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DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE SPLIT IN THE LIGA SOCIALISTA

(Mexican Sympathizing Organization of the Fourth International)

PART I: Statement by the Steering Committee of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction on the Internal Struggle in the Liga Socialista

PART II: Documents of the Militant Tendency

PART III: Platform of the Bolshevik-Leninist Tendency

PART IV: Articles from *Intercontinental Press*, *El Socialista*, and *Bandera Roja*

PART V: Documents Concerning the Electoral Strategy of the Liga Socialista

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Contents

| | Page |
|---|------|
| PART I: Statement by the Steering Committee of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction on the Internal Struggle in the Liga Socialista | 3 |
| Fact Sheet on the Internal Struggle in the Liga Socialista | 5 |
| PART II: Documents of the Militant Tendency | |
| Self-Critical Balance Sheet | 12 |
| Platform for the Dissolution of Tendencies in the Liga Socialista | 17 |
| PART III: Platform of the Bolshevik-Leninist Tendency | |
| Platform | 19 |
| For Internal Democracy in the Liga Socialista | 19 |
| Tasks and Perspectives of the Liga Socialista | 23 |
| PART IV: Articles from Intercontinental Press, El Socialista, and Bandera Roja | |
| The Split in the Liga Socialista, by Joseph Hansen | 31 |
| The Purported Second Congress of the Liga Socialista, by the FBL | 35 |
| Last December the Liga Socialista Held Its Second Congress, by the TM | 39 |
| The Politics of Robbery, by Ricardo Ramos | 43 |
| Call to the FBL | 45 |
| A Physical Assault on Members of the FBL | 46 |
| Against Violence in the Workers Movement | 47 |
| The Division in the Socialist League, by the GCI Political Bureau | 48 |
| PART V: Documents Concerning the Electoral Strategy of the Liga Socialista | |
| Letter from Joseph Hansen to the Political Committee of the Liga Socialista, October 24, 1975 | 50 |
| Letter from Four Members of the Liga Socialista Political Committee to Joseph Hansen, November 20, 1975 | 52 |
| Joint Electoral Platform of the Mexican CP, MOS and LS (TM) | 53 |
| Is the Mexican CP No Longer a Stalinist Organization? | 56 |
| Internal Circular of the Tendencia Militante on the Communist Party of Mexico | 62 |

Part I: Statement by the Steering Committee of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction on the Internal Struggle in the Liga Socialista

Last September an internal struggle broke out in the Liga Socialista between members of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction. The dispute soon resulted in the formation of two factions, the Fracción Bolchevique Leninista (Bolshevik Leninist Faction) and the Tendencia Militante (Militant Tendency). The latter gained a formal majority at the Second Congress of the Liga Socialista held in December 1975.

The sharpness of the struggle can be judged from the fact that the FBL felt that it had no alternative but to become a public faction, while the TM has admitted publicly (in an article by Ricardo Ramos) that some of its members "have drawn violent conclusions, which we are trying to restrain." As proof of the inclination of the Tendencia Militante to resort to violence, on January 23, about a week after the appearance of the article by Ricardo, members of the FBL who were distributing Trotskyist literature at an election rally were physically attacked by a squad of members of the TM.

Nevertheless, as can be seen from the accompanying fact sheet, no clear differences of political importance emerged in the internal struggle in the Liga Socialista up to and including the Second Congress. The Tendencia Militante did not submit a single political document to justify either its formation as a distinct grouping or its fight to gain a majority. It functioned as an unprincipled organizational clique in a power struggle.

In place of a political differentiation, the clique substituted a simplistic sociological characterization. Thus it dubbed the Fracción Bolchevique Leninista as a "petty-bourgeois" grouping that had to be "reeducated" by being sent into the factories. But an *unprincipled organizational clique* is certainly not proletarian in character; it is petty-bourgeois. Consequently the pedagogical prescription ought to be applied first to the Tendencia Militante.

The clique gained a majority at the September 1975 plenum of the Central Committee by taking advantage of an error committed by two members of the Political Committee. These two members had run across material that led them to think that Ricardo had connections with the police, although they recognized that the material might have been planted. They talked with several other members of the Political Committee and one member of the Control Commission about how best to handle the matter. One of these other members of the Political Committee began at once to circulate the rumor that Ricardo was being slandered.

At the plenum, Ricardo and his backers utilized the mishandling of the case to whip emotions to a high pitch. In this charged atmosphere and on this issue, they won a majority of votes. Besides exploiting the way the question of possible police connections was brought up with individual members of the Political Committee and Control Commission instead of these bodies as a whole, Ricardo and his backers raised other organizational matters that normally would never have led to the formation of tendencies, still less factions.

Following the plenum of the Central Committee, the new majority did not confine its course to trying to rectify the mishandling of the Ricardo case. A discreet investigation was what was actually required, since at bottom the affair may really have involved a *police provocation* intended to sow suspicions and to create dissension in the Liga Socialista.

Instead of carrying out a responsible investigation of the kind indicated, Ricardo and his backers acted in the opposite way. They utilized the case to arouse hysteria, to stir up bitter feelings and recriminations, thus setting off such turmoil in the organization as to destroy the possibility of a reasoned discussion on any question.

The congress that had been convoked was held under such circumstances as to catch the ranks utterly unprepared for what happened. For instance, on the political resolution adopted unanimously by the Central Committee in September, the new majority, with no warning, gave a report against the line of the resolution. No documentation was offered in support of this oral presentation. In the very course of the congress, organizational questions, including surprise changes in the statutes, were introduced in such a way as to supersede discussion of political issues. Even consideration of the Portuguese revolution was pushed off the agenda. The way the majority blocked discussion of the Portuguese revolution demonstrated their fear of letting the delegates discuss and vote on political questions.

Thus the nature of the congress was changed while it was being held. From a normal congress of the Liga Socialista it became a hysterical show dominated by an unprincipled organizational clique.

The objectives of the clique became crystal clear in the course of their operation. Their objectives were to entrench the new majority through measures designed to isolate the former leadership, drive it out of the Liga Socialista, and deprive the ranks of the organization as a whole of ways

and means to change the new leadership. The rules put into force by the majority gagged dissent, made it virtually impossible to organize tendencies, decapitated the leadership of the minority, and assured the leaders of the clique self-perpetuating domination of the Liga Socialista.

The lengths to which the clique went were shown among other things by two actions. One was the decision to purge the membership of the Liga Socialista. All members were suspended for a month and could be readmitted to the organization only after passing tests to be determined by the clique. The other was the decision to break off all relations with a sister organization of the Fourth International (in this case the Socialist Workers party which, as is known, is barred from actual membership in the Fourth International because of reactionary legislation in the United States).

Like the leaders of the Fracción Bolchevique Leninista, an unnamed SWP leader was accused of spreading rumors that Ricardo was a police agent. The clique demanded that the SWP carry out a witch-hunt of its leadership modeled on the methods they were introducing in the Liga Socialista. When it became clear that the SWP would instead condemn their methods as alien to Leninist norms they broke relations.

Publicly, the reasons for the rupture with the SWP remain undisclosed. The Ricardo clique hinted at something very dark, saying in their newspaper account of the congress that "it is an affair that we will not ventilate publicly, since it is an internal problem that can only be discussed within the Fourth International." In this way the SWP was smeared publicly, while the truth was covered up.

The actions taken by the Tendencia Militante under the leadership of Ricardo flagrantly violated the platform of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction, which includes among other things upholding the organizational principles of Trotskyism. Consequently the Steering Committee expels Ricardo from the ranks of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction.

Special note must be made of the role played by Greco and Eduardo in the internal struggle in the Liga Socialista. Both of them are members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Workers party of Argentina). Sent to Mexico by the PST, ostensibly to help the Liga Socialista, both of them supported the worst excesses of the clique headed by Ricardo, and even called for more. Without their assistance it is hardly likely that the Ricardo clique could have gained a majority.

We want to stress the fact that Greco and Eduardo were not sent to Mexico by the LTF. At no time did they act as representatives of the LTF, although they were members of it. Responsibility for their conduct and actions lies wholly with the leadership of the PST.

As in the case of Ricardo, the Steering Committee expels Greco and Eduardo for violating the platform of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction, specifically for violating the organizational principles of Trotskyism.

The Steering Committee considers the outcome of the struggle within the Liga Socialista to be a grave setback for that organization. It also represents a setback for the Leninist Trotskyist Faction and for the world Trotskyist movement as a whole. We also believe, however, that the setback will prove to be temporary. The indicated course of action is to seek to bring out the underlying political differences so that the ranks of the world Trotskyist movement can decide in an objective way on the merits of the dispute.

The Fracción Bolchevique Leninista has shown its understanding of this requisite. This was proven by its resistance to the disruptive course of the Ricardo clique and by its insistence that the clique disclose the political views associated with its organizational course.

These views may soon receive public expression. By way of anticipation, the first issue (January 16-31) of Ricardo's version of *El Socialista*, published an electoral platform that they signed in common with the Mexican Communist party and the Movimiento de Organización Socialista (Socialist Organization Movement). Among other features, the platform recognizes the Mexican Stalinists and the petty-bourgeois MOS as organizations that "do not hide their socialist objectives, nor their revolutionary method to gain them." Thus Mexican Stalinism is provided with a Trotskyist cover.

In addition, the common electoral platform supports "peaceful coexistence," that is, class collaborationism.

As for the Fracción Bolchevique Leninista, such errors as it made in this struggle resulted from lack of experience. This was the first time these comrades had found themselves in such a situation. They are to be commended for standing up and fighting to the best of their ability for the norms and practices of Leninism. From the firmness they displayed in this test, we can count on them continuing in the same principled way. In our opinion, they represent the Leninist continuity of the Liga Socialista.

The Leninist Trotskyist Faction rejects the public demand made by leaders of the GCI, PST and Tendencia Militante that the comrades of the Fracción Bolchevique Leninista be expelled from the Fourth International. We are opposed to the expulsion from the Fourth International of any of the groups involved. This would precipitate a split in the Fourth International as a whole. What is called for is sharp condemnation of the methods of the Ricardo clique as alien to the traditions of Trotskyism, and a clarification of the political differences, in order to facilitate the earliest possible unification, on a principled basis, of the forces of Trotskyism in Mexico.

February 10, 1976

FACT SHEET ON THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE IN THE LIGA SOCIALISTA

[Prepared by the Political Committee of the Bolshevik-Leninist Faction of the Liga Socialista]

In October 1972 a group of twenty-four comrades split from the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista (GCI), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Mexico, and constituted themselves as the Juventud Marxista Revolucionaria (JMR). When the question of splitting was debated, some of the leading comrades were not very decided, but Comrade Ricardo pressed vigorously for the course of splitting, taking an intransigent attitude in this respect. To put across the split, Ricardo even resorted to incidental organizational arguments.

The split was unjustified politically. Some political differences had arisen--such as the ultraleft coloration of the propaganda and actions of the GCI, the degree of repression that could be expected regularly from the government, and the importance of the "democratic opening"--but none of these differences had unfolded. A split was not at all justified.

In addition, although there was a problem of delays, it was perfectly possible to hold a political discussion within the GCI.

In June 1973, the JMR sought an immediate and unconditional reunification with the GCI. This change in policy corresponded with the fact that the members of the JMR had come to understand the error they had committed in splitting and wished to correct it.

However, the GCI did not accept our proposal at the time. The reason for its refusal was that its ranks were sharply divided over whether to reunify with the JMR.

In 1973 unification did not represent any problem to the JMR because it had not yet developed into an organization with its own characteristics. Because of the refusal of the GCI to unite the two groups, the JMR had to continue as a separate organization. After some success recruiting, the JMR became a well-defined and well-organized grouping. Thus upon holding its first congress in December 1973, the JMR transformed itself into the Liga Socialista.

The Liga Socialista still considered that the split had been a political error, but by this time it had become completely formed as a political organization distinct from the GCI and there were a growing number of political differences between the two organizations. Consequently on February 17, 1975, the Political Committee felt that it was necessary to bring its policy on unification into correspondence with the new situation.

The change in policy on unification was necessary, in addition, in view of the fact that the GCI finally changed

its attitude on the question in 1975. The internal differences that had existed within the GCI were resolved when the comrades who favored unification won a majority at a national congress.

After the congress, the GCI insisted on unification, and as rapidly as possible. They held that a sufficient basis for unification was to be found in the Transitional Program and the other programmatic positions of the Fourth International.

A little later, the comrades in the GCI who had opposed unification with the LS split and formed a group around the newspaper Rojo. The main cause of this split was the new position of the GCI on unifying with the LS.

The Liga Socialista now held that unification ought to be worked out as a process that included political discussions on Mexico and the accompanying tasks of revolutionists, plus working jointly in concrete projects that would show how the two organizations functioned together.

Any other course would have been irresponsible, since it would mean not trying to guarantee a genuine unification on the basis of program and principles. Thus a sharp maneuver could be pulled against the comrades of the GCI by taking advantage of their hopes for a rapid unification. In that case the objective would be a unification at full speed, setting aside political agreement and capacity for common work, the real basis being skill in inveigling and maneuvering the leaders of the GCI, who were considered not to have much political ability, perhaps picking up a few members and splitting once again.

Comrade Ricardo tried to sell this idea to the members of the Political Committee, trying to convince them to give up the concept of a serious unification as the outcome of a political process.

In the formal meetings, this concept of a sharp maneuver was voiced in proposals for a rapid unification with the GCI. Comrade Ricardo was in a small minority on this question (only one comrade supported him), but he was absolutely intransigent in his view.

At that time, the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST) of Argentina became quite interested in the Liga Socialista. On various occasions the leaders of the PST spoke of their desire to help construct the Mexican party. Needless to say, the Liga Socialista was ready, as always, to accept all the aid that sections of the international could give, especially those endowed with a long tradition and experience.

As an example of this, we sent four comrades to work with the PST in Argentina. The leadership of the PST was unable to convince the first two, who were leaders of the Liga Socialista, of the correctness of either their positions or their methods, although they tried to. On the side of the Liga Socialista, collaboration with the PST was always loyal and fraternal.

We argued, nevertheless, with the Argentine comrades over the form in which this aid could prove most fruitful for our young organization. Here some differences arose over the degree and form that collaboration with the PST ought to take.

Within the Liga Socialista, we also ran into some difficulties in maintaining loyal and fraternal collaboration with the PST, since within the leadership Comrade Ricardo on various occasions adopted an intransigent anti-PST attitude. Several times we had to prevent Ricardo from slandering the PST before the ranks of the Liga Socialista. In fact, he reached the point of maintaining that we must break relations with the PST.

In reality, what the PST did was to intervene in the internal affairs of the Liga Socialista. This was unacceptable to us and we never gave a millimeter on this question, holding to our concept that the leadership of the Trotskyist party in Mexico had to be formed by national cadres, by a national leadership team able to resolve the problems of constructing a mass revolutionary party. The only aid acceptable to us was that designed to help in the construction of cadres and a national leadership team, never aid that would block this process.

However, the PST decided that it had to intervene in one way or another in the internal life of our party. It resorted to working under the surface, behind the back of the leadership of the Liga Socialista, among a nucleus of comrades who sympathized with its methods.

At the August 1975 meeting of the Steering Committee of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction, in a closed session, Comrade Moreno took up a series of problems that had arisen in various countries with cadres of his party. Among the countries he dealt with was Mexico. Comrade Moreno said, quite correctly, that what had happened in these countries were errors that had been committed by some cadres of the PST and that they must not ever be repeated.

At the same time as the August meeting of the LTF was being held, a comrade from the PST arrived in Mexico, Comrade Greco. His purpose was to sell Revista de América in this country. However, since sales of the magazine were slow, he dedicated his free time to talking with rank-and-file comrades of the Liga Socialista on a whole series of organizational problems faced by the party.

Up to the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Liga Socialista, which was held September 14-15, 1975, the only difference that had arisen in an open way was the one over unification with the GCL

The Sixth Plenum began with a closed session. Two members of the Political Committee had run across material indicating that Comrade Ricardo was an agent of the police. These comrades thought from the beginning that there were two possibilities: either the material was accurate, or it involved a police provocation.

Because of lack of experience and knowledge on how to handle such a case, the comrades decided to ask the opinion of three other comrades on the Political Committee and one member of the Control Commission on the alternative that was posed by the material and what to do.

They did this in place of the correct procedure, which would have been to immediately transmit any suspicion or information they had to the party's Control Commission.

One of the members of the Political Committee with whom they consulted, Comrade Nava, told Ricardo and other members of the Central Committee, as well as Comrade Greco of the PST, about the suspicions. In this way, Comrade Nava undertook to circulate the rumor among members of the Central Committee, and even outside the party, that Ricardo was being slandered.

None of the comrades who followed the wrong procedure with regard to Ricardo have filed or submitted any charges against Ricardo.

The majority bloc of the Central Committee was formed on the basis of the error committed by the comrades of the Political Committee in handling the problem that arose around Ricardo. (These comrades later became the leaders of the Fracción Bolchevique Leninista (FBL): Nava developed into one of the leaders of what was later to become the Tendencia Militante (TM).)

This turn of affairs was utilized by the Argentine PST, which undertook to provide the bloc with positions, at first merely organizational in nature. By itself, the bloc did not have the capacity to advance any consistent alternative to the tradition, program, organizational methods, and political line of the leadership that built the Liga Socialista.

The Sixth Plenum had been convoked to discuss the proposal of the Political Committee to call a second congress, open a period of discussion, work out an agenda for the congress, and approve the general line of the reports and documents that the Central Committee would present for discussion. Greco attended the open sessions of the Sixth Plenum. He was the only international guest.

At the first meeting of the Sixth Plenum, an organizational counterreport was given. This, naturally, was a surprise.

In the whole discussion held by the Central Committee only one fact became clear: the newly formed majority wanted to eliminate the organization's branch structure and substitute for it a structure of "fronts" similar to that of cells.

The Liga Socialista had begun to function on a branch basis that same year (1975) and one of the objectives of the Sixth Plenum was to correct some errors that had been committed during the first months of this way of functioning.

In addition to the "fronts," the comrades posed only the necessity of being "more active."

On the basis of these differences, the majority of the Central Committee took the following actions at the same meeting of the Sixth Plenum:

1. The Second Congress of the Liga Socialista was convoked and the discussion period was opened (the majority had not yet presented any document explaining its new organizational position).

2. The entire structure of the party was immediately changed, the members of the branches being redistributed in the new "fronts."

3. The Political Committee was changed "to give a majority" to those who had argued for the proposed "fronts."

4. The organizational secretary was changed. Formerly the task had been shouldered by Comrade Horacio. He was replaced by Ricardo.

Immediately after this, a process was opened that aimed at destroying the minority, without a single political or organizational difference that warranted a sharp division in the party.

The new Political Committee adopted the following measures:

1. In the meeting of September 19 it was decided that the bodies in which the ranks were assembled did not have the right to elect their leaderships. It was proposed, for the time being, that anyone who wanted to could enter the leaderships of the "fronts." The criterion was also laid down that the Political Committee could send persons to function as leaders of "fronts" without the need to be elected or even ratified on a local basis. Those sent by the Political Committee had to be automatically incorporated in the leadership of the "fronts." In addition, the Political Committee had the right to ratify or rectify members elected by the "fronts" as their leadership.

2. On September 27 the decision of a majority of the Central Committee to immediately launch the construction of a youth organization was put into practice. In the meeting of "leaderships of fronts" held to implement this policy, some comrades tried to voice their disagreement, dissent, or doubts. They were told that they had no right to question or discuss something that had already been decided by the Central Committee or Political Committee, and that they had no alternative but to submit to discipline and immediately put into practice what they had been told.

3. On October 23, the majority of the Political Committee presented for the first time a political difference. This difference was at the same time a surprise for the members of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction.

A comrade of the LTF presented a report on Portugal to the Political Committee. Comrade Greco, a member of the Argentine PST, asked for time to present a counterreport. This was the first time, as members of both the Liga Socialista and the LTF, that we learned that the leadership of the PST was not in agreement with the position expressed in the document "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" adopted in August 1975 by the Steering Committee of the LTF.

At the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee, Portugal had been discussed, a point on which Greco had participated along the lines taken by Moreno at the August meeting of the Steering Committee of the LTF. At the Central Committee it was not possible to discern any important difference, and the vote on the line on Portugal was unanimous.

It was after the meeting of the Political Committee that took up Portugal that we decided to inform the LTF of what was happening in Mexico, since it was perfectly clear that what was at issue was not an internal problem of the Liga Socialista, but a problem that affected the LTF and the entire international.

4. On October 30, the majority of the Political Committee removed the editor of *El Socialista* for not being able to work for a month and a half because of sickness and not having officially advised the Political Committee of this fact.

5. On November 13, after a meeting of the members of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction in Mexico which was called to discuss Portugal and which was attended by two members of the Coordinating Committee of the LTF, the majority of the Political Committee voted to change the two members of Liga Socialista on the International Executive Committee because they did not support the position of the majority of the Political Committee on this question.

6. It was decided at this same meeting that from here on the line of the Liga Socialista on Portugal would be that of the majority of the Political Committee, although no document had been presented enabling the ranks and the other members of the leadership of the party to determine what line had been imposed on them.

On November 15, the Tendencia Bolchevique Leninista of the Liga Socialista was constituted on the following platform: (1) the general line of the document "For Internal Democracy in the Liga Socialista," (2) the general line of the document "Tasks and Perspectives," and (3) the general line on Portugal followed up to that time by El Socialista.

7. On November 20, the TBL proposed that the Political Committee postpone the congress that had been convoked for December 19-21. The Tendencia Militante refused to postpone the congress because of "the urgent need for a decision by the congress to put into complete practice the new method of constructing the party."

8. On November 20, the Political Committee voted by a majority to censure the TBL for having included Section III in its document "For Internal Democracy in the Liga Socialista." In this section, the TBL took up the anti-democratic measures that had been adopted by the majority of the Political Committee beginning with the September meeting of the Central Committee. The majority of the Political Committee complained that they had not been consulted about including a criticism of the measures they had taken. In addition, the majority of the Political Committee demanded that this section be withdrawn from the TBL's document, and that we should not talk about the minority being victimized because of its political positions. For the text of the section, see the attached addenda, "Antidemocratic Measures."

9. On December 12, delegates were elected from the "fronts" in Mexico City on the basis of the documents presented by the Tendencia Militante and the Tendencia Bolchevique Leninista. The documents of the TM included a document "Joint Platform for the Dissolution of Tendencies," which had not yet been presented to the members of the Liga Socialista.

This "Joint Platform. . ." was to be the basis, according to the comrades of the majority of the Political Committee, for the dissolution of the TM and the TBL. Nonetheless, the "Joint Platform. . ." codified all the anti-democratic measures taken by the majority of the Political Committee, and deepened them.

These were the conditions under which the supposed Second Congress of the Liga Socialista met. Various branches in the provinces did not have an opportunity to elect the delegates they were entitled to because they had not received the documents of the different tendencies.

Just a few days before the congress, another member of the PST arrived in Mexico. This was Comrade Eduardo, a member of the Political Committee of the PST. Eduardo said that he had come to the Mexican congress as a representative of the Political Committee of the PST.

At the Second Congress, the Tendencia Militante, openly inspired and supported by the Argentines Greco and Eduardo in their speeches, adopted the following measures:

1. Comrades Roberto (TBL) and Nava (TM) had drawn up, a few days before the September meeting of the Central Committee, a draft political resolution. This draft was discussed by the Political Committee and unanimously adopted. Nevertheless, at the congress the Tendencia Militante presented a report offering a line distinctly different in content from the draft that had been adopted unanimously.

2. A decision was passed to suspend all the members of the party for a month, after which it would be decided who would be readmitted and who would not.

After the congress voted for this purge of the members of the Liga Socialista, the TBL decided that it could no longer remain at the level of a tendency, and that to fight against the completely anti-Leninist organizational methods that were being used by the Tendencia Militante, a more adequate instrument was required; that is, the TBL informed the congress that it was converting itself into a faction to check these destructive organizational methods and to combat the leadership that was implementing them.

3. It was voted that the local bodies had no right to elect their own leaderships, since the Political Committee could order persons to take over the task of leadership in the "fronts" at any moment.

4. It would be up to the Political Committee to decide what local bodies could elect their own leadership.

5. It was voted that the members of the party could dissent from directives issued by the Central Committee or Political Committee, but the directives could not be discussed unless the top leadership decided they represented changes in party strategy. Any directive issued by the leadership bodies had to be immediately put into practice.

6. The Tendencia Bolchevique Leninista was characterized as a petty-bourgeois minority and the necessity was posed of "reeducating" its members "inside the factories."

7. The statutes were changed to give almost total power to the Central Committee and the Political Committee so that the ranks no longer had any way of controlling the leadership.

8. The statutes were changed to remove all the clauses granting minority rights within the party.

9. The four central leaders of the Fraccion Bolchevique Leninista were denied places on the Central Committee under the accusation of "lack of revolutionary morality" because of the Ricardo case. In addition, it was decided that these four comrades and the two comrades on the outgoing Control Commission who belonged to the FBL could not hold any post of responsibility in the organization because of alleged "moral reasons."

The Tendencia Militante decided that the Central Committee would be composed of thirty members (twenty-four full members and six alternates). The FBL was given ten members (eight full and two alternates). The TM refused to accept the FBL slate because it included four of the six comrades whom the TM had "suspended from any post of responsibility."

The TM said that they accepted the other six members of the FBL slate. The FBL rejected this. The TM then voted to elect their own slate plus a new list to be presented by the FBL to the Central Committee, but without the four comrades. The FBL rejected this likewise. Thus the FBL remained without representation in the Central Committee.

10. Relations were broken with the Socialist Workers party because of the alleged participation of one of its members in weaving suspicions against Comrade Ricardo.

11. The point on Portugal was removed from the agenda of the congress. The account of how the Tendencia Militante evaded discussing Portugal is as follows:

At the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee a position was unanimously adopted on Portugal and it was decided that this point would form part of the agenda for the Second Congress and that it would be discussed during the pre-congress discussion period.

At the meeting of the Political Committee in which Greco and the new majority of the PC pulled the surprise of letting it be known that they had differences, it was decided that a point of such great importance merited opening a broad discussion in the ranks.

After the meeting of the LTF, the new majority of the Political Committee decided that since the members of the International Executive Committee belonging to the Liga Socialista did not have the same position as they did, and since Portugal was of such great importance, it was necessary to replace them by members who held the position of the majority of the Political Committee. Up to the present, this position remains unknown to anyone but them, since they have never presented a document in which they state their views.

At this same meeting, the majority of the Political Committee decided to take the point on Portugal off the agenda of the congress and reduce it to various oral reports--one for the majority of the Political Committee, one for the Fraccion Bolchevique Leninista--which did have a clear position--one for the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista, one for the Leninist Trotskyist Faction, and one for the PST. There would be no discussion or summaries on this question because of lack of time.

Finally, at the congress, the Tendencia Militante decided that a decision on Portugal would be taken at a regular or broadened meeting of the Central Committee, since the point was too important and required a serious discussion.

During the congress, the comrades of the PST spoke in behalf of the conceptions of the Tendencia Militante on a whole series of points, such as their organizational methods. When the election of a new Central Committee came up on the agenda, and the TM called into question the right of the leaders of the FBL to be elected because they had not correctly handled the items concerning the Ricardo case, which they held to be an issue involving "lack of proletarian morality," it was the two comrades of the PST, Greco and Eduardo, who made the most dramatic speeches against the comrades of the Fraccion Bolchevique Leninista. In fact, Greco maintained that not only should they be rejected as members of the Central Committee or any other leadership body, but they ought to be expelled from the party.

In the meeting of the Central Committee following the congress, a new Political Committee was elected. Here again the FBL was denied the right to choose its own representatives.

Nonetheless, some of the members of the FBL attended the first meeting of the Political Committee. In this meeting, the majority decided:

1. To oppose taking minutes of Political Committee meetings, since minutes were considered to be unnecessary. After a strong protest from the FBL, the comrades agreed to take minutes of Political Committee meetings and circulate them. But there was to be only one copy for Mexico City and a carbon copy for each "front" in the provinces.

2. To have in the apparatus only an editor of the paper and an organizational secretary. The organizational secretary, Comrade Ricardo, was designated to decide on the formation of new "fronts," new posts that might become necessary, the naming and removal of members of any secretariat that might be set up, the distribution of members in the fronts, etc.

3. That members of the FBL, owing to their petty-

bourgeois character, could not participate in "apparatus" functions, as the TM called them, because of the necessity to "reeducate them."

4. It was held over to another meeting of the Political Committee to decide if the minority had the right to state their positions if they differed from those of the majority of the Political Committee.

In face of all these facts, the Fracción Bolchevique Leninista decided that it would be doomed if it accepted the new rules established by the new majority in the course of the Second Congress, the objectives of which were to entrench the majority and smash the minority. The FBL decided therefore that it was necessary to express its point of view publicly to save the tradition and program of the Liga Socialista as well as the program and organizational methods of Trotskyism. That is, the FBL considered that it was necessary to constitute itself as a public faction of the Liga Socialista.

At no point in the discussion did clear political differences emerge. The whole debate turned by necessity around the issue of democratic centralism and Leninist organizational methods. Nevertheless some political differences did begin to appear, although they were not debated and no document was written concerning them. These political differences are as follows:

1. On the character of the Mexican government. The Tendencia Militante maintains that it is a "bonapartist" government, that it is making genuine and important concessions to the workers and other exploited layers. The Fracción Bolchevique Leninista holds that the Mexican bourgeois government has not granted real concessions to the masses, but is taking away many of the things gained in previous struggles. The FBL believes that this is one of the causes of the deepening and broadening radicalization occurring in Mexico.

The TM holds that it would be difficult for the government to again resort to massacres as a means of maintaining control over the masses, and that it is following a foreign policy with nationalist characteristics reflecting the pressure of the masses along this line.

The FBL believes that the government is ready to resort to any extreme to maintain its control over the proletariat and its allies; that is, the government will not hesitate to utilize different degrees of repression, even the most extreme, if it considers it necessary. Hence the struggle against repressive measures that the government is continually ready to use must be one of the central axes of our propaganda. The FBL holds that in its foreign policy the government is trying to take advantage of the interimperialist squabbles to blackmail U. S. imperialism and gain better deals.

2. On the elections, the TM maintains that it is valid to form electoral fronts advancing a common program with petty-bourgeois groups, including the Stalinists. The FBL holds that above all in the electoral arena the revolutionary party must put forward its own program in the clearest possible way, since the only reason for participating in the elections staged by the enemy class is to win people to our program. The FBL is against any front or bloc that violates our principles.

3. Policy in the unions. The TM maintains that in the plants where the workers are becoming radicalized and going into action, it is necessary to support a struggle to break away from the big bureaucratized trade-union federations, since there is no other way of breaking the control of the bureaucrats over the workers. They believe that the party must help impel the workers to form small but militant unions.

The FBL holds that the struggle for union democracy in Mexico centers on winning in the union federations, which belong to the workers and not to the bureaucrats. The FBL holds that it is necessary to continually advance methods and forms of struggle designed to strengthen the unity of the workers and not divide them.

The only political differences that the TM has openly indicated are over Portugal; but not even this was debated, since the TM did not present any document and held that the point on Portugal did not warrant discussion at the congress.

January 1976

Political Committee of the Fracción
Bolchevique Leninista of the Liga
Socialista

Antidemocratic Measures

[Originally Section III of the FBL platform document, "For Internal Democracy in the Liga Socialista."]

Up until the first results of the discussion that arose in the Central Committee could be evaluated, many facts remained obscure: the hasty way in which the organizational line of the counterreport was applied without minimum consultation with the members, the struggle to win leadership of the LS at all levels in Mexico City, the measures adopted against members of the Political Committee. We can now draw up a preliminary balance sheet of the situation, and we must say that it is not very heartening.

If the logic of the document goes in the direction of substituting administrative measures for political issues, the practice of the comrades who wrote "Self-Critical Balance Sheet" could not but be the same.

In place of discussing and clarifying the organizational issues, a high-pressure attempt was made to apply a whole "new" line; and despite all the efforts made to collaborate in the Political Committee, new administrative measures were taken. First, the removal of the editor of El Socialista as a disciplinary measure for having fallen behind in her work during a period of illness. The measure was all the more out of place since it involved a founding member of our organization whose work as the comrade in charge of our newspaper had been commended by the Central Committee (the highest authority between congresses).

Finally, the absurd measure was adopted "changing" the fraternal observers of the Liga Socialista in the International Executive Committee (a measure that could not effect a real change, since members of the IEC, even fraternal observers, are nominated and elected by the world congress of the Fourth International. Whatever

the arguments that might be advanced, both measures adopted by the majority of the Political Committee fall into the dynamic of substituting administrative measures for political discussion.

Thus a crisis has been developing in the leadership of the LS. The only way to reverse its negative effects is to make a retreat. How can comrades of the LS have confidence in a leadership that by majority decision adopts measures against comrades who hold a position different from theirs?

The reply to this question lies with the comrades who have maintained the positions of the "Balance Sheet" in the leadership. Will they offer guarantees that they will not adopt new administrative measures against comrades who hold positions different from theirs? Or do they now plan new measures and changes against comrades of the rank and file or intermediate leadership level?

If guarantees are offered, it does not matter how deep the differences in the discussion may go, we will leave aside the whole issue that we have posed in this final section of the declaration. In addition to assuring the comrades of the LS of the right to hold positions contrary to those of the majority of the leadership, and thus ending any worry over the crisis becoming deeper, the above-mentioned guarantees would have the additional effect of avoiding the possibility that issues like these could hinder the discussion on political questions.

We sincerely hope that the comrades of the Political Committee who uphold the positions of the "Self-Critical Balance Sheet" will retreat by declaring that guarantees exist at least from now until the Second Congress and that we can count on ratification of the traditions of our movement.

Part II: Documents of the Militant Tendency

Self-Critical Balance Sheet

Translated from the Liga Socialista Internal Discussion Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 3, November 1975. Platform on which the Tendencia Militante was constituted.

(The general line of this document was adopted by a majority of the Political Committee at a special meeting held this November 4. The vote was as follows: 6 in favor of Ricardo's motion approving the general line of the "Self-Critical Balance Sheet" document; 4 in favor of Jaime's motion approving the general line of the counter-report he presented.

(This document is presented for the discussion and consideration of the ranks as a draft resolution for the Second Congress of the Liga Socialista.)

Self-Critical Balance Sheet

In order for the organization to move ahead it is necessary to include self-criticism as a tool in building the party. We don't use self-criticism the way the Maoists do, as a petty-bourgeois masochistic flagellation, but rather as an instrument to correct our policy. We have to be conscious that we are, in fact, just beginning to build a party, to build its leadership; conscious that this leadership is weak and very inexperienced. And even if this were not the case, i.e., if we already had a strong and capable leadership, even then the development of the party will always be the history of both correct decisions and errors.

We must not let the errors pass without criticizing them, without analyzing them. The leadership must be the most self-critical segment of the organization. There is no such thing as straight-line development for simon-pure parties. Bearing this in mind, this document tries to point out the methodological errors that the leadership as a whole of the Liga Socialista has committed. This means that the signers of this document are not exempt from the criticism.

The Method

The first methodological-type deviation has been the belief that the correct line is the result of political clarity, and that this political clarity results from discussion, reading documents, and gaining a complete historical understanding of a given situation. All these elements are valid, but they contain a serious error. We have forgotten that the only way to arrive at a correct line is through our total immersion in the class struggle. It is impossible to provide a political line for struggles without being thoroughly familiar with their conflicts and traditions. To show up in struggles with only our program is of little help. The fundamental problem is to lead them with our concrete line, not with the general concepts of our program. And to develop such a concrete line we have to be immersed in the struggle on all levels.

Revolutionary ideas must take on day-to-day life through the experiences of the masses themselves. But how can the Liga explain these ideas to the masses when it has no links with their experience? This must be explained; we have not even seen the need for this experience. It seems that all we had to do was form an opinion on the basis of the information we read in the newspapers and then express it in an article or at a conference. Moreover, if the most correct ideas don't directly reflect the ideas and actions of the masses, the masses will ignore them.

It is not coincidental that in our dealings with workers many times we would limit ourselves to proposing a political line for them from our office. It is not coincidental that within our ranks intervention in small factories is considered populism; that to throw oneself into activity among the workers, including the never pleasant tasks of asking for donations on the street, is something to be disdained; that people speak publicly of "piddling little" factories in reference to a small factory where a struggle is taking place; that work at Duramil is ridiculed, calling it the "Duramil Soviet." Thus there are abundant examples of disdain for practical work in the working class and other sectors. Our responsibility as the leadership is to recognize that we have been guilty of this deviation.

Another problem flowing from the same methodological deviation is the belief that you begin your participation in a struggle with the correct and polished line. From this flows the fact that members of the organization are in the habit of wanting to discuss everything in depth before initiating activity. This is not strange; the comrades have been educated to think that political clarification is gained through discussion and not through practice.

It must be stressed that we cannot start with the correct line; that we begin with approximations of it and that only day-to-day practical activity will provide us with the correct position.

Discussion around a given orientation before putting it into practice can be valid only when one is dealing with an orientation that has historically been proven incorrect. On the other hand, it is an error to have a discussion about something that has not yet undergone the acid test of action. The discussion held around the question of the youth group is a manifestation of this deviation that we encouraged. The comrades have demanded clarity on the proposal. They have demanded more documents in addition to those that have come out. In effect, they want to discuss until they are totally clear on the question of the youth group. This method has to stop. Only in the course of building the youth group can it be totally understood.

The leadership arrives at approximations that may or may not be correct. It is impossible to demand that the leadership come up with the exact line. The leadership must have the right to make mistakes. And furthermore, *it must run the risk of making mistakes*. To be right is to be less and less wrong. The only way to make no mistakes is to do nothing. The correct line, then, is the final result of a course of activity, not its beginning. We should not create myths about the leadership. The leadership will be approximately correct. But the fact is that the errors must be pointed out in order to complete the experience.

So, in summary, we are proposing a methodological concept different from what we previously upheld. On the one hand, we used to put forward the idea that in order to intervene in any struggle whatsoever, it was first necessary to establish the correct political line through discussion. Obviously this concept implied that once the line had been established, the party had to base itself upon it as long as the struggle was going on. Given the fact that this line had been extensively discussed, the concept also implied that the possibilities of its being incorrect were minimal. This last point brought with it the idea, which was widespread in the ranks of our organization, that it was very difficult for a leadership body—especially the Political Committee—to be wrong when it put forward a specific line. That is, it encouraged consciously or unconsciously—the creation of the idea of the infallibility of the leadership and the strengthening of its “moral authority.”

On the other hand, the conception we are now putting forward maintains that we cannot intervene in a conflict with an already perfect line. It means that, as was said, we intervene with one or several approximations of such a line and that it will be in the course of such practical intervention that we will be able to come up with the right position, the correct line. Therefore, this concept asserts that there are no perfect or immutable positions. This suggests that we must be sufficiently sensitive to polish up the first approximations on the basis of our intervention. In this way the development of the political line is the responsibility of the whole party, not just the leadership. The whole party through its daily activity contributes to developing it. Therefore the rank and file is an essential factor in this process; without it a correct line cannot be achieved.

An example of this is the position we have been following with regard to the independent unions. Now that we see this phenomenon from the inside, we see concretely that we cannot just sweep away the uneasiness of a large sector of the working class with a stroke of the pen. Meanwhile we had devoted ourselves like “Red Professors” to teaching workers about this. It is obvious that we are better polemicists than any worker. We must recognize that in this case we went wrong specifically through lack of concrete participation.

Thus our new concept maintains that there is no such thing as infallibility of the leadership bodies, nor “clarity produced through discussion.” Instead, the new concept is based on the idea that the appropriate line can only be arrived at through applying the often wrong approximations in concrete practice. Flowing from this, self-criticism is seen as a fundamental element of our methodology,

because if we don't recognize our errors with the same objectivity as our successes we are employing a fundamentally incorrect method in building the party.

Membership

It has been repeated a thousand and one times that we are building a party of Bolshevik cadres; cadres who are ready to give their lives for the party. But are we really on this road?

Another of the errors we have committed is to think that in order to build a jet we must start with a cart. A cart hasn't the slightest chance of being turned into a jet. This contrivance belongs to the homesteads of the past. Let it be used there. To begin to build a jet you have to start by gathering the metals required in its manufacture.

It was thought that developing from an organization not made up of activists to one that was was a problem of political clarity, of the consciousness of the membership. This consciousness is what we have always appealed to. The result is very clear. In a branch of 60 members, we ask for volunteers for one or another simple task. After pleading, three people volunteer. The problem of paying for the newspaper has been even more tragicomic. We have appealed to the consciousness of the members. They have been told that we are in desperate straits. They have even been told that legal proceedings are going to begin against us because of the newspaper debts. None of this yielded results. Are we someday going to build the party of the revolution in Mexico with this type of members? It is even sadder to look at the paper's debt. How is it possible that the organization has never received money for papers that have supposedly been sold? In this instance any sense of party loyalty is totally lost. The problem of sustainers has also been anarchic. Many comrades love their money even more than their party. The overwhelming majority of pledges, even the smallest ones, are in arrears. We have to establish the criterion that members give their absolute all. This includes their money. If we believe that this is the party of the Mexican revolution, we should not hesitate to give the party the maximum possible in monetary terms.

There are those who clearly state that their academic career is more important. Others don't dare say so, but their conduct is the same. The non-activist character of the party can be traced to our method of recruitment. We have set up study groups to deal with a whole series of questions. But, in general these study groups are not linked to any practical activity. This leads to the situation where comrades recruited through study groups understand our organization as one where the priority is on discussing, analyzing, educating in ideas, but not on carrying out activity. This has to change. From now on the study groups must be linked to our practical activity. A study group must serve to initiate activity or to analyze concrete actions. We can educate on abstract questions internally; but for our external work we must be an organization of political action.

Who is responsible for this situation? The party rank and file? No, no way! That is how we have educated them. We in the leadership are guilty. We have always used the argument that “you can't put a jet engine on a cart” to explain that you can't demand a Bolshevik activism from the membership of the Liga Socialista. Well, it's time we

bury the fabled cart. The only way to produce Bolshevik cadres is by producing and educating them in steered discipline and total dedication. Unless the present situation changes, we will be the best commentators in the class struggle but we won't become a revolutionary party.

We have stressed that members must be more active, more audacious. In the first place, how can we demand more activity and more audacity if we don't provide work in which one can effectively be more active and audacious? In the second place, how can we criticize the membership in this regard if the leadership doesn't set an example of how *it* is more active and audacious? We are going to start assigning tasks, minimal at first, but these will have to be carried out. The members will be admonished once or twice about carrying them out. If this doesn't work, they will be asked to participate outside the organization.

It can be said that the party has been educated primarily in seminars and conferences. This has its positive side in the development of cadres. But more important than this is the education of the cadres in the class struggle, in day-to-day participation in struggles. The disdain for activists must stop. The cadres will be judged on the basis of their sacrifice and their dedication, not on their polemical abilities. The best cadre will be the one who best carries out activity. It's time to drop past values and establish new ones.

What type of organization?

The methodological deviations we referred to had their concrete effects in the organization in branches through which we began to function in March. We transplanted organizational concepts mechanically and erroneously.

The idea behind the branches was that by mixing the various sectors we work in, the comrades would gain a rounded view of activity and politics. Neither of these aims was achieved. What ended up happening was that in the branches a good number of comrades who had just gotten started drifted away from the party. Moreover, the "rounded view" was really only a partial view since the branch meeting centered on reports of the three or four areas of work the branch was involved in. Of course this made the meetings interminable, without however enabling people to discuss things extensively or sufficiently.

Furthermore, in a meeting of 50 or 60 persons it is difficult to have reports that are clear to everyone since clarity depends not fundamentally on the clarity of the report, but rather on the possibility of participating in the discussion. Moreover, it is much more difficult for new members to participate in a branch meeting, where they only see the majority of people two hours a week, than in a smaller meeting made up of people they see daily. These problems are exacerbated when we try to have workers function with students.

The result of all this was that the strongest, most hardened comrades were the strongest in regard to ideological conviction, but not in terms of daily practical political activity. The result was that the branch leaderships did not carry on outside activity; their activity often boiled down to providing "leadership" from the central headquarters—coordinating various tasks, etc. But instead of being more linked to the day-to-day work, they were getting further away from it. This is a gross error, one that has caused us many problems with the rank and

file of the organization. If this was what was happening to the secondary leadership, we hardly need to refer to what was happening to the Political Committee. The situation had reached the point where it threatened to become a crisis. The P.C. was totally cut off from the rank and file.

Another problem for the branches could be seen flowing directly from these deviations in method—the problem of the lack of ties between the rank and file, the secondary leadership, and the central leadership. The result was that the political line would develop with great delay in the branches and branch leaderships. So then what would happen? Often the line arose and developed outside of any party body; then it would be adopted. That was how it worked.

This was seen from March 14 to the latest general line regarding the Anteproyecto de Responsabilidad Universitaria (Draft Resolution on University Responsibility). The line arose "spontaneously," as an elementary reaction to prevent us from being isolated. The party bodies responded sluggishly to the demands of the moment. There can be no doubt that the branches were good only for internal education of a political-theoretical type. From then on they could serve no other function, and we were wrong to demand it of them for 6 months.

We can better assess this stage of the organization by taking the following factors into account: 1. Even in the prior stage—of cells—a real criterion for membership didn't exist;

2. This stage—of branches—is not totally negative in that some middle cadres had the chance to develop to a certain extent.

Because of the concept of the branches, building them meant that similar areas of work were divided and others that were dissimilar were brought together. This error was clearly seen in the North and Central branches. The Polytechnic and the *prepas populares* were divided. [The *prepas populares* are free universities formed by students unable to get accepted into the federal and state schools. They are taught by volunteer professors]. Before the branches were established, the Polytechnic had been functioning as a front of work with quite a bit of success. The branches stopped this development. With the old method of organization, joint meetings between the *prepas populares* were beginning to be developed. The branches kept the *prepas populares* apart. The attempt to fuse Tulpetlac with the North branch was never successful because of distance problems, but even more importantly because the Tulpetlac comrades, having no common arena of activity with the North branch, saw no useful purpose in having to put up with the long speeches about Zacatenco and Tacuba. The fact that they attended branch meetings at all flowed more from a sense of obligation than from a need.

The South branch was the one that best survived the experience of the branches. This was because it was more homogeneous. Like the rest of the branches, however, it never became a unit in which activity was planned out, and in fact its development fell back on the good or bad functioning of the cells. For their part, the cells, which in general functioned poorly, had no alternative in functioning to what their leaders individually provided them.

The type of party nucleus we propose to build is of the following type:

1. The members must be divided up in accord with the party's day-to-day work, in fronts according to where they are intervening.

2. The fronts must bring together members who are in frequent contact where they work or in their daily life.

3. We should not make divisions from a formal or geographic point of view but rather on the basis of the real political and economic structure of the region.

4. Another factor to take into account is the distance and means of communication available to the front.

These four norms of organizational functioning are only guidelines. On organizational questions we should be very flexible and must experiment until we find the proper form of functioning. But we should not mechanically transplant the forms of functioning of fraternal parties.

Another negative aspect of the functioning in branches was that by leaving the cells as mere organizational nuclei we cut the ground from under our feet. The very good growth we underwent was specifically based on the fact that the cells as political bodies (with all their shortcomings) were tied to the schools. The result now is that there has been a stagnation if not a decline in the organization. In the *prepas populares* the losses were disastrous. In the Polytechnic there was also a decline, although not as great.

Various explanations have been put forward for this. On the one hand it has been said that the class struggle hit us; that the atmosphere became more tense, even more hostile. The March 14 demonstration and the SPAUNAM and Preparatoria Popular movements occurred. The other explanation goes like this: the cells were so many "white elephants"; when they were structured into branches—which are more Bolshevik organisms—they were bound to contract; that, in fact, the branches didn't cause the problem, rather it was a problem stemming from the period of the cells.

The first argument is hardly valid, although it may contain an element of truth. The rise of movements should strengthen a healthy, militant organization. March 14 and the SPAUNAM and Prepa Popular movements should have strengthened us, not the opposite. If we had participated on March 14 with our correct line, even though we were in a minority, there would be no reason why we should not have been strengthened. With the SPAUNAM and Prepa Popular movements, there is even more reason to think we would have been strengthened since there our line was not in a minority. The element of truth in the argument does not reflect well on the defenders of the branches. What kind of organization do we have that is negatively affected by the movements?

The second argument also has an element of truth; as we already said, there has never been a true cadre membership in the organization—neither when it was functioning through cells nor through branches. We can assert, without fear of being wrong, that there was no change in this aspect—cadre membership—when the change from cells to branches was made.

Nonetheless, the fact is that in the cells we nurtured a whole series of people who were slowly evolving to a higher level of commitment. There are many examples of people who evolved from doing no more than going to cell meetings into people who take on responsibilities. In the branches people also develop slowly, with the difference that the branches are less accessible to the majority of the members.

We might also add that the organizational discontent among the ranks of the organization began precisely when the branches began to demonstrate their failure. During the period of functioning in cells this organizational discontent did not exist. To a great extent it has been the pressure of segments of the organization that has convinced us of the need for the change.

Another of the errors we committed in the way we conceived of the branches was the attempt to artificially create a new leadership of the party as a whole. We tried to make this leadership the intermediary between the central leadership and the ranks. In this way the responsibilities of the organization fell on comrades who were not very developed. The phrase "go through your own experience" became famous. In this way we washed our hands of what might follow. In more than half a year of experience with branches, their leaders have not been able to become the leaders of the organization as a whole.

There are no two ways about it: The only way someone becomes a leader of the organization as a whole is by being in the central leadership. There's no other way to have an overall view of the party. We must bring the most capable, active, and self-sacrificing elements in the organization onto the central leadership in order to train them as national leaders. The secondary leaders will have to be tested in the leadership of a sector of the organization. Not as luminaries who pass down directives from the LS headquarters, but rather as the most active members in their area of political work. In this respect the central leadership also must be representative of the most active sectors of the organization.

A leadership that is made up solely of elements from the apparatus will run the risk of becoming sectarian. The leadership itself must be directly linked to the mass movement without intermediaries. Therefore it must undertake the most difficult and diverse tasks. The notion of leadership as an administrative center must change. Leadership choices must be made on the basis of highly political, active cadre. At this point the day-to-day leadership primarily reflects the apparatus and not the class struggle. The process will have to be reversed. Our newspaper should reflect this concept of membership and leadership. The newspaper must always reflect our activity in simple language.

In this way it will be a tool for recruitment in our activity and can be a fundamental element in building the party.

The tasks we are undertaking

The most immediate task hanging over us is to build the youth group. We have already put this off too long for no worthwhile reason. We are trying to create a party of young people, whose main task is to support, within its areas of intervention, the struggles of the proletariat and its allies. In this respect the youth would not have the same iron discipline that the party must have. At the same time, this youth group would bring to the party those cadres who were ready to commit themselves totally to the cause of the Mexican and world revolution. In the beginning this youth group would be totally student in

composition. Its organizational structure would be cells in each school. These cells must be intimately linked to the struggles in the schools. The function of the cell is to attract activists in order to swell its ranks. At its inception, as is to be expected, the youth group would be totally controlled by the LS. However, we hope it will become organizationally autonomous and linked to the party through its program and methods of activity.

Trade-union work

There is currently a rise in the class struggle in Mexico. While not massive, there are now sectors of the proletariat that are beginning to develop consciousness. The fact that we are a small organization is no excuse for abstaining from participation in these struggles. Although it is true that in the short run we cannot aspire to be the leaders of these movements, that should not stop us from acting like the vanguard of the workers' movement, a role which only Trotskyists can play. Our task is to put ourselves forward as the leadership, not only historically through our program, but in concrete terms in the daily activity of the class struggle.

It is true that there are physical limits to this; however, the lack of cadres in working-class sectors has been due more to a lack of line than to a lack of members. It is very important that we go through experiences of a working-class type. It doesn't matter if the factory is small or large; what is important is that the class composition of our party change. What is important is to recruit workers to the Liga. We must view our work among workers in the same way we have viewed our participation in the schools, i.e. paying attention to the sectors with the greatest potential for recruitment. Furthermore, experience in a small factory is just as valid as in a large one in terms of testing our line.

The elections

For us the elections are one more instrument of struggle. We cannot look at them as something separate from youth work and trade-union work. The elections will be another

tool in carrying out these two areas of work. We have to build the youth group by bringing the elections in to the schools; fighting against the ultras who will propose abstention. We will have to expose them to the ranks of the students, showing how a policy of abstaining from the elections leaves the road open for the PRI [Partido Revolucionario Institucional—Institutional Revolutionary party], and even the PAN [Partido de Acción Nacional—National Action party]. The youth group will be a great propagandist for elections.

In trade-union work we will link up the daily struggle of the workers to the elections. We will show the proletariat that just as you have to fight against the boss in the factory, you also have to fight against the bosses' parties. We will bring the election campaign into the workers' struggles, not as something separate from, but as something linked up to their immediate, democratic struggles. Through the elections we will not only make our program known, we will also advance the concrete struggles.

The Turn

There has been talk of a turn in our organization. Indeed a turn has been taking place since the last Central Committee meeting. It is still partial, but we aim to radically change the organization; not in its program, but in its level of commitment, its intervention in the class struggle, and its organizational forms. The coming congress can annul the turn or deepen it. The Central Committee majority has only a short period (from now to the convention) in which to prove this line correct. However, we are optimistic that the fruits of this change will ripen in a brief period. In fact we can already begin to see them. There are various reasons for our optimism, but two are basic. One is that a large segment of the ranks of the Liga Socialista saw the need for the turn and pressured for it to be undertaken. The other reason is that the turn corresponds to a concrete reality that we had refused to see. So, let's follow the path of building the true Bolshevik party. We believe that the great majority of our cadres will develop themselves in this spirit.

Platform for the Dissolution of Tendencies in the Liga Socialista

by Magallón and Ricardo

Translated from the Liga Socialista Internal Discussion
Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 7, December 1975. Document
adopted by the Tendencia Militante.

The oral discussions in the meetings of the local units of our organization have demonstrated great confusion with regard to the agreements and disagreements that exist between the tendencies. There are accusations on both sides that the opponent has misinterpreted the documents of the other. Given this situation, we think that both tendencies can reach agreement on the basis of the following points:

1. On party membership.

Starting immediately after the Congress, all comrades who are members of the Liga Socialista will go through a month of testing to determine whether they are full members of the organization. During this month, the rank-and-file and leadership bodies will set concrete tasks for each and every comrade and will supervise the carrying out of these tasks. On the basis of those assignments and supervision, a report will be drawn up. This report will be discussed at the end of the month by the appropriate rank-and-file body, which will decide which comrades have fulfilled the minimum level of activity required to be a member of the LS and which comrades have not. Comrades who lose their status as full members of the party will not be excluded from party bodies, nor from its activity, nor from political discussion. They will only lose the right to vote on questions related to the general political line of the organization, to vote in the election of leadership, and to vote on questions of principles. They will maintain their right to vote on the tactical implementation of the political line of the party in their areas of work. The objective of these measures is to not limit the possibilities of the development of these comrades, maintaining them in the party bodies, the discussion and the activity of the party. At the same time the objective is to educate these comrades in the concept that the right to be a full member of the organization—that is, the right to vote on questions of political line, and to elect and be elected to the leadership—must be won with an adequate level of activity.

The comrades who lose their status as members will be guaranteed their right to participate for three more months in the meetings, political discussion and activity of the party bodies. At the end of the three months, the party units will have to rediscuss these comrades' situations to decide who among them have risen to the status of full members and who hasn't. The latter will be integrated into other bodies (sympathizers or candidates) which the party will form and whose characteristics and dimensions can't be defined at present, inasmuch as we can't predict the results of these four months of testing.

2. On the combination of "external" tasks (interven-

tion in the class struggle) and "internal" (education in the program and Marxist theory and political discussion).

You can't establish rigid measures of time to define the relationship between both forms of activity. Both are militant and indispensable activities. Our problem is to define which of these are becoming essential in this stage of our party's development and that of the class struggle. As a general rule that each area of work will be charged with implementing according to its peculiarities, we propose that after the congress, the activity of each rank-and-file and local leadership member of the LS be apportioned in the following way: four days of the week, activity will be carried out "toward the outside" in their area of work; one day of the week will be dedicated to political-theoretical study; one day to political meetings of the party units where discussion on political line and the party's activity will take place; and one day of rest. In the national leadership, this division of "time" is not applicable, since the specialization of the comrades is indispensable (in another stage, a later stage, when our organization is more consolidated and has grown, we will also have to look for specialization on the level of the local leadership, but this is not the present situation). Therefore, we propose a similar guideline for the national leadership—not for the activities of its members, but instead, with regard to their specialized tasks—namely: for every six comrades on the Central Committee or the Political Committee, four will devote themselves to the areas of work and two to the tasks of the apparatus and organization, that is, the "internal" tasks.

What we have to keep in mind is that at this time the fundamental task of the LS is the accumulation and formation of cadres. This task can only be maintained by means of the broadest ties with the movements.

3. On democracy in the organization.

Starting after the Congress, all organizational initiative and the political line that emanates from the national leadership must immediately be put into practice by the rank-and-file bodies and members of the LS. If the political line indicates a change in the strategy of the organization (legal and clandestine work, position on the elections, policy toward the workers movement and its trade union organizations, etc.) the party units will be consulted so that it can be decided, by a majority, whether it is necessary to open up a period of discussion that in no case will last more than one month. If consensus is not reached by the majority of the organization on a particular question of this type, or if strong doubts persist about it, the party leadership will call an expanded Central

Committee meeting where the leadership of the party units will intervene to determine the position. Even in these cases, the leadership can determine whether the line must be put into practice during this period of discussion or whether it can be delayed according to the urgency of its application.

The party's objective is that party units elect their own leadership. Following the month of testing explained in the first point, the rank-and-file bodies that are consolidated can elect their own leadership, with the vote of the comrades who have passed the test and maintain their status of party members. In Mexico City, from what has been seen up to now, they will be able to do this in Naucalpan, Tulpetlac, and the University and Biology School of Poli. The *prepas populares*, where the majority of the present leaders will be moving into other areas of work, will need for a period of time a leadership designated by the national leadership. Zacatenco is in a similar situation, aggravated by the stagnation of the work. In the provinces the present leaderships will have the freedom to adopt whichever guideline is appropriate, depending on how they see the situation. The national leadership reserves the right to send in cadres to whatever areas of work it sees as stagnating or regressing, who should then be automatically incorporated into the leadership. The cadres sent by the national leadership under no circumstances can be the majority within a leadership elected by the rank-and-file. The national leadership reserves the right to intervene in whatever area of work that is stagnant or regressing. In order that a subjective evaluation of each area of work is not made, judgement will be based on three objective criteria: recruitment, sales of the paper, and financial contributions.

The national leadership is not yet constructed. It must go through years of testing and must be prepared to be sufficiently flexible in changing its members so that it can move toward forming a truly homogeneous national leadership team. To achieve this, we will have to experiment with different Political Committees. In this sense, the CC should frequently change the composition of the Political Committee, as the different comrades who are part of the national leadership prove themselves following the Congress. Both tendencies will have to commit themselves to seeing that changes are made as having the goal of the construction of a real national leadership, and not use the changes in the Political Committee in a factional way.

4. On the differences that still exist.

The question of "methodological deviation" will remain a part of the early history of our party. Without abandoning their respective positions, both tendencies must commit themselves to leaving this point out of the voting at the congress and in the discussions before the vote.

The question of the Congress. Both tendencies should commit themselves to respect the Political Committee's resolution at the Congress: at the end of the discussions, the delegates of the provinces will determine which points can be voted on and which ones won't be voted on. The congress is sovereign, but a previous commitment by the tendencies can guarantee that this standard of democracy is met.

The question of Portugal: in view of the differences that have arisen within the LTF [Leninist-Trotskyist Faction of the Fourth International], this discussion should take

place following the congress, and responsibly enough to arrive at a serious decision by the party. Depending on the possibilities, it must be resolved by either a special congress or an expanded CC.

The question of the workers movement. We are just beginning to know the Mexican workers movement. A real strategy for this sector must take into account what the workers think and feel (their consciousness). And we will only know this through our contact with them, our intervention in their struggles. On this point, only the experiences that the party has already had should be discussed (Naucalpan and the electrical workers in the Federal District, smelter workers and railroad workers in Monterrey). We propose that a meeting of all the leaders of our workers work be called in the middle of 1976, from which a document which arms the party for this activity will be issued, if possible. If there is no agreement, an expanded meeting of the CC will be convened. Each front of work in the provinces will figure out its own policy and go through its own experiences, without going beyond the framework of the program. In this way, we will achieve a truly rich discussion on the problem of our intervention in the workers movement, based on objective facts (our intervention, the lines applied, their results, the degree to which we have been able to be in the leadership, the comrades recruited, and the increase of sales of the paper, etc.).

The question of the IEC [International Executive Committee]: Since the fundamental differences on an international scale are those related to Portugal, the two tendencies agree to the following: the new CC that comes out of the Congress should meet immediately and vote on a position for the party on Portugal, a position that will remain in force until a special congress or expanded CC resolves this definitively. If the two positions persist, each of them will elect their representatives to all international bodies (the United Secretariat, the two sectors of the LTF, and all Trotskyist organizations). In the event those representatives have to attend a meeting of a body or an international meeting, both will go—one of them taking the vote of the majority leadership, and the other the minority—with a written statement signed by the whole CC which makes clear the percentage of votes each one of the positions got in the leadership of the LS. The only limitation on the freedom of each tendency to name its representatives is that there be no problems of a moral or disciplinary character with their delegate(s). A letter will be sent to the IEC explaining this situation, making it clear that there is unanimity on the part of the LS leadership with regard to the change in representatives. The comrades who currently represent the LS on the IEC and who belong to the TBL [Tendencia Bolshevique-Leninista—Bolshevik-Leninist Tendency] should make it clear in writing to the IEC that they agree that the representatives be changed in the way explained above.

The party units: the party units should be structured (taking into account that there can't be absolute rules) in the following way:

Taking into account the daily work of the party in the various sectors of work.

Gathering together the members that have contact with each other very frequently.

Taking into account the economic structure and actual politics of the region in question and the technical means of communication.

Part III: Platform of the Bolshevik-Leninist Tendency

Translated from the Liga Socialista Internal Discussion
Bulletin, Vol II, No. 4, November 1975

(The Bolshevik-Leninist Tendency met in the Federal District on November 15 and 20 to constitute itself. The documents published in this Internal Discussion Bulletin were approved as its platform.)

PLATFORM OF THE BOLSHEVIK-LENINIST TENDENCY IN THE LIGA SOCIALISTA

1. For the general line that *El Socialista* has expounded and defended on the Portuguese revolution up until now.
2. For the general line of the document, "For Internal Democracy in the Liga Socialista;" for the ratification at our next congress of the democratic traditions and practices of our organization.
3. For the general line of the document, "Tasks and Perspectives of the Liga Socialista."

To belong to the tendency

All members of the Liga Socialista who are in agreement with the three points above can belong to the Bolshevik-Leninist Tendency; the only requirement is that this position be adopted openly and that your party unit and the national leadership be notified.

Although there is no discipline of any kind in a tendency, we urge comrades who decide to join the TBL to keep up their membership obligations and activity in an exemplary manner.

The initial signers of this Platform are listed below; we invite others to add their names.

[A list of 28 names followed, broken down by basic unit, with areas of work following the name.]

FOR INTERNAL DEMOCRACY IN THE LIGA SOCIALISTA

A Declaration by the Bolshevik-Leninist Tendency

At the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee on September 14 and 15, there was a somewhat heated discussion around the "Report on Tasks and Perspectives."

The general line of this report, presented by Comrade Horacio, was rejected, and the majority approved the organizational line expressed in the counterreport presented by Comrade Ricardo.

During the five hours of discussion in the Central Committee, it was very difficult to evaluate the meaning of Comrade Ricardo's proposals. Before the plenum these proposals were not known and there had been no discussion where the different points of view on organizational questions could have been put forward. The counterreport centered on various problems confronting our organization, and the organizational means of resolving them. Fundamentally, it was a question of changing the structure of the party's basic units—changing the branches into party units which would group together the comrades in one arena of activity—and of "being on the level" of student activists in our practical work. Of course, there were a whole series of side propositions that complemented the one just mentioned, such as the immediate building of a youth organization in the schools and the necessity for people in the leadership to involve themselves more directly in struggles.

Up to this point, the possible differences with traditional organizational concepts of the Liga Socialista were of various kinds, but could easily coexist within an inclusive leadership, which would resolve them on the basis of their results in practice. Their effectiveness and validity would have to be proved within an effort at collaboration.

The problems began because of the way the counterreport was presented. First, it should be made clear that a prior exchange of opinions on the positions of the counterreport could have clarified many questions and avoided many comrades' uneasiness. Second, a five-hour discussion could not be sufficient to clarify the positions. The counterreporter, however, posed the necessity of carrying out all his proposals immediately, and for this purpose a new Political Committee and Organization Secretary were chosen.

In addition to that, there was one disturbing part of the counterreport—the concept of "membership," which will be dealt with later on.

The only way to know precisely what was contained in the proposals of the counterreport was to wait until they were expressed in written form, in addition to observing their practical results. Finally, on November 3 the document entitled "A Self-Critical Balance Sheet" was circulated to Political Committee members in preparation for a discussion November 4. This document contained, explained, and deepened the positions of the counterreport presented on the

“Tasks and Perspectives” point at the Sixth Plenum. A majority of the PC adopted the document and a minority rejected it.

1. THE AXIS OF THE DISCUSSION CHANGES

It could appear that the discussion—which will now go to the rank and file—would have as its axis the problems concerning the organizational forms and tactics that the party should adopt. Nevertheless, the most urgent problem posed by the “Self-Critical Balance Sheet” that needs to be discussed is not the one just referred to, but rather a more important question—internal democracy of the party.

What is the Function of Discussion in Party Units

According to the document “Self-Critical Balance Sheet”: “Discussion around a specific orientation before putting it into practice can be valid only when one is dealing with an orientation that has historically been proven incorrect. Otherwise, it is an error to have a discussion about something that has not yet undergone the acid test of action” (page 2, Internal Discussion Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 3). The discussion held a few weeks ago about the launching of a youth organization is the example presented in the “Self-Critical Balance Sheet” to demonstrate the “deviation” that has been encouraged in the LS. The question is that of the mortal sin committed by comrades who “have demanded clarity on the proposal.” The document states categorically, “This method has to stop.”

To complete the idea, the next paragraph of the document insists, “It is impossible to demand that the leadership come up with the exact line. The leadership must have the right to make mistakes.” The fact that the leadership is subject to making errors might seem obvious. The problem lies in the context in which this idea is placed: As far as the “Self-Critical Balance Sheet” is concerned, from now on discussion on line from the leadership *has to stop* (with the exception of cases where it can be shown that the orientation or line being proposed has been proved wrong historically).

This is monstrous. Every comrade in the LS should have the right not only to demand greater clarity about some proposal or line, but also he should have the right to *discuss* in his party unit the orientations that will be put into practice. Our tradition as the LS is rich on how a discussion in the party units has served to clarify a line. Let us remember nothing less than the discussion about the necessity of acting in an open way, in counterposition to the “clandestinity” of the ultraleft organizations. The comrades not only *demand*ed clarity, but they *needed* clarity on how to carry out the new orientation, which was unknown until that point. Today, more than a year later, we still are having this discussion with those persons we are trying to attract, to clarify the advantages of open activity.

Of course, the comrades who discussed the youth organization did not have “historical” arguments, since in the brief history of our organization there has not been sufficient experience to be able to say whether such and such a thing is valid or mistaken on the basis of experience. The only thing they could demand was *clarity*.

Nobody has joined the LS already a professional revolutionist, educated in the Trotskyist program, traditions, and method. Many comrades need to discuss in their party units

positions that appear to be new. They should be free to reject them or to demand greater clarity. A Bolshevik organization is composed of human beings that cannot be programmed like machines. Rather they have to be educated by means of theory and experience. In this process, we cannot underestimate the education that the leadership itself has received in discussions with people from the rank and file.

The leadership could be correct in proposing a certain line, if it has analyzed it carefully and considered it in light of experience. Nevertheless, above all in cases where there are concrete considerations relating to situations in their areas of work, rank-and-file comrades could be correct against the leadership; or, at least, could help clarify the best way to apply it concretely in our interventions. For that reason, party units should be allowed to discuss how they will apply the line of the party. And not only that, they should have a great degree of autonomy in working out their own tactics and strategy in their arenas of work. For units in the provinces, for example, this could not be any other way. For the units in the Federal District, it should be done the same way. These units should have “the right to make mistakes” which the “Self-Critical Balance Sheet” demands only for the leadership.

A DANGEROUS CONCEPT

Now, the criteria of the “Self-Critical Balance Sheet” could be turned upside down: Rank-and-file comrades could argue to the leadership, basing themselves on the leadership’s concepts, that the orientation which they have adopted against the line of the party “has not been proven historically,” and therefore there is no point discussing it with the leadership. This argument would totally destroy the concept of democratic centralism. In such a case the comrades would be going over the heads of an elected leadership and of a line adopted by the majority of the organization.

The dynamic of the idea expressed in the “Self-Critical Balance Sheet” is extremely dangerous. First of all, it limits the right of comrades to discuss in the party units. This not only cuts across the process of education, but also attacks an elementary democratic necessity for the hammering out of the party’s line. Second, when a comrade has differences he should express them openly, to air the problems and avoid their being handled outside or behind the backs of official bodies.

The history of Marxism is the history of discussion of theory and practical experiences. Unless there has been a tradition established on certain lines and concepts, when something “new” is presented to the rank and file, there will always be comrades with a whole series of doubts and possibly even differences. The only way to air them is through an open, democratic discussion. Such discussion should be guaranteed not only during pre-congress periods, but rather, on the level on each party unit, it is a permanent right of every comrade.

In our organization—which is often introducing “new” concepts and lines for Mexico, and which has only existed for three years—it is possible that we will continue to have a whole series of important discussions outside the pre-congress discussion period. This has been the only way of assimilating the experiences of the rank and file in their areas of work and, at the same time, of educating many

comrades on the program and line of the organization.

This concept in the "Self-Critical Balance Sheet" is dangerous precisely because it does not take into account either the rights of the membership or the *concrete conditions* of the development and experiences of the membership and leadership of the Liga Socialista. We will deal with this further on in this declaration.

Freedom of Discussion Does Not Mean Transforming the Party into a Club of Intellectuals

Now, up until this point we have explained why it is necessary to have the right of discussion in the party, as an instrument for clarifying and educating comrades on their tasks. But it is also necessary to explain what freedom of discussion is *not*, in order to avoid mistaken interpretations.

Freedom of discussion means fundamentally the right of comrades—on the leadership level, secondary leadership bodies, and basic units—to express their doubts and differences in an open and democratic way. This has a *political* goal, the party's action. This does not mean that at every meeting and opportunity there ought to be the "freedom" to have all kinds of discussions about philosophy, problems of materialism and the interpretation of history, or about this or that formulation. The party should be geared to political action; it is not a club where talented intellectuals meet to interpret and ramble on about abstractions. The leaders and the cadres should be educated to avoid this type of diversions.

Liga Socialista members who lived through the first stages of the formation of the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista [GCI—Internationalist Communist Group] know the negative effect of discussions that revolve around abstract theory and not around political action.

We can also remember more recent cases: of two comrades who joined the Juventud Marxista Revolucionaria (independent) [JMR (i)—Revolutionary Marxist Youth (independent)] in 1973 wanting to discuss everything, and who left criticizing us as "empiricists" and "reformists."

The dynamic of a wrong idea about what should be discussed and when this should be done in the basic units of the party tends to convert the party into something that it is not. Moreover, it leads to an eternal pre-congress discussion period, where everybody thinks they have the right to go to other party units to express their differences. Outside the pre-congress discussion period, comrades with a position opposed to that of official party bodies—with very special exceptions—should restrict discussions to their own party unit; they don't have the right to go through the whole party creating confusion and limiting the party's capacity for action.

Other Rights of Comrades that Should be Guaranteed

The problem of freedom of discussion, as we have seen, revolves around the education and action of the party. In the Liga Socialista, which has only three years of experience, this problem becomes even more acute for two reasons. First, the organization has not finished establishing solid traditions in which a large base of cadres have been educated. Second, in our intervention in areas of work, we meet many opponents to our right and left who

can exert pressures on our comrades.

In this sense, the only way of educating new recruits and comrades involved in the work *en route* is to allow for a good amount of democracy so that doubts and differences can be expressed.

But, in addition, there are other democratic rights of the members that the next congress has to guarantee. These are related to what was said previously and have to do with the degree of autonomy of the basic units.

First, there is the right of the party units to discuss, approve, and carry out a line in their areas of intervention. The leadership should guarantee that right, except in such cases where what is involved is a conscious or unconscious break with the party's line. Of course, there could be many errors, which will be overcome as comrades gain education and experience. But nobody can have a better idea of the tactical application of the line and program than those comrades involved in the area of work. The leadership must be extremely careful in pointing things out to basic units.

On the other hand, these party units, for the same reasons as in the previous case, should also have the right to elect their own local leadership. The greatest challenge confronting the Liga Socialista on the organizational plane is the construction of these local leaderships as bodies capable of making the party units function.

In carrying out this task, there will be no easy, direct solutions. But previous errors must be corrected—in this way avoiding their being deepened—by guaranteeing the right of members to elect their own local leadership. The brief history of the LS as a whole is the history of the formation, with all of its errors, of a local leadership capable of standing on its *own feet* to implement the building of the party.

II. DISCIPLINE AND MEMBERSHIP

As we mentioned previously, in the counterreport presented to the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee there was a proposal about what was called "membership" that caused uneasiness. The "Self-Critical Balance Sheet" explains this idea perfectly in its chapter on the topic.

"We are going to start assigning tasks, minimal at first, but these *will have to be carried out*. The members will be admonished once or twice about carrying them out. If this doesn't work, they will be asked to participate outside the organization."

The document is not more specific, doesn't say what tasks it is talking about, nor does it cite examples that could give us a clear and precise idea of which comrades will be invited to "participate outside the party." If the criterion outlined in the "Self-Critical Balance Sheet" were adopted, this lack of precision is what would leave us with a resolution that much more dangerous.

The Party is Not Monolithic

Although it is true that we must educate the members of the LS to be activists and loyal to the party, since the destiny of humanity depends on the party being constructed in time, it is also true that the Bolshevik party is not a sect of fanatics.

The party is not monolithic, because it is composed of various types of people. There will always be party activists whose dedication is totally proved, the full-timers (with or without salary) that dedicate their lives to the party, and the comrades with varying degrees of little or minimal dedication and commitment. The criteria set forth in the "Draft Statutes," presented by the Political Committee to the Second Convention of the Liga Socialista, is quite adequate to include all of them: Members of party are those who accept the party's program and Statutes, make regular financial contributions, attend meetings of their party unit, and help build the party "in the best way possible."

The only way a mass Bolshevik party is conceivable—one composed also of people that we could call "normal" if the word can be used here—is taking into account the various degrees of dedication, assimilation, consciousness, and commitment to the party. There are new comrades who have not yet found their place in the LS and who might spend quite a bit of time as rank and filers before finding it. To apply a disciplinary measure to such comrades is the best way of cutting off their development.

Furthermore, we also recruit worker comrades who have a family to maintain, and who cannot dedicate themselves to the same extent as an activist or full-timer. We should make clear that they, too, ought to be in the LS, and that this is also *their* party.

The reference made in the "Self-Critical Balance Sheet" to the comrades who "state that their academic career is more important" does not take into account a basic fact, one which Marxists should understand perfectly: If it weren't for their studies, these comrades would not be economically supported by their families. Whenever comrades like these are dedicated to the degree that they are able to the construction of the party, they should be inside it.

And were some comrade to say, "I can't do such and such because I have to go to work," "because I have to go to class," what are we going to tell them? That they must leave the LS? This would be absurd.

The problem of the level of activity of the various party members is as much a question of preventing any slacking off, through campaigns, interventions, payment of financial contributions, regular sales of the paper, etc., as of having flexibility towards problems that the comrades face. We should always keep in mind that party membership is voluntary and that discipline depends on the consciousness of the comrades and their experience. It is also necessary to remember that comrades suffer personal crises and for this reason will have periods of low or almost no participation.

Threats Do Not Resolve the Party's Problems

It is obvious that comrades who do not maintain a minimum of activity and who put completely aside the building of the party cannot continue to belong to the LS; that is, in cases when it is clear that they have totally abandoned the party perspective. But to try to transform the Liga Socialista overnight into a steel "jet" by threatening the rank and file of the party with disciplinary measures will lead only to the destruction of many comrades who would have been valuable cadres in the future.

The conditions for forging party discipline can only be created over long years and depend on various factors: In the first place, the consciousness of the membership—their "loyalty to the revolution"; in the second place, their capacity to link up with the masses of workers and their allies; and in the third place, the ability of the leadership to lead the party with a correct line that is confirmed in practice. Without these conditions, any attempt to solve the party's problems with administrative and disciplinary measures—leaving aside the *political* problems of education, consciousness, and experience of the cadres—will be in vain, and can even be converted into a farce.

The firmest comrades, the ones who are least pressured when they are in a tight spot, are those who have greater experience in the party. This is not an accident. Their discipline and their firmness come out of a long process of education and training. In most cases administrative measures play a minimal role or no role at all. We again repeat, joining and participating in the party are voluntary decisions; there are no coercive measures that can force comrades to develop Bolshevik consciousness.

An Incorrect Concept of Democratic Centralism

The thread that runs throughout the document "Self-Critical Balance Sheet" and its proposals is an incorrect conception of democratic centralism, which, if not halted in time, contains a destructive dynamic. Organizational problems are *concrete*; there are no recipes or formulas that can be applied universally. There are only organizational principles that serve as guides in the process of party building.

In this sense, the concrete application of the principles of democratic centralism also depends on the *concrete* conditions in which the party finds itself. The emphasis, be it on centralism or on democracy—let us remember these are counterposed, contradictory concepts—depends on the situation of the organization at a given moment, its degree of consolidation, its tradition, its legal situation, etc.

In the "Self-Critical Balance Sheet," restrictions on internal democracy, which are only valid in exceptional situations where there is a real emergency, are converted into almost a principle, or at least into a common practice. Disciplinary measures that no one doubts are valid in extreme cases are elevated into a category through which there is an attempt to institute Bolshevik membership norms. This is done without taking into account that the LS is going through a period of incipient formation and consolidation; independently of the fact that we have just begun to implement campaigns of intervention in the growing workers movement; and also that until now we have been in a semilegal situation, when we have rarely been bothered by the police.

In summary, these are the problems that must have priority in the preconvention discussion. All the organizational problems and complaints raised in the "Self-Critical Balance Sheet" must be put aside while there is still unclarity on the real political problems raised in this discussion in preparation for the Second National Convention of the LS. Otherwise, we run the risk of diluting the discussion around a thousand different questions on which nobody has expressed—up to now—fundamental differences (the necessity of increased intervention in the workers upsurge, of increased activity by the members in the movements, etc.).

We sincerely hope the comrades of the Political Committee that defend the positions of the "Self-Critical Balance Sheet" will pull back and declare that guarantees do exist at least from now until the Second Convention, so that we can set about reaffirming the traditions of our movement.

Call for a Tendency

The differences, as we have explained in this declara-

tion, are of sufficient importance so that we see the need to defend our points of view in an organized way. It is the duty of any organized formation within the party to maintain beyond the shadow of a doubt exemplary loyalty and dedication. This is the only way the goal our tendency is seeking—the building of the party—can be achieved in practice, avoiding thereby a dilution of our principles with factional considerations.

TASKS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE LIGA SOCIALISTA

Presented for discussion by the Bolshevik
Leninist Tendency of the Liga Socialista

Introduction

The purpose of this document is to indicate the most important tasks for our organization to carry out in the present period. The tasks flow from the Draft Political Resolution.

To understand tasks before us, we must recall the fundamental features of the present period that are noted in the Political Resolution. The fundamental phenomenon we are experiencing at this time is the growing radicalization in the different social layers of the country. This radicalization tends to become more and more acute because of the social and economic crisis of the country and the inability of the government to solve the problems of the masses.

Specifically, the most important index of this radicalization is the growing disillusionment of the masses in the government of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI—Institutional Revolutionary Party). At the end of the sixties, when this process began, the radicalization mainly affected sections of the petty bourgeoisie, above all the students. Now, although students continue to be the most radicalized sector, we can no longer say that they are the main axis of the mobilizations the country is experiencing.

We have begun to see movements and struggles that affect various sectors of the masses besides students. The peasants are beginning to move once again around the land question. Even though it doesn't have much strength, guerrillism reveals the growing instability of the petty bourgeoisie. The continuing struggles of the slum dwellers point to the explosiveness of the marginal, semi-proletarian sectors of our country.

Nevertheless, the most important thing we are experiencing in this growing wave of movements and conflicts is that the workers are winning most of them. The growing number of strikes and struggles, like the national mobilizations of the electrical workers, show the tendency of the proletariat to become the center of the class struggle in the country.

Even though the mobilization of these sectors is a response to the problems capitalism has created for them—that is, a response in their own interest—there is an axis that links all of their struggles: the problem of democratic rights. The severe erosion of the government's control apparatus, along with its smaller margin for granting concessions, has forced it to increasingly restrict the opportunities for the masses to express their demands. This is combined with the fact that the government cannot even grant the masses the right to choose their own solutions. Each struggle of the masses to defend their interests poses the question of the struggle for the right to express themselves and to control their own organizations.

The crisis of the PRI government is sharpened by the contradiction between having to maintain control over the masses while at the same time seeing itself obliged to take more measures against their interests.

In this sense, the struggle for democratic rights, linked with the needs of the masses, becomes the central political focus of the struggle in this period. This struggle brings to the fore the fact that the proletariat is the only class capable of completing these tasks. In our country, democratic slogans play a fundamental role in furthering and orienting the mass mobilizations against the bourgeois government. They are a key means of promoting independent political action by the working class.

Having this broad view, our organization must take another step forward in the task of constructing a powerful revolutionary party. This period is so crucial that if we don't know how to adequately respond and orient ourselves to participate in the movements, we could lose our central perspective.

Undoubtedly, this perspective poses new tasks for the Liga that are difficult from the central axes of our activity to date—even though they have already been outlined this year. We can point to four basic aspects that the party should deal with in this period.

The first is related to democratic rights. We should show that our organization is the most clear and consistent one in the struggle for the democratic tasks that have to be

resolved in our country. We must show with our program, our action, and our banners that these tasks can only be solved through the independent mobilization of the masses, and that this is an essential part of the struggle for a government of a different class than the present one, a workers and peasants governments. To do so, the party must clearly delineate a revolutionary position and participate in the fundamental aspects of this process.

It is not only in the schools and the unions that this task is posed for us. In this period it is our duty to participate more fully in the national political arena. We should have a political orientation that is directed toward broader sectors, even though in the immediate period we will not be able to intervene directly in them. An example of this type of task is the policy of calling for the formation of a coalition around the rights of parties and political groups to participate in the elections.

Another aspect is the electoral policy. This is a very important task that we should develop further, one that has to do with our policy of taking advantage of every opportunity to get out the revolutionary program to the largest possible number of people.

The need to increase and consolidate our work in the workers movement is the first step toward making this sector another main area of participation for our organization. We must begin to orient toward the radicalized sectors of the working class, since these sectors will be the backbone of the future mobilizations, and consequently, a fundamental factor in the development of our organization.

Lastly, there is another area which has been basic to the development of our organization: our work in the schools. We should remain in the schools, since the student sector is and will continue to be the main area of work for us. It is where we have gotten the largest number of our cadres and where there are the best opportunities to get out our program.

Without a doubt, many of the tasks that we are going to carry out in this period will be different than those we carried out before. The previous period was characterized by the fact that our central task was to recruit and to educate a small handful of cadres that had the opportunity to carry out only limited activity. Now the organization is entering a period in which it must cease being a closed nucleus. The central task is learning to make contact with the masses and to participate in their movements.

Do these new adjustments mean that our organization is entering a new stage in building the party? This is a problem that has to be clarified in order to understand more concretely the tasks and perspectives of the Liga in this period.

In fact, the tasks we are proposing still pertain to the earliest stage in party building, i.e., the propaganda stage. We are still at the stage where we are accumulating and training cadres to be able to participate in the movements with our political ideas. We have barely begun to take the first steps that will enable our party to acquire experience through participation in the mass movement.

The fact that we intervene in the mass movements does not mean that we have gone beyond the propaganda stage: that does not depend on whether we intervene or not, but on the conditions under which our intervention is carried out. A party ceases being propagandistic when it is in a position to vie for the leadership of the masses, or of a

fundamental sector of the masses. The Liga Socialista is not faced with this perspective in this period. Our perspective when we begin to intervene in new sectors is to obtain a wider hearing for our organization and its program so as to make our positions more well known, even if it is difficult at this time for them to take hold among the masses.

We must not confuse leading a struggle with leading a mass movement. To become the leadership of the masses we must be in the forefront of their main organizations and win them to our program. It is obvious that we are interested in intervening in and being able to lead struggles. Even now this activity is necessary so that our cadres and our party acquire experience and learn to participate in action with the masses in order to win them.

However, we should not think that our central task is to hunt down and lead struggles, or that this means that we are already leading the masses. It is just a part of our political orientation of making contact with the masses, something that depends on the ability of the organization and its cadres. In the mass movements in which we participate, which arise independently of us, our intervention as a party depends on these factors.

We should point out that hard work is basic to carrying out this type of task. The consolidation of our party structure continues to be key to carrying out the objectives we have proposed.

Therefore, in this period our perspectives are to attain a greater hearing for our political ideas, to develop our nucleus into a more homogeneous, more politically effective party, and to begin its implantation into important sectors of the mass movement.

Now we will go on to explain in more detail the political tasks of the party in its main areas of intervention during the next period.

The student movement

The student sector continues to be the main area of work for the Liga Socialista. The student milieu continues to be our main source of cadres, and the sector in which the best conditions exist for us to get out our political line. It is here that the organization has had its most important political experience.

The basis of our intervention has been the program that we have developed for this sector, focused around demands for the democratization of education and control of the schools by the students and teachers. Our main task continues to be to propagandize around this program and win students to it. However, in order to develop our political tactics we have to make adjustments to new conditions that have arisen in the student movement.

We are seeing a strong tendency for it to continue to lose the spontaneous, massive character that it had in the period from 1968 to 1971. This does not mean that the students have stopped demonstrating, but these demonstrations are taking on a more and more defensive character. Nevertheless, it continues to be the most radicalized sector, the sector with the greatest political independence from the government. It is not our task to speculate if it will rise again to the same level as before, or how it will do so. The fact is that the party must have an

ongoing political orientation toward the student movement, pointing out its main tasks in the period that it is going through.

The demobilization of the broad student masses has allowed the government to go on an offensive to regain control over this sector. The mobilizations we are seeing, and those to come, will be directed at defending students from the government's measures, and preserving the main educational opportunities.

In this period, the tendency of these mobilizations will not be toward building organs of student control—as was the case in past years when representative councils and so forth arose. While the development of these organizations is not ruled out, they do not at this point reflect the sentiment of the student rank and file. Of course we cannot dismiss the possibility that some such organizations may arise as a result of the implementation of the governmental policies mentioned earlier—and all of this could vary as a result of changes in the government's policies—but the clearest tendency is in the other direction.

Because of this, our slogans should be directed toward confronting the government's measures and exposing the character of the "official" organizations that are once again becoming the decision-making centers in the schools. We're not talking about raising slogans of power in the schools. The purpose of our slogans is to mobilize students in defense of democratic rights in schools, which in this period are in danger of being reduced by the government's offensive. Campaigns like the one around the rough draft of the statutes, the 40 pesos [a fee charged for make-up exams in the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico (UNAM)—Autonomous National University of Mexico], against the decentralization, for democratizing the technical councils, etc., are examples of what our main focus should be in the schools.

Another task before us in the student movement is to support the struggles of professors and university workers. These struggles are beginning to take on a fundamental role in the educational centers, and they will have an immediate impact on students. The movement to unionize academic personnel is an example of this. We have to point out the best ways of supporting these sectors.

This policy is important above all for the vanguard, which is the section most drawn to these struggles and most active in supporting them. Our experience in this field was with the strike of the Sindicato del Personal Académico de La Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico (SPAUNAM) [Union of Academic Personnel of the Autonomous National University of Mexico] and the struggle of the teachers at the Politécnico.

Among the most important problems we have to solve in the student movement are the "activism" [referring to feverish activity without any program or perspective] of the vanguard, and its division into a large number of very small grouplets. Confronted with an aggressive policy on the part of the authorities, and lacking massive support, these forces have become isolated. This has moved them toward impressionistic and sectarian policies. They either tail-end any workers' struggle, or they confuse a single demonstration with a revolutionary upsurge of the masses.

Though one of our tasks is to fight against sectarianism among the students, this does not mean that we look down

upon the vanguard. The best way for us to win over and educate the vanguard is to point to the politics of mass action. Although in this period it is going to be very difficult for us to counteract the pressures these sectors will be under, we should make an effort to win them to a policy of united front against the attacks of right-wing thugs, in support of other struggles of the exploited and oppressed of the world, against antidemocratic measures, for international solidarity, etc. Obviously, to be able to win them to this position, we have to be where the student vanguard is.

The perspectives in the student sector are very encouraging for the Liga Socialista. We not only have the opportunity to win new cadres on the basis of socialist propaganda. We may be able to affect this sector as a whole. If there is any place we have a chance to win influence, to show ourselves as an important political alternative, it is among students.

The rank and file bodies should orient their work in the schools along this line. They should orient toward establishing fractions in more schools. It means stepping up our propaganda, our newspaper, taking better advantage of our cadres who are leaders in the schools, and organizing the fractions and the rank and file bodies so they can assimilate a certain number of new recruits.

The workers movement.

Together with the student movement, this sector is becoming one of our main areas of intervention. Unlike in the student movement, we lack experience and a tradition in this sector. This will make our first undertakings difficult.

It is obvious that no one is proposing to throw all of our party into the factories. As was already clarified in the introduction, our intervention in this period is aimed toward the sectors where it will be easiest to gain experience and to get out our politics.

We are no longer discussing whether or not we participate in the workers movement. We must determine which sectors of the workers movement offer us the best political opportunities.

In general terms, we have already stated which sectors of the workers movement are mobilizing, and where our political work will be easiest. It is large unions that have shown the highest political and organizational level. These sectors have a greater ability to mobilize and, consequently, they are the most important sectors of the proletariat in this period.

In these sectors, which are the political vanguard of the workers movement, our party should have an ongoing orientation. We should have a conscious policy in the sense that these are the strategic sectors for the development of a class struggle current among the workers.

Our policy in these sectors is aimed at encouraging and participating in the different opposition tendencies and groups, in which the most radicalized and political workers are gathering. Our objective is to try to give these currents a class-struggle program, to develop and strengthen them, and to recruit or at least win the sympathy of their most important members. These groups are key. They are inside in the unions and federations controlled by the union bureaucracy, and they are the most important battering ram against the bureaucracy.

Another important sector that has begun to mobilize and may carry on important struggles is the newly industrialized sector of the proletariat. It is a very exploited sector with a low level of political organization, and consciousness, not tied to the main body of the workers' tradition in the country; but it is the most explosive and combative sector. We have seen this particularly in the last year, when the number and strength of its mobilizations has grown.

Given the very difficult conditions under which these sectors confront the union bureaucracy and the government, their main form of expression so far has been the formation of independent unions. As this type of struggle develops, and as the workers begin to acquire experience, this type of organization and approach will be superseded. Such is the case of SPICER, where—because they did not understand that within the miners union there were antibureaucratic tendencies and currents—their deep contempt for the large unions led them to the policy of independent unionism and a trade union defeat. Each conflict in these sectors should be analyzed according to its own particular traits.

This tendency toward independent unionism shouldn't be posed in a schematic way, but should take into account the possibility of linking up those conflicts with the democratic opposition tendencies of the big unions. We should be aware that the road for this sector will be difficult, since the main problem it faces is its tremendous isolation from the mainstream of the workers movement.

Our orientation toward this sector has to take into account that in the immediate period it generally needs, and we must give it, solidarity and support. The other feature of our policy is to get out our position on the importance of the struggle for a central union federation, the struggle to win back the official federations. This position is of utmost importance because through it we pose the struggle by means of which the independent unions can integrate themselves into the mainstream of the workers movements. At the same time we fight those currents that are fostering independent unions in order to maintain them as fiefs, increasing their isolation.

This means our call to organize and coordinate these bodies is aimed at building such struggles. But this is always with the perspective that they should become part of the opposition currents within the federations, since that is where the bulk of the workers are. In this period these independent bodies should not be given precedence over the organization of the big federations.

Our party's participation in this sector must take into account the difficult conditions it faces and the conjunctural character of its mobilizations. What we are able to build in this sphere will depend on our having sufficient, experienced cadres to maintain this kind of work. Furthermore, our intervention in these struggles will depend on their importance and on the forces at our disposal.

In the immediate period our most important political slogans for the workers movement as a whole revolve around setting up a national current involving the different sectors fighting for trade-union independence and democracy. This can become the main force against the bureaucracy, especially against its most reactionary sectors such as the Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico [CTM—Confederation of Workers of Mexico]. Such

a current would become our best opportunity to get out our program for the workers movement since it would obviously have to adopt a class-struggle program. At present this campaign revolves around building the Movimiento Sindical Revolucionario [MSR—Revolutionary Union Movement]. We have to orient all our work in such a way that we can participate as a current in this process, even if at this point we are not strong.

Right now we have to understand that in order to carry out this policy we have to be involved in various activities: support for and participation in important struggles where our forces make this possible; participation in opposition groups where not everyone is a socialist; membership in different kinds of unions; establishment, where we can, of propaganda tools such as study groups and conferences within the workers' organizations; development of a line for each struggle and each union; etc.

Our organization must be active in each struggle and we must be the best activists. But our method of work differs from that of the populists and ultralefts, who use activism (the only kind of work they know about) in the manner of Sisters of Charity, without any politics behind it. Above all, our intervention is carried out as a political party.

Our participation is not based on activism, but rather on the political line our cadres put forward in each of the activities they carry out. Unless our cadres develop this ability, we are doing little for the workers or our organization.

Therefore all the rank-and-file bodies must regularly discuss and familiarize themselves with our *political line* for the workers' movement. Also the comrades involved in this activity must be well integrated into the party's various bodies and middle-level leaderships so that their experiences can be transmitted to all the comrades. Unless our intervention in the workers' movement is based on a strong party structure, all our work will remain activism, opening us up to the risk of getting mired in syndicalism, without actually educating political cadres for the party. This would make the LS extremely weak and would make it easy for it to be destroyed or to disintegrate.

The struggle for democratic rights

It is already clear that the struggle for democratic rights is one of the most important axes of the mobilizations that will take place in this period. Given capitalism's inability to grant the masses their fundamental rights, it is one of the most important tasks the masses have to resolve. Our job is to push this struggle forward, showing at each step that these rights will only be won through mobilization and class political independence.

In order to demonstrate that we are the most consistent in this sphere, we have to have a well-defined political line regarding each aspect of this kind of demand. In addition we have to try to participate in and initiate all kinds of meetings, campaigns, and activities around these points. To do this we have to go beyond the boundaries of our activity in the schools or unions. We must learn to carry out campaigns by our whole party that allow us to reach sectors we are not used to working among, such as professionals, intellectuals, etc.

The most important campaign in this side of our

political orientation is the campaign against the antidemocratic Federal Election Law. This point is particularly relevant now, given the imminence of the 1976 presidential elections. While our objective is to build a coalition for political rights, this campaign will have to be adapted to the conditions that arise, such as, for example, support for the rights of the Communist party of Mexico (PCM), the struggle to run an independent candidate, etc.

Other important slogans in our on-going campaign for our democratic and political rights are the struggle to free political prisoners, freedom to demonstrate, freedom to join any political party, etc.

The activities around these points will basically be campaigns around calls to create a united front with other organizations, publicity campaigns, solidarity campaigns, campaigns of financial aid, etc. For this the party will need a well-centralized structure that allows it to go into action as a unit in different places and in our usual fractions. Equally important, the rank-and-file bodies must regularly discuss and familiarize themselves with these aspects of our politics in order to have a broader view of how to participate in these movements.

The elections

One of our organization's basic tasks is to try at all costs to use the 1976 elections to get out the revolutionary program. It would be political suicide if our organization remained quiet in the face of such an important event, when broad masses are receptive to political ideas.

Our political orientation towards the elections is based on the solutions we propose for the problems facing the masses. We point out the real cause of the problems, show that the only way to solve them is through mobilization and political independence, and, flowing from that, point out the need for a workers and peasants government in our country. We must denounce the antidemocratic character of the elections the PRI is pushing, and explain that they don't provide any solutions for the problems of the masses.

The methods we use to get our positions across have not yet been determined. The small size of our forces is the first limitation on our ability to make a significant intervention in this process; the second is the powerful legal impediments in Mexican law.

One possibility is to set up an electoral front with various organizations. The agreement with the CPM is an attempt by the LS in this direction. Here we must be clear that any agreement we reach has to be based on achieving a clear and real programmatic agreement with those making up the front, an agreement in which there is a clear political demarcation from the rest of the organizations. This means we must avoid agreements that dilute our positions or confuse our political identity.

The other perspective open to us—if a real electoral front is not set up—is to support, with our own programmatic positions, a specific independent candidate; or to give critical support to some other working-class front that might be formed.

The final perspective would be for us, by ourselves, to carry out a propaganda campaign around our program in the broadest sectors that our forces permit. At no time should we sacrifice our objective of clearly getting out the revolutionary program on the altar of setting up groupings

that might appear powerful to some sectors. The question of forming an electoral front is not an unimportant thing. It involves showing the masses the program with which they will take power and who are the only ones capable of carrying it out.

The elections are our most important campaign for the coming year. Whether it becomes a campaign that gains us a hearing among broad sectors will depend on our organization's initiative and its ability to function in this kind of activity. This is the LS's first electoral experience.

The first thing is our cadres' ability to make the revolutionary socialist positions on the elections perfectly clear. This will be particularly crucial in all our fractions and in places where other currents of the left come together. Another aspect will be our ability to carry out propaganda and activity around this point in such a way that, as an organization, we make ourselves heard in the midst of the sea of political propaganda that will undoubtedly flood the entire country.

Similarly, we must make use of every opportunity—public debates, meetings, mass media, publications, etc.—to get out our positions. This means that all the rank-and-file bodies and the middle-level leaderships must be clear on our electoral policy so they can carry out initiatives on all levels regarding this important campaign.

The parties and political groups

Part of our task of gaining contact and influence in the movements involves defining a policy towards the other political currents on the left.

Although the left is presently weak among the masses, important political alternatives will arise in the future upsurge. In this period we should expect a series of regroupments among the different left organizations. This process will define who are the principle obstacles to the construction of a mass revolutionary party and who are our allies in this task.

This stage is important because, as far as the political currents are concerned, in relative terms we are all starting from the same conditions in trying to win influence among the masses.

The CPM is our main opponent in the workers' movement. Although reformism does not have mass influence in Mexico, we should not forget that when the workers look at the left, generally the CP is the first thing they come across. The CP's present situation makes it possible to carry out joint activities with it since the bourgeoisie has forced it to remain in the camp of the opposition, making it more attractive to some sectors. We should use this policy as a way of gaining a hearing from any sector of the CPM that develops in a favorable direction, or from any sectors or movements in the CP's sphere.

This policy is important because it will later allow us to show more clearly who is most consistent in carrying out the activities we jointly participate in. In fact, this is one side of the method we use with all currents, particularly reformism. For example, the struggle for political and democratic rights is a very important point that will define the political currents in our country.

Similarly, debating and exposing the character of the politics of reformism is an ongoing task. It is an

important part of our ideological struggle with these currents.

While the Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores [PMT—Mexican Workers Party] and similar formations fall into the same camp as the CP, it should be noted that structurally they are extremely weak. They are parties without an active membership and are based on paper members. Although they are not rivals of ours in the schools or factories, in times of crisis their politics can attract thousands. Similarly, we must expose the limitations of their political orientation. By proposing a united-front policy to them, we must point out their limitations and inconsistency in practice.

Regarding the rest of the groups on the left, we should pay particular attention to those who are close to our program. Obviously in this regard we are referring to the currents that call themselves Trotskyist, the most important being the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista [GCI—International Communist Group]. We are already involved in a process of unification with this group, and in fact it is the organization we are closest to in Mexico, since we are sympathizing groups of the same International.

The purpose of this document is not to draw up a balance sheet on what has thus far been achieved regarding the unification, but rather to reaffirm our method and political orientation towards it. This means that the only way to determine if we can reach the point of functioning as a single party is through joint activity and political discussion. For unification with the GCI to take place the basic thing is to reach the point of having a common program for Mexico.

Groups like the Liga Obrera Marxista [LOM—Marxist Workers League] are actually of little importance and we feel their development is not towards our positions. However, we should pay attention to their development since in their splits and spin-offs we can find recruitable elements. As far as rapid integration into our party is concerned, the most important groups are those activist groups that are easiest to win to our politics because they lack a defined program. Our organization has already had successes with this type of group and we must continue trying to draw more of them towards us.

It is difficult to have a political orientation towards other populist and ultraleft groups because their sectarian methods and politics make it hard to have serious relations with them. But even with these groups we should not dismiss the possibility of joint activities. At the same time we must continue to denounce their politics and methods, which cause such damage in the movements.

The youth organization

Building a youth organization continues to be one of the Liga's most important tasks. Our concept of the youth organization has already been laid out in various documents and there is general agreement on the need to create this organization. The problem is how to go about building the youth group.

We feel that this is one of the most difficult tasks, where success depends on the capability of our cadres and on setting it up with the correct political orientation from its inception. The main point we have to be clear on is that from its inception the youth organization has to have

sufficient political and organizational autonomy to truly develop itself.

As the documents on the youth lay out, this organization bases its relationship to the revolutionary party on the political affinity of their programs and organizational methods. But this is accompanied by absolute independence to determine its own functioning and political line.

This aspect is crucial from the very first steps in building the youth group. What we are trying to build is an organization that can provide the alternative for radicalizing youth and that can, by taking up their own demands, develop them into an ally of the proletariat. This means building an organization whose objectives are adapted to working in a specific arena. In this it differs from the revolutionary party, whose task is to win leadership of the masses and take power.

These factors mean that the youth organization's problems and discipline are different than those of the party. That is why the youth needs its own leadership which decides its tactics and day-to-day line. And to have its own leadership means that the youth, in its conventions and its own bodies, adopts its own political line and elects its own leadership.

If we are to achieve this objective, from the beginning we must act in accordance with this criterion. From the beginning the youth group has to develop its own leaders and have its own structures. In other words, as soon as a nucleus of young people begins to be drawn around the program of the youth group, they must have enough autonomy so that they can go through their own political experience. This is the only political orientation that will enable us to create a real youth structure.

We can make big errors if we ignore these points. If we launch a youth group that doesn't have bodies that have real autonomy—that is, if they are tied to the party bodies—right from the start we will cut off their initiative and the development of their leaders, because the political decisions will be made by the party bodies and the cadres that lead them.

Furthermore, this situation would confuse and mix up the fields of activity and discipline between both organizations. In short, we would be setting up a carbon copy of the party.

Another possible error regards discipline. While discipline in the youth group is looser and more relaxed, this is due to the kind of tasks it must carry out and not to its being some kind of second-class organization vis-a-vis the party. We shouldn't see it as an organization of party sympathizers or of people who can't take the party's discipline. The youth group is the organization that the party backs as the political alternative for young people, and as such its discipline is just as important in building it as it is for the party; the youth organization is governed by the same principles that guide the revolutionary organization.

We feel that the best way to set up the youth group is through the youth circles, because we don't yet have sufficient forces—meaning cadres—to launch an organization with these characteristics on a general level. We have to go through a stage of accumulation of cadres. This accumulation cannot be achieved through a simple appeal, but rather will take place through political activity and experience.

The organizational forms

Organizational forms and tactics are one of the important things we must define in order to be able to carry out the tasks posed in this period. But the characteristics of organizational forms will be determined by the role they play in the party.

Although the organizational forms are governed by organizational principles, such as democratic centralism, they differ from principles in that they are not permanent. This means that organizational forms are decided in the concrete. These forms are flexible because they are governed by the tasks and activities that our organization has to carry out in a given time and place. This is the guideline we have to use when looking at the discussion of organizational forms; i.e., how do we best carry out the tasks that are posed, how do we avoid falling into the confusion of preconceived schema.

As was already mentioned in the Political Resolution, the central task of the LS in this period continues to be the accumulation and development of cadres. Our success in this period will be governed by the extent to which we can take advantage of situations that the radicalization opens for us and the experience we accumulate in our intervention in the mass movement. Our organizational forms must reflect this central task

As was already mentioned in the introduction, an important change is taking place in the party's activity. What is called for now is greater activity in the movements and our first interventions in the workers movement. In line with this, the organizational forms must be capable of developing our internal activities as well as our external activities. This will, in some cases, require a total turn-around by the Liga.

We cannot sacrifice either of these sides, both of which are essential for the consolidation of the party structure. We cannot look for forms that will assimilate many people if the party cannot hold onto this growth due to its insufficient consolidation. Nor can we adopt forms that generate a great deal of external activity but dissipate the organization through lack of structural solidity.

Another incorrect organizational form would be to only concentrate on internal activities, which would result in cutting off the rounded development of our party, freezing us at the level of internal efficiency.

When the Liga talks about developing its cadres, what we are basically talking about is political development. This means our members must be able to defend our program as well as implement it in specific activity. In order for our cadres to reach this level a process encompassing various aspects is needed: education in the theory and traditions of our movement, in the activity carried out in specific areas of work, as well as in discussion of and responsibility for implementing our political line. Our members must be the best polemicists and activists, the best union agitators, etc. But we must never take one of these qualities and make it the most important aspect of our members. The difference between one of our members and any union or student activist is that we consciously act on the basis of a political program.

Thus the most important thing for our members should be their commitment and loyalty to our party's program. This can be expressed in different activities that each

comrade himself carries out. The role that this or that member plays in the party depends on their abilities. The party must place them where these abilities can be developed.

The rank-and-file bodies. These are the central body to which members of the organization belong and through which they carry out their activity. The organization's general line is discussed in these bodies and the party's orientation towards the sector that that body is working in is determined there. It may be made up of various work fractions that are brought together to improve their functioning. These bodies are in charge of all the activities that involve their various work fractions, from discussing the line for each of them, to the sale of the paper and finances. To carry out these tasks the rank-and-file bodies will organize themselves on different levels, as plenary meetings of the whole body, fraction meetings to organize concrete activity, brigades to sell the paper, etc.

In setting up these bodies we have to be careful not to fall into sectoralism. We cannot divide our party into workers and nonworkers. The question of whether members from student and union fronts are in the same group depends on whether the sectors that are brought together function adequately, and whether bringing them together contributes to the political development of their members. We have an example of this in Naucalpan, where the characteristics of the sector make it necessary to include students and our worker recruits in the same rank-and-file body. The same is true for the body that includes various fractions in the University and could also easily include those who belong to the University unions.

An important aspect we should stress regarding the rank-and-file bodies is the degree of decision-making power they must have. They cannot simply be bodies to which instructions are dictated. If they are to really develop their members they must have a political life that includes discussing the activity and general line of the party, defining the line for the sector they represent, electing their local leadership, and even taking political and organizational initiatives within the limits imposed by the decisions of the convention and the national leadership. This is important because it is the basis for having bodies in which the members have a total view of our politics, our methods, and are integrated into the party as a whole.

The middle-level leaderships. One of the prerequisites for the Liga's developing more cadres with experience, at the same time that it is being centralized, is to develop middle-level leaders of the party. This is imperative in this period because it is impossible for the national leadership in the capital to keep on top of all the activities that will have to be carried out. Moreover, unless we have strong and consolidated middle-level leaderships it is impossible to aspire to build a mass bolshevik party.

The lack of a consolidated middle-level leadership hinders the national leadership's functioning as the national leadership. It also prevents a whole number of cadres from gaining needed experience and from taking on greater responsibilities within the party. It tends to keep them frozen at their present level.

The middle-level leaderships are going to be created in line with the needs of the party. They will have to be democratically elected by the party bodies in which they play this role. This may be in the rank-and-file bodies that

exist or at the level of a group of them, as would be the case with a city leadership. While it is obvious that the cadres who play this role cannot immediately develop all the capabilities and authority this responsibility requires, we must take this step now in order to have this type of cadres in the near future.

The newspaper and finances. Lastly it is necessary to stress the role that these two important aspects of the party will play in our future activity. The paper remains our principal tool. But we are just barely at the stage where our members are learning to use it. The rank-and-file bodies have to emphasize the reading and discussion of the paper, as well as participating with articles reflecting the work of the organization itself.

The other problem is the organization of sales. The debts that pile up around the paper reflect that we still don't have forms that enable us to get out our propaganda through the paper. This is one of the things we have to accomplish.

Regarding finances, there are two points to stress. First, that we cannot maintain finances as an institution that is

isolated from the party, solely the concern of a few people. We must make it one of the basic activities of each party body. We must aim to make the different sectors of the party, such as the rank-and-file bodies, the paper, our technical staff, etc. financially autonomous. We also must strengthen the center financially.

The second point is that in this period the financial activities of the party must be broadened. Aside from the dues, we have to regularly carry out financial campaigns. Only these campaigns will allow us to cover our needs and increase our activities effectively. For instance the elections will require a large financial fund. Furthermore, this policy—of linking our activity to our financial problems—is the basis for our members educating themselves about and understanding this important aspect of membership.

If the party does not understand and does not accomplish these financial tasks, unquestionably it will notably restrict the possibility of expanding our staff of professionals, headquarters and technical staff. Stagnation in this aspect of the party will limit what we can hope to accomplish politically.

THE SPLIT IN THE LIGA SOCIALISTA by Joseph Hansen

A deepgoing split has occurred in the Liga Socialista, one of the two sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International in Mexico,¹ the ramifications of which go beyond that country.

The split came in the aftermath of the Second Congress of the Liga Socialista, which was held December 19-22, 1975. The immediate cause was a series of measures taken by the Militant Tendency (Tendencia Militante), which won a formal majority against the Bolshevik Leninist Faction (Fracción Bolchevique Leninista). The FBL included most of the founding leaders of the Liga Socialista.

The leaders of both the Militant Tendency and the Bolshevik Leninist Faction belonged to the Leninist Trotskyist Faction, an international current holding minority positions within the Fourth International on various issues. The split in the Liga Socialista thus reflected a split in the LTF, the extent of which remains unclear as of the moment.

The leadership of the LTF has not yet taken a stand on the split but is expected to do so shortly.

The division within the Liga Socialista began in a sharp way at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the organization, which took place September 14-15, 1975. At the time there was apparently unanimous agreement on all major political issues both domestically and internationally.

A dispute flared over the way the majority of the Political Committee had handled what might have been a police provocation; that is, material planted to suggest that one of the leaders of the Liga Socialista, Comrade Ricardo, had associations with the police. Instead of at once alerting the Political Committee or the Control Commission as a whole concerning the matter, the

two leaders who had run across the material made the mistake of first consulting with individual members of the Political Committee and Control Commission as how best to handle the case. One of the persons with whom they consulted spread the rumor that Ricardo was being deliberately slandered.

At the plenum, Ricardo made much of the error. In fact, together with several backers and the support of a representative of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party), he succeeded in creating such an emotional atmosphere as to preclude rational consideration of the problem. On this basis, Ricardo won a majority of votes.

The Ricardo group, which later became the Militant Tendency, also raised some complaints concerning a shift the Liga Socialista had made earlier in the year to a branch structure.

The majority of the former leadership, Comrades Cristina, Jaime, Efraín, and Horacio, agreed that an error had been made in the way the possible police provocation had been handled. As for the organizational structure of the party, admittedly errors had been made that needed to be corrected. Steps had already been taken in this direction.

Nevertheless, the Ricardo group exercised the majority it had received to initiate a course aimed at consolidating its grip at the expense of the minority. For instance, it did not seek to rectify the error made by the comrades in handling the possible police provocation—a quiet, thorough investigation was called for to ascertain the facts—but utilized the error to pillory the former leadership. Thus the Ricardo group made this one of their main themes in the period leading up to the December congress.

At the plenum, the Central Committee convoked the Second Congress, which had been one of the points unanimously placed on the agenda.

In addition, the Ricardo group changed the organizational structure of the party at once, redistributing the members in

“fronts,” resembling cells. The group changed the composition of the incoming Political Committee to assure itself a majority. And it ousted the former organization secretary, Comrade Horacio, giving the post to Ricardo.

These measures, it must be emphasized, were taken in the absence of any clear political differences and even the absence of any document putting forth the organizational views of the Ricardo group.

In the three months from September to December, the new majority in the Political Committee took further organizational steps. For example, the ranks were denied their right to elect local leaderships. The Political Committee assumed the prerogative of changing local leaderships as it saw fit.

Another example is similarly instructive. Because of illness, Cristina Rivas was not able to keep up with her duties as editor of *El Socialista* for six weeks. She was dismissed from her post on the grounds that she had not *officially* advised the majority of the Political Committee that she was ill.

In opposition to these and various other innovations, the comrades in the minority formed the Bolshevik Leninist Tendency on November 15. They presented as the principled basis for forming the tendency two documents, “For Internal Democracy in the Liga Socialista” and “Tasks and Perspectives.” In addition they stood on the general line presented by *El Socialista* on the Portuguese revolution up to that point. That line, representing the unanimous opinion of the leadership of the Liga Socialista, had been challenged orally at an October 23 meeting of the Political Committee by Comrade Greco of the Argentine PST.

One of the first actions of the Bolshevik Leninist Tendency was to request postponement of the congress long enough to make possible the preparation, circulation, and discussion of documents on the differences that had arisen. This was rejected by the majority of the Political Committee.

1. The other sympathizing organization is the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista (GCI—International Communist Group).

The election of delegates to the congress thus occurred in great confusion and, except in Mexico City, in the absence of the necessary documents.

Congress Astonishes Observers

The congress itself was held in such disarray as to astonish observers from other countries as well as representatives of other tendencies in Mexico who had been invited to attend.

In place of a discussion of political issues, they were treated to heated diatribes about deliberate circulation of slanderous rumors of "association with the police." They were regaled with organizational accusations, the validity of which no one could determine unless they were privy to the internal situation in the Liga Socialista. They witnessed the passage of measures so bureaucratic in nature as to repel anyone with an understanding of the principles of Trotskyism.

The one political resolution before the congress, which had been drawn up by the outgoing Political Committee for consideration by the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee and which had been adopted unanimously by that body, was accompanied by a report by Comrade Nava of the Militant Tendency that went counter to the line of the resolution.

A decision was made to suspend all the members of the party for a month. Each former member was to go through a period of testing to determine who could be readmitted.²

A resolution was adopted denying local bodies the right to elect their own leaderships. The Political Committee was empowered to decide on exceptions to this rule.

A resolution was adopted to permit members of the party to dissent from directives sent down from the top but denying them the right to discuss them unless, in the opinion of the top leaders, the directives involved a turn in the strategy of the party.

The Bolshevik Leninist Tendency was characterized as "petty-bourgeois" and requiring "reeducation" inside the factories.

The statutes were changed so as to give almost total power to the Political Committee and Central Committee. Clauses granting minority rights in the party were stricken out.

The four central leaders of the Bolshevik Leninist Faction were denied places on the Central Committee for "lack of revolution-

ary morality" (a reference to their error in handling the Ricardo case). In addition, they and two members of the outgoing Control Commission who belonged to the Bolshevik Leninist Faction were denied any posts of responsibility in the organization for "moral reasons."

Relations with the Socialist Workers party in the United States were broken off.³

A discussion on the Portuguese revolution, scheduled for the congress by the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee, was removed from the agenda by the majority of the Political Committee on the eve of the congress. In place of it, five oral reports were scheduled, one by the majority of the Political Committee, one by the Bolshevik Leninist Faction, one by the Internationalist Communist Group (GCI), one by a representative of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction, and one by a representative of the PST of Argentina. No discussion was held, no summaries were made, and above all no vote was taken.

At the congress, as well as during the period leading up to it, two representatives of the leadership of the PST, Comrades Greco and Eduardo, played a strong role in advising and backing the Ricardo group.

At the Central Committee meeting following the congress, the Bolshevik Leninist Faction was denied the right to choose its own representatives on the new Political Committee that was elected.

At the first meeting of the new Political Committee, which was attended by some of the members of the Bolshevik Leninist Faction, the majority proposed that the taking of minutes be discontinued, since they were not necessary, but conceded to the protests and agreed to continue taking them, with one copy for Mexico City and a carbon copy for each "front" in the provinces.

The apparatus was reduced to an editor of the paper and an organization secretary, Ricardo, who was empowered to decide on the formation of new "fronts," any new posts, the naming and dropping of members of a possible secretariat, the distribution of members in the "fronts," and so on.

3. In a public report giving their version of the congress, the Ricardo group said the following on this:

"... it is an affair that we will not ventilate publicly, since it is an internal problem that can only be discussed within the Fourth International."

During a recent visit to Mexico, I was told that the Ricardo group had alleged that "a member" of the Socialist Workers party was involved in "weaving" the suspicion concerning police penetration of the Liga Socialista. Up to the present, the Political Committee of the SWP has not received any communication whatsoever on this question or the group's reasons for breaking off relations.

Members of the Bolshevik Leninist Faction were barred from participating in the functioning of the apparatus because of their "petty-bourgeois" character and the necessity to undergo "reeducation."

As to the right of the minority to state their positions if they differed from those of the majority of the Political Committee, this was held over for decision at a coming meeting of the Political Committee.

FBL Becomes Public Faction

Upon assessing the bureaucratic actions taken by the Militant Tendency, the leaders of the Bolshevik Leninist Faction decided that they had no recourse, if they were to succeed in upholding the program and traditions of the Liga Socialista and the Fourth International, but to take their case to the Mexican workers. They therefore decided to become a public faction of the Liga Socialista.

Under the editorship of Cristina Rivas, they put out two issues of *El Socialista* (January 1 and January 16), continuing the previous line of the paper and including their account of the course of the Militant Tendency and why they could not accept the organizational decisions of the congress.

The Militant Tendency responded by publishing their own version of *El Socialista* (January 16-31) under the editorship of Augusto León. This issue is quite interesting because of what it shows about the political line behind the organizational methods of the Militant Tendency.

Before taking this up, a couple of smaller items should be noted.

The first one is an appeal to the "Comrades of the FBL," signed by "Alfonso Ríos (GCI, Organización simpatizante de la IV Internacional en México), Eduardo (PST, Organización simpatizante de la IV Internacional en Argentina), Sergio (ROJO, Periódico de Acción Comunista), and Julieta Gómez (Delegada Fraternal del GIM, Sección Alemana de la IV Internacional, al Congreso de la Liga Socialista)."⁴

The appeal accuses the members of the Bolshevik Leninist Faction of having "precipitated a grave crisis in one of the two sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International" by taking their case to the public.

The argument is made that because of their attendance at the congress the Bolshe-

2. The Bolshevik Leninist Tendency announced at the congress that in view of this purge of the membership it was changing its structure to that of a faction.

4. "Alfonso Ríos (GCI, sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Mexico), Eduardo (PST, sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Argentina), Sergio (Rojo, newspaper of Communist Action), Julieta Gómez (fraternal delegate of the GIM, German section of the Fourth International, to the congress of the Liga Socialista)."

vik Leninist Faction accepted its outcome. The proceedings were "fully democratic" and the FBL did not announce that it was splitting but agreed to remain in the organization as a faction.

Thus, contend the signers, the FBL represents a minority that has split. Therefore, "according to the decisions of the Tenth World Congress," it has "left the ranks" of the Fourth International.

"In addition, we exhort the leadership of the International and of its sections not to recognize you in any way because of the unprincipled course you followed in splitting after the Congress had accepted your decision to convert yourselves into a faction and after it had nominated the number of members you were entitled to in the Central Leadership."

The signers said that they had asked the Political Committee "to discuss with you the terms for your reentry and to be the most flexible possible under current conditions so as to quickly eliminate this rupture."

They closed by expressing the "firmest hope" that the unfortunate split could be healed in the shortest time possible by the FBL "returning" to the ranks of the Liga Socialista; "otherwise, you will be outside the ranks of the Fourth International."

Two observations ought to be made:

1. The Bolshevik Leninist Faction has not left the Liga Socialista or the Fourth International. Its purpose in becoming a public faction of the Liga Socialista was to better defend the program and tradition of the Liga Socialista and the Fourth International.

2. Even though no clear political differences emerged at the congress, and the majority was obtained strictly on organizational issues that were greatly inflated, the signers of the appeal make clear their approval of the methods of the Militant Tendency, even referring to them as "fully democratic." But these methods represent a tradition utterly alien to the tradition of Trotskyism. They smack of the practices of the trade-union bureaucrats in Argentina or Mexico, if not worse.

In advising the Bolshevik Leninist Faction to go along with the new rules adopted by the Militant Tendency, the signers of the appeal stand in the position of the well-meaning priest who assures the victim that it will go much easier if he just relaxes and tries to cooperate as the executioner tightens the garrote.

The other item to be noted in the same issue of the version of *El Socialista* put out by the Militant Tendency is an article by Ricardo Ramos entitled "The Politics of Robbery" (*La Política del Atraco*). Ricardo accuses the Bolshevik Leninist Faction of having "appropriated our name (Liga Socialista) and our newspaper (*El Socialista*)."

Ricardo is correct in pointing to the confusion resulting from two newspapers having the same name (and the same format and typeface). It is to be hoped that this source of confusion can be eliminated as soon as possible by appropriate identification of the two periodicals.

As to the reasoning behind the decision of the leaders of the Bolshevik Leninist Faction, it is clear that they were not guilty of converting the organization into something quite different from the organization they helped found and build. They clearly represent the continuity of the original program of the Liga Socialista and the line followed by *El Socialista*.

As for the Militant Tendency, shouldn't its leaders feel proud about their role in creating a new organization based on changes representing a qualitative break with the "petty-bourgeois" past of the Liga Socialista and *El Socialista*? If not, what was the reason for their dramatic struggle for a majority and for a purge of the leadership and the membership? Why are they interested in hanging on to old names associated with the former leadership?

Ricardo also complains about the fact that in going public, the Bolshevik Leninist Faction took items from the headquarters, mainly several typewriters owned by members of the FBL. Perhaps they took more than they should have, such as newspaper clippings they had compiled, and copies of correspondence signed by the leaders purged by the Militant Tendency.

The fact is that Ricardo does not seem too much concerned about this, for his objection is to the way it was done—unilaterally and by surprise.

"It is clear," he says in his article, "that when a limit is reached and it is no longer possible to act together and a split cannot be postponed, then it must be announced either at a Congress of the organization or at one of the leadership bodies.

"Then you proceed to distribute the property of the organization proportionately. In this way you can establish fraternal relations between the two organizations that have split and establish the possibility of a unification in the future."

Of course, to achieve an amicable split of the kind Ricardo talks about, the leadership must inspire a certain amount of confidence and goodwill. That was hardly the situation over which he presided.

In a large organization, the question is quite different; for party property is clearly recognizable and of such proportions as to reduce to insignificance the question of small items owned by individuals. In a tiny organization where elementary equipment is often loaned by individuals, splits can cut ragged lines when the property question raises its ugly head. It is best to try to avoid disputes over such issues.

Political Issues Begin to Emerge

The most important item in the January 16-31 issue of *El Socialista*—the one put out by the Militant Tendency—is a joint electoral platform signed on January 12 by the Central Committee of the Mexican Communist party, the Political Committee of the Liga Socialista, and the Secretariat of the National Committee of the Movement for Socialist Organization (MOS—Movimiento de Organización Socialista).

The joint platform represents the first leap of the Militant Tendency into the wheeling and dealing of Mexican petty-bourgeois electoral politics. The venture explains, in part, why the Militant Tendency went to such lengths to try to stifle the voice of the Bolshevik Leninist Faction and why it became so angry over the decision of the Bolshevik Leninist Faction to speak out publicly.

The ostensible purpose of the platform is to back Valentín Campa, the head of the Mexican Communist party, for the presidency in the elections set for next July 4. The catch is that under the antidemocratic election laws in Mexico, Campa is barred from running as a legal candidate, since it is virtually impossible for a small party to get on the ballot. His name can be written in, but the votes cast for an illegal candidate are not counted.

Thus the common electoral platform amounts to a publicity gimmick.

But there is much worse. It is impermissible for revolutionists to merge their banners with representatives of an alien class. It is particularly incumbent in an election staged by the bourgeoisie that revolutionists clearly distinguish themselves from all other tendencies. They participate in such elections only to advance their own cause, the cause of revolutionary socialism. However, the PCM-MOS-LS electoral platform is a complete mishmash.

Still worse, the Mexican Stalinists and the petty-bourgeois MOS are presented as being just as revolutionary as the Liga Socialista. "The organizations that have united together to act in this electoral process," declares the platform, "do not hide their socialist objectives, nor their revolutionary method to achieve them. They consider it their duty to labor stubbornly to achieve them."

From that paragraph alone, one can surmise why the Mexican Stalinists favored adding the name of the Trotskyist Liga Socialista to the electoral platform. The worst problem facing the Mexican Stalinists is the contempt with which they are regarded by the workers for their decades of class collaborationism, sellouts, and betrayals. A left cover offered by the Trotskyists with their reputation for integrity is a windfall the Stalinists hardly expected.

And the Stalinists had to pay so little!

They even managed to persuade the leaders of the Militant Tendency to include a phrase in the platform about the importance of supporting "the general positions relative to peaceful coexistence. . ." But "peaceful coexistence" is the Stalinist code word for class collaborationism.

The platform is a long one. It is filled with phrases dear to the politicians of the "Third World." It makes obeisance to Mexican nationalism. It dares to criticize the Echeverría government. It contains excellent democratic slogans such as the need to democratize education. It includes sentences that seem to have been borrowed from the Transitional Program, such as a demand for a sliding scale of wages.

From a political point of view it can be

characterized as a blueprint for a "broad front" like the one worked up by the Stalinists in Uruguay behind the candidacy of General Seregni. It is an "incipient" or "embryonic" popular front that the Stalinist hope to spread on a national scale in anticipation of the appearance of a Mexican, Seregni, Allende, or Perón, whom Campa, of course, would be the first to hail.

The Militant Tendency does not report what went on in its secret parleys with the Stalinists. It does not tell what the Stalinists may have conceded or what Ricardo felt he had to give away under their pressure in the sessions where the joint electoral platform was drawn up. It is to be hoped that these secrets will be made the property of the Mexican working class, or at least the

membership of the Liga Socialista and the Fourth International.

As things now stand, the document was presented without a word about the process leading up to it, as if its mere coming into being spoke for itself.

It does speak for itself in a way. It marks the unveiling, or christening with champagne, of the political line that drove the Militant Tendency on its extraordinary organizational course to split the Liga Socialista. From that point of view the publication of the platform is to be welcomed.

The political issues at the bottom of the split in the Liga Socialista are now beginning to emerge into the open where they can be objectively discussed and judged. □

THE LS OPENS A FIGHT AGAINST ANTILENINISM: THE PURPORTED "SECOND CONGRESS OF THE LIGA SOCIALISTA"

[The following article is translated from *El Socialista*, No. 35, January 1, published by the Bolshevik Leninist Faction of the Liga Socialista.]

* * *

On December 19, 20, and 21, a purported congress of the Liga Socialista took place in Mexico City. This purported congress was the culmination of the attempt by a group, the "Tendencia Militante" formation, to usurp the name, tradition, and structure of the LS in order to found a new organization with political and organization principles completely foreign to the League. The events that took place during the congress, as well as those of the three months preceding it beginning September 15, merit a public explanation.

THREE YEARS OF EXPERIENCE

The Liga Socialista arose out of a split of 21 persons from the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista (GCI), October 31, 1972. From its founding in December, 1973, the Liga Socialista set for itself the strategic task of building the party that could lead the socialist revolution in Mexico through winning the majority of the working class and its allies to a revolutionary program.

For this, the League thought it necessary to center the greater part of its efforts on the elaboration of a program based on the tradition, experience, and principles of revolutionary Marxism, in order to win new forces through propaganda and agitation around this program and to build and strengthen a cadre organization based on Leninist organizational principles, most of all, democratic centralism.

The political resolution of the first congress, the long series of printed documents, the analysis presented in our organ *El Socialista*, our seminars and Socialist Educational Conferences, are the expressions of our attempts to give the program of revolutionary Marxism a living and current form and to concretize it for our country in the current period. At the same time we attempted to propagandize it, and make it known as widely as possible.

Our participation in different movements, at times deficient due to our limited forces and the inexperience of our cadre, reflected our attempts to put our program into practice and agitate around aspects of it among the sectors of the population that were mobilizing.

Finally, our extraordinarily rapid organic growth and our expansion to several cities in the provinces, as well as the increasing improvement of our organizational forms, reflected our advances in building the nucleus of a revolutionary party in Mexico.

THREE MONTHS TO TRY AND TAKE OVER THE LEAGUE

The sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Liga Socialista met on September 15 to call the Second Congress of the organization, to set norms for it and to open the pre-congress discussion. According to Leninist tradition, such a plenum would discuss the draft political resolution which would analyze the current political situation in the country and project the principal axes of the development of the class struggle in Mexico.

Likewise it would discuss a report on tasks and perspectives based on prior analysis; a draft of the statutes that would govern the organization, and call for the election of a new Central Committee that would lead the party until the next congress. A draft resolution on the international political situation, analyzing this—in particular the events in Portugal, the epicenter of the international situation—and the current situation in the Fourth International, was to be discussed as well.

Upon obtaining unanimous approval of a draft on each of these points, the CC would then open a discussion within the organization around the drafts. If there were different positions arising on some point, the discussion on such a topic would open with more than one contribution.

Nevertheless, in a completely unexpected way, and without prior warning or exchanges of opinion, a counterreport on Tasks and Perspectives was presented. The political positions expressed in it were extremely vague. The counterreport expressed—in quite an obscure way—the need for a greater "militancy," more intervention in the "class struggle" and a change in the party's structure in order to convert it into an "interventionist party."

The only concrete proposal was to change the basic party units from branches through which different kinds of party interventions are organized, to cells through which individuals are organized who are in one specific place where the party is intervening. In spite of this, and the fact that the purpose of the plenum was only to open the pre-congress discussion, a majority of the Central Committee decided to change the composition of the Political Committee and replace the Organization Secre-

tary in order to "carry out the resolutions of this plenum."

Although the majority of the Central Committee had the authority to do this, it forgot that the purpose of the plenum was to open the discussion on, among other things, tasks and perspectives, and that adopting a resolution (moreover a vague one) and taking steps to implement it immediately, could only obstruct and prejudice the discussion that was being initiated.

One and a half months later, the new political committee removed the editor of the newspaper as a disciplinary measure for having been absent—for reasons of health—without informing anyone. The Political Committee also attempted to remove two of its members who made up a part of the leadership of the Fourth International (the International Executive Committee) from that body, and to substitute others for them. This, nevertheless, goes against the statutes of the Fourth International in that the leadership is elected by the World Congress and only the World Congress can remove them.

The political differences did not begin to become clearly stated until November 4, when the majority of the new political committee presented the "Self-Critical Balance Sheet" as a counter document to the draft resolution on tasks and perspectives. This document, although quite ambiguous and confused, maintained that there had been a methodological deviation in the Liga Socialista. It affirmed that in order to "arrive at a correct line" a "total immersion in the class struggle" was necessary. It said that the Liga Socialista was "isolated from the experiences of the masses. . .," that it "has not even seen the need for this experience" (!) and has "confined itself to offering them a political line from our office" (!).

It also asserted that the organization had erroneously maintained that ". . . participation in a conflict is begun with a correct and polished line. . . ." ". . . we used to put forward the idea that in order to intervene in any struggle whatsoever, it was first necessary to establish the correct political line through discussion." "It must be stressed that we cannot start with the correct line; that we begin with approximations of it and that only day-to-day practical activity will provide us with the correct position."

With regard to the elaboration of the political line of the organization, the document said the following: "Discussion around a given orientation before putting it into practice can be valid only when one is dealing with an orientation that has historically been proven incorrect. On the other hand, it is an error to have a discussion about something that has not yet undergone the acid test of action."

What is the source of these "approximations" that are going to be put to the test? "The leadership arrives at approximations that may or may not be correct. It is impossible to demand that the leadership come up with the exact line. The leadership must have the right to make mistakes."

Observing that the militancy, dedication, and activity of the members was not perfect, and rejecting the conception that this is a problem of clarity and political consciousness among the membership, the document stated the following:

"We are going to start assigning tasks, minimal at first, but these will have to be carried out. The members will be admonished once or twice about carrying them out. If this

doesn't work, they will be asked to participate outside the organization."

Due to the ambiguity of some of the formulations, one could attempt to give them a favorable interpretation, but since they were presented as a "turn" with respect to the positions previously maintained, one could fear the worst.

Once it was clear what these and other proposals in the document, impossible to cite here, really meant, the Bolshevik-Leninist Tendency was constituted to struggle against them.

The defenders of the "Self-Critical Balance Sheet" who were organized in the "Tendencia Militante" stated that it was impossible to have a correct political line or strategy towards the different movements. Only after having been immersed in them could an orientation emerge. In contrast to this, the TBL presented a draft on Tasks and Perspectives.

The platform of the TBL consisted of support to the general line of the document "Tasks and Perspectives of the Liga Socialista," the general line of "For Internal Democracy in the Liga Socialista" and the line on Portugal expressed in *El Socialista*. Similarly, it called for the national congress to endorse the democratic traditions and practices of our organization, that not only had been violated by the procedures followed in opening the discussion, but that were threatened by the concepts contained in the "Self-Critical Balance Sheet."

Nevertheless, only a month remained to publish and circulate these documents before the congress was to take place. The basic units of the party had scarcely started the discussion.

For this reason, the TBL proposed that the congress be postponed until Easter. The majority of the Political Committee disagreed. Later it proposed that before voting on each of the points on the agenda, each delegation from the provinces would determine whether or not they were in a position to make a decision.

On November 11, the "Platform for the Dissolution of Tendencies in the LS" was presented to the Political Committee. The document was not circulated in the party until December 13.

Upon being presented to the Political Committee, the minority was pressured to adopt it after having listened to it only once. When this failed, it was decided that this document and the "Self-Critical Balance Sheet" would be taken up together at the congress under the point on the agenda dealing with tasks and perspectives.

This document carried the concepts in the "Self-Critical Balance Sheet" to very dangerous extremes. To begin with, it would submit *all* members of the party to a one month trial period, at the end of which it would be decided who would continue as a member. It regimented the activities of the comrades and provided a "general criterion" of "four days of the week for 'outside' work; one day dedicated to political and theoretical studies; one day for cell meetings; and. . . one day for rest."

The document proposed that: "Starting after the congress, all organizational initiative and the political line that emanates from the national leadership must immediately be put into practice by the rank-and-file bodies and members of the LS." Only "if the political line indicates a change in the *strategy* of the organization . . . will the party units be consulted so that it can be decided by a

majority, whether it is necessary to open up a period of discussion that in no case will last more than one month.” (Emphasis added).

Taking into account that the congress would not vote on a document on Tasks and Perspectives, if such positions were adopted, this would give the national leadership the absolute power to decide the general line that was to be followed by the LS. Moreover, according to the “Self-Critical Balance Sheet,” in most cases the units of the party would not participate in the movements with a political line, but with the approximations provided by the national leadership.

The general tendency, evidenced in the documents, but seen even more clearly in the oral discussions, was toward trying to install in the party not democratic centralism, but bureaucratic centralism. Not a centralism based on centralized leadership with some powers given to it by the National Congress based on the political confidence of the members, but one based on a leadership with enormous powers and prerogatives which are difficult to question.

The principal problem is that upon eliminating the participation of the rank and file in the elaboration of a political line, upon restricting the initiatives of the rank and file and excessively centralizing the decision-making powers, not only is the possibility of the party making an error increased, but the development of cadre is restricted as well.

In spite of all this, the purported “congress” opened on December 19.

This started off with the Tendencia Militante challenging the delegation from Chiapas whose members adhered to the TBL. Immediately the TBL proposed that the national meeting reconstitute itself as a Conference and that the congress itself be held during Easter Week in order to permit adequate discussion. The proposal was rejected and the “congress” opened with the following agenda: Political Resolution, Statutes, election of the Central Committee, Portugal.

The second surprise was presented when during the report on the draft political resolution, delivered by a leader of the “TM”, the content of the document was twisted with factional statements.

The TBL immediately asked to give a counterreport, which basically consisted of reaffirming the basic positions of the document, and in particular, Section V: “The Central Task—The Construction of the Party.” The TBL also strongly protested against the clear factional maneuvering, and proposed that the TM, as it did not agree with the document, present its amendments or a counterdraft.

During the discussion on the second point, the Tasks and Perspectives, the TM reiterated its positions in the “Self-Critical Balance Sheet” and the “Platform for the Dissolution of Tendencies in the LS.” Likewise they characterized the TBL as a petty-bourgeois formation, as they had started to do a few days before. In some of their contributions to the discussion, members of the TM called for the removal of “petty-bourgeois and opportunist elements” from the organization.

Based on the recognition of the evident danger of a split, and noting that the adoption of the measures outlined in the “Platform for the Dissolution of Tendencies in the LS,” would mean that the organization could cease functioning along democratic centralist lines and that total verticalism and bureaucratic centralism would replace it, the TBL

decided to constitute itself as a faction. That is, to launch a disciplined and organized struggle against a split in the Liga Socialista. Thus, the Bolshevik-Leninist Faction was born.

Opening the third point of the agenda, the draft on statutes, the congress was presented with a new surprise. In spite of having expressed agreement with the statutes since their publication in September 1975, (the draft having been adopted unanimously by the political committee) the “Tendencia Militante” presented a long series of amendments that completely transformed the character of the statutes.

Two facts are worth noting. Not only did they present the amendments at the last minute, preventing their discussion among the Party membership, but also they were presented orally and so rapidly that it was not even possible to take notes in order to study them carefully and quote them. Secondly, upon being questioned during the discussion, several members of the “TM” showed a knowledge of the amendments and seemed to have discussed them previously. This cast doubts on the real character of the Tendencia Militante formation.

Among the measures introduced, what most stood out was the negation of a large part of the rights of minorities within the party, the complete subordination of local party units to the national leadership, the extension of the central leadership’s powers, and the justification of the use of the control commission in cases of a “lack of moral character.”

ANOTHER SPICY DISH FROM THE TM

During the point on the election of the new Central Committee, the TM opposed the inclusion of six leaders of the FBL and the organization on the new central committee, alleging that in early September they had accused a current leader of the TM of being a police agent.

This, according to them, showed their lack of revolutionary integrity and morality, which made them incapable of leading the party. The six comrades in question recognized that they had committed a grave error in having discussed their suspicions among themselves instead of bringing them before the control commission immediately.

Considering that the national leadership had decided to name an investigating commission to clarify all aspects of the affair, and to publish a report to educate the party, bringing the matter to light at that time was a clear factional maneuver.

The very manner in which the motion to exclude the six comrades from all leadership positions was presented, without providing the delegates who were to make the decision with sufficient information amounted to following the same method for which the six were condemned. The objective was clear—to decapitate the FBL and not permit it to select its own representatives in the leadership bodies.

The discussion around this was quite heated, featuring rather emotional contributions from members of the TM. Similarly, two leaders of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores of Argentina (PST) intervened not only to condemn the “immorality” of the leaders in question, but also to endorse completely the congress and the antidemocratic methods used before and during it.

Four members of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International, nevertheless, repudiated the methods used by the TM and the majority of the Political Committee, and three of them characterized these methods as Stalinist.

It was approved, however, by majority vote, to exclude the six members of the FBL in question from all leadership posts, and to break relations with the Socialist Workers party (SWP), the party in fraternal solidarity with the Fourth International in the United States. It was also approved, unanimously, to call for the formation of an international control commission to clarify the facts of the case. The breaking of relations with the SWP was based on allegations that the suspicions held by comrades in September with respect to a comrade who later became a leader of the TM, were presumably encouraged by a comment made by a member of the SWP.

The "congress" ended with the presentation of several reports on Portugal which reflected the different points of view within the Fourth International. Despite the fact that the situation in Portugal had become the epicenter of the class struggle on an international level and that the Liga Socialista was an internationalist organization, this point was not discussed within the party nor during the "congress;" only the reports were presented.

The "congress" closed with the singing of the "International."

IN DEFENSE OF LENINISM

This so-called "second congress of the LS" was the culmination of the process begun on September 15 during the Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee. This process consisted of the creation of a new organization, whose political line—it has not yet been clearly expressed—is difficult to characterize; but whose organizational methods are comparable to those used by Stalinism. This organization, and so it has been expressed, is completely different from what the Liga Socialista has been in its political orientation and organizational methods.

The procedures used during the "congress" and in the preparatory period, are alien to the traditions followed by the Liga Socialista, the revolutionary marxist movement, and the Fourth International. The type of organization that applies the methods and concepts expressed in the basic documents of the "Tendencia Militante" completely breaks with democratic centralism and the Leninist principles of organization.

The objective of the "Tendencia Militante" formation was to totally transform the Liga Socialista, tearing out the Trotskyist tradition by the roots. The banners they chose were those of "greater militancy" and "immersion in the class struggle" (meaning only one aspect of the class struggle: the conflicts between the workers and bosses in the factories).

With these concepts they rejected any other aspect of party building, in particular the political training of revolutionary cadre, their training in the method and tradition of marxism. Their conceptions were unilateral in most cases. A global, broad vision of the class struggle on a national and international scale was lost; it was replaced with a localized and narrow view.

By putting aside the importance of concretizing the revolutionary program and intervening in the various

aspects of the class struggle in various ways in order to win the majority of the working class to the program, they rejected the concept of the Leninist party as the conscious element, the political vanguard of the working class.

Although due to the short tradition of the Liga Socialista the leadership bloc of the "Tendencia Militante" were able to make some gains, there was an obstacle preventing them from the realization of their plans.

In spite of its short life as an organization, in spite of the short time there had been to educate cadre and give them a solid foundation in marxist theory and the traditions of Bolshevism, a substantial portion of the organization—its most solid cadre—reacted to the approaching danger.

The efforts of this group of comrades to maintain the continuity of marxism and Bolshevism in Mexico—which the Liga Socialista had been able to establish—became the principal impediment to the leadership bloc of the TM.

All of the measures and maneuvers carried out from September 15 through the so-called congress were intended not to clarify political positions, but to isolate, weaken, decapitate, and finally, to create the conditions to destroy this obstacle.

This attempt to usurp the name, tradition, prestige and structure—limited though they may be—culminated during the sessions of the congress. The break, the split with Trotskyist tradition, was consummated. The rights of the minority were denied; its leadership excluded from responsible posts. During the following month, the members of the minority—"victims of their petty-bourgeois nature"—were to be excluded from posts in the apparatus of the party and sent out for reeducation and redemption in the factories. They were to be denied the right to express themselves and were to be dispersed throughout the organization.

The cadre of the Liga Socialista cannot permit the usurpation of our organization and the destruction of our traditions.

Nor can we remain locked up within a new organization where our most elementary rights are denied: Those of expressing our own ideas and choosing our own leaders.

Nor can we submit to a non-representative leadership with unlimited powers, that has shown itself to be disposed to use these powers in unacceptable ways. Nor can we submit to a process whose only objective is to attempt to tear us to pieces organizationally and individually.

We totally refuse to recognize this purported "Congress" which was organized and conducted with procedures completely alien to Bolshevism and our international movement. We refuse to recognize the right of this new formation to usurp our name and central organ through *methods of political gangsterism*.

We declare that we will continue to preserve and defend the tradition and methods of revolutionary Marxism, of Leninism and the Fourth International in Mexico. And we will continue to do this as the Liga Socialista and through our newspaper, *El Socialista*.

We call on the Fourth International and all its sections and sympathizing groups to disavow this new anti-Leninist formation and to disassociate themselves from its methods.

We call upon the comrades who adhere to the Militant Tendency to break with it and remain in the Liga Socialista, and to continue defending its traditions and methods.

LAST DECEMBER THE LIGA SOCIALISTA HELD ITS SECOND CONGRESS

[The following article is translated from *El Socialista*, No. 35, January 16-31, 1976, published by the Militant Tendency of the Liga Socialista.]

* * *

"All decisions of the Congress and all its elections are decisions of the Party and are binding on all Party organizations. They cannot be appealed against by anyone on any pretext whatever and can be revoked or amended only by the next congress of the Party." V.I. Lenin, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*.

The Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Liga Socialista took place September 14-16. It discussed a number of topics of vital importance, and ended with a call for the Second Congress of the Liga Socialista to be held in December.

In this way it opened a period of discussion which would culminate with the congress, where resolutions would be adopted, and where a leadership would be elected that would be charged with carrying out the decisions of the congress.

The discussion in the pre-congress discussion period and at the congress itself revolved around what type of party we want to build and why. This involved the kind of membership we wished to develop, the role of the central leadership and of the secondary leadership, the level of participation in the class struggle, etc.

In the course of the discussion—we will go into detail below—tendencies were formed and the members of the organization grouped around them.

Arrangements for the Congress and its Composition

The congress was composed of 48 seated delegates—one delegate for each five members. All of them had the right to voice and vote. The members of the outgoing Central Committee and the Control Commission had the right to voice and consultative vote. In addition to the delegates, most of the members of the organization were present and observed the proceedings of the congress. Delegations of fraternal parties from Argentina, the United States, Costa Rica, and Germany were present, as well as Mexican comrades from the GCI (Grupo Comunista Internacionalista), the newspaper *ROJO*, the Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario, and a number of veteran Mexican Trotskyists and other guests.

The first three days of the congress were held in a public hall rented for the occasion (at 3000 pesos a day) and the fourth and final day took place in the Preparatoria Popular de Fresno.

As the congress began, the TBL (Tendencia Bolchevique Leninista—Bolshevik-Leninist Tendency), a minority tendency with 14 delegates, appealed to the voting delegates not to hold the congress. They stated that as a consequence of the "short period of discussion" preceding the congress there was a lack of political clarity. They suggested as an alternative that the gathering reorganize itself as a simple conference and that the congress itself be called for Easter week. A solid majority (34 votes) rejected this proposal and voted that the congress take place just as planned. (14 delegates voted in favor of the motion presented by the TBL).

Of the 48 delegates present at the congress, 33 represented the positions held by the Tendencia Militante (Militant Tendency), 14 supported the positions of the TBL and one delegate was not expressly committed to either of the two tendencies.

Agenda of the Congress and Discussion on the First Point

The agenda for discussion at the congress was composed of the following points: (1) Political resolution, (2) organizational resolution, (3) draft statutes, (4) election of the leadership, (5) Portugal.

Portugal was placed last because on this particular point there was not to be a vote; rather it would only be discussed. A position would be taken later at a special congress or an expanded plenum of the Central committee.

The draft political resolution was one point on which there were no differences; thus it seemed that everyone would agree on it.

During the congress a member of the TM gave the report, explaining that he would not repeat what was said in the draft resolution, but rather concentrate on a few fundamental points, attempting to be brief so that there could be more time for discussion.

At the end of the presentation, the leaders of the TBL requested time to make a counterreport, arguing that the reporter had acted in a factional manner, distorting the draft which he was discussing.

The counterreport (leaving aside the hysterical outcries against the TM reporter) consisted of reading a few paragraphs from the draft and making a motion to vote on the draft political resolution plus the counterreport.

The motion in the official report was that the vote be for the draft political resolution itself, since as Marxist materialists we take as our point of departure only objective questions—in this case the text of the draft.

The delegates of the TBL centered their discussion on attempting to justify the supposed factional interpretation

of the document. However, to the great surprise of those attending the conference, the counterreporter for the TBL withdrew his motion during his final summary and proposed a vote on the draft alone. He had embarked his delegates in a sterile discussion which he himself did not dare to uphold.

This discussion, although in a marginal way, anticipated the following point on the agenda and made it plain that the axis of the congress would center around this second point.

The clearest contribution on the part of the TBL came from one of its leaders who said that it gave him the shivers to hear to official reporter say that in order to build a Bolshevik organization, it was necessary to be submerged in the class struggle, participating in the struggles through which the class struggle manifests itself. And that only through this participation is it possible to develop a correct political line. These shivers would become accentuated on the following day, when the organizational report was discussed. The vote on this point was unanimous: 48 votes in favor and 0 against.

The Axis of the Discussion: The Construction of a Bolshevik Party

The organizational report was discussed on December 20 from 10 o'clock in the morning till 9 o'clock at night. There was the majority report as set forth in the documents "Self-Critical Balance Sheet" and the "Platform for the Dissolution of Tendencies," and a counterreport by the minority grouped in the TBL based on its document "Tasks and Perspectives."

The axis of the discussion in the pre-congress period and during the congress itself turned around a point whose essence was the method of building a Bolshevik party.

More than 60 speakers took part in the discussion, apart from the contributions from fraternal organizations. There was a very rich discussion in which all of the pre-congress polemics were concretized, a discussion which had already been very full and very educational.

During the pre-congress period the comrades of the TBL avoided the real discussion; they did not center their discussion on the axis demarcated at the time of the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee. They introduced twists initiating false discussions.

The first document to be published was: "For Internal Democracy in the Liga Socialista," with which they tried to impress the ranks of the organization with a purported danger to democracy within the organization.

This document formed part of their platform and was a basic document for them. However, it was not voted on in the rank-and-file bodies at the time they elected delegates.

Despite the efforts of the TBL to avoid the central point of the discussion and to publish documents which most of the time had nothing to do with what was being discussed, the main positions were presented clearly enough for the congress.

The TM maintained that a Bolshevik party is built, from its inception, in the class struggle and through participation in the movements through which the class struggle manifests itself. It is impossible to attempt the task of building an apparatus and developing a finished political line outside the class struggle, without participating in it.

under the lure of thinking, as the FBL does, that once you have this apparatus and line, then you will go into the movements.

The intervention in the movements must take as its point of departure the participation of the organization in the movements through its cadres. This participation does not take place with a finished line because this line will be reevaluated as the struggles unfold. We begin with approximations or hypotheses which are put to the acid test of practice. This teaches us what is right and what is wrong and moreover, what it is that we have to correct.

For the TBL, intervention is reduced to coming into struggles with our program and our political line, and propagandizing for them. If the participants in these conflicts listen to and follow our line, fine; if not, too bad for them, since this results from their being backward individuals who don't understand.

Moreover, the TBL maintained that our participation should be in big mobilizations, in the big trade unions, in the big factories. They say it is pointless, to be in the small ones because they have no political power. For them Spicer was a "piddling factory" where it was pointless to intervene. Moreover, they had an incorrect political line since it was different from ours.

This propagandist conception of the party and its activity is reflected in the way in which a party cadre is trained, in the leadership and its functioning.

The TM always maintained that all persons who enter the organization do so voluntarily. They enter because they accept its program, and when they enter they place themselves under discipline. Everyone who joins the organization enjoys full liberty to discuss, but they also have the obligation to act as one once the vote has been taken on what has been discussed.

For the TBL "party membership is voluntary and discipline depends on the consciousness of the comrades and on their experience." "We again repeat, joining and participating in the party are voluntary decisions, and there are no coercive measures that can force comrades to develop a Bolshevik consciousness."

But where are they supposed to get this Bolshevik consciousness from? For the comrades of the TBL, this is possible through theory, in seminars which they organize. Seminars and cadre schools were supposed to be sufficient to temper cadre.

"Our cadres should be clear that in this period their basic activities will not be in the school or the trade union, rather they will spend their time in political discussion, in sales of the press, in branch assignments, financial campaigns, etc., etc. Those are the cadres we need at this time.

"We are more interested in cadres who have a clear view of the importance of finances, the importance of selling the press, the importance of discussion in the branches, than in a few comrades who may be very good agitators in the schools."

The TM maintained, in contrast, that what we wanted to educate were cadres who will participate on a day to day basis in their work places whether in the schools, the factories, or in the trade unions. Only through this participation combined with apprenticeship can Bolshevik cadres be trained.

Holding seminars should not be excluded, but they should be adapted to concrete topics which really assist in the training of party activists.

For the TBL, party activists are those who "pay dues, attend their rank and file meetings, and sell the press." From this it follows that there should be those in the party who are "the full-timers that dedicate their lives to the party, and the comrades with varying degrees of little or minimal dedication and commitment."

The TM, taking as its point of departure that there are varying degrees of closeness to the party, distinguishes between party activists with all rights and obligations, and those who are able to be sympathizers, candidates, etc.

A party activist is someone who pays dues, attends rank-and-file meetings and carries out the tasks assigned by the organization. "But for us the fundamental point is that non-party activists do not have the right to vote on the international line, the national line, and the leadership of the party. Yes, as far as discussion is concerned, like any party activist, yes as far as expending their energies for the revolution, no when it comes to settling the basic political and organizational questions of our organization with their votes. What we wish to say is that the right to vote in the LS should be won through consistent activism."

Whether an individual is a party activist or not will be demonstrated in practice, and the leadership cadres are the ones who should set an example. It is from them that the greatest dedication should be required. Being in the leadership is not a privilege, but an indication of greater commitment, and therefore greater dedication.

For the comrades of the TBL, the leadership of the organization are those in the headquarters, "behind a desk," working out the political line and directing the party from there: "The members of the PC (Political Committee) have another series of duties. They will spend most of their time behind a desk, they are overwhelmed with work and we have had to rely on the already developed cadres in this stage."

But a leadership of this type, which does not involve itself in activity, will always say that it makes no mistakes; the mistakes will be the fault of the activists, from the rank-and-file bodies, to the intermediary leadership, but never of the central leadership:

"... there was a certain weakness shown by the branch and its leadership in maintaining activity in a centralized manner. The cells displayed weaknesses and faults of coordination.

"... it was not able to thoroughly take advantage of its experience because there was no coordination between its members and those of the branches and because of the poor location of the headquarters that we have in the area. The branch brigades were somewhat irregular with respect to membership participation and the days they were supposed to get out. . . ."

This is the type of balance-sheet drawn by a member of the leadership—who later went on to take part in the FBL—on an area of work which had been developed. All the errors were committed by the ranks or the intermediary leadership; the central leadership was free of error. And of course they cannot commit errors because they are "behind a desk."

During the discussion at the congress, a number of delegates disputed a series of facts presented by a member

of the PC—belonging to the TBL. This individual in his contributions never replied to a single one of these points.

The discussion came to a close and passed to a vote. Thirty-two delegates were in favor of the report for the "Self-Critical Balance-Sheet" and the "Platform for the Dissolution of Tendencies" presented by the TM. Fifteen delegates were in favor of the counterreport "Tasks and Perspectives" presented by the TBL. The minutes do not record how the missing delegate voted (there should have been 48), nor does it appear that the delegate abstained. In any case, there was a mistake at the time of the counting.

The Statutes

On December 21, the statutes were discussed and the leadership was elected. More than half the day was devoted to discussing the statutes.

Before the discussion began, a comrade of the TBL proposed to the congress that the statutes be discussed in a special congress which would be called for Easter week. He argued that the TM's amendments to the draft had not been submitted in time to allow discussion of them.

The motion was voted on and 34 delegates voted against it and in favor of continuing with the agenda of the congress approved from the first session, which contained the point on the statutes. Fourteen delegates voted in favor of the motion.

The statutes are a clear reflection of the democratic and centralist aspects of an aspiring Bolshevik organization. These are the aspects that regulate the internal life of the organization, assuring broad democracy, but at the same time, the kind of centralism that makes smooth functioning possible.

The discussion on the statutes was closely tied to the discussion on the organizational aspects, on the type of party we want to build.

The draft statutes—prepared by a member of the TBL—were imbued with the conception of a party whose members "accept its program and its statutes and who are prepared to put them into practice." "All members should devote themselves to the construction of the party to the best of their abilities. . . ."

It is a question of what they are "prepared" to do, not of an obligation. This is clear because it was not specified what *should* be done and what *is an obligation*; in fact members were to do everything "to the best of their abilities."

Amendments were necessary to specify that party activists devote themselves to building the party, comply with the tasks that are voted on, and carry them out in action.

"The members have the obligation to distribute its official organ (the newspaper) *in accordance with their possibilities*." And if they say they have no possibilities? It was necessary to specify that: "Members have the obligation to distribute the official organ *as regulated by their rank-and-file group*." This is not an editorial change, but a change in concept.

The draft did not specify that an individual who wishes to be a member of the Liga Socialista should go through a trial period. After this period, the rank-and-file group will

decide whether the individual is ready to be considered a member of the organization or not. This too had to be added to the draft.

Concerning the rank-and-file groups the draft said: "The nucleus shall have a minimum five and a maximum of 80 members, except in cases where the Political Committee considers an immediate division of the group to be inconvenient."

Eighty members in a rank and file group! This is very much in keeping with the propagandist conception of the party displayed by the comrades of the TBL. Bodies of this size are good for discussing but not for planning political interventions.

The number of members in a party nucleus was modified to a minimum of five and a maximum of 15.

Further amendments were discussed: on how special congresses were to be called, on the leadership, on discipline, etc. It is impossible to specify all of them in this article which is intended as a general report on the congress.

After the discussion, there were summaries and the vote: 33 votes in favor of the proposed amendments and 15 against them and in favor of the draft as it had been presented.

The Election of the Leadership

The congress proceeded to the election of a leadership with representation proportional to the number of votes each tendency had obtained. The TBL, the minority tendency, correspondingly got to elect less than one third of the leadership, the rest were elected by the TM, the majority tendency.

Each tendency presented its list of candidates, full members and alternates.

Four of the members proposed by the TBL—members of the outgoing leadership and the Political Committee—were called into question on account of their moral integrity, which rendered them unfit for occupying leadership posts.

The comrade who raised the question—also a member of the outgoing leadership and the PC—began by explaining that what was going to be stated was not a problem of political differences, but one of revolutionary morality. For this reason it had been raised after the political discussion. To have raised it before, would have obstructed the political discussion rather than aiding it.

The following charges were raised against the four comrades:

1. Having accused a member of the leadership of being a police agent with the object of excluding him from leadership bodies.

2. That this accusation was not raised before any official body of the organization: Control Commission, Political Committee, or Central Committee. It was handled solely on a personal level, in preparation for dropping the comrade alluded to from the Political Committee at the Sixth Plenum.

3. Having acted like a clique which uses Stalinist methods—alien to Bolshevik and Trotskyist procedures—for the purpose of eliminating a comrade who held different political positions from their own.

In addition to the four comrades proposed for the central leadership, two comrades on the outgoing Control Com-

mission were involved in these cliquist maneuvers, comrades who, although they had not been proposed for the leadership, were also called on the carpet and would have the same sanction extended to them by the congress.

The comrade who raised the charges made the following proposals to the congress:

1. To call a national and an international commission to take up this case, make the pertinent investigations and recommend what should be done.

2. That the congress suspend those comrades from all leadership responsibilities until their situation was clarified. That, if after the investigation was carried out, the verdict was that they were innocent, they would be installed in the leadership posts for which they had been proposed. In the meantime, the TBL should be assured that it could elect the necessary replacements to cover the vacancies.

3. A proposal was made, which when it was not fulfilled, provoked the suspension of relations with the SWP (Socialist Workers party, fraternal organization in solidarity with the Fourth International in the U.S.).

The reason for this proposal which led to the suspension of relations with this fraternal party is an affair that we will not ventilate publicly, since it is an internal problem that can only be discussed within the Fourth International.

The comrade accused of being a police agent, a leader of the TM, stated that if any of those present had doubts about him, he was ready to stand suspended from all leadership responsibilities. No one expressed having such doubts.

There was a discussion on this point, which, although rather heated, demonstrated the maturity of the cadres of the Liga Socialista. Then it was put to a vote:

On the first proposal the vote was unanimously in favor. In the second, 33 in favor, 13 against, with 2 abstentions. On the third, 28 delegates in favor, 17 against, and 3 abstentions.

Then the leadership was elected, taking into account the previous decisions. The comrades of the minority maintained their proportional representation in the leadership.

The TBL Becomes a Faction

On the second day of the congress, after the conclusion of the discussion and the vote on the organizational report, the TBL announced that it was transforming itself into a faction—the Bolshevik Leninist Faction (FBL).

At the same time, they declared that they would act as a loyal faction within the Liga Socialista and would conduct an internal struggle to win the leadership of the organization at some future time. They said that their transformation into a faction was not a step towards a split but just the opposite: they were transforming themselves into a faction in order to avoid any possible split.

Despite their prior statements, as is reported elsewhere in this issue, the FBL did not respect any of this.

Portugal and the Close of the Congress

On the following day, December 22, five reports on Portugal were presented by reporters from the Liga

Socialista and comrades from fraternal organizations.

It was specified that the discussion on this point would remain open and that no vote would be taken at the congress.

In the closing session the role played by the Preparatoria Popular was reviewed and it was stated that the Liga Socialista took pride in the fact that the last day of the congress and the closing session were held in this recent symbol of the student struggle.

Thus, under the echoing strains of the Internationale—the hymn of the world proletariat—this historic Second Congress of the Liga Socialista came to a close, a congress which will be recorded as the congress where the type of party that this organization aspires to be was defined: a workers party immersed in the class struggle, whose program will be tested and perfected through trial by fire in political action.

THE POLITICS OF ROBBERY

by Ricardo Ramos

[The following article is translated from *El Socialista*, No. 35, January 16-31, 1976, published by the Militant Tendency of the Liga Socialista.]

* * *

“There is a saying that everyone is entitled to curse his judges for twenty-four hours. Like every congress of every party, our Party Congress was at the same time the judge of certain persons who laid claim to the post of leadership but who met with discomfiture. Today these representatives of the ‘minority’ are, with a naiveté verging on the pathetic, ‘cursing their judges’ and doing their best to discredit the Congress, to belittle its importance and authority.” (V.I. Lenin, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*.)

* * *

Inside the left there has always been a joke that every Trotskyist can be divided in two. Unfortunately today we must announce another division in the ranks of Trotskyism. We would prefer not to bother with a minority of our party that has acted in a way that is hardly revolutionary.

But the fact that this group has appropriated our name, and our newspaper (*El Socialista*) doesn't leave us any course other than to offer pertinent explanations to try to avoid the confusion stemming from the fact that there are two newspapers with the same name.

We are conscious of the fact that the absurdity of the incident has caused many to laugh; for us all this is reason for indignation and shame.

The Facts

When we returned on January 2 to our headquarters, we saw with surprise that it had been plundered. Most of our

equipment, electric and manual typewriters, the drafting tables, the photo files, the equipment for producing the newspaper, had disappeared.

What's more, the mimeo, the files, the collection of national and international newspapers and magazines, the lists of subscribers, the finances of the party and other things had vanished. The perpetrators of the robbery left a satirical note, wishing us a happy new year, signed FBL (Bolshevik-Leninist Faction).

Later we were able to confirm that the theft was not a trick of the repressive apparatus, but in fact, members of the FBL themselves confirmed that they were the perpetrators of the theft.

This act has caused great indignation among our militants. Some of them have reached violent conclusions, which we are trying to restrain.

The fact is that this minority which lost at the 2nd Congress of the Liga Socialista, is seeking revenge by trying to destroy our organization. They left us bankrupt and tried to leave us without a newspaper.

We can do no less than consider them bitter enemies of our party, because they have tried to destroy us with the methods of the repressive apparatus. As long as these elements don't return the stolen material and stop using our name and our newspaper, there is no possibility of a discussion nor of a united front. Nor is there the possibility of the slightest collaboration.

How to carry out a split

The building of a party is a complex process, because it reflects the class struggle. We can't hope for a linear process, without the party going through a series of splits and fusions that strengthen and purify it.

Taking all this into account, we are aware that splits are sometimes necessary and convenient. Nonetheless in order to carry out a split it is necessary to do so with

Bolshevik methods.

In the first place, it is necessary to have exhausted the last possibility of convincing the cadres on the other side. Even if a minority is being victimized, this fact can be used to gain sympathy among the members of the other tendency.

It is clear that when a limit is reached and it is no longer possible to act together and a split cannot be postponed, then it must be announced either at a Congress of the organization or at one of the leadership bodies.

Then you proceed to distribute the property of the organization proportionately. In this way you can establish fraternal relations between the two organizations that have split and establish the possibility of a unification in the future.

We split without even noticing it

The FBL will go down in history for having given the most absurd reason for a split. Its allegation is that we, the majority of the LS, split—a fact of which we were ignorant until the appearance of the pirate edition of *El Socialista* (which they brought out under the date of January 1). In this newspaper they tell us:

“This so-called ‘Second Congress of the LS’ was the culmination of the process begun on September 15 during the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee. This process consisted of the creation of a new organization whose political line—since it has now yet been clearly expressed—is difficult to characterize; but whose organizational methods are comparable to those used by Stalinism.”

Further on it says;

“This attempt to usurp the name, tradition, prestige, and structure—limited though they may be—culminated during the sessions of the congress. The break, the split with the Trotskyist tradition, was consummated. The rights of the minority were denied, its leadership excluded from responsible posts.”

And it concluded thus:

“We declare that we will continue to preserve and defend the tradition and methods of revolutionary Marxism, of Leninism, and of the Fourth International in Mexico. And we will continue to do this as the Liga Socialista and through our newspaper, *El Socialista*.

“We call on the Fourth International and all its sections and sympathizing groups to disavow this new anti-Leninist formation, and to disassociate themselves from its methods.

“We call upon the comrades who adhere to the Militant Tendency to break from it and to remain in the Liga Socialista and to continue defending its methods and traditions.”

This allegation has various aspects.

In the first place, they put forward a self-proclaimed “Trotskyist tradition,” which, in this way, is personified in themselves. This kind of pedantry could be understood, though not justified, in a Trotskyist group that already had three or four decades of experience and had incorporated in itself the traditions of Trotskyism.

In Mexico, none of the Trotskyist groups can hold themselves up as the revolutionary Marxist tradition and

the “continuity of Marxism and Bolshevism in Mexico.” This cannot be stated; it must be proven.

How can such a proclamation be made today by an infamous sect, which had control, above all, over the organizational apparatus and whose main ties are to its desks and not to the class struggle? How can they appoint themselves as judges to decide who is a revolutionary Marxist and who is not, who is Trotskyist and who is not? Is robbery, perhaps, the tradition of revolutionary Marxism? Moreover, what contributions have they made to the revolutionary movement? In what class conflicts have they participated? What struggles have they led? How can they decide that they are the “tradition” of the LS, when none of the worker sectors of the organization left with them?

The second aspect of their charge is that the Second Congress of the LS was a “supposed” congress, and therefore they don’t recognize it.

How can it be that today they don’t recognize the congress that they themselves organized; in which they had fourteen delegates elected on the basis of their platform; in which they discussed extensively, chaired, voted for and against, presented resolutions, motions, its slate of members of the leadership, etc? . . . In short, they participated right up to the end. How is it possible for them to not recognize the congress *a posteriori* while they recognized it at the time it was occurring?

This self-proclaimed “tradition of Trotskyism” has also decided that all of the delegates attending the congress did not know what they had decided or how they had decided it. How could the FBL’s own delegates vote? The participation of all the delegates has been annulled by the stroke of a pen.

But the allegation that is most incredible is that we are the splitters. We are supposedly splitting from the Trotskyist tradition. Since they are the judges of who is Trotskyist and who is not, they didn’t see it wrong to take the name of the organization and the newspaper for themselves, and at the same time take most of the assets of the organization.

The cynicism of these impostors is even worse, since they didn’t even mention the fact that they were less than a third of the convention. For that reason, the accusation in the following paragraph of their paper seems to us rather like a description by themselves of their own actions.

“We refuse to recognize the right of this new formation to usurp our name and our central organ through methods of political gangsterism.”

Thus, an “enlightened minority” tries to rob us of everything. This minority, that presented itself to us at the congress as the standard bearer of internal democracy, applies its “democratic right” to disavow and to usurp the rights of the majority. A strange interpretation of proletarian democracy! It closely resembles the bourgeoisie’s democratic conceptions.

Our characterization is confirmed

During the congress the majority of the delegates agreed on the class character of the FBL. We characterized them precisely as the pressure of the petty bourgeoisie inside our party.

This characterization, naturally, was not an epithet but a social description. In his *In Defense of Marxism* Trotsky said that every serious faction struggle, in fact, reflects the class struggle. We maintain then, that they reflect one of the elements that make up the class struggle: the petty bourgeoisie.

The cliquish methods of their leadership, which circulates rumors, concretely the accusation that a member of the leadership is a police agent. Their opposition to immersing themselves in the workers struggles. Their disdain for conflicts in small factories. Their defense of academic careers for the student members of the organization. Their defense of church marriages for members of

the leadership "in order to get in good with the family." The delight expressed by their central leader when some workers movements in Maucalpan were smashed by police repression, since that "confirmed" their line. Their practice of deciding a line from behind a desk. . . . Now their behavior has confirmed once again the petty bourgeois class character of this formation.

We know then, that there is going to be confusion because of this problem; but we can not give up our name nor our paper. Neither are we going to dedicate our forces to constantly delineate ourselves from this sect. Practice and political positions will do it for us.

CALL TO THE FBL

[The following appeal to the members of the Bolshevik-Leninist Faction is translated from *El Socialista*, No. 35, January 16-31, 1976, published by the Militant Tendency of the Liga Socialista.]

* * *

Comrades of the FBL: After confirming the split which you carried out in the Liga Socialista, with the publication of an issue of *El Socialista* in which you publically announce the split—thus precipitating a grave crisis in one of the two sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International in Mexico—we would like to make you aware of our opinion, as well as some of the results stemming from it.

In the first place, it is necessary to point out that the Second Convention of the Liga Socialista, last December, was endorsed by you through your presence and participation, and, above all, by your implicit and explicit acceptance of its resolutions. This was absolutely clear since you didn't do anything to cast any doubts on the proceedings of the convention, which were fully democratic, and especially because you made the decision to remain in the organization, not having announced your intentions to split; rather on the contrary, having announced your decision to become a faction within the organization.

It is our opinion that your act of splitting, only a few days after the convention, with the majority of the organization represented by its present Central Committee and Political Committee, has no possibilities of success.

In the present circumstances, you constitute a minority split of one of the sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International in Mexico and, consequently, in accordance with the decisions taken at the Tenth World Congress, you remain outside of its ranks. In addition, we exhort the leadership of the International and of its sections not to recognize you in any way because of the unprincipled course you followed in splitting after the Congress had accepted your decision to convert yourselves into a faction and after it had nominated the number of members you were entitled to in the Central Leadership.

We have asked the Political Committee to discuss with you the terms for your reentry and to be the most flexible possible under current conditions so as to quickly eliminate this rupture.

It is our firmest hope that this regrettable split be healed quickly with the return, in the shortest time possible, of the FBL to the ranks of the Liga Socialista, for if this isn't so, you will be outside the ranks of the Fourth International.

Alfonso Ríos (GCI [Grupo Comunista Internacionalista]—a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Mexico)

Eduardo (PST [Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores] sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Argentina)

Sergio (ROJO—newspaper of communist action)

Julieta Gómez (Fraternal delegate of the GIM [Gruppe Internationale Marxisten], German section of the Fourth International, to the congress of the Liga Socialista)

A PHYSICAL ASSAULT ON MEMBERS OF THE FBL

[The following article appeared in the February 1-15 issue of *El Socialista*, newspaper of the Liga Socialista-Fracción Bolchevique Leninista (Socialist League-Bolshevik Leninist Faction). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

On the evening of January 23 a number of comrades selling *El Socialista* [FBL] were physically attacked by members of the Tendencia Militante [Militant Tendency]. (As we have explained, the Liga Socialista is divided into two public factions—a majority grouping, the Tendencia Militante [TM]; and a minority, the Fracción Bolchevique Leninista [FBL]. The name of the newspaper of both factions is *El Socialista*, a fact that has been seized on by the TM as an excuse for threatening the FBL in an effort to halt the sale of its paper.)

The events took place in Mexico City in front of the Salón Riviera, where the Mexican Communist party (PCM), Movement for Socialist Organization (MOS), and Tendencia Militante of the Liga Socialista were holding a “united meeting of the left” as part of the campaign of Valentín Campa (of the PCM) as candidate for the presidency of the republic.

In front of the two entrances to the hall, five members of the FBL were selling the issue of *El Socialista* in which the FBL puts forward its position on the Campa campaign.

At one of the entrances at 7:00 p.m., a member of the TM (whom we shall call “E”) tried to take the newspapers away from Compañeros Cadenas and Hoyos. The two compañeros declined to be drawn into a violent confrontation but at the same time insisted on their right to sell their newspaper. In front of a number of members of the TM, “E” began to rough up Hoyos, threatening to “beat him up.”

“L” backed up “E” but did not physically assault the members of the FBL. Instead, he simply demanded that they not sell their newspaper there and not “try to cause a provocation” (!). This prompted a discussion, which for the moment halted the pushing and shoving of Hoyos and Cadenas.

At the other entrance to the hall, “S” (of the TM) struck Israel from behind while the latter was selling *El Socialista*. But other members of the TM pulled “S” aside, and the selling of the newspaper continued until the meeting began inside the hall.

Those who spoke at the meeting were Roberto Jaramillo of the MOS, Ricardo Hernández for the TM of the Liga Socialista, and Valentín Campa for the PCM. When Hernández took the floor he began with a “denunciation” of the FBL for selling *El Socialista*. He merely alluded to his differences with the position put forward in the newspaper, stating that the Liga Socialista (TM) had been subjected to certain criticisms for having signed a joint platform

with the MOS and PCM. According to Hernández, the masses don’t “give a flying shit” about the programmatic differences between the Trotskyists and the Mexican CP.

The aim of this article, however, is not to explain our areas of disagreement or agreement with the MOS, PCM, and TM, but to report the facts of the assault.

As the meeting was ending and a few persons began to file out the doors, sales of *El Socialista* began again; however, “G” organized a group of TM members to resume the attacks.

The intention of this group was to carry out a threat by “N,” who had said that if the members of the FBL did not stop selling their newspapers, “more drastic measures would be taken” against them.

When this group of TM supporters entered the fray, Israel had to protect his papers with his body to avoid having them wrenched away; he was pushed and shoved from one side to the other.

“S,” in a new act of provocation, grabbed another compañero by the neck. The latter had to twist away to avoid being kneeed in the face.

Despite these repeated efforts, however, it proved impossible to seize the newspapers from the compañeros, who eventually left the area. Plainclothes police officers who had the meeting under surveillance from their automobiles came onto the scene to try to stir up a general brawl—something that would have suited them perfectly. □

reprinted from Intercontinental Press, March 1, 1976

AGAINST VIOLENCE IN THE WORKERS MOVEMENT

[The following article appeared in the February 1-15 issue of *El Socialista*, newspaper of the Liga Socialista-Fracción Bolchevique Leninista (Socialist League-Bolshevik Leninist Faction). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Throughout its existence, the Trotskyist movement has opposed the use of physical violence between democratic and revolutionary currents in the labor movement. In its view, threats and violence should not be used as a way to "convince," or rather eliminate, individuals or political tendencies just because they disagree with certain political positions.

This has a bearing on a number of actions taken by the Tendencia Militante [TM—Militant Tendency], a formation that represents one of the public factions of the Liga Socialista. These compañeros have refused to discuss in political terms the current situation within the Liga Socialista and its origins.

To this end, they have used an evasion characteristic of political weakness to avoid a political discussion of the differences that exist between the Bolshevik Leninist Faction (FBL) and themselves (TM).

They advance the following argument as the principal means of avoiding political questions: "We do not discuss with thieves." And they have not settled for simply refusing to hold political discussions but

have resorted to violence and to attempts to take away newspapers from the comrades of the FBL. This occurred recently in the Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales [School of Political and Social Science] of the UNAM [Universidad Autónoma de México—Autonomous University of Mexico] and in the University of Puebla.

In our view, a policy of physical violence against those in the workers movement who oppose our views benefits nobody but our class enemy.

For many years Trotskyists have fought against this form of cutting off political discussion. Those who have opposed us on this question have mainly been the Stalinists.

They are the ones who have introduced violence against their revolutionary opponents. Not long ago in Mexico, they persecuted the Trotskyists, expelling them from the trade unions, beating them up, and suppressing their ideas.

In the workers states where the Stalinists constitute the caste that ties the hands of the proletariat, their long, permanent, and continuing campaign of terror against all those who demand their basic rights is well known. This is the case in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, China, North Korea, etc.

In addition to the Stalinists, the ultra-lefts also resort to blows and insults to conceal their political weakness. On the

occasions when they have resorted to this method, as did the Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre [September 23 Communist League] in Sinaloa, we have denounced their incorrect and destructive attitude as well.

To be sure, violence has also occurred within the ranks of the labor movement, introduced by the bosses and the formations at the disposal of the government. This occurs, indirectly, through the labor gangsters and other bureaucrats. As a direct means, the bosses use provocateurs.

In any case, and regardless of its origin, violence within the labor movement, and especially within the groups on the left, benefits only the bosses.

In their version of *El Socialista*, the Tendencia Militante warns that some persons within their organization "have reached violent conclusions" and that the leadership is "trying to stop them."

We hope that the compañeros of the TM come to understand in time the serious error they have committed and that there will be no more violent attacks against members of the FBL.

It was inevitable that the profoundly antidemocratic methods used by the TM in its attempt to usurp the Liga Socialista would continue to be put into practice. The only difference is that now that they cannot try to silence us with maneuvers designed to behead and crush us "morally," they have to try to eliminate us physically. □

reprinted from *Intercontinental Press*, March 1, 1976

THE DIVISION IN THE SOCIALIST LEAGUE

[The following article was published in the January, 1976, issue (No. 33) of *Bandera Roja*, organ of the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Mexico, whose leadership is in agreement with the International Majority Tendency. The translation is by the Internationalist Tendency Newsletter.]

The Socialist League (LS) has split. After having become a minority at the 2nd Congress of the LS, held last December, the Bolshevik-Leninist Faction (FBL) opted for a split. From a purely formal and organizational standpoint, the new group is outside the ranks of the Fourth International which recognized the Internationalist Communist Group (GCI) and the Socialist League (LS) as its two sympathizing organizations at its Tenth World Congress in 1974.

The arguments which the FBL has made in its publication (*El Socialista*) that it is the majority group are without foundation since the 2nd Congress was held and ratified by their presence and by their remaining during the election of the new leadership. Similarly, the participation of various delegations from sections and sympathizing groups of the Fourth International, including those of the GCI, the Socialist Workers party (SWP) of the U.S., the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST) of Argentina, and others, constituted a recognition of the democratic and non-Stalinist procedures of the Congress, contrary to what the FBL is claiming. In other words, the *post-facto* invalidation of the Congress by the FBL is completely contradictory and incoherent.

The FBL expressed itself freely in the congress and its representatives were included, in proportion to their strength, in the new Central Committee (CC). The only accusation made by the FBL that has any foundation is that five of its main leaders were eliminated from the new leadership by majority vote. What is at stake here is the *form* in which the democratic right of a tendency was expressed. But there is no doubt that the right as such was respected in the acceptance of representatives of the FBL in the new leadership. Therefore, this accusation does not justify the split.

But obviously, this last point leads us to the deeper political problem involved in the split, and simultaneously to the problem posed by the present situation of the Fourth International.

The tendency situation in the Fourth International

As is known, the Tenth congress of the F.I. saw the development of basically two main tendencies, the Interna-

tional Majority Tendency (IMT) and the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction (LTF). The unanimous resolutions which were agreed upon in relation to the maintenance of the unity of the F.I. as a fundamental requirement to making its weight felt in the present rise of world revolution and as a living example of the possibility of putting democratic centralism into practice (freedom of tendencies and centralism in action), constituted a political agreement of great effectiveness that we see today was highly effective. Two years after the Congress, the International has seen its ranks grow and the strengthening of some sections has been spectacular: Spain, Portugal, France, Japan, Argentina, etc. In Mexico, the agreement implied that the GCI and LS were recognized as the two sympathizing organizations, and should prepare their unification and the creation of the official section of the F.I. The agreement was based on the fact that, in Mexico, the two tendencies were not unified organizationally, and a period of time was allowed to overcome this difficult situation.

After the Tenth Congress, several events have brought about a whole series of new alignments within the International. In the first place, the growth of the ranks of various sections has posed new questions—totally new ones for organizations that until recently had at most a hundred members. Today, many sections have more than one thousand members and have to confront the problems that arise from a membership of several thousand. Above all, it was the advance of the Portuguese revolution that precipitated a profound divergence because this country clearly showed what was possible in revolutionary conditions. A fundamental divergence was thus precipitated on the interpretation of the Portuguese events and the strategy the F.I. should pursue in that country. Stated briefly, the positions were the following. On the one hand, the IMT posed the necessity of emphasizing the extension, expansion, centralization, and organization of the councils and other organs of dual power that arose in the deep process of the mass struggle in Portugal, and of considering this as the central task. On the other hand, the LTF held that the central question was the defense of democratic rights and the convocation of a Constituent Assembly with a SP-CP majority that would create a government composed of these two parties. In the LTF itself, the PST viewpoint became more and more separated from the official view supported by the SWP. Little by little, the differences within the LTF grew, and crystallized in the LS, the Mexican organization linked to the international minority, into two tendencies (the Militant Tendency, and the Bolshevik-Leninist Faction) leading up to the Congress.

The Politics of the Congress

The December congress was precipitated without there having been the possibility to deepen the political discussion. This was due to the poor preparation of the delegates. The main reason for this was that the leadership of the FBL, which represented the main nucleus of the LS leadership before the congress, committed grave errors that weakened it in the eyes of the great majority of the organization. In effect, the FBL leadership when it saw itself confronted by a large opposition, began to use totally apolitical arguments, even offensive ones, thus poisoning the atmosphere and preventing a deep, free, democratic discussion.

The congress therefore lacked the depth necessary to tackle many points of the discussion. But this did not mean that two strategies were not clearly outlined:

1) The TM argued for a change in the traditional focus, above all propagandistic, of the LS. This change was to be centered on a transformation of the *type* of activist that needed to be shaped in a concrete intervention and greater involvement in the class struggle.

2) The FBL, with a more global focus, warned of the dangers of the empirical approach of the TM (which had not presented a project of proletarian work) and of the risks involved in a poorly elaborated turn. It stressed an "orthodox" propagandistic focus on the program and on the consolidation of party cells. Nonetheless, beyond common positions such as these, in the area of posing alternatives, it did not confront the political turn proposed by the TM with an alternative.

Dangers of Sectarianism

The necessary criterion that must be used in evaluating the LS division follows two main axes.

In the first place, one must inevitably conclude that it constitutes the negative result of the sectarian politics conducted by the LS leadership before the congress, and for which it is responsible in front of the entire nucleus of the FBL. This sectarianism was apparent above all in the attitude taken toward the proposal to realize a process of fusion with the GCI. Contrary to the attitude of the LS leadership during 1973-74, in 1975, there was a sudden turn to a more "realistic" policy, which consisted in fact in giving more attention to the differences than to the agreements, however principled and programmatic the latter may have been. This sectarianism was reflected in the congress itself when neither tendency contributed a clear cut conception on how to approach the problem of fusion with the other organization of the F.I. in Mexico, a fusion which would create the Mexican section.

The problem of centralism constitutes the second axis of this evaluation. The LS was incapable of assimilating the lessons of the split in the GCI. Both our delegates and those of Rojo mentioned this split as an example not to be followed. The congress was unable to understand (especially the FBL) that our movement, which has demonstrated that it is the only one capable of putting into practice

democracy within the party, must now complement this understanding by demonstrating that it is also capable of maintaining two tendencies in a single, centralized and united organization. Fortunately, the hard lessons which both the GCI and LS now have on this score, should allow them to act with greater speed and decision. To begin with, the unification between the GCI and Rojo will become feasible shortly. And after that, clearly unification with the LS will be more than ever on the agenda since the bitter harvest reaped at the LS congress has been dearly paid. The only way to insure that in the long run this becomes a lesson and a step forward would be if the unification of the LS and GCI is accelerated and a strong and powerful Mexican section of the F.I. is created. Thus, we, Fourth Internationalists, would in the end laugh louder than our enemies who, today, are all rejoicing.

International Consequences

But the split in the LS has international consequences, above all because the LTF will have to pronounce itself, in particular its main supporters, the SWP of the U.S., and the PST of Argentina. One thing is clear; the GCI as much as the LS will struggle together to preserve the agreements of the Tenth Congress and the unitary and responsible character of our movement. Both organizations will defend the integrity of the International against all obstacles, and will oppose any attempt to disband and disperse their strength in Mexico.

Here the principled aspect is vital. Today we must educate the numerous new recruits of the FI to a fundamental truth which has been irresponsibly abused: splits are not made over tactical or strategical matters, nor because of different "political projects." *Only differences of principle, programmatic and global conceptions, justify splits in Leninism.*

Our movement crossed a desert, isolated and persecuted by powerful enemies for decades. In the majority of cases, the breaks which occurred during those difficult years were not justified, and were more likely an expression of the fatigue and disillusionment of many comrades. This demonstrates that revolutionaries are also human and that their nerves will and can be broken. But in the seventies, in the rise of world revolution which we witness today, there is not only no justification to remain isolated. In fact, every day as we grow larger, the remains of sectarianism which the long journey through the desert necessarily left in us, represents an obstacle for this new epoch. We must eradicate them, educating ourselves and our ranks.

To the group that split from the LS, we say fraternally, but inflexibly for us, you are outside the Fourth International. The only way of remaining in the Fourth International is by returning to the Socialist League, to the ranks of the organizations recognized by the Tenth World Congress in Mexico: the Socialist League or the Internationalist Communist Group.

January 7, 1976
Political Bureau of the GCI

Part V: Documents Concerning the Electoral Strategy of the Liga Socialista

October 24, 1975, letter from Joseph Hansen to the
Political Committee of the Liga Socialista

New York, N.Y.
October 24, 1975

Political Committee
Liga Socialista

Dear Comrades,

The "Joint PCM-LS Electoral Program," published in the September 15-30 issue of *El Socialista*, has caused some questions to be raised here that I would like to pass on to you. Perhaps you have already been considering them.

First of all, the joint electoral program does not seem to fit into the context of previous material in *El Socialista* dealing with the problem of participating in the elections. Two main questions have been considered in the past year or so—popular frontism and the undemocratic nature of the federal elections law. I will take them up consecutively.

1. From the articles in *El Socialista*, it seems clear that the first organization to raise the question of forming a common front of the left in the elections was the Partido Comunista Mexicano. The PCM called for "united action by the left to gain political freedom." The PCM also called for a "common platform."

In reporting this in an article in the February 1-15 issue of *El Socialista*, Comrade Roberto Torres A. denounced the maneuver of the PCM as a bid to set up a popular front. He also pointed out that this represented a switch from the PCM's previous ultraleft line.

The attack against the PCM's popular front maneuver was continued in another excellent article by Comrade Jeronimo Pedroza in the March 16-31 issue.

In the April 16-30 issue, the attack against the PCM was continued. The PCM's parleys with other groups of the left concerning setting up a popular front were reported. In the same article, *El Socialista* called on the PCM to drop its attempt to form an electoral coalition with forces of the bosses and to come out, instead, for a workers and peasants front. In addition, *El Socialista* called on all the organizations that favored a workers and peasants government to discuss a program and choose candidates to present as an alternative in the coming elections. The rest of the article listed a series of democratic and transitional demands that could serve as the basis for a class-struggle electoral campaign.

I could find nothing in subsequent issues of *El Socialista* reporting on discussions that might have been held by the Liga Socialista with other groups on the proposal. So I don't know whether discussions were held or, if so, what the results were.

In the July 16-31 issue of *El Socialista*, Comrade Jaime González reported the June 22 meeting sponsored by the PCM in Mexico City which was attended by 3,000 to 5,000 persons.

Among the themes presented by the speakers were defense of the PCM's right to exist as a political party and to participate in the elections, a call for the release of political prisoners, and a call for struggle against the high cost of living.

One of the speakers, Ramón Danzós, called for a general amnesty for "all prisoners, defendants, and those persecuted for political reasons."

Valentín Campa proposed a sliding scale of wages to combat inflation.

The author of the report thought that there could be no disagreement with most of these proposals because "in general they are correct." The case was otherwise with the remarks of the main speaker Arnoldo Martínez Verdugo, who proposed as the strategic solution for the struggle of the masses in Mexico "to open the way for the development of political freedom and we demand a climate of respect for the democratic opposition and the left; we do not expect either crumbs or free concessions; we pose the possibility of a road for national development, a road for solving the present political crisis."

Against this, *El Socialista* held that "only a workers and peasants government, established through the mobilization of the masses, is the solution to the present capitalist crisis."

Martínez Verdugo also spoke of the possibility of pressing for a coalition of organizations of the left for the next elections.

"We socialists," the author of the article responded, "believe that a coalition of the organizations that claim to be for the workers movement is a correct alternative for the next elections. We hope that the positions of the PCM continue to develop in this direction, and that in the near future we can publicly discuss a program for such a coalition."

Nothing was said in the next issue of *El Socialista* about the PCM, its proposals, or discussions between the PCM and the Liga Socialista.

Thus publication of the joint PCM-LS electoral program came as a surprise. What happened to the proposal for a broad discussion? Readers of *El Socialista* are left in the

dark as to the possible meaning of the document.

Moreover, a series of questions come to the fore. Was *El Socialista* wrong in its analysis of the course taken by the PCM after it switched from ultraleftism? Was that course popular frontist? Must this characterization be corrected now? Is the PCM no longer *Stalinist*?

If you have come to think that the analysis made by *El Socialista* was wrong, what caused you to reconsider? What was the evidence? And in deciding on a joint electoral program, what practical tests did you undertake to determine the reliability of the PCM? What preliminary common actions did you carry out?

2. On the undemocratic nature of the federal election laws:

I noticed three phases in the approach on this. First was the assurance that it is possible to run token candidates. The strongest emphasis on the feasibility and political necessity of doing this occurred in the report on the meeting of the Liga Socialista that appeared in the May 1-15 issue of *El Socialista*. The second was the analysis of the present federal election law and its unconstitutional nature, which appeared in the June 16-30 issue. This was an excellent article that made clear the virtually insuperable obstacles placed in the way of small formations getting on the ballot. Running a token candidate was no longer emphasized although it was held open as a possible solution. The third phase was marked by the article in the August 1-15 issue. Clauses in the electoral law were cited that indicate how difficult it is to run even a token candidate.

This material would seem to point to a campaign to challenge the constitutionality of the federal election law or to demand its repeal. Certainly enough has been outlined to show that a genuine basis exists for an action of that kind.

* * *

This brings me to the most disturbing aspect of the joint PCM-LS electoral program. Instead of singling out the one point on which joint action could be undertaken—a challenge to the constitutionality of the federal election law or a demand to repeal it, the two organizations project a different course:

1. Formation of a class-struggle front to *participate* in the elections.

2. Agreement on seventeen points to be adopted by that front, but which in the meantime constitute a joint PCM-LS program for advancement in the electoral arena.

What is the *practical* purpose of the joint electoral program? It is not possible for the PCM and the LS to run as parties in the coming elections. It is not possible for the two organizations to put up slates either separately or jointly. The way things stand, it appears dubious that a campaign can be undertaken for even a token candidate.

I see only one point in the joint electoral program on which there is a possibility of common practical action, that is point No. 4:

“Repeal of the present Federal Electoral Law and enactment of a law guaranteeing the participation of all the political currents and parties in the electoral process and assuring genuine proportional representation and

elimination of government control of the electoral process.”

This might include legal action of some kind in which the two organizations pool whatever resources they can gather for a common effort on this level. Even in this instance it might be better tactically to try to set up a broad committee which the PCM and LS could help organize.

In no case would such an action necessitate a joint electoral program. In fact a joint electoral program would stand in its way if for no other reason than that it would inject *other* issues that ought to be discussed in a different context.

The worst aspect of the joint electoral program is the impression it gives of mixing banners. Certainly the LS stands for more than is included in this seventeen-point program, which does not even mention the struggle to overturn capitalism and build socialism. Every issue of *El Socialista* is proof of that. What the PCM stands for additionally, the readers of *El Socialista* have no way of knowing. For example, does the PCM stand for the parliamentary road, for “peaceful coexistence”? Most of the points in the joint electoral program thus appear at best to be quite abstract, or even little more than pious declarations.

For example, point No. 2 calls for “Amnesty for all prisoners, defendants, and those persecuted for political reasons.”

Why “amnesty” This implies “guilt.” Political prisoners should be freed forthwith. Trials for political reasons should be quashed.

In any case, as a concrete issue, this can be advanced effectively only in relation to specific cases in which joint action could be undertaken by the two (or more) organizations. This approach holds no matter what occurs in the electoral arena. You could even compete, with separate platforms and separate slates, in the electoral arena (if it were possible legally) and yet engage in common actions in behalf of specified cases under jointly agreed upon conditions.

The joint electoral program, as presented, can give the impression that the Liga Socialista is mixing its banners with those of a Stalinist formation, or at least aiding it unwittingly in constructing a more favorable image required to rehabilitate its standing in the Mexican working class.

The latest issue of *El Socialista* (October 1-15) just arrived. I see that it contains neither a follow-up to explain the meaning of the joint PCM-LS electoral program nor a report on any new steps in relation to the federal election law. It may be that nothing happened in the last few weeks. On the other hand, the difficulties standing in the way of participating in the election may now appear more formidable than before and you may be discussing how to proceed in a realistic and effective way.

In any case, I would like very much to hear from you concerning the questions raised above. It would facilitate giving an account of the problems you face in trying to advance the program of Trotskyism by participating in the electoral process.

With comradely greetings,
Joseph Hansen

November 20, 1975, letter from four members of the Political Committee of the Liga Socialista to Joseph Hansen

Mexico City
November 20, 1975

Joseph Hansen
New York

Dear Comrade,

We received your letter, dated October 24 of this year, in which you make a series of criticisms of the position we arrived at in the Liga Socialista on participation in the 1976 elections in Mexico, and the way we put this forward

in *El Socialista*. Your letter has been translated and shown to all the members of the Political Committee.

Without going into details, we would like to say that we agree with the general sense of your criticisms, and that we consider it necessary to propose a change in the electoral policy of the Liga Socialista. We are asking for a meeting of the Political Committee to try to convince the rest of the comrades of the necessity to change our political line on this.

Fraternally,
Efraín
Jaime
Cristina
Horacio

JOINT ELECTORAL PLATFORM OF THE MEXICAN CP, MOS, AND LS

[The following is the joint electoral platform of the Partido Comunista Mexicano, Movimiento de Organización Socialista, and Liga Socialista (Tendencia Militante),¹ as published in the January 16-31 issue of *El Socialista*, newspaper of the Liga Socialista (TM).

[The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The Partido Comunista Mexicano, Movimiento de Organización Socialista, and Liga Socialista are jointly participating in the current federal election campaign, without diminishing the autonomy of any of the organizations. They are presenting a common platform and are supporting the presidential candidacy of Compañero Valentín Campa, along with a single slate of deputies and senators for Congress.

They propose to encourage united action by the masses, particularly by the working class, for immediate demands and in defense of their economic and political interests. At the same time, they propose the following: to advance the unity of the forces that support democracy and socialism, with the aim of increasing their political weight and mass influence; to strengthen the struggle of the Mexican people against imperialism; to compel respect for the political rights of the Mexican people, including their electoral rights; to combat the repressive political climate of intimidation arising from current governmental practices; in short, to contribute to the organization and development of an autonomous political force capable of challenging the bourgeoisie for power, defeating it, and building Mexican society on a new basis, without capitalist wage slavery, with a higher economic and cultural standard of living for the masses of people, and with truly human conditions of existence.

The organizations that have united together to act in this electoral process do not hide their socialist objectives, nor their revolutionary method to achieve them.

1. Mexican Communist party, Movement for Socialist Organization, Socialist League (Militant Tendency).

They consider it their duty to labor stubbornly to achieve them.

They propose limited objectives of struggle to the working class, peasants, students, to all manual and clerical workers—objectives that take into account the degree of seriousness of the problems requiring solution, the level of class consciousness and organization of the masses, and the necessity that the masses undergo their own experiences, enabling them to understand fully the need for a revolution to bring about deepgoing, radical changes in Mexican society.

The PCM, MOS, and LS recognize that the elections scheduled for the first Sunday of next July will not decide who will become president of the republic, nor the fundamental composition of Congress. Given the undemocratic way in which the electoral system is set up, the question of who will be the next president has already been decided. The highest circles of government will also handpick the vast majority of deputies and senators.

Consequently, these revolutionary organizations are not going to contest the presidency and the congressional seats in the polling booth. They are taking part in the electoral campaign with the aim of helping to raise the consciousness of the masses, whose rights it is their duty to defend. At the same time, they seek to strengthen the independent movement of the people, with the aim of enabling it to influence the nation's political life in a decisive way.

With full clarity of objectives, without illusions of any sort, and placing confidence solely in the power of the masses and their own organization, the Partido Comunista Mexicano, the Movimiento de Organización Socialista, and the Liga Socialista propose to citizens who support democracy and public well-being a platform of struggle that includes the positions, objectives, and immediate demands that correspond to the present situation in the country.

This platform contains both demands on the present government and objectives that are realizable only with the taking of power by the working people. Everything depends on the organized and united strength of the masses and on the mettle of their political leadership.

The platform of the Partido Comunista Mexicano, the Movimiento de Organización Socialista, and the Liga Socialista is the following:

I. Political Rights for All Citizens

It is a well-known fact that Mexico has an undemocratic political system that prevents the majority of citizens from participating in the solution of the most pressing national problems. Paternalism and despotism reign in this country, not democratic methods of rule. The political and social rights of citizens, especially of those who oppose the system and fight for democracy and socialism, are respected by neither the government nor the law. They cannot legally organize in independent political parties, and efforts at democratic trade-union organizing encounter endless obstacles. They cannot freely exercise either the right to vote or to assemble in the streets and public places, particularly in Mexico City, so as to put forward their views on the political issues before the country or on topics of interest to the masses of people. They suffer repression—murder, imprisonment, kidnapping, threats, and so forth—for dissenting from the official point of view, and for taking political and social action independent of the government. The hundreds of political prisoners are a telling example of this reality. Some have been sentenced to prison, others have simply been kidnapped by the government. Many are under indictment, out of jail on bail or “freed under protest,” with their political rights suspended. More than a few have been persecuted and forced to seek exile abroad.

The exercise of political freedom would begin to become a reality under the following conditions:

1. The passage of a general amnesty law that would free all those imprisoned for political motives, while voiding all political trials and halting all persecution of a similar nature.

2. A halt to the repression of the trade-union, peasant, student, and people's movement in general, a practice carried out by the present government.

3. Elimination of Title II of the Federal Penal Code and of other legislation of this sort that involves political repression.

4. Abolition of the present Federal Election Law and the corresponding laws in the states. Replacement of this law by one that would institute proportional representation in Congress; establish a system of registering political parties not on the basis of their

membership strength and the recording of each member with the secretary of state, but on the basis of their actual political existence; institute an autonomous body to organize the electoral process; form an electoral tribunal independent of the government to certify the elections impartially; and finally, establish guarantees that all citizens may freely exercise the right to vote.

5. Elimination from police and traffic regulations of all obstacles to the right to hold demonstrations and public assemblies, especially in the Federal District [Mexico City and the surrounding area].

6. Respect for the right to strike. Freedom of political affiliation for workers and other unionized sectors, and a ban on the incorporation of unions as such into any political party. Elimination of the government requirement that unions be "registered" and an end to any government interference whatsoever in the trade unions.

7. Elimination of all forms of discrimination against women.

8. Defense of the right of every citizen to hold any creed or religion, or none at all.

II. Means for Improving the Standard of Living of All Workers

Workers and their families experience living conditions that grow worse daily. At the same time the exploiters, especially the most powerful capitalists, not only enjoy all the necessities but live in luxury and riches.

Real wages are declining constantly despite nominal increases because the cost of goods and services, particularly the ones that are most necessary, increase systematically. The share of the social wealth that goes to the workers is constantly diminishing, while the bourgeoisie's share grows. The rate of exploitation of the workers is also increasing. The masses of people live in poverty. Lack of the most basic needs marks their lives.

In addition to the insufficient number of housing units and the unhealthy conditions under which the families of workers and peasants live, rents are very high, amounting to as much as half a worker's wages. As if this were not enough, the leases are weighted heavily in favor of the landlords. If they wish to rent housing, tenants are forced to relinquish their rights. Judges almost always rule against tenants; they are paid off by the landlords.

Unemployment is at a very high level. This includes not only those who have been laid off from a large number of companies but also the lack of jobs for hundreds of thousands of youths, men and women, who enter the labor market each year.

For these reasons the organizations that have joined together put forward the following as objectives of struggle:

1. An across-the-board increase in wages, salaries, and pensions.

2. Reduction of the workweek to forty hours, with fifty-six hours pay.

3. Establishment of a sliding scale of wages, that is, pegging them at regular intervals to the increase in the cost of goods. This must be complemented by genuine price controls, on a national scale and with the participation of consumers.

4. Institution of a rent freeze in public housing and passage of legislation making leases a matter of public concern and containing inalienable rights for tenants. Reinstitution of Section XII of Article 123 of the constitution, a provision that compelled employers to provide comfortable and decent housing for their workers. In sum, a struggle for decent, cheap housing for workers.

5. Subsidies for the unemployed from the government and the employers and coverage for the unemployed under Social Security.²

III. Demands of the Agricultural Workers

Bourgeois agrarian reform in our country has not and cannot resolve the pressing problems of the rural masses. More than half a century after the proclamation of land reform, a great proportion of the best land remains private property in the hands of a few persons. The big estates continue to exist up to this day, either openly or in a concealed fashion. The right of landholders to exemption, reestablished under the government of Miguel Alemán, serves to prevent the handing over of land to the peasants. Those who farm public land held in common [*ejidos*] usually lack water for irrigation and farming machinery, as well as sufficient, readily available, low-cost loans. The trend is toward agribusiness combines, through the intervention of the industrial, commercial, and financial capitalist monopolies. Millions of agricultural workers have neither land nor jobs. Field workers do not receive the minimum wage, and their right to an eight-hour day and a day off each week with pay is not respected. Governmental authorities make a mockery of their right to organize in trade unions. An agricultural crisis reigns in our country.

In face of this situation in Mexican agriculture, the organizations united in the present electoral campaign put forward the following demands:

1. Turn over the land to those who work it. Total elimination of the landed estates and the big capitalist landholdings. Encourage collective farming of the common lands on a voluntary and autonomous basis, under the peasants who work them.

2. Repeal Paragraph III, Section XIV of Article 27 in the constitution, which pro-

tections landholders who have obtained a certificate of exemption.

3. Reduce exempted property to twenty hectares of irrigated land and its equivalent in land of different value.

4. Priority in the allocation of irrigation water to those who farm land held in common and those who hold fewer than twenty hectares.

5. Sufficient, readily available, low-cost loans for those who farm land held in common, and for those who are genuine small landholders. Supervision of the Banco de Crédito Ejidal by genuine representatives of the peasants.

6. An independent organization of the peasants to oversee the sale of crops and all matters related to production in agriculture, cattle raising, and forestry.

7. Respect for the right of wage workers in the fields to unionize and bargain collectively, as well as for the right to an eight-hour day, one day off a week with pay, a minimum wage, social security, and other benefits established under the federal labor act.

IV. Measures to Reorient Government Economic Policy

The crisis of the Mexican economy is reflected in the low rate of growth in production (in agriculture, the rate of growth is lower than the annual rate of increase in the population); in the enormous and growing deficit in foreign trade; in monetary inflation, which in recent years has reached an annual rate of 25 percent; in the government's budget deficit, which is constantly increasing; and in the foreign debt, which now totals more than 250 billion pesos [about US\$20 billion]. All of this is expressed in the very low standard of living of the masses of people.

In its main aspects the government's economic policy is aimed at protecting the interests of the big bourgeoisie, and more narrowly, those of the financial oligarchy.

Consequently, big business pays less than its proportionate share of taxes; the biggest banks and financial holdings are in reality given the most favorable treatment; and the state enterprises are placed at the service of private capital, turning over to it fuel, electrical energy, railway transport, and credit at prices lower than cost.

In short, the government uses inflation, fiscal policy, state capital, state-guaranteed loans, and other measures to stimulate the most exorbitant profits for national and foreign concerns. As these capitalist profits increase, the income of the masses of people decreases proportionally.

This state of affairs can be confronted, in a way that conforms to the public interest, only by adopting these proposals:

1. A fiscal policy that places a heavy and

2. The national health system, which provides certain medical and hospitalization benefits.

graduated tax on the huge profits of foreign capital and on those of the big Mexican capitalists.

2. Control of foreign trade and exchange. Effective means to halt the increase in foreign debt.

3. Nationalization of private banks.

4. Nationalization of basic industries, whether in the hands of national capital, foreign capital, or mixed national and foreign capital, as well as of the food and drug industries. Workers control of these nationalized concerns, which means giving the workers access to their real records so that they can report irregularities thereby revealed and demand rectification of them. This would include such questions as workers' share of the profits, payment of taxes, and the possibility of increasing wages, taking into account increases in productivity, the level of profits, and the cost of living.

5. Reorientation of the state sector of the economy, mainly toward productive activity and putting an end to its role as a prop for private enterprise.

6. A halt to monetary and credit inflation through economic measures that will permit an increase in industrial and agricultural production and a limitation on capitalists' profits.

V. A Foreign Policy of Independence and Peace

Despite the establishment of relations with a growing number of countries, including socialist countries, and its participation in some independent-type actions in Latin America, Mexico's foreign policy continues solidly in the orbit of the United States. It continues to remain part of the Organization of American States and has not renounced the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. The Mexican government is seeking to attract a greater investment of Yankee capital and encourages the joining of Mexican and American capital, thus increasing the country's dependence. In the field of propaganda, the government defends the fallacy of considering the United States and the Soviet Union in equal terms, viewing both as rich countries opposed to the poor ones, including Mexico.

This foreign policy, indelibly imprinted by the crisis of American domination and the present international situation, is neither anti-imperialist nor fully autonomous. For that the popular masses must struggle for:

1. The immediate incorporation of Mexico in the group of nonaligned countries. This camp is composed of both underdeveloped capitalist countries dependent on imperialism and socialist countries. Their foreign policy fundamentally goes in an anti-imperialist direction. It is for that reason

that the Mexican people must demand the inclusion of our country in this group.

2. The strengthening of relations of economic and political collaboration with the Latin American governments that are fighting for the recovery of their resources and for their full autonomy. This category includes Peru, Panama, and Ecuador, which, in varying degrees, tend to carry out the policy described above.

The withdrawal of Mexico from the OAS. Renunciation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. A policy of action against colonialism in Latin America, supporting in particular the people of Puerto Rico, who are fighting for the national independence of their country; the national self-determination of the people of Belize; the autonomy the peoples of the French colonies of Martinique and Guadeloupe are fighting for; and in general the elimination of colonialism in Latin America.

3. An active defense of world peace, and solidarity with the peoples who are struggling for their independence and against imperialist aggression.

4. Effective measures to put into practice the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.³ In addition to the general points concerning peaceful coexistence among the various states, particular importance is attached to the right to nationalize foreign investments and to trade with all countries, including those under a socialist system—a right that Mexico must exercise. Diversification of foreign trade and defense of the prices of exported raw materials must be put into practice by Mexico, as called for in the charter. The public interest demands the realization of some of the measures called for in the charter—which is subscribed to by 120 countries, including all those under a socialist system, and rejected only by the major imperialist countries—if it is not to become simply a moral statement rather than a document of practical application.

5. The entry of Mexico into the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), that is, into the association of countries that sell raw materials, in this case oil, to protect price levels and the conditions of sale, would be an anti-imperialist measure. It must be pointed out that Venezuela and Ecuador are discriminated against in foreign trade by the United States for being members of OPEC. Mexico must unite with these countries and strengthen the resistance in all matters that concern the export of this raw material.

6. Expansion of commercial and techno-

3. An economic charter proposed by Mexican President Luis Echeverría Álvarez. Adopted by a vote of 120 to 6 in the United Nations General Assembly December 12, 1974.

logical exchanges with the socialist countries.

7. The establishment of diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with the People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of Mongolia, Laos, the democratic state of Cambodia, the People's Republic of Angola, and the other countries that are on the path of liberating themselves from colonialism.

It should be noted that the Liga Socialista differs with some points in this section. However, the three organizations declare their support to the anti-imperialist struggles of the Latin American peoples and of those of other colonial and semicolonial countries, including the struggle of the MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) against imperialist aggression and the forces of reaction in Africa. They call for Mexico to withdraw from the OAS and to denounce the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. The three organizations also declare their defense of the Soviet Union and other socialist states against any imperialist attack and call for Mexico to establish diplomatic, commercial, and cultural relations with the aforementioned countries.

VI. Democratization of Education

The backwardness of our people, which stems from capitalist exploitation and the country's dependence on Yankee imperialism, is shown in the field of education, to take just one example. There are millions of functional illiterates, the vast majority of whom have not even been able to finish primary school, while only a tiny minority of those who enter secondary school or the university manage to attain a professional career. The children of workers and peasants are practically excluded from higher education.

Education in general is at a low scientific and technical level. It is carried out in an authoritarian and undemocratic way, guided by the interests of the bourgeoisie. The national educational system is in crisis. The organizations that have joined together in this electoral campaign propose to fight for the following:

1. Education for all Mexicans, compulsory and free of charge up to the ninth grade (primary and secondary school).

2. Total elimination of illiteracy. A state monopoly of education at all levels and the elimination of private schools.

3. Autonomy for the university and for all other institutes and schools of this level even if they are not called universities. An end to authoritarian structures in all higher education (universities, institutes, and industrial and agricultural technical schools). Replacement of such structures by forms of self-management exercised by the teachers, students, and workers. Assistance benefits

for students, such as free room and board at school.

4. Professional, economic, and social improvements for the teaching profession at all levels.

5. Unification of the entire national educational system and institution of long-range planning in education. Jobs for all who come out of the secondary schools.

The above represents only the fundamental points that make up the broad electoral platform of the forces of the left that have united in electoral political action. The objectives of struggle they set forward can be won only by a united and organized movement of the masses, by the independent action of the working class, and by an

alliance between the working class, the peasantry, and other sectors of the people. Some points represent demands on the present bourgeois government. Others, which affect above all the property and economic interests of big business, will only be fulfilled with a revolutionary change in which political power passes to the hands of the working people, under the leadership of the working class, and with a reorganization of society leading toward socialism.

The Partido Comunista Mexicano, Movimiento de Organización Socialista, and Liga Socialista call on the working class, the peasants, the students, all manual and clerical workers, men and women, the youth, to hold this platform high, to fight

for it, and to join together in a great independent force opposed to the dependent capitalist system and to the government, to fight the reactionary and profascist forces—so as to emerge from the election campaign stronger in forces and in social and political influence.

Political freedom to advance toward democracy and socialism!

Mexico City
January 12, 1976

Central Committee of the Partido Comunista Mexicano. Political Committee of the Liga Socialista. Secretariat of the National Committee of the Movimiento de Organización Socialista. □

IS THE MEXICAN CP NO LONGER A STALINIST ORGANIZATION?

[The following article appeared in the February 1-15 issue of *El Socialista*, fortnightly newspaper of the Bolshevik Leninist Faction of the Liga Socialista (Socialist League), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Mexico. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Previous issues of *El Socialista* (Nos. 35 and 36 of the first and second fortnights of January) have informed our readers of the process that has taken place in the Liga Socialista, which culminated with our decision to make public our fight to rescue the traditions of our party.

Since both organizations claim to be the Liga Socialista and since the Tendencia Militante [Militant Tendency] has published an issue of *El Socialista* with the same name and format, in this article we will identify them as Liga Socialista (TM) and their newspaper as *El Socialista* (TM) so as to avoid confusion. In turn, we will identify ourselves as Liga Socialista (FBL) and our newspaper as *El Socialista* (FBL).

On January 12, 1976, the Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM), the Movimiento de Organización Socialista (MOS),¹ and the Liga Socialista (TM) signed a manifesto that stated they had formed a front to promote the candidacy of Valentín Campa, leader and presidential candidate of the PCM, on the basis of a common platform. This platform was published in No. 35 of *El Socialista* (TM).

1. Mexican Communist party, the pro-Moscow Stalinist party in Mexico. Movement for Socialist Organization, a group that split from the opportunist formation Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Workers party), which is considering supporting the official candidate. The MOS has become a satellite of the PCM.

2. Printed elsewhere in this issue of *Intercontinental Press*.

By signing such a programmatic agreement with the Mexican Communist party, a Stalinist party whose program and course for more than fifty-five years have shown its reformist character and its inclination toward class collaboration with the bourgeoisie, the Liga Socialista (TM) shouldered the task of providing the PCM with left cover for its attempt to vindicate itself before sectors of the vanguard.

Still more serious, the Liga Socialista (TM), in its eagerness to play this shameful role, has signed and endorsed a reformist minimum program that in structure and content is nothing more than a slightly modified version of the PCM program.

These acts are sufficiently important in and of themselves to deserve examination. But they also help clarify which of the two organizations that call themselves Liga Socialista really represents the tradition and continuity of that organization and of revolutionary Marxism in Mexico. They also help clarify the Liga Socialista (TM)'s course and explain the positions and actions it took during its fight to usurp the Liga Socialista and smash the obstacle represented by the FBL.

Tail-Ending the PCM

In past issues of *El Socialista* (FBL) we have already explained why we think that in general it is incorrect to form electoral fronts with other political parties. Although we consider it valid and necessary to seek and promote *unity in action* of all working-class forces, an electoral front to propagandize a program is something radically different. In the former case, what is involved is the formation of fronts for struggle and mobilization around concrete points and issues.

When participating in elections, we socialists do not act with the illusion that this is the method to obtain changes in our

country or the road through which the workers will take power.

What we propose to take advantage of is the fact that the bourgeoisie and its government are opening a period in which supposedly the question is posed of who should govern the country, in what way, and with what measures.

Nonetheless, without creating any illusions, we socialists can take advantage of this period to pose our solutions, publicize our program, and make as broadly known as possible the most important struggles the workers and their allies are carrying out against the bourgeoisie.

In doing this, we can in no way afford to create confusion about what we represent, what we propose to solve the problems of the nation, and what differentiates us from other parties.

We certainly do think it is valid at such times to support a candidate of a workers party against the candidate of the bourgeoisie, converting the elections into one more class battleground.

That is why at this time we support the candidacy of Valentín Campa against that of López Portillo,³ and why we call for a vote for him as a way of registering a class vote. At the same time we will explain how incorrect and dangerous his program and line are.

What we cannot do is negotiate our program or mix our banner with that of other, nonrevolutionary parties in an electoral front. We believe there is only one solution to each of the country's problems, and that is the one we indicate in the different points of our program.

For socialist participation in the

3. José López Portillo, the 1976 candidate of the ruling party in Mexico, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI—Institutional Revolutionary party).

elections—the terrain of the class enemy—to be fruitful, the socialist program, and what the organization that holds it up represents, must be expressed openly, clearly, and sharply. We must also counterpose this program to the reformist program of Valentín Campa and his party, and to that of other organizations, as well as to that of the bourgeois government.

We also explained previously the PCM's policy toward the elections. We pointed out how it at first attempted to initiate a process that would lead to the formation of an electoral front that would group the workers organizations together with the supposed "progressive forces" and "partisans of democracy" of the bourgeoisie and the government.

Upon seeing their attempts at implementing this policy frustrated for *this* election period, the PCM *adjusted* it to try to attract what forces it could indeed win over to its politics. Thus, it made several calls for unity and signed several agreements with various organizations.

It was in this sense that we explained why we considered we had made a political error on August 26, 1975, when we signed a joint electoral platform with the PCM, a platform that was abstract, general, and ambiguous.⁴ Furthermore, without respecting the agreement, the PCM later launched *its* campaign, with *its* politics and *its* program, inviting us to participate on the basis of it.

By signing the agreement and platform of January 12, the *compañeros* of the Liga Socialista (TM) not only have agreed to play the PCM's game and help it vindicate itself in the eyes of sectors before which it is deeply discredited, but have also decided to endorse and accept its program and politics, and even to become its defenders.

Is the PCM Revolutionary?

In the manifesto and platform of January 12, the *compañeros* of the Liga Socialista (TM) tell us that the three organizations—the PCM, the MOS, and LS (TM)—"propose to encourage united action by the masses, particularly by the working class, for immediate demands and in defense of their economic and political interests. *At the same time*, they propose the following: to advance the *unity of the forces that support democracy and socialism*, with the aim of increasing their political weight and mass influence; to strengthen the struggle of the Mexican people against imperialism . . . in short, to contribute to the organization and development of an *autonomous political force capable of challenging the bourgeoisie for power*, defeating it, and building Mexican society on a new basis, without capital-

4. This platform appeared in No. 30 (September 15-30, 1975) of *El Socialista*, under the title "Programa Electoral Conjunto PCM-LS."

ist wage slavery . . ." (Our emphasis.)

What is meant by this famous "unity of the forces that support democracy and socialism," this "autonomous political force" that is supposed to be capable of wrenching power from the bourgeoisie, which they propose to promote *outside* of the unity in action of the masses?

Does it refer to the PCM's conception of the collaboration of workers organizations with "progressive" bourgeois forces in a "popular front"? Is this what the *compañeros* of the Liga Socialista (TM) propose to promote? Or does it refer instead to the political unity of the workers in an organization with a revolutionary program? If the latter is true, the *compañeros* of the Liga Socialista (TM) would be telling us that the PCM does not propose to promote class collaboration, that it has stopped being a Stalinist party, and that it proposes to follow a revolutionary policy.

Whatever conclusion the *compañeros* come to, they are telling us that they are willing to help the PCM and other "forces that support democracy and socialism" in "increasing their political weight and mass influence . . ."

We, on the other hand, will fight with all our forces against this. We do so precisely because we believe the PCM is a Stalinist party that seeks to win over the working class to a disastrous policy that sooner or later culminates in collaboration with bourgeois forces and finally in the defeat of the workers.

The most recent example that shows we are not mistaken is the fact that despite what they have said, they followed a traitorous policy, contrary to the interests of the workers; in the strike at Fundidora de Monterrey.

But the *compañeros*—very frank, clear, and sharp so as to avoid confusion—make plain what they think. They have made the surprising discovery that the PCM leaders do not propose to implement a class-collaborationist plan and slow down the advance of the *independent, revolutionary* workers movement. What is proposed is nothing less than "challenging the bourgeoisie for power, defeating it, and building Mexican society on a new basis, without capitalist wage slavery . . ."

Since when, *compañeros*? Or do you believe that the way to defeat the bourgeoisie is by supporting it and joining it in "popular fronts" like the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (PRM—Mexican Revolutionary party, currently the PRI) was in the days of Cárdenas.⁵ Did the policy of the

5. Lázaro Cárdenas del Río, president of Mexico from 1934 to 1940. During his term broad reforms, such as the nationalization of oil and the so-called agrarian reform, were carried out. It was in 1935 that the Mexican Stalinists began to put forward their line of forming a popular front with the ruling party.

PCM during the 1968 student movement help to advance in that direction? Were the railroad workers wrong to withdraw their confidence in the Stalinists after the disastrous policy they followed in that sector's struggles in 1958-59?⁶

Were the *compañeros* of Fundidora de Monterrey wrong in feeling a deep aversion toward the leaders of the PCM in Monterrey during and after the strike?⁷

Perhaps the more than fifty-five-year course of the PCM does not count. Perhaps they were small errors in the long struggle to achieve socialism and "to strengthen the struggle of the Mexican people against imperialism."

To leave absolutely no room for doubt, the *compañeros* of the Liga Socialista (TM) tell us: "The organizations that have united together to act in this electoral process do not hide their *socialist objectives*, nor their *revolutionary method* to achieve them." (Our emphasis.)

And further on, they say, ". . . these revolutionary organizations . . . are taking part in the electoral campaign with the aim of helping to raise the consciousness of the masses. . . . With full clarity of objectives, without illusions of any sort, and *placing confidence solely in the power of the masses* and their own organization, the Partido Comunista Mexicano, the Movimiento de Organización Socialista, and the Liga Socialista . . ." (Our emphasis.)

So, the PCM is a revolutionary organization with socialist goals (about which it has complete clarity)? It uses a revolutionary method and seeks to raise the level of consciousness of the masses, whose strength is the only thing it trusts in?

Is the PCM revolutionary? Has it stopped being a Stalinist organization?

We must thank the *compañeros* of the Liga Socialista (TM) for having provided us in so short a time (ten days! from January 2 to January 12) with such a clear illustration of where one ends up using the method they defended during their fight to usurp the

6. The "disastrous policy" of the Stalinists in these struggles refers to the fact that Valentín Campa and his group signed a separate collective-bargaining agreement with the firm and ended the strike in one branch of the railroad system. Meanwhile, the rest of the strikers—led by Demetrio Vallejo—found themselves confronting the regime alone in pursuit of a wage increase and recognition of their democratically elected leadership. The Stalinists' action divided the movement, facilitating repression of it.

7. The latest strike at the Fundidora de Fierro y Acero de Monterrey in December 1975 was the result of a revolt by the workers against layoffs and violations of the collective-bargaining agreement carried out by the company, which had the support of the local trade-union leadership, controlled by the Stalinists.

Liga Socialista, culminating in the so-called Second Congress.⁸

Now it turns out that for not having been "immersed in the class struggle" we did not notice that the PCM is an organization with revolutionary goals and methods.

Reformist Minimum Program vs. Transitional Program

The compañeros of the Liga Socialista (TM) have concluded not only that the PCM is revolutionary but also that its program and method are the route to reach the socialist revolution.

In examining the joint PCM-MOS-LS(TM) platform, its strange and surprising similarity—in structure and presentation, as well as in content—to the program of the PCM stands out immediately. In spite of the fact—as it states—that it contains some demands realizable only with the taking of power by the workers, as a whole it is a reformist minimum program.

Conscious of this fact, the author of the manifesto supported and upheld by the three organizations tells us:

"... the Partido Comunista Mexicano, the Movimiento de Organización Socialista, and the Liga Socialista propose to citizens who support democracy and public well-being a platform of struggle that includes the positions, objectives, and immediate demands that correspond to the present situation in the country." (Our emphasis.)

And he explains to us:

"They propose limited objectives of struggle . . . objectives that take into account the degree of seriousness of the problems requiring solution, the level of class consciousness and organization of the masses, and the necessity that the masses undergo their own experiences, enabling them to understand fully the need for a revolution to bring about deepgoing, radical changes in Mexican society."

We are also aware of the level of consciousness and organization of the workers at present and of what is required for this to develop to the point that the masses acquire consciousness of the need for a revolution—a long process, a fundamental part of which is the experiences of the masses themselves in the struggle.

But this process also requires a revolutionary leadership, no matter how small it may be at the outset. At the same time that it struggles at the side of the masses around their immediate problems, such a leadership continues to propose and explain steps that actually deal with the problems they are afflicted with and are mobilizing around.

8. An article by Joseph Hansen, entitled "The Split in the Liga Socialista" (*Intercontinental Press*, February 9, p. 195), reports the matters in dispute during the factional fight that culminated at the "Second Congress."

Such an organization proposes transitional demands, demands that help raise the consciousness of the masses from the current level to a level of socialist consciousness.

For example, faced with the problem of unemployment, we not only fight with the workers who have been laid off and who are mobilizing to win back their jobs. We also pose the need to fight for the government to create a program of services and public works so as to provide jobs, for a reduction of the workweek to forty hours with fifty-six hours pay, and for the establishment of a sliding scale of hours.

This last demand means reducing the workday with no cut whatever in wages, so that all unemployed persons are provided with a job.

In this way the workers, while continuing to fight for their minimum demands, learn through their experience that the reinstatement of some workers or a wage gain does not resolve once and for all the problem of unemployment or poverty. They also come to understand little by little the need to fight for a step that really resolves those problems. At the same time, they come to understand the need to fight for a government that does implement such measures.

That is, through their struggles the workers are not only acquiring confidence in themselves and learning the need for mass mobilization and united struggle and organization. They are also raising their level of political consciousness.

But this too requires that in posing solutions at the propaganda level—as in the case of the elections—a revolutionary leadership must put forward a series of demands that includes both those that respond in an immediate fashion to the needs and consciousness of the masses and those that would genuinely solve the problems once and for all. That is, it must propose a program that combines minimum, democratic, and transitional demands. It must hold aloft a transitional program.

That requires as well an explanation of why only a workers government, a workers and farmers government, can implement all those demands, thus resolving the problems facing the masses. In other words, it is necessary to constantly explain—and to include as the crowning programmatic demand—the call for a *workers and farmers government*.

The compañeros of the Liga Socialista (TM) have abandoned these basic concepts of revolutionary Marxism. They have agreed to sign not only a reformist program of immediate minimum demands, but also a manifesto that admits this and attempts to justify it.

Isn't there a contrast between the solutions proposed in that program and the ones we have always called and agitated for

in *El Socialista*, in our political resolution and publications, in our proposals for the workers movement, and in our intervention in conflicts and mobilizations?

And what happened to the extremely important demand for *trade-union independence and democracy*, which more than 150,000 persons mobilized for in Mexico City November 15, 1975, and which thousands of electricians and tens of thousands of workers are fighting for?

How then are we going to complement the process of raising workers' level of consciousness, a process whose fundamental axis is the experience of the masses themselves in struggles around such general questions?

How are we going to do this without trying to educate—at the same time that we fight with the workers for their demands around a particular issue—on the steps we believe will genuinely and definitively resolve that problem? How, without focusing in a timely way on such measures—along with some of the minimum demands offered in their platform—through our newspaper, our electoral propaganda, and our activity?

How are we going to do it without presenting a transitional program that flows from the necessities posed by the objective situation and is formulated in such a way as to be easily understood by the masses, while pointing toward the formation of a workers and farmers government and the establishment of better forms of economic, social, and political organization?

Oh! We forgot. This is only their "platform of struggle . . . that correspond[s] to the present situation in the country," their minimum program for the current stage. Surely they have their maximum program for the future when we pass into the second stage of the revolution.

How are these two programs linked? How do we use the program to help raise the level of consciousness of the masses? How, without a revolutionary program, a transitional program? Nonsense! Those are just Trotskyist inventions!

Of course, references to socialism and to the fact that some of the demands could be achieved only by a workers government could not be missing from their manifesto. You always find that in reformist programs to cover up their true character.

The compañeros of the Liga Socialista (TM) might possibly argue that their program does contain some "transitional demands," like the sliding scale of wages and the nationalization of industry under workers control.

In the first place, the fact that a demand sounds like what was written in the Transitional Program does not make it into a demand of that type.

Galván,⁹ for example, also calls for a sliding scale of wages, but one implemented by a tripartite commission representing the trade unions (read, bureaucrats), the government, and the bosses.

The only way this step can be effective is if the commissions are democratically elected by the workers who frequently and periodically determine, on the basis of their own studies of the prices in the places where they do their shopping, how much wages should be raised. This must be stipulated in the clause in the collective-bargaining agreement that determines the implementation of a sliding scale of wages.

Nonetheless, the fact that the workers have "access to their real records so that they can report irregularities thereby revealed and demand rectification of them . . ." including "such questions as workers' share of the profits, payment of taxes . . ." and the real possibilities of raising wages, in no way constitutes workers control.

In fact, such a concept is in marked contrast to the Marxist view of workers control, which is that the workers have the right to determine not only their working conditions, but also the social and political goals of production. That is, whether production is going to be oriented toward increasing the bosses' profits or toward satisfying the needs of the workers and peasants.

We also raise the demand of *workers' access to the books* of the companies, but we do not confuse it with workers control. Moreover, we maintain it is important to stress in our propaganda the need to fight for the latter.

Furthermore, even if the program contained a couple of transitional demands, this would not give it a revolutionary character. On the contrary, by being presented in the setting of the perspectives put forth by a reformist program, these demands lose their value. They serve only to win a sector that is struggling to a reformist policy, and not as a bridge to bring it toward a socialist consciousness.

To be sure, they can also serve to make the "Trotskyist" heart of confused activists beat strongly, and to lead them to sign and endorse a reformist program.

We really are compelled to acknowledge that the method of the *compañeros* of the Liga Socialista (TM) produces rapid results. In only ten days of "total immersion in the class struggle" not only have they discovered that the PCM is revolutionary, but it even turns out that the Stalinist method

of the minimum and maximum program is as well.

Perhaps Trotsky, who up until his death exerted himself to teach us the method of the transitional program and the need to be true to the revolutionary program, also shared our "methodological deviation." After all, "he was noted not only for his great capability, but also for his propensity to concentrate too much on the administrative aspect of things." Oh! Those damned desk-bound leaders!

Everything Is Possible With Peace

Perhaps one of the most serious aspects of the break of the *compañeros* with the program and principles of revolutionary Marxism is the foreign policy they propose. Although under other points the program offers only minimum and partial demands, in this section it puts forth positions that break completely with the basic principles of Marxism.

Point V of the platform, entitled "A Foreign Policy of Independence and Peace," proposes, among other things, economic and political collaboration with several Latin American bourgeois governments, such as those in Peru, Panama, and Ecuador. It also calls for a struggle for the "immediate incorporation of Mexico in the group of nonaligned countries." (Non-aligned!)

The "Platform" accepts and defends the formation of an international class-collaborationist "popular front" between the workers states and the "progressive" bourgeois governments. It proposes to fight in "active defense of world peace" and for "peaceful coexistence among the various states." Between the bourgeois states and the workers states!

What happened to the basic principles of class struggle?

Throughout history we socialists have presented ourselves as the genuine and most consistent fighters for peace. But we point out that there can be no peace between classes while a minority class exploits and lives off the fruit of the labor of the majority, which is submerged in poverty.

Under these conditions, to accept peace between classes means to condemn the laboring majority to poverty and exploitation.

We also point out that we are opposed to workers of different countries annihilating each other to defend the interests of their bourgeoisies in imperialist wars of plunder.

We point out that the cause of wars and conflicts, whether within a country or between countries, is the existence of this unjust system of exploitation of one class by another, of oppression of weak countries by imperialist countries, and of wars of plunder over the division of the spoils among the imperialist countries.

It is for this reason that we say that the only way to achieve a real and lasting peace is through struggle, the fiercest war, against this system.

In this struggle we cannot call for "peaceful coexistence" or "economic and political collaboration" with exploitative governments, regardless of how serious their quarrels are with other, stronger capitalist governments. At certain times, when a dependent bourgeois government takes some *concrete step* that is progressive against some imperialist country, we can support the *step* and fight for it to be carried to its logical consequences.

But we can never collaborate, *politically* support, or create the slightest illusions about its reasons for carrying out such steps. We can never contribute to its attempts to give a progressive, anti-imperialist, or revolutionary cover to its passing quarrels with stronger countries, when it takes advantage of their conjunctural weaknesses to obtain a bigger share of the spoils that are the fruit of the exploitation of the workers.

Of course, the *compañeros* of the Liga Socialista (TM) had to try to make their capitulation less obvious. Thus, they add that "the Liga Socialista differs with *some* points in this section." (Our emphasis.)

Some! Which points? Why do they disagree with them? Why then are the points, whatever they were, that they disagreed with included in the platform? Why did they sign a platform that contained points they do not agree with? What did they get in return for endorsing Stalinist positions?

The least they could demand in exchange for the Trotskyist program is that their position on the points expressed also be included. But let's be reasonable. *At least* they could have included clarification on which points they disagreed with and why.

But not even in a separate article in their newspaper do the *compañeros* explain the reasons for their behavior, and why it was necessary or advantageous to give in on those points. Nor do they explain their differences. Should we assume that they are minimal and secondary?

The *compañeros* of the Liga Socialista (TM) have gone so far in their capitulation to Stalinism that when they "declare their defense of the Soviet Union and other socialist states against any imperialist attack"—a position with which we are totally in agreement—they don't bother to clarify at the same time that the Liga Socialista (TM) favors the overthrow of the Stalinist bureaucracy that is encrusted on the conquests of the workers revolution and prevents the flowering of socialist democracy.

But for the *compañeros* this is not necessary, because for them the USSR and the other workers states are no longer deformed or degenerated workers states.

9. Rafael Galván Maldonado, leader of the Tendencia Democrática (Democratic Tendency) in the Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores Electricistas de la República Mexicana (United Electrical Workers Union of the Mexican Republic). See the article entitled "150,000 March in Mexico City for Trade-Union Democracy" in *Intercontinental Press*, December 15, 1975, p. 1759.

They are "socialist states" where such a bureaucracy does not exist. They now accept *in fact* the Stalinist thesis of "socialism in one country."

It seems that they have abandoned the perspectives for the advance of the world revolution in one of its three sectors—the *political revolution* in the deformed workers states, carried out by the proletariat of those countries and its allies, the oppressed nationalities within them.

But that is enough. With what we have shown, there is sufficient reason to ask the *compañeros* of the Liga Socialista (TM) the following questions:

What is your aim in endorsing this program and Stalinist organization? What are you getting in return for agreeing to sign this program? What was your aim in making this concession? Some propaganda in *Oposición*?¹⁰ To win the respect of the Stalinists and their friends?

To be noticed and viewed favorably by Juan José Arreola¹¹ and Stalinist circles? The friendship of Raquel Tibol?¹² To receive publicity as a reasonable, progressive organization struggling for peace and "the public well-being" from the circles that are for peace, a humane existence, and democracy?

Is that what you are pursuing? "Spectacular actions" to make yourselves known, regardless of the sort of prestige you get?

Or is this really your answer to the question posed at this time of who should rule and with what program? Perhaps the *compañeros* actually think that the government Mexico needs is one shared between the bourgeoisie and the "revolutionary" PCM, MOS, and Liga Socialista (TM), and that the institution of their minimum program would resolve the most pressing national problems.

In that case, *compañeros* of the Liga Socialista (TM), if you have reached fundamental programmatic agreement with the PCM and if you agree with their "revolutionary methods," why propose a front only for the elections?

If you don't single out programmatic differences on problems as fundamental as the ones touched on, and have no methodological differences, why don't you fuse? Why go only halfway? Come now, *compañeros*, don't be sectarian.

We think that what we have revealed provides the elements to judge who really

represents the tradition and continuity of the Liga Socialista and of revolutionary Marxism in Mexico. Because, in effect, this is shown in practice, and the *compañeros* of the Militant Tendency of the Liga Socialista (TM) have taken only ten days to give us the material with which to judge from their practice.

What is the goal of the *compañeros*? To get a little publicity? To carry out a maneuver?

Now we understand what they meant during the so-called Second Congress when they defended the necessity to "intervene in the class struggle" independently of how and leaving to one side the question of program.

They have done this in the elections, and the PCM has taken responsibility for providing them with a program. Now we understand clearly that *the FBL, the traditions of the Liga Socialista, and its program were an obstacle for the implementation of a policy of "astute maneuvers,"* in which principles and program are only a nuisance.

What are they looking for? Shortcuts in the construction of the party through spectacular actions and maneuvers? Their policy has already led them, in less than two weeks, to break with the program and method of revolutionary Marxism, and to violate class principles in supporting a class-collaborationist foreign policy. It has set them on a course that, if they do not break with it, will lead them to become satellites of Stalinism.

Now we also understand why the *compañeros* needed to impose vertical structures on the organization, to wipe out internal democracy, and to make discussion impossible. Now it is clear why they needed anti-Leninist organizational methods. To carry out such a break from Trotskyist, revolutionary Marxist principles required that the ranks of the organization not have the slightest possibility to question it.

Up until January 2, the possibility of this PCM-MOS-LS(TM) agreement was not even suspected, let alone *openly* considered, in what was then the unified organization. When did discussions about it begin? Could the ranks discuss and evaluate whether they accepted such a policy? Were they able to evaluate if what they were getting in return for the capitulation to Stalinism was worth it? Could they discuss whether they agreed on supporting the government of Laos or the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)?

The *compañeros* also have to explain why they carried out *secret negotiations* with the PCM. To start with, *when did they begin?* How many discussions were there prior to the agreement and what was their character? How was the joint platform arrived at? What were the differences, proposals, amendments? Why are they willing to hide

such differences from public knowledge of the workers? Why was it justifiable to sign a program with which they say they have "some" differences on foreign policy?

Their error in principle is made worse by not explaining either how they reached this agreement or what their fundamental differences are (that is, if there still are some) with the PCM and MOS. What differentiates them from these two "revolutionary organizations"? Why did the negotiations have to be secret?

The *compañeros* of the Liga Socialista (TM) have embarked on an extremely dangerous course. Their policy of "intervention in the class struggle" on the basis of "astute maneuvers," leaving aside the question of program, has already led them to accept the PCM's program for the popular front, the program the CP is using to try to convince "progressive" forces to participate in its class-collaborationist plan.

They are doing this when the campaign of the PCM and the front is not legal; when it will not win over millions, let alone thousands, of workers; and when it does not have the slightest chance of succeeding or yielding some parliamentary seats, offering the possibility of agitation for socialist ideas.

What will happen when the PCM manages to attract "progressive" bourgeois forces on the basis of this program, when the popular front wins over millions, and when there is the possibility that its election campaign will succeed, as happened, for example, in Chile?

If the Liga Socialista (TM) accepts the program of the popular front now, in return for a few bits of publicity, what would they do in such a situation? Sacrificing program in order to carry out "astute little maneuvers" in the electoral arena—the class enemy's territory!—has set them on a course that leads to abandoning the territory of revolutionary Marxism.

On the other hand, the PCM has not abandoned its class-collaborationist plan of building a united organization of the forces "that support democracy and socialism." It has merely discovered that it is not yet in a position to implement it.

It must show the bourgeoisie that it is an "important force" with the capacity to mobilize broad sectors behind it, and that it can count on a chorus of "useful idiots" made up of left sects and groups. Likewise, it must show that it is capable of using proposals and agreements to maneuver with other important political organizations of the working class, thus helping to lead them away from a correct policy on any important issue.

For the present it has already been provided with the caboose for its election campaign and for publicizing its program. The leaders of the PCM know how to be patient. After more than fifty-five years of

10. Official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Mexican Communist party.

11. Leader of the Sindicato de Trabajadores y Empleados de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma (Union of Personnel of the National Autonomous University), who is linked to the Stalinists.

12. Well-known art critic linked to the Communist party.

experience they have learned the art of betrayal, as well as the science of winning over to its politics those who are willing to be fooled.

**Vote for Campa
Without Supporting His Program**

Previously and in other articles we have stated and explained our position on the elections and the PCM campaign. We call on the workers and the workers organizations to vote for Valentín Campa against the bourgeois candidate, José López Portillo, to demonstrate our class independence. At the same time we in no way endorse the program that he and his party defend, which we believe incorrect and dangerous. Moreover, we are willing to debate his electoral platform with him publicly.

In these elections, at the same time that we call for a class vote we will also try to publicize and explain our program, and to

publicize and seek support for the mobilizations that occur during the period. We will put forward our solutions and make clear the need for a workers and farmers government to implement them.

Moreover, we believe it is necessary to call for the formation of a united front of all workers organizations to encourage *mobilizations and actions* around the immediate obstacle of the Federal Election Law.

Something that stands out in the manifesto of the PCM, MOS, and Liga Socialista (TM) is that they do not call for the carrying out of any concrete action. They do not call for a mobilization around one or more concrete demands. They do not even challenge the undemocratic Federal Election Law by denouncing the fact that legally they do not have the right to carry out their campaign. Nor do they call on all workers and democratic organizations to fight to defend their right to carry it out.

A united front around concrete needs and events, a front for action and mobilization around a burning issue, does much more to educate and promote the unity of the working class than does any declaration of good intentions.

In the current situation a very real, concrete possibility is the establishment of a front for the political rights of the workers, against the undemocratic Federal Election Law, and in support of legal recognition for all political parties. We urge all workers organizations to unite with us in forming such a front. We call on the "astute" compañeros of the Liga Socialista (TM) to stop the "little maneuvers" that only lead them to move away from revolutionary Marxism, and to join us in carrying out this urgent task of the workers and revolutionary movement. □

Internal Circular of the Tendencia Militante on the Communist Party of Mexico

[The following internal circular was distributed to members of the Tendencia Militante at the beginning of February 1976.]

* * *

The objective of this document is to clarify a whole series of doubts that have arisen with respect to our support to the candidacy of Comrade Valentín Campa and our participation in the electoral coalition together with the PCM [Mexican Communist Party] and the MOS [Movement for Socialist Organization].

Our Method of Intervening

In view of the turn that our organization began to take at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee last September 15, our party has a mass orientation and rejects propagandism.

This means that our line, our slogans, and our tactics are oriented toward the needs of the masses. Independently of whether they are listening to us, we are obliged to act in conformity with their needs; first for educating our party to act as a party that defends their interests, and, second, to educate and recruit the vanguard elements on the basis of a mass line.

It is not necessary to be a seer to see that the sectors engaged in struggle are interested in and need unity in action among the working-class and socialist forces. Likewise we have seen the necessity of uniting our struggles in relation to the elections. We must not depreciate this opportunity. In short, we are interested in the unity of the working class and its mobilization. We are going to promote this within the coalition as actively as we can. This is the line that our congress voted for and that cost our organization a split. Now more than ever we are obliged to carry it forward.

Is the Joint Platform Principled?

The criterion we go by in any alliance is the programmatic criterion. We do not make an alliance on the basis of the past or the future of the organizations. What interests us is the programmatic accords and whether this alliance serves to promote the class struggle and build the party. Both considerations are of a principled nature.

The program that we signed jointly with the PCM and the MOS is a program of working-class nature. That is, it is not the revolutionary program of Trotskyism which includes, among other things, the construction of the international, the creation of soviets, and the taking of

power by the proletariat. The working-class program sets forth a whole series of tasks that the capitalist system cannot resolve. In addition, this joint platform does not hide the socialist objectives of our campaign. At the end of it, the type of government needed to carry out the proposed changes is clearly established; that is, the charge that it is a reformist program is false. This program is a proposal to repair the capitalist system. This argument could be made only if isolated points are taken, but as a whole it is a program that can be carried out only by replacing the capitalist system. Neither is it a revolution by stages since no sector of the Mexican bourgeoisie is able to support it.

Why Are We Within the Coalition and Not Supporting It Critically from Outside?

In the first place, as we have already explained, our agreement is principled. In the second place we have not renounced the right to criticize the PCM in any way we wish as we did in the case of the Fundidora [strike]. In the third place we had the option of choosing between propagandizing our Trotskyist program or entering an alliance that would permit greater intervention in the class struggle. Obviously since this was the line of our congress, we opted for the second variant.

All the supporters of "for Campa but on another platform" are propagandists. The case of the "FBLers" is quite clear. They have already told us that they were not interested in participation and that their ambition is to propagandize their program. Good, with that line there is not much to discuss.

In the case of the GCI [Internationalist Communist Group] its propagandism is more veiled. In the first place they do not agree that they are propagandists (in the sense of being interested in pure propaganda). But in fact their orientation, not being aimed at the masses, falls into propagandism. Their whole participation is directed toward the "new mass vanguard" or toward the "far left." Hence their constant preoccupation over "ideological differentiation" with "reformism and centrism." One should not be surprised that in an article in BR [*Bandera Roja*] in which we are told that an agreement with the PCM and MOS is reformist, almost the whole text is dedicated to a biography of Campa.

In conclusion: 1. In a situation like the present one, the Mexican workers movement and the masses vote for and show confidence in a bourgeois party, such as the PRI [Institutional Revolutionary party], that is, they do not yet have a politically independent organization (as is the case with the big reformist mass parties, the Communists and Social Democrats of almost all of Europe).

Because of this, the axis of a campaign to differentiate the sectors of the left, instead of uniting against the bourgeoisie, would confront us with an eminently sectarian and propagandist line.

2. The line of supporting Campa, but on the basis of different platforms, is in reality being converted into an abstentionist line. These people have not done anything yet but bring their written "differentiations" to the meetings.

3. These organizations are actually moving away from the possibility of extending their organization, forming committees to support the coalition, and all the possibilities implied by the campaign.

Are We Playing the Game of the Bourgeoisie by Participating in Their Elections.?

For us, participating in elections is one more tactic in building the party. Like any other tactic, its validity is determined by the objective conditions of the class struggle; above all by the consciousness of the masses. So long as the elections serve us to propagandize, agitate, and organize the masses, it is a duty of revolutionists to participate. If the masses were organized in soviet forms and had exhausted the experience with bourgeois parliamentarism, coming to comprehend that they must take power, that is, following our party in a massive way, to participate in bourgeois elections would be counterrevolutionary.

Our participation in the elections involves denouncing them. In addition no one in the coalition is creating illusions in the electoral process, no one is saying that the elections are going to change Mexico fundamentally. In this sense the participation of the three organizations is principled.

Hence the charge that participating in the electoral contest plays into the hands of the bourgeoisie is completely false. Because of the kind of campaign that is

being conducted, we do not believe that our participation is sowing illusions in anyone.

However, abstentionism does play into the hands of the bourgeoisie. It leaves the road open for the PRI to continue propagating its farce.

On the other hand it has been the tradition of the revolutionary movement to participate in elections, including bourgeois parliaments. (With regard to this Lenin's "Infantile Sickness" is recommended reading).

Our relations with the PCM

Our relations with the PCM are quite fraternal. This is due to the fact that in their present program there are planks similar to ours. It is a fact that at present the PCM is not presenting a line of revolution by stages, nor popular fronts, nor the peaceful road to socialism. Sooner or later this line will come into contradiction with that of the CPSU [Communist party of the Soviet Union]. It is important for us to maintain very fraternal relations (insofar as possible), in order to advance this line of class independence.

Likewise we must not forget the economic ties linking the PCM with the CPSU. What is important is to indicate that the ranks (above all the youth of the PCM) believe in the line of the democratic and socialist revolution as a single process. It is important for the comrades to read the program of the PCM. It can be obtained in the form of a tract that costs one peso. In conclusion: our orientation toward the PCM is that of working unitedly in action and fraternal collaboration. We are not thinking of trying to win cadres from them although we are not closing the doors of the party in case some member of the PCM should want to change organizations.

We must not permit the possibility of joint work and continued advancement of this non-people's-front line to be closed off because of the desire to win some members from the PCM. This line of the PCM favors us in the short and middle range.

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