

SWP

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THE SWABECK TENDENCY  
A DISCUSSION ON THE METHOD OF CAPITULATION

by Murray Zuckoff

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The discussion on the Third Chinese Revolution, more specifically, the discussion around the Communes, has revealed the formation, steady growth and hardening of a pro-Maoist tendency in the party. Over a period of four years, a sharp difference has developed between the majority of the party's leadership which continues to defend the revolution and its conquests, and a minority tendency whose platform is characterized by uncritical support of the Chinese bureaucracy.

Let us remember that the first difference to appear between various comrades in the party leadership was on the occasion of a proposed article by Daniel Roberts on the Chinese Communes. This was sharply criticized by the Los Angeles NC group in a Draft submitted to the Political Committee on March 15, 1959. This Draft stated in part: "As socialist partisans of the Chinese revolution, we hail the Communes. We defend their progressive character against the host of class enemies who try to distort and diminish its significance. We do this in spite of the Stalinist exaggerations and despite any bureaucratic distortions and repressions. The new developments manifestly testify to the creative initiative of the Chinese people emerging from destitution and endowed with new energy by their revolution." (Discussion Bulletin Vol. 20, No. 8)

Two days later, Swabek in a letter to Dobbs wrote: "We must view the communes as a progressive development. Our position toward them must be unconditional support, i.e., support regardless of the bureaucratic regime. Criticism of the bureaucratic excesses, arbitrariness, waste and mismanagement in these developments is due, of course. But such criticism can be justified, it can have value and it can have real meaning only on the basis of an affirmative position in support of the communes. But such support does not change in the least our rejection of peaceful coexistence based on the status quo of capitalist relations. We remain principled opponents of the theory and practice of socialism in one country which is directly ~~interconnected~~ with the acceptance of the status quo and its deadly consequences to the international working-class movement. ~~That~~ this theory still remains the guiding concept of the Chinese Stalinists was evidenced during the events in Hungary." (ibid) (emphasis added, M.Z.) At that time Swabek still accepted the characterization of the regime as bureaucratic and the

## leadership of China as Stalinist.

The opposition to Roberts article on the Communes was still within the framework of "an affirmative position in support of the communes" "regardless of the bureaucratic regime." The differences appeared to be more of a terminological approach than a difference of political orientation. Even so, the sharpness of tone and the opposition to having the Roberts article published in the magazine revealed, not a difference of approach but a conflict of a political line and conclusion.

On April 6, 1959, the Secretariat submitted a Draft Resolution on the Chinese Communes which supported Roberts approach to the Chinese communes and reaffirmed our resolution, "The Third Chinese Revolution and its Aftermath, " adopted in 1955, which stated: "The contradiction between the conquests of the revolution and the bureaucratic rulers is the central internal contradiction of Chinese society, determining its movement. At the same time, it is the point of departure for the Trotskyists to base their policy for China."

The 1959 Draft Resolution proceeded to outline the correct framework for evaluating the communes, and the tasks before the party. "The resolution of the contradiction between the conquests of the revolution and the bureaucratic rulers is the task of the Chinese workers. It is expressed in the program of the vanguard calling for the institution of proletarian democracy. They will find additional bases of support for their political demands in the experience of the 'communes' as these reveal on a new plane and in a still more glaring way the empirical, maneuverist, nationalistic and bureaucratic character of a petty-bourgeois leadership trained in the school of Stalinism.

"Politically advanced workers in the U.S., while defending the progressive character of the 'rural people's communes' and wishing them success, can best demonstrate their international class solidarity and help the Chinese people in the difficult tasks before them by resolutely continuing their own class struggle. In its general propaganda the Socialist Workers Party places high such demands as 'Hands Off China', 'Recognize the People's Republic of China,' and 'Extend Long-term Credits to China.' It will find it easier to advance the socialist cause the better it defends the Chinese revolution."

The response to this approach, and in growing opposition to it, was formulated by Liang in "The Draft Resolution on the China Communes-- A Commentary". In it he stated: "The continuing drumfire of hostile comment on

the Communes by capitalist propagandists places us squarely before the need to take a clear-cut position on what, essentially, is a class-struggle issue : FOR or AGAINST the Communes? The Draft Resolution fails to take such a clear-cut position. There is no need to repeat our well-known opposition to the 'bureaucratic deformations' (Par. 4 of the draft resolution). There is a need to make clear our support of the developing Chinese revolution in all its stages, the present stage being the communes." (ibid) (emphasis in original, M.Z.)

For the first time the note of "factionalism" is introduced. In the same "Commentary", Liang takes the occasion to remark: "The one explicit reference to the progressive character of the Communes is a perfunctory statement in the final paragraph of the draft -- 'wishing them success'. This apparent endorsement of the Communes is largely cancelled out, however, by the preceding paragraph which places 'communes' in quotation marks and appears to limit their usefulness to 'reveal(ing) on a new plane and in a still more glaring way... of a petty-bourgeois leadership trained in the school of Stalinism.' Anti-Stalinist factionalism here takes precedence over scientific analysis." (ibid) (emphasis added, M.Z.). The date of this "Commentary" was April 10, 1959. Less than a month earlier, Liang's co-thinker, Swabeck still referred to the Chinese leaders as Stalinist. What happened in less than a month to change this characterization and to accuse the Secretariat of "anti-Stalinist factionalism"?

At the time this outburst appeared to be motivated by the anxiety over "the continuing drumfire". The reaction to defend the communes against bourgeois reaction was commendable but misplaced. During the 1930's, the continuing drumfire of hostile comment on the Soviet Union, prompted Andre Gide to remark: "The stupid and dishonest attack on the Soviet Union has brought it about that we now defend it with a certain obstinacy." "Trotsky's answer was sharp and to the point. "But the stupidity and dishonesty of one's enemies is no justification for one's own blindness. The working masses, at any rate, have need of clearsighted friends." Unfortunately, Liang failed to assimilate this approach.

Aside from anxiety, Liang also manifested a certain timidity, even trepidation about the "need to repeat our well-known opposition to the 'bureaucratic deformations'". By August 28, 1959, this timidity gave way to self-assurance in the article Liang co-authored with Swabeck entitled "Ten Years of the Chinese Revolution". (Discussion Bulletin Vol. 20, No.16).

"Duncan's observation that persuasion is the method

used by the Peking regime to carry out policies denotes the sharpest possible contrast with the regime of bureaucratic terror...in the Soviet Union, in Stalin's day,... The explanation for Peking's attitude is really quite simple. The Communist Party regime has been riding a constantly advancing revolutionary wave in which the great masses of people have not only welcomed, but demanded the most radical reorganization of social and economic life. Coercion is unnecessary where the people willingly cooperate. Moreover, there is not now a bureaucracy in China such as that in the Soviet Union -- a hardened social formation of a parasitic character, consuming an inordinate share of the national product, standing above the people -- a social formation crystallized in a period of revolutionary retreat. The Peking regime is not a carbon copy of the Moscow regime. Instead there is an administrative apparatus, whose lower echelons are close to the masses in both living standards and social outlook. The fires of revolution have not cooled. It is this fact, basically, that explains the relative closeness of the 'bureaucracy' to the masses and its ready responsiveness to their needs and demands." (emphasis mine, M.Z.) Quite simple indeed!

While this paragraph is filled with ambiguous statements and half-truths, the general line is quite clear. This time it was Swabek's and Liang's opportunity to remove quotation marks around a term. Quite simple! Quite a trick tool! The bureaucracy was dissolved into an "administrative apparatus". Swabek and Liang transported us from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom by the stroke of a pen. This represented their "great leap forward."

A scintillating problem is thus posed. What sort of "administrative apparatus" is it that "rides" the revolutionary wave and is confronted by "demands" for the radical reorganization of social and economic life? What is the relationship between the wave and the apparatus? Who controls whom? The real problem is whether the wave will overturn the apparatus or whether the apparatus will harness the wave. This of course, in the final analysis will be decided by the revolutionary forces both within China and on a world scale. In the meantime, Swabek and Liang assure us that the relationship is one of "ready responsiveness" by the apparatus.

We are informed, in rapid succession that there is no bureaucracy in China now of a (1) "hardened social formation"; (2) "of a parasitic character"; (3) "consuming an inordinate share of the national product"; (4) "standing above the people"; (5) "crystallized in a period of

revolutionary retreat."

No one has claimed that there is a carbon copy of the Moscow regime in Peking. The Moscow regime originated during the ebb tide of revolutionary struggles. But it continued to consolidate itself on the basis of revolutionary defeats which it had prepared, either by the application of a misguided and incorrect theory, or incorrect estimate of forces (Germany 1924, China 1925-27, Germany 1928-32), or by consciously breaking the back of the revolution (Spain 1936). The Chinese regime originated during the flood-tide of revolutionary struggle and carried to power by its momentum. That is the basis for its responsiveness. To understand the way it responds and the limits of this response it is necessary to view its history -- not the fantastic one projected by Swabeck-Liang-MacLeod -- but the actual history.

The Soviet bureaucracy became a parasitic formation over an extended period of time, after a certain quantitative growth of the productive forces had taken place. "Soviet economy had to lift itself from its poverty to a somewhat higher level before fat deposits of privilege became possible.....it is already adequate to give significant privileges to a minority, and convert inequality into a whip for the spurring on of the majority." (Revolution Betrayed) There is sufficient evidence to show that an enormous bureaucracy is congealing. The higher echelons are hardly subsisting on a mere skilled workman's wage.

Furthermore, the Soviet bureaucracy became a hardened social formation by conducting a wave of terror, police actions, frame-ups and mass extermination of all its opponents while asserting that it had "the most democratic constitution in the world." The theory of socialism in one country served to justify the continued existence of the bureaucracy. All these various currents acted and reacted to strengthen and consolidate the Soviet bureaucracy. The Chinese bureaucracy, reacting to the pressure of the masses, insufficient industrialization and external pressures are developing similar features as the Soviet bureaucracy. In some areas, such as the struggle for the productivity of labor, their economic zig-zags are far more accentuated today than were those in the Soviet Union at the end of their first five-year plan. To overcome this, the Maoist bureaucracy is involved in a caricature of the Stakhanovist methods by a series of unplanned and abortive "campaigns" and "commandisms". The Maoist bureaucracy is also repeating the campaigns of arrest, imprisonments and executions of political opponents. The Chinese leadership is also involved in building socialism in one country

"in the shortest possible time."

The great leap forward that Swabeck and Liang took in August 1959 carried them to conclusions diametrically opposed to the views presented in 1955 Draft Resolution and since then defended and reaffirmed in the current P.C. Draft Resolution. Liang levelled a double-barrelled blast at both the Chinese Trotskyists and the SWP. "We must do what has to be done: drop the program of the political revolution and advise our Chinese comrades to do likewise." (Discussion Bulletin Vol. 24, No. 6). Swabeck followed this up by informing the party about the "inescapable conclusion. It demands steps necessary to end this confusion firstly, by dropping the absurdities about deformed revolution, Stalinist regime and political revolution in China; secondly by adopting a position of critical support to the Mao Tse-tung regime and its basic policies." (On Evaluating the Chinese Revolution, Vol. 24, No. 3). Of course Swabeck does not inform us what "critical support" would look like after dropping our other demands ("absurdities").

The distance that the Swabeck tendency has traveled since 1959 can be seen by presenting Swabeck in 1957 when, in answering the Marcy tendency he wrote: "But the Stalinist leaders took power in China not in the name of a socialist program, nor even in the name of the working class. They continued to cling to their theory of a 'revolution in stages'...

"Only to comrades who are more concerned with their own schematic proposition than they are with the living process of the revolution could this signify the creation of a workers state. Power in the hands of the Stalinists is not itself equal to a workers state, and much less so when this power is based on a capitalist program. Our adherence to the designation WORKERS STATE for the Soviet Union...is primarily because of its socialist type of relations of production; the Stalinist power marks its special feature of degeneracy.

"Marxists view the revolution as a process of development. And in the case of China a drastic change toward measures of expropriation of capitalism had to take place before we could recognize a qualitative change in the character of the regime. That change followed several years after the seizure of power, and as a result of the dialectical interaction of contradictory forces.

"The weakness of the Chinese capitalist basis, the imperialist economic blockade and its military intervention, driving toward the Yalu River, compelled the Communist Party



to change drastically its whole orientation. The objective logic of this gigantic struggle left the Stalinist leaders with no choice except to break with capitalism, nationalize the decisive means of production and institute state planning. When these measures were taken, the new property relations signified that a qualitative turning point had been reached in the process of developments. The social structure that furnished the foundation for the regime had been so transformed that it was possible to recognize a workers state, even though deformed by the ruling bureaucracy.

"...In China, because of these interrelations, the Stalinist bureaucratic leaders were compelled to play a progressive role."

In this entire polemic, Swabek correctly accepted the line of the 1955 Draft Resolution on "The Third Chinese Revolution and Its Aftermath." It is instructive to note the continued usage of the formulation "Stalinist leaders", a workers state "deformed by the ruling bureaucracy", objective developments that "compelled the Stalinist bureaucratic leaders" to "change drastically its whole orientation." To paraphrase Hamlet: "This was your position. Look you now, what follows:" "The Third Chinese revolution triumphed in the only way possible for it to triumph... by a correct Marxist program skillfully wielded by a conscious, well tested, well-disciplined revolutionary Marxist leadership. Moreover, it was the creative Marxism of Mao Tse-tung, applying the Marxist method to the concrete social conditions...such a leadership could not have been Stalinist". (Hilde MacLeod, "The Alvin-Reed School of Quotations" Discussion Bulletin, Vol.24, No.8). What superlatives would MacLeod have used had there been a Trotskyist leadership responsible for the victory of the revolution?

#### PAPER TIGERS IN THE SWP

In March of 1961 Swabek and Liang attacked an article by Murray Weiss for the International Socialist Review. In it, Weiss had stated that both the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party were forced to defy the Kremlin and "tear loose from their Stalinist moorings in order to lead socialist revolutions." In spite of this, Weiss continues, neither party ceased to be Stalinist. Accusing Weiss of being a "political word-juggler" Swabek demands to know "Does not the very fact of 'tearing loose' from Stalinism imply a repudiation of Stalinism? And does this not oblige us to reexamine our political estimate of a party that acts this way?" ("The Peking Regime and Stalinism", Discussion Bulletin, Vol.22, No.5). Hold on. Perhaps this is no more than a terminological difference.

Why the acrimony and the haste to "reexamine our political estimate"? Wasn't there a reference to a drastic change in the reorientation of the CCP? What did you mean when you used that phrase? Didn't that imply a "tearing loose" from their previous policy of a "revolution by stages"? But your characterization, Comrade Swabeck, of the drastic reorientation did not compel you to deny the Stalinist character of the leadership after their reorientation. What changed? Was the 1957 answer to Marcy written with a polemical zeal? Is it still correct today? In its entirety? Only part of it? With modifications and qualifications? Again -- what changed between 1957 and 1961? The establishment of the communes? Hardly, since Swabeck pinpoints the origin of their alleged transformation in a different area. "When a party leads a social revolution it reaches the crowning height of working class action. Thus the CCP ceased to be Stalinist in the classical sense of the term." (ibid) But Swabeck persists and demands to know "by what magic can revolutionary action still be identified with Stalinism?" (ibid) But the answer to this question was already correctly formulated in 1957. The revolutionary course of events in China took place in spite of not because of the Stalinist nature of the leadership who were compelled to reorient, etc., etc.

We see that this was not a terminological difference after all. Swabeck seized upon this phrase, "tearing loose", in order to prepare the way "to reexamine our political estimate of a party that acts in this way." Revising his previous estimate, or rather abandoning it, he proceeded to reformulate his views. "For 22 years, from the time of the 1927 defeat until the great victory of 1949, the party fought in a civil war against the Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship. During that time it also led a 7-year guerilla war against Japanese invaders. While the CCP fought Chiang, Moscow gave him official recognition and support. During the Japanese invasion, the CCP made a 'united front' with the Kuomintang for joint action against the invaders. While this led to certain (!!!) class-conciliationist measures by the CCP, and while the party fostered illusions of a permanent coalition, the leaders never repeated the Stalinist policy of subordinating their party to the Kuomintang, which was what brought defeat to the revolution in 1927." (ibid) (emphasis in original, M.Z.). What -- never? Well -- hardly ever.

Further still, in the same article, Swabeck and Liang succeed in hacking their way through the jungle of "contradictory nonsense" of the "Weiss-Roberts school of thought", namely, that the CCP was pushed onto a road it had previously barred and state: "The Chinese revolution, on the

contrary, provides us with a perfect object lesson in the dialectic of history; a hesitant, doubtful revolutionary party, pushed by the masses on to the track, then taking command and leading the revolution to victory. Let us remember that the Bolshevik party also wavered and inclined toward opportunism, and was set on a revolutionary course only by Lenin's vigorous intervention.

As long as analogies are being used it would be fruitful to know who represented the Lenin in the CCP and what constituted its April Theses? It is not difficult to identify the analogous Kameniev's, Zinoviev's, Nogin's, and Stalin's in the CCP, but who was its Lenin? It is true that the Bolshevik Party inclined toward opportunism before Lenin's arrival in April, 1917 (conciliationism would be the more precise characterization of the pre-April Bolshevik party). But Swabeck and Liang ignore, or at least minimize, the difference between an inclination, which incidently does not mark the entire history of the Bolshevik party, and the history of the CCP which, from 1927 through 1949 was permeated with ultra-leftism alternating with opportunism. We shall see shortly how the Swabeck-Liang version of the CCP coincides with the actual history of the CCP.

In the meantime, Swabeck-Liang inform us that the CCP "is the authentic voice of the Chinese revolution." (ibid) And what are we going to do about it? "Are we going to add our voice to theirs? Or shall we stand on the sidelines and hurl bricks? -- because we refuse to budge from our position that the Peking regime is 'Stalinist'". (ibid) what should we do in order not to be accused of hurling bricks? "In our opinion, the policy of the political revolution in China must be abandoned... By the same token we must cease regarding China as a 'deformed' workers state." (ibid) By the same token we must regard the present views of Swabeck-Liang as a drastic reorientation of their previous views. When did they discover that the policy of the SWP was that of hurling bricks? What new evidence did they uncover between 1957 and 1959 to cause their drastic reorientation? There was no new evidence, however, there were two contributing factors. One factor, already indicated earlier, was a defensive reaction against the continuing drumfire of hostile comments on the Communes. Another, no less important factor was stated by Swabeck in "The Third Chinese Revolution and its Communes."

"Considering our present policy and activities for revolutionary socialist regroupment, how can these activities be carried out and with whom will we regroup if we fail to recognize the profoundly revolutionary character of the Chinese Communes?" How indeed!

It seems to have escaped Swabeck that revolutionary regroupment was not predicated on accepting the communes but the Chinese revolution and all other revolutionary developments capable of destroying the bureaucratic monolith in the Kremlin. Secondly, regroupment was a tactic proposed for the realignment of socialist forces in opposition to the Stalinist incubus in the Soviet Union as well as China. Thirdly, no one ever put a gun to our heads with the warning that a critical appraisal of the communes would of necessity be a barrier to regroupment. Fourthly, our evaluation of the communes was not conditioned by our policy of regroupment but on our Trotskyist program and method of distinguishing the form and content of the revolution from the bureaucracy in the leadership. If regroupment would have necessitated Swabeck's view of the communes it certainly would not have been regroupment with socialist forces but with Stalinist minded forces. Fifthly, regroupment had been proposed by the party three years prior to Swabeck's concern over the possible effect our incorrect attitude toward the communes would have on the process of regroupment. What happened in 1959 to aggravate this concern?

Unfortunately, by misunderstanding the problem of regroupment and by adopting a one-sided and exaggerated attitude toward this tactic, Swabeck developed an equally one-sided and distorted appreciation of the communes. It would be interesting to know why Swabeck's concern with regroupment, from this vantage point, was not equally shared by the rest of the party leadership who were just as deeply involved in regroupment.

Having rejected the "Weiss-Roberts school of thought" in the aforementioned discussion article we find Swabeck combatting another paper tiger in his article "On Evaluating the Chinese Revolution" (Vol. 24. No. 3). This time, another misguided comrade is raked over the coals. Referring to Alvin's article in Vol. 23, No. 8, Swabeck writes: "What Milt Alvin in fact proposes to do is to judge the Chinese revolution and the Communist Party's role in it by what somebody (!!!) said about the party ten or twenty years ago. He refers extensively to the writings of Li Fu-jen and Harold Isaacs. This approach stands everything on its head and tends to disorient party members; it must be turned right side up so that we may gain a correct understanding of the important question before us." In the previous article of Swabeck's he accused Murray Weiss of writing "in defiance of the facts." Alvin presumably has the facts but they are stale. With all due modesty Swabeck announces that he has both the facts and a fresh approach. This no-nonsense approach to works written by somebody ten or twenty years ago evidently did not sufficiently impress one of his co-thinkers, who, in her bibliography of 50 books manages to sneak in 17 books of the ten to twenty year vintage. Of course, it does not contain a book written by "somebody" called Harold Isaacs on the "Tragedy of



the Chinese Revolution".

Swabeck's flippant attitude towards the writings of Li Fu-jen and Harold Isaacs is a disservice to the party, especially its younger members. One can understand nothing of the present developments in China without having studied their works. Swabeck's attitude is similar to those wiseacres who constantly inform us that Marx is valueless today because he wrote a hundred years ago. This was the same attitude the Stalinists had toward Trotsky when he utilized Marx's writings to demonstrate why socialism in one country was a reactionary utopia.

The real problem, however, is not whether Li Fu-jen's writings of ten or twenty years ago are applicable to today's events but whether he was correct 10 to 20 years ago about the events occurring in China at that time. This is the real reason for Swabeck's sneering attitude. Under the guise of rejecting the writings of yesterday to explain events today Swabeck manages to formulate an approach for revising past history in light of today's events.

"The 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia became a great lesson to those of us who were then participants in the movement here ... The names of Lenin and Trotsky were inseparably linked and they worked hand in hand as leaders of the revolution. Previously, over a period of years, they had at times disagreed. In the heat of controversy they said nasty things about each other. At one point Lenin angrily called Trotsky a 'Judas'.

"However, in the crucible of revolution all these charges were wiped out. The revolution was the great test against which all past positions were measured. When later Stalin dug up some of Lenin's sharpest remarks and hurled them at Trotsky, what was our stand? To re-interpret the revolution in line with these remarks? Not at all; the lessons of the revolution and Trotsky's role in it became our guide to refute Stalin's slanders. The revolution had changed decisively all conditions of the past. With the experiences of the revolution we could view the past controversies between Lenin and Trotsky in an entirely different light, and we could learn from them ... This applies with equal force to our study of China." ("On Evaluating the Chinese Revolution, Vol. 24, No. 3).

This is clear enough! we once called Mao and the CCP Stalinist (Judas). However, in the crucible of revolution this charge was found to be baseless. Now, Alvin, Reed, Weiss, Roberts, Peng and other Trotskyists are still hurling this epithet at Mao. Vile scoundrels that they are, not to realize that the revolution has "changed decisively all conditions of the past". Past controversies between the Russian Left Opposition and the Stalinist leadership in the

Soviet Union over the 1925-27 revolution in China and the subsequent criticisms of the CCP by the Trotskyist movement should then also be viewed "in an entirely different light".

Not so, says Swabeck. "Events there leading up to and including the historic defeat in 1927, and the role of Stalin's policy in it, have been forcefully elucidated and interpreted by Trotsky in his book Problems of the Chinese Revolution. None of the questions that arose during that period are in dispute in our ranks today." (ibid). The dispute then is over events from 1928 onward. But why from 1928? What separates 1927 from 1928? In 1927 the policy of a bloc between the CCP and Chiang Kai-shek was still in effect. In 1928 the ultra-left Third Period line of the Comintern found its expression in the CCP. In 1935 the Comintern projected the People's Front line. This, too, found its expression and application in the CCP. This policy continued in effect till 1949. What does Swabeck want to view as differently in the post-1927 period that should be changed today? Does Swabeck want to reject Trotsky's views on the CCP after 1927? On what basis?

#### THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

We are informed by another member of the Swabeck tendency that "in characterizing the Mao regime anything of a concrete nature, such as quotations from the Mao program and how victory was won, is avoided. Ignored also is the huge volume of factual information now available concerning the political and military means for winning the civil war and the actual march of events of the revolution; in short, the kind of concrete evidence so lacking the quotations relied upon in their articles, which were written long before the events." ("The Alvin-Reed School of Quotations", Vol. 24, No.3)

Aside from the quotations utilized from the Chinese sources by Alvin and Reed, there are any number of other documents available by Chinese Trotskyists, written during and after the events. It is strange, that MacLeod, who estols Mao as "not only a Marxist", but one of the world's greatest Marxists (ibid) (a pity she doesn't tell us who the world's greatest Marxist is), fails to utilize the writings of one Marxist, who presumably does not come up to Mao's level according to the MacLeod yardstick. Comrade Peng has supplied this "kind of concrete evidence so lacking in the quotations relied upon" by the Swabeck tendency.

Exhibiting a severe case of political bends, MacLeod finds it impossible to regain a vertical position. When referring to Mao, prostration is the only correct position. And while maintaining this position she tries to rewrite the history of the CCP. At the time of the Moscow trials, according to MacLeod, the horror evoked by the decimation of the Left Opposition tended to becloud our judgement of

the real nature of the CCP. "At that time there was ample reason to believe that the CCP was Stalinist in spite of the meagre information available." This claim is expounded blithely in spite of the voluminous writings of Trotsky, Li Fu-jen, Harold Isaacs, as well as the manifestoes, proclamations, interviews, articles and statements by such reliable spokesmen as Mao Tse-tung, Wang Ming, Chu Teh and other representatives of the CCP published in this country, by the Workers Library Publishers, in the magazines, "The Communist International" and "The Communist".

But if our version of the CCP was beclouded then, how should we view this party in light of new events? "But now history has rendered a contrary verdict on the Mao regime." (ibid) Just who, or what, is this history that has rendered a contrary verdict? Who else? Mao Tse-tung! MacLeod reaches a stage of euphoria as she declaims that "Mao is not only a Marxist but one of the world's great Marxists. A study of his writings would make this apparent to anyone with Marxist understanding. Moreover, such a study is a requisite for a correct appraisal of the Third Chinese revolution." This is enough to make even Mao demur.

At a meeting held in Yen-an, to celebrate Stalin's sixtieth birthday, Mao announced: "Stalin is the leader of world revolution. This is of paramount importance. It is a great event that mankind is blessed with Stalin. Since we have him, things can go well. As you all know, Marx is dead and so are Engels and Lenin. Had there been no Stalin, who would there be to give directions? But having him -- this is really a blessing. Now there exists in the world a Soviet Union, a Communist Party and also a Stalin. Thus, the affairs of the world can go well." (quoted by Chen Po-ta in "Stalin and the Chinese Revolution").

Notice how Mao exudes modesty. Notice too, the poetic images; the profound insight into the revolutionary process; the correct handling of contradictions among the people, living and dead; the acute revelation that Marx, Engels and Lenin are dead (and thus can provide no direction); the ecclesiastical fervor of this lackey. This work, incidentally, is an invaluable guide to the history of the second and third Chinese revolutions, as seen by the bureaucracy itself. It is a revelation of their unquestioned loyalty and undying devotion to Stalin, which in their eyes takes the form of his "close relationship with the Chinese revolution, his concern over the fate of the Chinese people, and his great theoretical contributions to the Chinese revolution." (ibid)

Any view that Mao and the CCP ceased to be Stalinist

after 1949 and consciously guided the revolution as well trained, conscious Marxists, can be dispelled by the following remarks made by Chen Po-ta. "The works of Comrade Stalin, the great teacher of the world communist movement, on the problems of the Chinese revolution represent a great contribution to the Chinese revolution and have long since ideologically armed the Chinese communists. The victory of the Chinese revolution is a victory for Marxism-Leninism as well as a victory for Comrade Stalin's theory on the Chinese revolution." (ibid) (emphasis added, M.Z.). In view of this, it is incumbent for MacLeod to demand that the writings of the world's greatest Marxist, Stalin, be read as "a requisite for a correct appraisal of the third Chinese revolution." It is. But not in order to bolster her theory.

We must further reject MacLeod's lightmindedness in "suspecting" that "the Cuban revolution was modeled on the third Chinese revolution. For just as Mao Tse-tung began the struggle for power in China with a small band in the Ching Kang mountains, so did Fidel Castro begin his in the Sierra Maestra. And just as Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh began organizing for the struggle by winning the leadership of the rebellious peasantry ... so did the Castro leadership." As the old saying goes -- when one has such friends who needs enemies? Mao and Chu Teh accepted the Menshevism of Stalin; capitulated to Chiang Kai-shek; frustrated the revolutionary aspirations of the masses from 1927-1949; hounded, imprisoned and executed the genuine Chinese revolutionists; attempted to strangle the third Chinese revolution; subordinated the independence of the CCP to the Kuomintang time and again; and sowed confusion in the minds of the people regarding the objectives of the third revolution. "When the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism was overthrown by the people, many were not clear as to where China was headed -- to capitalism or socialism." (On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People) To even "suspect" that the Cuban revolution and Fidel Castro had anything in common with the entire history of this treacherous and traitorous leadership is a slander on the Cuban revolution and its leadership. If the Cuban leadership learned anything at all from the third Chinese revolution, it was how to organize for the task and get it over with by avoiding the methods used by the CCP.

Specifically, the Cuban revolutionary leaders learned that it would be suicide to enter a political bloc with their executioners. Their attitude toward Batista was in diametric opposition to that taken by the CCP in 1949. According to Lin Piao "during the first year of this historical period the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade



Mao Tse-tung led the people of the whole country in carrying out the struggle, with great effort and enormous patience, to prevent Chiang Kai-shek from unleashing civil war; they conducted peace talks with the Kuomintang several times, and tried to bring about social and political reforms in China by peaceful means. ("The Victory of the Chinese Revolutionary War is the Victory of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung", published in Hongqi, No. 19, Oct. 1, 1960) (emphasis added, M.Z.). The peace talks failed and Chiang Kai-shek proceeded to "impose" a country-wide civil war, according to the above author. The civil war was an unwelcome imposition which forced Mao's hand. He did not want to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek, was reluctant to organize for a revolutionary struggle and hoped to forstall a revolutionary solution to the problems of the Chinese people by trying to bring about "reforms by peaceful means."

Of course, MacLeod may demur and point out that no one, including Marxists, want civil war when it can be avoided. True. But the entire argument of the Swabeck minority is that Mao is the continuator of Bolshevism. But what is Bolshevism if not the struggle for the seizure of state power? And how was Mao preparing for this task? By conducting peace talks! Perhaps hypnosis would have been more effective.

MacLeod recoils with horror at the Jack-the-Ripper approach to the virgin body politic of the CCP so crassly apparent in the writings of the Alvin-Reed-Weiss-Roberts-etc. school of thought. The Swabeck tendency is more inclined to the Biblical approach of the Immaculate Conception. The CCP was conceived in Purity, lived in Purity and continues in Purity. The CCP was ravishing but never ravished until the villains of the above mentioned school of thought appeared on the scene.

Not so fast, responds Swabeck. We have shown how the CCP "is the authentic voice of the Chinese revolution", furthermore "the Chinese revolution should be viewed as a continuation and an extension of the Russian Revolution. Nay more than that, it is a continuation and an extension also of the process of transition from capitalism to socialism, unfolding, however, on a grander scale and at a fantastically accelerated tempo." Above all, how could a counter-revolutionary, anti-revolutionary party be capable of leading a socialist revolution and radically transform the economic, social and political life of China, continues Swabeck. Doesn't this prove the absurdity of continuing to call the CCP leaders Stalinist? Even if the CCP was tainted by Stalinism in 1927, recent history has passed a different verdict and revealed a different past. Before we arrive at the content of this revelation it is necessary to establish its form.

THE REAL AND THE RATIONAL

"Any serious study will quickly reveal that the Chinese revolution is real. It is a continuation and extension of the 1917 Bolshevich revolution on the colossal scale of Asia; a revolution as real as life itself, and all that is real is rational. It is not the deformed phantom devoid of all reality that some comrades have concocted in their own minds. The Chinese revolution is a genuine socialist revolution." ("On Evaluating the Chinese Revolution", Discussion Bulletin Vol.24, No.3) (emphasis added, M.Z.)

To characterize the Chinese revolution as a deformed phantom without reality means that it is a deformed revolution and a phantom of the 1917 Bolshevich revolution, if, by phantom we take it to mean a reality lacking the substance of the revolution organized, led to power and established by the genuine Bolshevism of Lenin and Trotsky. The little phrase, "devoid of all reality", however, is a shabby and crude attempt to make it appear that a deformed revolution is equivalent to no revolution at all.

A proletarian revolution really did occur in China. It smashed bourgeois private property, abolished the capitalist wage system, eliminated capitalist accumulation and destroyed the bourgeois state machinery. This made it a proletarian revolution -- to be defended against attacks by world imperialism. However, the state issuing out of this revolution was deformed because of the leadership riding the revolutionary wave. China was ripe for a proletarian revolution. An interim, or intermediary, bourgeois-democratic regime between the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek and the dictatorship of the proletariat was impossible. This was the objective situation. But the party that found itself in the leadership of this revolution was a petty bourgeois Stalinist party. This was the subjective situation. This contradiction is the key to the subsequent conflicts between the regime and the needs of the working masses, and also the contradiction between the form of the revolution and its content. The decisive element for determining the nature of the revolution was not the party that led it but the classes that waged the struggle against the previous regime and the property relations that were established by the victory of the revolution. If this appears to pose a problem it is only because past history is disregarded. It is false to identify, or try to deduce, the nature of the revolution from the party that leads it. The two do not always coincide. Obviously, there is no problem of deciding the nature of the revolution where both coincide, as they did in October 1917.

The establishment of the Paris Commune forced the

Anarchists and Proudhonists to adopt methods and procedures that were in conflict with the programs they previously advocated. Moreover, the victory of the Paris Commune was accomplished without the intervention of the revolutionary party. In spite of this Engels characterized it as the dictatorship of the proletariat. The 1905 revolution in Russia was, according to Lenin, bourgeois in form and socialist in content. Here again, the revolutionary party was missing as the active agent for organizing it and carrying it to victory. The methods of mass strikes and the establishment of workers organs of power determined the class content of this revolution. It occurred again in Yugoslavia in the form of a civil war within the framework of a "war for national liberation. We further witnessed this development under entirely new conditions in 1956 in Hungary where the forms of mass struggle against the Kremlin satraps determined the socialist character of the revolution although no revolutionary party was on the scene. The latest example was the victory of the Cuban revolution under a leadership that evolved toward Marxism in the course of consolidating the gains of the revolution.

What does this prove? That the objective conditions and requirements for revolution is stronger than the subjective limits of leadership. The permanent revolution asserts itself as an objective law of the revolutionary process on the way to power. But this is only the first phase. It is much easier to seize power than to hold it. In order to assure the realization of the next phase -- the two phases are discrete but continuous "moments" in an integrated and unified process -- the permanency of the revolutionary process, in establishing the revolution and consolidating it according to a conscious planning principle, requires a revolutionary party as an indispensable prerequisite.

The problem in China is not how to prove that the theory of the Permanent Revolution has been vindicated but how to assure the permanency of the revolutionary process continuing to its conclusion in the construction of a socialist society. This, and not the theory, is in danger at the present time.

The other important element in the opening paragraph of this section, and the one that reveals Swabeck's method of dealing with the problem of the Chinese revolution and leadership, is contained in the phrase "all that is real is rational". To set the record straight, this formulation is not Swabeck's profound and original contribution to the dialectical interaction between the rational and the real. It is lifted from Hegel. By omitting the quotation marks around this phrase he avoids dealing

with the real premise for this formulation and the consequent implications and conclusions.

When Hegel wrote that "all that is real is rational and all that is rational is real" he was sanctifying the status quo. It was, as Engels pointed out in his work, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy", a "philosophical benediction bestowed upon despotism, police government, Star Chamber proceedings and censorship ... But according to Hegel everything that exists is certainly not also real, without further qualification. For Hegel the attribute of reality belongs only to that which is at the same time necessary: 'The reality proves itself to be necessary in the course of its development'." Does Swabeck want us to accept, by his unquoted quote, that the present regime, leadership and the CCP is real because it is also necessary. In that case we are dealing, insofar as this formulation has any political implication and application, with Deutscherism. For Deutscher, too, the Stalinist bureaucracy in the Soviet Union was necessary insofar as it was real. For both, the status quo is sanctified because "it is".

Swabeck, like Deutscher, cannot go beyond the first category of Hegel's logic, the category of Being. Swabeck forgets, or chooses to ignore, that this category contains within itself the seed of its own negation in the subsequent category, or moment, of Nothing. "...The proposition of the rationality of everything which is real resolves itself into the other proposition: All that exists deserves to perish." (ibid)

If Swabeck were sincere in his appreciation of this proposition he would have to add that, in spite of the reality of the present regime, a political revolution is necessary for the completion of reality as a developing process. From the category of "what is", Being, we merely discern the limitation of its existence and the poverty of a one-sided and incomplete evaluation of the present reality. In short, we have advanced to the category of Nothing since, we have only presented a formal determination of a dynamic process. Nothing has been affirmed about the process in its full development. In order to complete the dialectical process of investigation it is essential that the investigation continue to the next moment of development, that of Becoming, and to proceed from there to indicate the quantitative and qualitative transformations, the appearance and reality, the forms and substances of this intricately developing process and its movement from identity through contradiction and eventual negation. In other words, we would have to do precisely what our 1955 Draft Resolution did and what our present Draft Resolution on China continues to do.



Furthermore, Hegel's proposition was aimed at concretizing and defending the fullest possible expression and actual approximation of his Idea of Freedom in the Prussian state of Frederick William III. Does Swabeck imply that the present Chinese regime and the present stage of the Chinese revolution reflect the fullest approximation of the establishment of socialism? Is this what Swabeck had in mind when he wrote that the bureaucracy was actually, nothing but, an "administrative apparatus"?

Swabeck crowns his abject prostration before "what is" by informing us that "the Chinese revolution is a genuine socialist revolution". The inescapable conclusion drawn by Swabeck, as we witnessed earlier, was to drop the "absurdities" of a political revolution, etc. Dropping, what Swabeck refers to as "absurdities", really leaves us nothing to be critical about. But perhaps Swabeck is not quite sure that Mao's poetry expresses the quintessence of genuine socialist poetry. Here, indeed, is a phantom of the Trotskyist position, devoid of all reality. The method of Swabeck is that of Deutscher.

Swabeck replaces the dialectic with the syllogism. It can be formulated as follows: Stalinist parties could not lead a socialist revolution; a Stalinist party did lead this revolution; therefore, we are not dealing with a Stalinist party; this is followed by another syllogism: Stalinists lead the revolution; Stalinists were characterized by their inability to lead revolutions; therefore, they were never Stalinists (after 1927). This is still followed by another syllogism: The theory of the Permanent Revolution was formulated by Trotsky; This law is not a disembodied, ectoplasmic proposition but necessitates people for its realization; Only those who agree with this law are capable of carrying it out; The Stalinists disagreed with this law; However, the Permanent Revolution was vindicated in the crucible of the Chinese revolution; Furthermore, this revolution was led by Mao not by Peng; Therefore, Mao has accepted this law and, thus, reveals himself as a Trotskyist. These syllogisms, which constitute the foundation of the Swabeck tendency, were not newly discovered by them. They were previously presented for consideration, and much more persuasively, by Germain-Pablo-Frank at the 11th Plenum of the IEC of the Fourth International in May, 1952. It led them to conclude that The CP's represented the wave of the future and that 100 years of deformed workers' states was on the agenda of history. The only proper course, therefore, was for the various Trotskyist parties to dissolve, enter the CP's and act as a left pressure group to provide them with consciousness and momentum. This wave of the future enticed Cochran-Bartell-Clarke to ride the wave -- right out of the party and out of revolutionary politics.

Neither the SWP nor Trotsky ever claimed that Stalinism could not be forced to lead revolutions. Trotsky repeatedly pointed out that the petty-bourgeois Stalinists could be pushed, under certain conditions, to go beyond their formal program of neutralizing the bourgeoisie. True, tomorrow they would behead the revolution, but they could be forced to lead it today. What distinguished Stalinism from other petty-bourgeois currents was its theory of socialism in one country. This theory was already the cornerstone of Stalinism at its inception, long before the problem of leading or betraying revolutions was posed. It was this theory which led to the betrayal of revolutions. The essential feature of Maoism remains the theory of socialism in one country. The establishment of the communes, in large measure, was predicated on the theory that these were the units of a socialist and communist society, which, at the present could serve as the impetus for building socialism in China in the shortest possible time. The CCP leadership does not discuss the "uninterrupted" revolution on a world wide basis or even from the viewpoint of aiding in the formation of a Socialist United States of Asia. In this instance they stand on a lower level of thinking than did Tito, who at least advanced the concept of a socialist federation of the Balkan countries.

#### STALINISM AND REVOLUTION

Let us briefly review the lessons assimilated by our movement on this question. Trotsky indicated the approach in his struggle against the petty-bourgeois opposition of Burnham and Schachtman. Writing about the events in Poland and Finland, Trotsky stated: "It is more likely, however, that in the territories scheduled to become a part of the USSR, the Moscow government will carry through the expropriation of the large land-owners and statification of the means of production. This variant is the most probable not because the bureaucracy remains true to the socialist program but because it is neither desirous nor capable of sharing power, and the privileges the latter entails, with the old ruling class in the occupied territories." (In Defense of Marxism).

The impulse that Stalinism was capable of providing was further demonstrated in Finland. "The Red Army in Finland expropriates large land-owners and introduces workers' control while preparing for the expropriation of the capitalists. Tomorrow the Stalinists will strangle the Finnish workers. But now they are giving -- they are compelled to give -- a tremendous impulse to the class struggle in its sharpest form." (ibid) (emphasis added, M.Z.).

"It is not the question of a 'bureaucratic revolution' but only a bureaucratic impulse. To deny this is to deny reality. The popular masses in Western Ukraine and Byelo Russia, in any event, felt this impulse, understood its meaning, and used it to accomplish a drastic overturn in

property relations." (ibid) Here we have the guide necessary to understand how Stalinism can remain itself and still be capable of providing an "impulse" for the expropriation of bourgeois private property which, in turn, can be utilized by the masses to overturn property relations. Note well, however, that this does not change the nature of Stalinism, nor the tasks imposed on revolutionists to clear away the bureaucratic rubbish. The fundamental task of a political revolution remained in full force in the Soviet Union and in the occupied territories. Trotsky's course did not change before the advent of a bureaucratic "impulse", nor his analysis of the Kremlin oligarchy.

Another analogous situation fairly leaps to mind -- that of Yugoslavia. Here a phenomenon, similar to that in China, confronted us. From 1944 to the middle of 1946 the YCP executed a number of fundamental measures: property of collaborators and traitors were expropriated; property of foreign capitalists who served the invaders were seized; war profit was taken away from those who made that profit during the occupation; the private banking system was almost completely taken over by the new state; a state monopoly of foreign trade was established; the agrarian reform was carried out liquidating big landed estates and feudal remnants in land relationships; currency reform at undermining stocks of war speculators and the capitalists in general. This was the "reconstruction period". The period between 1947-49 was the period of the application of the Five Year Plan which "boldly brought Yugoslavia on the road of building socialism". Nationalization was instituted by law in December 1946, and proceeded at a faster and more extensive pace into the sphere of economic and social transformation than did the USSR itself in the first decade up to 1929.

If any evidence of the non-Stalinist character of the YCP is available it can be shown by the course the Yugoslav leaders during the war in opposition to the Kremlin. The Kremlin, in 1944, advised the Yugoslavs to dissolve party organizations into the army; abolish political commission, remove red stars from the caps of the partisans; not to solve the question of power in a revolutionary manner; create a coalition with Mihailovitch; temporarily recognize the monarchy; solve the problem of power by parliamentary methods after the liberation of the country. This advice was given in order not to furnish arguments to bourgeois reaction and weaken the "anti-Hitler coalition forces". The partisan leaders rejected this "advice".

Thus it was possible to demonstrate that the Yugoslav state apparatus was less bureaucratized at that time than the apparatus of the USSR; that it arose from the ranks of the masses in the process of conducting a war of liberation and a civil war; that it proceeded to transform the

property relations of the entire country and lay the foundation for socialist construction; that the rapid transformation from 1941-46 was a vindication of the Permanent Revolution; and that they had established their independence of the Kremlin as early as 1944 and continued to reinforce this in 1948. The break between Tito and Stalin was the first crack in the bureaucratic monolith.

In spite of this entire development, the SWP never characterized Tito as a fully conscious or even a semi-conscious Marxist. He was a Centrist who had broken with Stalin's methods, but remained a Stalinist ideologically. We continued to characterize the state as deformed, and the need for political revolution remained a correct perspective. The fundamental characteristic of Stalinism remained and continued to imbue the Yugoslav leadership -- that of building socialism in one country. The possibility of doing this without Moscow supervision, the forms of socialist organization and the tempo involved in industrialization and collectivization, was at the bottom of the dispute, and final break between Belgrade and Moscow. To a degree, the Yugoslav leadership stood on a much higher level in 1944 than the Chinese leaders in 1949.

QUOTATIONS ARE A MANY SPLENDORED THING OR THE ART OF  
"SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT"

One last task remains before concluding -- to discover how the Swaback tendency reconstructed the history of the CCP. The task was difficult, but apparently not insurmountable. It required patience, fortitude and the imagination necessary to cull through some 50 books, find the right paragraphs, wrench them out of context and rearrange them chronologically and according to topic. This done, the stage was set for discovering that Mao was not only a Marxist but one of the worlds great Marxists.

In "Red China -- Catalyst of World Revolution", MacLeod set herself the task of setting "a much confused record straight." The task was monumental, and could have been highly educational -- if it really had set the record straight. But alas, after 44 pages and a bibliography of 50 books, it is sad to state that it only amounted to a series of old quotations in new brackets. Worse than that was the fact that some of the quotations were falsified, others out of context and still others in dispute among the "experts" on China. This has already been verified by Reed and further attested to by Liang. But there are some striking examples that require more explicit exposition.

Section 2, of the above quoted document, is replete with quotations from Benjamin Schwartz's book "Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao". (Incidentally, it is worth noting that this is the same book that inspired George Clarke's

revisionist method on the Chinese revolution). In the interest of setting "much confused record straight", it should have been incumbent for MacLeod to, at least, note that Schwartz's account on "The Report on an Investigation of the Agrarian Movement in Hunan" has been disputed by another "expert", one Karl Wittfogel. In the April-June 1960 issue of the China Quarterly, Wittfogel, in an article entitled "The Legend of Maoism" (Part 2) writes:

"The text of Mao's Hunan report as presented in the Documentary History is based on a Chinese edition dated 1944; it comprises only the first section of the document -- Chapters 1 and 2. The second section -- Chapter 3, is entitled 'The Fourteen Great Deeds' -- is more than twice as long. Its fate during the time of the great civil war and Sino-Japanese war is obscure, but it appeared again at the end of 1947 ... In 1951 there began to appear in Chinese an official edition of Mao's Selected Works, revised -- and often substantially revised -- by Mao himself. Volume 1 of this edition, dated 1951, gives both sections of the Hunan report ... but with certain textual changes, which have considerable political significance." ( 1 )

MacLeod quotes Schwartz, who in turn quoted from the Hunan report on "the vast power of the peasantry." Wittfogel, however, claims that in the Hunan report, Mao "avoids discussing the agrarian revolution". He further indicates that the original Report confined itself purely to political questions, setting no limits on political attacks against traditional rural elite, "the villiage bullies [t'u - hao] and the bad gentry." But this, according to the author, had already been requested by the Kuomintang and the Central Committee of the CCP. Mao's demand that the peasants be armed -- appearing in the Second Section of the Report -- was a left deviation in terms of the position taken by the CCP previously, prior to the report, but in line recommended by the Comintern and the Left Kuomintang. According to Wittfogel, Mao never asked in his Report for the unleashing of the power of the peasantry through the furtherance of the Agrarian revolution. This was due to the fact that the "Comintern leaders feared to initiate a course that might shake the CCP's alliance with the KMT".

The Hunan report contained not a word about the core of the agrarian revolution; the land question. Wittfogel quotes an altered sentence in the Second Section of the Report which states; "An economic struggle should also be started immediately in order that the land problem and other economic problems of the poor peasantry can be completely solved." The underlined words were inserted in 1951. In the same issue of the China Quarterly, Schwartz defends himself by pointing out that, while the "language of the Hunan report is that of the United Front strategy" nevertheless, "there is every reason to think of it as a report of a Communist peasant organizer to his own party". Schwartz simply denies that the

Report showed any reserve about the potential of peasant power.

The weight of evidence tends to substantiate Wittfogel rather than Schwartz. In the famous "Letter from Shanghai", written in 1927 and reproduced in Trotsky's book Problems of the Chinese Revolution we read that "the fear of the peasants' movement has existed and still remains in the party. The realization of peasant possession of the land is called by the C.C. 'a dangerous infantile disease of Leftism'. It continues to speak of 'the United Front with the good gentry and the small and middle landlord against the bad gentry and the blackguards' (Report from Hunan of December 30). The expression: 'good gentry', is found to this day in all party documents, in articles by leading comrades. This replacement of social categories by moral categories is essentially a suspension of the revolutionary movement in the village. At the December Plenum of the C.C., a resolution on the peasant question was adopted with the participation of the representative of the ECCI [Executive Committee of the Communist International]. Not a word is to be found in this resolution on an agrarian program and on the struggle of the peasantry. The resolution does not answer a single one of the most burning issues of the day: the question of the peasants' power is answered negatively. It says, the slogan of a peasants' power must not be raised so as not to frighten away petty-bourgeoisie. From the neglect of the peasants' revolution springs the suspension by the leading party organs of the arming of the peasantry."

The absence of the underlined in the original report of Mao's, and the admission by Schwartz that Mao's report was that of a "Communist peasant organizer to his party", is additional evidence of Wittfogel's evaluation that there was no rift between Mao and the C.C. of the CCP. This is quite different than the picture MacLoed would have us accept.

On page 7 of MacLoed's "Catalyst", she writes: "Mao rejected the Third Period line." The evidence for this comes from an unimpeachable source -- Mao Tse-tung -- after the fact. Again, for the sake of setting the record straight it would have been helpful to know how Mao felt at the time of the Third Period, that is, between 1923 and 1935. Since we have only Mao's retroactive statement to support his rejection we call upon another representative of the CCP, Wang Ming. There is no evidence that either one denounced the other for deviating from the party line during the 7 years in which the Third Period line was in effect, Wang Ming was a representative to the Thirteenth Plenum of the ECCI held in 1933. At this Plenum he reaffirmed the Colonial Thesis adopted by the 6th World Congress of the CI, which adopted the Third Period line. In his statement, Ming notes that the Thirteenth Plenum formulated the correct line for the "Bolshevization" of the CCP.



This "Bolshevization finds expression, first, in the fact that the CCP headed by its C.C. firmly and undeviatingly carried out its general line, which had been worked out and defended by the Fourth Plenum of the C.C. held on January 7, 1931 under the leadership of the ECCI, and that it does not fear any difficulties or complications that may arise in its path. What is the content of our general line at the present stage of the Chinese revolution? The struggle for every possible timely combination of the revolutionary mass movement in Soviet and non-Soviet China under the uniform leadership of the proletariat to overthrow the rule of the imperialists and their lackeys, the Kuomintang, and establish the power of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the working class and the peasantry in the form of Soviets throughout all China."

Note that Ming speaks about the line having been carried out "firmly and undeviatingly." The difficulties and complications referred to is not Mao's rejection of this line, which, for the sake of setting the record straight, was projected during a period of the revolutionary ebb in China, but of the difficulties and complications arising from the need to "correct" previous "errors" of the United Front line with Chiang Kai-shek.

On page 8, MacLeod quotes Dennis Warner to the effect that there was no "Stalinist blood bath in the struggle for power and the struggle for industrialization." Perhaps MacLeod did not complete her research on this aspect. All the more unfortunate, since the literature of the Chinese CP leaders abound in descriptions of liquidating the "Trotskyite" renegades. In 1941, Liu Shao-chi, a veteran Stalinist, declared: "...Trotskyite traitors and counter-revolutionary elements have smuggled themselves into the party, and they seek to undermine the party by taking advantage of inner-Party struggle." In view of this "all party members must take great care to maintain sharp vigilance lest the hidden Trotskyites and counter-revolutionary elements should take advantage of the conflicts and struggles inside the party to carry out their subversive activities." ("On Inner-Party Struggle"). This was a signal to a more intense policy of liquidating the "treacherous Trotskyites". What does MacLeod characterize this, if not a blood bath? What does one characterize the arrest, imprisonment and execution of the Shanghai workers in 1949 who dared to strike for higher wages and better working conditions? Perhaps MacLeod is willing to tell us that this was similar to the famous "Kronstadt incident"?

From October 1949 to October 1950, in four of the six administrative regions, a total of 1,176,000 people were executed. Victims were charged with resistance to grain collections, taxes, labor and military service, or with spreading rumors and counter-revolutionary propaganda.

A public mass trial was staged in Peking followed with mass executions. A handbook was issued to the CCP cadres explaining the technique for "accusation meetings". An official report was given of 322,000 people executed in the south-central region alone. In 1953 another series of public prosecutions was launched to round up "remnant counter-revolutionaries." Not a blood bath? Then what was this?

On page 23 MacLeod states: "There has been so much misunderstanding and therefore condemnation in our ranks of the United Front of the CCP with the KMT against the Japanese,-- calling it a 'betrayal' and a 'sellout' etc.-- that it is necessary to examine this question thoroughly." Swabeck referred to this period as follows: "Derisively some comrades have called this another edition of the popular front ... In reality it had a lot in common with the United Front the Bolsheviks made with Kerensky to defeat the Kornilov counter-revolutionaries." ("On Evaluating the Chinese Revolution"). The essential difference, in fact the class difference, between the two instances is completely ignored by Swabeck. The Bolsheviks proposed the United Front as a tactic within the strategic perspective of seizing power. Before Kerensky there was the April Theses to serve as the guiding line for an episodic bloc on the way to power. The CCP consolidated and consummated a political bloc for a permanent coalition until Chiang Kai-shek "imposed" civil war and forced the CCP to undergo a "drastic reorientation". Not at all similar.

Furthermore, there was no misunderstanding in our ranks or derisiveness, but a clear understanding and rejection of this United Front by our ranks because we were armed with facts not fictions. All one has to do is read, among other material, Wang Ming's article in the December 1937 issue of The Communist International entitled "The Struggle of the Chinese People Against the Japanese Aggressor", and "The Great Socialist Revolution in the USSR" along with "Interviews with Mao Tse-tung, Communist Leader" by Edgar Snow in the book "China: The March Toward Unity" published by the Workers Library in May 1937. In the interview, Mao informs Snow, that if the Kuomintang helps to enact the principles of Sun Yat-sen "we are prepared to cooperate with and support it, and to form a united front against imperialism such as existed in 1925-27." (emphasis added, M.Z.) Snow states his conclusion after the interviews: "The Communist Party evidently will not insist upon representation in the Cabinet of the proposed 'democratic republic'. They would be prepared to submit to its discipline. ... The Communist Party, I was also assured by Chairman Mao, would be willing to agree not to organize mass movements opposed to the principle of the National Salvation United Front, and not to 'promote' class struggle." what this has in common with Lenin's attitude toward Kerensky we leave to the distorted imaginations of Swabeck and MacLeod.

Finally, on page 30, MacLeod treats us to an excerpt of Trotsky's article "Class Relations in the Chinese Revolution". This is designed to prove that both Trotsky and Mao shared a common view that there would be a revolution in stages -- first, the democratic revolution, and then, the socialist revolution -- thereby transforming Trotsky into a Maoist. She excerpts it in such a way as to make it appear that the three paragraphs in her bulletin appear as three successive paragraphs in the original article. Actually, each paragraph in this excerpt is separated, in the original, by many paragraphs, formulations, polemical material and the guiding thought that, between the bourgeois military dictatorship of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the dictatorship of the proletariat there could be no intermediate "democratic" regime. Between paragraph #1 and paragraph #2, MacLeod omits approximately 300 words. Between paragraph #2 and paragraph #3 she omits approximately 2000 words. The omissions decimate the revolutionary concepts of Trotsky's.

It should be incumbent on the part of every comrade to read and reread this article in its entirety.

The "scrupulousness" of this method of quoting, together with the other material on China is a reflection of this tendency to emasculate Trotskyism, to abandon our method and tradition, to capitulate to Mao and to reject our revolutionary perspective and independence. The claim of the Swaback tendency that Mao Tse-tung is a close approximation of Trotsky must be rejected by the party.

#### CONCLUSION

The Swaback tendency leave a number of vital questions unanswered. How is it possible for the CCP to escape the corroding influence of the Kremlin? What unique mechanism was involved that permitted the CCP to escape the fate that befell the other Communist Parties throughout the world? If the CCP leaders were Stalinists, when did they break their ideological ties? Does the role, attributed to the CCP by the Swaback tendency, foreshadow the future role of other CP's? How was it possible for the Marxist character of the CCP, especially Mao, to have escaped the notice of our ranks before 1959? Should the Trotskyists in China strive to rebuild the revolutionary party?

The capitulation of the Swaback tendency to Maoism is, in all essential respects, similar to the capitulation of Radek, Smilga and Preobrazhensky in 1928-29. Impressed with the "concrete figures of the First Five Year plan they accepted the Stalinist leadership which proved, as Trotsky put it, "better than their theories." Trotsky mercilessly attacked the emphasis on the exclusively economic side of the question while completely blotting out, in this connection, the nature and role of the Stalinist leadership. "Pitiful

indeed is the politician who gauges a political line within the range of a small span of time without asking himself who are the elements that are carrying out a given political line and for what reasons." The Swabeck tendency would gain an immeasurable insight into their own evolution and direction by probing this problem to its depth.

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- (1) The Documentary History referred to by Karl Wittfogel is "A Documentary History of Chinese Communism", edited by C. Brandt, Benjamin I. Schwartz and J. K. Fairbanks, published in 1952, one year after the publication of "Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao.