

DISCUSSION BULLETIN

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RESOLUTION OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF LSSP ON IS RESOLUTION
"RISE AND DECLINE OF STALINISM"

(Passed unanimously on April 12, 1954)

The CC considered the IS resolution "Rise and Decline of Stalinism." The CC also considered the allegation that this resolution embodies certain revisions of the basic positions of Trotskyism on Stalinism.

1. In its consideration of the IS Resolution, the CC proceeds from an acceptance of the following basic positions:

a. In contrast with the long period before the War, the present is a period of the World Revolution in flow. This is the key to the understanding of the achievements of the revolution in Yugoslavia and China despite the Stalinist leaderships of the mass movements in these countries.

b. The relation of forces between the Soviet bureaucracy and the Soviet working class has altered radically in favor of the Soviet working class. In consequence of the industrialization of the USSR, the specific weight of the working class has enormously increased in relation both to the bureaucracy and to the peasantry. The cultural level of the workers has also risen.

Further, the capitalist encirclement of the USSR has been importantly broken by the emergence of the Eastern European states and, especially, People's China.

Above all, the World Revolution is again in flow.

The situation is thus being created in which the working class leading the working masses can launch an offensive against the bureaucracy aimed at the bureaucracy's overthrow and the restoration of Soviet democracy. The East German events are a pointer to this fact.

c. World Imperialism under American leadership no longer seeks a modus vivendi with the USSR but is openly engaged in preparing military intervention against the USSR. This intervention is for Imperialism the central task of its general war against the developing World Revolution. However, Imperialism's war preparations go forward in the context of a relationship of forces on a world scale which is developing fundamentally in favor of the World Revolution.

2. Although the IS Resolution too proceeds from substantially the same basic positions as set out above, nevertheless, the CC finds itself in disagreement with a number of points in the IS Resolution. In particular, the CC finds itself in fundamental disagreement with certain parts of the IS Resolution on the following questions:

1. The question of the political revolution in the USSR.
2. The question of the Soviet bureaucracy's international policy.
3. The question of the role of the mass Communist Parties.

3. In the view of the CC, the IS has opened the door to a departure from the basic positions of Trotskyism regarding Stalinism in respect of the above questions. This has been done as follows:

Re Question 1 above: The IS Resolution has, in certain passages presented a line of development which leads to an abandonment of the concept of political revolution in the USSR.

Re Question 2 above: Certain passages in the IS Resolution amount in effect to the position that the Soviet bureaucracy has been compelled in practice to give up its treacherous policy of seeking to maintain the international equilibrium between itself and Imperialism and that, caught between the imperialist threat and the World Revolution, the Soviet bureaucracy aligns itself with the World Revolution.

Re Question 3 above: Certain passages in the IS Resolution appear to put forward the perspective that, through the gradual disintegration of Stalinist ideas in the mass Communist parties and through a progressive leftward turn in their policies, these parties are capable of projecting a revolutionary orientation under mass pressure without powerful revolutionary uprisings of the masses taking place. This leads to the position that the Stalinist leaderships of the mass Communist parties are capable of a revolutionary role.

Political Revolution in the USSR

Regarding (1) above, the CC draws attention to the following:

4. Rise and Decline, section 18: The post-Stalin "New Course" of the Soviet bureaucracy is here treated as the expression of a basic tendency, namely, the "liberalization" of the regime. This is clear from the very formulation of the question of the terror. The passage says:

"Historically the Malenkov era thus signals the beginning of the decline of the Bonapartist dictatorship. That regime can now maintain itself only by suppressing temporarily or definitively the most hideous aspects, that is to say, the most characteristic ones of the regime. It is not excluded that before falling, the Bonapartist dictatorship will suddenly once again have recourse to the bloodiest terror."

The third sentence in the above passage makes it clear that the first two sentences are meant to express a basic trend within the dictatorship and not a change in the relationship of strength between the dictatorship and the masses. "Recourse to the bloodiest terror" is merely "not excluded"; that is to say, it will be in contradiction with the basic trend. In this view, the second sentence is seen really as the definition of the trend; and the definition is that of the regime itself "suppressing -- temporarily or definitively -- the most hideous aspects, that is to say the most characteristic ones of the regime." But that is really a conception of the regime progressively suppressing its most characteristic aspects, that is of the regime in fact setting out on the "new course" of changing its very nature!

This is not merely an over-optimistic estimation of the "New Course." It is a mis-estimation of the very meaning; of the "New Course." It contemplates not a "liberalization" (within inverted commas) but an actual liberalization; the beginning of a qualitative change in the regime which gives to the term "decline" in the phrase "decline of the Bonapartist dictatorship" in the first sentence the meaning of a falling away from its very dictatorial nature rather than the sense of a fall in its strength in relation to the masses.

5. This impression is further strengthened by the following sentence which appears quite early in the Resolution "Rise and Decline": "The events which have taken place in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death do not constitute only the first stage of a process which must end in the socialist regeneration of the Soviet Union." That is to say, a process which must in time end in the socialist regeneration of the Soviet Union has already begun. The sentence as it stands thus strengthens the impression that the Resolution contemplates that a qualitative change in the regime has already begun.

6. We are fortified in our above interpretation of the IS resolution by a passage in Comrade Pablo's article, entitled "The Post Stalin 'New Course'" of July 1953, appearing in the magazine Fourth International of March-April 1953. The passage we refer to is the last section, entitled "The Dynamic of the New Turn" and reads as follows: "The dynamic of their concessions is in reality liquidatory of the entire Stalinist heritage in the USSR itself as well as in its relations with the satellite countries, with China and the Communist Parties. It will no longer be easy to turn back.

"In reality events will oblige them as is being demonstrated in Eastern Germany, and partly in Czechoslovakia, to quicken and extend the concessions to keep the impatient masses in the other buffer-zone countries and in the USSR itself from taking the road of action. But once the concessions are broadened the march forward toward the real liquidation of the Stalinist regime threatens to become irresistible.

"What form will it then take? Will it be that of an acute crisis and of violent inter-bureaucratic struggles between the elements who will fight for the status quo, if not for turning back, and the more and more numerous elements drawn by the powerful pressure of the masses?"

The above passage, proceeding from an over-optimistic appraisal of the concessions made by the Soviet bureaucracy to the masses, raises a perspective of "the real liquidation of the Stalinist regime" taking place by an intra-bureaucratic struggle as distinct from our traditional concept of struggle between the masses and the bureaucracy. The process contemplated is one of "more and more numerous" elements within the bureaucracy itself in violent struggle against the elements within the bureaucracy "who will fight for the status quo if not for turning back." The role ascribed to the masses is that of a powerful pressure-agency upon the bureaucracy. This perspective leads to the abandonment of the Trotskyist concept of the political revolution, namely the overthrow of the bureaucracy by the masses in struggle for the restoration of socialist democracy.

Soviet Bureaucracy's International Policy

Regarding (2) above, the CC draws attention to the following:

7. Rise and Decline section 9: The IS correctly states that the "new situation (after 1947) restricts more and more the capacity of counter-revolutionary maneuvers by the bureaucracy." But it seems to draw from this fact the incorrect inference that the aims and content of the Soviet bureaucracy's international policy have changed in the present period.

8. The aim of the Soviet bureaucracy's international policy previously is admittedly that of maintaining the international "equilibrium" between itself and World Imperialism. The content of this policy in the pre-war period was the effort to play on inter-imperialist contradictions in order to "neutralize" the international bourgeoisie, and trading of the world revolutionary movement for agreements with imperialism. The continuation of this policy in the post-war period amounted to an actual alliance with World Imperialism against the World Revolution, or in the IS phrase, to a "total attempt by the Soviet bureaucracy to maintain a policy of equilibrium." The disruption of this alliance, or the failure of this "total attempt" in the period after 1947 is assessed as follows: "Caught between the imperialist threat and the colonial revolution, the Soviet bureaucracy found itself obliged to ally itself with the second against the first...Every general attempt to use the colonial revolution as small change in the transactions with imperialism had to be abandoned."

It is to be noted that the alliance spoken of above is with "the colonial revolution" and not with the new People's Republic of China which emerged with the success of the Third Chinese Revolution. The meaning of the phrase is made clearer by the statement that "every general attempt" to trade the colonial revolution in the Soviet bureaucracy's transactions with imperialism has been "abandoned." Manifestly, therefore, the suggestion is that the Soviet bureaucracy has now made a general alliance with the colonial revolutionary movements as a whole and not simply with the state which has emerged with the success of the (colonial) revolution in China. It has "abandoned" its former policy of trading the World Revolution to Imperialism at least as far as the colonial revolution is concerned. The shift therefore is a shift in the aim and content of the Soviet bureaucracy's international policy and not merely a shift in the method by which it continues to follow its "policy of equilibrium."

9. It is in the light of the above assessment of the meaning of the new shift in the Soviet bureaucracy's international policy that the concluding sentences of section 9, in which the assessment appears, must be read. "The new situation restricts more and more the capacity of counter-revolutionary maneuvers by the bureaucracy. Attempts to utilize the inter-imperialist contradictions continue to subsist; so do attempts to gain the support of certain bourgeoisies in colonial and semi-colonial countries (India, Argentina, Indonesia) by muzzling on the sly the anti-capitalist struggle of the masses in these countries, by attempts to mobilize all the classes in these countries, including the 'national bourgeoisies' against imperialism, so do the attempts to arrive at a temporary and partial agreement with imperialism. But the practical effects of these attempts become more and more limited

and ephemeral in proportion as, on the one side, the upsurge of the masses becomes more accentuated despite all attempts to curb them and, on the other, as the pressure and the march of Yankee Imperialism towards war is stepped up."

The perspective here is obviously the continuance (under compulsion of external events no doubt, but nevertheless the continuance) of alliance with the colonial revolution as the basis of the Soviet bureaucracy's international policy. The old policy of trading the colonial revolution stands basically abandoned; any continuance of such "attempts" in the present period is regarded really as an exception, as lapses from the "New Course" rather than as indicative of its true policy content.

10. The point becomes clearer from the Report of the IS Secretary to the 12th Plenum of the IEC of November 1952. Here, the reporter states (page 17): "On the one hand it should not be forgotten that the unquestionable desire of the bureaucracy for compromise is not enough now for the practical realization of compromise and class collaboration, which require the consent of the other party -- in this case of the bourgeoisie. However, the bourgeoisie is rejecting compromise; the objective basis for compromise no longer exists; this fact imposes in fact on the bureaucracy, and the Communist Parties under its influence a line which cannot be likened to that of the people's fronts and of class collaboration, such as we knew between 1934-1938 or between 1941-1947.

"Objective conditions are essentially different now, and, despite what other desires the bureaucracy might have, in practice they bring about a different line." (Our italics.)

What is this different line?

11. In the case of the colonial countries, as we have seen, it is that of alliance with the colonial revolution. But further passages in the IS Secretary's Report open the road to the concept of a "different line" even in the imperialist countries; that is, to the concept of the Soviet bureaucracy aligning itself with the revolution in the imperialist countries. Thus, in regard to the decisions of the 1952 Moscow Congress of the CPSU, the Report declares: "The leaderships of the Communist Parties seem to consider that its principal directive which concerns them is not the alignment with their respective bourgeoisies against the United States but on the contrary the ideas contained in Stalin's closing speech, namely that the bourgeoisie has become definitively and totally "reactionary" and "anti-national"; that they should consider themselves as "the new shock brigades" having as their task and perspective the seizure of power in their respective countries following the example of the Russian CP."

12. The perspective opened up in this way is one of the Soviet bureaucracy being compelled in practice to give up the treacherous policy of seeking to maintain the international equilibrium between itself and imperialism, and that, caught between the imperialist threat and the World Revolution, the Soviet bureaucracy aligns itself with the World Revolution.

Role of the Mass Communist Parties

Regarding (3) above, the CC draws attention to the following:

13. Rise and Decline, section 45: "In countries where the CP's are a majority in the working class, they can under the pressure of the masses be led to project a revolutionary orientation counter to the Kremlin's directives, without abandoning the political and theoretical baggage inherited from Stalinism. They will do this all the more so because the masses, which are still seeking, as they will continue to seek for a whole period to come, to make use of those parties to satisfy their aspirations, have acquired a more critical attitude toward their leaderships than in the past and are no longer prepared to follow any turn of these parties, regardless of what it may involve. Under these conditions, the disintegration of Stalinism within these parties ought not to be understood in the next immediate stage as an organizational disintegration of these parties or as a public break with the Kremlin but as a progressive internal transformation, accompanied by a political differentiation within their midst. It is even possible that such a process of Stalinist disintegration may be accompanied in some Communist mass parties by a certain consolidation or an organizational strengthening, to the extent that, under pressure of circumstances, they modify their policies to conform closer to the interests of the masses. This perspective, the understanding that what is involved is not an organizational disintegration of the mass Communist parties, but rather a disintegration, molecular in its nature for an entire period, of the Stalinist ideas inside these parties as well as of the bureaucratic relations which extend from the Kremlin down to the ranks of these parties -- such an understanding is essential for determining the forms of intervention by our movement in this process in order to make it evolve in a direction favorable to revolutionary Marxism."

This passage appears to put forward the perspective that, through the gradual disintegration of Stalinist ideas in the mass Communist parties and through a progressive leftward turn in their policies, these parties are capable of projecting a revolutionary orientation under mass pressure, even without powerful revolutionary uprisings of the masses taking place.

14. The Third World Congress "Orientation and Perspectives" declared that such Communist parties can "under certain favorable conditions go beyond the aims set for them by the Soviet bureaucracy and project a revolutionary orientation." These favorable conditions were also described. "In the event of powerful revolutionary uprisings of the masses...it is not excluded that certain CPs with the bulk of their forces can be pushed out of the strict orbit of the Soviet bureaucracy and can project a revolutionary orientation."

Is it proposed to drop this qualification with regard to the conditions in which mass Communist parties can project a revolutionary orientation? The following lends strength to such a supposition:

a. The position taken in the resolution with regard to the international policy of the Soviet bureaucracy itself, dealt with under (2) above.

b. Comrade Pablo's Report to the 12th Plenum of the IEC, quoted under (2) above (section II), in which he states as follows: "The leaderships of the Communist parties seem to consider that its principal directive which concerns them is not the alignment with their respective bourgeoisies against the United States, but on the contrary...that they should consider themselves as 'the new shock brigades' having as their task and perspective the seizure of power in their respective countries following the example of the Russian CP."

If this statement were correct, it would mean that the class collaborationist perspective of the CP's of seeking an alliance with the national bourgeoisie against American Imperialism had changed to a basically revolutionary perspective of seizure of power against the bourgeoisie!

Conclusion

15. The three points discussed above have a logical inter-connection. When they are taken together there emerges the single governing concept that, in this period of the World Revolution's flow in which moreover, a durable compromise with Imperialism is ruled out for the Soviet bureaucracy, this bureaucracy and with it, the Stalinist leaderships of the mass Communist parties, get pushed on to the revolutionary road under the pressure of the masses. This concept not only leads to a fundamental revision of the positions of Trotskyism in regard to Stalinism but also denies to the Trotskyist movement all justification for its continued independent existence. Accordingly the CC urges that the IS Resolution, "Rise and Decline of Stalinism" be re-drafted in respect of the three points mentioned above in such a manner as to remove any basis for a departure from the Trotskyist positions thereon.

-- Reprinted from the Internal Bulletin of the LSSP
(Ceylon section of 4th International) - April 1954.

PABLOITE MINORITY SPLIT IN ICELAND

By P. Kane, National Secretary

The supporters of Pablo have splintered from the Icelandic section of the Fourth International. They pulled out two days prior to a national convention scheduled to formally determine the position of the Iceland section on the struggle that the international forces of Trotskyism have been waging against Pabloist liquidationism.

Immediately following their walkout they announced a farcical reconstitution of the Icelandic section of the Fourth International under their auspices, and their intention to endorse a person, to masquerade as a delegate from the Icelandic section to the Pabloite rump Fourth World Congress.

The Pabloists claim to represent the majority of Trotskyists in the most highly industrialized section of the country and 35 per cent of the movement nationally. The mechanics behind the trick of setting themselves up as THE Icelandic section of the Fourth International, while only claiming to have a minority of 35 per cent of the Trotskyists in Iceland, are: that to support the International Committee (which is an international faction already speaking for the basic cadres of Leon Trotsky's Fourth International), is to have split from the Fourth International. Pablo -- who had been entrusted by the Third World Congress to carry its line and who has completely revised it, at the same time high-handedly purging from its continuing bodies all those who opposed his traitorous course -- he says so, and it is therefore so.

While the Pabloists remained in the Icelandic section, that is up until last week, they recognized that the forces of orthodox Trotskyism were the overwhelming majority, and not just 65 per cent either. The West, representing one half of the numerical strength of the movement, was almost 100 percent in support of the International Committee. The Pabloists were never able to rally more than one-third of the forces in the main Eastern concentration.

Now, having deserted the party, the Pabloists suddenly claim to have 35 per cent of the Icelandic Trotskyists. But like the earlier reports of Mark Twain's death, this is an exaggeration -- in fact it is a lie of the whole cloth.

Their splintering off from the movement was heralded on April 7 by a pitiful handful walking out of the only party group where they had influence. This miserable little group is attempting to deceive itself, probably more than anyone else who might be interested, by going through the motions of adding to itself a scattering of persons who are more or less sympathizers of the movement, a handful of disreputable elements who walked out of the section 10 months ago after almost three years of sectarian disruption of the party's work, and then, through a series of arithmetical manipulations, turning up with the total of 35 per cent. The bulk of them are persons who have become demoralized and defeated under the difficulties of attempting to build the revolutionary party.

The Icelandic section remains solid and confident of its capacity to build the mass Marxist party of the Icelandic revolution. Its

cadre, in the process of coming to grips with the revisionist concepts of the Pabloists, has tremendously matured, developing a clearer concept of its tasks and in short order will more than make up for whatever it lost through the Pabloists desertion.

The Iceland section's experience with Pabloism has been a rich one. Last November the Socialist Workers Party, in an open letter to Trotskyists throughout the world, warned against Pablo's international faction which was revising Trotskyist fundamentals and purging its opponents from the movement. The Icelandic Political Committee, admitting inadequacy of information, made the mistake of disapproving the act of an open statement, while declaring its neutrality on the political issues at dispute. Pablo and his aides quickly circulated the International to the effect that Iceland supported his politics as against the views of his opponents.

Immediately, in keeping with its democratic traditions, a wide open discussion developed within the Icelandic section. Very shortly some of the party's main concentrations, along with the majority of its national committee, made known their political support of the SWP Open Letter and of the International Committee that had been organized by the French, British, Swiss, New Zealand and Chinese sections. No sooner was this a fact than did Pablo, through a rump meeting of the International Executive Committee, suspend, along with all other IEC members who took similar positions, the Icelandic national secretary who had been elected to the IEC by the Third World Congress. At the same time the Pabloite IEC suspended the majority of the leadership of the Icelandic section from the posts that the Icelandic section in convention had elected them to.

The two leading Icelandic Pabloists expressed their complete agreement with Pablo's Stalin-like attempt to decapitate the Iceland section with the astounding comment that, due to the nature and the political level of the Iceland section, this instruction was inoperative here. The Icelandic section of course refused out-of-hand to submit to the Pablo ukase.

With the refusal of the Icelandic section to be stampeded by him and his pitiful handful of supporters through false accusations of split, Pablo made a slight tack in his course. Ignoring the refusal to implement his orders, he wrote, "Take the time to know and discuss all the documents of the International on the crisis... adjourn your final decision until you have heard the reports of your representatives to the World Congress."

This tactical shift from plying the axe to an attempt to seduce sections into not taking positions on documents up for discussion, urging them to send along delegates chosen by undetermined means on undetermined views to vote an international policy and international leadership -- which would be discussed and approved later by national sections when everything is sealed, signed and delivered -- resulted in a sudden veer on the part of his Iceland supporters to get out from under a national convention which they themselves had proposed be held to determine the position of the Iceland section.

Early in the dispute, when it had already become apparent that the overwhelming majority of the section supported the International Committee, one of the leading Pabloites stated that he would never

submit to the Icelandic section supporting the IC without a full-fledged convention. As this was agreeable to all, plans for such a convention were immediately made.

During the pre-convention discussion it was only with the greatest difficulty that the party was able to force the discussion from the organizational plane onto the political issues at dispute. The Pabloites at first claimed that there were no real political differences. But once the discussion got underway, on the East German uprising, the French General Strike, the political revolution in the USSR, Stalinism, and finally the orientation of the Iceland section itself, their deep-going differences were brought out.

All this time the documents of the Pabloist International Executive Committee were freely circulated. A leading spokesman of Pablo's Cochranite supporters was even permitted to address one of the main party groups. But the Pabloites were strangling on this democracy. The Trotskyist cadres of the movement rallied to the defense of their doctrine and the Pabloites moved from weakness to weakness.

As the convention approached, and in receipt of Pablo's instructions, the Pabloites commenced to desperately attempt to get out from under it. One week before their walkout the minority presented a statement bewailing the apparent fact that the convention was going to ally the Icelandic section with the International Committee. The statement flung in the face of the party the challenge that the Pabloists "refuse to be a part, even as an objecting minority," to such an action.

Despite the disloyal statements of leading minorityites and this outrageous attempt to blackmail the party into not carrying out its democratic will, the majority remained unprovoked. Their very failure to provoke the majority into any disciplinary actions against their disloyal conduct only goaded the Pabloists into greater fury.

They revealed that they were collaborating with a handful of sectarian disrupters who had walked out of the party, along with some party property, some 10 months previously, and who, when the international dispute erupted, had come to life again only in order to announce their enthusiastic support of Pablo and call for a split from the party to their so-called Committee for Socialist Re-groupment. At the time of this split appeal the Pabloists sharply dissociated themselves from this Committee, labelling them disrupters of the party "who have seized upon the dispute in the International to further disrupt the party and its work."

At a meeting two days prior to the convention, in collusion with these disrupters, the Pabloites presented their applications for re-admission to the party. The majority, in view of the pre-convention agreement to freeze the membership, voted that the applications be held over until after the convention and further experience could be had with these persons. With this the minority stomped out.

The next day the Pabloists circulated a statement over the name of three leading members which bore the return address of the so-called Committee for the Socialist Re-groupment. In the statement the Pabloites label the party convention a rump convention without authority.

They condemn the convention for lack of documentation although the minority presented no documentation whatsoever, not even a statement on its own behalf all during the discussion, other than its infamous threat that it would not be a minority, even an objecting minority.

They condemn the convention for its alleged non-representative character -- its failure to represent "the real relationship of forces." Part of the evidence to back up this charge is that the basis of representation to which they had previously agreed does not allow voting representation to a point where the party had one member, and that the split-calling deserters, the so-called Committee for Socialist Re-groupment, do not have representation at the convention of the Icelandic section of the Fourth International.

The Iceland experience demonstrates that Pabloism considers itself to be completely incompatible with orthodox Trotskyism; that Pabloism is totally unprepared to accept a position of a loyal minority within the ranks of any of the parties of the Fourth International. The Iceland experience confirms to the hilt the charge that Pabloism is attempting to liquidate the Fourth International, to wreck and disperse the precious cadres of international Trotskyism.

The solidity of the Iceland section, now in alliance with its co-thinkers in the International Committee of the Fourth International, who already encompass the overwhelming majority of the forces of the Fourth International, is striking testimony to the indestructible temper of Leon Trotsky's world movement, against its enemies from within as well as its class enemy without.

April 9, 1954

THE SUCCESSIVE STAGES OF PABLOITE REVISIONISM

1. With the Third World Congress the Fourth International entered upon a crisis which has steadily worsened and today threatens its very existence. The root of this crisis is to be found in the inculcation within the leadership of the International of an ideology alien to Trotskyism: revisionist and liquidationist Pablism.

2. The principal theoretical ideas of Pablism were formulated by Pablo as a personal contribution during the course of the discussion on the buffer zone (1949-50). Dazzled by the transformation of the productive relations in the buffer zone countries, attributing in addition the victory of the revolution in Yugoslavia and China under the leadership of centrist parties of Stalinist origin to the resources of Stalinism itself, Pablo, using the sectarian errors of the Chinese Trotskyists as a pretext, began a fundamental revision of our historical perspectives. In place of the conception of proletarian revolution he substituted that of centuries of transition between capitalism and socialism under bureaucratic rule; he introduced military-bureaucratic action by the Stalinist bureaucracy as an independent historical force, capable of taking the place of action by the exploited masses in accomplishing their historical task, he declared that Stalinism was objectively struggling for the proletarian revolution in capitalist countries and that in the USSR and buffer zone countries, it could only be reproached for causing suffering for the masses which was historically unnecessary; whereas the historical necessity of the Fourth International lies in the fact that Stalinism has "definitively passed over to the side of bourgeois order" in the capitalist countries (that is to say, the Stalinist bureaucracy fights neither consciously nor "unconsciously" for the proletarian revolution but seeks primarily to maintain the status quo in all spheres), and will lead the workers' state to ruin in the USSR and in the buffer zone if it is not overthrown by the masses.

3. It is in "Where Are We Going?" that Pablo develops these theoretical premises to their final conclusions and begins to draw the political and tactical conclusions from them. The revolutionary action of the exploited masses from here on are for him nothing more than a supplementary force to be added to the military and technical forces of the Stalinist bureaucracy whose nature and historical function have changed radically; history for him is no longer one of class struggle but that of the struggle of blocs, between the capitalist regime and the Stalinist world. He denies that the character of the period separating us from war (considered by him as imminent, anyway) is a distinct historical period involving specific tasks for Trotskyists, and under the designation "war-revolution" proclaims the identity of a war conducted by the Kremlin bureaucracy with the proletarian revolution; he substitutes for the Trotskyist perspective of revolutionary overthrow of the bureaucracy that of an "objective" leadership of the world revolution by the bureaucracy, and of a subsequent and gradual withering away of the bureaucracy with the development of the productive forces. Within such a perspective, the Fourth International loses all historical necessity, and even all meaning.

4. Thanks to his tactic of bureaucratic manipulation, accompanied by a clever camouflage, Pablo succeeded in introducing his

basic ideas in a thinly veiled form into the theses of the Ninth Plenum of the International Executive Committee (subsequently adopted by the Third World Congress) and thus achieved this eclectic and contradictory mess. Strengthened by the majority he thus secured, he was able at the Tenth Plenum of the I.E.C. to develop the tactical conclusions of his liquidationist orientation. He predicted that the policy of the Kremlin bureaucracy and that of the Stalinist parties would increasingly develop leftward, while the masses would flock about them; from this he deduced an entrism tactic into the Stalinist parties with political capitulation by the Trotskyists, entrism "sui generis": these ideas and this liquidationist tactic were subsequently extended to the reformist parties and to all mass organizations under petty-bourgeois leadership (the Bolivian M.N.R., the Peronist movement in Argentina, the Ibanist in Chile, etc...).

5. However, events brought refutation after refutation to the Pablist predictions. Following the 19th Congress of the C.P. of the USSR, the Stalinist parties throughout the world oriented their policies not toward the left as Pablo had predicted but toward the right. With the policy of the United National Front, the present position of the Stalinist parties such as the French C.P. and the Italian C.P. is far more rightist than at any time in the past. The revolutionary upsurge of the masses, of which the general strike of August 1953 in France has been the most startling manifestation up to now, has under these conditions swept the crisis of Stalinism to a higher level, setting the communist militants in direct conflict with their leaders, while for the first time in history, the radicalization of the masses in France is not passing into the channels of Stalinist organizations, which are continuing to lose their members. The decisive role of the independent revolutionary party as a pole for attracting and organizing communist militants who are in conflict with the Stalinist leadership thus shows up in a striking fashion.

In an equally striking fashion does it appear that the revolutionary upsurge in the capitalist countries, far from provoking the outbreak of a "suicide-war" by imperialism, serves to delay the effective unleashing of the war.

Finally, the Kremlin bureaucracy, caught in a vise between imperialism marching toward counter-revolutionary war and the pressure of the proletarian masses, which have been stimulated by the progress of soviet economy and the worldwide revolutionary upsurge, and seeing the class equilibrium on a world scale broken, the equilibrium from which it was born and upon which its power in the USSR was founded, has entered a stage of convulsive agony which is tearing it into opposing tendencies; for, contrary to the declarations of Pablo, it is incapable as a whole of basing itself on the masses as against imperialism and the potentially restorationist tendencies in the USSR (Beria's orientation); and it is no less incapable as a whole of basing itself on the masses as against the masses (Malenkov-Khroutchev orientation). Finally, it is more ready than ever to sacrifice the interests of the masses in countries like France and Italy, for example, as a price for even limited concessions of the bourgeoisie in foreign policy.

6. In the face of such a complete failure of his perspectives, Pablo has begun a large-scale operation of camouflage and political

swindling, abandoning some of his fundamental positions and deliberately back-tracking, in order the better to hold on to the basic element: liquidation of the political independence of Trotskyism vis a vis the Kremlin bureaucracy and bureaucratic apparatuses in general.

"Objective conditions" yesterday imposed deformed workers' states for centuries. Today Pablo declares that nothing must interfere in the near future with establishing the widest proletarian democracy. War was imminent at the Third World Congress and the revolutionary upsurge could only precipitate imperialism into a "suicide-war." Today Pablo has the audacity to write that war has become "possible at any time now" (so it wasn't yesterday?), either immediately or in "several years"; that the revolutionary upsurge is delaying the war and may even prevent it! And he coldly concludes from this that "our tactic" (outlined at the Third World Congress and at the Tenth Plenum of the I.E.C.) "remains (! ! !) valid."

Whereas he refused, as the French majority especially demanded, to inscribe among the slogans of the Third World Congress the traditional Trotskyist slogan for the overthrow of Stalin, today he correctly declares that the struggle for the approaching overturn of the bureaucracy is one of the basic tasks of the International and speaks with tears in his voice of "our Soviet brothers," a subject which was taboo two years previously. Yesterday the victory of Mao-Tse-Tung "was not exactly a victory of Stalinism"; today Pablo correctly indicates what the majority of the I.C.P. has stressed for three years, that it is only the break of the Chinese Communist Party with the Kremlin which permitted the victory of the Chinese revolution.

7. At the same time, Pablo is reaffirming and developing his liquidationist orientation: insistence upon an objective revolutionary process which is automatic and irresistible, and which subordinates the reformist and Stalinist bureaucratic apparatuses to itself, changes their nature and function before our eyes and is ever increasingly transforming them into instruments of the revolutionary will of the masses. The analysis of Pablo winds up by considering the problem of revolutionary leadership as "objectively resolved," and ignores the unequal development of the revolution in the backward countries and in the advanced countries, whereas it is precisely the delay of the proletarian revolution in the advanced countries which underscores the importance, historically more decisive today than ever before, of the conscious factor for the victory of the world revolution.

He ignores the pressure exerted by imperialism on the Kremlin bureaucracy, and above all, ignores the fact that the pressure exerted by the Soviet masses, far from transforming the role of the bureaucracy and compelling it to enter upon an irreversible course of ever increasing concessions to the masses, is, on the contrary, strengthening its counter-revolutionary vigilance in self-defense. He foresees, contrary to the factual evidence and counter to principles, a co-direction of the world revolutionary movement by the Kremlin and the masses during the entire transitional epoch. He does not understand that the policy of the Kremlin will continue to oscillate right up to the end, up to its disappearance, and pastes the same label on the Beria course, during which the leading oligarchy had

attempted to find a support in the masses against the restorationist forces and imperialism, and upon the Khrouchev-Malenkov course, during which the leading oligarchy is searching for a support in the restorationist forces against the masses.

For Pablo the historical mission of the Fourth International has lost all meaning. The "objective revolutionary process," under the aegis of the Kremlin, allied with the masses, is taking its place very well indeed. That is why he is mercilessly bent upon liquidating the Trotskyist forces, under the pretext of integrating them into the "movement of the masses as it exists."

The salvation of the Fourth International imperatively demands the immediate eviction of the liquidationist leadership. A democratic discussion must then be opened within the world-wide Trotskyist movement on all problems left suspended, befogged or falsified by the Pablist leadership during three years. Within this framework, it will be indispensable for the health of the International that the greatest self-criticism be carried through on all phases and causes of the development of the Pablist gangrene.

October 1953

THE STRUGGLE OF THE FRENCH TROTSKYISTS
AGAINST PABLOTTE LIQUIDATIONISM

We shall confine ourselves in this document to a recital of the developments of Pablist activities in France and of the struggle which he waged against the French section. We shall not attempt here to examine the problem of the origins of Pablistism, a subject of major importance which the International will have to submit to study and discussion, but which would require an explanatory work at least equivalent in length to the present text.

From its very nature, and contrary to the statements of Pablo and his partisans in the I.S., Pablist revisionism, as is well understood in the I.S. and in the I.E.C., had an earlier development. Its first clear but incomplete manifestation, in an official document of the International, is found in the projected theses on the international situation written by Pablo and submitted by the I.S. to the Ninth Plenum of the I.E.C. (November 1950) as a preparatory document for the Third World Congress. These theses, which take as their point of departure the closeness of the Third World War, propose a change (not yet specified) in the tasks of the International, proceeding in the direction of abandoning the building of independent revolutionary parties as the leadership of the masses in the period prior to the war. In this document also figure the first attacks against "pure norms," and the improbability of a "free development toward socialism" is broached.

The I.E.C. was disturbed by this orientation, and in accordance with a tactic which will constantly be his from then on, Pablo agrees to integrate certain Bleibtreu amendments, presented by Theo (Holland), into his thesis which coexist with the contradictory statements of the first version in the theses bearing the name of Theses of the Ninth Plenum.

The Central Committee of the I.C.P. had been called together at the very moment when the Plenum of the I.E.C. ended. The uneasiness of the I.E.C. invades it immediately. The members of the French C.C., disturbed by the reading of the projected theses which had been sent them, see the members of the I.E.C. who are present at their meeting in violent conflict with each other. Pablo is absent and it is Livingstone who takes his place and with shocking violence attacks Privas and Frank, who had indicated reservations on the theses within the I.S. Except for two members of the C.C. (Michele Mestre and Corvin), whom Pablo has for the past two months made his direct spokesman in the I.C.P., the C.C. criticizes the revisionist elements introduced into the theses and refuses to approve the draft. It agrees to meet again one month later.

At this January C.C. meeting, certain Bleibtreu-Frank-Privas addenda to the political resolution prepared for the Seventh Congress of the I.C.P. and relating to its tasks in the struggle against war are adopted, despite a hysterical intervention by Livingstone, representative of Pablo. Privas proposes to the C.C. that he be assigned to the leadership of "La Verite" in place of Michele Mestre. This proposal is adopted.

From the Ninth Plenum of the I.E.C. to the month of March, 1951, when the crisis will break out, the tendencies are in process of

being defined within the leadership of the I.C.P. and of acquiring the content which they will finally have. The opponents of Pablo within the I.S. (Germain, Frank, Privas) call the Parisian members of the C.C. of the I.C.P. together, with the exception of M. Mestre and Corvin, in order to advise them of the threats of expulsion from the I.S. pronounced by Pablo against them: by a bureaucratic ruse Privas had already been expelled from the bureau of the I.S., which had given Pablo his majority of three votes against two. Immediately afterward he demanded that Germain and Frank defend the line, which had become the majority line in this fashion, before the I.E.C. and in the sections, or face expulsion from the I.S.

From the outset, a difference in views shows up regarding the methods of struggle:

1. Germain, Frank, Privas, frightened by the organizational threats of Pablo, favor waging a campaign for the defense of democracy, for changing the statutes of the I.E.C., for the recognition of minority rights in the preparatory discussion for the world congress, etc...

2. Bleibtreu is against this orientation, estimating that a struggle against revisionism must be waged with political weapons, that abstract democratic demands by a "minority," which does not express itself politically, will interest no one. He proposes a political counter-attack by the publication of a counter-thesis by the minority of the I.S. or by the majority of the I.C.P. Germain alerts the I.C.P., declaring that "Pablo has been waiting for a long time to destroy the French section."

In order to divert the majority of the I.C.P. from its orientation, Germain advises Bleibtreu (January 1951) of his projected ten theses on Stalinism, formally promising to submit them to a vote by the sections and by the world congress. With this formal promise, the majority of the I.C.P., when advised, agree not to wage a separate fight and to wait for the publication of the Ten Theses, considering that these theses constitute a very clear refutation of the pro-Stalinist revisionist elements in the theses of the Ninth Plenum and a noteworthy contribution to the Trotskyist analysis of Stalinism. Most of the Parisian members of the C.C. fall into line for these reasons, particularly since the I.S. is asking for a discussion with the P.B., enlarged by the Parisian members of the C.C., on the subject of the "addenda" adopted in January.

On the eve of this common I.S.-enlarged P.B. meeting, the members of the French leadership receive a letter from the I.S. placing them under discipline to cancel their vote adopting the "addenda" and to rewrite them along the lines of the theses of the Ninth Plenum. This letter appears shortly after "Where Are We Going?" wherein Pablo develops his most revisionist ideas and gives some of them the most provoking tone ("We must unequivocally line up with the anti-imperialist forces," etc...) At the common meeting of the I.S. and enlarged P.B., Pablo is again absent; it is Germain who represents the I.S. (Livingstone has so angered the French C.C. by his style of intervention -- which earned him the nickname "the cowboy" -- that Pablo can no longer use him). One surprise awaits those attending this meeting: it is Privas who is reporting in the name of the I.S. and who, in a long embarrassed speech, tries to justify the positions

of "Where Are We Going" which he had sharply criticized shortly before. He concludes that it is necessary to comply with the demands of the I.S. Frank and Germain speak along the same lines. It is a confession of their capitulation, to which they were brought by their idea of a soft "struggle" by means of organizational pressures and measures. From now on, they will be compelled to outstrip themselves from day to day and to show themselves more Pablist than Pablo. The effect of this turnabout on the C.C. is the reverse of that anticipated by the I.S. Without any prior consultation among themselves after receipt of the I.S. letter, the members of the C.C. all react alike. They readdress to the I.S. its demand for clear explanations, for explanations of "bad formulations," for more precision whether new views are involved which they consider as revisionist. The meeting decides on calling an immediate extraordinary C.C. session and on publication of an international political resolution. It is noteworthy that the division in the C.C. between majority and minority leaves on the majority's side the comrades who are doing mass work (in the factories and trade unions, the youth organizations, etc.) and on the other side the flotsam which was unable to find a working milieu outside the party. The text (of the resolution) is worked out collaboratively.

The C.C. reassembles in April 1951. For the first time, Pablo comes there personally, not to defend his positions but to attack the French majority, which he accuses of conservatism and which, according to him, is succumbing to the pressure of Shachtman, of the POUM, of the Yugoslavs and of the neutralists (grouped around the weekly "The Observer"; it is necessary to point out that these neutralists are pro-Stalinists; they will support the Pablists at the time of the split, will give publicity to their publications and their meetings; Germain is one of the acknowledged and assiduous editors of this paper).

The C.C. adopts the theses, prepared by the P.B. and Parisian members of the C.C., decides to postpone the date of the Seventh Congress of the party, against the wishes of the Pablists who are afraid of clarity and are using the argument of authority. Frank drafts a criticism of the majority theses which bears all the earmarks of political capitulation: Frank covers up the revisionism with which he does not really agree and attacks positions which are really his own by trying to read into them what isn't there. The majority, after having outlined its international political position, develops all aspects and all practical consequences of its policy in the daily work of rooting the French section in the masses. A series of reports (trade union, youth, organizational) is drawn up. The Pablist faction presents an opposition document on each of them: on trade union work, it proposes abandonment of the orientation toward rallying a class struggle tendency (which, according to them, cuts us off from the Stalinist workers, who are increasingly rallying about their leadership in anticipation of imminent war), and proclaims that we must enter the C.G.T. (90% of the wage-earning members of the party really are in the C.G.T.), in order to do faction work within a Stalinist organization and to "get closer to the communist workers," a task which they believe can be fulfilled by getting closer to the policy of their (the communist workers') leadership. Similarly, the Pablist document on youth work in effect advocates giving up building the Revolutionary Youth Movement, proposing instead work in the Stalinist youth organization, the Union of Repub-

lican Youth of France; the majority supports the document on building the party which had been prepared by Privas in September. The minority, to which Privas belongs, opposes it and advocates integration of the party into the "Fighters for Peace."

But the conclusions of the minority on these problems have as yet none of the clarity in orientation that they will assume after the Third World Congress. Nevertheless, their direction recalls the positions developed by the right-wing tendency in our party in 1945-46 according to which we had to get closer to the politics of the Stalinist workers if we wished to get closer to the Stalinist workers themselves.

Let us recall that in the summer of 1951, after having reached the Yalu and provoked Chinese intervention in Korea, MacArthur is dismissed. The Pablists then publish a pamphlet, over the heads of the French leadership, explaining that "we have just missed having war," thus unveiling the impressionism of the I.S.; the latter does not on that account alter its perspective of "war-revolution" in a year or at most two, of ever increasing radicalization of Stalinist policy and of seizure of power by the various C.P.'s such as took place in China. These "optimistic" perspectives for tomorrow -- their optimism is relative to the future of the Kremlin bureaucracy not to that of the Fourth International -- serves in reality to conceal the most profound scepticism as regards the working class's own resources, to whom they deny the possibility of entering any large scale struggle and of raising its level of consciousness prior to the war.

However, some extreme manifestations of pro-Stalinism, which should have served as a warning signal, showed up in weak sectors of the party. A young provincial militant, Maurice Burguiere, went over to the Stalinists, and was only won back by the arguments of the January "addenda"; at Lyon on the other hand, another young militant, LeFort, drew up theses which he considered, and not without reason, as the logical conclusions of the Tenth Plenum theses and which declare that the Stalinist bureaucracy will stop playing a counter-revolutionary role as soon as war breaks out. Burguiere will completely go over to Stalinism after the split, denouncing Trotskyism as an imperialist agency.

The theses of Germain ("Ten Theses on Stalinism") which Frank had proclaimed as the document which should straighten Pablo out, are published in the month of May, but as a discussion document and with a preface which places them under the aegis of the Ninth Plenum. This obviously does not prevent Pablo from calling this document "untimely." The Political Bureau of the French section adopts them as a resolution for the Third World Congress (without the preface). The seventh congress of the party will likewise adopt them, to the unusual and comic indignation of their author.

As a supplement to the theses of the C.C. majority, Bleibtreu publishes "Where Is Comrade Pablo Going?", an article critically analyzing "Where Are We Going?". This text, published by "La Verite" after the split under the title "Defense of Trotskyism," but submitted as far back as this time to the I.S. as a document for the preparatory discussion for the Third World Congress, is not distributed by the

I.S. in the International; the other French documents, notably the theses on international orientation, are also not distributed.

From the still confused and timid character of the revisionism, certain majority comrades are inclined to conclude that what is involved is not a revisionist course -- Pablism -- but certain revisionist errors, and that although an energetic struggle against them is of course necessary, they can be corrected without serious losses at the Third World Congress. This is the reason for a certain weakness in the struggle by the majority at the Seventh Congress of the party, which takes place in July 1951, and at the Third World Congress. Despite that, the Seventh Congress of the party confirms the decisive weight of the majority which counts 2/3 of the militant forces on its side (it will be over 3/4 at the time of the split). The struggle there was a violent one. The minority tried to use the argument of authority, in anticipation of the decisions of the world congress. Naturally, the liquidationist revisionists circulate the rumor that the majority wants a split. The congress reaffirms the principle of discipline toward the decisions of the world congress. The I.S. declares that it is impossible to postpone the date of the world congress as requested by the I.C.P. so that discussion on the new positions of the I.S. can take place. Although the main French texts have been published within the discussion period, they will not be distributed in the International. This prepares the maneuvers of the world congress.

The Third World Congress takes place in France. The delegates from distant countries are called a month before its sessions and are "insulated" by the I.S. They are prepared by a campaign of slander against the French majority, which is pictured to them as splitters (it is even insinuated that some are "captives of the Yugoslavs"). The three days of general discussion in the congress boil down to a series of violent attacks against the French section, contradictory attacks, the Pablist delegates attacking it one after another on the basis of imaginary positions. The Pablists are not afraid, in the course of their criticisms of the I.C.P. positions, to attack the theses of Germain on Stalinism, characterized by a Dutch leader as a reflection of imperialist pressure!

The I.C.P. presented three documents to the congress: its theses on international policy adopted by its Seventh congress, the "Ten Theses on Stalinism," then, during the course of the congress, numerous amendments to the theses of the Ninth Plenum correcting all the revisionist declarations in that document. The vote of the congress, without precedent in our movement, motivates the refusal to declare itself on the French theses (after a night of reflection) by the fact that the delegates were not informed on them (although they were able to polemicize against them during two out of three days); and the refusal to take a position on the "Ten Theses" on the score that Germain, their author, "did not write them with the object of having them voted on."

Pablo wants to get rid of the majority by means of a French Commission set up as a tribunal. Some delegates are opposed to this procedure. The report made by Frank to this commission is a slanderous attack against the majority without counterposing program and conception of building the party. His sole aim is to have the congress hand over the real leadership of the I.C.P. to its Pablist

minority. The majority does not accede to this and Pablo cannot carry out his operation successfully, failing in an attempt to split the majority by the offer of a dubious compromise...The last session of the French commission and of the congress saw a relaxation of the hostile atmosphere organized by Pablo against the French delegates. Pablo has to yield and accept the fact that there is no precedent for the violation of democratic centralism in the designation of leadership of national sections; the I.C.P. retains the leadership which its own congress has established.

For the I.S. the international discussion has definitely ended with the congress. This includes the discussion on the Chinese revolution ("the most important event which has occurred since October 1917"), which did not take place at the world congress and which the I.S. will open only after it will place the French majority outside the possibility of participating in it. By making a forbidden ground of every problem which poses the question of Stalinism anew, Pablo leaves the field free for the development of his pro-Stalinist revisionism.

An I.S.-I.C.P. commission had been formed for drafting a program applying the line of the Third World Congress to France. Germain represents the I.S. there. The world congress confirmed for France the line of building an independent party. The resolution drawn up by the commission scarcely goes beyond this decision and proclaims the maintenance of what has been achieved. Pablo, in the course of a visit to the P.B. of the I.C.P. states: "it was not Pablism which the Third World Congress adopted!" Nevertheless, hardly have the delegates left France when the Pablist offensive is renewed; each sphere of activity of the party supplies an occasion for defining the turn toward the line of the 3rd World Congress. The special point of this offensive will first be trade union work. The Pablist minority is connected with all sectors of party work. By virtue of this, the proposed document of orientation in trade union work presented to the P.B. had been drawn up with the participation and agreement of Pierre Frank. Nevertheless we see the latter supporting an amendment by Privas at the P.B. which, by its tendency toward total alignment on Stalinism, by that very fact alone, brings into question (by extension) the necessity for an independent party in France. The P.B. asks the I.S. for its opinion on the Privas amendment. The "enlarged I.S." at which this question is placed on the agenda is a star-chamber affair at which Frank makes a fraudulent report on the activity of the party in the trade union group of "Unity." By means of this report Pablo succeeds in obtaining full power to settle this question. In this manner he is able to make up for all the time lost at the world congress. The document on trade union orientation which he draws up concretizes "Where Are We Going?" in the direction of pro-Stalinist and liquidationist revisionism. He writes: "Stalinist policy surely becomes in practice a policy of militant mobilization of the working class masses against the war preparations of imperialism...It constitutes...not an episodic or transitory turn, but rather the expression of a forced march which the evolution of imperialism toward the counter-revolutionary war imposes on the Stalinist leaders."

The Pablist offensive continues on the level of youth policy and that of the paper. The leadership (majority), in various documents on these questions, denounces the transition from the positions of the Third World Congress (and of the resolution of the French commission appointed by the congress) to liquidationist Pablist positions.

This entire battle, however, takes place in the P.B. It is closed to the party which the P.B. does not have the right to keep informed. An extraordinary congress is consequently the only way out. Pablo cannot again run the risk of nullifying his bureaucratic successes before a representative assembly. That is why, on the eve of the Central Committee called for January 20, 1952, an ultimatum document (dated January 15) unveils his batteries. This is the "entry sui generis turn." This text will be minutely analyzed by the French majority. It is the program of liquidation. The P.B. must accept it or resign. The C.C. denounces it, driving Pablo to decisive admissions: "We cannot today discuss what the Stalinists are doing... nor with those who cling to the formulas of the transition program... We will discuss with those who agree...etc..." As a matter of discipline, the leadership agrees to begin carrying out entrism into the CP but demands an extraordinary congress in order that the party can be clarified on this "unprecedented turn." In order to avoid the destruction of the party, the leadership refuses to agree to the principal point of the Pablist ultimatum: surrender of the leadership to the minority.

Pablo thereupon declares the majority of the C.C. suspended, without the I.S. having met during the course of the C.C. sessions.

The Pablists had prepared an act of violence against the party along the lines of taking over locals, files, etc...but they fail. The majority refuses to submit to the illegal suspension, to the sole leadership of Pierre Frank, appointed gauleiter for the I.S.

Emergency measures assure the security of the party. The majority publishes all the documents of the discussion and prepares the 8th Congress.

In these difficult circumstances the party shows its political maturity and its clear attachment to the principles of Trotskyism. All the living elements condemn the Pablist act of violence. The meetings called by Pierre Frank only manage to gather a few Pablists.

The extraordinary congress is prepared. The Pablists have to resign themselves to coming to meetings called by the majority. The general discussion confounds and discredits them. Their sole strength lies in using the threat of expulsion and in using the bond of international organization to play upon the sentiments of militants bred in the most profound internationalism. The period of suspension (January 20 -- beginning of March) witnesses an intensive political life. Numerous writings unveil the real pro-Stalinist liquidationist face of Pablism.

Nevertheless, at the 10th Plenum of the I.E.C., the majority of the I.C.P. accepts the distorted proposals made by Pablo (the extraordinary congress will take place, but the leadership is changed: it is to be dominated by Germain, who is to have a major vote. The majority accepts this formulation, because it hopes that in the light of the new developments of Pablism, French isolation will cease and that sections will join it in order to put a brake on revisionism. It agrees to a heavy sacrifice in the interests of international Trotskyism, to which it sends out an appeal.

The period lasting from the 10th to the 11th plenum, under the leadership of this new two-headed political bureau (Germain constantly acts along Pablist lines, but the majority keeps the levers of command in its hands) is a dark period.*

*A period marked specially by the publication in "Quatrieme Internationale" of the report by Pablo on "entry sui generis." Pablo thereby publicly offers his collaboration with the Kremlin.

Except for the "Unity" conference which takes place at the same time as the Tenth Plenum, it is a period of party atrophy and decline.

In the "Unity" conference, the majority won a striking success, dealing a crushing defeat to the Yugoslav agents, readily isolating and scattering them, whereas the Pablist tactic sought to isolate us, in order, in the final analysis, to destroy two years of work, much to the advantage of the Yugoslav agents.

But seeing the leadership of the Fourth International abandon Trotskyism, many militants abandon their militant work. The party is paralyzed. The I.S. refuses the majority elected by the 7th Congress the right to present its political report to the 8th Congress which is in preparation. On the eve of the Eleventh Plenum of the I.E.C., Germain presents a new Pablist ultimatum: complete capitulation (not to defend our positions at the congress, the latter being transformed into a conference for carrying out entry sui generis) or outright removal from the leadership. There is no further choice. Pablo, through Germain's mouth, is demanding our self-destruction. The Eleventh Plenum gives him a free hand. The majority then decides to call the congress. The Pablists know that the C.C., with the support of the entire party, will reject the ultimatum. Consequently, a few days before the meeting of the C.C., they ransack the technical apparatus of the party, and issue a pamphlet, which they distribute to the congress of the Indo-Chinese B.L. (a group which will be criminally but needlessly split on this account on the very eve of its return to Viet-Nam), accusing the majority of preparing a split. Secretly, two months previously, they had filed a statement with the police department establishing an I.C.P. with a completely Pablist leadership. By this splitting tactic they think they have put an end to the party. At the C.C. they refuse to retract their splitting actions. The central committee suspends them. They organize a minority congress.

The Eighth Congress of the party finds that the split, so far as numerical forces are concerned, is of slight importance. All the working class elements of the party remain attached to its program and completely understand the pro-Stalinist liquidationist character of Pablism; but the split isolates us physically from the International for a period, because of the tactic of isolation which Pablo had employed concerning us, in order to first get rid of the main obstacle which the French section represented. This isolation initially discourages some militants. However, the majority does not lose its hope in the strength which lies in the attachment to principles.

Historical dialectic serves the Marxists and events come to our aid. The brief course of Stalinist adventurism in France has brought the Pablists to madness. After the disastrous demonstration of May 28, 1952, they proclaim: "The French revolution has begun under the leadership of the men from the Kremlin" and they demand of the Eleventh Plenum that it expel the majority which "is deserting the revolution."*

*These same people say of the strike wave of August 1953 that it was not the revolution nor even a general strike!

While the split is taking place, the last Stalin course of United National Front comes as a brutal contradiction of all the prophecies of Pablism.

The first C.C. after the congress* (*September 1952), reaffirming its unalterable attachment to the Fourth International, drafts its plan of struggle for its reintegration in conjunction with a struggle against liquidation within the whole International.

Just as the party was able, upon being freed from the debilitating factional struggle, to turn outward and during the course of the year 1952-1953 to achieve a series of important successes (thanks to which we will win back many militants lost during the struggle against Pablism and before), so on the international level, our new situation allows us to establish direct contact with many Trotskyists in the International, as a starting point for the realignment of the International.

Disappointed in its hope to destroy Trotskyism in France by the split, Pablism resorts to the most odious means for accomplishing its work of destruction: police actions, slanders, collaboration with the Stalinists. These operations dealt serious blows to our cause but are finally turning against their authors, who are discredited from now on.

With the struggle against Pablism, the French section of the International experienced its longest and most painful crisis in (party) building. Heavily proletarianized during the last few years, tempered in the class struggle, it has magnificently survived this trial and demonstrated both its political maturity and its capacity for action. In this three-year struggle the incomparable value of our program has once again been verified.

October 1953.