncture. So for example, the last few years, under impact of NEP, have seen a general decline in mass rank and file militancy over the late 60's when measured in terms of contract rejections, growth of national opposition caucuses, etc. The NEP effect is wearing off. The government crisis, inflation, and shortages, resentment at the bureaucracy for going along with corporate attacks--all have created a growing openness on the part of large numbers of workers to political ideas. At least in auto, with the still high unemployment, this has not yet been reflected in shop floor militancy. But it does seem to be a period of gestation and politicization.

While it is still too early to definitely state that an upswing in rank and file activity is certain, it is becoming clear that conditions increasingly favor the success of our industrial work. Continuing inflation and the complete adherence of the labor leadership to the defense of the employers profit margins combine to increase the pressures on the ranks. Without ~~the~~ predicting its proportions or degree of organizational stability, it is likely that our perspective for rank and file organization will achieve some limited but possibly important successes.

It must be borne in mind that we entered industry, for the most part, just as the rank and ~~file~~ rebellion of the late 1960's reached its limits. NEP succeeded in destroying the ~~momentum~~ momentum of that movement and we have spent the past three years experiencing that defeat--a defeat of the entire class. Our own confusion on the rank and file movement as a perspective stem in part from the conditions we existed in--we saw a politically primitive rank and file movement defeated.

The growing number of politically conscious radical workers, the relative successes in the Detroit UAW delegate elections, and a small rise in strike activity generally all point to greater possibilities.

But although we expect that conditions over the next several years will be increasingly favorable to our work, we must develop a systematic, sustained method of work which would permit slow political growth and advancement even if we were to be thrown back into an unfavorable political/economic conjuncture like the one we experienced over the past few years.

In its broadest outlines, what follows is based on the general nature of the period, i. e., the growing crisis of capitalism, but not on the short term fluctuations, which would, of course, affect tactical implementation. In its fundamentals/ it is essentially the same method and perspective as that employed by the early Comintern in Britain and the U.S., by the ~~Left~~ Trotskyist movement in the late 1930's and 40's, and by the British IS today. That is, fundamentally it is a strategy for building the revolutionary party in a situation where the general crisis of capitalism is sharpening but the party itself is only a tiny minority in the class. It demands of revolutionaries that they function within the existing unions and that they exploit the contradictions between the needs of the ranks and the collaborationist methods of the bureaucrats to build a movement in which the party can grow by participating in the struggle and providing leadership.

It is one of our political failures that we all too often forget that the starting point of this perspective, regardless of the rather wide differences in detail and tactics from country to country and time to time, is the need to build a revolutionary socialist party in the working class.

OUR PRESENT PERSPECTIVES

Let's begin by summing up the perspectives under which we have been operating. They are just about unanimously accepted throughout the organization as far as they go. As such, they provide a firm foundation on which to build.

Objective conditions are laying the basis for the development of a rank and file movement inside U.S. labor. As conditions of economic stagnation and decline intensify, the present labor bureaucracy will find itself unable to respond in a fashion that effectively satisfies the ranks. It is a bureaucracy whose collaborationist methods and consciousness were molded in the years of post war capitalist prosperity. It will become increasingly disoriented--caught between a vicious capitalist attack on the workers and growing unrest in the ranks.

Under these conditions, a layer of militant activist workers will emerge. The IS wishes to embed itself in this emerging layer, to assert its consciousness, to participate with it in building a rank and file movement--giving what leadership and direction we can. We wish to win this emerging layer movement to a policy of Class Struggle Unionism.

Neither collaborationists, reformist, or stalinists will be able to provide satisfactory leadership that meets the real needs of this layer. Our politics,

on the other hand, will permit the IS to play a leadership role thoroughly disproportionate to our present small size and influence.

Our presence in this emerging layer will permit us to influence it with our revolutionary Marxist politics and to recruit workers from it who through their experience in working with us, learn the value of our full political program. In this process, the IS will be able to transform itself into a revolutionary workers organization.

Parallel to the development of a militant layer within the unions will be similar developments among unorganized ~~wor~~ and unemployed workers, and also in relationship to black work and community movements and struggles/ The revolutionary workers organization will also participate in these movements and struggles as well, giving what leadership it can. Within all struggles, will attempt to relate the specific to the general: the union struggle to the community struggle to ~~be~~ the political struggle. It will attempt to break through parochial and sectional consciousness.

The revolutionary party will be built through the interaction between the revolutionary workers organization, on the one hand and the growing rank and file and insurgent movements that attempts to ~~make and break~~ shape and lead. We cannot predict the exact way the party will be ~~not~~ built. It could be through direct recruitment, through regroupment, through the development, under influence of the revolutionary organization, of a revolutionary tendency within a mass workers organization, or through some combination.

As an outline, this perspective is correct. But it leaves a number of questions unanswered. In day to day trade union work, what distinguishes the functioning of an IS member from that of ~~just~~ a good trade unionist militant? How can we use our day to day trade union work to interject revolutionary marxist ideas into the emerging advanced layer? Ork, is our trade union work and our fight to bring revolutionary marxism ~~in~~ into the workingclass, basically separate tasks which relate to one another only by virtue of the fact that the same individual IS member does both? Is there a relationship between the politics we fight for inside the trade union movement and our full revolutionary marxist program? What is it?

SPONTANEISM AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Before going on to answer these questions, let us take a closer look at the emerging layer of militant activist ~~in~~ workers ~~wh~~ upon whom our entire perspective is based. Before the IS ~~was~~ first entered industry, our organization shared a fantastic view of the emergent layer. The struggle group concept was based on the belief that this layer would explosively emerge on a mass basis/ Leading members of our organization were predicting that literally overnight, mass insurgent struggle organizations would emerge throughout U.S. industry replacing the unions and making them obsolete.

The fantastic character of this view has long been apparent to all. It reflected a total misunderstanding of working class consciousness and the dynamic through which working class struggle and organization unfold. We have come a long way since then. But

for an organization like ours, that developed outside the working class and is still trying to enter it, these are still the most difficult questions. The IS, as a collectivity, has still a long way to go before we have internalized that sure feel for working class consciousness and dynamic of struggle required ~~xxxx~~ of any effective proletarian leadership group. We will move in this direction only on the basis of careful attention to the experiences of our industrialized comrades.

We have learned the great difficulty we have in just developing a relatively solid rank and file opposition caucus. The first problem is bourgeois ideology. It is rare for even the most angry and militant worker to reject, spontaneously, the ideological basis of the class collaborationist policy of the bureaucracy. They know they are getting screwed. Some think the problem boils down to dishonesty and payoffs from the company. Others feel that the problem boils down to one of sincerity, intelligence, having a sharp ~~xxxx~~ tongue, or just some undefined quality of personal strength, will and charisma. The conclusion from this is that to improve the union you put into office younger people who are more honest, more sincere, more dedicated, more intelligent, and more strong willed. Those who get into office ~~xxx~~ on the basis of these views, of course, end up just like the people they replaced. Most workers become apathetic believing the problems of the union are problems of human nature, and you can't do anything about ~~xxx~~ it in any way. And what to keep a militant oppositionist from going over to the union administration when he or she discovers the kind of pressures they are under and that ~~xxx~~ really, they're not such bad people ~~xxx~~ after all?

Bourgeois ideology pervades the working class of every capitalist country. But its opposite, proletarian class consciousness, also exists throughout every working class. The two co-exist with a contradictory tension that determines the actual consciousness of the class. The pole of ~~xxx~~ proletarian ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ class consciousness is weaker in the United States than in the working class of practically any other capitalist country. This country lacks even such minimal class institutions as a rotten mass social democratic, communist or labor party. Revolutionary Marxism, the only true repository of consistent proletarian class consciousness has been dead in the U.S. working class for a quarter of a century.

The growing ~~xxxx~~ capitalist attack on the working class ~~xxxxxxxx~~ provides ~~thoxxxxxx~~ the objective basis for a resurgence of class consciousness. The class has new experiences which it finds increasingly difficult to satisfactorily understand on the basis of bourgeois ideology. Workers are increasingly open to answers other than the traditional ones. They find themselves increasingly dissatisfied with the dominant institutions of leadership and authority and are open to considering alternatives. Often, conditions impel them into actions which contradict the values they believe they hold. It is all this which creates the material ~~potential~~ preconditions for the emergence of a new militant activist layer within the working class.

Objective conditions are determinant in creating a rank and file movement. That is, workers do not give up their free time or make real sacrifices unless they feel they have no choice; that is, things are viewed as being so bad (this is not a matter of starvation)

~~that are reviews of existing work~~ that one must do what is necessary. While the first workers to feel this are necessarily small in numbers, that is the dynamic.

Furthermore, the nature of the conditions that impel workers to build rank and file organizations determine to some degree the nature of the ideas these worker leaders develop. Rank and file leaders are strongly pushed toward opposition to any sort of productivity deal because of the nature of the crisis. The movement they lead will certainly be opposed to wage controls now that they have experienced them/

Nevertheless, objective conditions cannot, by themselves, determine the specific outlook of rank and file leaders. Nor can conditions save people from becoming demoralized or falling for opportunist leaders or solutions. To become a stable leadership, rank and file rebels must be won to a consistent point of view, must become in fact a self-conscious cadre with a class struggle outlook. This is not to say that the emergence of a rank and file movement in the unions requires the presence of class conscious revolutionaries. It is to say, however, that a rank and file movement cannot achieve stability or win long term victories without that participation.

Certainly, the greater the objective contradictions between the ranks and the bureaucracy, under the impact of objective conditions, the greater will be the tendency for events to generate such a leadership group. We But we can no longer count on the naively spontaneous view that this will just happen automatically. The collective class memory of U.S. workers has been largely eradicated. At present, even the simplest of class concepts, required to sustain such a leadership, don't just float in the air--nor can they be easily reinvented at will. We live in a period when fundamental class lessons must be reintroduced into the working class. Objective conditions make this possible. But they don't automatically do it for us.

The only national rank and file oriented opposition caucus in industry that has shown any staying power at all is the United National Caucus. And it is an exception which proves the rule. Its political leader is Art Fox--one out of only a handful of old revolutionaries that has at all survived from the '30's and '40's. Its basic leadership cadre include: Kelly, Gardner, and Singer, all immigrant and influenced in their youth by social democracy.. McFadden has been influenced by the SWP, Dewey by the CP.

Class concepts reintroduced into the working class, can rapidly take on a life of their own inside the class, if they speak to the real questions plaguing workers and provide satisfying answers. It is difficult for a worker to enter into principled and sustained opposition to the collaborationist bureaucracy unless that worker is in the process of moving beyond the confines of bourgeois ideology, in the direction of a Marxist world view. It is possible for workers to move spontaneously in the direction of Marxist ideas. But only after these ideas have already been introduced into the class from the outside. Ideologically, the main task of the present period in the United States is the reintroduction

include its own traditions

of elementary basic Marxist, class struggle concepts into the collective consciousness of the working class.

The key to the IS perspective is to embed our organization in the emerging layer of militant rank and file activists, and to affect its consciousness. This layer is still just beginning to come into existence as a coherent political entity. It will develop a life of its own, only when it becomes a political entity and not just a sociological one. Our organization can play a role, even in the task of helping bring this political ~~movement~~ layer into existence. But we can play this role, only if we ~~are~~ clearly understand the political tasks before us.

THE MARXIST METHOD APPLIED TO TRADE UNION QUESTIONS

Ideas have meaning only insofar as they have practical consequences--only insofar as they lead to or influence action. The only reason that we, as political people, and as Marxists, want to influence the way people think, is because we want to influence the way they will act. Looking at the same question from the other direction, we can only say that an individual's consciousness has changed, if there has been a change in the way that individual acts and in the way the individual relates to others.

According to our generally agreed upon views, the key struggles in this country in the coming period will be going on within and through the unions (broadly interpreted.) All agree that a key goal of the I.S. is to influence workers in the direction of our politics, Marxism. The most important way to concretize this will be to influence them with ideas which change the way they relate to the actual class struggle. The more like a Marxist, a worker relates to the actual class struggle, the more like a Marxist that worker becomes--and the easier it becomes to win that worker to the full Marxist program and organization.

we

It is through our trade union work that ~~most~~ most directly relate to the class struggle. It is in our trade union work that we most influence other workers in how they relate to the class struggle. It is for this reason that we view our trade union work as our primary method of winning workers toward Marxism, toward viewing the world from a consistent proletarian ~~vantage~~ vantage. But the IS has not yet effectively learned how to do this. Doing so will be the key to further progress--toward influence in the working class, toward recruiting workers, toward becoming a working class revolutionary organization.

Our immediate goal is to establish consistent and systematic methods of winning workers to take a Marxist approach to trade union questions--the questions that have the most immediate and practical consequences. This does not yet make the worker a Marxist. To be a Marxist, one must understand broader political questions: the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Stalinist degeneration of the Russian revolution, the popular front, the nature of fascism, the historical materialist world view, etc. Few U.S. workers today have the experience on which to really make up their mind on these questions--or the inclination to ~~do~~ do the study necessary. With only rare exceptions, when we attempt to win workers today to these broad range of questions we usually find ourselves, more or less, asking them to take our word for it. And even if they do, we can normally only convince them ~~in a shallow~~ in a shallow

shallow way, until they can relate this broad range of ~~questions~~ important ideas to their own experiences and activities. Until then, it is difficult to make Marxism much more than a bunch of interesting ideas. This is much more difficult among workers than among intellectuals who are trained to delve in systems of ideas.

It is much easier to win workers to take a Marxist approach to trade union questions. We can base this on concrete experience, on observable facts, on testable activities. We need not ask anybody to take our word for anything. Rather, we use common experience as the basis of the politics we teach. In this practical and concrete way, a worker can learn the Marxist method at least as it applies to trade union questions. But once this method is internalized, ~~the~~ (the worker-(? typist addition-word missing)) is well on the way of grasping and accepting the full range of Marxist politics.

With our trade union work, IS members carry out two tasks at the same time. We act as the best and most consistent trade union militants. But at the same time, we use every experience, every struggle, every campaign--as an opportunity to win our co-workers to a Marxist approach to union questions. The two tasks are parallel and of equal importance. As trade union militants, we attempt to convince a worker, for example, to participate with us in a campaign of some sort. But at the same time, we use the experience of the campaign as an opportunity to influence the worker in to generalizing the experiences and drawing the political lessons. If we do the one without the other, we are acting just like any other trade union militant--and we fail to function in our trade union work as revolutionary Marxists. To consistently make this error would end up as the flip side of the ~~other~~ coin of those would-be revolutionaries who are too pure to get their hands dirty with day to day practical trade union work.

Our Labor Perspectives states: "Basically, what we are attempting to do is to develop a tendency and a leadership in the labor movement which stands for class struggle unionism as opposed to ~~what~~ class collaborationist leadership which already exists." Class struggle unionism is nothing more or less than the name we give to a union policy ~~which is based~~ which is based on the Marxist method as applied to trade union questions. It is our name for a union policy based on consistent proletarian class principles. When we fight for class struggle unionism within the working class, we are fighting to reintroduce the basic concepts of proletarian class consciousness into the U.S. working class. Class struggle unionism is the banner under which we fight the collaborationist trade union bureaucracy, is the banner under which we fight the collaborationist trade union bureaucracy, the only mass organized expression of bourgeois ideology inside the U.S. working class.

Every demand, every policy, every program ~~that the IS puts forward inside~~ that the IS puts forward inside the labor movement, we put forward as a demand, a policy, a program of class struggle unionism. If we believe that a UAW militant should run "Dump Woodcock" campaigns for convention delegate elections, then we argue for such campaigns as the policy of class struggle unionism inside the UAW. We do more than try to convince workers of activities, campaigns and issues. ~~We try to convince them to view the developments inside the labor movement the same way we do.~~ We try to win them to approach labor questions the way that we do. We try to convince them to view the developments inside the labor movement the same way we do. We try to convince them to view the dynamics of class struggle the way we do. And to sum it up, we try to convince them to think for

them to think of themselves and to think of us, the IS members, both as part of the small, but growing, selfconscious class struggle tendency inside the labor movement.

PRINCIPLES OF CLASS STRUGGLE UNIONISM

To the IS, the policies of class struggle unionism are nothing more or less than our own trade union policies, the trade union policies of revolutionary marxism. But of course, you don't have to be a marxist to be a class struggle unionist, and in fact, it's possible to express the basic political ideas from which class struggle policies flow in quite simple trade union terms. We can define class struggle unionism to be union policy that flows from the seven basic principles of class struggle unionism.

For us, each of these principles has a basically algebraic character. This means that they can be ~~readily~~ easily understood and accepted in a simple and shallow way. But through ~~the~~ an individual's growth and political development, they can take on an increasingly rich meaning. In fact, each principle represents a fundamental Marxist concept, translated into the narrower language of trade unionism. Taken together, these principles form a bridge from trade union practice to revolutionary politics. In the struggle to politically influence the consciousness of the emerging layer of militant workers we press, to the extent possible, to make these seven principles, the underlying ideas which shape the political common sense of this new strata.

1. Class struggle policy: The most basic idea of Marxism is the class exploitation of the proletariat through the extraction of surplus value. For the capitalists, labor power is just a commodity to be bought at the minimum wage socially ~~is~~ required to ~~keep~~ maintain and reproduce a productive proletariat. Translated into trade union terms, this means that working people only get what we fight for and only hold onto what the boss is afraid to take away. Our desire for a decent human life, for ourselves and our families, both on and off the job, conflicts with the boss's greed for the greatest possible profits. Workers and bosses have basically conflicting interests. For this reason there can be no peace between us. The weaker we are, the more the boss will take advantage. A class struggle union policy is one that can recognize these basic facts and understands that the main purpose of a union is to strengthen the position of workers in our fight with the bosses for a decent life.

The class collaborationists who now run our unions try to preach the opposite. They try to tell us that we and our bosses have basically the same interests. Conflicts happen when one side or the other steps out of line and acts in an unfair or greedy way. The ~~main~~ job of a union, according to them, is to avoid conflict and bring about labor peace. When conflicts do arise, according to them, the union and the company should try to sit down together and find out ~~what~~ who is to blame. If the workers are in violation of the contract, the union helps ~~the~~ the company bring them in line. The only kind of union struggle the collaborationists consider to be legitimate, are ones that follow the procedures laid out in the contract. And these are only to be resorted to when the collaborationists believe the company acts in an unreasonable or an irrational way.

There are thousands of examples we can point to every day that show the difference be-

tween a class struggle policy and a class collaborationist policy. We as opposed to the collaborationists, believe that the worker is always right, the company is always wrong. We view ~~contracts~~ the contract as nothing more than a written truce in the class ~~struggle~~ war. If we can violate the contract ~~and~~ to our advantage and get away with it we will--just like we know the boss will. When we obey the contract it is out of respect for the power of the company, not out of any moral obligation. Our only interest in the contract is to use it to the advantage of the worker. We are perfectly willing to lie or to cheat the boss ~~if~~ if we can get ~~we~~ away with it. In making demands on the company we consider the needs of the workers and our bargaining strength. How easily the boss can afford to meet our demands is of no particular concern--providing we are strong enough to force him to pay.

2. Rank and file approach: another basic idea of Marxism is that the emancipation of the proletariat is the task of the proletariat--the working class advances only through self-activity, consciousness and self-confidence.

We translate these concepts into trade union terms as the rank and file approach to unionism. The purpose of a union is to bring together the weak, isolated, individual workers into a ~~single~~ single, powerful body. A union is strong only when the membership as a body, is strong. The main job of union leadership is to keep the membership informed, educated, and aware. They should always be seeking to instill in the membership an understanding that it must remain active, vigilant, self-confident, united, and ready to ~~stand~~ stand up and fight for what's right. Class struggle unionists refuse to get confused or lost in the maze of official procedures and red tape, but merely use the procedure as one tactical part of a total approach. This is the opposite of the bureaucratic and elitist approach of the collaborationists. All they really want the membership to do is to passively support the leadership and do what the leadership says. They see no need for an informed, self-confident, self-activating membership. Their view of how a union works is for union officials and management to get together behind closed doors and settle things. The collaborationists think that the union ~~is~~ officials make up the union, not the total membership. They see the job of the union as a middle man between the company and the workers, not as the organization and organizer of the workers in their fight against the company.

3. Workers control: Marxist understand that it is the struggle against capital that prepares workers themselves, as a class, to rule. To us trade unions are a school for socialism.

We translate this into trade union terms ~~the~~ through the concept of workers control. The main reason ~~for~~ why we ~~do~~ as workers organize our selves into unions is to gain more control over our own lives and our own destinies. This is the reason we fight for higher wages and benefits. This is why we fight for more humane working conditions. In every area, we as a ~~collective~~ collective group, fight to limit and encroach on the prerogatives of management and to increase our own freedom of action and initiative as workers. We try to limit and control the authoritarian and arbitrary power management tries to exercise over us, and try to extend to the greatest extent possible the rights of workers and our freedom of action. We press from within the system for the greatest power we can to organize and control our own work processes.

The notion of workers control and that of democratic unionism are really one and the same idea. We can't use our union to fight ~~for gain~~ to gain more control over our own lives unless we democratically control ~~our own union~~. And workers who democratically control a union always use it to fight to gain more control over their lives as workers.

In practice, collaborationists always reject the notions of workers control and democratic unionism. They respect, defend and enforce the prerogatives of management. They help management limit worker self-activity directed at gaining more control and help to maintain the authoritarian structure of the work place. They do all in their power to free themselves from the controlling pressures of the workers who want the union to fight for their real needs. Not only ~~that~~ does this lead to undemocratic practices. But they also enforce and defend rules and procedures which limit the range of effective action open to the union.

4. Class solidarity: Marxists believe that the interests of workers as a class supersede all individual, sectional and parochial ~~interests~~. We translate this into the terms of today's trade union movement as class solidarity. Every victory of workers advances all workers--every defeat sets us all back. We fight for solidarity among all working people: those seeking work as well as the employed, those not yet organized into unions as well as the organized, working people of all countries of the world and not just working people of the U.S. In response to every major workers strike of struggle, the bosses try to defeat the workers with cries of damage to the "public interest." We recognize no such thing as "public interest". There are only class interests--the interests of the workers versus the interests of the bosses.

The collaborationist bureaucracy undermines class solidarity. They defend the boss'es notion that so called "public interest" comes before workers' interest. They refuse to use the power of the employed worker to vigorously defend the unemployed; ~~refuse~~ refuse to use the power of the organized workers to defend and to help organize the unorganized; refuse to use the power of the union to ~~champion~~ support community struggles; refuse to champion international class solidarity but rather help the capitalists and politicians play off worker of one country against worker of another. We respond with the slogan: "An injury to one is an injury to all--a victory for workers is a victory for the class."

5. Champion liberation, support all struggles against oppression: Marxists understand that capitalists use special oppression to divide and weaken the working class by undermining class unity. Special oppression pits white workers against black, man worker against woman, worker of one national group against a worker of another. We also understand that effective fighting unity can not be achieved between workers of the oppressed group and workers of the dominant group on the basis of any acceptance of social inequality. A precondition for effective unity is the commitment of workers from the dominant social groups to become champions of the fight against inequality and for the liberation of the oppressed.

We fight for these ~~ideas~~ ideas inside the unions. In particular we fight to convince workers that in order to become effective class struggle unionists, and in order to accomplish our objectives, it is necessary to join in the fight

against ~~xxx~~ black and racial oppression, women's oppression, etc. We point out that no part of the labor movement (not even the rank and file, class struggle opposition) can expect to have the confidence or real support of workers who are subject to special oppression if it goes along with that oppression and refuses to lead a fight ~~xx~~ against it.

The racism and chauvinism of the union bureaucracy is covered with only the thinnest liberal veneer. They have not only refused to champion the fight against oppression, but have shown themselves to time and again be a party to it.

6. Labor's need for our own party: As Marxists, we understand that basic defense and advancement of working class interests requires a political and not merely an economic response. It is only in the political struggle that the most fundamental class questions facing the working class can be raised and fought for. We call for and fight for a party which will consistently champion the interests of the working class. We understand in advance, that no reformist labor party can do this. Nor do we call for a reformist labor party. Our fight against collaborationism in the trade unions carries over into a fight against reformism in the realm of politics. In posing the need for a party that fights for a program to meet the real needs of workers, we are posing the need for a party that goes beyond reformism. We raise the question of labor party in a way which algebraically poses the question of class power and workers government (The best detailed presentation of this ~~xx~~ approach can be found in the "Fight for Socialism" program pamphlet put out by the Workers Party in 1946).

In labor terms we argue that both the Democratic and Republican Parties are controlled by the bosses and by politicians loyal to them. For these people, the private greed and profit of the powerful few are more important than the real interests of the vast majority. They use the government to defend the interests of the big corporations against the workers. Working people need our own party so that we, the majority, can use the power of government to defend our interests against the greed of the wealthy and powerful few. We need a party that can fight for a political program based on real working peoples needs and not on the defense of private profit. We argue for labor party in terms of specific issues such as inflation, unemployment, wage controls, government anti-labor intervention, Watergate, etc.

We point out that our collaborationist union leadership are already fully involved in politics through the Democratic Party. This is nothing more or less than an expression, in the realm of politics, of the same class collaborationist policies that they carry out within the unions. They refuse to lead workers, the majority, to fight for our ~~xxx~~ own interests against the bosses. Rather they hope to get crumbs from the bosses in return for the favor of helping ~~the bosses~~ tie the workers to capitalist dominated democratic Party. But as economic conditions get worse, we don't even get crumbs any more--just a kick in the ass. Our union leaders sit on the Republican President's wage control boards and support the Democratic politicians who are pushing for more wage controls.

Our unions are already involved in politics. We fight for a labor party as something that will be needed before it will be possible to effectively fight in the political arena for our true needs as workers. Today, the fight for a labor party is an important ~~xxx~~ part of the fight against the collaborationist leadership.

But until the collaborationists are thoroughly defeated, even if we can win our unions to the task of launching a mass labor party, we will have to continue to fight the collaborationists within the labor party for a program that really ~~meets~~ meets working peoples's needs.

7. An organized class struggle movement: As Marxists, we understand that political objectives can best be accomplished through organization. We argue to workers that it will ~~be~~ take an organized class struggle movement to effectively lead a fight to rebuild our unions and to reclaim them from the collaborationist class traitors who now control them. We concretize this by fighting for local ~~and~~ caucuses and national caucuses and for the need to win them to policies and programs based on class struggle unionist principles. We also raise the idea for a broader class struggle movement based on these principles to connect up workers from different unions together with unorganized workers, unemployed ~~and~~ workers, black minority and community organizations. Without generating illusions about the speed at which this can happen, this is the task we pose.

To summarize, class struggle unionists are trade union militants committed to:

1. Class struggle approach
2. Rank and file orientation.
3. Workers control
4. Class solidarity
5. Championing liberation and support to all struggles against oppression.
- 6/ Labor's need for our own party
7. An organized class struggle movement

It will take experience and experimentation to learn how to best use and formulate these principles of class struggle unionism. They are not being ~~presented~~ posed as something we try to get caucuses to adopt to to vote on or carry in a box in their publications. To repeat a point made earlier, to us, class struggle unionism is the term we use ~~to~~ to describe our own, IS labor policies, programs, proposals, views, analysis, etc. when we are addressing these views within the labor movement./ to a workers audience. If we believe a fight must be made to reject the CWA contract, we argue that class struggle unionists should be organizing to reject the contract. If we wish to write a pamphlet, on, let's say, a strategy for struggle in the UAW, we argue for it as the strategy that all class struggle unionists in auto should be following. If we have an analysis of a split or tension in the teamster bureaucracy, we can put this forward as a class struggle unionist analysis, and so forth.

We project the IS as a socialist, revolutionary marxist organization whose members are all good class struggle unionists. We argue that class struggle unionism is one important part of revolutionary marxism. But marxism is much more. It is the science that gives a proletarian class answer to all questions confronting the working class, ~~that gives~~ it represents the crystallization of the international class memory and class experience of the working class, it represents the understanding that there is an emerging international crisis of immense proportions and that on an international scale, either the working class will take power, or civilization will be destroyed. The IS represents the organized commitment to fight to build the U.S. section of the international revolutionary ~~marxist~~ marxist workers party. Marxism tells us that either the party will be built, or the working class will be defeated.

We use the political concepts embodied in the principles of class struggle unionism as a bridge from today's consciousness and trade union experience to marxist ideas. An individual who in a serious and rich way internalizes these concepts will rapidly move in the direction of our total politics. These exist ~~not~~ not a single organized political tendency of any size or consequence whose politics are even consistent with a serious commitment to the, No. 1, by asserting that labor peace is impossible because of basic conflicting interests between classes, already begins to weed out reformists. Nos. 2 and 3 include concepts that gnaw away at the very core of stalinism. No. ~~6~~ 6 is inconsistent with syndicalism and most forms of anarchism. No. 7 rejects dual unionism, and the whole approach, taken together, rejects anti-union spontaneism and abstract sectarianism.

From a positive side, these concepts pose many of our basic political ~~the~~ ideas. The seven points, taken together, algebraically pose ~~a~~ a set of tasks, that can, in fact, only be carried out by a revolutionary party, or at least a mass revolutionary ~~with~~ workers ~~movement~~ organization on the verge of becoming a party. The fight to win workers to a rich understanding and acceptance of these principles, in terms of immediate tasks, is in an algebraic ~~sense~~ sense, the fight to win them to the need for a party that can organize to carry ~~out~~ out these tasks.

In the ~~late~~ middle '60's, politically serious students who were anti-stalinist, anti-Democratic Party, and who favored non-sectarian full participation in the mass movements, joined the ISC. Once they were sure on these questions, they were willing to receive the rest of their political training inside the organization. We want politically serious workers, who are clear on the questions of class struggle unionism and have drawn revolutionary conclusions, to join the IS and learn the rest of their politics inside the organization.

It is fundamental to our perspective that the world crisis of capitalism is what makes both a class struggle rank and file movement and a revolutionary workers party possible. Furthermore, it is the nature of the crisis and the history that precedes it that even makes the rank and file movement a relevant form of struggle in which a revolutionary movement can arise. In life, the "bridge" between militant unionism, class struggle unionism and revolutionary marxist politics is the nature of the crisis. The ideas of class struggle unionism are essentially a reflection of that objective reality and the contradictions in it. As ideas they embody the direction the struggle must take to ~~and~~ succeed at any point. Without the crisis they would be ideas that could not win a mass following.

While this document attempts to focus on one aspect of our work, it would be a mistake to forget that in winning workers to class struggle unionism and marxist politics, it is essential that they understand the crisis and its nature. By themselves, the principles of class struggle unionism appear timeless. Seen as a bridge in today's context, however, they provide the means for educating workers on the nature of the capitalist crisis by relating it to their experience today.

The IS can begin recruiting workers by a strategy of attempting to group around our organization a milieu of workers won to consciously view themselves as class struggle unionists, and then recruiting them to our organization out of that milieu. It is this strategy for building a revolutionary party and the notion of the rank and file movement (the material embodiment of class struggle unionism) which is the distinct characteristic of IS politics. It is also the rank and file movement and the struggle to build it that allows us to have an organized relationship with other worker revolutionaries and radicals who we are recruiting to our periphery, politics, and revolutionary organization.

6/1/74

Building a rank and file movement, and an IS periphery within it, requires a systematic notion of our work. This means an understanding of the tools we have and of their relationship to our tasks, and to each other. In the context of actual work and struggle, the starting point for winning a periphery is the consistent propagation of the ideas, practice and strategy of class struggle unionism and the rank and file movement that strategy fights for. At present the most consistent, most serious means for doing this is WORKERS POWER. It is potentially the most consistent advocate of class struggle unionism because it can relate those ideas to our entire perspective for socialist revolution. WORKERS POWER can, as a revolutionary socialist paper, draw both the logical and objective conclusions that flow from our labor policy. Those conclusions, of course, are the need for a revolutionary workers' party and for a world socialist revolution.

Other publications, in particular our local and shop-based bulletins, are expressions of the same politics and policies put forth by WORKERS POWER, but they do not draw all the conclusions. While they center on problems specific to one union, shop, or local, these are the publications in which we can use the life experience of the workers to "prove" our ideas and to convince workers, over time, of class struggle. Today's consciousness is still quite localized, so in most instances caucus building and related educational tasks that we use the bulletins for must be carried out at the local level.

With the sole exception of WORKERS POWER, all of these publications are put out with other workers who do not have our politics. While there is a good deal of consistency, some of these publications are more politically advanced than others. That is, some are more consistent advocates of our class struggle unionist ideas and strategy than others. This, of course, simply reflects the varying levels of consciousness of the people in the groups that officially sponsor these publications. This in itself should not be a source of confusion. We are for bulletins, newsletters and journals that consistently reflect a class struggle point of view. But the fight to make these publications and the groups behind them consistent has a different time table, even a different road, in groups so widely divergent as Grass Roots in the NY AFT and the Voice of Chrysler Workers in Detroit. In all cases, our purpose in publishing such a newsletter, bulletin or journal is to win workers to class struggle unionist policies on a consistent basis. This, of course, is done by a combination of educational and agitational articles that relate and guide real struggles.

When our roots and contacts on the one hand, and the objective situation on the other hand allow, we can move beyond local publications that put forward class struggle unionist policies and arguments to union-wide or regional newsletters, papers or journals. In IBT, for a number of reasons, it has been possible already to establish papers that speak to more than one local. In the AFT, it has become possible because of fairly extensive networks of collaborators and contacts to have two state-wide publications (Teachers Forum in NY and Network in California).

In addition to newsletters, papers and bulletins that go beyond one local union, but are still of the same character as the shop bulletins in terms of the depth of ideas and conclusions, it will become possible in some industries or working class arenas to publish journals that deal with class struggle policies in more depth and detail. These journals could be more analytical and educational than most bulletins. The need for such a journal depends on the existence of a substantial milieu that is politically advanced enough to develop a consistent class struggle view, without however having to agree with IS politics.

Whether or not such militants view themselves as socialists, the journal could help to solidify them as a hard core for the rank and file movement in that industry. It would be this core that would give future rank and file organizations their stability.

Over the next several years, the task of winning our co-workers to take the leap of identifying with socialist revolution in general, and politically identifying with the IS in particular, will be a difficult job. Most workers will resist openly and explicitly identifying themselves as IS supporters until they are pretty sure of us and themselves. But we wish to have a method which permits a worker to openly and explicitly identify with our labor policy, while not yet taking responsibility for the IS as an organization or taking responsibility for all of our revolutionary conclusions.

Class struggle union journals (for specific proposals see section II below) will represent an organ of IS labor policy and strategy. It will be possible to win workers to openly and explicitly identify with these journals and with their political line who are not yet ready to enter into this same relationship with WP. It should be possible to get numbers of workers to view these journals as an expression of "their" politics who are not yet ready to view WP as representing "their" politics. In relation to this layer, WP can play a particularly important role - extending the conclusions of class struggle unionism to their necessary completion, revolutionary socialism, and educating these workers in broader political questions. It can thus be a key tool for solidifying these militants as a periphery and for recruiting them to the IS.

In most cases, it remains the case that ~~not~~ even the best militants have not been won to the most rudimentary aspects of class struggle unionism or our strategy. That is, for most militants who form our potential periphery, the bulletins are still effective educational tools.

Our basic tools, then, for winning workers to a class struggle unionist point of view are WORKERS POWER, the bulletins, and as our work advances the journals. Each plays a specific role at a somewhat distinct political level, in the process of cohering a worker periphery for the IS in the context of building the rank and file movement.

But systematic work requires organization. The basic form of organization by which we carry out our trade union work is the fraction. It is here that we organize our interventions, plan tactics, make contact assignments and determine the specifics of using all the various levels of publications.

One of the problems in the past is that fractions have limited themselves to discussing the day to day tactics of caucus building or other specific activities. If, however, our practical task is to cohere a periphery based on our labor policy, then more must be discussed systematically. The use of WORKERS POWER in the plant and the union - not just selling at the gate - with those we work with should be regularly discussed and assessed. Person to person educational work should be organized here. After all, convincing one worker of our strategy and ideas takes hours of patient discussion and explanation. Of course, actual contact work for the IS should also be a regular fraction function.

On a national scale, industry-wide fractions are beginning to play a more important role. Essentially they should do on a national scale what the local fraction does: regularly assessing all aspects of our work. National fraction bulletins, such as the IBT and UFW fractions have, can help this.

The following proposals and motions are meant to help concretize the perspective set forth in the discussion document and to further systematize our work.

I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF WORKERS POWER.

Central to developing a political periphery, for the ideas of the IS and for the organization itself, within the rank and file movement is the use of our newspaper WORKERS POWER. WP must become in reality what it now is only on paper - the organizing tool which represents the public face of the IS, the struggle for a national, politically organized class struggle opposition in the unions, and the fight to build out of this movement a revolutionary socialist working class party.

Class struggle unionism is the policy of revolutionary Marxists inside the labor movement. Thus, our newspaper must identify with the slowly developing struggle for class struggle unionism - i.e. the rank and file movement - and seek to speak and become known as broadly as possible as the centralizing organ of this struggle and its most consistent voice. Of course, we realize that today this movement is extremely fragmented and weak, and has no authoritative public voice of its own. It is all the more critical, then, that the IS systematically fight to make WP the paper which is known as such a voice. Today, this is the concrete political meaning of making WP a real workers' paper. Moreover, as we have understood for several years, this rank and file movement is the only soil in which our organization and newspaper can grow.

Of course, WP is much more than a class struggle union paper. It is a paper of revolutionary socialism going far beyond trade union issues. WP must deal with the economic and political crisis on the US and internationally, with every progressive social struggle against capitalism and Stalinism, and with all the problems of building the revolutionary movement. It must draw the conclusions of class struggle unionism, pointing out how its consistent application requires revolutionary opposition to capitalism. It is in many of these areas that WP is today less effective, consistent or precise, but their importance should be clear to all. However, none of this is new - it simply means that in fighting for a class struggle opposition movement, we do not tailor our paper or its basic ideas to the current level of consciousness of that movement. We struggle to broaden that consciousness and draw the political conclusions - from the labor party all the way to revolution.

Our goal, our perspective, is to make WP the paper that working class militants feel they must read in order to know what's going on in their own movement - in terms of both information and analysis. Of course, this cannot be accomplished until our own members feel this way about their paper. What we are arguing, then, is that the use of WP by our branches must be changed and dramatically improved. The paper is our central ~~link~~ link between trade union work and party-building. It must be used intensively - i.e. on a one-to-one basis - by worker members with contacts whom we want to draw into the IS or its periphery. At the same time, expanding its circulation and influence among new groups and layers of militants is critical in the coming year.

This perspective requires that branch leadership bodies, and comrades and fractions in industry, play much more aggressive roles both in shaping the paper and distributing it. The national organization devotes far and away more of its financial, political and personnel resources to WP than to any other single concentrated activity. This expenditure is what is responsible for the improvement of WP - however, the potential represented by these improvements can be realized only through the activity of the whole IS.