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# discussion bulletin

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## Political Committee Report on National

### Committee Question

by Farrell Dobbs

Comrades, in discussing the National Committee question today we deal with a general problem that has become increasingly urgent for the party. We are carrying through on a specific assurance that was given to the last convention of the party that the incoming national committee would go to work on this question and try to have a solution worked out as quickly as possible.

Comrades present here who participated in the nominating commission at the last convention will recall that an unusual thing occurred. Comrade Cannon, Comrade Stein and myself appeared before the nominating commission after they had been at their labors for a couple of days. We told them that we were wholly aware of the problem they were grappling with. They wanted to bring some younger comrades onto the national committee but did not have any room to do so, unless the already large national committee were expanded even further, which would be no solution to the problem at all. We assured the comrades that the central leadership of the party would take the initiative in trying to arrive at recommended lines of readjustment that would be calculated to make certain that the nominating commission at the next convention would not be confronted with the same problem.

Those of you who were in attendance at the last convention will recall that, before the report of the nominating commission was brought in on the last day of the gathering, Comrade Cannon addressed the convention on this subject and assured the comrades in the name of the central leadership and the incoming national committee that we would go to work on the problem.

Now I say that this was an unusual action for Comrade Cannon, Comrade Stein and myself to appear before the nominating commission. I want to call to the attention of the younger comrades a bit of the background about the nominating commission. If memory serves me right, Murry, wasn't it at the 1941 combined plenum and active workers conference that you and I were co-chairmen of what was a sort of anticipation of the nominating commission as we know it today? [Murry: Yes.]

That was an occasion where a great chunk of the top leadership of the party had been included among the comrades indicted under the Smith Act in the summer of 1941. We were going to trial in the fall and being practical, hard-headed tacticians we didn't proceed on the most favorable variant. We proceeded on the possibility that the judge might send us right from the courtroom to the pokey. So between the indictment and the trial we called a special party gathering to take measures to provide for a substitute leadership and modify the committee accordingly.

It's not an accident that I'm going back to this 1941 event because it bears on the need to be flexible -- within the framework of carefully established and well motivated basic lines of procedure -- in grappling with the present leadership problem in the party. We organized what was termed a combined plenum and active workers conference. The gathering comprised members of the national committee and delegations of leading activists from the various party branches. In this way we expanded the national committee, on an ad hoc basis, in order to meet the emergency leadership problem we anticipated because of the Smith Act trial. Although the judge didn't send us to jail right away from the court room, we did have to go to prison at the end of 1943, so there was merely a delay in the need for emergency leadership arrangements.

In a sense there's a similarity in some features of this gathering. Grappling with a new problem, this plenum takes a form which is a little unusual. That circumstance is both a symbol of the unusualness of the problem we face and an indication of our attempt to be flexible -- while we carefully follow established lines of basic procedure -- in seeking a solution.

But returning for the moment to 1941, it was on that occasion that the adumbration of the nominating commission idea appeared and it became further developed in the ensuing period. Then, while we were in prison, Comrade Cannon wrote several letters to the party dealing more basically with this question, and at the 1944 party convention the nominating commission mechanism for the selection of the national committee as we have come to know it took full form.

I recommend to the younger comrades that you go back to the internal discussion material of that period and read particularly the letters on this subject that were addressed to the party by Comrade Cannon from prison. You'll find this material very rich, very fruitful in probing some of the basic aspects of the problem of leadership and the

manner of handling the leadership problem. A key factor to note is the synthesis between permitting genuine democracy in selecting the leadership and the duty of the leadership to give guidance to the cadre on the leadership problem at critical moments in the life of the party.

Although undertaking broad guidance on the matter, it has not been the practice of the central leadership to intervene in a direct sense, as occurred at the last convention, in the work of the nominating commission. It was done then only because we had a special problem, only because we were just entering a new stage in dealing in a flexible and yet objective way with a special problem that confronted the party. That problem, as you know, is to infuse younger blood into the leadership at a more rapid rate than we have been able to attain in recent years.

This question has to be taken with extreme seriousness. When we talk about the national committee of our party we are talking about the highest form of continuity in revolutionary class consciousness between past, present and future. We are talking about a leading cadre which, as a living force, dates back to participation in class struggles at the turn of the century. Its task is to help assimilate into the leadership younger comrades who are going to play a comparable role in coming class struggles which we anticipate will appear in a new magnitude and scope and on a far higher plane in the period ahead.

We face the problem of extending the leadership continuity to younger comrades, interlinked with the more experienced cadre leaders, so that we provide the bridge of historic consciousness to the working class and its allies and also so that we may most actively intervene in the objective political processes and work to thrust these developments in the direction of a socialist revolution. That means we should pause for a moment and, if I can use the title of one of Comrade Warde's pamphlets, take the long view of history, take ourselves up out of the immediate and the particular; leave aside the smaller questions, the secondary aspects; and think for a moment about what the leading cadre of this party represents and what it has to be; realize how very careful we have to be to do the necessary things and yet to do them in a right way when we deal with the leadership question.

I would say that the present national committee of our party can be described as being composed of four general layers. First, that category of comrades who are the founding

leaders of our movement, who took the initiative in establishing American Trotskyism. The second, a layer of comrades who came to our movement as radicalized youth of the Thirties, workers and students reacting to the dynamic class struggles of that period. A third layer made up of comrades who came into the cadre during the early '40's under the impact of the second world war and the labor upsurge that occurred in the immediate aftermath of the war. The fourth layer, a very thin one, of comrades who came into the cadre during the latter '40's and early '50's under conditions of the cold war and witch hunt.

Now I have to stop. I can't give you the fifth layer, covering the latter part of the 50's and the beginning of the 60's because that's where the biggest hole is. That's part of the problem we're talking about.

What does this leading cadre represent? I have said that this cadre plays the key role, this leading cadre, plays the key role in fulfilling the party's function as the bridge in historic consciousness for the working class and its allies. What in more specific terms does this cadre represent from that point of view?

There are comrades in our leading cadre who were participants -- and if not in a primary, at least in a secondary capacity leaders -- in some of the great struggles of the IWW back in the early part of the century. They are comrades who participated in the socialist movement in the great days of Debs. They are comrades who learned to fight against imperialist war in this country, under war-time conditions, back in the first world war. They are comrades who -- already richly endowed with class struggle experience, already possessing a significant degree of Marxist education -- could and did play various leading roles in helping to form the Communist Party of the United States under the impact of the Russian Revolution.

They are comrades who didn't hesitate to break with Stalinism in the Communist Party movement and it had developed by the latter part of the 20's and -- true to their dedication to the movement when they entered as youth to fight for truth -- they faced isolation in support of truth on Trotsky's side in the historic conflict with Stalin, and went on from there to found our movement, the SWP.

Not long after the break with the CP they began to get some reinforcements, which must have made them feel about like the older comrades feel today about the young people



who have been coming in our direction the last few years. These reinforcements they welcomed at that time were the young radicalized workers and students of the 30's who came toward our cadre. In those days the party functioned under adverse circumstances as a small propaganda group more or less isolated from the mass movement and up against a vastly stronger Communist Party that viciously persecuted the Trotskyists. Yet to the very best of their ability our comrades sought to intervene among leftward-moving workers and students, working persistently to build a strong revolutionary-socialist cadre that would know how to fight Stalinist without capitulating to imperialism and how to fight imperialism without capitulating to Stalinism. Comrade Cannon describes this period graphically in The History of American Trotskyism.

Then came the second world war and with it the death of Trotsky. Something else happened that isn't so well known, or at least isn't often thought of, and in view of the discussion we've been having about the world movement, it's a matter that's worth keeping in mind. When the second world war came the battle lines of the opposing imperialist forces drew a line of fire across the world, isolating Trotskyist cadres from one another. The comrades on either side had little or no contact back and forth. Don't forget this happened coincident with the death of Trotsky, the founding leader of the party.

Now it is not well known, and if known not often remembered, that our leading cadre, and before all others the founding leaders, played a big role during those times in doing the necessary and possible to preserve the continuity of the historic threads of the world Trotskyist movement. Ours was the leadership that in the aftermath of war responded to every opportunity to recement the world cadres on the most effective possible basis. And for many years this fraternal effort on our part has since had to be undertaken under conditions of the cold war and the witch hunt.

Meanwhile the earlier leading cadre -- the founding leaders and the comrades of the 30's -- became reinforced by comrades who came into the party during the early 40's and in time rose to leading positions. That leadership with some limited reinforcement from comrades subsequently recruited and developed as leaders, has had the task of holding the cadre together, maintaining its viability, preserving its theoretical and programmatic integrity across the long, long, 16-year period of isolation from 1946 to the present.

We're not as big as we were in 1946. But what does the balance sheet show? The fundamental balance sheet is remarkable, not for what we lost across those 16 years, but for what we held. Not for the disabilities that in one way or another occurred among us, but for the viability that we preserved across that whole period. That's the key meaning of the balance sheet.

Look at it another way. How does our cadre stand with relation to opponent tendencies? The social democrats have lost any real capacity -- if we're on the ball -- to seize leadership among newly radicalizing elements. The Stalinists are a hollow shell of what they were. The CP is crisis-ridden, bankrupt in program, stripped of any really effective use of the monolithic, bureaucratic rule of the hacks over their cadres. Stalinism today, like the social democracy, has to confront us everywhere on the test of viability of program and capability of leadership.

If we keep our wits about us, if we keep the large view of things, if we think and if we act consciously and deliberately, we've got every reason in the world to be confident that we can deal them hammer blows. We've got every reason to be confident that right here in this room is gathered a representative nucleus of what -- in the continuity of revolutionary leadership -- is destined to be the leadership of the revolution that the American working class is destined to carry out against the imperialist monster in this country. And when you draw the balance sheet from that point of view there's a lot to be said for us that is positive.

Now what I've described, or sought to describe at least, is an objective process which has unfolded across an extensive period of time. I've been describing a process in which comrades who are leading members of our party today were active participants in revolutionary struggles that encompass a span of a little over half a century. That's what gives rise to our difficulty.

Some of the comrades are not as young as they used to be. Some of the comrades are coming into the autumn of their lives. Comrades who have had a long and honorable and productive record of active leadership in the party are not able to be as active as they once were. This circumstance has begun to generate a situation within our cadre in which we are falling a bit off balance in the basic concept of a revolutionary leadership as one that leads in action. This has been developing for some time but during

the political doldrums of recent years the problem didn't thrust itself upon the cadre as forcefully as it has lately. One of our key problems during adverse times has been to preserve the integrity of the party program. One of our problems has been to fight off attempts to derail the cadre in its fundamental outlook in a search for some slick way to overleap adverse objective conditions. As you know this sometimes led to splits.

Under these conditions the role of the older, most-experienced comrades, who had so much to contribute even though they couldn't be as active as they once were, offset the circumstance that the leadership was beginning to fall out of gear with the concept of a leadership that leads in action.

But now, as this whole plenum has shown in our discussion of all the main points, we have come to a period which we can characterize generally as follows: While our task still remains primarily propagandistic, we are finding increasing opportunities to engage in political activity and more of a premium must be placed on political activists.

Now what does this gathering represent concerning that aspect of the problem? You will recall that I previously noted a certain parallel between this gathering and combined plenum and active workers conference of 1941. Let me cite just one special aspect of this plenum that I think will illustrate the point.

There are present here organizers from several party branches who are not members of the national committee. There are two or three other organizers in that same category who were invited but could not be present. Now that symbolizes the problem. Branch organizers are only one category among the various party functions through which the testing of leadership capacity in the eyes of the cadre takes place with regard to selection of the national committee, but they represent an important category. Also it is true that in selecting our national committee we don't use as a main criteria any concept of geographic representation. Yet in the nature of things it usually turns out that either a branch organizer is a national committee member or a branch organizer is a comrade who shows promise of such leadership capacity.

From this viewpoint what is striking about the present situation is the number of branch organizers who are not members of the national committee. It indicates the gap



that has developed with respect to the concept of a leading committee that leads in action. And our problem is to find a way to open the door for younger activists to come onto the national committee.

We can't meet that need by enlarging the committee out of all proportion, so we also have another problem. We would be unwise not to make a realistic provision whereby the younger activists on the national committee can have the benefit of the experience and the wisdom of older, less active comrades who have been in the battle a long time and have learned a lot and have got a lot that they can give to help the younger leaders. We must not disadvantage the cadre from this point of view in trying to solve the problem of increasing the action component of the leading committee. We've got to find a synthesis of these two problems, these two needs.

Since the convention we've talked informally in the central leadership about this problem, and across a period of time evolved a concept which -- for want of a better term -- we have come to characterize as an advisory membership status. After considerable informal discussion the political committee decided to make some formal recommendations concerning advisory membership which I will present to you in terminating this report.

We believe that the plenum is entirely justified in taking this action, that it remains within the basic framework of party constitutional provisions. Although an unusual step it is justified as a self action by the national committee to meet an unusual problem. It constitutes an interim adjustment of the leadership structure as a provisional step toward preparing for the next convention to make headway in solving the problems of transition in our leadership.

The P.C. motion is contained in the minutes of June 6. These minutes were distributed only to the National Committee members. So I will read the Political Committee motion to the body as a whole:

- "(1) National Committee members not able to be active may withdraw from regular membership and assume advisory membership status.
- "(2) As advisory members they will receive committee material and will be entitled to participate in committee proceedings with voice but without vote.

- "(3) The P.C. is authorized to arrange this change in status to advisory membership upon request by N.C. members.
- "(4) When an N.C. member changes from regular to advisory membership the vacancy on the regular committee shall be filled by the comrade highest on the alternate list.
- "(5) Vacancies created on the alternate list shall remain open until the next party convention."

The motion, as I have read it to you, is submitted to the plenum by the unanimous action of the Political Committee and its adoption by the plenum is, of course, recommended.

Now in closing I wish to read a letter addressed to the plenum by Comrade H. Adams, dated June 11.

"National Committee Plenum:

"Dear Comrades:

"For the past several weeks I have been trying to compose a letter to propose an action to the plenum. Today I received the minutes of P.C. meeting No. 12, June 6, 1962, and I find I can forego my efforts towards this letter. Instead, I want to endorse and approve the P.C. proposal on advisory membership and be so recorded.

"I am confident the plenum will establish the membership status anticipated and wish to submit my application to such status. Due to continued adverse personal conditions, I am unable to be present."

# # #

Plenum Discussion of National Committee Question

Kirk: I would like to ask a question of Comrade Dobbs. Have you considered making a provision for the P.C. status of any such advisory member who may apply at the time they are on the P.C.?

Dobbs: The provision that advisory members are entitled to participate in committee proceedings means the National Committee and its subordinate body, the P.C., in the same generalized sense that it's dealt with in the constitution.

Edwards: Does this apply to alternate members?

Dobbs: It would be meaningless for alternate members because advisory membership gives the regular members who assume that status exactly what is essential to the status of alternate members, that is, they receive committee material and participate in meetings with voice but without vote.

Alvin: What would be the status of advisory members at the time of the next convention? In your mind, would they just continue until the convention has to elect them?

Dobbs: The advisory membership provision itself would have to be authorized by the convention and formalized in a constitutional manner. When we present the recommendations on advisory membership at this stage, the national committee is taking a self action that, as I pointed out before, doesn't abrogate the essence of the constitution but at the same time is a provision that will have to be formalized by the convention.

Part of the problem of the leadership between now and the convention is to prepare specific recommendations for the convention. I would say that assuming, as I think we can justifiably assume, that the convention will concur in this arrangement it does not follow that anyone who assumes advisory membership status before the convention will be automatically continued in that capacity. That's something the convention itself will decide.

It doesn't follow from a provision for advisory membership that anybody who is on the committee in whatever capacity is guaranteed a life-time association with the committee by the automatic device of graduating to advisory membership status. The convention itself will decide who

should simply be dropped from the committee and who should be continued on in an advisory committee status. The cadre, I think it can reasonably be assumed, will decide this question in the same basic sense that it decides who should be regular members of the national committee and who should be alternate members.

Winnick: Comrades, Farrell's excellent and serious summary of the history of our leadership can only be beneficial to those comrades who are here and not completely familiar with some of its history. It serves a very salutary purpose.

I believe, however, that section five of the motion which reads that vacancies created on the alternate list shall remain open until the next party convention may have the effect of defeating precisely the objectives that Farrell indicated.

If the purpose of the revision now being proposed is to create an infusion of the activists that Farrell described, paragraph 5 obviously bars this -- because the process as it would unfold would be that we would have the present alternate members who are active in the national committee in any event and participating in its deliberations, but we would then have this vacuum created on the bottom. Therefore, we would be depriving ourselves of the benefit of the advice and recommendations and experience of some of the activists.

I would therefore like to inquire whether it is possible to work out some procedure whereby, upon the initiation of the advisory status for some of the comrades, some way could be created of filling the gap in the alternate list, so that we would avail ourselves directly of the contributions that could be made by comrades who have been designated by Farrell as the active component.

Chairman: There is no provision on the agenda for a summary. What is your pleasure: to have the reporter answer questions as they are raised, or to have a summary.

Motion: To have them answered as raised.

Carried.

Dobbs: On Bill's question: would there be a vacuum? There would be a vacuum in a formal sense. We wouldn't have a full list of 20 alternates as provided by the constitution insofar as alternates step up to regular membership when comrades who are now regular members voluntarily assume advisory

member status. But that is just from the point of view of form alone. It is simply a shift in form and not the creation of a vacuum from the point of view of the total committee content as established by the convention. All the comrades who were elected to the national committee by the convention -- in the form of either regular membership or alternate membership -- remain in the national committee as an entity. There will simply be a shift in the formal status from two categories to three: advisory membership, regular membership and alternate membership.

So even from the aspect of pure form the seeming vacuum, as you call it, on the alternate list is more superficial than real. But that's not the most important part of the question. I indicated in my report on this question that at the 1941 session on leadership we actually coopted. Why did we coopt? First, what were we doing when we coopted? We were actually establishing de facto committee status for comrades who had not previously been elected to the committee through formal, constitutional convention action. That's what we were doing then. And if we tried to fill any gaps in the alternate's list by similar means in the present situation, that's what we would be doing now.

Why did we coopt in 1941, and why do we not propose to coopt now? In 1941 the loose counterpart of what we're contemplating here as comrades who would still participate as advisory members were not in that position at all -- they were on their way to prison. There was no basis to assume they would continue to receive committee material and continue to participate in committee proceedings with voice but without vote because they were about to be removed from direct contact. So there was a hole punched in the leadership in the most real and complete sense.

In those emergency conditions we had to act as best we could short of a formal party convention. Let me stress that it would not have been physically possible under those circumstances to call a formal party convention, so we resorted to the provisional device of a combined plenum and active workers conference instead. Don't forget that we were engaged in a knockdown dragout fight on the streets of Minneapolis, battling Tobin's goons in a showdown fight in the Teamsters Union, and in the midst of this struggle Roosevelt had thrown a grand jury indictment at the top leadership of the party and the union under the Smith Act. We had only limited time before the Smith Act trial in which to make emergency preparations in order to preserve the leadership function in the party under these adverse conditions.

We, therefore, had no alternative but to coopt. There was nothing formal about it at all, nothing formal in the sense that we were following some kind of abstract law about avoiding formal vacuums.

So it would be absolutely artificial, from the point of view of necessity in the cadre, for us to contemplate filling any present vacuum in the alternate's list on a makeshift basis. It would be artificial both because you don't have the hole in the leadership that was created by the problem of the 1941 Smith Act trial, and you don't have a similar urgent necessity to fill the alternate's list on an ad hoc basis through cooptation.

To coopt now, in the judgement of the leading comrades, would be to take an action that would in fact -- without any real justification -- prejudice deliberations of the nominating commission and the decision of the next convention concerning the election of the national committee. It would unnecessarily cut across the democratic, carefully thought out, tested way in which the party has learned to proceed on this question. That is why we propose to leave open until the convention any vacancies on the alternate list that may result from regular NC members assuming advisory status.

Another question is: if the status of advisory members is so identical with that of alternates, would't this arrangement in view of the present designation to the PC of regular NC members, prevent participation on a regular basis?

Well, here again I think it's a question of looking at it from the point of view of the essence rather than the form. When I made reference to the circumstance that an advisory member would in fact have a relationship in the National Committee identical with that of an N.C. alternate, I was simply trying to indicate that there is no point in an N.C. alternate contemplating advisory membership status. But it does not follow that you can just turn that around and say that, since his form of participation is identical with that of an alternate, an advisory member would have the same status with respect to the P.C. function as an alternate. Here again it is a question of flexibility. An alternate under our present provision, where the P.C. is composed of the regular N.C. members, does not become a formal part of the P.C., does not necessarily participate in its meetings, because he is not yet a full member of the National Committee.



In the case of an advisory member that paragraph in the P.C. motion providing that the advisory member will be entitled to participate in committee proceedings with voice but without vote is intended to mean that such comrades may still participate in the P.C. sessions but they will no longer have a vote. At the same time where advisory membership status is voluntarily taken by regular members of the national committee between now and the convention, comrades on the alternate list, in the order of their priority as determined at the last convention, become full voting members of the National Committee, and if resident at the center, of the P.C.

Boulton: Since the advisory membership status must begin with a request from the elected national committee member himself, would a contrary initiative to subsequently remove a comrade from advisory membership require the unanimous consent of the national committee members?

Dobbs: Where a comrade voluntarily assumes advisory membership at this stage, we don't contemplate any removal from such position other than that which constitutionally applies concerning all N.C. members between conventions. The only point I was trying to make about what would ultimately happen to advisory membership status is that it will be determined by the convention. It is within the power of the convention to make any decisions it may choose concerning advisory memberships. If I may hazard an estimate, it is my belief that the convention will ratify and continue both the advisory committee structure and such advisory memberships as may be established before the convention. That is my personal belief, my educated guess, without a college education, that this is about the way it will work out.

The point I also wanted to make was that the convention has the right not to do that if it so decides. Moreover, in thinking about this problem as leaders, which is the way we have to think in a gathering like this, we must not fall into any mechanical posture of assuming that anybody who makes the alternate list is assured of advancement to regular membership and ultimate graduation to advisory membership. In other words, just because we establish an advisory membership status it doesn't mean that anybody's guaranteed a lifetime N.C. membership in one or another form, like Ryan serving as president of the IIA.

Dunne: Comrade chairman, I would like to suggest a little clarification here that may possibly help since the party is going to be talking about this question between now and the convention. What you're trying here is not to set up a

formal body that's going to be an upper house advising the National Committee. We do not contemplate a club of old timers who will get together and collectively take a position in the deliberations of the National Committee under the proposed change in its form. At one time as we thought these questions over it was suggested that there should be an advisory collective group established, but we don't think that's a very good idea at all.

I don't think there's going to be any difficulty about this. However, the convention will decide. And that's one of the tests of the new and what we think will be perhaps an improved leadership in time. They can change these things by going to the comrades of the party at the convention and laying before them their decision. The convention will adopt it, or amend it, or do something else. That's the only way.

We have 19 alternates right now. I do not believe, and it's hardly possible, that there are going to be 19 requests for advisory status. We're not crippling the party. We're simply making preparations for the next convention to be able to do what we think it will want to do.

Dobbs: On the question of the relationship of advisory members to the N.C., Ray has put it exactly right and in doing so he has given you part of the history of our earlier discussion. As he said, in our thinking about the question since the last convention, various suggestions have been made as we wrestled with the problem. After a time we came to what I think can now be said to be the unanimous opinion of the leading comrades that in their formal relationship with the N.C. the advisory members should not constitute a collective body. Each advisory member should stand in an individual relationship to the N.C. as a whole within its changed form, just as they now stand as regular members of the committee. Otherwise we would have what amounts to a bi-cameral committee. That would create problems for us, because to lead in action it's necessary to be able to decide, there's got to be a central authority. And it can't be a dual authority. That would contradict what is symbolized by the fact that the advisory member gives up his vote.

Now the advisory member in giving up his vote at this time acts voluntarily thereby opening the way formally for the plenum to change the N.C. structure without violating the party constitution. Simultaneously the fact that he assumes advisory member status, while giving up his vote

on the regular committee, signifies that he will continue to do all he can to help think out party problems and promote party-building work. In short, the advisory membership arrangement helps open the way for younger comrades to come forward in the leadership without causing an untoward rupture in leadership continuity.

Murry: Farrell has indicated that this procedure is unusual in the history of our party, while it is not a new thought. At the last convention and years before that different aspects of the problem of bringing younger strata into the leadership were discussed and I don't want to give the impression that any of us in the party leadership that are working on the problem have foreseen every aspect of the development. In the light of a long lag of necessary steps by the party in the field of leadership, and the renewal of leadership, the big thing in mind is that this plenum is taking an important step forward, is catching up.

But there are many wide open problems. And Comrade Winnick has raised questions which I don't pretend to have thought out. I know Farrell's working on the entire problem quite thoroughly. It leaves all kinds of questions, the renewal of alternates, the problem of how the commission will work, and all that. I've got the feeling that we've got to be considerably critical of our own tardiness on many questions, theoretical, programmatic, tactical in this most important department. I think we're catching up. In Comrade Breitman's presentation on the key question of all American theory, politics and tactics, he very gently points out that he opened the discussion but the party leadership or even the ranks didn't to any great extent respond to the problem and its urgency -- but here I think the leadership is leading in tackling this problem as outlined by Comrade Farrell. We'll think about it, and work on it, and begin to find a greater relationship between the tempos required and the audacity and energy required, and the problem of the party, its leadership, its theory, its politics. That's the great step forward, outlined by this proposal and presentation.

Motion: To accept report.

Carried.