

SWP

D I S C U S S I O N B U L L E T I N

Published by the

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY  
116 University Place  
New York 3, New York

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## MAOISM: MYTH AND REALITY!

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Students of the dialectic of internal party struggles will find rich material in studying the evolution of the dispute with the Swabeck-Liang tendency over the Chinese question. In the early stage of the dispute the position of "critical support" was presented as consistent with a unified view of the Liang-Swabeck bloc. Criticisms of the Mao regime, although muted, were nonetheless advanced to qualify the tactic of "support." At least in those documents submitted jointly by Liang-Swabeck.

From the beginning, however, it was apparent that Swabeck tended to go far beyond the position stated in their joint statements. This is most evident when comparing the material published under Swabeck's name with that co-authored with Liang. As the controversy proceeded and under the pounding of spokesmen for the majority, the Swabeck position was more and more disclosed as outright capitulation to Maoism.

It was at this point that an open break -- rather a half-break-- occurred in the Swabeck-Liang bloc. In his statement: "Where I Differ With Comrade Swabeck on the China Question," Liang accuses Swabeck of adopting a People's Front position. (DB, Vol. 24, No. 3, January 1963)

If, says comrade Liang, 'we were to accept Comrade Swabeck's new views on people's frontism as it was practised in China, we would have to revise our view of people's frontism as it was practised by the Communist parties of Spain and France.

'We would, in fact, have to discard our principled opposition to people's frontism.' (Liang's emphasis)

Since the above was written Liang has remained silent. Swabeck, in turn, has ignored what amounts to a charge of having made a fundamental break with Trotskyism. For his part, Liang concludes his attack on Swabeck with the assertion "that I continue to stand with Comrade Swabeck on the proposition that the CCP, by leading and continuing to lead a revolution, ceased to be a 'Stalinist' party." Swabeck reciprocates by retaining Liang's slogan of "critical support" long after he arrived at the point of considering any criticism of Mao as pernicious and unwarranted.

Thus, by a mutual accommodation, the bloc is maintained intact. But the entire axis has shifted and Swabeck has

emerged as the dominant ideologue of the tendency. Truly, as Trotsky observed, the discussion has its own dialectic. What appeared in Liang as a tendency toward conciliation with Maoism has, in the course of the discussion, emerged as a full-blown Maoist grouplet in the SWP.

The party is thus presented with a most peculiar situation. We have before us a resolution submitted jointly by Comrades Swabek and Liang upon which the convention will be asked to vote as representing the "line" of the Maoist tendency. Since the resolution was submitted, Comrade Swabek's contributions to the discussion constitute a direct polemic against the line of the joint resolution. Upon whose "line" then, will the convention be asked to vote?

The Swabek-Liang resolution states that: "The Peking government is a highly centralized regime and as such displays bureaucratic tendencies -- arbitrariness and commandism." It affirms that the tactic of "critical support to the regime and backing for its basic policies, both domestic and international" does not "exclude, but rather implies, criticism of all bureaucratic manifestations and stress on the need for democratization in every phase of government and society, to be achieved by peaceful reform, not by the overthrow of the Peking government."

In his most recent contribution to the discussion, "Marxism and the Sino-Soviet dispute," Swabek hails the democratic character of the CCP, denies any need for "democratization" of either the "government" or "society," and flays The Militant for its "smug, self-satisfied criticism," its "sterile ritualistic criticism," its "anemic complaints," etc., etc. As a matter of fact, from a reading of the document it is impossible to understand just what is Swabek's definition of "critical support!" Judging from the complete absence of any hint of criticism of the CCP together with his unrestrained attack on the SWP and The Militant, one can only conclude that Swabekian "critical support" means unqualified support to the Mao regime and unbridled criticism of the SWP!

If what Swabek says about the CCP and the Mao regime is true I can't understand why he proposes "critical" support. For example he informs us: "Conditions of internal party democracy in China can be best illustrated by one very concrete example. (My emphasis) After the 1927 defeat the CCP experienced a period of leftist-adventurist policies, first under the Li Li-san and later under the Wang Ming leadership. Mao Tse-tung fought against both and against their policies, and he replaced them in the leadership in 1935. Yet to this day,

Li Li-san and Wang Ming are both members of the CCP Central Committee. Few parties can match this record of internal democracy. (My emphasis)

When I first read this I blinked, rubbed my eyes, cleaned my glasses, then read it again. I still couldn't believe it! I checked with the original manuscript sure that it was a typographical error and that something had been left out. No error -- there it was in black and white.

Imagine -- Swabeck had searched the records since 1935 -- some 30 years -- and had found "one very concrete example" to establish for all time, that the CCP had an unblemished "record of internal democracy," that "few parties can match." The two culprits weren't shot when they were "replaced" by Mao but permitted to live and even remained on the Central Committee. If that isn't democracy of the most pristine purity then Swabeck just doesn't know what democracy is!

Let us apply Swabeck's criterion to another party we know of -- and see what we come up with. When Khrushchev replaced Malenkov and Molotov and other "anti-party elements" were downgraded, they were not imprisoned or executed but were assigned important posts in the government. Doesn't that make Khrushchev's CP even more democratic than Swabeck's paragon of democracy, the CCP?

But let's take a look at one more "very concrete example" directly involving the unmatched democracy of the CCP. We select two individuals in every way comparable to Li Li-san and Wang Ming.

In a special supplement to People's China (later changed to Peking Review) dated April 16, 1955, there was published a "Resolution on the Anti-Party Alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih," adopted by a National Conference of the CCP on March 31, 1955.

Let us first present the credentials of the two individuals involved to establish that they were in no way "tainted" with Trotskyism. Kao Kang was a Maoist from the beginning. He headed a Red Army unit in North Shensi, Mao's home province. Kang was numbered among those commanders who have gone down in Chinese history as one of the "Long Marchers." He was a party leader throughout the whole period of the Civil War. At the founding Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in 1949, Kang was elected as vice-chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.

Jao Shu-shih was director of the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee. He occupied top posts in the CCP and the government administrative apparatus. No Johnny-come-Lately these, but tried and true Stalinists of long standing.

Applying the technique perfected by Stalin, both culprits were charged with retroactive crimes dating from the period of their elevation to positions of leadership in the party and government. We are informed that "Kao Kang's anti-Party activities had a fairly long history. The facts brought to light before and after the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party held in February 1954 proved that, from 1949 on, Kao Kang carried on conspiratorial activities aimed at seizing leadership in the Party and the state."

As for Jao Shu-shih, we are told he "was Kao Kang's chief ally in his conspiratorial activities against the Party. It has been fully established that in the ten years between 1943 and 1953 Jao Shu-shih resorted on many occasions to shameless deceit in the Party to seize power."

Worst of all, it appears that neither of the two men charged with all the crimes in the calendar, would "confess." The resolution complains that "from the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party up to the present, Jao Shu-shih has never shown any signs of repentance, and still persists in an attitude of attacking the Party." (My emphasis)

Nor were they permitted to state their defense against the charges. Both were expelled, "unanimously" of course, and "removed from all posts they held within and outside the party." Later Peking reported that Kao Kang had "committed suicide." Jao Shu-shih disappeared and is believed to have been imprisoned or executed.

If we were to apply Swaback's logic we would be justified in concluding that this "one very concrete example" cancels out Swaback's "concrete example" and so we are back where we started. Li Li-san and Wang Ming haven't been heard from in years. Unless Swaback is privy to information not made public we must assume that the lot of Swaback's dramatis personae is not all beer and skittles.

#### Nao the Thought Remoulder!

In her recent bulletin article entitled: "Why the Majority Leaders Do Not Understand Red Chinese Democracy," Comrade Hilde McLeod literally drools over "the Chinese method of

'criticism and self-criticism'" or, as she informs us, what Mao Tse-tung calls "thought remoulding." She falsely credits Mao with an innovation that is, in reality, a plagiarism from the "master" himself, Joseph Stalin.

It is not for nothing that Mao claims the distinction of being Stalin's foremost disciple. The monstrous formula of "criticism and self-criticism," or "thought remoulding," if you prefer, developed parallel with the Stalinist degeneration of the Soviet Union. In the process the Soviets were emasculated and the Russian Communist Party was converted into an instrument for consolidating the strangle-hold of the bureaucratic caste on the economic, political and social life of the country.

Throughout the Comintern, Lenin's concept of democratic centralism was horribly perverted into the theory of "monolithism" based on the practice of bureaucratic centralism. From the beginning our struggle against the Stalinist degeneration required repeated and sustained explanation of the vital distinction between Lenin's democratic centralism and its Stalinist perversion.

Under Lenin's concept, a minority in the party was required only to accept the decision of the majority, in action. Under the Stalinist version, a minority was obliged to agree with the majority -- to expunge from their minds their "erroneous" views, to confess their error, to swear eternal fealty to the infallible "leader" and to repent of having failed to correctly apply the self-immolating purgative of "self-criticism."

This act of self-flagellation was and is the quintessence of the Stalinist practice of "criticism and self-criticism." In addition, the limits of "criticism and self-criticism" are strictly defined. It could be applied only to "criticism of the application of the "general line" and under no circumstances to the "general line" itself -- and never, never, never, under any circumstances was it to be understood as a license to "criticise" the infallible leader!

The Maoists today subscribe to and defend the Stalinist concept of the monolithic party. Their application of "criticism and self-criticism" is not one whit superior to that practiced by Stalin and his political police. It is not democratic it is bureaucratic; it is not progressive it is a vile, inhuman abomination!

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So much for the super-democracy of the CCP. What of the "need for democratization in every phase of government and society," as stressed in the Swabeck-Liang resolution on China? Comrade McLeod assures us that there is no such need. The majority leaders, she insists, do not really understand "Red Chinese Democracy" than which there is none purer. But what about Laing, does he understand it? Or Swabeck?

In seeming contradiction to Comrade McLeod, Swabeck lectures us that we must not expect to find democracy in China but only in the industrially advanced, the "rich" nations. He even quotes Trotsky to substantiate his contention. Let's hear him out!

"The democratic regime is the most aristocratic way of ruling. It is possible only to a rich nation." So spoke Trotsky in Discussions on the Transitional Program (Fourth International, February, 1946). His rational view forms a healthy contrast to the abstract, idealized notions of democracy separate and apart from class relations and from economic conditions that one hears so often in regard to China."

This is an appalling distortion of Trotsky's views. The interview in question had nothing at all to do with the subject under discussion on China. In 1938 the SWP had undertaken to sponsor the Transition Program before the founding conference of the Fourth International. Trotsky's interview with the American comrades was in the nature of clarifying the essence of Trotsky's unique contribution especially as it applied to the United States.

The question of "rich" nations and "poor" nations mentioned in the interview had solely to do with the phenomena of the decay of bourgeois democracy and the rise of fascism. Trotsky pointed out that in the period of capitalist decay and crisis only the rich nations could afford the luxury of bourgeois democracy. That is why, he added, fascism came first to the "poor" nations, first of all Italy and then crisis-ridden Germany. Trotsky amplified on this concept in his introduction to the Living Thoughts of Karl Marx.

What has all this to do with China? In China, Swabeck insists, we have a healthy workers state and a democratic regime. To cite Trotsky on "rich" bourgeois nations and "poor" bourgeois nations as his authority for the astounding conclusion that there can be no "democracy" in a "poor" workers state is to make a mockery of Trotsky's years of struggle against the Stalinist degeneration in the Soviet Union. Didn't Lenin and



Trotsky know, when they jointly undertook to combat the cancerous growth of the Stalinist bureaucracy in the Soviet Union, that democracy was possible only in a "rich nation?"

And Swabeck has the gall to lecture us on our "idealized notions of democracy separate and apart from class relations and from economic conditions." He hashes up bourgeois democracy with workers democracy and implies that "economic conditions" in a "poor" nation like China makes "democracy" a luxury the Maoists cannot afford. It was always the view of Trotskyism that with the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the widest range of workers democracy is essential to a harmonious development of the nationalized economy in the transition period from capitalism to socialism.

That far from being a "barrier" to the economic development of the workers' states, workers democracy and workers control is an essential ingredient in planning production and administering the planned economy.

That it is only through the establishment of workers democracy and workers control that bureaucratic distortions and deformations of the planned economy can be eradicated.

That only through workers democracy and workers control can the appetite of the bureaucracy, which devours an inordinate share of the national income, be curbed.

That only workers democracy and workers control can prevent bureaucratic power and privilege from imposing a frightful cost on the people as a whole.

That, as I understand it, is Trotskyism! If Swabeck now believes that only "rich" workers states can afford democracy, let him so state -- but please don't try and saddle Trotsky with that view.

How does Cuba fit into Swabeck's "rich nation" only theory? All of the arguments the Maoists use to justify the need for a monolithic party and state are present with greater force and urgency in Cuba. Yet the experience of Cuba has demonstrated that workers democracy and control has served to strengthen the revolution and widen its base of support among the whole people. So much for Swabeck's "rich nation" theory.

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The one thing that impels the Swabeckians to rise in righteous wrath is the insistence by the majority in designating Maoism as a variety of Stalinism. Not an identity but nonetheless one of a number of varieties. To insist upon an identity is to dissolve Stalinism in a fog of semantic verbiage. Nevertheless Stalinism does exist. Does it have a consistent ideology? Not to my knowledge. It is capable of the most violent zig-zags. Its most universal feature, in those countries where it is in power, is that of a privileged bureaucratic caste, resting on the foundation of those property forms and relations characteristic of a workers' state.

Its common outlook is that of national socialism. Its characteristic features, the repression of workers democracy, the absence of workers control, which invest it with the character of a totalitarian regime, bolstered by the theory and practice of monolithism in both political party and government.

In the joint Swabeck-Liang document, "The Peking Regime and Stalinism," (Vol. 22, No. 5, March 1961) it is conceded: "That there are hangovers (even strong ones) of Stalinism in the CCP leadership we would not deny." (My emphasis) That was written some two years ago. Since then the denials have been coming thick and fast. Suppose we let the Maoists speak for themselves!

Just prior to Stalin's death in 1953 the Foreign Languages Press of Peking published a pamphlet by Chen Po-ta entitled: "Stalin and the Chinese Revolution: In Celebration of Stalin's Seventieth Birthday." According to the bibliographical blurb in the pamphlet, Chen Po-ta is identified as "A member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, (and) is concurrently Vice-President of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Peking and Vice-President of the Academia Sinica." In other words, a man qualified to speak on the subject of Stalin and Mao.

I quote from page 1, paragraph 1, line 1, as follows:

"At the meeting held in Yen-an to celebrate Stalin's sixtieth birthday, Comrade Mao Tse-tung said:

"Stalin is the leader of world revolution. This is of paramount importance. It is a great event that mankind is blessed with Stalin. Since we have him, things can go well. As you all know, Marx is dead and so are Engels and Lenin. Had there been no Stalin, who would be there to give directions? But having him -- this is really a blessing. Now there exist in the world a Soviet Union, a Communist Party and also a Stalin. Thus, the affairs of the world can go well."

That was on the occasion of Stalin's sixtieth birthday in 1943. Swaback informs us that Mao ceased to be a Stalinist in 1953. Liang takes exception and dates the transformation as having occurred in 1946. But hold on a minute! Let Chen Po-ta have the floor. After a glance back at the whole panorama of the Chinese revolutionary development, Chen emphatically affirms:

"It is clear that ever since 1927 those comrades in our party who at one time or other committed various kinds of opportunist deviations against Comrade Mao Tse-tung's correct line did so because they had all forgotten every lesson contained in Stalin's refutation of the trotskyites (sic) in 1927. This was the case whether the issue involved the nature or the tactics of the revolution, whether it was political or military. These mistakes created a lot of trouble for our revolution in its progress."

(Throughout the pamphlet Chen Po-ta uses a lower case "t" in "trotskyites." I presume that is in line with Mao's Paper Tiger dictum to "despise the enemy strategically.") Be that as it may, let's continue the quotation --

"Under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, our Party, by advancing along a devious path, finally overcame both the objective difficulties and subjective errors and carried the revolution to victory. This is because Comrade Mao Tse-tung's views on the nature and tactics of the Chinese revolution were based on the teachings of Stalin and were identical with the views of Stalin. Furthermore, he has developed in the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution Stalin's teachings regarding the Chinese revolution."

So that there will be no mistake whatever of where Mao -- in 1953 -- stood in relation to Stalin, Chen Po-ta adds:

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung is Stalin's disciple and comrade-in-arms. He is Stalin's outstanding disciple and has been able to lead China's revolution to victory because his method of work and his way of reasoning are those of Stalin's. He uses Stalin's methods to learn from Stalin. These are the methods of creative Marxists which Stalin referred to in his famous article written to commemorate Lenin's fiftieth birthday." And so on and so forth for 53 pages.

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I probably owe Comrade Swaback an apology. There is one oblique "criticism" of Maoism in his most recent document. "One Militant editorial," he says, "notices the omission in

the Chinese document of any mention of Stalin or Stalinism. In other documents this omission has been patched over, but not in accord with our views. (How delicately put! T.K.) At certain points Stalin is quoted approvingly as a Marxist-Leninist, some of his opinions, including some of his slanders of Trotsky are accepted. The fact that these have reference to the early period in Stalin's career -- before the blood purges -- makes them no less objectionable to us. We reject them. These are the paradoxical aspects of the Chinese position whose main characteristic is the head-on attack on the basic pillars of Stalin's policies which still remain in full force in the Kremlin."

All that's involved, you see, are a few "paradoxical aspects" of the Chinese position having "reference to the early period of Stalin's career!" What Swaback so lightly dismisses are such crude and brazen falsifications of history as would make even a Stalin blush.

Let us cite just a few from Chen Po-ta: "After Chiang Kai-shek had betrayed the revolution in 1927, Stalin refuted the nonsense of the trotskyites about confusing the Chinese revolution with Turkey's 'Kemalist form of revolution.'"

What was Stalin's prognosis? "Victory in China will be won either by the Chinese Mussolinis like Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-chang, who will then be swept away by the agrarian revolution, or by Wuhan (referring to the revolutionary regime in Wuhan of the time -- Author); Chiang Kai-shek and his followers, trying to hold out between these two camps, must inevitably fall and share the fate of Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-chang."

What actually happened? "When Wang Ching-wei, (head of the "revolutionary regime" in Wuhan -T.K.) following in the footsteps of Chiang Kai-shek, betrayed the revolution, Stalin again refuted the nonsense of the trotskyites about the bankruptcy of the Chinese revolution and affirmed that there was no room in China for reformism." With each "betrayal" Stalin meticulously "refuted the nonsense of the Trotskyites" who warned in advance that the "betrayals" would come!

When Stalin called upon the Chinese workers and peasants to place their faith in Chiang Kai-shek and then Wang Ching-wei he "affirmed" after both had "betrayed" the revolution that "there was no room in China for reformism." Ergo? "Stalin's predictions encouraged the Chinese people in their struggle over the past twenty-odd years and clearly demonstrated that

revolutionary science is an irresistible force. At the same time, they exposed the shameless way in which the trotskyites and all reactionary clowns served the counter-revolution of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei."

All of which leads Chen Po-ta to the ineluctable conclusion, that: "Stalin pointed out that the viewpoint held by Trotsky and his underlings was the counter-revolutionary viewpoints of Clang Tso-lin and Chiang Kai-shek. As everyone knows, it was precisely because the trotskyites based themselves on the whole of Trotsky's counter-revolutionary views and at the same time on these counter-revolutionary views of Trotsky's in relation to China that they took the road of counter-revolution together with the trotskyites in other countries." (my emphasis)

And to what source does Chen Po-ta trace all of the "errors" of the critics of Mao? "Since 1927, the errors committed by the dogmatists in our Party, who were 'Left' opportunists at one time and Right opportunists at another, consisted precisely in forgetting the lessons contained in Stalin's refutation of the trotskyites."

#### Swaback's Sui Generis Entry!

Doesn't all of this indicate that the SWP should heed Swaback's admonition to cease operating "with the ready-made formulas of yesterday" and execute an entry "sui generis" into the CCP? It would have to be sui generis of a most unique kind for even Swaback is constrained to observe that: "We cannot enter into membership, but we can and must become active participants in these profound (Chinese) developments."

What does all this gibberish add up to? We couldn't "enter" if we would but we "can and must become active participants." How? Any criticism of the Mao regime is derided as "standing on the sidelines and hurling bricks." First of all, Swaback's entry sui generis would involve exchanging our critical "bricks" for floral bouquets. Then to find "new formulas" (specially tailored) to deodorize some of the more noxious "paradoxical aspects" of Maoism. But for that kind of "participation" why do we need a party? Wouldn't it be preferable to drop the Trotskyist label altogether and dissolve the SWP into the American "Friends of Mao's Chinese People's Republic?"

Why doesn't Swaback come out openly and say what he means! If the Swaback entry gambit has any validity at all it would apply not to the SWP, but to what Comrade McLeod daintily refers as the "small band of Chinese Trotskyists" who have "become something pitifully whining in a corner in Hong Kong." We can be assured, from even a cursory perusal of Comrade McLeod's zapsody of Mao's

ineffable technique of "thought remoulding," that after a few applications of Mao's celebrated therapy the "small band of Trotskyists" in Hong Kong would cease their "pitiful whining." Of course, those who failed to respond to the treatment would likely die in the attempt but we can be certain that those who survived would emerge as simon-pure "participants." They would no longer be Trotskyists, to be sure, but if we accept at face value everything that Comrade McLeod says, that would be all to the good! Better Maoist "participants" than "whining" Trotskyist "sideline" critics.

### The Myth of Mao's "Break" with Stalin

For years there has been a sedulously fostered myth of Mao's "break" with Stalin; of Mao as a Marxist innovator on a par with Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky. Bourgeois "experts" on China have been arguing the question pro and con for some time. In the April-June 1960 issue of The China Quarterly professor Karl A. Wittfogel, professor of Chinese History at the University of Washington, engages in a polemic against the Fairbanks-Schwartz-Brandt school of Chinese historians in an article entitled: The Legend of "Maoism." Wittfogel effectively punctures the "Legend" by demonstrating that it is largely based on deliberate falsifications of historical events by Mao and the Maoists.

The myth of Mao's "break" with Stalin lies at the root of the Swabeck-Liang position on China. Swabeck and Liang differ over precisely when the "break" occurred. This difference led to the heated denial by Liang that the analyses of Li Fu-jen were colored by "the white heat of anger over Stalin's terrible bloodbaths in Moscow." It led also, to the charge by Liang, that Swabeck had capitulated to people's frontism. While they differ over dates, both agree on the "fact" of Mao's "break" with Stalin. When did the "break" occur and of what did it consist?

Chen Po-ta and Mao to the contrary notwithstanding, Swabeck dates the "break" with Stalin from the "historic defeat in 1927." "Since then," he avers, "Chinese history shows a consistent pattern of the Communist Party engaged in struggle." (On Evaluating the Chinese Revolution. DB Vol. 24, No. 3, January 1963)

On page 14 of the same DB Swabeck elaborates on this theme. "During the second Chinese Revolution which suffered terrible defeat in 1927," he says, "the CCP, under the leadership of Chen Tu-hsiu became a victim of Stalin's Menshevik policy. After

this defeat the party made a 180 degree turn to a leftist adventurist position under the Li Li-san and later the Wang Ming leadership; it was exemplified by the ill-fated Canton Commune and the disastrous attempt to capture Changsha. This policy was not finally changed until 1935 by the establishment of the Mao Tse-tung leadership at the party conference at Tsunyi on the Long March from Kiangsi to Yen-an. (My emphasis) None of the former party leaders were purged; they remained in responsible positions. (Proof of low democratic Mao was! T.K.)

"Through the hard school of irrepressible civil war, and the war against the Japanese imperialist invasion, the party had to steel itself and learn the lessons that prepared it for victory in 1949. Thus the change from failure and defeat under Stalin's policy to the struggle for power in defiance of the latter was the outcome of a process filled with both rich and bitter experience." (My emphasis)

Thus, we are told, the transformation of the CCP from a party based on "Stalin's Menshevik policy," to one firmly founded on Mao's "Bolshevik" line, took place in 1935 "in defiance" of Stalin. This is pure myth culled from the bowdlerized version of Chinese history as presented by the Maoist school of historical falsification.

To understand Chinese revolutionary development it is necessary to view events in their historical context. Otherwise one sinks into a Swabeckian quagmire of windy abstractions. The evidence shows that the CCP, both under the "left" leadership of Li Li-san, Wang Ming AND Mao, bowed to the "general line" of every twist and turn in the zig-zag policy of the Stalintern from beginning to end.

In the latter part of 1927 Stalin was already preparing his break with the right wing of the RCP -- Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, etc. -- under whose guidance the disastrous policy of subordinating the CCP to the Kuomintang was carried through to the bitter end. During this period Mao was an ardent supporter of this line and an active participant both as a leader of the CCP and holder of top posts in the Kuomintang. In the article by Wittfogel (cited above) he quotes: "H. N. Roy, who had headed a Comintern delegation to China in the spring of 1927, stated retrospectively: 'The Chairman of the Federation of Peasant Unions, Mao Tse-tung, in the critical days of 1927, represented the extreme right-wing view in the leadership of the Communist Party.'"

As head of the Kuomintang Peasants Unions, Mao Tse-tung "carried out the policy of keeping the peasants in check

while the counter-revolution advanced upon them." (Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution by Harold Isaacs) Wittfogel also punctures Mao's claim to have been the first to advance the slogan of Soviets for China. For his role in the abortive adventurism of the period following the collapse of the Canton Commune, Mao was dismissed from the politburo of the CCP. (He wasn't "purged" thereby proving, according to the criterion advanced by Swabeck, how democratic the CCP was even before Mao rose to power.)

Wittfogel points out that following his dismissal from the CCP politburo, Mao "became more mature and more conspicuously orthodox when, from 1928 on, he rose to ever higher positions and finally to supreme leadership in the Communist Party of China." (My emphasis)

Following the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928 Stalin made his sharp ultra-left zig-zag into what became known as the Third Period -- according to the theoreticians of Stalinism, the period of the collapse of capitalism on a world scale. Along with it came the doctrine of "social fascism." The revolution was just around the corner and all sections of the Comintern were instructed to prepare for the armed struggle for workers power. The slogan of Soviets for China for which Trotsky was flayed in the period of the rising wave of the Chinese revolution was transmuted into the organization of peasant Soviets in rural China and the establishment of the caricature known as "Soviet China," following the tragic defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution.

Every change in the "general line" of the Stalintern brought its customary crop of scapegoats in all sections of the CP. After Mao's dismissal the "leftist" Wang Ming was elevated to the position of top leadership in the CCP. With the collapse of Stalin's Third Period lunacy following the victory of Hitler in Germany, the Stalintern began its shift to people's frontism. This time it was Li Li-san and Wang Ming who played the role of scapegoat.

With the shift from the Third Period to the People's Front, Mao was elevated to power in the CCP. The Japanese invasion of China constituted a mortal threat to the Eastern Frontiers of the Soviet Union. Stalin was threatened with Hitler in the west and the Mikado in the east. Collective security and the popular front became the watchwords of the Stalintern. The Third Period perspective of social revolution was jettisoned. The central issue became the defense of "democracy" against fascism. It was under the banner of people's frontism that the Spanish revolution was curbed,



throttled and betrayed.

In China, the Stalinist turn to people's frontism marked the resumption of the policy of "united front" with the Chinese bourgeoisie. In a pamphlet published in 1951, entitled: "Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China," written by Hu Chiao-mu, Vice-Director of the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee, (hereafter designated as "Thirty Years") we are informed that "aided by the correct policy of the united front against fascism adopted by the Communist International, the Communist Party of China issued a declaration on August 1, 1935, calling for a united front" against Japanese imperialism.

The character of the "united front" was spelled out in a report by Mao Tse-tung entitled The Policy of Fighting Japanese Imperialism at a conference of Party activists on December 27, 1935.

According to the author of "Thirty Years," Mao Tse-tung "summarized the Party's task as follows: 'The task before the party is to integrate the activities of the Red Army with all the activities of the workers, peasants, students, the petty-bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie of the whole country, and to form out of this integration a united national-revolutionary front.'

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung vigorously rebutted all the arguments which the 'Left' elements in the Party had advanced against the united front. Comrade Mao Tse-tung raised the slogan of a People's Republic to replace that of a Workers' and Peasants' Republic, and formulated a correct policy relating to the national bourgeoisie both politically and economically. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that during the period of bourgeois-democratic revolution the People's Republic would protect the national bourgeoisie, who did not support imperialism and its lackeys, together with their industry and businesses."

From then on the policy of people's front class collaboration dominated the line of the CCP. The so-called agrarian reform program was quietly interred. Substituted for it was the policy of "reducing rents and interest" in the liberated areas under domination of the Chinese Red Army. Uprisings of the poor peasants against the "patriotic" landlords and rich peasants were put down by force. All reform measures were subordinated to the "patriotic War of Resistance" against Japan. The contention that the CCP, under the leadership of Mao, conducted a "revolutionary" struggle against Japanese imperialism is pure fiction.

In 1936 the "united front" was broadened to include Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. "On December 12, 1936, Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng, who demanded an alliance with the Communist Party of China in resisting Japan, detained Chiang Kai-shek in Sian, forcing him to put an end to the anti-Communist civil war which was ruining the nation. In this situation, the Communist Party of China considered it necessary to secure a peaceful solution of the Sian Incident in order to resist Japanese imperialist aggression and Chiang Kai-shek was therefore released and internal peace achieved.

"After the peaceful solution of the Sian Incident, to assist in maintaining internal peace and to win the landlord class over to joint resistance to Japanese imperialism, the Communist Party decided temporarily to suspend carrying out the policy of confiscating and redistributing the land of the landlords." ( "Thirty Years.")

The Maoist historian dates the beginning of "the nationwide patriotic War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression and the new cooperation between the KMT and the Communist Party of China," to July 7, 1937.

"On July 7, 1937, the Japanese army of invasion attacked the Chinese (KMT) garrison troops stationed at Lukouchiao, south of Peking. The garrison heroically resisted the attack. On August 13, the Japanese army of invasion again attacked Shanghai and the Shanghai garrison troops put up resistance. Then the entire nation entered the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression. After reaching an agreement with the Kuomintang Government, the Chinese Red Army and the guerilla forces which it had left behind in the various provinces of South China were reorganized successively into the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and left for the North China and East China fronts to take part in the War of Resistance."

This was the first of a whole series of agreements made with Chiang Kai-shek in which the CCP subordinated its independence to the butcher of the Chinese workers. Each time, to the very bitter end, Chiang broke the agreements when it suited his purpose. Each time to the accompaniment of anguished cries of "betrayal."

The Stalin-Hitler pact, prelude to the outbreak of World War II in 1939, provided the backdrop for Chiang's "first betrayal." The author of "Thirty Years" informs us that: "The danger of capitulation by Chiang Kai-shek reached its

peak in September 1939 when war broke out between fascist Germany and Britain and France. At that time the United States and Britain were all the more eager to seek a compromise with Japan by sacrificing China so that Japan might not join with Hitler in opposing Britain and the United States. To force China to surrender, they had to intensify their opposition to the Communist Party, which was persistently carrying on the War of Resistance. In these circumstances, from the end of 1939 to the beginning of 1940, Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang began the first anti-Communist campaign."

You might think that this "betrayal" would have been seized upon to mobilize the Chinese masses for a revolutionary struggle to overthrow the hated Chiang dictatorship. Instead, "Bolshevik" Mao utilized the occasion to launch a struggle against "left" deviations in the CCP with the publication of his book "New Democracy" in January 1940. This, according to the author of "Thirty Years," "greatly strengthened the Chinese revolution."

"To expand and consolidate the anti-Japanese national united front still further," he explains, "the Party, having overcome the Right deviations, adopted a series of measures to correct certain 'Left' deviations which began to occur during the struggle against the attacks launched by the Kuomintang on the Chinese Communist Party and people. The Party held the opinion that in the period of the War of Resistance, because the enemy of the nation had penetrated deeply into our country, the contradictions between the two nations were still the main contradictions.

"So long as the Kuomintang did not capitulate to the Japanese invaders, it was necessary and also possible not to break with the Kuomintang and to carry on our struggle against the Kuomintang reactionaries within the limits of not causing a rupture."

In furtherance of this perspective, Mao introduced his own variation of the "bloc of four classes," dubbed the "Three-threes." The "Three-threes representative system," says the author of "Thirty Years" was "the system whereby the Communists (representing the workers and the poor peasants), the progressive elements (representing the petty bourgeoisie), and the intermediate elements (representing the middle bourgeoisie and enlightened gentry) each contributed one-third of the leading personnel of the government administration, was introduced in all the Liberated Areas."

Chiang Kai-shek was not at all mollified by Mao's concessions. Our historian informs us that: "To weaken the forces of

the Chinese Communist Party, Chiang Kai-shek started a second anti-Communist campaign in January 1941. He arbitrarily ordered the headquarters of the New Fourth Army and a section of that army numbering more than 10,000, which had hitherto been stationed in southern Anhwei Province, to move to the north bank of the Yangtse River. On January 7, while on the march, the New Fourth Army was encircled and assailed by more than 80,000 Kuomintang troops and suffered tremendous losses. The commander of the Army, Yeh Ting was taken prisoner and the Deputy Commander, Hsiang Ying was killed in battle. Having carried out this plot, Chiang Kai-shek immediately abolished the designation of the New Fourth Army and ordered attacks on other sections of the New Fourth Army. This incident was known as the 'Southern Anhwei Incident.'

Just imagine! In response to Chiang Kai-shek's "arbitrary order" the Maoists sent 10,000 troops under their command marching into Chiang's bloody trap! All in deference to Mao's policy of avoiding a "rupture" with the Kuomintang. You would think that after this second "betrayal" Mao would have altered his collaborationist course. Paraphrasing an American military hero, Mao's response was: ~~Damn~~ the betrayals, full speed ahead!

Our historian tells us, for example, that, "the Southern Anhwei Incident marked only the beginning of the Chinese people's difficulties. As early as the beginning of January 1941, Japan had concentrated more than 60 percent of its aggressive forces on the fronts in the Liberated Areas which were located in the enemy's rear, and intensified large-scale 'mopping-up' campaigns against the Liberated Areas, carrying out the policy of 'Burn-all, Kill-all and Loot-all.' The bulk of the Kuomintang troops behind the Japanese lines surrendered to the enemy and became puppet troops. Over 90 percent of these puppet troops were employed, under the command of the Japanese invaders, in attacking the Liberated Areas. Chiang Kai-shek had secretly ordered many of his troops to surrender to the Japanese invaders and then, under the command of the Japanese, to turn against the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army."

"Betrayal" number three! But Mao would not be moved. The next two years were years of ebb in the "patriotic War of Resistance." In June 1941, Hitler launched his military invasion of the Soviet Union and the fascist juggernaut rolled across Russia to Stalingrad before being halted. In December 1941 came the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and America's entry into the war. In a series of lightning military thrusts the Japanese offensive shattered Anglo-American power in the Pacific. It was not until 1943 that the tide of war turned against the axis powers.

The fate of the Chinese revolution was being decided by the clash of arms between the world powers. The Maoists marked time awaiting the ultimate decision. "In such circumstances," our historian informs us, "the Liberated Areas together with their populations and troops diminished in size and encountered great financial difficulties. The Party had to make still more strenuous efforts to overcome such difficulties. It led all the government offices, schools and troops in the Liberated Areas to strive to be self-supporting by engaging in production and carried out the policy of reducing the numbers of troops, raising their quality and simplifying government administration, in order to lighten the burden on the people. At the same time, emphasis was laid on leading the people to organize themselves to develop agricultural production, in order to provide relief in case of natural calamities. Side by side with the campaign to develop production, the Party led the peasants to carry out a large-scale movement to reduce rents and interest. (My emphasis)

The revival of the War of Resistance begins with the year 1943. The Pacific counter-offensive of American imperialism brought military advisors, support and aid to Chiang Kai-shek's forces. Stalin, engaged in his own "Patriotic War" in which the central slogan was "kill Germans," relied heavily on his allies for military assistance. In 1943 he announced the formal dissolution of the Comintern. According to our historian, the year 1943 was punctuated by yet another Chiang Kai-shek "betrayal."

"Notwithstanding his own corruption and isolation," he informs us, "Chiang Kai-shek, in 1943, still vociferously alleged that the Communist Party had disrupted 'unity,' asked that a 'punitive' campaign be launched against it and moved large numbers of troops in preparation for assaults on the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region. This was the Kuomintang's third anti-Communist campaign."

Chiang's anti-Communist phobia did not fit in with the plans of his American "advisors" who, out of military considerations alone, if not because of the assurances they had received from Stalin that the social revolution had been postponed to the Greek Kalends, pressed for a "united front" in the war against Japan. Despite the latest "betrayal" our historian informs us: "To reorganize the Kuomintang Government into a democratic coalition government became the unanimous demand of all patriotic people."

With the end of the war approaching, we are informed that "the Communist Party of China called its Seventh Party Congress

in Yen-an on April 24, 1945...The Seventh Party Congress unani-  
mously adopted the General Programme of the Party and the  
Party's general and concrete programmes for the period of the  
New Democratic Revolution. It correctly analyzed the current  
world and domestic situations and called upon the whole Party  
and the people throughout the country to struggle for final  
victory in the War of Resistance and for the establishment of a  
democratic coalition government." (My emphasis)

The war in the Pacific ended with the atom-bomb atrocities  
against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 8, 1945 the Soviet  
Union declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria. On August  
14, Japan announced its unconditional surrender. The atom-  
bombing of Japan has been correctly stigmatized as an unwarranted  
atrociousness intended more as a warning to Stalin than as a  
valid military measure to force the capitulation of Japan. Despite  
the secret pacts at Yalta, Teheran, Casablanca, etc., etc.,  
defining spheres of interest and division of the spoils, the  
wartime allies did not trust each other. With the military de-  
feat of the "common enemy" the contradictions within the alliance  
came to the fore. It was not long after the Japanese surrender  
that charges and counter-charges were publicly aired leading  
in 1946 to the outbreak of the "cold war."

In his article on "Where I Differ with Comrade Swabeck  
on the China Question," Comrade Liang writes: "It was our joint  
view that the 1946-49 struggle for power marked a dividing point,  
a point of qualitative change, that saw the CCP become a genu-  
ine instrument of the socialist revolution." There is no sup-  
porting evidence for this view. On the contrary, the evidence  
shows that the CCP never did become "a genuine instrument of the  
socialist revolution."

The author of "Thirty Years" continues his narrative fol-  
lowing the surrender of Japan: "After the conclusion of the War  
of Resistance, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist  
Party on August 25, 1945, issued a Declaration Concerning the  
Present Situation, which expressed the desire of the Chinese Com-  
munist Party for peace, democracy and unity. In order to realize  
this desire, Comrade Mao Tse-tung went to Chungking on August  
28 and conferred for more than a month with Chiang Kai-shek of  
the Kuomintang. On October 10, the results of the conference  
were finally made public. They contained many agreements on  
measures to safeguard internal peace. The Chinese Communist  
Party was ready to carry out faithfully these agreements to  
which it was a party, and it had already begun to put them into  
effect. But Chiang Kai-shek, on his part, regarded these agree-  
ments as nothing but tricks to cover up his plans for starting  
war." Another "betrayal." But the end was not yet!

Another agreement was concocted and, we are told, "on January 10, 1946, he (Chiang Kai-shek) issued a truce order and called a Political Consultative Conference embracing all parties and groups. At that time the American government also nominally advocated a truce and sent George C. Marshall to replace Patrick J. Hurley in carrying on 'mediation' in China's civil war for the purpose of helping Chiang Kai-shek speed up his war preparations under the cloak of 'mediation.' Shortly after the announcement of the truce, Chiang Kai-shek ordered attacks against the People's Liberation Army which had gone to North-East China around the time of the Japanese surrender."

The history of the whole period reads like one wearisome repetition of agreement-truce-betrayal-war. Each time Chiang Kai-shek was granted an interlude of "truce" to prepare for another assault. This continued until the spring of 1947. The author of "Thirty Years" relates:

"On October 11, 1946, Kuomintang troops occupied Kalgan, one of the important cities in the Liberated Area of North China at that time. On the afternoon of the same day Chiang Kai-shek violated the resolution of the Political Consultative Conference and ordered the convocation of a dictatorial bogus 'National Assembly' which split up the nation...In March 1947, the Kuomintang reactionaries compelled the Chinese Communist Party to withdraw its delegations in Nanking, Shanghai and Chungking to Yen-an." (My emphasis) "This," concludes the author, "shattered all hopes of a peaceful settlement."

It was not until October 1947 that the CCP broke with the policy of coalition with Chiang Kai-shek and switched back to their 1935 position of coalition with the "progressive" landlords rich and middle peasants and national bourgeoisie.

On December 25, 1947, Mao Tse-tung made a report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, entitled: Present Situation and Our Tasks. It was published in this country in 1948 by New Century Publishers under the title: Turning Point in China. On the shift in line, Mao states:

"The People's Liberation Army issued a manifesto in October 1947, in which it is stated: 'Unite the workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and commercial elements, all oppressed classes, all people's organizations, all democratic parties and groups, all national minorities, overseas Chinese everywhere and other patriotic elements -- unite to organize a national united front to strike down the dictatorial government of Chiang Kai-shek and establish a democratic coalition government.'" (My emphasis)

Some bourgeois historians contend that it was the October 10, 1947 manifesto that marked a definitive break with Stalin who had not formally repudiated his "support" of Chiang. Not true.

The 1946 Fulton Missouri speech of Winston Churchill ushered in the era of cold war and signallized the open rupture of the wartime alliance. The Marshall Plan for Europe was designed to resuscitate the shattered economy and stabilize the rule of the bourgeoisie. The Communist Parties were elbowed out of the coalition governments in France and Italy. Stalin reacted with a shift to the left which brought down the jerry-built coalitions in Eastern Europe setting in motion the process of expropriations and nationalizations which transformed the states of the "buffer zone" into deformed workers states.

Stalin's "left turn" was reflected in a shift in policy in the CP's throughout the world. (In this country, for example, the American CP fostered a "third party" movement, the Wallace Progressive Party to contest the 1948 election. At that time, Swaback was one of a small group in Chicago who saw the Progressive Party development as the wave of the future and advocated "critical support." A position which was rejected by the party. It was later dropped by Swaback himself without, however, changing his view on the nature of the Progressive Party.)

Is it conceivable that the Stalin shift in line had no reflection in China? Mao tells us otherwise. In his December 25, 1947 report to the Central Committee of the CCP we are informed: "The anti-imperialist camp headed by the Soviet Union has already been formed."

Again: "The various new democratic countries of Europe are consolidating themselves internally and uniting with one another."

And: "The Communist parties of nine European countries have organized an information bureau (the Cominform) and published a summons to battle, calling on the people of the whole world to arise in opposition to the imperialist plans of enslavement."

Did the Communist Parties of the East European bloc thereby cease to be Stalinist? Yes and No! If we equate Stalinism with the period of the war and the immediate post-war period, the answer is yes. But if we use that criteria we would have to say that the Stalin of 1946-49 also ceased to be a "Stalinist." This is the type of sophistry to which Liang resorts to buttress his contention that Mao broke with Stalinism in the period 1946-49. The record proves otherwise.



In his "Where I Differ" statement, Liang avers "Comrade Swabeck and I elaborated a common viewpoint which holds that the CCP, when it threw off the Moscow-imposed shackles of people's frontism and coalitionism, thereby ceased to be a Stalinist party (more accurately, a Stalinized party) as we had always previously understood it." (My emphasis)

Precisely when did the shedding of the "Moscow-imposed shackles" occur? The manifesto of the People's Liberation Army calling for armed struggle against Chiang was issued on October 10, 1947. If not 1946, was it then that Mao abandoned the policy of people's frontism and coalitionism -- "in defiance of Stalin?"

In his December 25 report Mao insists that no such change was envisioned. In fact he insists that: The new democratic revolution is to eliminate only feudalism and monopoly capitalism, only the landlord class and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (big bourgeoisie) -- not capitalism in general and not the petty and middle bourgeoisie. "Owing to the backwardness of China's economy," he adds, "it will be necessary to permit the existence, for a long period, of the capitalist economy represented by the broad petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie even after the nation-wide victory of the revolution." (My emphasis)

And Mao was as good as his word. After the fall of the Kuomintang the Maoists established a coalition government, designated the People's Republic of China. The First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Consultative Conference, meeting on September 29, 1949, adopted "the Organic Law" of the new government. Article I reads: "The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference is the organization of the democratic united front of the entire Chinese people. Its aim is to unite all democratic classes and all nationalities throughout China by establishing the unity of all democratic parties and groups and people's organizations." Mao establishes here a new "Marxist-Leninist" category -- "democratic classes." If this isn't people's frontism, Comrade Liang, what would you call it? Was this step taken in "defiance" of Stalin? Why was it necessary, the "Master Bolshevik" would have voted for it with both hands.

The October 10, 1947 manifesto calling for armed struggle against Chiang met with a popular response from all sections of the population with the exception of the narrow circle of compradors grouped around Chiang. This corrupt gang of grasping, greedy and degenerate parasites, were despised and hated by the people. Unable and unwilling to conduct an effective struggle against the hated Japanese invader Chiang became an object of revulsion to virtually the entire Chinese population. The Kuo-

mintang was rotten to the core. It could not rely for support either on the people or the KMT armed forces which disintegrated in the course of the civil war, tens of thousands going over to the "People's Liberation Army." Short of direct, massive military intervention by its American "ally" the Chiang regime was doomed.

Much as they would have liked to do so, the American imperialists were unable to commit the forces necessary to fight a war in China. Washington was beset with its own difficulties and problems. The post-war strike wave in the U.S., the growing clamor to "bring the boys home" which developed into an organized movement in the armed forces, the massive aid, both economic, political and military required in Europe to bolster the shaky bourgeois regimes, made it impossible for Washington to embark on a military adventure to "save" China.

It was against this background that the CCP rode to power on the crest of a revolutionary wave of popular revolt. But did the CCP provide a genuine revolutionary leadership, as we are now told by the Swabeck-Liang bloc? At each step of the development the CCP was literally forced to take measures contrary to their stated program and often in opposition to their desires in a fight for survival. This was true of the alleged Maoist form of "coalition" with Chiang's Kuomintang which differed fundamentally with that of the second Chinese revolution in 1926-27.

But there is no evidence that Stalin insisted or pressed for a repetition of the 1926-27 debacle. Whatever illusions Stalin may have had then were shattered in the subsequent period. He was well aware that a 1926-27 type coalition would mean suicide -- physically -- for the CCP. From his own narrow, bureaucratic interests Stalin stood in mortal dread of a China dominated by either Japan or the United States. For the CCP to serve as an effective curb on Chiang it would have to retain its primary instrument of power, its armed contingents.

The "left" shift beginning in 1946 signified no fundamental change in Stalin or Stalinism but expressed the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy which sought to defend its home base, the Soviet Union, from the imperialist threat of armed encirclement and war. While there were undoubtedly conflicts and friction over tactical questions there is no reason to believe, and the record fails to show, any definitive "break" between Stalin and Mao.

Was there any "break" so far as the conduct of the civil war was concerned? We are told that the CCP carried on a con-

sistant "revolutionary policy" during the entire period of the civil war. Let's examine this claim. The most burning social problem in China was that of the Agrarian Reform. This was the foremost of the uncompleted tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolutions of 1911 and 1926-27. In his December 25, 1947 report, Mao outlines the shifts in policy on this question and how they occurred.

"During the anti-Japanese war," he affirms, "for the sake of establishing an anti-Japanese united front with the Kuomintang and uniting all people who at the time were still capable of resisting Japan, our Party on its own initiative changed from the policy before the anti-Japanese war of confiscating landlord's lands and distributing them to the peasants to that of reducing rents and interest." "This," he insists, "was entirely necessary."

However: "After the Japanese surrender, the peasants urgently demanded the land and we, therefore, made a timely decision to change the agrarian policy of reducing rents and interest to one of confiscating the lands of the landlord class and distributing them to the peasants." (My emphasis) In other words, the CCP had to run like hell to catch up with their followers.

The peasants were no longer to be put off with promises. They "urgently demanded the land," and, in fact, proceeded to carry out their own expropriations, which led the CCP to "make a timely decision to change the agrarian policy."

Writing of these events while they were still fresh and before memory and brain became befogged with the effluvia of Mao's "Great Leap" into the People's Communes, the erstwhile Trotskyist specialist on China, Li Fu-jen, confirmed these facts. In a review of Jack Belden's book, China Shakes the World, extending over two issues of The Militant, Feb. 27 and March 13, 1950, Li Fu-jen writes:

"It was only under the urgent pressure of the impatient peasant masses that they (CCP) finally went over to a program of land expropriation with the cry of 'land to the landless.' As Belden puts it, 'with the Japanese surrender...poorer peasants could no longer be put off with talk.' They wanted the land. Had the Stalinists not agreed to give it to them, they would have taken it themselves, in fact were already doing so.

"Moscow's Chinese henchmen are here revealed very clearly, not as revolutionary leaders of the masses, but as opponents of revolutionary action. The restraints imposed upon the

peasants by their supposed leaders were excused on the familiar ground of the need for 'national unity' against the imperialist invader. Belden accepts this excuse, as he does most of the Stalinist apologetics."

Sounds like a polemic against Swabeck, doesn't it? And Swabeck can hardly claim that the above was written "in the white heat of anger over Stalin's terrible blood-baths in Moscow!" From the same review -- on the alleged "break" with Stalin over the policy of coalition with Chiang:

"The banner of agrarian revolution was not unfolded until more than two years after the defeat of Japan. During the war, the Stalinists pursued a policy of class collaboration in the alleged interests of the struggle against the foreign invader. With the war over, they strove with might and main to forge a 'coalition' with Chiang Kai-shek. Only when this effort failed because of the obstinate refusal of Chiang and his landlord capitalist backers to make any concessions, did the Stalinists declare open war on agrarian 'feudalism' and call for the destruction of the Kuomintang regime."

How does this account by Li Fu-jen square with Liang's current thesis of the qualitative change in the CCP during the period 1946-49? Wouldn't we be justified in saying of Liang what Li Fu-jen says of Belden: "Conscientious as a reporter, he is careless in dealing with the past, falls into repeated error, accepts Stalinist political double-talk as objective truth, and ends up in a sticky mess of confusion."

The complete absence of a conscious revolutionary policy exacted a frightful toll of human lives and prolonged the agony of the war and civil war. The "War of Resistance" against Japan was fought as a "patriotic" war. The Japanese invasion armies were composed of workers and peasants who had no more love for the Mikado and his coterie of military-fascist generals than did the Chinese people for Chiang Kai-shek. With a revolutionary policy it would have been possible to set in motion a process of social revolution in China that would have infected the Japanese troops, undermined their morale, aroused their sympathy, and inspired them to settle accounts with their own exploiters.

That was the policy of the Red Army under Trotsky's leadership in the Russian Revolution where, under incomparably more difficult circumstances, fighting a war on 21 fronts against the armies of the Whites and imperialist military contingents, Bolshevik revolutionary propaganda undermined the legions of

the counter-revolution, infected the troops of the Kaiser's imperial army, and set in motion a process of revolutionary upheaval throughout Europe.

But Mao and Company strictly adhered to the pattern set by Stalin's "Patriotic War" in which the central slogan was: Kill Germans. By this policy Stalin drove the German workers back into the arms of the hated Hitler, throttled any hope of a revolutionary development in Europe, propped up the tottering capitalist structures through his "coalition" policy, planted the seed of future war by his German policy, and helped preserve and perpetuate the decaying capitalist order which now threatens the very future of mankind with nuclear annihilation.

With the surrender of Japan the policy of Mao in China was to circumscribe, limit and control, the revolutionary development. With the exception of the agrarian reform which was literally forced on the CCP the Mao policy was to confine the civil war to purely military means. There was no call to the workers in the cities to rise and take the power. On the contrary, despite spontaneous risings in Shanghai and elsewhere, the workers were discouraged from taking the revolutionary road to power. Mao and Company were fully aware that an insurrectionary struggle for power in the cities would have doomed their plans for a people's front coalition government and endangered their aim to establish their "monolithic" control of the state.

In his Belden review, Li Fu-jen comments on this aspect of the development. Belden, he observes, "should reflect upon what the Stalinists did in the great industrial city of Shanghai, where they imposed a ban on strikes, instituted compulsory arbitration, slashed wages, and lengthened the working day. What we see throughout," he concludes, "is not some episodic deviation or accidental political aberration, but a consistent pattern of policy and conduct which suggests, not a party of genuine revolutionists, but a coterie of political adventurers."

Not the least of the results of CCP policy toward the workers in the cities was that it permitted Chiang Kai-shek to escape from the mainland with part of his army and set himself up in Taiwan (Formosa) as the "legitimate" ruler of China. A workers revolution in the cities would have made impossible Chiang Kai-shek's flight to Formosa. Through puppet Chiang Kai-shek American imperialism has established a beach-head off the China coast. This is not the least part of the price paid by Mao's people's front coalition policy in China.

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If this article seems to be heavily weighted on the "critical" side, I feel that it is necessary to refute the myth of Maoism which the Liang-Swabeck bloc utilizes as a springboard to launch an attack upon the basic tenets of Trotskyism. To this end, the history of the Chinese development has been distorted, perverted and falsified. Liang's "critical support" differs from Swabeck's uncritical panegyric about Maoism which seeks to whitewash Stalinism in China from the year 1927. The fact that Liang dates Mao's resurrection from the year 1946 doesn't make the "sticky mess" any more palatable.

July 1963

THE END