

INTERNAL INFORMATION BULLETIN

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MATERIALS RELATED TO THE SPLIT OF THE INTERNATIONALIST TENDENCY FROM THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

REPORT OF THE CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY, Submitted to the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party, July 2, 1974

MOTIONS ADOPTED BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY, JULY 4, 1974, WITH ATTACHED LETTERS

CALL FOR A SPECIAL WORLD CONGRESS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL, Statement Adopted by the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party, July 4, 1974

ATTACHMENTS TO THE REPORT OF THE CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY, Submitted to the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party, July 2, 1974

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Report of the Control Commission of the Socialist Workers Party

Submitted July 2, 1974

Part I

Summary of Findings and Recommendations

On June 20, 1974, meeting in plenary session, the National Committee of the Socialist Workers Party passed the following motion: 'As provided for in Article VI of the Party Constitution, the National Committee (1) turns over to the Control Commission the material concerning the May 11 action and the letters from comrades Massey and Barzman, and (2) designates comrade Horowitz as the National Committee member of the Control Commission.'

Article VI of the Constitution of the SWP is as follows:

"Section 1. A Control Commission of five members shall be elected as follows: the Convention shall elect four members and the fifth member, who shall be a member of the National Committee, shall be designated by the National Committee. The Control Commission shall have full authority to investigate any individual or circumstance which it may deem necessary, and shall have power to delegate any of its authority to representatives.

"Section 2. The Control Commission, on completion of its investigation in each case, shall present its findings and recommendations to the Political Committee for action. Action shall be taken by the Political Committee, or by the National Committee, in those cases referred to it by the Political Committee.

"Section 3. In those cases where the Control Commission finds it necessary to intervene, its authority shall supersede any local investigation or trial.

"Section 4. It shall be obligatory on every member of the Party to furnish the Control Commission or its authorized representatives with any information they may require."

The Control Commission is composed of the following four comrades: Anne Chester, Barbara Matson, and Helen Scheer, elected by the 1973 SWP national convention, and Gus Horowitz, designated by the SWP National Committee, in accordance with Article VI, Section 1 of the constitution. (The other comrade elected by the national convention, Duncan Ferguson, died on April 29, 1974.)

Evidence Examined

All four members of the Control Commission were able to meet together in New York City during June 20-24, to conduct a series of interviews in person and by telephone, to examine the documentary material, and to consult together by telephone before submitting this report.

In conducting our investigation, we were guided in particular by the following documents:

1. The constitution of the Socialist Workers Party.
2. "The Organizational Character of the Socialist Workers Party," resolution adopted by the 1965 convention of the SWP and reaffirmed by the August 1973 convention of the SWP (available in an Education for Socialists bulletin bearing the same title).

These documents set forth the fundamental organizational principles of the Socialist Workers Party.

The Control Commission was able to examine the fol-

lowing evidence, including both documentary material and interviews:

1. The files of the national office of the SWP dealing with the Internationalist Tendency. These include a substantial amount of correspondence from John Barzman, Bill Massey, and other IT members alleging harassment or other improper procedures taken against the IT. The files also include letters and documents from various SWP leadership bodies or from comrades writing in their capacity as elected SWP leaders, or as individuals; these materials deal with many of the same incidents contained in the correspondence from the IT members. Also included in these files are branch minutes and other branch records. Also included are copies of letters and other material received from the YSA national office relating to the Internationalist Tendency. We decided to confine our investigation to materials dating since the August 1973 convention of the SWP.

2. The transcripts of the remarks made to the June 1974 plenum of the SWP National Committee by Comrades Barzman and Massey.

3. We twice interviewed representatives of the Internationalist Tendency. First, we met briefly with Bill Massey on June 20, 1974; Comrade Charles of the International Majority Tendency was also present. We informed Comrade Massey that we had received copies of his 14-page letter of June 9, 1974, to the Political Committee of the SWP. We asked him if he had any further information to add to this letter that would be of help to the Control Commission. He said that at this time he did not have anything to add. (In the concluding part of his letter he also states that "I feel that these sixteen points cover the situation adequately.") On June 23 there was a second meeting, this time with John Barzman and Bill Massey. A report on that meeting is appended to this report.

4. During the course of the June plenum of the National Committee we were able to meet with many elected executive officers from various branches across the country for the purpose of obtaining information and verification of information already received. We were also able to talk by telephone to several comrades in other cities to obtain and verify information.

5. In the course of our investigation, we were able to obtain copies of several internal discussion bulletins and internal newsletters of the Internationalist Tendency. The Socialist Workers Party had never been informed of the existence of these documents.

Evaluation of Evidence and Recommendations

After examining the secret internal discussion material of the IT, the Control Commission concluded that this was sufficient by itself to enable us to arrive at the conclusions and recommendations that appear below. We decided that this evidence was so overwhelming that it was not necessary to spend a great deal of time to ex-

amine many of the specific incidents, allegations, and counter-allegations. We did examine some of these, and append a few documents to this report. This material can be considered as specific illustrations of the general conclusions that can be drawn from the IT documents themselves.

Following is a summary of our findings, our conclusions, and our recommendations:

1. These documents give proof positive that the IT is a separate party organization operating both within the SWP and outside the SWP. The IT party has its own secret, highly organized and centralized independent party structure functioning on all levels, nationally and internationally. It has its own party discipline that supersedes SWP discipline. It determines its own areas of external activity and establishes its own relations with opponent groups. Persons who are not members of the SWP, the YSA, or the Fourth International are allowed to participate in its deliberations and are given access to its internal bulletins attacking the SWP. It describes the SWP as "deadly sick" and the SWP membership cadre as "politically incapable of either understanding or putting into practice a revolutionary line."

Just prior to the IT National Conference, held in Chicago May 25-27, several comrades resigned from the IT, while remaining ideological supporters of the IMT's political positions. Among them were Berta Langston and Bob Langston, whose statement of explanation for resigning from the IT was published in the internal bulletin of the IT (appended). In it they pointed out to the IT that the line of the IT leadership "would lead not merely to instances but to patterns of organizational indiscipline in regard to the party and the YSA." They warned that "the comrades of the ITPC [IT Political Committee] are projecting a line the logic of which is precisely to build a rival organization to the SWP." They added that "the logic of the ITPC's position is that the IT, defining itself as the nucleus of a section in the U.S., would begin to combine the exercise of political leadership of groupings outside the SWP and YSA with an entry tactic inside the SWP and YSA." They said that this course "would intensify the dangers of a split in the International." They said that the positions put forward by IT leader Williams [the evidence shows that Williams is a pseudonym for Bill Massey] "is not a marginal or peripheral one in the IT; it comes equipped with all the authority and prestige of the leadership." They concluded that it was necessary to resign from the IT prior to the IT national convention, stating

that "our differences with the ITPC are of such a magnitude on a fundamental question as to make continued collaboration within a tendency impossible. . . [for us] to continue to struggle within the IT—with its internal bulletin, a possible tour, election of delegates, a convention—would be in practice precisely to cooperate in helping make the IT become what we urgently hope it doesn't."

Further documentation proves that what Comrades Berta Langston and Bob Langston quite accurately saw as the logical outcome of the IT course has occurred. The IT has been set up as a rival party to the SWP.

The Control Commission finds that the establishment of this rival party is in violation of the constitution and organizational principles of the Socialist Workers Party. We also note that it is in contradiction with the statutes of the Fourth International and the organizational principles and traditions of the world Trotskyist movement.

The Control Commission recommends that the Internationalist Tendency's status as a separate, rival party be recognized and that the members of the Internationalist Tendency party be informed that this status places them outside the constitutional provisions of membership in the Socialist Workers Party.

2. Regarding the status of the ideological supporters of the IMT who are not members of the IT party. Berta Langston and Bob Langston contended in their document that it is possible to be an ideological supporter of the IMT and to abide by the SWP constitution. They also recognized that it is not possible to hold membership in the IT and abide by the SWP constitution.

The Control Commission recommends that supporters of the IMT political positions who are not members of the IT party remain members of the SWP as long as they abide by the constitution of the SWP, the organizational principles of the SWP, and the democratic centralist norms of the world Trotskyist movement. We note that the rights of membership include the right to form a tendency or faction, within the bounds delineated by the 1965 document on organizational principles of the SWP.

3. The evidence clearly establishes the complicity of members of the elected leadership of the Fourth International in the IT's decision to form a rival party. But the full extent of this complicity, and further documentation detailing it, are not available to the Control Commission of the SWP. The jurisdiction of this Control Commission is limited to the SWP, and we do not have the power to obtain information going beyond this limit.

Part II

Findings

We found a discrepancy between the way in which the leaders of the Internationalist Tendency describe themselves in documents that they make available to the entire SWP and the way in which they describe themselves in their own internal discussion documents that have been kept secret from the SWP. For example, in his letter of June 9, 1974, to the Political Committee (appended) Bill Massey states that "the IT is not a faction, secret or otherwise, it is a tendency." But in the IT's secret internal discussion bulletin, IT leader Vincent (John Barzman) describes

the IT as "not merely an ideological tendency, but the nucleus of a future section" (his article is appended). Vincent's description of the IT as the nucleus of a future section is repeated in several of the documents.

The IT Is a Separate Party

Even this description, however, understates the situation. The IT's description of its own structure and method of functioning clearly indicates that it is already a separate party. One example is given by the report on the IT

national convention which is published in the June 6, 1974, issue of the secret "Internationalist Tendency Newsletter" (appended). The report opens as follows:

"The first national conference of the Internationalist Tendency was held in Chicago on the Memorial Day weekend, May 25, 26, 27. The conference had been preceded by a discussion period of three months which elicited twelve discussion bulletins containing thirty-four different contributions to the discussion. Discussion around these took place in every area of the Tendency. Delegates were elected on the basis of five persons per delegate. There were twenty-four delegates and ten consultative delegates."

The convention elected a Presiding Committee. It also elected a Nominating Committee which brought in recommendations for a new IT Steering Committee (National Committee). A Steering Committee of 19 full members and 10 alternates was elected. (One full member later resigned.)

Following the convention of the IT, there was a Steering Committee Plenum. It elected a Political Committee. The report on the IT convention states that "The PC will consist of the six PC members now resident in Chicago plus 3 other members of the Steering Committee not resident in Chicago at this time. The PC, with the approval of the Steering Committee, will recommend the three additional members who will move to the center in Chicago."

In addition to such procedures, the IT documents reveal that there is an IT national office, a fulltime staff, and provisions for various commissions. For example, the IT convention report on Work in the YSA, which included the proposal for a "special YSA commission," was accepted unanimously. Another article in the IT newsletter indicates that a YSA commission of 10 members was established.

The June 6 IT newsletter also informs us that "the center is currently discussing putting regional travelers on full time in Houston, Chicago and New York." It also informs us that the IT is organized into "local tendency units." The newsletter also calls upon each local unit to elect an executive committee, to supervise the carrying out of the work of the local unit.

The IT internal communication of June 14, 1974 (appended), gives additional information about the party structure of the IT. The communication, signed by Gilbert, for the IT PC, was sent to "Steering Committee Members, Area Organizers, Financial Directors, and Publications Directors."

This communication reveals that the IT has decided upon a subscription drive for *Inprecor* with assigned quotas for each local unit of the IT, and a sales campaign for *Inprecor*, for the *Old Mole*, publication of the Canadian Revolutionary Marxist Group (RMG), and for *International*, publication of the British International Marxist Group (IMG), with proposed quotas for the regular bundles to be taken by the local units of the IT.

The communication calls for substantial financial commitments by IT members and asks that "all areas adopt a policy of regular payments to the center based on their membership figures." The IT Steering Committee has adopted a recommendation of "a \$7.00 per person sustainer per week to the center."

The communication describes some of the purposes such funds are needed for: this includes back debts for *Old Mole*

bundles, for domestic and international travel, and for printing costs for the "Chilean supplement" distributed on the May 11 demonstrations; money is also needed for full-time IT staff and for travel expenses for an IMT representative on tour in the USA; in addition money is requested in order "to have a really interventionist role in the YSA preconvention discussion nationally"—this includes travel subsidies for YSAers travelling to the upcoming YSA National Committee plenum. Money is also requested for the publications program of the IT—several pamphlets have been projected as part of this publications program.

In these activities and projections, the secret IT structure functions as a parallel party structure.

The IT Determines Its Own Independent Areas of Activity

The main areas of work to be carried out by the local units of the IT are defined in the June 6 IT newsletter as these three:

1. Internal education and the elaboration of IT perspectives. Also better internal organization such as "taking and sending regular minutes to the center, raising the financial commitment to the tendency, learning to organize meetings more efficiently. . . ."

2. Intervention in the SWP and YSA. The IT newsletter describes this as just one of three areas of IT activity. The document by Estreugal and Rahdrik (appended) quotes from the draft political perspectives document by Hank Williams (Bill Massey) who states that "we just want the tendency locals to work out as *part* of their overall work a continued and well rounded participation in the activities of the branches" (emphasis added). The IT newsletter states that in this work "the intervention into the YSA is the most important priority." An article by Inessa in the IT newsletter outlining "Our Tasks in the YSA" states that "some of our own regional probing can be done while fulfilling YSA assignments . . . however, the most returns will come from forays into the region. . . ." In all of the IT documents the YSA and SWP are treated as a unit, and SWP members who are not members of the YSA are also encouraged to participate in the "intervention into the YSA."

3. Public work by the IT, which is described in the IT newsletter as "contact work for the F.I." This work includes "contact work at the job, at school, or in the course of trade union or political activity." A goal is to "develop a periphery of people who listen to us. . . ." The IT newsletter also states that ". . . we can even take actions given a favorable relationship of forces." In describing the public work of the IT, the Estreugal-Rahdrik document states that "by no stretch of the imagination can this be called 'participation in the day to day work of the branches.'"

The IT Violates the SWP Constitution

The structure and method of operation of the IT are in violation of the constitution and organizational principles of the SWP, which make it explicit that the SWP has the right to regulate both its internal affairs and the public activity of all SWP members.

The 1965 resolution on the organizational principles of the SWP states: "A dissenting minority has the right to organize itself, but the conduct of organized minorities,

just as that of every individual member, must be subject to regulation by official party bodies. The party is therefore entitled to organize its internal discussion and to determine the forms and limits. . . . Official party bodies must determine correct procedure, both in public activity and in the regulation of internal affairs, on the basis of the party's principles and statutes" (page 20).

When organized groupings are formed in the party, there are three key norms that must be observed to insure party unity and to uphold the principle of democratic centralism.

1. While a faction has the right to meet privately and determine its own structure, it must inform the party as a whole of its organizational nature: its basis for membership, its structure, its membership composition, its leadership composition, the powers of its leadership bodies, and the extent of its discipline.

2. A faction must loyally participate in the work of the party, including participating in the internal activities of the party, in external party-building activities, and in fulfilling financial obligations to the party. Faction finances and faction activity are permitted; but the needs of the party take precedence over the needs of the faction. Any faction finances or faction activity must be carried out only within the context of maintaining normal membership obligations in these areas.

3. The conduct of the faction, in both internal party matters and in external activity, is subject to the direction of the official party bodies. Faction discipline must be subordinate to party discipline.

The IT violates all three of these norms. It is neither an ideological tendency nor a legitimate faction. It is qualitatively different from either.

The IT Functions Secretly

The entire structure of the IT, as disclosed in its internal bulletins, has been kept secret from the party. Furthermore, when Bill Massey and John Barzman were asked directly by members of the Control Commission if there existed a steering committee or other leadership body of the IT, they did not answer; Bill Massey only replied that he would "think about" the question (see report appended).

There is an IT "security policy" *vis a vis* the SWP. It is designed to hide IT activity from the SWP. This security policy includes the use of pseudonyms that are not party names and deceptive covers attached to the secretly circulated IT discussion bulletins (see appended examples). This security policy extends to the IT's own internal functioning, as shown by the listing of two of its bulletins as having "restricted" circulation within the IT (see appended list of IT bulletins). One of these "restricted" bulletins bears the title, "Unless We Believe the SWP To Be Reformable. . . ."

The IT also attempts to impose organizational discipline, as evidenced by the decision of the IT Political Committee on May 4, 1974: "To reject the resignation of Comrades Berta Langston and Bob Langston on the grounds that it is contradictory to their open support to the International Majority Tendency" (appended to the document by Berta Langston and Bob Langston). Thus, the IT attempts to require all ideological supporters of the IMT to join the IT. But the IT has not informed the SWP of the nature and extent of its discipline.

The articles published in the secret IT internal bulletin and newsletter, and the decisions of the IT national convention also show that the political basis for membership in the IT is different from the positions stated in the declarations of the IT published in the SWP internal bulletins.

The IT Does Not Participate Actively in the Work of the Party

In his letter to the SWP Political Committee of June 9, 1974, Bill Massey alleges that "no effort whatsoever has been made to integrate comrades of the I.T. into areas of work that they would participate in wholeheartedly or with relatively less tension." The Control Commission found, on the contrary, that the IT, by its own choosing, does not participate actively in the work of the SWP.

The August 1973 convention of the SWP took note of the lack of participation by IT members in the party-building activities of their local units.

However, the 1973 convention decided to wipe the slate clean on this past record of inactivity and to move forward with the expectation that all members of the party would participate fully and loyally in its work.

As part of the Control Commission investigation, we examined many statistics and reports on the activities of the party branches. From these reports we were able to determine the functioning of the members of the IT after the August 1973 convention. The material examined shows that the IT's policy of non-participation in party-building activities has not changed since the convention. A few examples follow.

Militant Sales. The SWP projected an 18-week spring sales campaign with the goal of selling 10,000 *Militants* in a single week. In Chicago, no member of the IT sold more than a total of 8 *Militants* over the course of the entire 18 weeks. The average number of *Militants* sold per IT member per week during the sales campaign was 0.2. The average number sold per week by non-IT members in Chicago was over 8.0.

Financial Contributions. In the IT internal communication of June 14, 1974, the IT Steering Committee projects a sustainer goal of \$7.00 per person per week to the IT center. In this context, the communication states: "Some areas such as Houston and Philadelphia have been "models financially" as well as in other ways."

The members of the IT in Houston and Philadelphia have not been "models financially" with respect to their local branches of the SWP. In Houston, the average weekly sustainer of the IT members is \$1.62. The average weekly sustainer of non-IT members in Houston is \$8.40. In Philadelphia, two IT members lowered their weekly sustainer from \$10.00 to \$2.00 after joining the IT. The other two IT members in Philadelphia have a weekly sustainer of \$2.00 and \$1.00 respectively. The average weekly sustainer of non-IT members in Philadelphia is \$9.15. We found this same pattern of financial boycott on the part of IT members to exist around the country.

Participation in Branch Functions. We also found a general pattern of low attendance on the part of IT members at branch meetings, forums, and other branch functions. In Oakland-Berkeley, no member of the IT had attended more than 3 out of the last 10 forums, and only 3 IT members had attended any of the 10 forums at all. In Washington, D.C. IT members averaged an attendance at less than half of the branch meetings.

SWP Election Campaigns. In Texas, the party is conducting a major campaign to obtain over 50,000 signatures in order to have the SWP placed on the ballot in the fall elections. The IT members in Houston, Texas, make up 31.7 percent of the membership, yet they collected only 5.92 percent of the signatures that had been collected as of June 7. Out of 1119.7 total hours petitioning by that date, the IT members together contributed a total of 89.

These are only a few illustrative examples drawn from a general national pattern of inactivity by the IT in all aspects of party building that have been decided upon as priorities by the SWP. This can only be described as a systematic and sustained boycott of party-building activity.

We also examined the IT internal communication of June 14, 1974, regarding bundles, assigned quotas, and subscription campaigns for publications of the British IMG and Canadian RMG. The IT has unilaterally decided to organize its own public sales campaigns for these publications. They have not proposed sales campaigns for these publications to the SWP Political Committee. Nor is there any mention made of the need to organize such sales under the direction of the appropriate SWP bodies responsible for propaganda work or to organize sales of the publications of the American Trotskyist movement.

The Socialist Workers Party has the responsibility and authority to decide upon the best way to advance the ideas of Trotskyism in the United States. The SWP has placed first priority on sales of *The Militant* and *International Socialist Review*. The IT sales and subscription campaigns decided upon unilaterally by the IT have no relation to the campaigns decided upon by the SWP as a whole.

The same general conclusions can be drawn with regard to the decisions of the IT, as disclosed in the IT internal newsletter and communication, for assignment of personnel. Transfers from one city to another, or assignments to one area of work or another are made unilaterally by the IT. There is no consideration given anywhere in any of these IT documents to the needs of the SWP in making such assignments.

The conclusion drawn by the Control Commission is that the goals and political priorities for activity by members of the separate IT organization are determined totally independently of the goals and priorities decided upon by the SWP.

The Control Commission also notes that party-building activity is not merely a desirable norm. It is a criterion for membership, as defined in Article III, Section 1 of the SWP constitution: "Every person who accepts the program of the Party and agrees to submit to its discipline and engage actively in its work shall be eligible to membership." These responsibilities are spelled out in more detail in the 1965 resolution codifying the organizational principles of the SWP.

The IT Rejects the Discipline of the SWP in Internal Matters

The Control Commission has concluded that the internal documents of the IT and the other evidence in our possession reveal a consistent pattern of violation of SWP discipline by the IT. These violations occur in both in-

ternal and external matters, including both mass work and relations with opponent political groups. The Control Commission notes that this pattern of IT violations of SWP discipline has been escalating since the August 1973 convention of the SWP, and has become very blatant in the past two months.

The 1965 document on the organizational principles of the SWP emphasizes that "the party exercises the right to regulate its internal affairs" (page 13). The IT has flouted this democratic centralist principle. Two areas bear special mention: the conduct of internal political discussion and the conduct of SWP members in the YSA.

The IT's Secret Internal Political Discussion

In the early 1960s the Robertsonites claimed the unconditional right to determine their own conduct inside the party. The 1965 SWP resolution rejects this claim, saying that "to grant such demands for special license to organized minorities would strip the party of the right to regulate its internal affairs and would undermine its whole democratic-centralist structure. . . . The party would become converted into an all-inclusive federation of autonomous factions; it would degenerate into a political jungle where perpetual factional warfare prevailed" (page 15).

The 1965 resolution further states that "the party is therefore entitled to organize its internal discussion and to determine the forms and limits" (page 20). The time, place, and extent of all internal discussion are determined by the democratically elected leadership bodies of the SWP, not by an arbitrary group of individuals within the party. A faction has the right to circulate drafts of proposed documents among faction members for the purpose of preparing material for presentation to the party as a whole. But an organized faction can circulate its own internal discussion bulletin only on the condition that it receive the prior approval of the party and that its bulletin be made available to the party.

The IT has violated this principle of Leninist organization. There is even one contribution to the secret IT bulletin that affords an ironic commentary on the IT violation of SWP norms. The article by Carapace, et al. (appended) voices the opinion that breaking democratic centralist norms should not be allowed *within the IT*: "We argue for a break with the traumatic democratism inherited from our passage in the SWP . . . a comrade or a group of comrades, whether they pay for the material or not, cannot take it upon themselves to launch a discussion or a debate or widely circulate documents without the organization's approval; this is not centralism, it opens the door to chaos and it is *absolutely inadmissible*" (emphasis in the original).

Carapace et al. misunderstand the SWP when they think that the SWP has failed to note the fact that the IT has been breaking the democratic centralist norms of the SWP. In fact, the record shows that the SWP, in order to maximize the chances for political clarity in the discussion, has bent over backwards in abstaining from using organizational measures to deal with the IT's growing pattern of violations of discipline. Many warnings were given in an attempt to allow the IT a chance to alter its course.

The secret circulation of private internal discussion bulletins by the IT has apparently been going on for a long

time. Leaders of the IT, Vincent, Hank Williams, Mitchell, and Mike Patrick (all pseudonyms), have a contribution in IT bulletin No. 8, in which they refer to a question that "was discussed in response to the Gregorich-Passen split in the 'Jules Verne document' circulated in the PO [Proletarian Orientation Tendency]." (The relevant section of the Vincent-Williams-Mitchell-Patrick document is appended.) The Gregorich-Passen split occurred on October 26, 1972, long before the formation of the IT. The SWP has never been informed of a "Jules Verne document." Nor had the SWP been informed by Bill Massey of the preparations for the Gregorich-Passen split from the SWP.

The formation of the Proletarian Orientation Tendency was announced openly in the SWP during the 1971 pre-convention discussion period. The fact that the secret circulation of the "Jules Verne document" is part of the pre-history of the IT shows that some component of the IT has been functioning as a secret faction on a permanent basis. The 1965 SWP resolution points out that "temporary groupings that arise out of conjunctural political differences should not be perpetuated regardless of principled considerations indicating the need for their dissolution. . . . A danger arises that such permanent formations may degenerate into unprincipled cliques bound together by personal associations" (page 13).

The unprincipled combinationism that the 1965 resolution warns against is evident in the IT document entitled "A Reply to Comrade Massey from Los Angeles" (appended). The Los Angeles group of the IT, in demanding minority representation *within* the IT, write: "The assertion [by Massey] that 'the June 10th Tendency joined the IT on the basis of the platform of the IMT . . . is not quite accurate. . . ."

"Our views on the role of guerilla warfare in Latin America were expressed quite clearly in the June 10th Position Paper (although guardedly, because it was introduced into the debate with the LTF). In essence we called for a rejection of the guerillaist strategy implied in the 9th World Congress resolution on Latin America (and *explicitly* repeated in the [IEC Majority] resolution on Bolivia of December 2, 1972), and for a return to the Leninist line on the road to power. . . ."

"Furthermore, this resolution was singled out as one of the planks in the platform of the IMT. A significant section of the IT is *categorically opposed to this line*, but this found no reflection in the delegation to the congress. *The plain fact is that the resolution on Latin America at the 9th W.C. was fundamentally wrong on the question of guerilla warfare, (no matter what else was right about it), and contributed to the disorientation of a number of Latin American sections*" (all emphasis in the original).

Thus, the Los Angeles IT members assert in the secret IT discussion that they *oppose* the line of the IMT on Bolivia. Nevertheless, when an open vote took place on the IMT resolution on Bolivia in the Los Angeles branch of the SWP these comrades voted *for* the IMT resolution.

This shows the pernicious effects of unprincipled combinationism and secret discussion, as is pointed out in the 1965 SWP resolution. A faction has no right to conduct an internal political discussion that is kept secret from the party, and then to bind its members to discipline on political questions when they participate in the party's internal discussion.

The secret circulation of private internal discussion bulletins denies the democratic right of the party membership as a whole to access to all points of view in arriving at political decisions, and it sets centrifugal forces into motion inside the party. The 1965 resolution clearly explains the implications of such conduct.

"Concentration on private discussions of disputed issues, on the other hand, tends to give the comrades involved a one-sided view and warps their capacity for objective political judgment. Inexperienced comrades especially are made the target of such lopsided discussion methods. The aim is to line them up quickly in a closed caucus, and prejudice their thinking before they have heard an open party debate. When dissident views are introduced into the party in that manner groupings tend to form and harden, and the dissenting views tend to assert themselves in disruptive fashion, before the party as a whole has had a chance to face and act on the issues in dispute" (page 12).

The IT "Intervention Into the YSA"

The activities of SWP members within the Young Socialist Alliance are guided by the unique relationship between the two organizations.

The YSA is in fraternal political solidarity with the SWP; there are many joint activities and common interventions in mass work; the internal discussion bulletins of the SWP and of the Fourth International are generally made available to the YSA, upon request of its elected leadership; YSA members are generally invited to attend SWP conventions; a representative of the YSA, elected by the YSA National Executive Committee, sits with vote on the Political Committee of the SWP.

But the SWP and YSA are *independent* organizations. Each determines its own policies by democratic vote of its own membership. The SWP has no statutory rights within the YSA and the YSA has no statutory rights within the SWP.

In his letter of June 9, 1974, to the SWP Political Committee, Bill Massey states that "the I.T. has held joint meetings with SWP ITers and YSA ITers. . . . We have not hidden the fact that we hold joint meetings, in fact, we have informed the Party about it in the past." The Control Commission notes that it is not sufficient to "inform" the SWP of such activity. Such activity by SWP members must receive authorization from the SWP. The organizational report adopted by the 1971 SWP convention reaffirmed the principle, with specific reference to the YSA, that "party members in *all* areas of work are bound by party discipline."

The record shows that no SWP member in the YSA has ever been put under SWP discipline not to present their views concerning questions under dispute in the world movement when internal discussion has been opened up in the YSA on these questions by the elected YSA leadership. Further, in the YSA pre-convention discussion period in 1973, upon the request of the YSA leadership, the SWP took the exceptional step of allowing SWP members in the YSA to present views contrary to those of the SWP on questions relating to political perspectives in the United States. But no authorization has ever been given to SWP members in the YSA to raise contrary views at all times and under all circumstances.

Not only is the IT intervention into the YSA by SWP

members of the IT unauthorized by the SWP but it is carried out in violation of YSA discipline as well. The pattern of IT violations of SWP discipline already discussed, as well as that which follows, are also violations of YSA discipline. Under no circumstances does the SWP permit SWP members to violate YSA discipline.

Furthermore, the extent of the IT's activity with non-party YSAers is far greater than "joint meetings." The IT newsletter report on the IT convention establishes that the IT members in the YSA who are not members of the SWP and the IT members in the SWP are organized together into one unitary organization on all levels. In fact, the statistics presented in the IT newsletter show that more than one-third of the ITers who were present at the IT convention were not members of the SWP. This violates the most elementary principles of democratic centralism guiding the relationship between the SWP and YSA.

The IT Rejects SWP Discipline in External Work

The IT "security policy" also applies to its external work. The formulations in the IT documents with regard to external work are edited for "security" *vis a vis* the SWP, to hide the IT policy of violating SWP discipline. Nevertheless, a reading of the IT's internal documents makes the facts clear.

The article by Berta Langston and Bob Langston quotes from the Hank Williams (Bill Massey) document to prove that the policy of the IT is to put itself forward in public as an independent entity. The Williams document states that "our major thrust must be carefully drawing up a line for the party to implement in specific situations, and then showing how it should be carried out. More can be shown with actions than words. This will force us to start thinking in motion rather than in position. Working out a line and putting it into practice is better than talking about it only." The Williams document states, concerning groups outside the SWP, that the IT "must work with them."

Berta Langston and Bob Langston also emphasized that there is a "lack, anywhere in the [Williams] document, of any specification that when we carry out those actions that speak louder than words, those actions should be carried out under the supervision of the appropriate leading bodies of the SWP and YSA." They concluded that the line of the IT "would lead not merely to instances but to patterns of organizational indiscipline in regard to the party and YSA." And they stated that "the comrades of the ITPC [IT Political Committee] are projecting a line the logic of which is precisely to build a rival organization to the SWP."

The documentary material of the IT itself shows clearly that these conclusions by Berta Langston and Bob Langston are accurate.

We note further that the Estreugal-Rahdnik document states that "many comrades of the IT have been invited over the years to give classes, participate in discussion groups outside the party, help build united front actions, etc. We will continue to do these very same things; and if the SWP leadership attempts to prevent us from doing contact work, they will be in direct violation of the agreements reached at the Tenth World Congress, and the issue can be fought out on that basis." Estreugal and Rahdnik feel that the "agreements" reached at the World Congress release them from any obligation to conduct public

work under the supervision of the SWP. Accordingly, they argue for loosening the IT "security policy" in this regard: "There is no need to engage in such activity furtively or feel that we may be violating security."

The IT newsletter of June 6, 1974, states that the trade-union resolution was *passed unanimously* by the IT national convention. One passage in that resolution is as follows: "The fact that we are in the SWP automatically poses the question of what to do with potential recruits that we are able to draw around us. . . . if the potential recruits find joining the SWP an uninviting alternative then we have the duty to help sustain their interest in the politics of the Fourth International through a variety of means including study classes, reading programs, action interventions, and social functions (tavern raps, dinners, parties, etc.). It is entirely possible that concentrations of potential recruits may desire to coalesce in some organizational form." (The relevant section of the IT trade-union resolution is appended.)

Thus, the IT policy is to build groups in the labor movement behind the back of the SWP.

The Control Commission feels that the IT documents, in themselves, are sufficient to prove that it is IT policy to violate the discipline of the SWP in public work. There are three aspects of this policy to note in particular: (1.) It is IT policy to carry out its own public activities and public interventions in mass work regardless of decisions by the SWP unit in charge of such activities. (2.) It is IT policy to carry out unauthorized work with groups outside the SWP. (3.) It is IT policy to construct its own groups in the mass movement behind the back of the SWP.

Our investigation has also uncovered specific instances showing how the IT applies its policy of violating SWP discipline in public work.

The May 11, 1974, Actions and Other Examples

In his letter of June 9, 1974, to the SWP Political Committee, Bill Massey acknowledges the responsibility of the IT leadership for the public IT intervention on the Chile solidarity demonstrations that occurred on the weekend of May 11, 1974. In their remarks to the National Committee on June 23, 1974 (appended), Bill Massey and John Barzman reiterated this position. Bill Massey stated, "there is no facts in dispute, or it hasn't been brought out, since we've taken the position that we've done what you have charged that we have done, we admit that and take responsibility for it, we don't promise to discontinue it at all."

Our review of the documentation concerning the incidents of May 11 shows that the essential facts are these: (1.) The various local units of the SWP decided upon a certain tactical course of action on these Chile solidarity demonstrations. (2.) The IT was present during these discussions in most branches and was aware of the SWP policy on these demonstrations. (3.) The IT had proposed an alternative tactical course of action in some local units of the SWP, the IT proposals were discussed, and the IT proposals were rejected. (4.) The IT did not appeal these decisions to higher bodies of the SWP. (5.) The IT, acting in a coordinated, uniform way on a national scale, carried out in public the tactical course of action that had been rejected. For the most part this public intervention by the IT consisted of selling

the *Old Mole*, newspaper of the Canadian RMG, or distributing the September 1973 statement of the United Secretariat on Chile rather than carrying out the assignments that they had been given by the local units of the SWP.

In his letter of June 9, Bill Massey offers the following justification for the IT rejection of SWP discipline in public activity: "Our comrades have the right to sell the press of the International and they have the right to hand out the statements of the F.I. We would prefer that the Party implement that line in its own tactical form, but if the Party refuses to do this, then we will, without shirking other assignments, continue defending the line of the Fourth International. We acknowledge having done it on May 11th and we promise to do it again when the need arises."

We note two things about this argument.

1. It does not describe the real position of the IT. The secret IT documents show that the IT has a *general* policy of carrying out its own activity in public, regardless of whether it is authorized by the SWP or not, and this general policy of unauthorized public activity by the IT is not limited to cases like Chile work, in which the IT has a political difference with the SWP. (We also note that no elected leadership body of the Fourth International has ever objected to the tactics of the SWP in carrying out Chile work.)

There are reports in the files we examined that show that the IT carries out its own independent public interventions in cases where there is no disagreement on political line in the world Trotskyist movement. We append one such report, a letter dated June 16, 1974, from Pat Grogan of the Chicago SWP branch to the SWP national office. Her letter indicates that on the day concerned members of the IT refused to carry out their assignments decided upon by the branch, and instead carried out the unauthorized assignments that they had been given in the IT. This violation of SWP discipline included an independent IT intervention in a rally on behalf of Soviet dissidents. We note that on April 20, 1974, the United Secretariat discussed work on behalf of Soviet dissidents and agreed unanimously on how to conduct this work.

Thus we conclude that the policy of the IT has nothing to do with its argument that it is necessary for the IT to carry out the line of the majority of the Fourth International.

This argument is simply part of the IT's "security policy" used to provide cover for its unauthorized public activity, and its rejection of SWP discipline in public activity.

2. The argument is wrong on the face of it. There are no grounds whatsoever to allow any individual or group of individuals to take it upon themselves to decide when, where and how to implement policy. In fact, the IT actions are not only in violation of the constitution and organizational principles of the SWP, but they are also in contradiction with the statutes and organizational principles of the Fourth International.

The statutes of the Fourth International state the following:

Article 31: "National sections exercise jurisdiction within their own countries. . . . National sections exercise disciplinary powers over their own members."

Article 15: "In no case has it [the IEC] the power to alter the majority rule of a regularly elected leadership of a national section." (*International Information Bul-*

letin, January 1969, part 1, pp. 11, 8).

Not even the IEC has the right to do what the IT arrogates to itself!

The IT argument is also in contradiction with the IMT Political Resolution adopted by the 1974 World Congress, which the IT says it supports. That resolution states: "The task of the center cannot consist of making authoritative decisions about the tactics of national sections; this is forbidden by the International's statutes."

The article by Berta Langston and Bob Langston also shows up the falsity of the argument raised by the IT: "As far as we know, however, to appeal to the [World] Congress to justify such activities is incorrect. As far as we know, there is nothing in any document adopted by the Congress that would confer on a grouping within a section the authority to carry out any line in the name of the International; nor is there, as far as we know, anything in any document that prescribes any *tactical* line for the United States in carrying out the political line of the FI." (emphasis in original)

If permitted to continue, the actions of the IT would result in the total breakdown of the authority of the units of the SWP. Democratic centralism would be thrown overboard.

The IT Violates SWP Discipline in Work With Groups Outside the SWP

The internal documents of the IT show that it is the policy of the IT to carry out its own independent political work with outside groups behind the back of the SWP. This is a very serious violation of SWP discipline; all work with outside political groups, especially work involving opponent groups must be carried out under the close and direct supervision of the SWP. Full information on all such activities must be provided to the SWP units responsible for such work.

The Control Commission has concrete evidence of IT violations of SWP discipline in this area. This includes not only instances of unauthorized political work with outside political groups, but also instances of IT work with such groups in direct violation of decisions against such activity by local SWP units. We append evidence that shows the following:

- Unauthorized IT intervention in the national conference of the Attica Brigade, a Maoist opponent group.
- Unauthorized IT work with the Puerto Rican Socialist Party of New York.
- Unauthorized work in the Stalinist-dominated Emergency Committee to Defend Democracy in Chile in San Jose, California.
- Unauthorized work with the Revolutionary Marxist Collective in San Francisco and Oakland-Berkeley. This includes unauthorized participation in a closed study circle of the RMC by a member of the IT.
- Unauthorized work with various opponent groups in Minneapolis.
- Unauthorized work with various opponent groups in Madison, Wisconsin.
- Unauthorized work with the Baltimore Marxist Group and Chile Resistance Committee.

Attendance at IT National Convention by a Non-Member of Either the SWP or YSA

We append a report showing that a person from the

Washington, D. C., area who is not a member of either the SWP or the YSA or of any section or sympathizing organization of the Fourth International attended the national convention of the IT. This was in complete violation of the organizational norms of functioning by party members. *This person was present during discussion on how the IT planned to intervene in the SWP and YSA!* Furthermore, the Washington, D. C., branch of the SWP has never at any time decided to give internal SWP bulletins to this person, or even to inform him about the internal debate in the world Trotskyist movement. Nor has it ever been proposed in the branch to do so. Yet he was made familiar with the internal discussion in the SWP and the Fourth International.

This person was also made familiar with the secret documents of the IT. In them he could read various statements attacking the SWP such as those in the Williams document that the SWP is "deadly sick" and that its cadre "are politically incapable of either understanding or putting into practice a revolutionary line." He could read in the Carapace, et al. document a description of the SWP and YSA as the "the SWP sect and its bastard offspring." A perusal of the IT internal documents will show many other similar statements.

The IT Is a Rival Party to the SWP

The documents of the IT provide overwhelming proof that the IT is a separate party organization operating both within the SWP and outside the SWP. It has its own highly organized and centralized independent party structure functioning on all levels. It has its own party discipline that supersedes SWP discipline. It determines its own areas of external activity, independent of and in violation of SWP decisions concerning external work. Except for payment of dues (not financial sustainers), it violates every criterion of membership in the SWP, as defined in the constitution and organizational principles of the party.

In their resignation document, Berta Langston and Bob Langston stated that the logic of the IT line was "precisely to build a rival organization to the SWP." The documents of the IT clearly show that this logic has been carried out to its conclusion.

The IT party writes off the SWP. Berta Langston and Bob Langston quoted from the Hank Williams (Bill Massey) document giving the IT estimate of the SWP. The SWP is described as having a "petty bourgeois methodology" and "the methodology of a right wing opportunist sect." The SWP is judged "deadly sick," and it is concluded as "an objective fact that the cadre of this party are politically incapable of either understanding or putting into practice a revolutionary line."

The above statements of the IT are not those of a group that is loyal to the Socialist Workers Party, and that sees the SWP as the nucleus of the mass revolutionary Marxist party that must be built. They are not the statements of a loyal minority that has confidence in the cadre of the party and that seeks to convince the majority through force of argument, and that pitches in to help build the party while retaining dissident views.

The 1965 SWP resolution pointed out that party loyalty is at the very foundation of membership:

"To begin with, loyalty is far more than an abstract idea; it is a standard of political conduct. The party's

whole democratic-centralist structure is founded on the rock of organizational loyalty. Without loyal members the party, as a voluntary organization, would have no basis upon which to maintain the necessary discipline in carrying out its revolutionary tasks. Disloyal people don't believe in the party, they won't pitch in selflessly to help build it, and they will resist and evade discipline. That is why the organizational resolution adopted at the SWP's founding convention specified that unconditional loyalty to the party is required of every member" (page 10).

Far from seeing the SWP as the nucleus of the mass revolutionary Marxist party in the United States, the IT assigns that role solely to itself. As Berta Langston and Bob Langston explained, the IT sees itself as "an organized grouping essentially independent of the SWP and linked to the FI as the nucleus of its 'future' and 'true' section in the United States." The Williams document, as amended by Estreugal-Rahdrik also states that the IT is the "nucleus of the future section of the Fourth International in the United States." The IT newsletter report on the IT national convention states that "the section of the Rahdrik-Estreugal amendments on the nature of the SWP were passed as the beginnings of a discussion within the IMT."

Berta Langston and Bob Langston said that "the logic of the ITPC's position is that the IT, defining itself as the nucleus of a section in the U.S., would begin to combine the exercise of political leadership of groupings outside the SWP and YSA with an entry tactic inside the SWP and YSA."

The IT convention decided that its members in the SWP should retain nominal membership for the moment. The IT documents make it clear that this is a tactical decision, and that the IT is prepared to split formally whenever it sees fit. There is evidently a dispute over this tactic, with several IT members urging an immediate open split. The IT newsletter report on the IT convention states that "the objective reality of our existence within the SWP/YSA conflicts in some cases with our subjective desires." The Alexander position, as reported in the IT newsletter, calls for the speedy withdrawal of the IT from the SWP and the formation of an open organization. It is expressed in the "restricted" document, entitled "Unless We Believe the SWP To Be Reformable..." The Rico document (appended), written in April, calls for "preparation for a sovereign body in the next 3-5 months."

The Carapace, et al. document, signed by a section of the IT leadership, also argues for the quick, open-split position, prefacing their remarks by saying that "we have weighed our words carefully." They state early in their document that "the transformation of the tendency into a revolutionary organization has been correctly recognized by the SC [Steering Committee] to be the number one item on the agenda." Later they add, "we must prepare the rest of the International and the revolutionary movement at large for what is going to happen. . . it must be clear that we are preparing ourselves and by taking our first steps toward acting as if we were an independent organization we are quite correctly moving across the Rubicon."

The documents of the IT show that it has, in fact, crossed the Rubicon. It has consummated a split. It is a separate, rival party to the SWP.

PART III

The Problem of Complicity of Some Leaders of the Fourth International in the IT Split

The evidence contained in the internal documents of the IT establishes the complicity of a section of the elected leadership of the Fourth International in the decision by the IT to split from the SWP and form an independent party. The leadership of the IMT (International Majority Tendency), which includes elected leaders of the Fourth International, was fully aware of the evolution of the IT, had access to its internal discussion documents that had been kept secret from the SWP, participated in the discussions about IT split policy; yet it never, at any time, informed either the elected leadership of the SWP or any of the elected leadership bodies of the Fourth International about the splitting course that was being undertaken by the IT. Documentary evidence proving this is contained in the IT newsletter of June 6 and the internal communication of June 14.

In addition to the IMT Steering Committee, an IMT international leadership body whose composition has not been revealed to the Fourth International, these documents show that there are other elements to the IMT structure.

Below the IMT Steering Committee there is an IMT Bureau and an Enlarged IMT Bureau. Below this, there is at least one regional body, the North American Bureau (NAB). The North American Bureau is not a body of the Fourth International, but of the IMT. In fact, the existence of a "North American Bureau" has up until now been kept secret from the SWP and the International as a whole. The membership of the IMT Bureau and the Enlarged IMT Bureau has also been kept secret.

According to the IT newsletter, the North American Bureau is attended by "comrades from the North American sections" (emphasis added). The IT internal communication of June 14 speaks of the *Old Mole* as "the paper of the Canadian section of the IMT" (emphasis added). These sections are not recognized bodies of the Fourth International. We note that in Canada the section of the Fourth International is the LSA/LSO, and that in the United States, where affiliation to the Fourth International is prohibited by reactionary legislation, the SWP is considered to be the only organized expression of the Trotskyist movement.

We also note that the internal IT document entitled "A Reply to Comrade Massey From Los Angeles" speaks of "the IEC of the IMT."

All of these statements indicate the existence of a secret parallel international apparatus, different from that of the recognized and duly elected bodies of the Fourth International.

The leadership bodies of this parallel international apparatus conducted discussions about the IT split policy prior to the IT convention. The IT newsletter reports that prior to the IT convention there was a meeting of the NAB, attended by "comrades from the North American sections" and also a "representative of the IMT Bureau." Discussion took place "on perspectives for the building of a section in the United States" and on the upcoming IT convention. After this meeting, the same questions were discussed

in the Enlarged IMT Bureau. Hank Williams (Bill Massey), who attends meetings of the IEC of the Fourth International as a fraternal observer, was present at this meeting.

The IT newsletter also tells of the existence of a "full IMT Bureau report on the American situation, the SWP, and the perspectives of the IT." This report was presented in its entirety at the IT national conference. The SWP has never seen this report nor been informed of its existence.

After the IT national convention, another meeting of the North American Bureau was scheduled. According to the IT internal communication of June 14, this meeting has been set for July 15, 16, 17. The communication gives the tour schedule of a representative from the IMT Bureau, who will tour the U.S. for the IT prior to the NAB meeting. It is the same comrade who attended the June plenum of the SWP National Committee. This comrade is a member of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

Thus, the IMT leaders not only participated in discussions with the IT prior to the IT split convention, but they retain their relations with the IT after the split was consummated at the IT convention.

Furthermore, we note that this parallel international apparatus attempts to impose discipline on the supporters of the IMT within the SWP. The IT newsletter says that at the meeting of the Enlarged IMT Bureau a motion was passed saying that "members of the SWP and YSA who support the IMT must join or rejoin (in the case of 9 comrades who recently resigned) the IT." Not only does this motion indicate that discipline is imposed, but it is an instruction to members of the SWP to violate SWP discipline by accepting non-SWP members of the YSA as members of the IT.

Finally, we note the reports in the IT newsletter about political differences inside the IMT Bureau concerning the evaluation of the SWP. Whereas the Williams [Massey] leadership of the IT writes off the SWP, the majority of the IMT Bureau thinks that the Williams document "incorrectly viewed the degenerative process of the SWP as completed." The IMT Bureau requested the IT to cancel its convention; the request was rejected by the IT. And still not a word about this was said to the elected leadership bodies of the SWP or of the Fourth International.

The RMG representatives present at the IT convention expressed agreement with the IT position in this internal dispute. They called for active collaboration between the IT and RMG in "the struggle within the IMT to break it of illusions concerning the SWP."

Further information is required to establish the full extent of the collaboration of leaders of the Fourth International in the split of the IT from the Socialist Workers Party. But since the jurisdiction of this Control Commission is limited to SWP members, we do not have the power to investigate this aspect of the case.

**Motions Adopted by the Political Committee
of the Socialist Workers Party**

July 4, 1974

1. To adopt the Control Commission's two recommendations: (1) "That the Internationalist Tendency's status as a separate, rival party be recognized and that the members of the Internationalist Tendency party be informed that this status places them outside the constitutional provisions of membership in the Socialist Workers Party," and (2) "That supporters of the IMT political positions who are not members of the IT party remain members of the SWP as long as they abide by the constitution of the SWP, the organizational principles of the SWP, and the democratic centralist norms of the world Trotskyist movement."

2. To instruct each branch to re-register its membership by removing from its rolls as of this date all of the 69 known members of the Internationalist Tendency party.

3. To send the attached letter to the 69 known members of the Internationalist Tendency party.

4. To send the attached letter to all branches and at-large members.

5. To adopt the draft Political Committee Statement.

6. To immediately make available to the membership in an internal information bulletin all the relevant material on the split of the Internationalist Tendency party.

**Letter Sent from the Political Committee of the
Socialist Workers Party to the 69 Known Members
of the Internationalist Tendency Party
July 4, 1974**

14 Charles Lane
New York, New York 10014
July 4, 1974

***TO KNOWN MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL-
IST TENDENCY PARTY***

[A list of 69 names is omitted.]

Dear Comrades,

On July 2, 1974, the Control Commission of the Socialist Workers Party, acting under Article VI of the party constitution, submitted the following recommendation for action to the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party:

"That the Internationalist Tendency's status as a separate, rival party be recognized and that the members of the Internationalist Tendency party be informed that this status places them outside the constitutional provisions of membership in the Socialist Workers Party."

At its July 4, 1974, meeting the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party voted to adopt the Control Commission's recommendation and to instruct each branch to re-register its membership by removing from its rolls as of this date all of the 69 known members of the Internationalist Tendency party listed above.

Fraternally,
s/Jack Barnes
National Secretary
for the Political Committee
Socialist Workers Party

cc: SWP branches and at-large members

**Letter Sent from the Political Committee
of the Socialist Workers Party
to All Branches and At-large Members,
July 4, 1974**

14 Charles Lane
New York, New York 10014
July 4, 1974

TO ALL BRANCHES AND AT-LARGE MEMBERS

Dear Comrades,

On July 2, 1974, the Control Commission of the Socialist Workers Party, acting under Article VI of the party constitution, submitted the following recommendation for action to the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party:

"That the Internationalist Tendency's status as a separate, rival party be recognized and that the members of the Internationalist Tendency party be informed that this status places them outside the constitutional provisions of membership in the Socialist Workers Party."

At its July 4, 1974, meeting the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party voted to adopt the Control Commission's recommendation and to instruct each branch to re-register its membership by removing from its rolls as of this date all of the 69 known members of the Internationalist Tendency party listed in the enclosed letter.

Enclosed is a copy of the letter sent today to the 69 known members of the Internationalist Tendency party.

All political relations with the Internationalist Tendency part or any of its members now come under the provisions of Article VIII, Section 8, of the party constitution which reads as follows:

"Political collaboration with non-members of the Party must be formally authorized by the Party committee having jurisdiction."

Please read this letter to the branch meeting and call it to the attention of all members.

Comradely,
s/Jack Barnes
National Secretary
for the Political Committee
Socialist Workers Party

Enc.: Political Committee letter to 69 Known Members
of the Internationalist Tendency Party

Statement Adopted by the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party, July 4, 1974

The report of the Control Commission of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) proves conclusively that the Internationalist Tendency (IT) has organized a split in the SWP. Systematically prepared in the period beginning immediately after the last world congress, the split was consummated at the May 25-27 national convention of the Internationalist Tendency held in Chicago.

The IT documents previously kept hidden from the SWP and the Fourth International as a whole were obtained by the Control Commission within the last two weeks. The material contained in them is of the gravest concern for the entire world Trotskyist movement, for it demonstrates that the leadership of the International Majority Tendency (IMT), including elected members of the United Secretariat, was involved in the split operation carried out by the IT.

The secret documents received by the SWP Control Commission show that the IMT leadership had full knowledge of the months-long engineering of the split in the SWP by the IT and *did not inform the leadership of the SWP or the leadership of the Fourth International*. Instead, the IMT leadership allowed the split operation to proceed and helped to cover it up. This was a victory for the wing of the IMT that is driving to split the Fourth International.

The prosplit wing of the IMT, which considers the IMT to be the "real" International, includes the Internationalist Tendency and the leadership of the Canadian Revolutionary Marxist Group. The May 1973 Barzman letter named individuals who held a split orientation. This prosplit wing views the League for Socialist Action/ Ligue Socialiste Ouvriere (the Canadian section), the Argentinian Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, the Socialist Workers Party in the United States and undoubtedly other sections and sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International, as "deadly sick," whose cadres "are politically incapable of either understanding or putting into practice a revolutionary line." This wing of the IMT has been pushing for some time for a split in the International. They had anticipated that an open split would take place at the last world congress, and were bitterly disappointed that this was not the outcome of the congress.

Having been dealt this blow by the majority of the delegates at the world congress, the prosplit forces in the United States began immediate preparations to split the SWP. Within a few days after the adjournment of the congress they opened a three-month secret discussion in the IT culminating in the IT national convention. Their object was to blow apart the unity made possible by the nine-point "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International" that was adopted by the congress.

The IMT leadership was not only privy to the secret discussion opened in the IT on how and when to split the SWP, it participated in this discussion. The IT report on the national convention of their new party states that a document adopted by the "IMT Bureau" warned

that the course the IT was embarked upon would lead to a split and the "establishment of the IT as a flimsy group outside of the SWP." *Not a single one of the IMT leaders took the course that could have prevented the split in the SWP*. Responsible leaders would have immediately placed before the elected leadership bodies of the SWP and of the Fourth International the information they had of the split plans of the IT, and sought the aid of the leaderships of the SWP and the Fourth International to prevent the split.

The entire IMT leadership took the opposite course. *They placed loyalty to their secret faction above loyalty to the Fourth International*, and thus became *captives* of the splitters who proceeded to present the IMT with an accomplished fact.

We have warned of the destructive logic of such methods of functioning before. In 1971, when we discovered the secret factional political document circulated by a leader of the United Secretariat within certain selected sections and groups in Latin America (the "Domingo" letter), we asked the United Secretariat to repudiate this method of functioning. Unfortunately, the majority members of the United Secretariat failed to heed our advice. Instead they deepened the error by asserting that such procedure was perfectly correct and normal.

At that time we pointed out: "The fact that the majority of the United Secretariat could consider that the writing of such a document by one of its members is a perfectly normal private matter raises a number of questions in our minds as to the concepts and procedures regulating the functioning of the body entrusted with the leadership of the Fourth International between meetings of the International Executive Committee.

"1. It signified that any member of the United Secretariat is free to act on his own as a private individual in handling situations of a grave nature that require mutual discussion, evaluation and decision. Such a practice reduces the United Secretariat to a federation of heads of commissions, who consider it normal not even to inform each other at times of important decisions they have made and processes they have set in motion.

"2. It opens the way to abuses of a most serious nature, such as operating behind the back of the leaderships of sections.

"3. It fosters the formation of personal cliques and similar unhealthy groupings put together in secret by this or that individual member of the United Secretariat.

"4. If it is considered normal for Comrade Maitan to operate in such a fashion it must be considered likewise normal for other members of the United Secretariat to operate in a similar way. The question follows automatically: Who else in the United Secretariat is sending out comparable factional letters to his own private mailing list? The position taken by the majority of the United Secretariat on the question of personal privilege in such matters places the entire committee under a cloud. A se-

rious blow had been dealt to its authority and to its claim to be serving as a collective leadership" (July 7, 1971, "Letter from the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party to the United Secretariat," reprinted in *International Information Bulletin* No 4 in 1971 and in *International Information Bulletin Reprint, Discussion on Latin America*).

This warning went unheeded. In March 1973 it came to light that six members of the United Secretariat had engaged in private political discussion with the Argentine PRT on burning questions that were under discussion by the whole International. They did this behind the back of the United Secretariat and on the eve of the December 1972 International Executive Committee (IEC) meeting that had as one key item on its agenda the balance sheet on our movement in Argentina. These six members of the United Secretariat kept their real views and actions secret on this central question in dispute at the IEC meeting where it was discussed. This document was not submitted to the *International Internal Discussion Bulletin* for publication until four months later.

Then, the May 1973 Barzman letter showed that the IMT leadership as a whole was operating as a secret faction. Barzman indicated that the IMT had a Steering Committee, whose composition was kept secret from the International. Applicants for membership in the IMT were required to accept "IMT discipline" and their applications were voted on by the IMT Steering Committee. These requisites for membership are among the distinguishing marks of a faction—in this case a secret, undeclared faction.

This contrasts sharply with the methods employed by the Leninist Trotskyist Faction (LTF). The LTF was openly declared. Its membership, leadership, structure, and limits of its discipline were all openly stated. All of the political documents of the LTF have been published in the regular discussion bulletins of the Fourth International; none have been secret for a secret discussion. The entire international is aware of the real positions of the LTF and of differences within the LTF when these occur.

The groups and individuals supporting the LTF have lived up to the conditions for adherence to the LTF outlined in the declaration of the formation of the faction:

"4. Faction discipline does not transcend the discipline of sections or sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International.

"5. Members of the faction must conduct themselves in a completely loyal way in sections of the Fourth International or sympathizing organizations, maintaining their activities and financial obligations in an exemplary way."

The secret IT documents shed new light on the structure, discipline, and methods of functioning of the IMT secret faction. It has become more highly structured since the Barzman letter was written. We learn that the IMT has an international "Bureau" and an "Enlarged Bureau." The composition of these bodies is kept secret from the International. There is a "North American Bureau"—presumably of the IMT—which is composed of representatives from the "sections" in North America. The existence of the North American Bureau has been kept a secret from the Fourth International as a whole, the SWP, and the Canadian section of the Fourth International.

We learn that a political discussion has been opened in the IMT on the political situation in the United States,

and that the IMT Bureau has prepared a document on this question, a document that also deals with the SWP and the perspectives of the IT. The existence and content of this discussion has been kept secret from the SWP and the Fourth International. Like the discussion held in the IT preceding its national convention, this discussion in the IMT is not an example of the normal circulation of material within an openly declared faction or tendency, the object of which is to prepare the documents of the tendency or faction for submission to the regular bulletins of the official internal discussion.

The object of this secret discussion is the opposite—to *hide the real views* of the various components of the secret faction from the International as a whole. The Barzman letter revealed that some leaders of the IMT considered it to be the arena where the "real" discussion takes place. The new documents brought to light by the Control Commission show that this is now an operating principle of the IMT as a whole, on a national as well as international scale.

The IMT secret faction is disciplined to such a degree that it adopted a motion giving various instructions to the IT, even instructing it to violate SWP organizational norms and discipline by accepting non-SWP members of the YSA as members of the IT. It even instructed those IMT supporters who resigned from the IT over disagreement with the IT's split course, to *rejoin the splitters*.

The Barzman letter consisted of a report to the Internationalist Tendency of negotiations Barzman was conducting on behalf of the IT concerning the IT application to join the IMT. Barzman's report indicated that one of the conditions for joining the IMT was that those members of the IT who disagreed with the IMT line on guerrilla war would have to support the IMT line in the discussion in the International, as part of accepting IMT "discipline." The secret IT documents discovered by the Control Commission demonstrate conclusively that this was in fact the case.

In "A Reply to Comrade Massey from Los Angeles," the Los Angeles grouping within the IT states that it is and always has been opposed to the IMT line on guerrilla warfare and to the IMT Bolivian resolution submitted to the last world congress. Nevertheless, all members of the IT, under IMT *faction discipline*, voted for the IMT Bolivian resolution in the pre-convention discussion in the SWP in preparation for the world congress. Such unprincipled combinationism is not in the tradition of the SWP and the Fourth International, which demands political honesty and faithfulness to principles.

The fact that the IMT placed its members under discipline to vote for its resolutions even if they disagreed with the fundamental line of those resolutions throws doubt over the validity of the votes cast at the last world congress. We ask: how many delegates to the world congress voted for the IMT Bolivian resolution, for example, who were in fact opposed to that resolution? Enough to reduce the bare 50.7% majority of delegate votes this resolution received to a *minority*?

The IMT Bureau apparently approves of the breaches of SWP discipline organized by the IT. At the recent plenum of the SWP National Committee, Comrades Massey and Barzman asserted they would continue their boycott of SWP finances. They reiterated that the IT would decide

and carry out its own tactical interventions in public activities whenever it decided that the tactics decided democratically by the SWP branches were inadequate. They would also, they stated, continue to concentrate on selling the "press of the International" (in which they include the *Old Mole* of the Canadian RMG and the British IMG's *International* magazine) regardless of the decisions of the SWP to campaign to increase the circulation of the American Trotskyist press.

A member of the United Secretariat, who is also a member of the IMT Bureau as the secret IT documents reveal, was present at the SWP National Committee plenum. He presented the summary for the IMT after these statements were made by Massey and Barzman, yet he made no dissociation from these assertions by Massey and Barzman. Thus the SWP leadership could only conclude that these assertions by Massey and Barzman stand as IMT policy.

By its actions the IMT leadership has contravened its own Political Resolution which was adopted by the World Congress. This resolution states: "The task of the center cannot consist of making authoritative decisions about the tactics of national sections; this is forbidden by the International's statutes." It is also in violation of the statutes, which state: "Rather than exercise disciplinary measures of its own in instances of differences with a national leadership, the International Executive Committee should seek to rely on persuasion and recommendations. In no case has it the power to alter the majority rule of a regularly elected leadership of a national section."

In violation of the statutes and the Political Resolution adopted by the world congress, the "center" overturns the tactical decisions of a sympathizing organization and its branches.

Further, this "center" is not even one of the duly elected leadership bodies of the Fourth International. No motion was adopted by the United Secretariat instructing the SWP to concentrate on selling the *Old Mole* and the *International* rather than the American Trotskyist press. No motion was made in the United Secretariat instructing the SWP to utilize *Inprecor* as their primary weapon in *contact work* "on the job" rather than the American Trotskyist press. Because such motions themselves would have been such a blatant violation of the statutes and such a gross trampling upon democratic centralism, the "center" which gave these secret instructions to the IT had to be a secret body, presumably the IMT Bureau.

We also note that, at the very time the Bureau of the United Secretariat was consulting with the national office of the SWP on organizing the distribution of *Inprecor* in the U.S., the IMT "center" went behind the back of the SWP to organize distribution of *Inprecor* through the IT.

Such a conception of "democratic centralism," applied by a secret parallel international center that operates behind the backs of the elected leaderships of sections, that overturns majority rule and the democratic decisions made by the sections or sympathizing groups, that seeks to determine tactical questions even down to what leaflet will be distributed at a given demonstration, will wreck the Fourth International if it is not opposed and rooted out. Under such a conception not a single section or sympathizing group would be able to function as a democratic-centralist organization. No self-reliant na-

tional leaderships democratically selected by the ranks on the basis of their own class-struggle experience could emerge, capable of building the kind of proletarian combat parties necessary to carry out the historic mission of the Fourth International.

The IMT leadership has set up a secret apparatus paralleling the elected official bodies of the Fourth International. Parallel to the IEC, there is the IMT Steering Committee; parallel to the United Secretariat, the IMT Enlarged Bureau; parallel to the administrative Bureau of the United Secretariat, the administrative IMT Bureau; parallel to possible regional bureaus (which, according to the statutes of the Fourth International, can only be established by the IEC), there is the IMT North American Bureau and perhaps several others; parallel to the sections and sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International, like the Canadian LSA/LSO and the Socialist Workers Party, there are the "sections" of the IMT.

This disciplined secret apparatus places loyalty to itself above loyalty to the Fourth International. It has usurped the functions and authority of the United Secretariat. It holds its own "real" secret discussions. In the case of the SWP, it seeks to overturn the democratic decisions of the elected leadership concerning tactical questions in the United States, to impose its own tactical line on the SWP, and thereby destroy the SWP's democratic-centralist character. It does this in violation of the Political Resolution adopted by the world congress and codified in the statutes of the Fourth International. The cadres of the Fourth International cannot assume that this method of functioning is restricted to the SWP, but must assume, as in the case of the "Domingo" letter, that it is being applied to other sections and sympathizing groups.

Most important, out of greater loyalty to its own secret faction than to the Fourth International, the IMT leadership has permitted and helped cover up a split engineered by its followers in the Socialist Workers Party.

By taking this course of action, the IMT leadership has broken the nine-point "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International" adopted by the last world congress. This places the unity of the Fourth International in the gravest danger.

To avert the danger to the international arising from the actions of the IMT, we call for the convocation of a special world congress of the Fourth International as provided for in the statutes of the Fourth International. Section II, Article (6) of the statutes includes the following provision: "A special World Congress can be convoked at any time by the International Executive Committee or by one third of the national sections." Section IV, Article (9) includes: "In the intervals between sessions of the International Executive Committee, the United Secretariat acts in its name and with its powers except that it cannot organize subsecretariats or commissions."

Let the whole International debate the real views of the various components of the IMT. Publish all the secret political resolutions and discussion, including the IMT discussion on the American political situation and the SWP, and submit them for consideration by the whole world movement. Only a special world congress can now isolate the splitters and reverse the disastrous orientation now being fostered by the prosplit wing of the IMT.

July 4, 1974

Attachments to the Report of the Control Commission

I. List of Resignations from the Internationalist Tendency by Supporters of the International Majority Tendency

*List of Resignations from the Internationalist Tendency
By Supporters of the Political Positions of the IMT*

Celia S.
Gerald G.
James M.
Berta L.

Bob L.
Ralph L.
Alan W.
Peter G.

The following letter from Berta Langston and Bob Langston to Dennis Richter, the Lower Manhattan SWP branch organizer, is similar in form and content to the letters of resignation received by the SWP from the other IMT members. All of these resignations were dated between May 3, 1974, and May 9, 1974.

May 4, 1974

Lower Manhattan Branch

Dear Comrades,

This is to inform you that we have withdrawn from the Internationalist Tendency caucus. We remain ideological supporters of the International Majority's political positions.

Comradely,
s/Bob Langston
Berta Langston

**II. "Comrades of the
Internationalist Tendency,"**

**Resignation from the IT
by Berta Langston and Bob Langston
with IT PC Reply;
from IT Bulletin #V**

With this letter to you, which we are requesting the ITPC to circulate in the bulletin or newsletter, we are announcing our resignation from the I.T. This is a step we have taken only very reluctantly; it is, however, an unavoidable one. For it has become clear to us that we have a difference of such fundamental character with the ITPC as to make further principled collaboration within a tendency impossible. This difference concerns not one tactical question or another, nor even a specific programmatic point, that might be resolved through discussion on the basis of a shared methodology. No, the difference pertains to the very self-definition of the tendency and hence to all the tasks confronting it. This difference is inseparable, moreover, from a difference in political characterization of the party and the YSA.

The logic of the ITPC document is, in effect, to impose a self-definition of the IT as an organized grouping essentially independent of the SWP and linked to the FI as the nucleus of its 'future' or 'true' section in the United States. (pp. 10, 17). Correlative with this definition, Comrade Williams presents an implicit but quite clear characterization of the party. It is dominated by a 'petty-bourgeois methodology' which it is now seeking to foist on the world movement (p.8); it is an "objective fact that the cadre of this party are politically incapable of either understanding or putting into practice a revolutionary line" (p.10) and this explains why the IT does not have more adherents; the party cadre "was recruited and trained in the methodology of a right wing opportunist sect." (p.9). The party is "deadly sick." It is clear that the correct label for such a moribund formation would be degenerated opportunist sect.

We, on the other hand, regard the IT, with respect to its present perspectives and tasks, as an organized tendency within the SWP and YSA, that is, as a grouping that has the goal of changing the line and practice of the party and youth in certain specific ways. It is an integral part of the International Majority Tendency within the FI. And just as the IMT has no political existence independent of or outside the FI, so too the IT has no political existence independent of or outside the organized presence of the FI in the United States -- the SWP and YSA. All members of the IT are bound by the discipline of the party and youth because they are bound by the discipline of the FI. That discipline includes the duty to put forward the declared political positions of the FI even on those points on which at present the comrades of the LTF are unable or unwilling to. That discipline precludes any organizational political activity outside the SWP or YSA in whatever form that is not under the supervision of the appropriate leading bodies of the SWP and YSA.

Correlatively, we regard the SWP as what it in fact is -- the U.S. section of the Fourth International, which is prevented by reactionary legislation from formally taking its place in the ranks of the FI. Politically, we characterize the SWP as a revolutionary Marxist organization marked by significant tendencies towards opportunism and sectarianism. Politically, it is the revolutionary Marxist character of the SWP that binds it to the FI and us to its discipline; it is the existence of the opportunist and sectarian tendencies that make necessary an organized tendency to combat them.

We do not, of course, deny that the party may in the future degenerate into a finished opportunist-sectarian formation. We maintain, however, that whether it does or not depends to some extent on how supporters of the IMT characterize the party and define

their tasks now. We do not, of course, argue against the building of an unblunted instrument -- to use Comrade Williams' phrase -- for the proletariat and its vanguard. We are proposing a course that would help sharpen the existing instrument and help assure that if, at some point along the way, a portion of that instrument becomes an obstacle, the remaining part would be sharp enough to cut through that obstacle too. The path the ITPC is proposing leads in the opposite direction; Comrade Williams' perspectives and definition of tasks tend toward the production of two obstacles -- one a large and well-endowed opportunist sect; the other a tiny sect condemned to try and hide under the aura of the accomplishments of revolutionists abroad with whom it proclaims its political solidarity.

But no one has been able to show, in a way consistent with Marxist method, that the party has already degenerated into an opportunist sect, that quantity has already been transformed into quality. And all attempts to demonstrate that completed degeneration have heretofore terminated in a mass of pseudo-concepts -- 'Pabloism' being the most usual general one --- that have both reflected and pushed forward the sectarianization of the groupings that have taken as their point of departure the battle against that alleged degeneracy. Unfortunately, it seems to us likely that comrades who adopt the characterization of the party and definition of the IT contained in Comrade Williams' document -- with its complete lack of concrete analysis -- will soon begin generating sectarian pseudoconcepts to justify politically the actions that must logically flow from that characterization and definition. In fact, as we shall see, that process has already begun -- in the ITPC document.

As evidence for the new characterization of the SWP, Comrade Williams adduces three complexes of problems which were dealt with in the counter political resolution the IT presented last August:

- a) The SWP's 'petty-bourgeois' methodology, meaning, presumably, that complex of linked conceptions and orientations related to sectarianism, single-issueism, mass intervention opposed to vanguard intervention, party-building in the abstract, and emphasis on democratic slogans opposed to transitional ones'
- b) In particular, the party's theoretical and practical adaptations to feminism and nationalism;
- c) Also in particular, the party's failure to rally the more advanced elements on more advanced slogans during the radicalization of the sixties.

With some important reservations -- indicated in a document submitted to the pre-convention discussion -- we generally agree with the analysis and criticism begun in that IT political resolution. In particular, we agree with the August document's treatment of the party's deviations as tendencies, not as elements of a completed degeneration. There is nothing new, concerning these points, in Comrade Williams' documents, not in any document that we have seen produced within the IT, that could justify the new characterization of the party.

Two new points are raised as evidence of the party's degeneracy in the ITPC document: the party's relationship to the process of "recomposition of the left" now underway and three examples from the trade-union field.* Before it could be regarded as such, the IT would have to propose a concrete plan for intervention, for that plan to be rejected by the party, and for the grounds of the rejection to be carefully analyzed. This has not been done nationally; to our knowledge, it has not been done locally. And the paragraphs of the ITPC document dealing with specific areas of work do not even begin to outline such a plan. Moreover, it should be noted that the party has not wholly abstained from this recomposition process. Apparently the regroupment arising from the left-wing split in the Puerto Rican Independence Party has been substantially influenced by the SWP. We cannot judge how well or badly this

add- a) It is impermissible to use the party's insufficient intervention in the mini-regroupment now underway as evidence of degeneration.

intervention has been carried out; a careful examination of it could be an important contribution of the I.T.

b) In its lack of a sense of proportion and production of pseudo-concepts in the form of 'principles', Comrade Williams' handling of his three trade-union examples rather clearly shows the danger of the sectarianization of the tendency; it does not at all show that the party has degenerated into an opportunist sect.

"The line of the party, "Comrade Williams writes, "is to either make no criticisms of the leadership of the unions in struggle, as they did in the Sears strike in the Bay Area -- where the party tail-ended Walter Johnson, a leader of 'Alioto for Governor,' who in turn tail-ended the local labor bureaucracy -- or they put forth no independent class struggle line as they did with the CLUW conference, or they cross picket lines as they did with the strike of the maintenance workers." (pp. 8,9).

The crime in the case of the Sears strike, then, was that the party did not criticize Johnson. With this argument, we are present at the conception -- if not yet the birth -- of precisely one of those sectarian pseudo-concepts. A "principle" is about to leave the womb: Thou shalt not support a workers' struggle without criticizing the leadership if that leadership happens to be of the trade-union bureaucracy. The necessary next step is to enunciate the principle: Thou shalt seek to incorporate into every worker's struggle an immediate, head-on collision with the whole labor bureaucracy.

The need to establish this 'principle' against the SWP's alleged trade-union policy leads to an at least partially faulty analysis of the Sears strike itself. From all the factual information we have been able to gather from the bourgeois and left press, Walter Johnson was not tail-ending the Bay Area bureaucracy as a whole but was virtually at a point of rupture with it. And while, to judge from Comrade AW's report in the tendency newsletter, there were important elements of tail-endism to Johnson in the party's orientation, the party so far as we can judge from the reportage in The Militant was also rather far out in front of Johnson on the crucial point of projected strike policy -- the call for the entire Bay Area labor movement to rally in support of the Sears strikers and to extend the picket lines to Sears outlets throughout the Bay Area, with those lines to be composed of workers from other unions. A detailed criticism of the party's intervention is needed. A concrete counterproposal on how to intervene is called for. An analysis that might show how the party's errors in this or similar cases are related to the general pattern of its opportunist tendencies is needed. A sectarian pseudo-principle, substituted for concrete analysis, we do not need. That kind of "principle" and the trade-union policy consistent with it can well be left to the comrades of the Spartacist League. It may be an aid to their rather successful intervention in the present re-composition of the left; we do not think it will help them win a layer of advanced workers. We don't think it would help us to solve the concrete problems of combining initiatives in action with outflanking the bureaucracy, while preventing isolation of the mass vanguard from the workers' movement.

Likewise, the ITPC's treatment of the CLUW orientation of the party generates a sectarian 'principle': Thou shalt not, under any circumstances, be Best Builders; thou shalt always accompany thy organizational efforts with a definite political line counterposed to someone else's. We think it is necessary to raise the question as to whether programmatic intervention in CLUW was not essential. And we suspect that the party's failure to undertake such intervention was related to the tendency to see CLUW entirely too much in feminist perspective, to approach it with some notion that the mere getting together of a group of trade-union women contains a spontaneous progressive thrust. But we of the IT did not present -- nationally, at least -- any proposal explaining specifically what the party should have sought to gain from its CLUW intervention and how it should have gone about it. The tendency newsletter report suggested, at least, that the party should have made support to the Farm Workers against Teamster union-busting the main axis of

intervention. But possible out of eagerness to demonstrate the party's capitulation to the bureaucrats who controlled the conference, the author of the newsletter article failed to notice a fact that is of some significance in judging whether or not a struggle on the question would have been advisable: the fact that the Farm Workers group at the conference dominated as it no doubt was by the Chavez bureaucracy -- was opposed to a fight on the issue. Would vigorous intervention by the party have found a response in the Farm Workers' delegation? Would it have helped develop rank-and-file sentiment within the IBT against the union-busting of the bureaucracy? Would it have contributed to the development of consciousness of the advanced women workers present at the conference? These seem to us relevant questions. But once again, we have been offered a sectarian pseudo-principle instead of a concrete analysis and a plan of action.

In the case of the New York City school maintenance workers' strike, there was in reality we think, an important question of principle involved. But the ITPC document does not mention a certain fact that is highly relevant to judging the party's attitude -- the fact namely, that the leadership of the maintenance men's union publicly declared that it was not asking teachers to observe the picket line. The leadership of the union, in which we have no implantation, was, in short, declaring its picket line to have an informational character. Under these circumstances, the party recommended that teacher comrades go to their schools and discuss the issues of the strike with other teachers.

We think that was the wrong decision. We think it would have been correct for our teacher comrades to have utilized the opportunity to solidarize with the maintenance workers on the lines, to encourage other teachers to join them, and by precept and example to help strengthen the instincts of trade-union solidarity. This seems to us particularly so, since Shanker of the teachers' union more-or-less invited the teachers to observe the line by issuing assurances that those who did so would not be penalized.

But it is only by some stop-sign conception of principle--the expressions of which by comrades of the LIT we have correctly opposed -- and by a loss of all sense of proportion that Comrade Williams can write in connection with this incident, "A party that can allow its members to cross picket lines without any appreciable outcry is a party that is deadly sick." (p.9). The New York school maintenance workers' strike really was not Hitler's seizure of power in Germany.

In short, the ITPC's trade-union examples do not, any more than the other bits of evidence Comrade Williams adduces without analysis, demonstrate that the party has become a right opportunist, anti-working class sect. The document's handling of them, however, diverts attention away from the need for careful analysis, precise criticism, and concrete counterproposal. And it does demonstrate the serious danger of the sectarianization of any group of comrades who adopts it as their own.

Against Comrade Williams' whole construction, we want to give a few examples, drawn from the past fifteen years, which may be helpful in thinking more clearly about the real character of the party. They suggest, we think, a capacity to make great, timely turns towards broad sectors entering into motion, a tendency to adapt opportunistically, to falsely theorize the adaptations and to transform the revolutionary-Marxist program into a "world-view" to be propagated, and yet an ability at certain crucial political points an ability to reassert the revolutionary-Marxist program in practice and to contain or reverse the opportunist drift.

1) In the late fifties and early sixties, the party was able to turn towards the successive ripples and waves of the Black and student radicalization; in doing this, it was able to orient towards the most advanced currents (Robert Williams and Black self-defense; Cuban solidarity). It was able to understand correctly the Cuban revolution and to act on that understanding. It was able to break with the "Theological" Marxist Healey and, together with the majority of the comrades of the International Secretariat,

to reunite the International.

2) The adaptation in the antiwar movement was only relative. The party and YSA were not simply organizational 'best builders,' putting together a pressure group objectively in support of the Vietnamese Revolution and establishing a milieu in which to propagate the Marxist world view and recruit. We carried a line of principle into that movement of which we were the best builders; the struggle for 'withdraw' against 'negotiate' served in fact to advance the political consciousness of rather broad layers of antiwar activists. The failure to advance slogans of open solidarity with the Indochinese Revolution and to develop the corresponding organizational forms has to be seen in relation to that fundamental achievement. And criticism of the party's antiwar policy has to take full account of the tactical complexity that would have been involved in carrying out both these tasks.

3) The theory of combined revolution in the United States and the closely associated beginning of a revision of Marxism on the national question in general constitute the most serious, explicitly formulated theoretical deviations. Moreover, they stand at the head of the whole sectoralist drift. But they have their roots in a very peculiar ideological adaptation. Black nationalism, that bourgeois or petty-bourgeois current to which the party adapted, was when we first began to champion it, and to a large extent still is today, rejected, bought and defamed by the entire real bourgeoisie and by almost all the petty-bourgeoisie, white or Black. On the other hand, it informed the action of the most advanced layers of the Black militants who were linked to mass struggles. It has been the consciousness of the closest thing to a new mass vanguard organically linked to the working class -- and its most oppressed layers at that -- yet to emerge in the United States. That kind of adaptation, though once it is falsely theorized it encourages opportunistic trends, does not in itself lend credence to the notion that the party is deeply opportunist, sectarian or anti-working class. Moreover, after drifting quite far towards a reformist position in calling for Black control of the police, the SWP-YSA pulled back, corrected, contrary to the opportunist logic.

4) Despite the serious inroads made by feminism in the party's theory and practice, at a crucial political point, these inroads were contained. The party resisted the logic of advancing the slogan of a women's party. And the grounds the party majority gave for rejecting the slogan were not of purely tactical order; on the contrary, despite all its despite all its other failings, the 1971 women's liberation resolution presents a generally correct, programmatic reason for rejection of the slogan. A sectarian, purely theological and propagandistic Marxism would easily have found a way to reconcile itself to the opportunist logic of sectoralism.

5) Likewise, in the case of the gay liberation movement, a sectoralist strategy would have indicated a plunge. And a purely propagandistic Marxism dished out in conjunction with a big "best builder" effort would probably have brought not insignificant recruitment. But the thrust in that direction was halted. And while the majority statements bear marks of compromise and excessive argument from tactical grounds, there was a current in the national committee, represented in Comrade Nat Weinstein's document that opposed the orientation towards the gay liberation movement on clearly programmatic and generally correct grounds, even if Comrade Nat's argumentation was itself overlaid with sectoralist conceptions.

6) A more recent test is provided by Watergate and impeachment. The logic of single issue, sectoralist, best builderism indicated a turn towards an impeachment movement. Sectarian Marxism would have had no difficulty in reconciling itself to this opportunist policy; numerous demands in the press to build a labor party now would have fully sufficed. The party did not respond in this way. Instead, it launched a propaganda campaign centered on the capitalist state's systematic violations of democratic rights. This campaign an opportunist sect with boundless appetites would have launched.

In our opinion, what these examples indicate is that the party is living out the contradictions between the logic of its adaptations on the one hand, and the revolutionary

Marxist program on the other. The correct orientation of the tendency would be to insert itself in this contradiction, to drive forward the resolution of this contradiction on the side of revolutionary-Marxism. This, we think, is the really 'concrete' answer to the question, Can this leadership be reformed?

It seems evident that the party is now beginning to make a turn towards struggles waged at the work places. This turn is belated; it is perhaps not now being pushed forward rapidly enough; there is already and there will be in future much to criticize in connection with it. It is also possible that despite what the IT should do or how it might develop, the party will show itself incapable of carrying through this turn, of moving towards a serious implantation in the work places and unions; it is possible that the turn will remain largely confined to the pages of the Militant; it is possible that the fundamental orientation of the party will be tail-endist and economistic, that it will be incapable of drawing around it and educating the most militant elements of worker's vanguard. But it is only on the basis of the kind of sectarian pseudo-concepts pointed to earlier that it would be possible to predict that any of these things are inevitable. We should not orient on such purported 'inevitability'; rather, we should seek to encourage this turn, to criticize concretely its specific deficiencies; to explain the connection with the party's other theoretical and methodological errors, to develop and propose alternatives to false politics.

Corresponding to their false and sectarian method of characterizing the party, the party, the ITPC projects an orientation for the tendency which, if adopted, would tend to lead to an organizational existence of the I.T. independent of the SWP and YSA. Contrary to their intentions -- they write, "We are not attempting to build a rival party to the SWP" -- the comrades of the ITPC are projecting a line the logic of which is precisely to build a rival organization to the SWP. This can be seen very clearly from three passages -- and one striking absence -- in the document:

a) "Our (the IT's) major thrust (within the party) must be carefully drawing up a line for the party to implement in specific situations, and then showing how it should be carried out. More can be shown with actions than words." This will force us to start thinking in motion rather than in position. Working out a line and putting it into practice is better than talking about it only." (p. 16, emphasis added);

c) Finally, in discussing groups that arise outside the SWP-YSA which indicate sympathy with the Fourth International and are engaging in organized political activity, Comrade Williams indicates one of the ways the IT has of 'moving outward:' "We (the IT) must work with them (these groups), getting them the political positions of the Fourth International, telling them what the major campaigns of the International are, and how the International would carry them out." (p. 11, emphasis added).

d) The absence is very simply the lack, anywhere in the document, of any specification that when we carry out those actions that speak louder than words, those actions should be carried out under the supervision of the appropriate leading bodies of the SWP and YSA.

The logic here is clear -- the IT would begin to put itself forward as an independent entity. Likewise, to begin to interpret to groups outside the Party and YSA how we think the line of the International should be carried out in the United States, is to begin to play an active leadership role for these groups, it is to begin organizationally to play that self-assigned role as the nucleus of the true or future section of the FI. in the United States.

We have not yet had an opportunity to see the documents adopted by the World Congress in their final form. As far as we know, however, to appeal to the Congress to justify such activities is incorrect. As far as we know, there is nothing in any document adopted by the Congress that would confer on a grouping within a section the authority to carry out any line in the name of the International; nor is there, as far as we know, anything

any document that prescribes any tactical line for the United States in carrying out the political line of the FI.

In short, the logic of the ITPC's position is that the IT, defining itself as the nucleus of a section in the U.S.; would begin to combine the exercise of political leadership of groupings outside the SWP and YSA with an entry tactic inside the SWP and YSA.

The errors of such a course seem to us clear. It would lead not merely to instances but to patterns of organizational indiscipline in regard to the party and YSA. This would tend to intensify the factionalization of the SWP-YSA; it would increase the difficulty of arguments and proposals based on our political conceptions being heard, understood, discussed on their merits, and adopted. In response, the thrust toward the IT's sectarianization would be strengthened; the criticisms would become increasingly alienated from the objective reality of the party and the proposals would tend to be based increasingly on putting a minus where the party leadership puts a plus. At the same time, the trend towards the sectarianization of the Party would be strengthened. The fact of genuine organizational indiscipline would provide ammunition to those elements of the LTF who are inclined to substitute organizational disputes for political discussion. The direction of development would be towards the expulsion of the comrades who take this course in such a way that they would be headed towards a sect existence outside, while all the worst features of the SWP and YSA would be strengthened. It is hard to see how the building of the U.S. section of the FI would be served.

The effects internationally of such a course would be perhaps even more serious. It is obvious that such a process would intensify the dangers of a split in the International. It would strengthen the most split-oriented and right-tending elements of the LTF within their own faction. It would inhibit the working out and surfacing of the contradictions within the LTF. It would drive towards a split on a world scale under conditions in which the political differences were not fully clarified, in an atmosphere in which they could not be clarified, and in such a way that the ultimate responsibility for the split would be obscured.

One of the central political tasks of the FI today is to demonstrate, on a world scale, that it is possible to build an international revolutionary Marxist party, increasingly governed by the norms of democratic centralism, that is able to contain within it even major political differences that arise episodically as a result of the uneven development of the world revolution and the different experiences of revolutionists in different countries. One of the major accomplishments of the 10 World Congress was to establish the principled basis for a point of equilibrium on which the differences within the International can unfold without threatening its unity. It provides the possibility of halting that split dynamic that was so evident in the two years preceding the Congress. One of our major tasks -- perhaps our fundamental task -- to make that possibility real. We cannot do that by acting, in any way whatsoever, as an organization independent of the SWP and YSA.

But -- and this is perhaps its most serious defect -- the ITPC document does not even raise the question of the international consequences of its projected course -- except in connection with the odd suggestion that the reason to oppose a split is so that there will be an opportunity for the SWP to fully reveal its nature to comrades abroad.

We think a wholly different orientation is indicated. We think the comrades who support the IMT should define themselves in fact as a tendency. Our main tasks are, in cooperation with other comrades of the IMT, to deepen and develop our understanding of North American reality, to develop and deepen our criticism of the theoretical errors of the LTF, to develop concrete criticisms of the errors the Party and YSA make in specific interventions, and to develop and present concrete counterproposals when necessary.

Like all other comrades, we should carry on propaganda, contact and recruitment work. In doing this work, we should explain and defend the line of the FI, bearing in mind that on those questions on which the FI has not declared itself by World Congress resolutions or USec or IEC statements, we are bound by the positions of the SWP and YSA. That does not mean we have to come forward as vigorous defenders of positions with which we personally disagree. We will often find that emphasis on the basic programmatic aspects of Trotskyism, explanation of the activities of Fourth Internationalists around the world, and discussion of FI documents, is a more effective recruiting method than efforts to defend positions we personally oppose. But it does mean that we have to explain those positions correctly and coherently and not introduce positions counter to them. Our basic approach should be -- recruitment to the SWP and YSA on the basis of the program of the FI. In carrying out this work, we should use the press of the various sections and sympathizing groups and of the USec, as well as of the SWP and YSA.

We should in no way challenge or appear to challenge the right of the party and youth leading bodies to direct all organized interventions and all interventions in other organizations.

When we meet comrades who regard themselves as sympathizers the FI and who are trying to establish political action leagues or groups, we should discourage them from that course. We should make every effort to recruit them to the SWP and YSA. We should make every effort to recruit them to the SWP and YSA. We should remain in individual contact with such comrades; we should under no circumstances participate in their groups except after consultation with and approval by the relevant leading body. We should encourage those FI sympathizers who are unwilling to join the SWP and YSA to find specific areas of work in which they can nevertheless co-operate with party and YSA fractions. Even when they are refused admission by the party or YSA, we should still encourage them to find areas of work in which cooperation is possible and to apply for membership again later. Where these comrades have formed groups, we should encourage them to apply for membership as individuals, not groups. We should not do anything that would place any barriers to their admission. We want them in really, we want them in; we want every Fourth Internationalist, who is prepared to abide by the discipline of the FI and party, in. Our basic conception in this regard should be: encourage all Fourth Internationalists to join the party or youth; discourage every tendency towards the development of formations outside the SWP and YSA claiming adherence to the FI.

It seems to us evident that our differences with the ITPC are of such magnitude on a fundamental question as to make continued collaboration within a tendency impossible. Why do we not struggle for this point of view within the IT, at least until the May conference? Two points are relevant here. First, the position upheld by Comrade Williams is not a marginal or peripheral one in the IT; it comes equipped with all the authority and prestige of the leadership. Secondly, the issue, as we see it, is precisely whether the IT will begin to assume the character of a political organization in its own right. Under these circumstances, to continue to struggle within the IT-- with its internal bulletin, a possible tour, election of delegates, a convention -- would be in practice precisely to cooperate in helping make the IT become what we urgently hope it doesn't. Under ordinary circumstances, this paraphernalia within a tendency would merely be the means of discussing and hammering out a tendency policy; in this case, however, given the question in dispute and the sponsors of the position we oppose, this paraphernalia will, we fear, inevitably begin to appear to many comrades as the organizational skeleton of -- a new organization.

We are notifying the party leadership of our resignation with the following message addressed to our branch organizer: "This is to inform you that we have withdrawn from

the Internationalist Tendency Caucus. We remain ideological supporters of the International Majority's political positions."

We would of course be pleased to discuss informally these questions with any comrades. We can be reached at R.D. 1, Box 211-A, Catskill, N.Y. 12414

Rejection of Resignation -- statement by the Political Committee.

The following motion was passed at the Political Committee meeting of 5/4/74:

1. To reject the resignation of Comrades Berta Langston and Bob Langston on the grounds that it is contradictory to their open support to the International Majority Tendency.
2. To publish the letter-document sent in to the internal bulletin of the tendency.

III. Portions of Internationalist Tendency Newsletter of June 6, 1974

"First National Conference of the Internationalist Tendency," by Alec

"Preparing Local Tendency Tasks and Perspectives"

"Our Tasks in the YSA," by Inessa

1. FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONALIST TENDENCY

By Alec

The first national conference of the Internationalist Tendency was held in Chicago on the Memorial Day weekend, May 25, 26, 27. The conference had been preceded by a discussion period of three months which elicited twelve discussion bulletins containing thirty four different contributions to the discussion. Discussion around these took place in every area of the Tendency. Delegates were elected on the basis of five persons per delegate. There were twenty-four delegates and ten consultative delegates.

Eighty six persons attended the conference, 79 of whom were members of the IT, six were members of the Revolutionary Marxist Group (Canadian sympathizing group of the FI), and one member of the International Marxist Group (IMG - British Section of the FI).

The comrades attending the conference were mainly young people, with 73% between the ages of 20 and 29, 19% between the ages of 30 and 39 while 8% were 40 or older. Thirty three of those attending were members of the SWP, 32 were members of the YSA and 14 were members of both organizations. Women made up 31.6% of those attending (25 ITers and two visitors) while 54 ITers and five visitors were male.

On a geographical basis, comrades from 18 different cities in 14 different states attended. Seven regional locals of the YSA attended. The largest contingent of comrades was from Chicago (21); this was followed by Houston (12), Washington (9), New York City (8), Madison (5), Los Angeles (4), Portland (3); two from each of Philadelphia, Paterson, New Brunswick, St. Louis, Iowa City, and San Francisco. One person came from the following areas: Kansas City, Milwaukee, Boston, San Jose, and Minneapolis.

Thirty-nine ITers in attendance are active members of trade unions. The largest bloc were in railway unions, with a total of 8 comrades (5 in UTU, 2 in BRAC and 1 in Brotherhood of Railway Carriers); this was followed by AFSCME - 7 comrades; IBEW - 3 comrades; Bakers Union - 3 comrades; AFT - 2 plus one member of the AAUP; 2 each in OPEIU, OCAW and United Steel Workers of America. One person each from United Auto Workers, Teamsters, Communication Workers, IATSE and the Printers Union (AFL-CIO). Two comrades in attendance were retired workers, two were full-time IT staff persons, eight were students and seven were unemployed, the rest being non-union workers.

Perspectives Discussion

The initial discussion was procedural, focusing on the adoption of an initial agenda, election of a Presiding Committee, a Nominating Committee for the new IT Steering Committee. There was discussion on the merits of a nominating commission with several objections raised. The proposal for an eight-member nominating commission (2 from each of North-South-East and West voted by the delegates in regional caucuses, with Comrade Mitchell chairing without vote), was adopted with two comrades voting against it.

Following the procedural discussion Comrade Hank Williams gave a report on the most recent session of the Enlarged IMT Bureau and on the meeting of the NAB which preceded the IMT Bureau meeting. At the NAB the comrades from the North American Sections disagreed very firmly with the representative of the IMT Bureau on perspectives for the building of a section in the United States. The request to cancel the IT conference was rejected and it was proposed that any perspectives adopted by the IT conference and the IMT Bureau be tentative so that further discussion within the IMT could take place.

At the IMT Enlarged Bureau meeting a motion was passed which noted that the Hank Williams document perspective was not in conformity with the perspectives of the IMT and that certain ambiguities of the H.W. document should be rectified; that an immediate discussion must be opened between the ITFC and the IMT Bureau on the perspectives for the class struggle in the United States and the initiatives of the IT comrades; that the IT should recruit people politically to the FI and organizationally to the SWP, and in the case of groups who supported the FI and the 10th World Congress, that the IMT would fight for members of these groups to be recruited and accepted into the SWP - each and every one of them without exception; that members of the SWP and YSA who support the IMT must join or rejoin (in the case of 9 comrades who recently resigned) the IT. One comrade in the Enlarged Bureau meeting abstained on this motion, while all the others including Hank Williams voted for it. Comrade Williams along with three other members of the Bureau submitted statements indicating that they did not see a contradiction between the perspectives of the IMT and the IT. A motion that indicated that there only seemed to be a contradiction was defeated receiving six votes and two abstentions. Some comrades in the bureau felt that with a workers upsurge in the U.S. many radicalizing workers would go into the SWP and that it could grow to the size of 5 or 6 thousand quickly which would enable a viable IT to reach a thousand of them and draw them to its ranks. Comrade Williams totally disagreed with this perspective. Comrade Williams stressed that the IMT would have to make a strong effort to democratize the SWP in order that the IT be able to carry out its tasks in the SWP and the building of a strong tendency - this was generally agreed to by all of the Bureau comrades. It was also agreed that the comrades who resigned recently from the Tendency in no way represented a serious leadership element, however it was felt that they should be told to rejoin and that those from the East Coast in particular could bring theoretical abilities to the Tendency. The IMT bureau will send a representative shortly to meet with comrades in the main centers of the Tendency.

Following lunch, discussion was open on the adoption of a perspectives resolution. Four proposals were put forward: the general line of

1. "Which Way Forward." drafted by Hank Williams. Vincent was the reporter for this position, calling for the vote to be based on his oral report, which took into account the IMT Enlarged Bureau recommendations.

2. A series of amendments to the H.W. document by Estreugel and Rahdnick; the reporter was Comrade Nora. These differed from the original in three major ways: (1) they contained a much more lengthy analysis of the SWP, (2) they qualitatively differentiated between the SWP and YSA as areas of work de-emphasizing the former, (3) they stressed contact work on as yet independent elements.

3. A counter-resolution "Unless we Believe the SWP to be Reformable..." introduced at the conference by Alexander. It stressed the irreconcilable differences between the IT and the LTF. It called for a conference within six months to decide whether to remain in the SWP and YSA and emphasized the need for a stronger Leninist organization of the IT constituted as a faction within the SWP. The counter-resolution also said the IT should look with benevolence upon supporters of the FI outside the SWP and YSA pulling together into a national organization with its own press.

4. A proposal by Thor Ladislav which reflected the views put forward in the document of Tom K. which was felt by the outgoing Steering Committee to constitute a counter resolution. Later Comrade Thor changed this and along with Comrade Archie Shepp proposed that the three other positions be rejected and that the incoming PC draft a new document. They questioned the sincerity of the H.W. document stress on recruitment work inside the SWP and YSA.

Discussion was concluded on the perspectives discussion. Following the summaries of the four reporters, time was granted for translation of the full IMT Bureau report on the American situation, the SWP, and the perspectives of the IT as put forward in the H.W. resolution.

The report which had previously been given by the Bureau representative to the NAB meeting, argued that the H.W. document posed problems, in that it incorrectly viewed the degenerative process of the SWP as completed and in that context seemed to set in

motion a series of events leading to the expulsion of the IT and the establishment of the IT as a flimsy group outside of the SWP. It called for a hard political fight inside the SWP and proposed rejection of the H.W. document, cancellation of the conference and the opening of a discussion within the IMT.

The final votes on the perspectives discussion were:

1. On the motion from Archie Shepp and Thor L.: 3 for, 20 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting.
2. Alexander's counter-resolution: 2 for, 21 against, 1 abstention, 0 not voting.
Consultative: 0 for, 10 against, 0 abstaining, 0 not voting.
3. Amendments by Estreugal and Rahdrik: 8 for, 15 against, 1 abstention, 0 not voting.
Consultative: 2 for, 7 against, 1 abstention, 0 not voting.
4. General Line of Vincent's oral report for the PC proposal: 18 for, 6 against, 0 abstaining, 0 not voting. Consultative: 9 for, 1 against, 0 abstaining, 0 not voting.

Comrade Alexander made a four point motion in regard to the IMT Bureau statement which had been read by Vincent:

1. Stating agreement with the NAB in rejecting the position of the IMT Bureau.
2. Rejection of the motion of the Enlarged IMT Bureau.
3. Accepting the authority of the IMT Enlarged Bureau but pledging to seek to reverse the decision.
4. The opening of an immediate discussion in the IMT on North America.

The resolution passed 19 for, 4 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting, 1 absent.

The section of the Rahdnick-Estreugal amendments on the nature of the SWP were passed as the beginnings of a discussion within the IMT and the PC will welcome all contributions on the subject, but discussions between the IMT and IT on this matter will be a leadership to leadership basis.

RMG Greetings: Other Reports

The conference then heard a comrade from the RMG who brought greetings to the IT. She stated that the RMG fully identified with our Hebate and called for active collaboration between the RMG and IT in 4 areas: 1) the development of a perspectives for North America (2) the struggle within the IMT to break it of illusions concerning the SWP (3) a joint exchange of experiences in regard to interventions and party building (through the Old Mole, pamphlets, etc.) and (4) joint contacts at all levels.

Comrade Cisco then presented the proposed trade union resolution. He emphasized that crucial confrontations would occur in basic industry and spoke on the reasons for the delay in the response of the working class to ruling class initiatives (and of possible changes in this regard), on recent strike actions and demands, and the role of causes. He stressed the importance of the public employees unions in the general trade union struggle. He noted that the question of the Labor Party while not an immediate question is useful as a propaganda call. Discussion centered on local experiences with strike support activity and on the difference between proletarianization and implantation. The trade union resolution passed unanimously.

Inessa then introduced the Black Report. She rejected the idea that Blacks are a nation; discussed the concept of Black control of the Black community which she pointed out was whatever its merits, solely a democratic demand, not involving any question of self-determination. She described the special oppression of Blacks as racial-cultural and as part of the lower layers of the working class, and stated that they would play a vanguard role in the revolution. She discussed the concept of action committees which would aid in extending the organization of Blacks as a part of the working class struggle against oppression. She listed priorities in regard to recruitment of Black YSA'ers, intervention into the YSA and YSA-sponsored meetings,

Errol presented the position of the document "The National Question: Setting the Record Straight". He stressed that there should be no support whatever to nationalism, Black

or otherwise (although he felt that this was not a point in dispute). He stated sectoral movements would increase and that the working class must support all struggles against oppression. He considered support to preferential hiring and advancement to be a decisive question, and stated that "Jobs for All" was meaningless in this regard. The position of Black Control of the Black Community is inferior to the call for Community Control of the Ghettos. He argued that Blacks have the potential to become a nation. He stated that it is incorrect to only support working class parties saying that he called for critical support to LaRaza Unida Partȳes and other such formations.

Ophelia presented an amendment to the Black struggle section of the Hank Williams document as a counter to both Black resolutions. She argued that Trotsky was right in 1939 and stated we should not rule out the possibility of the development of a Black nation. She added that Mexico should be included in any discussion of North American perspectives.

There was a vigorous discussion in which Comrade Carlos argued that Blacks are a people/class in the sense of A. Leon's analysis of the Jews. A motion by Comrade Kirk to take no vote on any of the Black resolutions failed.

The votes of the delegates on the Black Struggle resolutions were as follows:

1. On the motion of Ophelia: 1 for, 19 against, 2 abstentions, 1 no vote, 1 absent.
2. On the motion from Errol (for "Setting the Record Straight): 5 for, 12 against, 6 abstentions, 0 not voting, 1 absent.
3. On motion of Inessa (in favor memorandum by Vincent): 15 for, 3 against, 5 abstentions, 0 not voting, 1 absent.

Vietnam

Next followed the discussion on Vietnam. Vincent spoke first in favor of the Palomar Position. He stated that the tendency could not survive in the American left without a clear understanding of where it stood on the Vietnamese revolution. The interest in methodology does not reflect a sectarian inward deviation, but the necessary foundation to build a firm cadre with an objective view of the SWP's theoretical heritage. He said the NLF was a proletarian force intent on establishing a workers state over the whole country and that dual power presently existed. The characterization of the Algerian Ben Bella regime as a workers and farmers government had been a mistake. Because the VCP had no subjective safeguards against becoming enmeshed in the process of bureaucratization, its leadership would have to be replaced. He emphasized the importance of international solidarity.

Elvis then reported on the counter-proposal from the Los Angeles comrades. He argued that it is a mistake to take theoretical and methodological positions on Vietnam now. He attacked certain concepts of the Palomar resolution, especially the idea that the Accords were a partial victory and that dual power exists now in the South. He saw Vietnam as a stalemate. He criticized the idea that a military victory by the NLF would automatically create a workers' state, pointing to Austria from 1945-55.

Carapace then introduced a counter-proposal - an amended form of the original Carapace 7-point Statement sponsored by both Carapace and Alec (who withdrew his original amendments to Palomar in favor of the revised Carapace document). He read the amendments, which eliminated a number of vague or misleading statements, according to Carapace. He labeled the VCP a revolutionary empiricist organization; it is a revolutionary party which jeopardized its very existence by breaking with the USSR.

There followed considerable discussion at the end of which a motion made by L.A. delegates to not vote on any position failed by 7 for, 16 against, and 1 absent.

The votes on the reports were:

1. The revised Carapace document: 3 for, 15 against, 2 abstentions, 4 not voting.
Consultative: 0 for, 9 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting.
2. Comrades from L.A. then withdrew their alternative position and introduced a four-point statement on Vietnam instead:
 1. Stressing the need for International solidarity.
 2. Calling for "Victory to the NLF" as a slogan.
 3. Noting the necessity to criticize the shortcomings of the VCP.
 4. Calling for continued discussion on Stalinism until the next conference.

- 13 for, 11 against, 0 abstaining, 0 not voting
 Consultative: 4 for, 2 against, 4 abstaining, 0 not voting.
3. The Palomar Resolution: 11 for, 10 against, 1 abstaining, and 2 not voting (initial vote) A revote was taken when Comrade Thor Ladislaw asked to change his "not voting" position to a vote against. The final vote on the Palomar resolution was: 11 for, 11 against, 1 abstaining, 1 not voting.
 Consultative: 6 for, 2 against, 4 abstaining, 0 not voting.
4. The Amended Palomar Resolution: 9 for, 12 against, 3 abstaining, 0 not voting.
 Consultative: 4 for, 5 against, 1 abstaining, 0 not voting.

YSA - Organization - Elections

Mike Patrick then gave a report on Work in the YSA. He stressed the need to work in regional locals first. The regional centers will draw in many of the regional comrades during the summer months thereby requiring stress on work in all the regional centers. There is need for a YSA profile; each area should provide empirical data for this. We plan regional tours, with a focus on new areas. The reporter proposed a special YSA commission, to aid the Tendency's intervention into the YSA. The general line of this report was accepted unanimously.

Hank Williams then gave the organizational report. He noted that the IT had been heterogeneous at birth in Toronto, some differences had been overcome and others further clarified. We need a major orientation to the YSA; we must fight to have the IMT push the democratization of the SWP, we are against any split in the SWP and must fight the LTF on this question. We will have another conference in February. We hope to have tours by IMT representatives. The newsletter will become biweekly going to the entire tendency while a PC mailing will go to the steering committee on a weekly basis. The Steering Committee will meet four times a year with the next meeting projected for the time of the YSA convention. It is necessary that the PC stop acting as a consensus leadership and function as a real political leadership eliminating ambiguities and vacillations. We must escape from our regionalist conceptions and the IT must stop the tendency toward being an assortment of pressure groups. A heavy stress must be put on basic Leninist-Trotskyist education.

Estreugal introduced the idea of a commuter PC. While both the supporters of the "commuter PC" and the outgoing PC recognized the shortcomings of the old PC as representative of the breadth of the Tendency, the commuter supporters argued for a PC in which all the residents would not have to live in Chicago. Rather the Chicago PC members would become a resident bureau for all day to day and emergency decisions, and full PC meetings would occur monthly to decide all important non-emergency decisions.

Others called for fighting the problems through more frequent Steering Committee meetings and "enlarged PC" meetings. They criticized the Estreugal position as a step backward toward less political centralization as costly and unworkable. A straw poll on the question of a commuter PC revealed that among the delegates 10 favored it, 13 opposed it, and 1 abstained.

The general line of the organizational report was accepted unanimously.

The open session of the conference ended with the singing of the International.

In closed session the delegates heard the report of the nominating committee. Discussion was opened and motivations and demotivations were made. A steering committee of 19 was elected, however one comrade who was elected felt it necessary to resign. An empty slot was left vacant so that the Steering Committee is of 18 with one empty slot and 10 alternate members.

Steering Committee Plenum.

The question of a commuter PC was debated again. The vote by the Steering Committee was: 7 for, 11 against, 1 absent. One "consultative" vote was added to the against votes.

Mike Patrick made a motion for a nine member PC which passed with a unanimous vote.

The PC will consist of the six PC members now resident in Chicago plus 3 other members of the Steering Committee not resident in Chicago at this time. The PC with the approval

of the Steering Committee will recommend the three additional members who will move to the center in Chicago.

A Review

The IT conference indicated that the Tendency still has many problems to overcome: discussion is not closed on some issues. The Center must be strengthened and regional attitudes overcome. The objective reality of our existence within the SWP/YSA conflicts in some cases with our subjective desires. The period between today and the February IT conference will be a difficult one in many ways. Any weaknesses and difficulties, however, must be assessed in the light of our gains and advances. The IT has developed considerably from its origins; from a loose confederation of local tendencies only tenuously oriented toward the FI, it has become a component part of the International Majority Tendency. We have not surrendered nor have we become cowed by the bureaucratic methods of the SWP/YSA leadership and we have extended considerably our freedom of criticism and action within these organizations.

Most importantly by our conference we demonstrated in practice our political and organizational alternative to the LTF. The IT conference was marked by free open and thorough discussion in which differing currents were viewed not as heresies to be stamped out, but as mirroring differing perceptions of the class struggle. Debate was not a tiresome prelude to annihilating opposition, but a healthy normal manner in which to hammer out a correct line. IT comrades for the first time were able to project, plan, and put into operation our policies and our structures. The result was that even the vigorous debate which marked the conference produced not despair over differences but enthusiasm and determination.

3. PREPARING LOCAL TENDENCY TASKS AND PERSPECTIVES

How to organize local T&P discussions:

The tasks and perspectives discussion is the key link between our general political orientation and the activity of each and every member. It should therefore be treated as one of the most important stages of the I.T.'s life and carefully prepared. The first task is to place it within the general national context of the political situation we face and the tasks of the I.T. as a whole has for itself. The second task is to review the local tendency's past work, to examine what was projected at the last T&P, what was actually achieved, whether the projections were realistic and if so why they succeeded or failed. This is the only way to put isolated incidents, feelings of personal failure or misunderstandings into a political framework and to work to improve every comrade's ability to function and the collective power of the group as a whole. The next step is to outline how the national tasks can be implemented locally, which ones are more relevant and why. Each main area of work should be examined in detail resulting in the delineation of specific responsibilities of individual comrades. The discussion should conclude in the election of an executive committee whose duty is to supervise the carrying out of these assignments. The fact that our areas of work are limited does not matter; what is important is our ability to analyze a political situation and find the best vantage point from which the impact of our small but united forces can have the greatest effect on changing the relationship of forces. Our work in the SWP and YSA can provide invaluable experience for a disciplined, fractional, communist intervention into difficult situations.

The main areas of work for local tendency units outlined at our conference were:

1) internal education and elaboration of our perspectives; 2) the YSA and SWP; 3) contact work for the F.I. Under the first point we can also include the need for better internal organization: taking and sending regular minutes to the center, raising the financial commitment to the tendency, learning to organize meetings more efficiently so that the time is dedicated to political issues (prepared reports, specific assignments). The educational program should be geared to the needs of the local: basics of Marxism, labor history, international discussion; teachers should be the most qualified and should accept close supervision. Discussions of articles from the international press, and of articles by local comrades to be submitted to the I.T. newsletter or foreign press (on exemplary struggles, background issues, etc.) should be organized.

The intervention into the YSA is the most important priority. Our chances of success are so threatening to the LTF that they have already called a "Majority Faction" against us. This only means we must refine our intervention even more. We must make a careful study of who is in the YSA, why they joined it, and why others might join. We must seek to develop situations where political discussion is possible: by exposing contradictions of the LTF's line, making realistic proposals for actions that correspond to the needs of the class struggle locally, engaging in joint activities as YSA'ers or party members, and demonstrating our capacity for analysis and organization. The issues are many: Chile, strikes, elections, repression, etc. While the atmosphere is more tense in the SWP, there are opportunities for gains even if only on the level of confusing the LTF and diminishing its ability to strike back. The main point which needs to be clarified is what level of activity we strive for in the YSA and SWP in order to have a chance of being considered as a serious alternative. Pure activism will not gain us respect: any critical minded comrade will soon realize whether he or she is conducting mindless activity and will turn on those who encouraged it. Gaining positions of organizational responsibility has not either given us any greater ability to win over comrades. What is needed is to be recognized as political people, with the capacity for judgement and action, and this can only be demonstrated by a steady involvement in the work of the organization alongside those we are seeking to win. We do not refuse "shitwork" but we demand the right to participate in meaningful responsible political activities. There are a certain number of activities which we can work on wholeheartedly or with relatively minor conflict: Chile work, CLUW, petitioning, Indochina, Farmworkers support, TU fractions, campus fractions,

various facets of election campaigns, forums, regional work, educationals. Where these assignments are refused, we should protest, where we can get them we should do our best. We should make this clear in the branch and local T&P's. This implies that all IT'ers make a regular effort to attend all meetings of branch or local, be active with YSA'ers and socialize with them. The coming agenda of each branch or local meeting, or of fraction meetings, should be carefully gone over, the important issues should be identified as well as the different leanings of comrades involved; then our approach should be outlined in detail including various contingencies. The same applies to our presence at forums, on demonstrations, or in answering phone calls: we should have a clear policy designed to achieve a particular political impact on the uncertainties of these comrades.

Finally the local tendency should insure the fullest possible audience for the views of the F.I. This means day to day contact work at the job, at school, or in the course of trade union or political activity. We can begin to develop a periphery of people who listen to us in our union situations, give them literature, and invite them for talks, even where the LTF attempts to block these, and we can even take actions given a favorable relationship of forces. In areas where we have a majority in the YSA we should seek to build model YSAs and recruit cadre. One of the chief tools has to be the sales of the international press and publications. Each local should make specific assignments for that. We have to get subscriptions to Imprecor, and sell it at every political event in the whole region, thus getting a feel for how different audiences react to FI politics. Reprints of particular articles may be useful at a given point. Comrades can take Militants and ISRs along with them as they are a good topic of conversation and all vanguard elements should be familiarized with it, as well as being a responsibility of membership in the SWP and YSA. Wherever this results in interest in the FI, comrades should explain in detail why these contacts must join the SWP and YSA to help build an American section of the FI. This involves a process of politicization of contacts by taking them to a wide range of activities, including SWP forums and other groups' political events, so that they come to understand the exact role of revolutionary Marxists in the left.

4. Our Tasks in the YSA

Inessa

To implement the orientation to YSA work approved by the conference all comrades must begin immediately, and maintain, a seriously coordinated effort. A commission of ten will act as a liaison with all comrades in local tendency units and as the primary communicating link with the center; however the tasks outlined require that all comrades immerse themselves in this perspective. The following are some immediate projects and more long-range tasks that we must begin to work on now:

1. The upcoming plenum of the YSA will be the weekend of July 4-5. Comrade Rich M. will head up this phase of YSA work. There are eight comrades of the IT who could attend and participate in counter reports and discussion at the plenum: the four on the national committee and four local organizers. We will approach Peter G. to ask for his collaboration. The other seven comrades will discuss the plenum reports, transportation subsidies, etc. The formation of a majority faction in the YSA which will be reported on separately, may result in an attempt to keep us from even participating in the plenum. Comrades should report all pertinent information. We have requested that a representative of the IMT be present at the plenum.

2) The center must have a comprehensive picture of the local and regional areas, and a realistic idea of the gains we can make. Forms will be sent to comrades of the areas and should be given serious consideration and filled out completely, and then returned to the center ASAP.

3) Regional traveling and follow-up will be an important aspect of YSA work. Some of our own regional probing can be done while fulfilling YSA assignments to petition campaign tours, USLA trips, etc, where we can speak to YSA comrades. However, the most returns will come from forays into the region, taking the FI press and IT documents with us, looking up the regional local or at large comrades; where we are only going by an address in the Militant or a name and address obtained by questionable sources our audacity must be

tempered by subtly. As some IT centers have an extremely large territory to cover, we should get to those areas where we have already laid some ground work before school recesses for the summer. In conjunction with this the center is currently discussing putting regional travelers on full time in Houston, Chicago, and New York. There are concrete needs for such assignments especially in Houston where it sometimes requires a full weekend of traveling to get to an area and back again. The tasks of the regional traveler could be expanded as necessary to include others of the myriad tasks of coordinating our YSA work. These three areas of the tendency in particular should discuss fully whether or not a comrade can be freed for such work, including an evaluation of the regional situation over the summer, finances, etc. Comrades should refer to a recent newsletter article for a listing of all the YSA locals and research which ones will fold over the next period, how many comrades in those locals will move from the city, etc.

4). A separate newsletter article will deal with the nature of our activity in the YSA; here we should deal with some of the specific points. All YSA comrades should participate in the on-going activities of the locals, including attending meetings, forums, interventions. There will be many regional comrades moving into the centers shortly in addition to the already resident contacts of the IT, that require a presence in the daily life of the locals to afford us the best hearing and recruitment. The newly formed YSA Majority Faction will mean a stepped up factionalism in many respects including slanders and distortions in greater degree; we can answer them and best gain the ear of unaligned or new recruits only if we maintain an active face. This also means carrying out assignments given us and seeking assignments in those areas that are in keeping with our political capabilities. In addition, we should request giving local reports, including counter T&P's that offer a positive political criticism and an alternative that avoids the approach they often attribute us with having - that of carping critics. Our interventions should be worked out collaboratively with all IT'ers of the given area with the aim of developing the tendency cadre we have.

5) Convention Discussion - it is projected that there will be a first draft of the political resolution in about a month, which can be circulated well in advance of the opening of the YSA discussion and worked on with the idea of sending in the completed document at the first announcement of the pre-convention discussion's opening. Other major and secondary documents must be initiated soon. On the form which will be sent to comrades it should be indicated which documents they are prepared to or wish to write. This is done in order to prevent a repeat of our last pre-convention discussion chaos and the number of contributions written on the same topics, leaving many important areas uncovered. All documents must contain practical suggestions and proposals for action so that we avoid an abstract discussion of the failings of the YSA leadership. In addition to our written intervention an oral counter-political perspectives report will be drafted by the center for use by the comrades, which should of course be modified to each area's needs. A preliminary list of documents the tendency should contribute to the YSA discussion include: 1) Theory of and nature of revolutionary leadership and organization, applying the FI discussion over democratic-centralism, the factionalism in the YSA and its distortion of the concept of democratic-centralism, and the responsibilities of the YSA leadership (failings, minority rights, etc.) 2) Record of the PST up to the current events. 3) Chile and the USLA campaign 4) Disputed FI questions, 5) Election campaigns, including national and campus elections, PRDF, etc.; 6) UFW work; 7) CLUW; 8) black work; 9) current trends in the U.S. working class.

6) To ensure adequate means of communication, all reports, contributions, and ideas for carrying out tasks should be sent to the center. Regular YSA reports should be on the agendas of the local tendency units and written up in detail into the minutes of the areas that are then sent in. All suggestions are welcome.

Page 44

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original bulletin

- Marty Dec 2013

IV. Other Internal Documents of the Internationalist Tendency

BULLETIN
OF THE
MIDWEST INSTITUTE
FOR
POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL STUDIES
NO.1

(Cover of IT Preconvention Bulletin #4)

FACING THE SEVENTIES

The Christian and Social action In Today's World

Bulletin , 4

April 1974

"Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum Classium"



(Cover of IT Preconvention Bulletin #5)


INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF AGGRESSION

THE POLITICS OF HUNGER AND FEAR IN
THE URBAN SETTING

Two Essays by Dr. Edward J. Leadbetter

Published As A Fraternal
Courtesy to the Cosmic
Current

May 1974



*Partial List of Pseudonyms Used by IT Members
In Their Internal Discussion Material*

Hank Williams
Vincent
Molly Macguire
Archie Shepp
Joseph Wedemeyer
Tom Paine
E. Pluribus
Thor Ladislaw
Cisco
Herman Meyer
D. Ahmad Estreugal ["The Armed Struggle"]
Nora Rahdrik ["Narodnik"]
Elvis
Inessa
Tom K.
Kirk
Ophelia
Carlos
Rico
Mitchell
Alec
Alexander
Mike Patrick
Carapace
Plastron
Gilbert
Kelly
Azdak
Antoine
Edward
Errol
Father Vermelt

Note on pseudonyms used by IT members

Hank Williams: The evidence shows that Williams is Bill Massey: (1) the IT newsletter reports that Williams attended the meeting of the "Enlarged IMT Bureau" prior to the IT national conference; (2) John Barzman reported to the Control Commission that Massey had attended an IMT leadership meeting at around that time.

Vincent: The evidence shows that Vincent is John Barzman. The IT document, "A Reply to Comrade Massey from Los Angeles," states that the two ITers proposed by the IT PC to attend the World Congress as fraternal observers were "Massey and Vincent."

Available on request from I.T. center

- I. Bulletin of the Midwest Institute For Political and Social Studies No. 1.
 1. Is the Question of Constructing the American Section of the Fourth International Posed? Let's Pos. It. by Carapace, Plastron, Kelly, Molly Macguire, Azdak, Antoine, - N.Y.; Alec - Chicago. March 5, 1974
 2. A Letter from Bob L. to the Political Committee, March 13, 1974.
 3. A Letter from Ron W. regarding Discussion on Stalinism; Los Angeles, March 22.
 4. Letter from Ron W. submitting "The National Question: Setting the Record Straight" - Los Angeles, March 22, 1974.
 5. Palomar Position on Vietnam, By Mitchell and Vincent
 6. Amendements to Palomar Position on Vietnam, by Alec, Chicago.
 7. Addition to "Is the Question of Constructing, etc...." by Alec, Chicago

- II. Sociological Journal of the South, Bulletin Number 15, April 1974.
 1. Which Way Forward? Draft Political Perspectives Resolution - by Hank Williams April 14, 1974.

- III. Sociological Journal of the East, Bulletin Number 3, 1974. April, 1974.
 1. Reply to ML - by C.M., from D.C.
 2. It Is Still Necessary to Draw Lessons from the Failure of the Chinese Trotskyists - by F. Wang and K. Lau, submitted by Hank Williams
 3. The Political Struggle in Chile and the Relation to the Solidarity Movement by Tom Paine
 4. Reasons for the Amendements to Palomar, by Alec

- IV. Facing the Seventies, The Christian and Social Action in Today's World, Bulletin Number 4, April, 1974.
 1. Report on the Palomar Position, by Vermelt, April 19, 1974, Chicago
 2. Which Way Forward? A Step Back, by Rico, April 25, 1974, Chicago.
 3. A reply to Comrade Massey from Los Angeles, April 23, 1974.
 4. Some Comments on Organizational Norms in the Present Context, by Vincent

- V. Institute for the Study of Agression, The Politics of Hunger and Fear in the Urban Setting, Two Essays by Dr. Edward J. Leadbottom, Published as a Fraternal Courtesy to the Cosmic Current, May 1974.
 1. Comrades of the Internationalist Tendency - by Berta Langston and Bob Langston, Catskill, New York.
 2. Rejection of Resignation - statement by the Political Committee, May 5, 1974.
 3. "...Our Main Struggle Is to Win the Ranks of the YSA and Party..."??? - Proposed Amendements to Draft "Which Way Forward?" Introduction and explanation of Amendements and Amendements, by D. Ahmad Estreugal and Nora Radnik, May Day, 1974.

- VI. Bulletin of Social Economics Number 6 - May, 1974.
 1. On the Vietnam Discussion, by Nora Rahdrik, May 3, 1974.
 2. Strike Support Activity in the Houston Branch, by Edward, Houston
 3. The Labor Party, the SWP, and Us. by Carlos, Bay Area
 4. On the Palomar Position on Vietnam, Passed by Los Angeles - 7 for, 1 against, 1 abstention, 1 absent.
 5. Alternate Position on Vietnam, Passed by Los Angeles - 7 for, 1 against, 1 abstention, 1 absent, April 29, 1974.
 6. On our Orientation to the Ranks of the SWP/YSA, by Archie Shepp, Houston, May Day, 1974.

- VII. New Horizons in the Compensation of Working People, by E. Pluribus
1. Draft Resolution on Trade Union Work
- VIII. Bulletin of Social-Economic Studies, Issue #7, May 1974. This Month: Value Price and Profit and the Modern Consumer.
1. Carapace Statement on Vietnam - A 7-point Program for the I.T., May 5, 1974.
2. The Black Question: A Problematic Point and a Turn to Tasks - Inessa, Chicago May 15, 1974.
3. American Revolutionaries Must Know Where They Stand on the Vietnamese Revolution - by Vincent, Mitchell, Hank Williams, Mike Patrick.
4. Toward Greater Clarity on Black Work: Or Some Preliminary Notes toward an Initial Outline of Our First Contribution in the Way of a Black Document - by Joseph Weydemeyer and Herman Meyer, St. Louis Internationalists,
- IX. Journal of Science Fiction Series I: Dick Tracy and the Escargots
1. A little background information is necessary - by Tom K. Oakland, May 15, 1974 (restricted)
- X. Journal of Science Fiction Series II: Dick Tracy and the Moon Maid, Bulletin #10
1. Memorandum on Some Key Issues Raised by the Black Liberation Struggles, by Vincent
- XI. Counter Resolution "Unless we Believe the SWP to be Reformable..." (restricted)
- XII. Amendments to Political Resolution - by Los Angeles.

June 14, 1974

From : Gilebert, for the IT PC
To: IT Steering Committee Members, Area Organizers, Financial Directors
and Publications Directors.

Dear Comrades;

Enclosed is material that we of the PC feel is very important to bring to your attention and in that sense the attention of the Tendency as a whole. We ask that you give this material your priority consideration and that you act on it immediately.

This includes 1) a proposed sub quota for a sub drive for Inprecor during the months of July and August. 2) Proposed quotas for the regular bundles of Inprecor-the Old Mole and the International Magazine. 3) a form to fill out and send back to the center concerning # 1 and 2. This should be sent back no later than the 24th of June.

4) A bulletin on the need for financial aid to the center and the need for regularization of payments(and in some cases payments period).

5) The proposed tour schedule for a Comrade from the IMT who will be here in the next few days.

The PC asks Steering committee members or local organizers to take prompt actions in dealing with these matters. In those areas where no steering committee members exist we ask the comrades or the comrade to take prompt action. For further information call 312-871-3277(this is the number in the center-as people have been calling 281-2142 in error). or write to Bill Massey 2602 N. Burling Street, Chicago, Illinois 60614.

Thank you for your troubles with warm Leninist greetings

Gilbert-ITPC

TO ALL AREAS OF I.T.
ATTENTION: LOCAL ORGANIZER AND PUBLICATIONS DIRECTOR

June 14, 1974

FROM: GILBERT, FOR THE IT PC
TO: ALL IT LOCALS

REF: PUBLICATIONS: INPRECOR-OLD MOLE AND INTERNATIONAL MAGAZINE

1. The Political Committee proposes a subscription drive for Inprecor to be held during the months of July and August. The sub drive will begin on July 1st and end on August 30th, 1974. Each area of the Tendency will be assigned a quota to fill. The total that we are shooting for is five hundred subscriptions. Any subs collected prior to July first will be counted for the quota.

2. The PC also proposes a quota for the local areas for the sales of individual copies of Inprecor, the Old Mole and the International Magazine. The quota for the Inprecor subscription drive and the individual bundles per area are based on the same figures. This sets one set of figures for the four different categories, which we list in the order of the priority as we see it: 1) Inprecor subscriptions, 2) Inprecor individual sales, 3) Old Mole individual sales and 4) Individual sales of the International.

3. The Inprecor is a fortnightly magazine, that is every two weeks, whereas the Old Mole is a monthly newspaper and the International magazine is a quarterly. The quota system for these publications as well as the sub drive for the Inprecor for the months of July and August is the following one per area:

BOSTON----5	Minneapolis----10	Other---93
N.Y.-N.J.-L.I.---60	Iowa City----10	
Philadelphia---12	Kansas City---5	<u>Total----500</u>
Washington D.C.---35	Los Angeles---50	
Chicago---75	San Jose----20	
Madison-Milwaukee---15	Bay Area----25	
St. Louis---10	Portland----15	
Houston---60		

The Center will receive the bundles of all these publications from the source and then distribute them to the areas. The Center will send the full payment for the total bundle to the senders. Then the center will bill the local areas for the material sent to them. In each case the Center will reduce the mailing costs from the total receipts that the publications will raise and then adjust the billing to the local areas to pass along any "profit" to the local areas. In other words the Center will not try to raise money for itself out of these sales. We will stay dependent on the sustainer base for our incomes. At this time the Inprecor costs us .25¢ per copy and we sell it for .50¢, -for a bundle of 500 we will pay \$125.00 and if all of them are sold we receive \$250.00 dollars. Out of the \$250.00 we will pay the costs of the shipment of the total bundle to the Center from the source and the customs, in addition to paying for the costs of mailing the bundle to the local areas. What is left after this we will pass along to the areas for their "profit". Whatever that figure is it will be small so that it is in no way the incentive for the sales of these publications-our incentive is the political one. The same method will be followed with the Old Mole which will give us a bundle rate also and the International which we pay .50 for and sell for \$1.00.

All bills from the Center for local bundles must be paid promptly or we can not afford to continue sending that area its bundle. If an area must cut its bundle, it should do so promptly so that it does not get into a financial hole. We are still at the stage where bills must be paid or no goods can be distributed and the Center will in that sense act as a repressive arm and stop bundles when payments are not received. All checks whether they are for subs or for the bundles should be paid on the receipt of the bundle and not after the bundle is sold. All checks should be made out to Bill Massey and sent to 2602 N. Burling Street, Chicago Illinois 60614.

IT PC Internal Communication
of June 14, 1974

INPRECOR

The subscription drive for Inprecor is one of the key tasks of the Tendency at this time. This cannot be overstated. When in the first edition of Inprecor it is stated in the Editorial: "Because of its international mode of distribution, INPRECOR, can survive only if a large enough number of subscriptions are taken--and taken quickly." They are not whistling "Its Only a paper moon". Without subscriptions, Inprecor will stop coming out. We cannot depend on the SWP to provide the sub base in the U.S. for this publication of the Fourth International, only we can do it. Therefore even though it will be most difficult we must go on a forced march to provide these subs. This is the first such drive that the Tendency has been asked to undertake, it will mark our seriousness as to how we fulfill this task.

INPRECOR is the boldest venture on the part of the International. A revolutionary journal coming out every two weeks in French, Spanish, German and English. No revolutionary journal like this has appeared since the beginning of the Communist International and that rested not only on the communist movement in Europe but on the state power of the Soviet Union under Lenin and Trotsky. While the Trotskyist movement has made major gains over the entire past period and this is fundamentally reflected in the birth of Inprecor, it is still a daring venture to begin this journal. If we are successful it can only ensure the continuing growth on a global scale of the political influence of our movement. This journal is a direct reflection of the revolutionary activity of our world cadre and the theoretical lessons in action. We can use it to build our influence in this bastion of world reaction only if we begin with a military like approach toward the securing of a beach-head for its development. It will serve many purposes, first as a guide to our political outlook, second as a guide to the ranks of the YSA and SWP whom we are trying to reach, third as a vehicle to spread the ideas and respect of the Fourth International in the advanced layers of radicals and revolutionaries not yet in the Trotskyist movement, and fourth and not inconsequential, as a direct tool of contact work in reaching, politicizing and drawing to us, the advanced workers on our jobs. With a sale of a sub to a worker contact we lay the basis for an ongoing political relationship and discussion topic. Every two weeks it will take up the most important events concerning the struggles of the world working class and oppressed peoples in struggle, and give a Marxist analysis in addition to the strategy being implemented globally to push forward the revolutionary struggles. Inprecor is the biggest propaganda gun in our arsenal. In this the first stage we must implant the gun so that we can fire it. This means selling those subs. This is a political task of the first magnitude. The fact that the list of contributors to this journal include Ernest Mandel, Livio Maitan, Pierre Frank, Pierre Rouseset, Tariq Ali, Alain Krivine, the leaderships of the Latin American revolutionary movements and the most active participants in the class struggle globally makes it a very interesting and important journal that can be used to arm the advanced layers here and give them a cohesive approach both theoretically and organizationally. This is our epoch and Inprecor is our sword.

1. The Center will bill all the local areas for the first issue. The second issue will soon be out and the bill for that will be sent with it. The initial costs of the first two bundles necessitate that the areas pay .50 a piece for the copies they received. Future issues will go down somewhat. Make all bundle payments payable to Bill Massey.
2. All subs are to be sent to the Center which will send them and the checks accompanying them to Inprecor. If you have already subscribed and sent your funds to Inprecor, notify the Center as to how many subs were sent and for whom.
3. The Center will mail out sub blanks to the local areas with the final sub quota list. We have been informed that the Inprecor will have in addition to its yearly air mail sub for \$16.00 (which may be adjusted) two other airmail introductory subs: a 6 month intro for \$7.00 and a 3 month intro for \$3.50. However try to push the yearly airmail sub first in that it gives a more long range base and cuts down on the necessity for another drive right away. In addition to the yearly and intro airmail there is the yearly sea mail sub for \$7.50. (The L.A. cdes have gotten the ball rolling already with a number of subs (10-4 for airmail yearly and 6 for sea mail yearly).

4. We provide a blank to be filled out by each area and sent back to the center. We expect that each area will hold a discussion in the next week and decide whether to accept the proposed quota for subs to Inprecor and for the bundles of Inprecor as well as the Old Mole and International. We ask that your subscription quota as well as the others be coldly discussed as to what can actually be done. While we want to make a push we don't want to become like the Wolforth grouping which is sales crazy. If by exerting the major effort you can that you can't accept this quota then revise it. However, be aware that the Center assumes that it was being somewhat conservative in assigning these quotas. This letter should reach all areas no later than the 17th of June that gives you until the 24th to have your answer (the filled out form) back to the center. Then the center will publicize the final fund drive quota. This work is not in place of carrying out our other tasks such as YSA and Party work but it is meant to augment it and vice versa.

THE OLD MOLE ALL PAST DEBTS FROM THE LOCAL AREAS TO THE OLD MOLE HAVE BEEN PAID BY THE CENTER. THEREFORE IF YOU OWE ON AN OLD MOLE BUNDLE OR THE CHILE SUPPLEMENT DO NOT SEND THE MONEY TO THE OLD MOLE. INSTEAD PUT IT IN YOUR LOCAL TREASURY.

2. In the future all Old Mole bundles will be ordered from and distributed by the Center in Chicago. Do not place orders in Canada but in Chicago.

3. Like the Inprecor the Old Mole bundle must be paid for regularly or it will hold up future bundles that you would receive. We do not get a bundle rate on this yet.

4. The quota system for Old Moles is the same as the Inprecor sub quota and Inprecor sales quota on a total of five hundred. Old Mole is a monthly.

5. Designate what your check is for when paying for Inprecor or Old Moles or Internationals or subs etc. This is the only way we can keep the books straight.

The Old Mole plays a different role than Inprecor in that it is a newspaper and is the paper of the Canadian section of the IMT. People in the U.S. have a very chauvanist attitude toward Canada, this is a good way to combat this attitude in action. The Mole like the whole development of the RMG-GMR has been a beacon to us and a main stay in our own development. It is the comrades of the North who brought out the consciousness of a Red North America which is the reflection of the reality of the upcoming revolution in this continent. Lets continue to share this understanding, and continue to develop a readership for this publication here in the more backward section of the interlocked triangle of the soon to be Red North America.

INTERNATIONAL MAGAZINE

The International Magazine which is a quarterly remains an important part of our propaganda approach. It is a most serious theoretical journal of Trotskyism and should seriously be read by all of our comrades for its political value. It is a magazine that will have an appeal to those who are seriously trying to come to grips with Marxist idea in this country. Likewise it also reflects the dynamism of the British section of the Fourth International which in a short number of years has gone from being a small group to nearly 1,000 revolutionaries battling in what was up until the Second World War the major imperialist bastion. Today the struggles of the British working class and the struggles of the Irish masses are an integral part of the global class struggle. The development of the IMG in this circumstance holds many lessons for us. For the first time in ages the development of an Internationalist approach combined with the day to day struggles of the British workers is to be found in the reality of the politics of the IMG and reflected in the International magazine, the U.S. still lags behind in this sense.

All the same policies on sales of the International are the same as the Inprecor and Old Mole except that it is quarterly and that we get it for .50¢ per copy and sell it for \$1.00. This will be reflected in the billing of the areas after costs of shipping are deducted.

A BULLETIN ON FINANCES: (Or "WHILE THERE IS NOT YET A CRISIS THERE COULD BE IF..

The treasury of the Tendency has fallen below the level that is necessary in order to maintain our past level of development. In large part this has been caused due to the costs of the conference, the payment of the debts on the Old Mole, and the Chilean supplement, the initial payment on the Inprecor and the costs of travel to various areas of the Tendency and abroad. Also most areas have lagged somewhat in their payments just prior to the conference and after.

Many areas have not adopted the recommendation of the Steering Committee of a \$7. per person sustainer per week to the center. While we know that this is not always easy, it is a small sum considering the inflated state of the dollar. In the coming period with our plans for regional work, for getting more material out to the Tendency (such as the newsletter to all members-PC minutes to the Steering committee-a regular monthly bulletin) continued travel in order to keep the Tendency leadership informed as to the local developments as well as giving the Tendency members as a whole the chance to meet with its leadership and make its views known to them in a first hand manner. Travel within the IMT, not only to Europe but to Canada, Mexico, Japan and elsewhere. All of these things cost money. In addition we want to have a really interventionist role in the YSA preconvention discussion nationally and that will cost funds.

In the next period we want to free up one of the full time staff to do as much preparation and coordination of the preparation of the North American perspectives document, this will necessitate that the other full timer spend time on the organizational needs of the Tendency which now includes the handling of the publications in a professional manner. This all costs money.

We have all learned many bad lessons from the leadership policies of the Party. We do not seek to emulate them in any area. They make a fetish of finances while neglecting the political development of the ranks we seek to do the opposite our fetish must be the political development of the ranks which includes the leadership that the Tendency has chosen to represent it in this period. However, we cannot take a light-minded approach to finances or everything else will be just so much good intentions. Therefore we ask that comrades send in their back payments which on the whole have increased in the aftermath of the conference. That all areas adopt a policy of regular payments to the center based on their membership figures and with the \$7.00 per member average as close to a reality as possible. We have a tour coming up which is very important and it cannot be conducted unless our finances are in shape.

Some areas such as Houston and Philadelphia have been models financially as well as in other ways. Other areas have tried very hard to improve, other areas have been very slip shod in this respect. All have the same rights as members of the Tendency. Now none of our comrades at this time are rich people. Our Tendency is made up of working people for the most part. This means that we don't depend on a few angels to finance us but we depend on the collective effort of the Tendency as a whole-if we are unsuccessful in motivating and fulfilling this need the entire collective will fail. We ask that comrades consider this seriously and take responsibility for this matter.

While we motivate any gifts or financial donations over and above the regular amounts that comrades give, we depend on the regular payments of the comrades and the areas. Therefore we ask that comrades please try to pay up and then regularize your payments. In each of the areas there must be a financial consciousness developed by the local leaderships. Those areas that have not been paying regularly must do so. Those areas where only a few comrades pay must spread out the responsibility and thereby increase it; those areas who have not been paying anything at all.

We plan to help get out pamphlets on the Sprarticists, on the revolutionary movement in Africa and a reissue of Pierre Franks History of the F.I. in the next period as well as subsidize YSAers travelling to the Plenum in addition to the trip of the IMT rep and 1 person to accompany him. Please help, we hate to ask for money but it is necessary. Comradely Gilbert for the PC of the IT

PUBLICATIONS FORM-TO BE FILLED OUT AND RETURNED
Immediately

TENDENCY LOCAL _____ Number of Cdes _____
(name of area)

Comrade assigned to Publications _____

address _____ Phone # _____

address to send bundles of Inprecor-Old Mole and Internationals _____

QUOTA ACCEPTED BY THE TENDENCY FOR INPRECOR SUBSCRIPTION DRIVE _____

QUOTA ACCEPTED BY THE TENDENCY FOR BUNDLE OF INPRECOR _____
(fortnightly)

QUOTA ACCEPTED FOR BUNDLE OF OLD MOLE _____
(monthly)

Quota Accepted for Bundle of International Magazine _____
(Quarterley)

ADDITIONAL REMARKS _____

Please discuss these questions in the local Tendency groups and then make decisions and mail this back to the Center so that we can proceed. This should be back in the Center no later than the 24th of June. Thank you, comrade.

IMT REP. TO TOUR MAIN TENDENCY AREAS

A comrade of the IMT Bureau will make a tour of the IT in the coming period. Comrades who attended the recent conference were made aware of this visit. Now we can give the proposed schedule for the tour. The comrade will arrive in New York City on the 19th of June and will attend the Socialist Workers Party plenum there as well as comrades John B. and Bill M. who have been invited as IEC observers. The comrade will also attend the YSA plenum which will also be attended by Cde. Rich M., Mark L. John H., and the IT comrades who are also organizers of locals of the YSA, which includes Long Island, Paterson, New Brunswick, and Iowa City. In addition John and Bill are requesting to attend this Plenum as observers.

It is not possible for the comrade to visit every area so that there will have to be a preparation for meetings in a central location to allow the maximum number of comrades to meet with the comrade and discuss. The following is the proposed tour of the Tendency as worked out by the PC.

June 20 thru June 23 - - - - - The SWP Plenum in N.Y.C.
June 23 evening(a Sunday night)- - - Mtg. of IT cdes from New York-N.J.
L.I., Philadelphia-Boston.

Monday June 24-25 26- - - - - Houston

Thurs. to Sat. June 27-28-29 - - - - - Los Angeles

Sunday June 30, Mon.&Tues. July 1&2- - - - - -The Bay Area (On Sunday
June 30 a meeting of IT
members from Portland-SF-
Oakland-Berkeley-San Jose.

Wed. July 3- - - - - Chicago- meeting with ITPC

Thurs. July 4 thru Sunday July 7th- - - - The YSA Plenum in New York
Sunday July 7th- - - - an evening meeting with the IT Cdes. in the N.Y.-
N.J., L.I., Boston and Phila. areas.

July 8- - - - - New York
July 9th- - - - - a day of rest

July 10th and 11th- - - - - -Washington D.C.

July 12-13-14-- - - - - Meeting with IT cdes in the Chicago
Minneapolis-Madison-Milwaukee-Kansas
City, Iowa City and St. Louis areas.

July 15-16-17-----NAB

*These meetings are just for IT members. Arrangements will attempt to be made to allow comrade C. to meet with cdes who have not yet rejoined the IT but this is to be arranged separately and secondarily.

Arrangements are being made to work out a common bloc in the YSA plenum with Cde. Peter Gr. who is a member of the YSA NC and who left the IT. Cde Peter who was consulted by us said he is open to discussing such a bloc. The YSA N.O. turned down Peter's offer to resign his position since Peter felt that he was elected as an IT rep. The IT leadership previously notified Peter that we had no objections to his remaining on the NC.

IS THE QUESTION OF CONSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN SECTION OF
THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL POSED? LET'S POSE IT.

BY: CARAFACE, PLASTON, KELLY, MOLLY MACGUIRE, AZDOK,
ANTOLINE--NEW YORK; ALEC--CHICAGO
Submitted: March 5, 1974

INTRODUCTION

We don't think that what we propose in this document is earthshaking or new and original. The problems posed are those that many sections of the 4th have already faced and begun to tackle. However the questions we've raised are very important and fundamental. Our eventual success depends upon an adequate answer to these questions. We have proposed areas for debate but have not begun this debate--this we shall do in forthcoming documents. We have weighed our words carefully and we may well form a group in the tendency in order to better wage this debate. Some will think that we are trying to move too fast, others will say that we're trying to be provocative and irresponsible. We've simply attempted to center the debate. We know that some of our formulations may not be well presented, we know that others will be proven false; yet, the general method of this document is correct and productive. We are confident that history will absolve us.

Forward to the American Section of the Fourth International!

CENTER THE DEBATE-- BUILD THE ORGANIZATION

The necessity for a syncretical exposition of the tasks of the hour and the conditions in which we struggle poses the key problem of structuring the process of debate through which we will take our first timid steps toward developing a revolutionary organization of the 4th in the United States. The key question facing us today is thus the development of our political line here (we recognize the limits placed upon such an elaboration as a line is developed in its application). The formation of our political strategy can only be achieved if we avoid diversions that could lead us to separate ourselves from the essential contribution we can make to the 4th and we repeat this is the development of a political line for building the organization in the U.S. and nothing else. Therefore, we pose the question of which topics must and must not be discussed and in what manner the tendency can approach them: how do we center the debate?

This question is all the more timely as serious mistakes have been committed by the tendency leadership and these, in general, are being committed in the manner of sectarian deviation reminiscent of the S.P. sect and its bastard offspring. We argue for a break with the traumatic demoralism inherited from our passage in the S.P. so that we may correct the tendency's heterogeneity, its dilettante and outdated style of militantism, its insufficient political criteria for organizing our militants and giving them a strategy for struggle in the S.W.P., its inability to allocate our forces in function of our priorities. . . . In this regard, two examples are explanatory. First, there is the Vern-Ryan episode. The initial internal discussions (circulated quasi-officially by the tendency) focused attention on positively secondary questions and had the further inconvenience of tending to divert our new comrades' back to some ludicrous, ancient, internal debate in the S.P. The S.P. debate--with few exceptions--has always been a theoretical poorhouse due in large part to the fact that we are in the imperialist camp's stronghold and to the S.P.'s party patriotism. But the problem here is that a comrade or a group of comrades, whether they pay for the material or not, cannot take it upon themselves to launch a discussion or a debate or widely circulate documents without the organization's approval; this is not centralism, it opens the door to chaos and it is absolutely inadmissible. . . . This practice must be stopped and only the Steering Committee can define the framework of a debate and then delegate a commission to organize it. More importantly, however, is that we cannot afford at this time a divisive and unproductive, abstract, intellectual discussion on Stalinism.

the time of day a workers state comes into existence, Vern-ryan, Dan Ryan, Vietnam or on international questions, questions for which the 4th already has positions. The tendency doesn't have the time to do this: it cannot afford to do this and it will not focus the debate on our key task and our key contribution to the 4th. This doesn't mean that the SC couldn't motivate the opening of discussion on certain international questions that may directly effect our work--i.e. Latin America and Moreno's coming collapse. Also, under the circumstances we are not opposed to a literary debate on stalinism, etc. AFTER the YSA convention. Another bad example is the IS's handling of the YSA convention discussion. Here again we saw a similar problem--an inability to focus on the essential and allocate forces in relation to priorities. It was inexcusable that the IS resolution did not appear until convention time. This not only prevented the resolution's coming under criticism from the YSA IS'ers and independents and thus allowing us to recognize and profit from its strengths and weaknesses in the debate, the resolution arrived too late to be an effective organizing tool around which we could gather YSA'ers, our own included. Why did this happen? (Obviously the problem is not just with the mistakes of one comrade (although this comrade in charge of the IS resolution found the time to write four or five other documents which were interesting and well written but again secondary and we recognize that the delay was partially due to an attempt to receive suggestions from other comrades across the country), but rather with the tendency's lack of clarity in determining, and we say it again, priorities--the priorities of an organization in construction. Also appearing in the convention discussion were 5 or 6 documents from all over the country, all with different titles and all saying the same thing. One further point in this regard, we are disappointed that this subtle "vern-ryanism" kept cropping up in the convention interventions and documents purporting to be the positions of the IS. This was wrong even if it was "thought" that nobody would disagree with the particular or so subtle points being made. Finally, the v-r document on Vietnam, highly touted as an exciting contribution to Trotskyism, was not only totally non-explanatory vis-a-vis the Vietnamese revolution but misrepresented Rousset's positions especially concerning bureaucracy in the VCP and the inadequate fight against it. It smacked of sectarianism and demonstrated that two leadership comrades could not keep their attention on the essential problem of developing an organization with a line in the U.S.

BUILD THE INTERNATIONAL TO BUILD THE SECTION

In brief, it is time for comrades to stop playing at the little theoretician; if some comrades cannot cease and desist we propose that their most valuable contributions be circulated only in the SC and IS leadership. We propose in the interest of integrating the tendency: the immediate acceptance of all the 4th International's positions, that the tendency so declare and so act and that debate on these broad questions (immediately non-practical) be closed in the tendency for one year. There could be rare exception to this, subject to SC approval. The tendency thus gives priority to building the International by giving priority to developing a dialectic of our sectors of intervention here and trusts the International leadership to handle the far-reaching international questions for another year. We would like our proposals in the following sections of this document to be considered as a step toward defining an initial and productive framework for the debate.

TOWARD A DIALECTIC FOR INTERVENTION

The transformation of the tendency into a revolutionary organization has been correctly recognized by the SC to be the number one item on the agenda. Developing a strategy for the construction of a revolutionary organization cannot be simply reduced to good intentions and a desire, orthodox in the eyes of Marxist theory but without any great practical-tactical portent, to implant ourselves in the class. The necessary strategy, to the contrary, must conceive and expound the complementarity and interaction of our possible areas of intervention, that is to say, the dialectic of our entire intervention in the class struggle. The implantation of revolutionary nuclei in the class is always a primary objective, yet, this implies that we must simultaneously conquer points of support outside the industrial center and that we must make bourgeois reformism retreat from areas where its grip is the weakest--we must take advantage of

and implant ourselves in the "weak links". The successful work that we do among students and teachers, for example, favors by the echo it receives the popularization of revolutionary ideas in the heart of the working class itself. Until there is a revolutionary organization implanted to some significant degree in the class, student struggles can possibly be an example for workers struggles (France, Pakistan). The gathering of certain social layers around the proletariat, and the prestige that can be gained by participation in mass struggles in the periphery is very important for a new organization and a necessary first step. The strategy for the construction of a revolutionary organization must combine our main and central efforts toward implantation in the class--and this central focus must be determinate regarding all our other political options--with a serious attempt to develop the credibility of our organization in the so-called marginal and peripheral layers. We must also consider the attempt to build some sort of unity in action with other revolutionary groups to give us a striking force and a bit more weight, by so doing we can use to a maximum the subjective and objective complementarity of our dialectic of sectors of intervention--our strategy for building the American section of the 4th. The United States is in an economic crisis, Watergate is the outer face of a thoroughgoing crisis of the entire American political system. It's a continuing problem for the ruling class and it's going to get worse for them. Watergate caught Nixon and his cohorts in the midst of a major overhaul of the executive branch of the state, minus the authority of the old structures and with the new ones not yet in place. This crisis remains in the limelight and has become part and parcel of the problems of unemployment and inadequate wages. Signs of mobilization and radicalization in the American working class have appeared: there have been strikes against speed-ups and against the rationalization of employees, Lordstown is an example, struggles around working conditions, against the wage freeze, important responses against anti-strike legislation, strikes for 30 hours work with 40 hours pay, wildcat strikes against the wishes of the union bureaucracy. There is every indication that 1974 will see the spread of these kinds of movements. Right now the American worker must contend with the unprecedented increase in prices and in unemployment. Workers are coming to understand what the results of the energy crises will be and they know that they're paying for it. There is increasing dissatisfaction in the union ranks and we've witnessed the appearance of militant local committees. This radicalization around the working class and its problems will show its effect in the racial minorities and could give impetus to student struggles led by revolutionaries. The absence of any strong CP or Social-Democracy leaves the field relatively wide open to us thus making the task of forming the junction between the new vanguard and the lessons of the Left Opposition easier for us than it is for our European comrades. Yes, the day is past when anything outside the SWP sect means political death. Still, we must be cautious and not have a conception of the proletariat that is too legendary, our implantation will be a difficult task. We must develop an analysis permitting us to appreciate the weak points and the resources of bourgeois political control of the working class so that we may strike out at these weak points. That is to say, that just as there is a combined and unequal development of the world system, there is a combined and unequal development of the working class. Certain areas of the classic proletariat may be faster in coming around. Also we can't have an ossified approach to the petty-bourgeoisie. The accumulation of capital and monopolistic consolidation disintegrates certain middle layers and throws them into the ranks of the proletariat. These new layers that one hesitates to call marginal are sometimes already quasi-organic allies of the proletariat. Let's, therefore, direct the debate toward defining the strategically determinate areas of work for the construction of a revolutionary organization in the USA. Some criteria could be traditions of struggle, economic perspectives, implantation of the CP and other currents, degree of political organization, etc.....

THE FUNDAMENTAL AXIS

Today, the exploitation of the working class is coming to be widely recognized as a daily reality. To reaffirm the priority of political work in the working class as a credible and effective organization is also to reaffirm a fundamental tenet of Marxism: the

historic role of the working class. The pre-conditions for a real and fruitful implantation in the class is above all a question of forming our political perspectives. Today the working class is politically unarmed. Militant American workers, not educated about concepts such as the revolutionary crises, dual power etc. rarely find answers to their problems that go beyond a simple desire to change administrations. To answer to the problems of unemployment, wages, productivity, work conditions, to pose the question of workers control, we must elaborate a transitional program around the theme of workers control for the U.S.A. Already, spontaneous and sporadic struggles are being waged by certain parts of the class on problems of work conditions and spectacular forms of struggle are being employed. The paradox of a capitalist plant where a handful of workers occupying a nerve center can paralyze an entire factory gives us an idea of the possibilities present in the struggles of the vanguard workers. Granted, most of the American working class is not unionized; still, the unions are the most powerful organizations of the class struggle here. In a period of management crackdown, the legal cover provided by the unions may appear to most workers as a minimum guarantee of protection without which they will be less willing to fight. Thus our political work in the unions is a principle task. We can't be satisfied with organizing a "trade union tendency" but must rather animate a different sort of practice based on direct action that challenges de facto the legality of the bosses, giving political meaning to even the little struggles and pointing towards what a mass militant workers organization could be. However, we must also develop an intervention for non-unionized sections of the class--they could become quite dynamic being less under the bureaucracy's control. The working class will not become radical and political in one fell swoop. This radicalization will be very differentiated and we must see that, in this context, a Labor Party is neither desirable or likely. We don't rule out the possibility of some formation arising calling itself the Labor Party but this, in the imperialist stronghold, will most assuredly be no more than the third capitalist party. Debate on this point would, however, be very educational. Remember-- a small but significant implantation by us would have an important impact on the entire political life of this country. Another area for debate would be on the feasibility of constructing neighborhood committees touching on problems of housing, rent, transportation, elections and broad political questions like Chile committees.

INTERNATIONALISM AND ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLES

This is the Achilles heel of the SLP and all other currents. An entire generation of militants was born under the banner of the heroic Vietnamese Revolution--this revolution proved that it was possible to fight and win. Recognition toward this revolution has given these militants a desire to carry on. This generation, in a more or less confused way and more or less consciously, has devoted a major part of its efforts to the political support of the Indo-Chinese revolution and is fertile ground for the development of international solidarity campaigns and for the development of an internationalist consciousness. The SLP has stumbled here, having rejected our international strategy it has rejected the 4th International and the rise of the world revolution; instead it has chosen to wage an unconditional defence of its tail-ending line and its sect apparatus. The SLP is vulnerable here as it, in fact, rejects internationalism in order to become a respectable institution, the respected "defender of Trotskyist acquisitions". In substituting a vague, humanist type of charity for veritable proletarian internationalism (its sect offspring are effectively abstentionist on this crucial question) the SLP has left the field of anti-imperialist struggles wide open to us and it is here that the organization could quite likely be built, initially at least, with rapid success. This is another good focus for a debate for today more than ever, the building of anti-imperialist solidarity campaigns and the leadership that we can give in the practical, theoretical and organizational rediscovery of proletarian internationalism is a task to which we should give high priority. Practically, the question of increased support to the colonial revolution, for the intensification of antibureaucratic struggles, and to the anti-capitalist struggles in Europe is posed. Strategically, the problem of the construction of the revolutionary International implanted in the masses becomes urgent and the resolution

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[Note: Page 5 of this bulletin was missing in the copy received by the Control Commission.]

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OUR ORGANIZATION'S STRUCTURE

ere again we should have discussion and raise questions of organization into cells, how tendencies function, security questions, how conventions are held and how leaderships are designated. This will mean that a critique of the SWP's social-democratic mode of organization, its cooption of 'leadership' and its dialectic of partial acquisitions is in order.

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN CAPITALS-

e propose that the tendency leadership form a commission composed of competent comrades to begin work on this immediately in collaboration with our Canadian and international comrades.

A POLITICAL THESIS

e propose that the tendency leadership form a commission to solicit suggestions on this subject from the tendency and the international. This will mean that at least an implicit critique of the SWP's revisionism on nationalism, revolutionary violence, transitional program, internationalism, etc... is somehow necessary.

till, we can avoid raising a full fledged debate on the subject "What is the SWP?" This could only be divisive at this time and without fruit. For our part, we agree not to pose the question, "Does consistent Cannonism lead to Trotskyism?"

CONCLUSION

ur immediate-immediate task is to stay in the U.S. and make the political fight in the International clear. In this regard we must prepare the rest of the International and the revolutionary movement at large for what is going to happen; because of the international debate it doesn't make much sense to attempt to put a timetable on this process. Still it must be clear that we are preparing ourselves and by taking our first steps toward acting as if we were an independent organization we are quite correctly moving across the Rubicon. The problems involved with this tactic are numerous. First, it's difficult to develop a line without being able to test it. The consequence of this is that comrades will neglect the important problem of trying to form a line and this can only reinforce the sectarian strain in the tendency that wants to make a fetish out of its little theories. This would be exactly the opposite of what we need--we need to be open, open, open. This problem is further complicated by the fact that the SC refused to take a decisive decision on the question of mass work and this means that we will benefit very little from any haphazard mass work that is done. This mass work is crucial for us, it has the merit of refocusing attention on reality and can prevent us from developing a sect mentality which is already being cultivated by the comrades who have been in the SWP too long and who have become SWP traditionalized.

On the other hand, the I.S. leadership is trying to help us and trying to give us a political maturity but they must be cautious they must have doubts about us and we must prove ourselves. If the International was ready to build a section here we would already have ten or fifteen organizing cadres here and active among us.

The greatest risk, however, is this: we risk to waste one or two years perhaps losing comrades at least not gaining much (maybe a spectacular radicalization in the coming months would give us a few new USA'ers but we can't bank on that). Doing mass work we could make significant gains in two years, this is not an unrealistic perspective. Also, in two years these gains could be decisive. Look at the I.S., they've reached a threshold of 600 and because of this will make a fantastic advance in 1974. We're living in the exciting time of a rise in the world revolution, we have the opportunity to build a creative and rich organization. We can build a successful organization with the politics of the 4th. The J.C.R. in France started with less cadres and less political line. All the European sections were built from small nuclei. Let's not be afraid. After saying all this, we state clearly that we are ready to follow the cautious route, let's just be flexible and ready to adapt a new tactic if the situation merits.

ADDITION TO "IS THE QUESTION OF CONSTRUCTING. . . ETC"
BY Alec (Chicago)

It has come to my attention since the submission of our document that it contains two factual errors. So that discussion will focus on central issues, these should be cleared up at the outset.

First: on the Vern-Ryan documents. Shortly after some of us formally affiliated with the IT, we were (as were other IT comrades) deluged with the whole series of Vern-Ryan documents: Vern-Ryan on Stalinism, Vern-Ryan on the Buffer States, Vern-Ryan on Bolivia, etc. Afraid to discover just how many of these curious documents we were going to receive (and unwilling to wait for Vern-Ryan on Women's Suffrage, and Vern-Ryan Meet the Wolf-Man), we protested to the PC of the IT at the idea that limited IT funds were being wasted on tedious, rambling momentos from the graveyard of SWP discussions. We were not opposed to the Vern-Ryan oriented analyses appearing in the discussion bulletin; on the contrary, we argued that such analyses should be appearing rather than simply reprinting material of dubious relevance from the past. We thought it peculiar that the first eight discussion bulletins should be monopolized by such past documents, when there were pressing immediate questions within the IT which were not being dealt with. We received a reply informing us that the IT had not provided the funds; but that rather individual comrades in Chicago had provided the funds. Our statement on the V-R documents reflects what we were told at this time.

It now appears that the SC did, in fact, vote to distribute these documents. The charge of freelancing thus no longer applies; we feel that the other charges do, however, especially on the question of whether the IT can afford to focus its attention on secondary issues when we have yet to even begin to seriously work out a plan of intervention into the class struggle in the U.S.

Second: on the YSA-IT resolution. Our document unfairly makes it appear that the comrade who ultimately authored the resolution was at fault. The actual events reflect far more poorly on the political leadership of the IT as a whole; the resolution was assigned to one comrade who was allowed to doodle around with it aimlessly until the last moment, when another comrade was assigned (more or less in desperation) to provide such a resolution. By the time this comrade could finish a draft, mail to the Tendency, receive replies, and rewrite the document, it was too late for it to be used in local discussions. The disorganization and lack of direction which this episode reveals is obvious; again, our criticisms of the YSA-IT affair (especially in regard to the ~~disorganizational~~ effects of the delay in appearance of the resolution) continue to apply.

A final point: our original statements were based upon the information which we had, at the time the document was drafted. Since that time, members of the PC corrected me on these two points and expressed astonishment that we did not have the full story. What the PC feels "everybody knows" and what everybody does know are it seems, two very different things. This is, in itself, a serious problem.

WHICH WAY FORWARD? - A STEP BACK

by Rico

I. Introduction

Since May-June 1963, the practical and theoretical work of revolutionary socialists around the world and in particular in the advanced capitalist countries has been on an objectively higher plane. It is no longer adequate to defend the heritage of Trotskyism and to solidarize with anti-imperialist struggles. Now, more than any time since the post-war upsurge, the actuality of socialist revolution in the belly of the monster welds more closely together our theories and concepts and our day to day activity. One can see the coming class battles as a Messianic delivery, or as a projection of a line of development, one of the laws of capitalism in decay. In either case, they are forthcoming.

Everything that grows, develops, or is built, must have an initial stage. The mass party of the American section of the FI with have its early origins among the socialist militants debating political program. A policy can be changed, but persistence in an incorrect policy can devour a small group which has a great deal of potential, but no stabilizing base in the class. The proposed PC political perspectives, while being positive in that it does not pose the building of a section by reforming the SWP, or even by long-term penetration, does not prepare the ranks for the next step - for the bulk of the activity of supporters of the Fourth International to be outside of its traditional framework, and the transition to this work.

This document is not intended to be an in-depth analysis of conjunctural America and the abyss it is being swept into. Neither is it meant to serve as a political resolution which must proceed from a study of world economy and politics. Rather, it is intended to highlight a few facts and basic trends which are readily discernable, and the reality that the PC's perspective is mistaken and, if used to justify remaining in the SWP until the next World Congress, is suicidal.

II. WHY Are We In The SWP?

Although it may not seem so, there were several reasons why it was correct to make the SWP our main arena, instead of joining those who left in the past couple of years. We could justify this orientation on the following grounds: 1.) The International is the most important factor. When left-wing elements began to coalesce into the P.O.T., the European leadership was attempting to effect a detente with the SWP. We understood that any attempt at national Trotskyism was bound to degenerate and end in a sect (most likely of the anti-Pabloite variety). It was mandatory that we seek to bloc with the European leadership which represented the revolutionary majority of the International, in a struggle against the SWP's Centrism. The past two years of world politics and internal fac-

tional struggle has educated the entire International. Our task is no longer to break out of isolation and explain the nature of the SWP, but to advance the idea of constructing the American section of the Fourth International. We must explain that, although the most revolutionary party since Lenin's has degenerated, the lag in consciousness of American workers is not such that a revolutionary organization cannot begin to regroup vanguard elements around the FI's program. The majority of Trotskyist cadre have no vain hopes about the revolutionary potential of the SWP. We must show them however that it is possible at this time to build a real nucleus of a section of the FI in the US. This cannot be done solely through words; it must also take up revolutionary activity in deeds.

2.) A second factor has been the fundamental need for any idea to exist to have human repositories -- cadre. The SWP was the most likely place we could assemble a cadre, since it had a revolutionary history and remained inside the FI. While there may be a branch or local which has new recruits who are open to our program, the bulk of SWP members are incapable of assimilating a Marxist program. A tactical penetrationist position was correct so long as there were more cadre to be recruited inside the SWP and the class was still relatively quiescent. 3.) As long as the working class response to capitalist policies was only sporadic (Postal Workers, Teachers, ILWU), and its radicalization was on a molecular level, it was correct to apply a secondary tactic to the fullest. But this is no longer the case. While we do not yet see generalized national struggles of the class, there is growing dissatisfaction (Auto, Truckers) on all levels of the class. There now exists whole layers (Miners, Bay Area) which are developing embryonic class consciousness. The discontent in the working class is highly volatile and could break out into open struggle from any section of the class. It is this fact that now becomes determinant for our perspectives.

III. The Crisis Is Now !

The U.S., along with world capitalist economy is entering another recession which will prove to be harsher and longer in duration than that of 1970-72. The capitalist class is devising diverse methods to extract greater surplus value (speed-up, combination of jobs, deunionization of jobs). The most extensive experiment has been the wage freeze. This policy was mismanaged as every other by Nixon, so even executives wanted controls lifted. But more of a reason was the fear of confronting workers as a class, if controls were continued. The employing class, realizing the present ineffectiveness of the government apparatus, finds it difficult for the moment to apply a political solution; so it must resort to slugging it out on an industry by industry basis. A growing number of industries are founding mutual aid pacts to offset the losses if one company is struck (auto, airlines, rail). Or there is the indirect attack on the workers and middle class, the consumers, by the creation of shortages (energy crisis).

A few economic statistics reveal the situation we now face. Foremost is the rate of inflation which now exceeds 15% a year. The average wage gains of 5% are obviously not adequate to maintain the working class standard of living. Almost four million workers are covered by escalator clauses. None of the escalator clauses cover the rate of inflation, however the existence of this sector is a positive force in showing the way to not simply something that is necessary, but a measure that is achievable. Other economic indicators point to living conditions worsening in the months ahead. The real GNP for the first quarter of this year declined at an annual rate of 5.8%. Even if production were to pick up, there will not be a general recovery with the prime rate at 10.5%, and rising. Unemployment is nationally at 5.2% but expected to rise a couple of percentage points. A further breakdown of unemployment figures show that young workers, those with the least to lose, have an employment figure of 7.7% (20--24 years) and for veterans of the same age a 9.9% rate. It is continually difficult to maintain a favorable balance of payments as U.S. imperialism maintains its role as world cop. The workers know that now is the time to fight before matters get worse, but are lacking the leadership to unify the class. The labor bureaucracy has been unable to answer the fundamental question

What can be done? With more rhetoric than fight the bureaucrats have openly carried out the ruling class program (pay board), defused struggles (auto), or out and out sold down their members (steel). This year will see contracts covering 5.2 million workers from miners to garment workers come up for renewal. While we are not now in the position to alter the course of class struggle, we are capable to begin propaganda within the workers movement and to establish a few recruits and contacts; a first step on a long haul.

IV. The Next Radicalization

Certain attitudes of the class are undergoing changes, although they lag far behind the economic and social reality. How the class responds to a situation depends on concrete circumstances such as whether it has experienced a series of victories or defeats, its unity leadership, whether its organizations are intact and above all its consciousness. We are not prepared today to raise the level of consciousness of masses of workers and to lead them. However, we must prepare to penetrate the class organizations and lay the initial ground work for winning a base in the working class. For a Marxist organization, its primary orientation must be to its own class. It must not only have a proletarian orientation, but must also be proletarian in composition. At certain conjunctures it may be necessary to place secondary tactical orientations to the fore as with the SWP's turn to the campuses in the early 1950's. But this must be resultant of exceptional circumstances as a prolonged period where the class is politically inactive, but peripheral layers are awakening and it is necessary to change one's tactic or have one's sails go limp from lack of cadre. The Marxist organization must inject socialist consciousness from the outside, at the same time it must exist in and experience all the problems of the class. Whoever today wishes to continue the secondary tactic of work in the SWP must prove that we can not do fruitful work in the class and that the cadre of the SWP are moving or even capable of moving towards revolutionary Marxism.

Everything indicates that the next radicalization will not be preceded by petty-bourgeois layers but from the beginning will be a radicalization of the class. Most likely it is on this basis that the student movement will be revived. We must begin now to prepare. This is why it is doubly important to make our cadre aware of the tasks ahead. Our orientation must be to the proletariat and the most oppressed layers of the class and take into consideration the existence of a small layer of revolutionary youth, many of whom may be won to the banner of Trotskyism. But this radical layer must be subordinate to implanting cadre into industrial jobs and recruiting militant workers. Some comrades may object that to subordinate work among this radical layer is wrong and runs counter to the concept of the New Mass Vanguard. I think this is a misunderstanding of that concept.

The NIV exists as a current of revolutionary young workers and students in many European countries. This fact coupled with their willingness to struggle outside the framework provided by the traditional leaderships give this vanguard its importance. We do not intend to build the Party directly on this vanguard, but attempt to educate and direct it to become a political force to alter the relationship of the far left to the reformist workers leadership and to change the relationship of forces between the militants and the bureaucracies in the unions and mass political parties. Is there anyone who will say that the few thousands of radicals, can play the same role? It would be a fantasy. The radical layer in the U.S. can provide some experienced cadre who will be greatly needed. We must take note that revolutionaries will be attracted to that group which shows itself able to do serious work in the class. Where we can achieve unity in action (strike support, anti-imperialist solidarity) we can show militant workers that we are not only talkers, but also doers. There is no escaping the fact that a revolutionary Party will be built principally through intervening into the class struggle and building our campaigns (international issues, elections, defense) in the class. If it is seen that the mass radicalization of the class will proceed the students and lower middle class, then our efforts clearly must

be concentrated on the mass organizations of the class (the unions in the U.S.). The S. will not reflect this radicalization in the way that justified the French turn. It is dangerously wrong to base such an orientation on an alien class organization.

V. Is the Question of Split Posed? Well, Let's Pose it.

It is far short of precision to merely claim the SWP non-Marxist and never able to assimilate a revolutionary socialist program. Some Comrades may not wish to discuss the nature of the SWP, preferring to wait for an answer to descend on us from heaven or by special courier from the Pope. We must be exact in terminology to draw exact conclusions. The SWP's liquidation of the vanguard role of the proletariat in favor of their sectoralist approach and its reliance on a democratic program in the colonial and advanced capitalist countries warrant to mark its demise into a right riddling organization. They are now taking all their accumulated mistakes and applying them in febrile interventions into class actions (Sept. 3, CLUN) and as we expected tailoring the lower and middle echelon bureaucrats. What happens when a revolutionary wing arises in such an organization? One lesson is that their mutual existence in the same structures is of a relatively short time, with that period being of shorter duration when the organization has not achieved a mass base. We must prepare now for this certainty. The evolution of the class struggle nationally and internationally, the changed relations in the FI, and our own growth numerically and politically (we are still weak), all warrant the preparation for a sovereign body in the next 3-5 months. How can we prepare for this transformation? I don't think one person can substitute himself for the PC, but I will point out a few practical steps, some of which we are doing, but have no meaning if they are not in preparation for the bulk of our Comrades to be openly acting for the FI in the next few months.

First, our sales of FI press should be regularized and systematized. At every political event we attend there should be sales of Red Weekly, Old Hole, and the International. Beyond this, technical preparations for a press reflecting the method of the FI in the USA must be made, correspondents assigned and a printer found. The interventions into the Edelstein tour has indicated a broader receptivity to the FI outside the SWP than inside. We must step up our independent interventions carrying out the campaigns of the FI on Vietnam, Chile, etc. We will prepare for a transformation without complete isolation in this way. Comrades looking for jobs should first consider the national priorities of auto and steel or where we have a local concentration on basic industry. Where we do have a few comrades in an industry or union we should co-ordinate contact work as a cell. If we were to really carry out the line of the Tenth World Congress through reprinted articles original leaflets, the SWP leadership before the ranks of the International ~~...~~ unwilling and unable to integrate itself into the International would be exposed. At the same time it would prepare us as an organization that implements the FI's method and line in the USA. Even the Comrades of the third tendency will understand that the SWP is an alien body inside the FI and a true section must be built. Comprehending this fact cannot come strictly through debates, but by a conflict of lines in practice. The last thing the SWP wants is for the program of the FI to be expressed publicly in the U.S. Were we to pose the question of international democratic centralism in a sharp way, and in such a manner that the International will understand, we will ease the transition to being a revolutionary organization that implements the line of the FI as well as clarify for the international comrades the necessity to assist us in this work. There are now more contacts of the FI outside the SWP than inside. If we are to prolong our entry in the SWP for too long (a year), these contacts and some cadre will probably be lost.

VI. Prospects

The class struggle in the period ahead will flow primarily through the unions (or create new unions). We must be able to link up with the rising tide of militant struggles and propagandize our transitional demands, explain the need for action and strike committees, the social nature of the labor bureaucracy, educate on the danger of the integration of the unions with the capitalist state and the meaning of the joint company-union production committees (steel, food, industry, etc.). We must also be ready to pose ourselves, even at this state of our development, as a pole of attraction to militant workers who may investigate socialist organizations. In this field our main adversary is the CPUSA. For the first time in the history of the Trotskyism and Stalinism; does not offer a qualitative advantage to the CP. We have a historic opportunity to challenge the CP in winning the allegiance of young workers and to prevent them from gaining a significant base. It is not enough to be correct, one must also be smart. The organization that is smart enough to find a road to the workers will be the mass Party of the class. The next important step for the FI is to adopt a policy of industrial concentration and formulate a program for the American Socialist Revolution. If this is undertaken it becomes obvious that no consistent revolutionary work in the class other oppressed layers of the population, or among radical groups can be done without a regular and serious national newspaper that espouses the program of the FI.

I am not proposing on June 1 we all resign from the SWP/YSA. I do propose that we carry out the FI's line regardless of the SWP's indiscipline. With a few months of intense work we could make the transition. The YSA comrades should attempt for another two months to wage a hard campaign to win YSA'ers to the true FI organization. If possible, half a dozen comrades should illustrate the presence of the FI in the SWP. Whether we undergo this transformation now or two years from now at the next W.C. we will still be a small propaganda group. We have already surpassed the stage of primitive accumulation, which stretches from gathering enough cadre to insure programmatic continuity to the stage when there is enough geographic dispersion and human power to establish an ongoing national newspaper and intervene in various struggles. We are now at the level where we are primarily a propaganda group, but can have influence and give leadership in some actions. This stage is the most difficult. Through our propaganda and the activity of Comrades in certain political and work situations we must patiently establish worker contacts and cells which group small numbers of workers around our program. It represents the difficult period where we are almost strictly a propaganda group to that time when we are viewed in the eyes of the vanguard workers as a tested tendency which should be supported; even at this stage we will be a propaganda group to the mass of workers.

VII. Critique

The Perspectives Document is caught in its own synthetic contradiction. It is posed in the following two quotes: "...the cadre of this party are politically incapable of either understanding or putting into practice a revolutionary line. (p. 10) and 'Our main struggle is to win the ranks of the YSA and party to our line. (p.11)'. This is amazing. How do we win people who are incapable of either understanding or putting into practice? This is surely a mystery sealed with seven seals. The perspectives advanced by the PC cannot stand on the document alone. Further justification is needed to propose staying in the SWP for an indefinite time and with the only reason ...because we wish to continue to attempt to win over member of the party and YSA to the ranks of the International Majority. (p. 10) This is true, but it does not require being in the SWP/YSA. Even when the intentions are to build the American Section of the FI. Remember, to hell is paved with good intentions.

A resolution for work in the unions would be excellent start in analysing the labor movement and putting forth some basic tasks. It should state that our main task is to link up with and regroup those elements in the class being radicalized for the first time--whose numbers are several thousands. Does the PC propose to link up and regroup these workers using clandestine leaflets when the SWP leadership's back is turned? Are we going to bring these workers into our ranks with plant sales of the Red Weekly? Are we going to educate militant workers by bringing them to a SWP forum?

For the reasons outlined in this contribution I propose that the Perspectives Document be withdrawn and within one month of the Conference a perspectives document reflecting the realities of the class struggle in the U.S., the stagnation of the SWP and growth of the IT and majority of the FI, be circulated as a substitute. It should incorporate the fundamental thrust of this contribution. It must be complete in that it offers an initial program for intervention into the class struggle.

April 25, 1974

"...OUR MAIN STRUGGLE IS TO WIN THE RANKS OF THE YSA AND PARTY..."

--Proposed Amendments to Draft "Which Way Forward"

Introduction and Explanation of Amendments

[By D. Ahmad Estreugal and Nora Rahdrik]

The perspectives document outlines two tasks to carry out in the immediate period. One task is to do contact work among individuals or groups that are inclined toward the positions of the Fourth International. Even the SWP leadership would have difficulty finding fault with such a perspective. After all, a major part of party building is to reach out with our ideas--to try to recruit people to Trotskyism. The SWP majority/LTF is limiting this arena to people who tend to find better compatibility with LTF ideas--liberals, pacifist types, left-moving reformists, etc. Anti-imperialist youth are, to them, hopeless ultralefts. ITers, on the other hand, must reach out to those very people who are considered "ultraleft" by the SWP--those interested in the resistance movement in Chile, in the continuing war in Vietnam, etc. We must attempt to recruit in our own political image, as the LTF attempts to recruit in theirs. Within the framework of the political struggle within the Fourth International, the question of "double recruiting" becomes absurd. There is no need to engage in such activity furtively or feel that we may be violating security. Many comrades of the IT have been invited over the years to give classes, participate in discussion groups outside the party, help build united front actions, etc. We will continue to do these very same things; and if the SWP leadership attempts to prevent us from doing contact work, they will be in direct violation of the agreements reached at the Tenth World Congress, and the issue can be fought out on that basis.

The second task, of course, relates to our work with the ranks of the SWP. It is obvious that the LTF is pursuing both tasks within the FI: they are continuing to attempt to convince the ranks of the International of the LTF positions (an almost hopeless task, but they have the right to keep trying!), and the LTF is also attempting to recruit people to Trotskyism on the LTF line (Friends of IP in England, excursions to Puerto Rico, "contact work" throughout Europe and the Near East). Essentially, we must do the same thing. We must continue to attempt to win the ranks of the SWP/YSA to the positions of the IMT, while we continue to recruit fresh cadre to the positions of the IMT. We must, of course, oppose a split course by the SWP and make it clear that we will not perpetrate a split in the SWP but neither will we lie down, play dead, and cease to attempt to win people to the ideas of the IMT.

Unfortunately, the perspectives document, in its second half, "Our Tendency and Its Tasks," distorts the nature of the second task--work within the party. It does so in the following ways: Although it is absolutely true that we must avoid a split in every way possible, it is necessary to make it clear to the comrades in the IT and in the whole International that the likelihood of a split is very great. In other words, because of the very nature of the LTF and its goals, a split becomes inevitable. Those who see our continued efforts to win the SWP/YSA ranks to our ideas as our main task generally hold the position that a split is not inevitable. They reach that (continued on next page)

conclusion because of faulty analysis of the nature of the degeneration of the SWP leadership, a faulty analysis of the political character of the party's ranks, and no analysis of the real nature of the LTF. The perspectives document gives great weight to our work inside the party and insufficiently characterized the nature of the SWP/LTF and its ranks. The first part of our amendment is an attempt to add at least a beginning analysis of this question to the document.

If a split is a highly likely variant, and if the ranks of the SWP majority are as the document states, "...politically incapable of either understanding or putting into practice a revolutionary line..." then we must define our role inside of the party in light of this discouraging fact.

If a split is a highly likely variant, then it must be obvious that the greatest weight must be given to our contact work with fresh forces outside the SWP.

Here, in contradiction to its own estimate of the party ranks, the document tells us (page 12, paragraph 1): "This means regular participation in the activities and meeting of the YSA. It means putting forward the line of the International in the day to day work of the YSA ... We must spend time discussing politics with the comrades of the YSA, doing elementary contact work. Not to do this is to fail to reach the ranks. Our contact work should gear in on political discussion, not organizational horror stories-- they are not political and not very interesting...."

And in the next paragraph: "Too often in the past, the tendency has been soiled by unserious and flippant forays into the social events of the party. Today, the stakes are too high for such foolishness. All sectarian practices toward the cadre of the party and YSA must become a thing of the past."

Now one could argue that the reference is to the YSA, and that the characterization of the SWP majority ranks is less applicable to YSA members because of their newness: they are not yet totally deaf party patriots. Yet under the heading "The Socialist Workers Party" (page 12), we are told that "the tendency locals should coordinate their work so that the tendency has a presence not only in meetings of the party branches but in the work of the branches...the orientation that we have cannot be maintained for five minutes, never mind any longer period if our comrades do not maintain a presence in the life of the branches. We are not an oratorical society only interested in coming around to make speeches. If we are able to win party members and YSAers to our banners, then we must confront them in a serious manner... We just want the tendency locals to work out as part of their overall work a continued and well rounded participation in the activities of the branches."

We remember the report of the Nominating Commission at the end of the 1973 SWP Convention. We were told, in effect, that we were all useless. That we had contributed nothing--almost ever--as party builders, given no money, no time, not recruited a living soul, etc., worthless garbage, in other words. We hope that this estimate has not colored the self-image of the IT Political Com-

mittee. The above references make it appear as though we never went through the excruciating chores involved in trying to work within the party. Haven't most of us made heroic efforts to discuss politics with SWP/LTFers, only to find that they suddenly suffered from acute bladder problems or remembered a sudden engagement? Haven't most of us party-built, sold militants, recruited, spoken for the party, almost up until the eve of last spring's pre-convention discussion? Didn't we attend social events of the party and politely sit through the most tortuous political rhetoric? Didn't we take long hours out to discuss at great length with anyone who would even smile our way? Didn't we hop around from branch to branch, without a nickel from the party, attempting to present the line of the IMT to whistling, stomping, giggling party patriots? Didn't we conduct two tours of our European comrades, accompanying them, assisting them in any way we could, zeroing in on anyone who looked slightly puzzled?

Now we are told that in an even more factional atmosphere, in a party on a split course, after we have won almost everyone with an ounce of guts, we must do it again. And to add insult to injury, we mustn't be "soiled by unserious and flippant forays (!)" AND THIS IS OUR MAIN TASK!! A perfect exercise in masochism and demoralization.

We must also face the fact that the party's work is for the most part mindless activism. Should IT comrades sell Militants endlessly, fight for assignments to USLA (as the document suggests) to find that they must limit themselves to collecting signatures of endorsers; for freedom for political prisoners; take Farmworkers assignments to be allowed to spray picket lines with the SWP's empty line and help cover up for the SWP's sellout of that struggle at the CLUW conference; fight for trade union fractions and get told to sit down because we are out of order? Cook exotic dishes for apolitical banquets? Do PRDF endorser work? What is a well-rounded participation in the branches, anyway?

Pages 13 to the end instruct us in this work, but the real problems of attempting to carry out our line are not put forth. Our amendment attempts to outline some specific tasks that can be carried out within the framework of our avoidance of a split and our efforts to win people to the politics of the Fourth International. It may be noted that phrases such as "we can possibly win many of them (SWPers)" have been eliminated and a more realistic appreciation of possibilities is outlined. It is clear that special tactics must be used in order to carry out Chile solidarity or Vietnam solidarity work. The SWP branches are doing nothing of that kind. Therefore we will not be participating in the "day to day work" or "well rounded participation." We will instead be gadflys, doing our own thing and trying to get a few brave LTF souls to join with us! Our work in the branches will be rhetorical--rhetorical because the SWP will unanimously vote down our proposals. Our activity will be by necessity the activity of the Fourth International--frowned upon or prohibited by the SWP/YSA/LTF. By no stretch of the imagination can this be

called "participation in the day to day work of the branches." Instead we must do the day to day work of the Fourth International, in and out of the party.

Two further clarifying points are in order here. First, we have made only one amendment to the first part of the perspectives document, mainly because we agree with its general thrust, and also because we were assured by comrade Vincent that certain of the questionable slogans outlined on page 6 would be changed. However, the paragraph we changed needs some explanation.

The original paragraph, on pages 6 and 7 (Part I, Section 6, paragraph 1) states that "The radicalization... (of the 60's) ...will continue to have profound meaning in determining the course of the struggle of the working class." ~~While the overall thrust of the paragraph is generally correct in polemicizing against those who "fail to make the connection between" the radicalization of the 60's and the coming working class radicalization, we think that the sentence in question is open to misinterpretation along sectoralist lines and is in fact misleading about the actual course of the coming working class radicalization. Therefore, we submit the following paragraph in place of the one mentioned:~~

"History is a set of interconnected and interrelated events. The decade of radicalization that included the civil rights struggle, the Cuban revolution, the Vietnam war, the struggles of the students, the ghetto uprisings of the Blacks, the emergence of the struggles of the Chicano and Puerto Rican masses, the G.I. movement and the women's liberation movement, determined the course of that radicalization and cannot be divorced from the coming radicalization of the working class. It is only the narrow economists of today and the opportunists of yesterday that fail to make the connection between these events. Yet it is equally incorrect to hold that the course of the struggles of the working class will be determined by the course of the radicalization of the 60's. The beginnings of the molecular radicalization of the working class takes place in its essence around economic issues, and from the outset assumes a different character than the ideological revolts which characterized the struggles of the 1960's (the exception being the ghetto revolts). All of the struggles that took place in the period of the quiescence of the proletariat as a class will now be combined as part of the struggles to be solved by that class "

Second, the final sections of the document, on trade union work and Black and Chicano work, are wholly inadequate. It would have been preferable to not have written anything in the general resolution rather than what was written. We are striking these out from the amended Part II rather than expanding on them or changing them, in recognition of the fact that separate documents are being submitted on these very important questions.

Finally, we should explain the format of our contribution. It is our feeling that too often when amendments are involved, comrades have great difficulty in setting down and comparing originals and amendments. We feel that it is much better to have the entire second section, rewritten in its amended form, be placed in the bulletins. That is the procedure which we have followed in preparing the amendments. We feel that it will be readily apparent what the differences are between the original and the amended version. However, if it is not, a quick glance at the original will suffice.

May Day, 1974
submitted by D.Ahmad Estreugal
Nora Rahdnik

[Attached to the Estreugal-Rahdrik document was Part II of Hank Williams' document, "Which Way Forward? Draft Political Perspectives Resolution" as amended by Estreugal-Rahdrik. The IT Newsletter dated 6/6/74 re-

ported that these amendments were defeated. However, the characterizations of the Socialist Workers Party contained in these amendments were adopted later as "the beginnings of a discussion within the IMT."]

PART II. OUR TENDENCY AND ITS TASKS

Our tendency has developed from the cadres first assembled around the Proletarian Orientation, and from a greater number who were drawn to the positions and actions of the International Majority. The essential position of the P.O. tendency was to prepare the party by sending comrades into the working class, and to focus its anti-war, Black nationalist, and feminist campaigns on the working class component of those sectors. The party, had it heeded the advice of the P.O., would have been in far better shape to cope with the emergent radicalization of the workers, but methodologically, the P.O. was not on a higher level than the party leadership. It was the political positions of the International that were able to put the proletarian orientation into its proper perspective and context. Our differences today are much more profound than they were at the time of the Proletarian Orientation tendency.

Over a year ago, we emerged with the formation of the Internationalist Tendency. This was preceded by two years of struggle, during which the formation of the Proletarian Orientation Tendency was a high point. The PO then split, with some of its main leaders going into the anti-Pabloite Class Struggle League, and others going toward the Spartacist League. To the extent that we could have a debate with them, we differed on their characterization of the anti-war movement as a popular front, and on their characterization of the Fourth International. We have been able to win over some 150 people of various political levels during the course of the two SWP and the YSA pre-convention discussions taking place in 1973.

At present we represent about 150 of the 2000 combined membership of the SWP and YSA. This is a rather small percentage of the movement, and the reasons for our small size are neither simple nor encouraging. Our size cannot be explained simply in terms of tactical blunders by the IT, for in the fundamental objective and political task of linking up and integrating ourselves into the International Majority, we have been eminently successful. Nor is it correct to fault the leadership of the tendency for what in essence are objective causes for our enforced isolation from both the ranks of the SWP and the emerging vanguard in the U.S. The enormously difficult task of building a political leadership despite the leadership and apparatus of the SWP has been proceeding basically along correct lines.

The answer, then, must be sought elsewhere, namely in the nature and composition of the SWP-LTF. It is politically unserious to discuss concrete projections for the IT without first at least drawing the outlines of our analysis of the SWP.

There is a direct relationship between how we characterize the SWP and where we center our interventions for the next period. An analysis of what the SWP-LTF represents both politically and organizationally is not only desirable; it is essential.

The Nature of the SWP-LTF

The point of departure for any analysis of the SWP and the tendency's relationship to it must be the relationship of the SWP-LTF to the Fourth International. The political differences between the International Majority and the LTF are widening, not narrowing. A split in the International looms as an ever more likely probability. For years the dynamic of the political and organizational evolution of the component parts of the LTF has been toward a split. A brief review of some of these past and present practices will help establish that the course of the LTF is a split one, and will aid in understanding the international context of the discussion on perspectives.

For years the SWP has aided and engineered splits in the sections and sympathizing organizations of the International. Argentina is perhaps the most notable example, but the SWP has also done its work in Spain, Mexico, Brazil and Peru, to name a few. The Pathfinder International has become a major phenomenon, and it is being extended.

The political basis of the various LTF groups is questionable, except on one point: absolute hostility to the International Majority. One of the LTF's member sections, the Liga Comunista of Spain, stated that the LCR-ETA(6) had broken with the fundamental principles of revolutionary Marxism; the PST claims that guerilla groups are agents of the class enemy, that the Rouge comrades were agents of French imperialism, and that the POR in Bolivia had betrayed the revolution in 1971, and these are the least of the PST's political errors. The SWP publicly defends such positions of the LC, while internally differentiating itself from the more grotesque positions of the PST. But the SWP has its own contributions to make, aside from the practice of the SWP in the U.S., which we are all too familiar with. Barnes indicated at the World Congress that there can be no revolutionary situation without the prior existence of a mass Trotskyist party; that the Chinese revolution was a detour in the class struggle. Comrade Hansen stated that the adoption of the Resolution on Armed Struggle represented a programmatic break with Trotskyism on the part of the IMT. The PRT(U) is, as far as we know, still in the Frente Amplio; the British Tendency at the World Congress advocated that the IMG should be mobilizing the students on the basis of the red university during the recent miners' strike there. Organizational unity within the FI cannot proceed indefinitely while differences of such magnitude still prevail. There is a certain dynamic to this aspect alone, but there is more.

In the face of a world political situation which increasingly calls for the construction of a genuine democratic-centralist International, the SWP increasingly pulls back from its responsibilities in this regard. They refuse to take responsibility for an International which allegedly supports terrorism, which has broken programmatically with Trotskyism, etc., as was keenly revealed in the nominations for the United Secretariat (John Benson and other "notetakers"). They have also

suddenly found an interest in "educating" the membership on the 1953 split through the publication of bulletins on the development of the fight with the IS and the Cochranites.

It is false to analyze the SWP's relationship to the FI without discussing the pressures applied by the other components of the LTF. Aside from the SWP and its shadow, the LSA, the LTF also contains the Moreno current. This fact has the following consequences for the SWP leadership. On the one hand, as the LTF's largest group, the PST puts meat on the bones of the LTF body count in the International. The importance of this to the Barnes leadership should not be underestimated. Moreno and his followers make up two-thirds of the LTF. Yet, on the other hand, the PST cares nothing about staying in the International. Identification with the FI can only be a liability for Moreno. He is quite content to go about the task of building a Latin American Secretariat of Orthodox Trotskyism, and he can do it better without having to contend with the IMT. This, of course, upsets the SWP's plans and timing, for the length of its stay in the International is primarily determined by the prospects it sees for building a "leninist-Trotskyist" base in Europe. The degree of affinity between the Kompass and Barnes shown at the December SWP convention was nothing compared to the friendship consummated at the Congress and since. For the LTF, Kompass represents the first very real possibility for a breakthrough in Europe, and Barnes does not want to endanger this "love affair" by acting rashly. Moreno, on the other hand, could not care less about winning a base in Europe, and has on occasion shown impatient impulses to be out of the International now. But the SWP cannot openly confront the PST because of its numerical strength and the closeness of political line and practice between the two organizations. What this means practically is that in a short time the SWP leadership will have to choose between Moreno and the Fourth International. It should not be necessary to mention which one it will choose.

It should be clear that the SWP is on a split course from the International--although the timing is still an open question. What will happen to the IT when the SWP decides to split from the International is quite obvious, regardless of how much our loyalty is proclaimed. Yet there are other things that must be said about the SWP in order to determine our relationship to it.

It is exhausting and unnecessary to repeat the methodological criticisms made of the SWP's theoretical foundations by the IT Political Resolution for the SWP convention. The purpose here is not to repeat the generally accepted contents of that document but to cover some ground which it did not.

It is wrong to see the SWP today as a static organism. It is the product of an evolution, and is still in the process of transformation. The roots of the present crisis of the SWP can be recognized in certain of its Cannonist traditions. It is necessary to understand these past errors to demonstrate that the Barnes leadership's grotesque mutations are not as innovative as one might imagine.

In brief, it must be acknowledged that although there are some very positive features of the Cannon tradition, such as an unshakable optimism about the revolutionary potential of the American working class, and although some valuable cadres were educated in the struggles of the 'thirties, Cannonism also contained in it some equally negative features. The most notable of these is an overemphasis on the administrative side of politics and the apparatus side of the party. This tended in practice to benefit the organizational aspect of party building at the expense of the development of program and its practical testing in real life interventions. In its turn, this led to political and organizational sectarianism in union work, an intense Stalinophobia, and a dogmatic approach to theory. It is absolutely undeniable that the traditions of the SWP are revolutionary in their essence; yet it is also undeniable that serious weaknesses of these traditions are apparent.

With the Barnes-dominated leadership came a certain amplification and distortion of these erroneous political practices of the SWP, producing a qualitatively different organism from that which had previously existed. It is almost as if the Barnes leadership (with the tacit approval of Dobbs, Kerry, et. al.) had made a caricature of all the negative aspects of the Cannon tradition.

If in the past the administrative aspect of building the party was stressed at the expense of the political aspect, today the latter has all but vanished in the construction of the SWP. Not only is an equation made between the building of the apparatus and the building of the party, but quantitative organizational recruitment by any means conceivable is seen as the be all and end all of the construction of the organization. The specific historic role of the party, that of injecting revolutionary class-consciousness into the working class, has been abandoned for an openly spontaneist conception of how the working class gains revolutionary consciousness. This produces the following deviation: The SWP theorizes that revolutionary class consciousness can be generated by non-proletarian elements through their own experiences, producing the requisite anti-capitalist consciousness -- without the specific political intervention of the party. This is especially evident in the recent theoretical efforts of the SWP on China and Vietnam, and to a lesser extent in the Novak -- Abramavici exchange. Since an independent political role no longer exists for the party, it therefore assumes the administrative responsibilities for any and all movements as its sole intervention. Thus the specific role of the party, as understood in a Leninist sense, is obviated. In lieu of that role comes organizational sectarianism promoted by the administrative adventures of "building the party." Selling the press thus becomes the line of intervention for every activity when there is no ongoing structure which can be taken over organizationally.

The result of these theoretical deviations, when considered as the foundation of the overall practice of the SWP, and seen in relation to the less subtle secondary aspects of crass opportunism and adaptationism, combine to define the SWP as a sect.

Currently without any "mass movements" to control administratively and liquidate politically, the SWP has turned inward toward the most elemental forms of sectarianism on both an organizational and political level, as well as an abstentionist policy regarding ongoing struggles. Episodically, some formation arises which is completely dominated by the trade union bureaucracy, without even a semblance of democratic self-organization, to which the SWP "orients" and intervenes along the pattern outlined above, offering to do any and all administrative work which the leadership of these formations might request, combined with an incapacity and unwillingness to offer a concrete political orientation for advanced militants who come around such formations. The experience of the September 8 Coalition and the CLUW conference offer an excellent confirmation of this contradictory approach of the SWP.

In view of all this we can make some concrete predictions of how the SWP will relate to the coming radicalization of the working class. This is perhaps the most important practical aspect of making an analysis and projection for the IT. It must therefore be a central focus of the discussion of perspectives.

Within the FI there are divergent views of the course of the coming radicalization in the United States. The SWP holds that the coming radicalization is merely a continuation of the radicalization of the 1960's, interrupted by a lull, which will be characterized by the same sectoral fragmentation and pluralism. Conversely, the IMT Political Resolution of the Tenth World Congress analyzes the coming radicalization as being chiefly characterized by the primacy of the battle between labor and capital, with the peripheral layers being drawn into the primary struggle, and politically defining themselves in relationship to that struggle. Thus, purely on the political level, the fact that the SWP maintains and consciously orients its members toward the concept of the revolution culminating in the combined struggle of sectors, puts it in a politically disadvantageous position in terms of preparation for or comprehension of the unfolding of the coming radicalization of the working masses. This is seen in the inability of the SWP to even empirically direct its membership to the unions, although it has hailed the CLUW conference as "wonderful" and the Coalition of Jobs and Economic Justice in Chicago as proof positive of the sectoral nature of the continuing radicalization, this time including the working class sector. This in and of itself raises serious questions as to whether the workers radicalization will "pass through" the SWP, but it is not by itself decisive.

The absence of social-democratic tradition and organization of the working class, or of a history of labor reformism in the United States, eliminates the coordinate on the right which the SWP could define itself to the left of politically, and which could conceivably arrest a qualitative rightward political development. This problem does not seriously

pose itself today, because the pressures which accompany an intensive working class upsurge do not now exist. Yet despite this, the political line of the SWP has been on an uninterrupted rightward course. An increase in the repression of the SWP by the bourgeoisie cannot but mitigate against the regeneration of the SWP's politics, because it will even more desperately seek legitimacy. The example of the PST provides a portend of what to expect from the SWP.

We must also deal with the character and composition of the leadership of the SWP. For over ten years, there has been no serious division in the central leadership of the party. This is not to say that leadership differences determine the revolutionary character of an organization. Yet throughout the entire period of the intervention of the SWP into the youth radicalization, not one central leader raised any serious criticisms! The closest thing to a dispute came over the question of intervention into the gay liberation movement, which was actually more of a product of the backwardness of some of the older members of the National Committee than it was an understanding of the relative political importance of this area of intervention. Moreover, there has been a continuous exit of middle-aged leaders out of the leadership and Barnes lieutenants in the other door, transforming the National Committee into a monolithic social club. "Homogenous leadership" has become a farcical euphemism for a handraising chorus of political eunuchs. This has resulted in a redefinition of "leadership" and a false representation of the traditions of the movement to a young, politically unsophisticated rank and file. Political differences have come to equal disloyalty to the party; loyalty to the party completely supplants the Trotskyist tradition of loyalty to program, etc, ad nauseam. We realize that the inability to win over the leadership of the SWP is not tantamount to seeing the party completely unable to relate to the radicalization of the working class. Unfortunately, unbridled faith in the correctness of the Barnes leadership and the fear of losing a serious struggle, has eliminated virtually all possibilities of opposition springing up within the secondary leadership of the party. Coupled with the way-servility is inculcated into the ranks of the party, we have raised some serious questions as to the ability of the SWP to regenerate itself.

Many comrades place their hopes on the perspective that the SWP will be regenerated as a revolutionary organization through the formation of a serious rank and file opposition. Those who hold this hope can come to the conclusion that the tendency can do little but continue to work among the SWP ranks. How possible is this? The membership of the SWP came for the most part from a non-proletarian milieu, recruited by and large from the most conservative layers of the left student milieu. They were not educated in a traditional understanding of the primary revolutionary role of the proletariat, but rather were educated in the "traditions" of the student radicalization and Toward an American Socialist Revolution, a "tradition" based on sectoralism and the combined character of the coming American revolution. The membership of the SWP was never educated about the dangers of being isolated from the working class

or of the political problems which can arise in a party with predominantly petty-bourgeois composition. They were not encouraged to read the classical writings of the Marxist movement or to be able to think for themselves on important political issues, but were told that the leadership is always right and encouraged to read TASR, Socialism on Trial, and Camejo's How to make a Revolution. Joining the movement at the height of the sectoral fragmentation of the radicalization, the ranks of the SWP never saw nor were ever taught that a Trotskyist party has as its goal the leading of the working class to the seizure of power. They instead were recruited to the line that being the best builders of the "mass movements," on the level of the mass movements themselves, constituted the quintessence of revolutionary practice. The Leninist norms of organization were discarded in lieu of the more recent innovations on questions such as internal differences, proletarian internationalism, etc., and a religious understanding that there are to use Kerry's words, "no higher bodies" than the national party.

In order for the ranks to oppose these departures from Leninism, they must first know what Leninism is! The recognition of the contradiction between word and deed can be the touchstone for a more general reassessment of the entire party program, encompassing a re-examination of the more important theoretical errors of the party; but since the ranks have no initial insight into the words that contradict the deeds, this process does not take place. The interest of the present leadership of the SWP is served by not teaching the ranks the fundamentals of Marxism and Leninism; by discouraging any independent thought by an individual because it detracts from the homogeneity of the organization; by using social ostracism as a barrier between the minority and the majority of the party. But the important thing to note here is that the mass movement sectoralism and the training which was given (or not given) in revolutionary politics prevents the overwhelming majority of the membership of the SWP from ever developing interest in finding out about the things which have been neglected by its leadership.

The only way possible to turn this situation around is to push ourselves forward to offer to the ranks the education and politicization they have been denied. Yet this perspective is completely utopian.

For over two years the members of the IT have been attempting to patiently explain the political errors to the SWP rank and file; to engage the comrades of the SWP majority in political debate and discussion; to challenge them to read and evaluate for themselves the politics of the leadership. Our gains have been less than 150 people out of 2000. Through the combined efforts of the leadership in distorting and falsifying our political positions, together with the forced isolation of the IT in the party and the social stigma attached to association with the tendency, the leadership has succeeded in creating an atmosphere in the party in which the ranks rarely listen to or even speak to us. Thus, barring a massive influx of raw recruits in to the SWP, who are willing and allowed to listen, the possibilities for immense growth of the IT within the SWP are at best remote.

Finally, could the SWP relate to a working class radicalization--even if not on a leadership level, then perhaps the possibilities exist for the ranks to generate an empirical appreciation of such a radicalization. We have noted above the incorrect position of the SWP as to the nature of the coming radicalization, and their attendant inability to empirically turn toward the class as of yet. The plain and simple fact is that the party has no roots in the working class, has a petty-bourgeois composition, and will only be able to react to the radicalization of the working class, if it reacts at all, in economist fashion, not even equalling the PST.

The party has programmatically divorced itself so completely from the proletariat that there is little hope for any such perspective of a regeneration. A non-proletarian composition would not be decisive if the program of the SWP had remained intact, which it hasn't. Even in the case of a mass influx of workers into the SWP, which we see as an unlikely event, that would not signal the demise of the sectoral degeneration of the program and life of the SWP--unless one accepts a rather crude conception of being and consciousness. The present party program plus 500 workers would still equal a degenerate organization because these workers would have been recruited to a degenerate line. A party is above all defined by its program. Without a proletarian base trained in the traditions of revolutionary struggle on the basis of a revolutionary program, any hopes of regeneration of the SWP in the face of a working class radicalization are illusory.

Our tendency in the SWP is the nucleus of the future section of the Fourth International in the United States. We have the duty to carry out the line set at the World Congress. In this we are aided by the international press such as the Old Mole and the International magazine. In addition, a new journal on the format of the IP will be out in three languages by the United Secretariat. This, unlike the IP, will contain the political line of the FI, and the political analysis of the majority sections of the International. It will also have articles of prime interest on the situation in North America. This magazine can be used not only to introduce party members to the FI, but also those outside the International who are looking for, or in need of political leadership. It can also be used for holding discussion around the particular analysis of different world events.

The International's Broader Appeal

There is today a great reservoir of militants who belong to no organization because they have no confidence in any of them -- including the SWP -- and who can be reached with the ideas and actions of the International. We have a duty to reach them, to discuss with them, and to bring them to the International. At this stage, the left is in a period of recomposition or gestation. If we fail to reach these elements now, they will be lost to us at the next stage. The SWP leadership cannot reach them because of its mixture of opportunism and sectarianism -- it immediately repels these layers because of its poor politics and its organizational rigidity. We, however, have the line of the International and the actions of the majority of sections of the International which can be a magnet to these layers. We must and have every right to take that line to them and to discuss with them, and to win them to the International.

There are already groups whose existence we know of only by accident, who are outside the International and outside the SWP, but who are in general agreement with the International, and we assume there will be others. Some of them contain former members of the party or YSA who were either demoralized or driven out of the party by the actions of the leadership. They are in some cases made up of individuals who attempted to get into the party, and were not allowed to join. For example, the books were closed on our recruits in Madison, the party turned down comrades like Milt Z. in Los Angeles because he is political, and they kept YSAers such as Larry N. of Chicago dangling outside of the party, even though he has been in the YSA for five years. There are many cases like this.

We also find that comrades who are presently with us will falter, and go outside the party due to the pressures that the leadership exerts on the tendency. We must fight this demoralization. There is absolutely nothing to prevent comrades from working in a fraternal way with groups or individuals on the outside, in the same way that they worked with independents in the antiwar, women's movement, helping them to build united front actions, etc. The leadership of the SWP and YSA can be exposed by contrasting their abstentionism with the activities carried out by any such groups.

When there are such groups on the outside who support the International in spite of the SWP, and who are opposed to being put through the organizational wringer by the SWP one by one, we must not take a sectarian attitude toward these cadre. We must work with them, getting them the political positions and analyses of the FI, telling them what the major campaigns of the International are, and how the International would carry them out. This is a duty that we have. The documents of the World Congress will be published soon and should be circulated and discussed by these groups. As supporters of the International majority, we have the task of aiding these groups in their understanding and implementation of these resolutions.

Supporters of the Fourth International must develop a national perspective of their role in the building of an American section. We therefore look favorably upon any initiatives they take in that direction. Our leadership should carefully seek out and observe such developments so as to use all necessary means -- consistent with the interests of the Fourth International -- to bring them into harmony with our perspectives.

IT Work Within the Young Socialist Alliance

The major activity for tendency comrades in the next period -- and this includes comrades in the party as well as the YSA -- is to mount an orientation to the next YSA convention. We made serious mistakes with regard to the last YSA convention. These were not the mistakes of any individual, but due to the many weaknesses, not only subjective, but mainly objective, that the tendency has. The late preparation of the YSA document came about through a lack of organization and lack of planning and division of labor. This time, assignments for documentation must be taken up early. But the documentation is only the point on the spear. Our orientation toward the YSA convention must begin now at the local levels. This means putting forward the line of the International in the day to day work of the YSA and proposing applications of its methodology in actions flowing from that line. We must show by initiatives how a proper line is carried out. We must spend time discussing politics with the comrades of the YSA doing elementary contact work. Not to do this is to fail to reach the ranks.

This task must be carried out not only in the center locals, but in the regions where we have the best chance of winning people. Our work over the next period must concentrate on these regions. Party comrades must be mobilized for regular weekend trips into the regional YSA areas. This must be done in a serious manner. We must recognize that we will make even smaller gains than we did at the last YSA convention, but until the LTF splits from the International, the YSA remains a more fertile ground for recruitment than the SWP.

In the areas where the IT has hegemony over YSA locals, we should forthrightly initiate forums and other activities that openly express the line of the Fourth International. These locals can and will be held up as exemplary models for how a revolutionary line is advanced in practice, a valuable asset for our intervention into the YSA convention.

IT Work Within the Socialist Workers Party

The tendency is located in thirteen branches of the party. The newest of these is in St. Louis. The prospects for the coming period are to leave Boston and to strengthen St. Louis and Detroit. We will want to have a flexible attitude toward other areas such as Atlanta and Pittsburgh also.

Our tasks in these branches are limited by the reality of the SWP as a political organism. Even if we could get assignments to USLA or the Farmworkers fractions, we would be

under discipline to carry out the at best limiting and at worst totally incorrect line of these fractions. Our major thrust within the party is to pose the tasks necessary to build the U.S. section of the Fourth International, challenging the party leadership to assume this responsibility in the concrete. We must carefully draw up a line for the party to implement in specific situations and then show how it should be carried out. We must do this through reasonable and seriously put motions in the branches and through our actions.

It is difficult to make suggestions in the abstract, but perhaps a few concrete examples will suffice. If a USLA report informs us that a Chile demonstration is taking place and that the party is strictly using USLA slogans and banners, we must put forth the ideas as we have many times in the past that the party has a role of its own to fulfill -- a role of solidarity with the Chilean resistance. When we have information on the actual facts of this resistance, we must present them in order to dispel the myth of the party that there is a total and twenty-year defeat in Chile. If we have contacts with groups or individuals on the outside that support that position, we should encourage them to mobilize for the demonstration. YSA locals that are majority IT should carry signs with the slogans of the International and fight against the attempts of the YSA leadership to stifle them.

As far as other party activities are concerned, it may be useful for comrades to attend party and YSA events where independents are likely to attend. We are not interested in going alone to 100% SWP functions and put our cadre through the "test" of how well they can stand up unprovoked to social ostracism or personal insult. However, at USLA functions, for example, contacts are often internationally minded radicals who are open to our ideas. We should intervene at these affairs and freely discuss the positions of the FI with all those who are willing to listen. Often this is far more fruitful than begging for a USLA assignment and being permitted to turn a mimeo machine in an isolated back room office or arguing our line with five or six handraisers. If there are cadre still floating around the SWP or YSA who could be recruited to our tendency, our best chance of getting them is through our political arguments and our revolutionary practice -- within the limitations of SWP/YSA discipline.

Anti-Imperialist Work

a) Chile Solidarity work is the prime activity that our work should center around today. Everywhere that we have influence, both in the party and YSA, and on any contacts or groups that are not yet in, we must push the line of the International in building Chile Solidarity.

This will be aided by our international press and by specific pamphlets that other sections of the International will put out. We should not be sectarian in this regard where there are pamphlets put out by other groups outside of ourselves which support the line of the International, we

should use them to augment our work. We should get copies into the hands of SWP and YSA members. Translations of the articles that have appeared in Rouge are an excellent way to get our line out on this question.

We also have the added responsibility of bringing to the vanguard the debates currently proceeding within the Chilean resistance and the MIR, such as the question of alliances within the workers movement in general, and the nature of the resistance to the junta in particular. Concretely, to the slogan of the CP for the reinstatement of the UP government and bourgeois democracy in Chile, we should counterpose the slogan of a workers united front against the junta. By doing this we will be giving added political education to broader ranks involved in the solidarity movement, and will win them away from groups such as the Spartacist League and the Maoists, as well as the CP. In getting the International's press and approach to groups who choose to implement it, we can benefit from the effect their action has on the thinking of SWP and YSA comrades. We should, as part of our struggle, make contact with broader groups working on Chile, and seek to raise the level of political understanding and consciousness among them through our participation in joint activity. We must put forward the line of the International in a clear, but tactically well formulated manner, so as to win these elements to our banner. Comrades must fight to get USLA assignments, but if they are not assigned to this work, it does not excuse them from carrying out the tasks of Chile solidarity. Each tendency center should have an on-going campaign on this question and a proper division of labor.

b) Vietnam Solidarity: It is our political position that the Accords were not a betrayal of the struggle of the Vietnamese and the death knell of the war in Indochina. Regardless of the intentions of Moscow, Peking, or Washington, the fact of the matter is that the forces represented by these capitals are incapable of leashing the revolutionary struggles of the workers and peasants of Indochina. It is our position that the Accords represented a step forward in the struggle of the Vietnamese people, and that the struggle will go on from its present stage culminating in the setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat throughout Vietnam. In this regard, we support the victory of the NLF.

With this position, it is in our interest as revolutionaries and as internationalists that there be a campaign of solidarity until final victory. Both the SWP and the CP have closed shop on these tasks for their own separate, but opportunistic reasons. The Fourth International maintains Indochina solidarity as a priority aspect of its work; so do we. We must search out opportunities to mount campaigns on this work. At first, we will reach only relatively small groups and individuals, but by using them as a fulcrum we can start the process of rebuilding an Indochina movement, but this

time with a dominant component on an explicit anti-imperialist line and revolutionary internationalist consciousness. This work has been relegated to pacifists and reformist groups and individuals in this country (Fonda and Hayden among others). They will draw elements to them because no one else is doing the work. We must be involved and seek out these elements to win our program, that of the International. We must use every opportunity both in word and in deed to re-raise the level of consciousness of the SWP and YSA as to their obligations in this regard.

c) African Liberation work: The struggles going on in Black Africa have found a deep interest in the radical milieu in this country. The boycott against Rhodesian chrome, the pan-African liberation movement, the many articles in the radical press on the struggles against the Portuguese colonialists all testify to this. Our tendency, being part of the SWP, has not had a high enough consciousness of these struggles. It is the first task of the tendency in this regard to familiarize ourselves with these struggles and then seek to involve ourselves in building solidarity with them. While that is our prime task, it also has a special meaning to us with regard to the winning over to the International of the Black vanguard in this country. While Vietnam had a high impact on the student youth, the struggles of the African revolutionaries can have an impact on ghetto youth and Black working people in general. The application of the International's position and analysis can help us in making our program meaningful to these layers, and thus win them to our banner. We must find ways of carrying these tasks out in the very next period.

d) Solidarity With the Struggles in the Advanced Capitalist Countries: It is a scandal that the work of solidarity with the British Miners was left to the Spartacist League and the Maoist sects in this country. Struggles such as Lip, the Miners strike, the events unfolding in Spain and Japan, involve tasks that all the organizations of the International should have more than a general interest in. The fact that these are revolutionary struggles of the working class is enough to motivate this. But in addition, our sections are playing major roles with regard to them. This makes it more imperative to propagandize and agitate for support that we explain these struggles of the advanced workers of Europe to our own working class vanguard, which will be confronted with the same struggles in the not too distant future.

The internationalization of the tactics of the sit-down strikes is but one chapter from the annals of working class history that points up the importance of our tasks. This concept of solidarity with the struggles in the advanced countries is of prime importance in drawing vanguard layers both within and outside of the working class to us. The concept of struggles in the advanced capitalist countries is still relatively new to the American scene. The lessons of the Quebec strike has not penetrated the vanguard, never mind the masses. The proximity of the class struggle in these countries to our own will be helpful to our future tasks here. It definitely poses

the question of the working class in struggle in a manner to wipe all traces of Marcusianism away.

In addition to the areas mentioned above, we should pay close attention to the events around the struggles in Ireland, the Middle-East, Argentina, and in particular Puerto Rico. Where we can come in contact with Arab students, Iranian students, etc., we should stretch every opportunity to do so. In the East Coast cities in particular, our comrades should attempt to closely involve themselves with regard to the struggle of Puerto Rico. Any opportunity to reach into this movement with our program and our actions, such as the united front Committee for the Decolonization of Puerto Rico, should not be missed.

Organizational Proposals

The tendency is still very weak. Our preparation for discussion reflects that. This should neither panic us, nor should we be smug about it. Our past experience has been internalized and has left its marks on all of us. With the 10th World Congress, we have a chance to move outward in the ways outlined above. This will force us to start thinking in motion rather than in position. Working out a line and putting it into practice is better than talking about it only. We will make mistakes in this regard also, but we must not allow that fear to stop us from acting.

It is recommended that a continuing literary discussion take place after the conference on several issues. Many issues such as Latin America and Stalinism with regard to Asia will be discussed in the IMT. Besides these, issues related to the Black question, trade union work, etc., and exchange of practical experiences in carrying out tasks in local areas would seem proper. It is our suggestion that a bulletin of reasonable size be issued once a month to handle these matters. In addition, the newsletter will come out twice a month with copies for all comrades. We wish to continue our political education and discussion but at the same time do not wish that the literary or oral forms of that education stand in the way of our actual tasks and duties in carrying out the line of the International in actions.

The tendency must start taking responsibility for writing and contributing articles to the international press (for newspapers such as Red Weekly, Rouge, Bandiera Rossa, Old Mole, etc.) and the soon to be initiated INPRECOR. These articles should deal with the political situation in the United States and take up such concrete events as the recent Bay Area strike, the CLUW conference, the actions of the truckers; as well as articles of a more analytic nature on such things as the Watergate scandals, the oil crisis, and so on. Each area should put one comrade in charge of this type of press work. Not only will this provide our other sections with material on the situation in the U.S., but it will begin the training of our cadre in the tasks of preparing articles for newspapers and magazines. And in return, the sales of this press will have a more direct relevance to our periphery.

For the next period, the center will have the task of creating a more efficient distribution of labor on our varied tasks. Over the past period, too little attention has been paid to efficient planning and prioritization of our tasks. This has resulted in not only a weakening of our field work, but has limited the impact that the center itself should have. The coming period will test whether we can have an on-going political homogenization, while at the same time carrying out a stepped up action orientation.

If our analysis of the political situation, the character of the SWP and its split course, and the objective dynamics of the class struggle inside and outside the SWP is accurate; if we see ourselves as being the nucleus of the American section of the FI, then the importance of building an authoritative and politically competent leadership for the tendency becomes an essential project for the upcoming period. We have made strides forward in the development of leadership, but these are limited compared to what will soon be required. The political committee of the tendency should be broadened to serve two basic functions: (1) to increase the political authority of the central leadership, to effect its discussion and extension of a positive as well as a negative program for the IT (i.e., determining what we are for instead of only what we are against) and (2) to provide for the broader representation of the differing political views represented in the tendency. Political committee membership can no longer be based upon geographical considerations, but rather must reflect the actual political leadership of the tendency on a national level. Toward this end it is necessary for the PC to qualitatively as well as quantitatively expand. In line with this, we propose to leave open the precise size of the PC until the possibilities for the expansion of our leadership can be discussed at the conference. Included in this discussion will of course be the discussion of the necessity of two full-time comrades for the IT.

All comrades should be willing to take on the task of tendency leadership. Having said this, it is obvious that there will be mitigating circumstances which will make it impossible for comrades who would ordinarily be elected to the PC to reside in the IT center area. To ameliorate this problem, we think that a "commuter" approach should be applied. That is, the PC would schedule monthly meetings at which the major political questions would be discussed and decided. If a member of the PC did not reside in the center area, he or she could travel once a month to make these regularly scheduled meetings of the PC. To assume the functioning of the tendency on a day to day basis, it is appropriate for the remaining PC members to constitute a bureau through which the interim decisions of the tendency could be made and reported to the nonresident PC member(s).

This perspective is for the coming period, up to and including the YSA convention. We propose to continue the center in Chicago, primarily because of immediate considerations. Chicago is centrally located nationally, and for the next period it is tactically to our advantage not to be in New York City where the party leadership has 136 full timers without much to do

but harrass us. Moreover, several present members of the PC who are likely to be reelected would find it impossible to relocate. This would mitigate against arbitrarily picking up and moving the center.

These organizational proposals can only be of a tentative nature. Being in a transitional period, in which entirely new problems will arise and must be confronted, the building of an ongoing leadership will have to be taken up in a more systematic fashion. Certainly, the whole question of party structure, in light of our experience in the Socialist Workers Party, will have to be discussed thoroughly.

We do not wish to continue the exchange with comrade Massey on the level of a quarrel over organizational incidents. We are satisfied that in the case of the letter to the IMT, the error was inadvertent, and we consider the matter closed.

However, on the matter of minority representation, comrade Massey's letter raises a number of larger questions that need clarification. We believe it is important that the ground rules for a healthy internal life be established right from the beginning. In addition, comrade Massey appears to misunderstand the status of our political differences with the center, and we will try to clear this up first.

The assertion that "the June 10th Tendency joined the IT on the basis of the platform of the IMT..." is not quite accurate. The statement by the June 10 group announcing our fusion with the IT explicitly qualified our adherence to the platform of the IMT and the IT resolution by reaffirming the views expressed in the Position Paper of June 10th and the document on Nationalism. Comrade Massey neglected to mention this in his letter, just as he did in the report on the fusion.

We did this precisely so that there would be no misunderstanding as to where we stand. Now, when a group of comrades, comprising a significant fraction of the tendency, announce that they stand on documents spelling out their special views, then, to our way of thinking, you have a clearly defined minority.

Then comrade Massey suggests that even if there had been a political basis for the June 10th group at the time of the fusion, this is no longer the case, because our views on Latin America have now been adopted by the majority and are "reflected in the resolutions adopted at the 10th World Congress." Apart from the fact that this would have no bearing on the selection of delegates prior to the congress, we can only say that if this were true, we would be delighted to forego all claims to representation. But is it really true?

Our views on the role of guerilla warfare in Latin America were expressed quite clearly in the June 10th Position Paper (although guardedly, because it was introduced into the debate with the LIT). In essence we called for a rejection of the guerillaist

strategy implied in the 9th World Congress resolution on Latin America, (and explicitly repeated in the resolution on Bolivia of December 2, 1972), and for a return to the Leninist line on the road to power, i.e., popular revolution of all the exploited and oppressed classes led by the urban proletariat. We wrote, "...it is of the utmost importance that the resolution which will guide the work of our Latin American comrades point unambiguously in the direction in the direction of mass work and away from guerilla warfare at this time." We are not aware that this is now the official position of the IT. If it is, it should be duly recorded and reported. As far as we know, the position of the IT is one of uncritical support to the IME.

Has the IME itself eliminated the basis for this controversy by self-correction? At the time of the June 10th document, we were encouraged by what appeared to be movement in the right direction. However, it must be said bluntly now, that the corrections have been empirical, superficial, equivocal, contradictory, and extremely inadequate. The proof is that after indignantly denying that it ever supported a guerillaist strategy, the IME of the IME approved a resolution on Bolivia which postulated that the "specific form of armed struggle for an entire period could only be guerilla war", and this of a "continental dimension." Furthermore, this resolution was singled out as one of the planks in the platform of the IME.

A significant section of the IT is categorically opposed to this line, but this found no reflection in the delegation to the congress. The plain fact is that the resolution on Latin America at the 9th W.C. was fundamentally wrong on the question of guerilla warfare, (no matter what else was right about it), and contributed to the disorientation of a number of Latin American sections, yet the leadership refuses to recognize this and limits its self-criticism to euphemistic phrases, "elliptical formations, one-sidedness" etc., while repeating the very same error. We assume that this is partly due to reasons of face saving vis a vis the LTF, and partly an attempt to satisfy everyone, including the author of the Bolivian resolution. But these considerations count for nothing compared to the urgent need for a fundamental reeducation and reorientation of our cadres, and this can only be done by an honest, forthright recognition of the full extent of the errors of the 9th WC and the reaffirmation of the Leninist strategy for the socialist revolution in underdeveloped countries. If the majority of the IT is ready to join us in our effort to bring this about, then the major issue separating out the June 10th group will vanish.

On the question of national and women's movements, the differences are not as well defined. We have put forward a clear cut position in our document on nationalism; no support whatsoever to nationalism, full support to all movements against national oppression. Although we did not submit a document on women, we indicated that the same basic two sided policy applied. We frankly saw this document not only as an attack on the SWP's petty-bourgeois nationalism, but as a criticism of the IT resolution which we believed was at the very least ambiguous on the subject of support to national and women's movements.

The IT resolution was, we think, defective on this score, primarily by omission... but not by oversight, since none of our amendments aimed at clarifying this question were accepted. It is in order to determine how much agreement or disagreement there is on this question that we have introduced our document on nationalism for adoption at the upcoming conference.

There remain two questions concerning ground rules referred to above. If we understand comrade Massey correctly, he advances two more arguments for failing to provide the June 10th group representation; One, that we did not declare ourselves an official tendency, and did not demand our legal rights, and second, that our

differences were not of a "principled character."

Regarding the first, we find it hard to believe that comrade Massey really insists that every loose, temporary grouping that develops around a particular question immediately crystallize into an organized tendency, (which after all, is the same as a faction), before he will acknowledge that its views should be represented. There has been no attempt to set up an organized group or even to maintain regular contact between L.A. and Bay Area comrades who comprised the June 10th grouping. We prefer it that way, and would not like to be forced into organizing a formal tendency in order to gain recognition.

The comrades from Los Angeles did not want to push for a delegate when only two were to be selected, and the FS proposed comrades Massey and Vincent. Comrade Massey was informed, in Chicago, of our desire for representation. If we knew that a third member of the IT would be admitted, we would have certainly proposed a representative of the June 10th group. We were not concerned about a vote at the congress, but with voice in the IMT deliberations. If comrade Mitten did not speak at these meetings we assume it was because he did not find it necessary to do so since he had no special or dissident views to put forward. Obviously, a representative of June 10th would have spoken.

However, in our opinion, it is the responsibility of leadership not merely to allow, but to insist that in all gatherings where disputed issues are to be considered, minority viewpoints receive reasonable representation. We further believe that these political considerations take precedence over questions of "rewards or penalties" or of the personal merits of individual comrades, praiseworthy though they may be.

Nor can we agree that the principle of representation applies only to "principled questions." Actually, Comrade Massey unwittingly calls into question any minority rights at all. On the one hand, he says that if the differences are "principled", "this raises the question as to the (principled) character of the fusion", or to put it more directly there shouldn't have been any fusion. The inescapable conclusion is that there is no room for minorities, or at least minority representation in the IT. We do not think that comrade Massey has followed through the logic of his arguments.

In fact, the movement has experienced perfectly legitimate tendencies, factional struggles and splits over questions of strategy and even tactics (entryism, etc.). It is true that a tendency (or a faction) is generally more homogeneous than a party. Indeed if the tendencies, in the international were divided solely over the question of the role of guerilla warfare in the Latin American revolution, we would not be in the IT. We would have to form a separate tendency. But we all know that far more is involved. We believe that in spite of some serious errors pertaining to guerilla warfare, the IMT (and IT) represent authentic Trotskyism, while the LTF is a genuine petty-bourgeois right wing.

Furthermore, because of the SWP leaderships dead-end factionalism and monolithic proclivities, the struggle has resulted in a division into two hostile camps with the permanent threat of split. We are therefore not dealing with temporary tendencies around particular issues, but with two rival international organizations that are embryonic parties, somewhat similar to the relationship between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in the RSDLP. Under these circumstances the IMT (IT) must of necessity take on a broader character, and will inevitably include tendencies and groupings within it, and they are not likely to be based on issues of fundamental principle.

We have been indoctrinated in the "lessons" of the history of faction fights and splits in the SWP. The chief "lesson" is that any serious opposition to the official line must result in political warfare, a power fight and a split. This, indeed, is the tradition of the SWP, but not of Lenin's party. Trotsky described the internal life of the Bolshevik faction (and then party) as a "seething democracy", in which the struggle of tendencies and factions were the rule. Yet the Bolsheviks suffered far less splits than the SWP, because the struggles were conducted in a spirit of mutual respect, honesty, and loyalty, not one of monolithic, rigidity, in which every opposition is seen as a deadly enemy and a "challenge to the leadership" to be shot down.

We believe that the unity of the IT rests on solid programmatic foundations, even though it is not entirely homogeneous. With a new and healthy atmosphere the debate over differences can lead to political maturation and stronger unity.

Passed by the Los Angeles IT, 7 for, 1 against, 1 absent.

SOME COMMENTS ON ORGANIZATIONAL NORMS IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT

by Vincent

The contribution entitled "A Reply to Comrade Massey" from Los Angeles, makes a valuable effort at grappling with a real problem of our tendency, namely a re-statement of our organizational norms as applied to our current status. In expressing the desire not to continue the discussion on the basis of quarrels over incidents, it also took a positive step. However, since specific circumstances are re-raised anyway, they deserve some more clarification.

The reaffirmation of the Leninist conception of the role of minorities is entirely correct. Our tendency, insofar as it is not merely an ideological tendency, but the nucleus of a future section, will of necessity encompass a spectrum of views such as exist in the organizations generally supporting the IMT as a whole. We do not have any conception of amnolithic organization. Differences inside the revolutionary organization reflect the perception of different aspects of the class struggle. Through internal struggle, an overall view is achieved, and the correct line is arrived at. In this sense internal struggle is a normal and healthy process which builds a revolutionary organization. Differences can be reflected in the form of broad currents of opinion, tendencies or factions, all of which deserve some form of representation within the framework of democratic centralism.

Unity and discipline on action, and continuing theoretical elaboration and political discussion, are mutually reinforcing concepts. The practices of the IMG and the French section are good examples in this matter. The central committee meets frequently, and holds real political discussions at which differences are expressed in votes. Internal literary discussion bulletins come out regularly. Tendencies are subsidized by the organization as a whole. All these questions will have to be taken up by our tendency in the concrete. Our present status is eminently transitory. While we can already sense the problems that will arise, we don't yet have a clear enough view of how they will be posed concretely, and therefore can only reaffirm general principles. In this sense, the "Reply" is welcome.

However, in attempting to demonstrate that these principles have already been misapplied the "Reply" stands on some unclear ground. The question basically is whether the former June 10th tendency was still a tendency within the IT at the time of the world congress. The basis of such a tendency would be the positions of June 10th on Latin America, and less clearly, on nationalism and feminism. The latter two are absolutely questionable. The amendments to the IT political resolution from L.A. were only one set among many. We received amendments and proposals from the original draft of Cde. A.W., from Houston, from Philadelphia, and several other individuals and local areas. Each one of them constituted a nuance

in a consistent direction ~~backwards~~ but nothing sufficient to warrant even the name of a current. None of them claimed the status of a minority.

On nationalism, the formula of the "Reply" of : "No support whatsoever to Nationalism" is actually more rigid than the IT Political Resolution which indicated that in some cases, nationalism could and had played a progressive role -- this is in reference to Lenin's example from the 'countries of the East' wher it represented an advance over apathy in these backward countries. In addition the position was clarified by the report of Cathy Matson to the YSA convention, which was not challenged by either component of the former June 10th tendency. On the women's movement, the nuances covered a similar spectrum and could not justify a special representation at the World Congress.

On Latin America, a problem arises. The authors of the "Reply" state that the tone of the June 10th document had to be "guarded" because it was introduced into the debate with the LTF. But that very same contribution specifically indicated that it was wrong to subordinate part of one's criticisms for factional gains. This was done in reference to a large number of comrades in the IT who shared the same positions as those expressed in the June 10th statement - and still do-- but did not wish to throw them as a lever to the LTF. Further, no document internal to the IT ever indicated that any component of the June 10th tendency ever rejected the 9th World Congress line altogether. While singling out the guerillaist deviations, it did not challenge Cde. Germain's assertion that the 9th World Congress orientation had been one toward ARMED STRUGGLE. To my knowledge, the "Reply" is the first contribution which I have seen which actually rejects Germain's interpretation. The stated differences of June 10th were not qualitatively greater than differences which other comrades had on issues related to Latin America, such as the role of Cuba, the characterization of the PRT, etc. How were we to determine which one of these non-qualitatively greater differences was to be represented, and which one was not to be? It was impossible even to begin to .

While it is correct that we should not demand of minorities that they harden in order to be represented, in a situation where there are a large number of secondary differences --in my opinion mainly through lack of good discussion and information--, unless clearly defined tendencies emerge, it would seem impossible to privilege any one of them. For this reason, I would say that the selection of delegates to the world congress could not have been done any differently than it actually was.

If major differences exist on Latin America, inside the IT, everything should be done to insure that they are reflected in the discussion which is due to take place inside the IMT, within limits set by the IMT leadership. But they must be stated and argued out clearly to warrant such an effort, and this remains to be done.

**Extracts from the IT Resolution on Trade-Union Work;
from IT Bulletin No. VII**

IV. TASKS

Our tasks in relation to the trade union movement must flow directly from our general political perspectives and be consonant with those tasks. Our work in the unions and around union struggles should be seen as an integral component of our

longterm strategic goal of achieving a sufficient base in the American working class that will enable us to exercise an influence beyond our numbers and actually have an impact in the process of advancing the class struggle in the United States. In order to achieve this goal we must necessarily have a "proletarian orientation," that is we must always keep in mind that all of our work is directed toward building a base in the class. How we implement this strategy, however, is a tactical question. We cannot afford to be locked into a sterile debate over whether we should ~~advant~~ toward vanguard elements wherever they might be or begin to implement a "proletarian orientation" by colonizing every available comrade in basic industry. Such a debate would neither reflect the reality of our current situation nor serve to place the discussion of urgent specific questions facing us in a meaningful framework. The counterposition of "vanguard orientation" to "proletarian orientation" more properly belongs among the schema and methodological contortions of the LTF.

Let us make it clear at the onset that we seek to relate to vanguard elements wherever they may be. To do less would be sectarian madness of the worst sort. The only inhibition on our part with an orientation to vanguard elements is our size and organizational imprisonment.

How then should our trade union work fit into this perspective? We must begin with a clear appreciation of the factors delimiting our work. The relative paucity of available cadre necessarily dictates that we evaluate where to invest them with a good deal of circumspection. The fact that we are in the SWP automatically poses the question of what to do with potential recruits that we are able to draw around us. Although the SWP is not the most congenial organization for working-class militants, we should attempt to induce them to join. Should the SWP refuse to admit them for factional reasons (either blatantly or via the imposition of long waiting periods, impossible assignments, etc.) or if the potential recruits find joining the SWP an uninviting alternative then we have the duty to help sustain their interest in the politics of the Fourth International through a variety of means including study classes, reading programs, action interventions, and social functions (tavern raps, dinners, parties, etc.). It is entirely possible that concentrations of potential recruits may desire to coalesce in some organizational form. In order to initiate contact with such individuals, however, we must first delineate a line of intervention for our union work.

Given the smallness of our members our work must occur on three planes: (1) Strike support work, (2) on-the-job, day-to-day, one-to-one recruitment, and (3) organized interventions.

Strike support work should be the province of the tendency as a whole. Work of this nature can be carried on by comrades who are students, unemployed, or working in union situations that are relatively dormant compared to the actual strike struggle that is occurring. The actual character of strike support work obviously flows from the particular strike situation. Strike support work involves not only an opportunity to reach the more advanced workers active in strike struggles but also an axis around which we can coalesce vanguard elements outside of the class. In situations where strikes assume a national importance, support work should be coordinated directly from the center. Responsibility for work in support of local strike actions should be assumed by the local tendency units in consultation with the center. In either case questions of line, strategy and tactics cannot be predetermined outside the context of the particular strike.

2) On-the-job, day-to-day and one-to-one work is an aspect of our trade union work so elementary that it scarcely requires mention. Ordinarily, once comrades are established in job situations and have familiarized themselves with the conditions of their particular work place, one-to-one recruitment ought to be an integral

component of everyday life. Individual sales or even initially free distribution of the Red Mole, International, Imprecor, pamphlets and other materials should be a norm. Work breaks, lunch breaks and punchout time should be utilized for discussion of a wide range of issues including working conditions, union democracy, contract evaluation, etc, etc. It is essential, however, that such discussions transcend economic issues and include such topics as Chile, Vietnam, racism, women's rights, etc. Out of our initial one-to-one work we should be able to draw around us a periphery that will be useful as we begin initiating larger interventions. One-to-one work is especially important in those job situations where union meetings are held infrequently or are poorly attended.

3) Action interventions is a category of work that is broad in scope and includes a variety of possibilities. In situations where we have only one comrade in a workplace, it might include joining an established "left" or even an "out" caucus with the idea of ultimately building a pole within the caucus. Another activity we can undertake is the preparation and distribution of bulletins either on the workplace level, the union level or acity-wide level within the same industry. Preparation of such bulletins depends, of course, upon each individual situation (relationship of forces, SWP presence, potential receptivity, etc.). The political character of such bulletins should include a mix of economic and political topics. The type of interventions our comrades make at union meetings themselves is a tactical question. We must be careful, however, not to emulate the self-isolating presentation of the full transitional program at the drop of a hat as practiced by the Spartacist League, nor succumb to the "deep entry" economist practices of the International Socialists. In general, we should attempt to function as the best militants at the work-place. Whether or not we assume positions as stewards or grievors is tactical depending on whether it inhibits or enhances our political functioning, whether it identifies us too closely with the union bureaucracy, etc.

AN OVER-ALL APPROACH

It would seem from an examination of our resources that our comrades in such tendency units as Boston, Philly, Minneapolis, the Bay Area and Los Angeles would necessarily be limited to strike support activities and possibly some one-on-one recruitment work in the coming period. Opportunities exist, however, in the D.C. area, Chicago, Houston and St. Louis for the initiation of work on a broader level in a systematic and co-ordinated fashion. We must proceed initially from the reality of our existence rather than embarking upon grandiose and utopian colonization schemes. In the D.C. area for example, we already have a small base in local 1199. This base should be extended and reinforced through the tendency as a whole in this area. In Chicago we already have a concentration in two areas: rail and the public sector. The rail comrades should be brought together into a functioning cell/fraction. It is imperative that the other comrades work with the rail cell in the interim period as we attempt to broaden our base through contacts. In Houston we are developing our base in oil but have a toehold in steel there as well as in St. Louis with some contacts in Chicago. We should have the perspective of building up these tendrils, in line with a special orientation to the developing situation in steel, and participation in the Steel-workers for Change caucus.

On a national level, the tendency must organize educational series on the labor movement in the U.S., and make on-going studies of the situation of the trade unions in their area. These should be co-ordinated by a trade-union division in the center. With these steps we can develop a limited but politically indispensable intervention in the trade-unions.

AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES MUST KNOW WHERE THEY STAND
ON THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION

by
Vincent, Hank Williams, Mitchell, Mike Patrick

The proposal to adopt the Palomar position on Vietnam at our coming conference has been criticized from basically two angles. One angle counterposes the idea that the tendency should adopt no position. The other main criticism is that it underestimates or almost rules out the possibility of the VCP's development into a revolutionary party in the full sense of the word. The purpose of this contribution is to answer the various arguments for postponing a decision or not discussing the issue, and to defend the essential positions put forward in the Palomar statement.

Why Should the IT Take a Position?

Interestingly enough, taking a position on this issue at our conference has been opposed both because the issue is not sufficiently important to warrant a diversion from our main tasks, and because the issue is too important to be voted upon without further discussion. This is rather puzzling and deserves explanation.

Cde. Carapace complains about the production of the "ark Lause document, "Vietnam and the Proletarian Revolution" (YSA DB Vol. 17, #9). He says: "It smacked of sectarianism, and demonstrated that two leadership comrades could not keep their attention on the essential problem of developing an organization with a line in the U.S." Earlier he explained that "the essential contribution we can make to the 4th, and we repeat this, is the development of a political line-for building the organization in the U.S. and nothing else." The conclusion is: "we propose in the interest of integrating the tendency: the immediate acceptance of all the 4th International's positions, that the tendency so declare and so act, and that the debate on these broad questions (immediately non-practical) be closed in the tendency for one year. There could be rare exceptions to this, subject to SC approval." In other words, we are being asked not only to defend the F.I.'s positions, which we have already done as a tendency within the SJP, and will defend even more in any other framework which the struggle imposes upon us, but to do this blindly without discussing the positions we are to defend, and seeing whether we agree with them or not! We believe that our organization should defend the line of the F.I. in its public interventions, and this will be done all the more effectively if that line has been thoroughly discussed and understood, and if comrades who disagree feel that they had their chance and were given a hearing. Of course, the best way to build the F.I. is not to have comrades defend positions they don't hold, but rather to explain the activities and general method of the F.I. as a whole.

Another point made by Cde. Carapace is that the leadership should not waste time on this question but stick to the essential contribution, a line for North America. This position does not hold any water. In fact, one of the most important questions facing American revolutionaries is the question of the Vietnamese revolution, and Cde. Carapace knows it so well that his alter ego, Cde. Bill Y., thought it necessary to devote

the single written contribution he made to the SWP discussion to precisely this question. Yes, Cde. Y. saw his most important to the P.I. as introducing a North American audience to the un-sectarian, un-diversionary niceties of General Giap's thoughts. The document, designed probably to agitate the stodgy LTF out of its stupor, unfortunately laid itself wide open with such formulations as: "The Vietnamese CP has produced some fine theoreticians like Giap and LeDuan who have eliminated all Maoist mechanicalism from their analytical works in order to come extraordinarily close to our own theory concerning the general process of the permanent revolution, the role of the party, and the diverse social classes, etc. . .", or further, "We see the Vietnamese CP as the most beautiful example today of revolutionaries in struggle, of far-sightedness in combat, of consistency in the reaffirmation of revolutionary practice." (SWP DB Vol. 31, #24)

In fact, it is clear that Cde. Carapace really thinks the Vietnam question is an essential one, and we are led to the second argument, that the question is too important to be voted on now, without further discussion. This is the most valid objection. Comrades are understandably unwilling to rush into a position whose full implications they are not aware of. However, two points must be borne in mind. The first is that the Palomar position does not involve a sweeping methodological choice on the overall questions of workers' states bureaucracies, Stalinism, and centrism. As Cde. Alec has pointed out, it attempts to establish some key points which are necessary to orient our work and propaganda around Vietnam. While serious methodological differences may underlie some of the formulations, until they result in actual practical divergences on our orientation, it is best to pursue the discussion at a theoretical level, in the open fashion usually provided by literary discussions. So the ideological struggle must go on, and the practical steps must be clearly adopted, if we are to avoid a creeping indifference to theory combined with hesitations in our activity. The Palomar position arms us to intervene in the movement with the confidence of knowing where we stand on some immediate key questions.

The second consideration is that the discussion can only progress by comrades thinking out their inclinations and confronting them. If the organization goes wrong on some question, it will be incapable of analyzing the source of its error unless it can re-examine exactly where it stood, on the basis of the resolutions it adopted in the past. Already a good deal of discussion has taken place on this issue. For the comrades who have been through the Proletarian Orientation tendency and the Massey-Shaffer-Smith tendency, the question was discussed in response to the Gregorich-Passen split in the "Jules Verne document" circulated in the FO. This document defended the NPAC strategy, the raising of the slogan of victory to the NLF, and the concept that the NLF represented a proletarian force whose victory would mean an extension of the workers state. The January 19, 1973, statement, drafted by Cde. Lauren C., which we fought to be allowed to read in the branches contained a statement on Vietnam. Some of us may or may not have agreed with it then, and some may have changed their minds. Tom Kerry and the LTF attempted to use that brief statement to accuse us of an unprincipled bloc with the IMT. But this should not provoke us to go running for cover with an ostrich policy. Rather we should be inspired with a

healthy urge to study the question and take a position. Since then, we have had the first Feldman-Johnson ISR article, the August SWP convention discussion, the Walter-Sterne resolution, the Germain document on China, the many answers to Sterne and Vern-Ryan positions by the LTF, the Mark Lause document, and the new Feldman-Johnson and Rousset articles in the ISR.

The reason there has been so much discussion on the nature of the Vietnamese revolution is not because of any inclination for the esoteric, BUT rather because of its importance to the world revolution and the particular responsibilities it imposes on American revolutionaries. Every socialist militant is conscious of the implications of the outcome of the war on the rest of the colonial revolution, and of its impact on the vanguard around the world. Sustained involvement in solidarity work has led to a deeper interest in the course of the struggle in Vietnam. In the same way, discussions around the Algerian revolution in France played the role of catalyzing political differences on the left, and the Cuban revolution did not only inspire solidarity actions in this country but also provoked a renewed interest in deepening revolutionary theory.

In fact, it is impossible for our tendency to exist as a component part of the American left without a position on the Vietnam issue. All the accusations and misrepresentations directed by the LTF, the Spartacists, and other sects, against us, would be unanswerable. These sects cannot be dismissed with a brush of the hand as isolated, turned to the past, etc. All serious revolutionaries interested in theory will at least examine their pretensions and this means we must explain our differences with all of these groupings. The positions outlined in the I.T. documents submitted to the SWP are not sufficient for this task. Many comrades may have felt at the time these documents were submitted that they were not in a position to argue for particular points given the needs of our struggle against the minority faction. To avoid false suspicions and false debates, clarity is necessary. The French section did not launch the JCR one day to come out with the Communist League a few years later. The solidity of the Communist League and its successor, is due to the patient theoretical elaboration and political clarity achieved through years of polemics against the Lambertists and Lutte Ouvriere, and many others. A clear position on Vietnam is necessary also to guard us against possible dangers of third worldist, Ho-Chi-Minhist type deviations that may occur in a different context than the SWP, and to arm us in our polemics with the Maoists and centrists. Without a position, we would merely be buffeted about, with no chance of regaining our bearings by starting from a clear presentation of the problem in our own terms and a set of principles to which we adhere.

The Place of the Discussion in the Evolution of the Tendency

Several comrades have expressed concern that the interest in the methodological questions underpinning this debate might reflect an inward, sectarian archivist type deviation in the tendency. While the danger does exist, it must not prevent us from struggling to equip the tendency with Marxist theory. The best way to deal with this danger is to understand its origins. Any tendency existing in the SWP, excluded from responsibility for political interventions, and prohibited from discussing politics with the ranks of the party, would naturally tend to develop a left Opposition mentality (in the sense that the Left Opposition's

struggle was a necessary, but deformative, part of the price for the rise of Stalinism). But the conditions of the rise of the I.T. are even more specific.

Given the nature of the SWP, fluctuating between sect-like abstentionist traits, and opportunist adaptation to existing movements, and this within the context of a long isolation from the International, any opposition which developed in the SWP would have to combine and draw its strength from three sources: a claim to the revolutionary heritage of the party, a consistent line for revolutionary intervention, and an assimilation of the lessons of the activity of the rest of the International. However, not all these traits could combine at once. The P.O. developed at a time when the party was deepening and generalizing its adaptationist interventions. The P.O. naturally reacted to this by harkening back to the party's past. At the same time it did incorporate some elements based on a rejection of the adaptationist practice in the interventions of the party, especially in the anti-war movement. The fact that the international majority had not at that time theorized its practice, as was later to be done in the European Perspectives Document, and had not expressed interest in establishing a dialogue with the P.O. tendency (except for the telegram from Tariq Ali which wished the SWP success in its efforts at implantation in the working class; the IMG was of course more directly concerned with internal SWP affairs, if only for self-defense) further diminished the chance of any synthesis of these different aspects being worked out. The increasing weakness of the party's mass intervention cut off the possibility of a stream of recruits coming over to us because of a disillusionment with the party's intervention, bringing with them a good experience of the mass movement and the vanguard layers and contributing to cross-fertilize our tendency. The initial, partially dogmatic, approach of the P.O. did not help to overcome this weakness. At the same time, any opposition current in the party would have had to confront the sledge-hammer repression of the leadership, tending to freeze its development. For these reasons, there is a need for a struggle in our tendency to assimilate the lessons and heritage of the Fourth International--this does not imply an uncritical assimilation of course--and to detail our approach to intervention in the American political scene.

However, the first potential source of strength we mentioned, the winning of the party's revolutionary heritage, is an important and necessary component for any revolutionary tendency in the USA. It entails an orientation toward winning the cadre trained in some of the more positive of the party's history. The number we can hope to win is limited. But the struggle to win them and to demoralize the others is necessary. The strength of the LTP, and the main ultimate factor that prevents tested cadre of the SWP from coming over to us after they have seen the correctness of some of our positions is the belief in the SWP as the repository of Trotskyist orthodoxy. The SWP's orthodoxy is like the Catholic Church's canon law: it holds together ultimately on one assumption, revealed truth; if you destroy one element, then the whole world view has to go. Hence the importance of the organizational and theoretical fights in the SWP: the preservation of the legitimacy of the usurpacious leadership depends on a fight to the death for the continuity and sacred character of the dogma. At the core of this dogma

is the SWP's contribution to the analysis of the workers states in the two historical fights against Shachtmanism and Cochranism. "The SWP has always been right on every major question," comrades are told.

The evolution of some comrades in the P.O. in coming to reject the SWP's traditional analysis of the "social transformations" in Eastern Europe, China, and Cuba, as these proletarian revolutions are euphemistically referred to, is indicative in this regard. They began by rejecting the party's position on the "Democratic Secular State in Palestine," and questioning the refusal to raise the slogan of "Victory to the NLF". This led them to investigate the origins of the SWP's confusion on the question of self-determination and the state, its characterization of parties that established workers states as petty-bourgeois, and to discover that the much praised Cochran-Hansen position in the 1951 debates were shot through with serious theoretical confusion (as documented in a rudimentary but undeniable form by the Vern-Ryan documents). Some of this confusion can be found today in the SWP's current formulations on Cuba, Vietnam, and the role of armed struggle. We will not be able to shake the confidence of the better elements of the LTR unless they develop at least some doubts regarding the orthodoxy of the theoretical fantasies of Hansenism, and the alleged liquidationist nature of the ex-Pabloites. Comrades were led to argue these points extensively not because of any shibboleth on their part, but because the LTR immediately saw in this challenge a subversive threat to their weltanschauung and began a massive bombardment of educational series, conferences, Education for Socialists documents, ISR articles, and internal documents against both the theoretical positions adopted during the International Secretariat period, and the positions expressed by comrades in the USA inspired by the Vern-Ryan documents. In point of fact, the same process occurred with comrades who defended the Cochran positions. Healthy iconoclasm explains the place of this debate in our tendency, and not any sectarian bent for sterile incantation of dogmatic formulas.

The Palomar position does not attempt to delve into the theoretical and methodological questions in general. These will have to be taken up in a literary discussion and within the framework of the debate in the IMT and in the International. What Palomar does, is take a stand on the issues which have a direct impact on our ability to plan our Vietnam solidarity work, and relate to the legitimate debates going on among vanguard elements in the United States. Let us examine therefore what delineations are drawn by the Palomar document.

**V. Material Related to
Unauthorized Public Work by the
Internationalist Tendency on
May 11, 1974, and Afterward**

Los Angeles

Los Angeles, California
May 20, 1974

Dear Comrades,

This letter is to inform you of violations of discipline on the part of members of the Internationalist Tendency in the Los Angeles Local.

The first instance occurred during the May 11 demonstration demanding freedom for the political prisoners in Chile. Prior to the demonstration, there were extensive discussions in both branches (Central-East and Westside) and in the Local Executive Committee concerning our intervention. The reason why we had rather lengthy discussions was because we were in a difficult fight with a whole range of our opponents, from the Stalinists to the Spartacists, to build a non-exclusionary demonstration.

Reports in both branches and the Local Executive Committee outlining our intervention were approved as the situation developed. Our basic orientation was to build a united-front as best we could, around the demands to "Cut. U.S. aid to the junta" and to "Free all the Chilean political prisoners"--concentrating on the six prisoners singled out by USLA. Olga Rodriguez, our candidate for governor, would speak at the demonstration for the party, and present our views on the Unidad Popular, as well as support the demands of the action. (A section of the rally was set aside for discussion of issues that went beyond defense of the prisoners.) The USLA also had a speaker, and the party was to support the USLA intervention through leafleting and carrying USLA signs. In addition, we were distributing leaflets for our election campaign banquet to be held that evening, and selling The Militant. We also had important responsibility for defense of the demonstration, which was necessary to ensure the united front character of it.

This general orientation was approved in the Local Executive Committee held prior to the action. A member of the IT, Comrade Gene, is on the Local Executive Committee, although he failed to attend this meeting. At the Central-East branch meeting held May 6, this orientation was approved, with no opposition on the part of IT members of that branch. At the May 6 meeting of the Westside branch, however, members of the IT made a motion that the party distribute the September 1973 statement of the United Secretariat on the coup in Chile. Comrade Massey, who was visiting Los Angeles, attended this meeting as a guest. After discussion, the branch voted unanimously, with the exception of the members of the IT present, against this motion. The majority of the branch felt that this statement was dated and inappropriate for this demonstration, and that the orientation decided on was in full consonance with the positions of the SWP and the Fourth International.

On the basis of these decisions, the organizers made assignments for the demonstration. All members of the IT were given assignments.

At the demonstration itself, the IT members from both branches showed up with copies of the September 1973 United Secretariat statement, with a leaflet stapled to it. I, as the city organizer,

instructed the IT members to carry out their assignments as decided by the branches rather than distribute this statement. The IT members refused to do this, and proceeded to distribute the statement.

On May 18, some comrades of the IT participated in a demonstration in support of Mexican political prisoners, but on their own, with no consultation with the party. Comrade Gene had asked to be excused from an assignment to sell Militants that day, because of work. However, he showed up at this demonstration, but did not sell Militants.

On May 19, at a Gary Lawton defense rally held in Riverside, Comrade Judy W. of the IT sold the Canadian paper, Old Mole. No decision by the party was made to sell this paper. In fact, we are on a campaign to sell The Militant.

Comradely,

s/Barry Sheppard
Los Angeles City Organizer

May 15, 1974

Dear Comrades,

The following facts about the activities of party members who belong to the Internationalist Tendency have been reported to the New York Local Executive Committee at its meetings on April 28 and May 12:

1) At a Haitian antideportation demonstration in Brooklyn on April 27 Comrade Frank Manning, a member of the Lower Manhattan branch, carried a sign that was not part of the intervention decided upon by the Brooklyn branch. He had been informed two days prior to the action that the party and YSA interventions were being organized by the Brooklyn branch and YSA local, including the preparation of signs and the organization of sales. He was asked to sell The Militant or the Young Socialist.

Instead of participating in the intervention along the lines determined by the Brooklyn branch and YSA, Manning, along with Dan Cahill, a non-party member of the Long Island YSA, carried out their own intervention. They carried YSA signs with a hammer, sickle, and a "4" on them. When Comrade Geoff Mirelowitz, the YSA city organizer and a member of the party's Local Executive Committee, asked them to put down their signs and sell The Militant or the YS they refused. They indicated they would participate in the party and YSA's intervention only if Mirelowitz instructed them to do so in writing. Mirelowitz told them that a demonstration was not the place to negotiate and draw up contracts.

2) In New York City on May 11, at a united front demonstration initiated by USIA in defense of Chilean political prisoners, members of the IT refused to carry out their assignments. They are: Hedda Garza, Rich Mitten, Frank Manning, Karen Chaplin, Chris Chaplin, from the Lower Manhattan branch and John Singletary from the Brooklyn branch.

The Local Executive Committee had voted at its April 28 meeting that the branches should prepare their own signs and banners and that only three slogans would be carried: "Free All Chilean Political Prisoners," "End U.S. Aid to the Military Junta," and a slogan demanding freedom for the six imprisoned Chileans selected by the organizers of the demonstration for particular focus. Each branch was asked to assign at least 20 comrades to participate in the action, in addition to the comrades in our Chile defense work fraction. Some of these comrades were assigned as marshalls. The rest were assigned to Militant, YS, ISR, and pamphlet sales, and one each to distributing the SWP state election platform and the Upper West Side forum leaflet. All the comrades in the Chile defense work fraction were assigned to tasks in relation to organizing the demonstration and rally. These were the only assignments made by the branches.

Comrades Garza, Mitten, Manning, K. Chaplin, C. Chaplin, and Singletary were assigned to sell Militants. They were asked to take no other assignments. All six of them agreed to carry Militants,

and they did sell a few. However, they all took it upon themselves to distribute a three-page leaflet which includes a reprint from Intercontinental Press of the September 19 United Secretariat statement on Chile. With the exception of Singletary they sold the Old Mole, the newspaper of the Revolutionary Marxist Group in Canada. Neither of these items were part of the party's intervention in the action and when the comrades were asked to put them away and concentrate on selling The Militant they refused. They indicated that they would participate in the party's intervention only if they were instructed by me in writing to do so. They even had a prepared statement which they asked me to sign then and there.

It should be added that the May 11 action occurred during a week when all three of the New York branches had voted to increase their bundles of Militants by more than double in order to help surpass the national sales goal of 10,000 in one week. Consequently special attention was given to Militant sales during the action.

Comrade James Morgan, a supporter of the political views of the International Majority Tendency, who had resigned from the Internationalist Tendency two days before the May 11 action, sold only Militants as he had been assigned, and did not distribute the three-page leaflet or sell Old Moles.

These facts about the May 11 action were reported to the three New York branches at their regular meetings on May 13. Members of the IT were present at the Lower Manhattan and Brooklyn meetings and spoke during this point on the agenda, and did not dispute these facts.

Comradely,

s/Doug Jenness
New York City Organizer

Chicago

May 14, 1974

Dear Comrade Barnes:

At the Chicago Branch Meeting of May 7, 1974, under the point of the Executive Committee Report, the organizer read all of the assignments for Saturday, May 11, 1974. There were two demonstrations plus our press sales that the branch voted to participate in on May 11, 1974. The Executive Committee further recommended that the branch mobilize on May 11, 1974, and that any comrade who found it impossible to function politically for work, illness or pressing personal problems should ask to be excused. The Executive Committee report made it clear that the literature to be sold by Party Comrades doing the press intervention was the Militant, the ISR, Pamphlets, a campaign statement (which the branch approved), forum leaflets and ballot petitioning. Comrades assigned to USLA would carry out their assignments under the direction of the USLA fraction. Finally, all comrades were to be dispatched from the hall on the morning of May 11, 1974. It was important that the comrades participating in USLA work meet at the hall at 10:00 a.m. to hear a final report on last minute assignment changes, political tone, etc. The Minutes will indicate that after discussion, the branch voted to approve the Executive Committee report overwhelmingly.

In order that there could be no confusion in the minds of any Executive Committee member, the Executive Committee was polled on May 10, 1974 to decide whether we needed a special Executive Committee meeting prior to May 11, in order to reaffirm the decision of the branch meeting of May 7, 1974. All Executive Committee members, including Ed Ho., a member of the Internationalist Tendency, stated that a special Executive Committee meeting would not be necessary.

On the following day (May 11, 1974) the YSA Organizer, Comrade Brian, and myself attended the USLA fraction meeting and arrived at the Demonstration gathering at around 11:00 a.m. We found that members of the Internationalist Tendency NOT assigned to the demonstration, but to other activities, were present at the demonstration. The Comrades of the Internationalist Tendency present at the Demonstration were AnneMarie C., Cathy M., Debbie P., Don S., Ed Ho., Judi R., Mark L., Polly C. (late), and Ted S. All of them (except Polly C.) sold the Old Mole and gave out the Sept. 19, 1973 United Secretariat Chile Statement. Only AnneMarie C., Judi R., and Ted S., were assigned to attend the demonstration. Comrade Brian approached each comrade present, including those not assigned to the demonstration, to take branch assignments of Literature. Mark L., when approached, refused. When the Branch Organizer spoke to him, he replied that he could not find his name on the assignment sheet which was attached to the City Letter of May 7, 1974. After the Organizer spoke to him he did take Militants at the demonstration.

I called Ed Ho. aside and we discussed the phone conversation we had on May 10, 1974 re the special Executive Committee meeting. Ed Ho. stated that he did not know what the Branch motion meant, and felt that he was not violating the motion by selling the Old Mole. Don S. was present during this discussion with Ed Ho. The members of the Internationalist Tendency continued selling the Old Mole and

distributing the Chile statement despite the fact that they were asked just to sell the SWP press.

On May 12, 1974 I reported the events of the Demonstration to the Executive Committee. The Minutes of the Executive Committee meeting are self-explanatory.

Comradely,

s/Pearl Chertov
Chicago Branch Organizer

(Information) Prior to our major interventions in Chile actions 4/29th and 5/11th, the E.C. recommended and Branch approved the sale of the Militant, YS, ISR, IP, Pathfinder Lit., USIA press & buttons as the tools of propaganda to be used in Chicago. On both occasions comrades of the IT sold copies of the Old Mole. Leaders of the tendency here were personally approached on the first occasion by the Organizer to no avail. The Organizer then discussed by phone the situation with the IT comrade on E.C. also to no avail. The suggestion by the Organizer to call a special E.C. mtg. before 5/11 to clarify the Branch decision was rejected by the IT comrade on the E.C.

Disc.--Ed Hof. request for 10 min to reply, denied--vote for-1, opposed-2. Recommendation to request an extension when needed, not opposed.

In responding to the report on activity of IT sales, Ed Hof. indicated that there had been instances in the past when no objection was made to Branch comrades selling periodicals of other sections. He reiterated the motions in the E.C. and Branch mtgs. relating to our Chile interventions and stated that the entire tendency nor he personally felt that these motions as passed prevented the tendency from selling the Old Mole. He said, in addition, the tendency would not be persuaded to stop distributing the 9/19/73 statement of Un. Sec. (F.I.) or stop selling publications of any section they choose unless or until they received in writing a prohibitive statement signed by Branch Organizers especially; this statement would be copied and circulated to IEC majority.

Further discussion clarified the position of the E.C. on sales as part of a planned national campaign in which the Branch is participating and pointed out the area of disagreement by IT comrades with Branch sales activity as a whole to be a national question. Lack of participation by the tendency in assigned sales was also discussed. In reply, Ed Hof., stated that the tendency felt that phone calls received as reminders of assignments were simply harassment by the party majority. (Statement by Ed Hof. will be received and attached later).

Chicago

June 16, 1974

SWP National Office
14 Charles Lane
New York, N. Y. 10014

Dear Comrades:

I have been requested by the Organizer to inform you of a second instance of an organized decision to violate the discipline of the Chicago Branch by comrades of the Internationalist Tendency, similar to that which occurred on May 11.

Two activities were called by the Chicago Committee in Defense of Human Rights in the Soviet Union, a group we have been working with: an open forum Friday evening and a demonstration on Saturday. At the May 28 branch meeting, we discussed and planned our intervention. All comrades were urged to attend the forum Friday night. The branch projected that, in addition to an intervention at the demonstration and sending several comrades into the region to petition, we would attempt to reach our goal of selling 700 copies of *The Militant*. In order to accomplish this, all comrades were given assignments either at the demonstration or at sales locations throughout the city, and asked to contact the organizer or press director if they were unable to fill their assignments. Materials and press to be part of the intervention were specified. Comrades who were assigned to the demonstration were to attend a fraction meeting Saturday morning at the headquarters. This was unanimously approved by the branch and no objections were raised by any of the members of the Internationalist Tendency present at the meeting.

No comrades of the I. T. attended the Friday forum. However, at the Saturday demonstration, comrades of the I. T., who had been assigned to other sales locations, attended the demonstration and sold the *Old Mole* and *Inprecor*. These were: John B., Ed Ho., Annemarie and Kathy M. Two other I. T. members, Debbie P. and Don S., had been contacted by the press director Saturday morning to confirm their assignments. When they told her that they would be unable to make their sales assignments, she told them to go the demonstration and sell *The Militant*. They did attend the demonstration, but concentrated on sales of the *Old Mole* or *Inprecor*, which

were not a part of the organized branch intervention. I. T. members did accept copies of *The Militant* when asked, but concentrated on the *Old Mole* or *Inprecor*. The I. T. comrades who took *The Militant* each turned in a quarter for one copy of *The Militant*. None attended the fraction meeting.

At the executive committee meeting following the demonstration, Ed Ho. made it clear that the members of the I. T. had made a conscious decision to ignore the decisions of the branch and to organize their own intervention. He stated that no comrade of the I. T. had been assigned to the demonstration and that it had appeared to them to be a totally unprincipled exclusion of the Tendency. He further stated, "If we accede to the party majority's definition of discipline, we are not going to get out the line of the International. Our responsibility is to get out the majority line of the International and we are not going to permit any kind of branch discipline to get in the way of it."

We pointed out that no comrade of the I. T. had raised any objection to the assignments prior to the demonstration. Nor had Ed Ho., who was present at both the executive committee and the branch meeting, requested that assignments be changed. In fact, the two comrades who were contacted at the initiative of the press director, *were* asked to attend the demonstration to sell *Militants*. Instead, the I. T. comrades had ignored their assignments and chosen to organize their own intervention. We also pointed out, as we had previously, that it was not the "line of the International" but the right of the branch to organize interventions and function in a disciplined manner that was at issue.

These events were reported and discussed at the branch meeting of 6/4/74. The minutes of that meeting are self-explanatory. The charges made at the meeting that members of the I. T. are given only menial assignments are easily dismissed by actually examining the assignments that have been made in the branch. In fact, members of the I. T. have been asked to accept assignments in practically every area of branch work: the educational committee, forums, press, campaign, USLA, CLUW, etc.

Comradely,
s/ Pat Grogan
Chicago Branch

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**VI. Material Related to
Unauthorized Internationalist
Tendency Work
with Groups and Individuals
Outside the SWP and YSA**

Unauthorized IT Intervention in the National Conference of the Attica Brigade

P. O. Box 471 Cooper Station
New York, N.Y. 10003
June 24, 1974

National Control Commission
Socialist Workers Party
New York

Dear Comrades,

I was in Iowa City, Iowa, June 14-17 on national assignment to coordinate the joint intervention by the SWP and YSA into the Attica Brigade National Convention. This intervention consisted of sales activities and individual contact work. In addition, arrangements had been made to place observers within the conference itself. For security reasons, these arrangements were made in as discreet a manner as possible directly in collaboration with the organizers of party branches and YSA locals involved.

Comrades from St. Louis, Iowa City, and New York participated in the sales intervention. For serious tactical reasons we decided to discontinue our intervention Saturday afternoon. The fraction was unanimous in reaching this decision.

At an informal social gathering Saturday night I met comrade Mark Lobato and another comrade who is a member of the Internationalist Tendency in Chicago but whose name I do not know. Neither one of the comrades had functioned as part of the SWP and YSA intervention at the Attica Brigade convention. They had not carried out sales as part of the fraction nor participated in the meetings of the fraction.

Comrade Bob Felsing of the Iowa City YSA and also a member of the IT informed me that the two Chicago comrades were in town at the request of the Iowa City local executive committee to help with the intervention into the Attica Brigade conference. At the social gathering I explained the decisions that the fraction had reached about our intervention to the two Chicago comrades.

The Iowa City e.c. request was not routed through the YSA National Office as is customary. Nor was the YSA N. O. informed that such a request had been made by either the Chicago local or branch.

Comradely,
s/ Jose G. Perez
YSA National Office

June 18

I saw Mark Lobato and Larry Nowicki at the Attica Brigade Convention at Iowa City, Iowa, on June 15, 1974. I also saw Mark Lobato on Sunday, June 16, 1974. There was also a third person with Mark and Larry that I did not recognize.

Dale Garee

[Dale Garee was assigned by the Chicago SWP on request of the YSA N. O. to attend Attica Brigade convention.]

Unauthorized IT Work with the Puerto Rican Socialist Party of New York

[On June 23, 1974, the Control Commission received the following letter from Doug Jenness, New York City SWP Local organizer. Later that day, in a meeting with two members of the Control Commission, Bill Massey denied having taken part in the meeting with Alfredo Lopez described below.]

To Control Commission:

On March 25, 1974, Comrade Dick Roberts informed me of a discussion he had with Alfredo Lopez. Lopez is a political committee member of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party's U. S. section and is a prominent spokesman of the PSP. Roberts reported that:

"I had about a 45 minute talk with Alfredo Lopez yesterday.

"At the end of the discussion he told me—and he seemed to be somewhat embarrassed about it—that he was going to have a meeting with Massey last night. He is obviously familiar with the debate in the F. I. He thought we should throw Massey out for factionalism and said

that they were carrying on 'international factionalism.' But he said he wanted to know what happened at the World Congress and seemed to believe he could find out from Bill."

I asked Comrade Ivan to check with Lopez to determine if this meeting took place.

Lopez informed him that the meeting took place and that Comrade Hedda Garza was also present. According to Lopez the meeting lasted about 30 minutes. He said he wanted to learn more about the World Congress, but that Comrades Massey and Garza wanted to learn more about the PSP.

Massey and Garza never reported this meeting to me or any other New York Local Executive Committee member. All relations between the SWP and the PSP are under the direction of the New York Local Executive Committee.

s/ Doug Jenness
June 23, 1974

**Unauthorized Work in the Emergency
Committee to Defend Democracy in Chile
in San Jose, California**

June 23

To the Control Commission:

1. Enclosed are letters received from Glenda Horton, organizer at the San Jose YSA and Armen, a member of the S.F. YSA and SWP.

2. I call attention to the fact that at meetings of the S.F. Executive Committee and S.F. branch, we approved a formal policy of approach to the Emergency Committee to Defend Democracy in Chile, a C.P. dominated group

in the San Jose area.

3. The fraternization with and participation in this group by members of the I.T. in the S.F. branch has not been authorized by the branch nor has the branch leadership been informed by them of their participation in this group (ECDDC).

Comradely,
s/ Steve Chainey
S.F. SWP organizer

May 31, 1974

Comrades,

I have some information concerning the activities of some members of the Internationalist Tendency in San Jose. Two of these comrades are in the SF branch, and one is a member of the San Jose local.

On May 8 we had an USLA forum at San Jose State. A member of the Emergency Committee to Defend Democracy in Chile attended. He told me that H. (of the SJ YSA), J. and J. (of SF SWP) regularly attended meetings of the ECDDC. H. had permission to attend as an observer, J and J had been told by the S.F. organizer that they were not to take part in the ECDDC.

A few days prior to this a member of the Radical Student Union at SJS told Tom T., regional organizer, that H. had explained to her why USLA was incorrect in not supporting the fourth demand for the May 11 Chile demonstrations. We held a special executive committee meeting with H. to discuss this incident and his participation in the ECDDC. He agreed not to repeat the breach of discipline and the local subsequently voted against any further participation in the ECDDC.

Comradely,
s/ Glenda Horton
San Jose organizer

May 4, 1974

The following happened at the Socialist Workers '74 campaign rally in San Jose, on May 4, 1974.

1. Upon arriving at the hall where the rally was being held, I noticed that Bill Massey and H. (S.J. YSA comrade) were handling the refreshments counter. On one corner of the counter Bill Massey and H. had set up a literature display. Their literature corner was made of four publications: (a) *The Militant*, (b) *Old Mole*, (c) *Statutes of Fourth International* (IMG pamphlet), (d) *Chile Newsletter* (published by NICH and in San Jose distributed by Emergency Committee To Defend Democracy in Chile—ECDDC). About 10 or 15 minutes later Bill Massey handed the *Chile Newsletters* to two women apparently from the Chile Defense Committee (ECDDC). Later upon the request of one comrade (either John H. from San Jose or Tom T. for Oakland-Berkeley) the rest of the literature was moved to the main literature table.

2. Later when J. and G. (both San Francisco comrades) came to the rally I noticed that J. had a bundle of *Old Moles* that he put away after seeing that the literature table had a bundle already.

3. J., G. and H. immediately formed a caucus with the two women from ECDDC. Their conversation lasted over 15 minutes, and later they were joined by Bill Massey. My impression was that they all were close friends or had worked together.

4. At this point the two women from ECDDC started selling the *Chile Newsletter*.

5. After buying a copy of the *Newsletter* and asking the two women if they knew J., they said sure, J. and H. work with their committee (ECDDC).

6. When I was talking with the two women from ECDDC, Thurston and Vaughn (both from San Francisco) joined and we started a discussion about the "fourth point" (support to the resistance). At this point Bill Massey also joined into our discussion. I had to leave the discussion for about 5 or 10 minutes and when I came back Bill Massey was talking about the International's discipline and political line on the resistance question versus the party's (SWP) discipline and political line. I am not sure of Bill's exact words nor the context of his point. During this last stage of the discussion the two women from ECDDC were also present.

7. Later when I was talking with Glenda H. (San Jose YSA organizer) she also mentioned that H. and J. were working with ECDDC.

Worried that comrades were obviously breaking discipline, I mentioned the above incidents to Steve C., and he asked me to submit a written report.

Armen
San Francisco SWP

Unauthorized Work with the Revolutionary Marxist Collective in San Francisco and Oakland-Berkeley

On June 24, 1974 the control commission received the following information about unauthorized political collaboration between Garth, a member of the San Francisco branch of the SWP, and the Revolutionary Marxist Collective.

We spoke to comrade Y. in Oakland-Berkeley, who had been assigned by the SWP branch organizer to find out about the political activities of the RMC. She told us that she had been informed by the RMC that a meeting of an RMC study circle was scheduled to take place on June 23. It was made clear to her that the meeting was not open to the public, but only by special invitation. She was given the time and address of the meeting. She conveyed this information to Cindy Burke, acting organizer of the Oakland-Berkeley branch.

June 24, 1974

I attended a meeting of the Chile Solidarity Committee in San Francisco on April 18. At that meeting, a person who identified himself as Jim Collins stated that he was a member of the Revolutionary Marxist Collective. I remember meeting Collins this past summer at the SWP convention in Oberlin. At that time, he identified himself as an American who had gone to Britain where he had joined the IMG. Collins now denies ever having been a member of any of the sections of the Fourth International.

On April 27 in Berkeley at a meeting called to plan the May 11 Chile solidarity demonstration Bill Massey, a member of the Chicago branch, approached me and informed me that he was on a leave of absence from his branch. He asked if he could attend the meeting. I said yes. During part of the meeting he sat next to me. I no-

Cindy Burke told us that upon receiving this information, three comrades were assigned to observe the meeting: Cindy Burke, Roger Rudinstein of San Francisco, and John Votava of Oakland-Berkeley. They arrived too late to see people go into the meeting, but waited outside until the meeting was over, two and a half hours later. They observed that the people who had been present in the meeting came out together. There were five or six RMCers, and with them was Garth. Anne Chester and Barbara Matson spoke with Linda Nordquist, the acting organizer of the San Francisco SWP. She stated that she had not been informed of Comrade Garth's intention of attending the Revolutionary Marxist Collective's study group in advance of the meeting. Neither had she received a report from Comrade Garth after the RMC study circle had met.

ticed Collins was sitting in front of me and I asked Massey if he knew him. He responded that he might know Collins and asked me if I did. I said that I had met him last summer in Oberlin. Massey smiled and nodded; he then asked me if it was all right for him to talk with Collins. I said yes.

Later on in the day another comrade in our branch said that he had seen Collins and Massey in an animated discussion following the meeting. Although I have talked with Massey on a number of occasions after that conversation he has never informed me of its contents. The RMC has never approached the SWP and asked us to have any kind of political collaboration.

s/Jeff Powers
Oakland-Berkeley organizer

June 23, 1974

To the Control Commission:

Enclosed is a leaflet distributed by a newly formed Bay Area group calling itself the Revolutionary Marxist Collective. This group has approximately 8 members, including some who were formerly members of the YSA and SWP. On Saturday, June 22, at a Bay Area meeting to protest the Chilean junta, the RMC had a literature table which included the following: *Inprecor*, *Old Mole, International*, a hand-out on American politics by Brett Smiley, and an IMG pamphlet on Chile by Tariq Ali.

Seymour Kramer, a member of the group who staffed the table, said the RMC considers itself a sympathizing group of the Fourth International. However, neither the San Francisco branch, nor to my knowledge the SWP national office, has ever been approached formally or informally by any member of the RMC to discuss any form of political collaboration with the SWP.

Comradely,
s/Steve Chainey
S.F. SWP organizer

ABOUT OUR GROUP

The authors of this pamphlet are a newly formed group of revolutionary militants in the Berkeley - San Francisco area. Our participation in the political struggles of the last decade has convinced us of the importance of revolutionary organization. The American socialist movement lacks many things, but it does not lack its "share" of collectives, leagues, unions, and parties all claiming to be that organization or at least its sturdy foundations. Yet if we look at the real character of their work, in for example an area as central as solidarity with the Chilean resistance, we see how flimsy these claims really are.

We do not hold these groupings morally responsible for their shortcomings. In many ways they are a reflection of the political confusions of the working class they are aspiring to lead. What we do criticize them for is their consistent failure to study and assimilate the experience of the workers and revolutionary movements in other countries and in particular the rich experience of the European revolutionaries beginning with May 1968 in France.

Our group, which is smaller than most and not free of this debilitating American "firstism," still sees a place for itself in that we are consciously trying to overcome this deficiency. We hope that the analysis that we have presented on the Chilean revolution and the movements underway internationally to defend, nourish, and sustain it will indicate this and prepare the way for a needed internationalization of discussion among American militants.

The activities of our group at the present time are concentrated on the vital work of solidarity with the Chilean resistance. Our actions in the solidarity movement and the ideas and positions we bring to it are directly inspired by the activities of the solidarity movements in Western Europe and Canada. In particular, we have been influenced by the work of the militants in sections of the Fourth International such as the former Communist League in France (now banned but organized around the paper Rouge), the International Marxist Group in Britain, and the Revolutionary Marxist Group - Groupe Marxiste Revolutionnaire in Canada and Quebec. Both the general analysis of this pamphlet and much of its factual material are taken from the various newspapers and magazines of the Fourth International, papers which we intend to distribute regularly.

At present, our members in Berkeley are working in the NICH. Comrades in San Francisco are trying to set up a viable Chile Solidarity Committee there.

Readers of this pamphlet who would like to know more about our perspectives on Chile solidarity work or more general questions should contact us at the following number: call San Francisco 282-4518.

REVOLUTIONARY MARXIST COLLECTIVE
(San Francisco - Berkeley)

Unauthorized Work with Various Opponent Groups in Minneapolis

[This letter is one of several from Mary Hillery concerning the activities of IT members in Minneapolis. In one of the other letters, she reported that Jeff M., a member of the IT in the Minneapolis branch, acknowledged being part of the Selby-Dale Freedom Brigade's study-classes. The Selby-Dale Freedom Brigade is one of the groups co-sponsoring the meeting referred to in Mary Hillery's letter below.]

25 University Ave. S.E.
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55414
May 20, 1974

SWP N. O.
New York

Dear Comrades,

This letter is to inform you of the displeasure felt by the Minneapolis branch concerning the recent visit of a member of the Revolutionary Marxist Group of Canada. The RMG, we have been told, is a sympathizing section of the Fourth International, yet this group sent one of their people here to speak on Chile sponsored by several groups who are opponents of the Socialist Workers Party.

The Twin Cities Branch was requested to co-sponsor the meeting of Peter Danson from the RMG. Peter Danson did not make the request. The request came from a member of the Class Struggle League, a group of six people, formerly members of the SWP who are now calling for the formation of a Fifth International.

The SWP sometimes co-sponsors meetings built by our opponents but only when it is in the interests of a united front we may be working in or if a meeting would also include the SWP's point of view. This meeting was sponsored by the Class Struggle League, Progressive Labor Party, SDS and the Selby-Dale Freedom Brigade—all opponents with whom we were at the time working over the May 11 Chile demonstration. All these opponents had done everything in their power to destroy the political-prisoner emphasis of the coalition; had done everything in their power to destroy the coalition itself, including physical threats if Progressive Labor Party did not get a speaker at the rally.

Peter Danson made no attempt to contact the SWP himself and request co-sponsorship or at least inform us of his visit and its purpose. He chose rather to serve our opponents and their sectarian approach to the Chile demonstration. He spoke at Macalester College on May 2 to an audience of about ten sectarian opponents from the above-mentioned groups.

This not-so-public meeting is nonetheless a public insult to the Fourth International and a maligning of the word "Comrade" which the opponents freely tossed around in referring to Danson's relationship with the SWP. The executive committee of the Twin Cities branch feels the above incidents are severe enough to be relayed to the United Secretariat. We hope the national office has enough information here to do as you see fit.

Comradely,
s/Mary Hillery
Minneapolis SWP Organizer

Unauthorized Work with Various Opponent Groups in Madison, Wisconsin

Young Socialist Alliance
Box 471 Cooper Station
New York, N.Y. 10003
June 27, 1974

Control Commission
Socialist Workers Party
New York City, N.Y.

Dear Comrades,

Over the past several months the YSA National Executive Committee has collected substantial material concerning infractions of YSA discipline by members of the Internationalist Tendency. We believe that one series of such undisciplined actions may be of particular relevance to the recently convened Control Commission of the Socialist Workers Party since it directly involves members of both the YSA and the SWP.

On May 8, our office received two letters from Comrade James Levitt, organizer of the Madison, Wisconsin, YSA local. The first letter was dated May 1; the second was dated May 2 and co-signed by Comrade Ted Shakespeare, also of the Madison local.

In these two communications, Comrade Levitt describes two separate external activities on the Madison campus in which IT members of the local—in conjunction with at-large SWP members Pat and Martha Quinn—intervened unilaterally, behind the backs of the local and its elected leadership bodies and with no consultation or direction from the local as to tactical orientation or political intervention.

The first letter cites IT activity in connection with a

support rally in solidarity with the striking Hortonville teachers, and briefly notes IT participation in building a May Day Chile forum sponsored by the Community Action for Latin America (CALA). The second letter goes into more detail about the IT's activity around the Chile forum.

Comrade Levitt summarized the violations of discipline noted in his first letter in the following manner:

"Let me briefly run down what the IT'ers have done this week: 1. Built a rally behind the backs of the local, going so far as to consciously, by omission of details in conversations, try to keep us in the dark. The Ad Hoc Committee [to support the Hortonville strikers] was clearly under Quinn's leadership. It contacted the Spartacist League, but not the YSA. 2. At the rally, Mark K. counterposed selling *Old Mole* to our press. 3. Boycotted or managed to coincidentally be absent from E.C. meeting, local educational, local meeting, YSA forum. 4. Built a forum for another organization (CALA) without even contacting the organizer, at the same time that we were trying to build a YSA forum."

In the letter of May 2, after the Chile forum, Levitt and Ted Shakespeare continue:

"When this last episode is added to the tendency actions reported in my previous letter, what results is a picture of a faction operating completely independent of the YSA for over a week, intentionally keeping the elected leadership of the Madison local in the dark."

Comradely,
s/ Rich Finkel
YSA National Secretary

Unauthorized Work with the Baltimore Marxist Group and Chile Resistance Committee

1345 E St., N.W. 4th Flr
D.C. 20004
(received in SWP national of-
fice May 20, 1974)

Lew Jones
SWP/NO
14 Charles Lane
NYC 10014

Dear Lew,

A new group has emerged in Baltimore that makes some claims that we would like some clarification on.

First, what we know of them. The three main people involved are all former members of the YSA, Rick E. was also in the party. They resigned several years ago, Rick in his resignation letter outlined that his differences with the SWP on the antiwar movement, nationalism and the Middle East made it necessary to resign from the party. Michel Sidman in his letter of resignation from the YSA stated that the SWP was not Trotskyist, that it is a centrist organization like the POUM in Spain, that the SWP and the YSA are pseudo-Internationalists, and that the "real comrades" of the 4th International have a clear position on the Mideast. He also stated that he remained within the Fourth International and loyal to the United Secretariat. Michel and Janice (the 3rd main member of the BMG) returned to France for a year and some months, meanwhile Rick had joined is. After Michel and Janice returned last summer, a group called the Red Circle emerged in D.C., very small. Michel explained to a comrade last September who inquired about the Red Circle that it was a group that agrees with the ex-Ligue Communiste and with the IEC Majority. We thought it strange for such a group to emerge making such a description of itself. In that period they attended a few forums of

ours and had several of their own, one on Chile.

They then moved to Baltimore and the next time we saw them at the impeachment demonstration they were the Baltimore Marxist Group. At that demonstration several IT members spent the majority of their time sitting with the BMG members instead of working hard to sell our press as the rest of us were doing. Both IT and BMG members were selling the *Red Weekly* at that demonstration.

The next contact with them was at the Chile demonstration on May 11 where they distributed a leaflet with the statement of the United Secretariat on Chile, signed by the Chile Resistance Committee. Again, IT members sat with them and both IT and BMG members sold the *Old Mole*, paper of the Canadian RMG. An independent told me that he had been told by the BMG that they were a "sympathizing group of the Fourth International."

This whole matter raises a lot of questions. When did the BMG become a "sympathizing group?" We were not aware that such a group existed here. Is it now policy for the IT, along with a group not affiliated like the BMG, to sell the *Old Mole* at public functions? Is there a group besides the SWP that acts in fraternal agreement with the Fourth International here?

Comradely,
s/ Bitsy Myers
Washington D.C. SWP Organizer

[Note: On June 23, 1974, Bitsy Myers informed the Control Commission of other similar activities by the ITers in Washington, D.C. and added that "at no time, however, has the branch asked any of the ITers to establish any relationship with the Baltimore Marxist Group, nor have the ITers ever approached the branch leadership about the BMG."]

SUPPORT THE RESISTANCE!

Excerpts from a statement of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International

With the defeat of the Bolivian working class in August 1971, Chile became the principal center of the class struggle in Latin America. The international revolutionary movement followed events in Chile knowing that a test of strength was inevitable. This test of strength--prepared by increasingly bitter partial confrontations and foreshadowed by the unsuccessful coup of June 29--came dramatically on September 11. The armed forces launched a criminal attack on the working class, its organizations, and its long-standing and newly won gains, an attack against the most basic democratic rights. This new manifestation of the barbarism of the so-called national ruling classes and imperialism has been marked by the death of tens of thousands in Santiago and other parts of the country. Once again these rulers have shown--through rivers of blood--that all political, judicial, and human considerations are subordinate to the ferocious and intransigent defense of their threatened interests.

Once again there has been a tragic confirmation of the danger to humanity which capitalism represents; once again a confirmation of the shamefully mystified nature of the "principles" and "values" of a society of exploitation and oppression! Once again a confirmation of the catastrophic consequences for the working class that lurk behind the illusory and irresponsible perspective of a "peaceful" and "democratic" transition to socialism in a world in which for more than half a century there have been on all continents local and generalized wars, revolutionary convulsions, bloody repressions, and fascist and military dictatorships!

The Chilean events demonstrate just how illusory is the perspective of a "democratic, anti-oligarchic, and anti-imperialist stage" of the revolution in which the national bourgeoisie can participate, from the standpoint both of objective facts and of political possibilities. No bourgeoisie can go beyond absolutely limited reforms or attack the basic interests of imperialism. Further, no bourgeoisie is inclined to move even to a reformist course unless it is assured of being able to strictly control the process and to crush any independent dynamic of the mass movement. The Peruvian military regime is a classic illustration of this.

The Chilean events show that labor reformism, even under broadly favorable conditions, leads rapidly to an impasse. Even the reforms actually carried out will be challenged and emptied of all content unless they are generalized. Such a generalization leads inevitably to a threshold that cannot be crossed without breaking the mechanism of the capitalist system itself. And further partial measures attack many bourgeois interests without destroying them; they inevitably provoke reactions by forces that continue to command powerful resources and allies. Once again, it has been proven that the petty bourgeoisie cannot be won over by a conciliationist attitude; an anti-capitalist perspective must be offered to combat in the most determined fashion the maneuvers of the ruling class.

The Chilean events show the absurdity of the plan of a transition to socialism without the destruction of the entire state apparatus, the apparatus that the ruling class has organized and structured to be as efficient as possible in guaranteeing the maintenance of its system of exploitation and oppression. This is not to deny the tactical need to utilize every legal possibility or to exploit exceptional circumstances such as those created by the elections of September 4, 1970, in Chile. What must be understood is the absolute and urgent necessity, in a situation of mass revolutionary upsurge, of building revolutionary organs of proletarian democracy, elements of dual power, instruments of struggle for the conquest of power, and embryos of qualitatively new political structures of a workers state that will issue from the revolution.

And finally, the Chilean events show once again that the premise that it is possible to overthrow the capitalist regime without revolutionary violence, without armed struggle, is the most shameful of mystifications and the most suicidal of illusions. It is of primary necessity to understand that when the crucial moment of the confrontation for power comes, armed conflict, independent of the specific forces involved, is inevitable in every case and that, to repeat Lenin's expression, "the military question is the central political question."

The working class must systematically prepare itself within such a perspective, rejecting all spontaneist illusions and understanding the necessity, on this point too, of centralized action. It must understand that a purely defensive attitude prepares defeat when the crucial time arrives, and it must seize the initiative from the enemy.

The defeat suffered by the Chilean working class is serious. The situation, however, is not irretrievable. The ruling junta is facing increasing economic difficulties--the effective rate of inflation since September 11 has been over 500%--its political base among the petty bourgeoisie is eroding, and the economic struggles of the masses are resuming, although still in a fragmentary way. Therefore what is necessary is that the revolutionary vanguard regroup its forces, organize the resistance, and give confidence to the masses in preparation for new battles.

We, as part of a Chile Resistance Committee, are in solidarity with those who are organizing the revolutionary struggle against the junta. We believe that everyone concerned about ending the nightmare in Chile should provide material support to these resistance forces. The CRC is linked to Chile Solidarity in Great Britain and Canada and Comites Chili in France, Belgium, and Switzerland. We maintain contacts with groups in Chile which are part of the resistance forces, and any funds which we receive are used to support these groups.

THE RESISTANCE NEEDS YOUR HELP!!!

For more information call the CRC in Baltimore at 338-0750. Contributions should be sent Chile Resistance Committee, Box 94, Baltimore, Maryland 21203.

VII. Report on Attendance at Internationalist Tendency National Conference by Non-Member of Either the SWP or the YSA

The report in the Internationalist Tendency Newsletter of June 6, 1974, states that *nine* people from Washington, D.C. attended the IT national conference. From information provided to the Control Commission by Bitsy Myers, Washington, D.C. SWP organizer, we learned that there are a total of only *eight* members of the IT in the YSA and SWP in the Washington, D.C. area. We asked Bitsy Myers if she could check out the causes of this discrepancy.

On June 26, 1974 she telephoned Gus Horowitz and Barbara Matson and stated that she had held a conversation with D.M., who is not a member of the SWP or the YSA. Nor is he a member of any section or sympathizing section of the Fourth International. D.M. told her about the conference of the IT, indicating that he had been present at it, and that he was familiar with what had happened there. He was politically familiar with the internal debate in the SWP. Bitsy Myers also informed us that the Washington, D.C. branch of the SWP had never at any time decided to give internal bulletins to D.M., or to inform him of the internal debate in the SWP or in the world Trotskyist movement. Furthermore, the Internationalist Tendency had never proposed to the branch that D.M. be permitted to receive internal discussion bulletins of the Socialist Workers Party or of the Fourth International.

On June 29th, we received further confirmation of D.M.'s attendance at the IT conference.

Dita C., a member of the Washington, D.C. branch of the SWP, reported the following to us: On June 3, with the approval of the Washington, D.C. SWP branch leadership, she attended a meeting of an independent Marxist study group. She was the only member of the SWP or YSA present at this meeting. Eight other people were present, including D.M. During the discussion, several people spoke with D.M. about the conference D.M. had attended in Chicago the previous weekend. D.M. told one of them, S., that he had seen a friend of S.'s from Houston at the conference. The person from Houston whose name was mentioned by D.M. is a member of the IT. At the time, Dita C. did not know what conference D.M. was talking about.

VIII. Statements by Bill Massey and John Barzman, Internationalist Tendency Leaders

Report on Discussion Between Bill Massey, John Barzman and Two Control Commission Members, Gus Horowitz and Barbara Matson

The discussion began on an informal basis with Bill Massey after the plenum session on the World Movement had been completed. John Barzman joined us shortly. Both Barzman and Massey asked about the purpose and extent of the Control Commission investigation. We referred them to the motion passed by the National Committee on June 20, 1974. (Both Barzman and Massey had been present during the session of the National Committee plenum at which that motion had been passed, and Bill Massey stated to us that they had heard the motion.) We pointed out that the Control Commission would determine the nature and extent of its investigation. As we pursued the questioning, Massey stated that this could not be considered a meeting of the Control Commission, since none of us had tape recorders. We stated that tape recorders were not necessary, and that this discussion could be considered an official meeting.

We asked Bill Massey if he was the coordinator of the Internationalist Tendency and could be considered a spokesman for it. He said yes. We asked if the IT had a steering committee or other leadership body. Neither Barzman nor Massey would answer this question, although we asked it twice during our discussion. Massey told us that

he would "think about" the question. We asked Massey if he was still a member of the steering committee of the IMT. He said yes. We told him that Mary-Alice Waters had reported to us that she had seen him in Brussels a few weeks ago (she had told us earlier that the date was May 22, 1974). He stated that he had not seen her, but that he had been in Brussels around that time. We asked if he had attended a meeting of the IMT steering committee. John Barzman responded that Massey had been there for a meeting of an IMT leadership body, not the IMT steering committee, but "another body."

We told Massey that Doug Jenness, New York Local organizer of the SWP, had informed us that he had received information that earlier in the year Bill Massey and Hedda Garza had held a discussion with Alfredo Lopez of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party of New York. We asked Massey if he had ever had a discussion with Lopez. He said no. Massey and Barzman then informed us that they were planning to write a letter to the Political Committee concerning the Control Commission investigation.

June 23, 1974

Excerpts from Remarks by John Barzman to Socialist Workers Party National Committee Plenum, June 1974

I want to conclude with the general attitude of the IMT towards the building of an international leadership and towards the IT in the United States. The IMT leadership had requested in earnest that the LTF assign top cadre to work in the center in order to deal with the day-to-day work as it came up and in order to enhance the process of collaboration on different projects. The LTF has hemmed and hawed on this. The LTF-dominated groups which are legally allowed to affiliate to the International had pledged to raise their financial contributions and we of the IT are very sensitive to that because that is one of the reasons that we have been forced to cut our sustainer to the Socialist Workers Party, because the Socialist Workers Party has not been urging these groups to contribute to the International, not even a formal one-sixteenth way of giving one-sixteenth of their dues. But with different systems of dues and sustainers and special funds it is even more ridiculous, the kind of contributions being made. The LTF—no group of the LTF is contributing to the international financially.

Finally, the attitude toward the Internationalist Tendency in this country is very revealing. There apparently was some kind of decision to allow comrades of the Internationalist Tendency to get onto local executive committees because they were on only in one branch prior to the World Congress, in Houston. After the World Congress they somehow magically got on in Los Angeles, Oakland, Chicago and New York. Nothing was done to follow this up; a completely factional attitude was maintained.

And now a Control Commission has been called to investigate charges that we admit having done. There is no need for a Control Commission; there is nothing that we challenge in the allegations. We have stated that we have sold the International press and that we have handed out statements of the International and that we consider that this is defending the line of the International, it's not substituting for the leadership in carrying out interventions and that we have the right to do this. What is there to investigate? This is the International's organizational pressure suit. Members of the International have the right to defend the line of the International. They have the right to sell the press of the International; this is what we have been doing. We are not talking about issues that have not been settled by the International. We're

talking about issues where the International has called for a specific campaign, a campaign of solidarity with the Chilean resistance. We defend this position of the International, this campaign of the International. This is what we are being attacked for, this what the Control Commission has been called for.

I don't think there has been a Control Commission in the history of the party which has not ended in an expulsion. So there's nothing to be challenged. If there's to be an expulsion, let's hear it right now. See, what's actually taking place is that there's some blackmailing going on, that the norms are not being followed, that pressures on the IT is being used as a bargaining tool to blackmail the International. The Control Commission is something which will go on for a while to try to intimidate the comrades of the Internationalist Tendency from exercising their rights as members of the International. We reject that.

We also take note of the fact that the letter from Comrade Massey was not a response to the charges concerning the 11th which we have not seen in writing yet. We have seen the declaration of the YSA faction, we haven't seen the charges that are being brought against us in the party. This letter was not an answer to that. His letter was a demand for a parity commission and for an investigation of the attacks against us, the irregularities against us which have been committed. You have chosen not to take this into account. You want to continue this, to go on, with the very dangerous dynamic that it implies. We have no choice but to go to higher bodies, to try to redress the situation.

The basic choice which faces this plenum is, will the SWP continue on a course, a dangerous course which threatens the unity of the International? Are the political positions of the SWP leadership, of the LTF majority in the party now so serious and so worsened that collaboration in, coexistence in the same International is impossible? We heard that this was not the case before; is this the case now? If not, why these organizational steps to provoke an organizational split being taken? That is the question we have to face. Are you doing everything to save the unity of the International, do you intend to continue in the International? Because the kind of course you have taken at this congress, the kind of course you have taken in the last four months leads to a split.

**Excerpts from Remarks by Bill Massey
to Socialist Workers Party National
Committee Plenum, June 1974**

In the last minute— on the question that has been raised by the institution of the Control Commission. First of all, it's necessary in order to be able to cooperate with that body that we receive some statement of what the body has been set up for. We have received none.

Two, since there is no facts in dispute or it hasn't been brought out, since we've taken the position that we've done what you have charged that we have done, we admit that and take responsibility for it, we don't promise to discontinue it at all, there is no need for an investigation to establish what the facts are. What the discussion does come down to, and it's not the job of a Control Commission here, is whether the comrades of the Fourth International or in sympathizing sections of the Fourth International obstructed by illegal laws of the bourgeoisie from being in there, if those comrades have the right to carry out the activities of the Fourth International in the face of the refusal of a faction to implement the line. And if that is the dispute, and I think it is, then it is, then it is a higher body that will make those decisions. And if you don't understand that you're making the biggest mistake of your life.

Letter from Bill Massey to the Socialist
Workers Party Political Committee
dated June 9, 1974

JUN 13 1974

2602 N. Burling Street. #1
Chicago, Illinois 60614
June 9, 1974

Political Committee
Socialist Workers Party
c/o Jack Barnes
14 Charles Lane
New York, New York 10014

Dear Comrade Barnes;

Enclosed please find (10) copies of a letter ("Against the Split Tactics of the LTF") signed by myself for the Internationalist Tendency. I have provided you with ten copies for the convenience of the Political Committee. I hope this is enough but not knowing the size of the body I may have not sent enough, my apologies. But feel free to duplicate it if the P.C. is larger.

By the way we received Bev Scott's letter of June 7, 1974, postmarked June 9, 1974 acknowledging the receipt of John Barzman's letter to you dated June 4th 1974. I hope that this mention won't necessitate Cde. Bev having to write another letter acknowledging that she has received my letter of June 9, 1974 acknowledging that she has received my letter acknowledging that I have received her letter acknowledging that she has received John's letter.

Comradely

Bill Massey

Bill Massey for the Internationalist
Tendency

Encl: 10 copies ltr of June 9, 1974 to P.C., SWP (1 original-9 copies)
1 copy ltr of Oct. 29, 1973 to U.S.F.I.

Bill Massey-Internationalist Tendency
2602 N. Burling Street, #1
Chicago, Illinois 60614

original w/appendage

June 9, 1974

Political Committee
Socialist Workers Party
14 Charles Lane
New York, New York 10014

Dear Comrades,

AGAINST THE SPLIT TACTICS OF THE LTF

I write to you at this time in order to bring to your attention the highly dangerous situation that exists in the Party due to your past actions and to ask that you act immediately in order to preserve the unity of the Socialist Workers Party which is endangered. If you fail to act at this time, as you have in the past, or if you continue to intensify the factional heat that exists due to your leadership, you will be responsible for whatever occurs. This letter is written as a plea for responsible action on your part in order to avert a split in our ranks that will profit no one.

We of the Internationalist Tendency ask that a PARITY COMMISSION be set up not only at a national level, but also in the branches, in order to work out the problems that make a split inevitable if your past course of action is not reversed. This parity commission would seek to deal with the mutual grievances that exist between the L.T.F. and the I.T. Since the leadership of the Party is undistinguishable from that of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction, in appealing to one, we speak to the other.

Going back to the beginning of the Proletarian Orientation Tendency, which this writer was a part of, although the majority of the tendency which I now represent were not, your methods in dealing with minorities within our ranks has been closer to the norms of the Stalinist movement than to those of the Fourth International. You have packed branches (witness your sending of over fifty persons into the Oakland branch following the 1971 convention -- this was documented in the document of Cde. Mark Lause, "Confessions of A Cadre Killer", SWP DB Vol. 31, No. 31, July 1973, and the action was never denied by you, nor was the method involved repudiated --). You have systematically denied political assignments to members of both the Proletarian Orientation Tendency and the Internationalist Tendency. You have manipulated the youth movement in order to serve your factional needs (utilizing a double standard for the graduation of members out of the YSA). You have denied us our due representation on the leading bodies of the Party and labelled us a disloyal tendency.

Failing to demoralize our membership you now are in preparation of an expulsion, or de-facto expulsion, i.e. a "drive-them-out", campaign to purge the Party of our political presence and ideas. Let me go over some of the past actions that motivate our attitude at this time and to bring to your attention the caricature that you have made of Bolshevik norms.

1. EXCLUSION FROM POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Both at the Oberlin convention in the summer, and at the special convention in the winter of 1973, you denied the Internationalist Tendency any representation on the National Committee of the Party. Out of the 150 or so comrades of the I.T. in the Party and YSA only one of them heads up a fraction of work in a branch. That is John Shaffer who heads the clean-up committee in Houston. No effort whatsoever has been made to integrate comrades of the I.T. into areas of work that they would participate in wholeheartedly or with relatively less tension. In fact, minute attention is given by branch organizers to prevent any such development. In the 1974 election campaigns, not a single

member of the I.T. has been designated to represent our Party as a candidate. While it is true that some of our comrades were placed on branch executive committees (not more than one per branch), they are treated to a CHARADE in that they are not allowed to participate in the decisions of those executive committees, but are there for the purpose of giving the forms of democracy without any of the content. Rather than being the first step to reintegrating our comrades into the life of the Party and YSA, these positions on the executive committee are but the cosmetics of our complete exclusion from political activity.

2. DISLOYALTY SLANDER AGAINST THE I.T.

The label applied to our tendency by you, the leadership of the Party, that is that we are a "disloyal" tendency, remains as a continuing slander of our comrades, and as a way of putting us and our ideas off limits to the comrades of the Party and youth. At the August 1973 convention, Comrade Livio protested in writing against the labels of "disloyal" and "anti-party", which he described as being part of the Stalinist arsenal of slander and falsification. It is not only that you have never concretized these charges before any body, either local, national, or international, but your factional followers in the branches and the YSA continually dredge up this slander to intimidate any comrades who might show an interest in our ideas. As a matter of fact, there are several instances where members of your faction who hold positions of responsibility in the Party have even gone outside the membership to slander our tendency or to attempt to frame up members of the tendency on false charges.

3. FACTIONAL EDUCATIONAL SERIES

Your policy with regard to the national educationals given to the Party and YSA is one of pure factionalism. Not only do you refuse to allow any of our comrades to participate in the giving of educationals or forums on any subject, but you refuse to allow us to participate in the discussion at these educationals on the basis that you have invited non-Party or non-YSA persons to them, and that therefore differences must not be brought up in front of them. When one considers the topics of these recent educational series, one can appreciate the grotesque situation existent in our movement. You began with the national educational series on the "Cochran Fight" and the split of 1953 as a means to prepare the ranks for a split in the near future mirroring the one of 1953. The whole digging up of the sins of Pabloism is meant to portray the I.T. as the latter day Cochran Tendency which was expelled, and to cast the International in the same light as when you left it in 1953. The same was true of the national educational series on Eastern Europe which was a continuation of the war against the ever present demon Pablo.

Now your most recent educational series on the History of the Fourth International and the U.P. in Chile are but further steps in the war you began against the International leadership and its supporters in the pre-Congress discussion. You now use your classes on electoral policy to openly and viciously attack the French section as class collaborationist, as you had in pre-Congress discussion. The only difference is that now only one side of the argument is allowed to be presented: your side. The history that you present is an International Committee history, not the true history of our International. Your classes rather than giving comrades a critical mind and the ability to analyze the class struggle, are sterile incantations to the glorious and always correct leadership of the SWP. You now prepare the ranks of the Party and YSA to be full fledged sectarians of the same cast that members of the Workers League, Spartacists, and Class Struggle League have already become, not without a helping hand from similar history lessons given by members of the Faction.

4. FACTIONAL REPORTS ON THE WORLD CONGRESS

The denial of the right of representatives of the supporters of the IMT to make a national

tour of the branches and YSA locals to report the decisions of the world congress. This, in fact, is a denial of the right of the ranks to hear such a report. We had proposed a joint tour of both representatives of the International Majority and the Minority. Instead, you have systematically spread the lie that the congress was a stand-off and that nothing was decisive. You even go so far as to say that the LTF was the majority in the world movement leaving the distinct impression that the majority is not really the majority and that the congress decisions are in no way binding. This further enhances the federalist conception that you would seek to replace internationalism with.

5. PUBLIC ATTACKS ON SECTIONS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

The continued slander campaign against the International on the part of the leaders of the Party is a daily reality. Recently in Portland, Oregon, Cde. Maceo Dixon, on national tour, stated publically that there are two wings of the F.I., a guerilla terrorist wing, and a mass-oriented party-building wing. This is but one such instance. The Party press has printed open attacks on the Spanish LCR/ETA VI, sympathizing section of the Fourth International, as "unTrotskyist" while at the same time providing us with a plethora of favorable articles on the centrist PST and the grovellings of its major spokesperson, Coral, before the bourgeois ministers of that country. Oddly enough, there has been no mention either in our press or elsewhere of the PST's SIGNING, ALONG WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF BOURGEOIS PARTIES, THE MEASURES OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY IN ORDER TO FORESTALL CIVIL WAR. While one can understand the reluctance of the leadership of the Party to divulge the depth to which the Moreno-Coral organization sinks, it is nonetheless wrong to keep this information from the ranks of the Party. At a time when gunmen freely shoot down members of the PST, Coral politely participates in charade type meetings with the masters of the gunmen. The failure to prepare measures of self-defense now finds its tragic consequences in the victims of the centrist policies of the PST and the LTF. The denunciations being made in the branches of the Party of the French section of the International for having supported an alleged popular front by their call for a vote for Mitterand on the second round of the French elections, follows the article by National Committee member Lund in the Militant. THIS PUBLIC, FEATURED, TWO-PAGE ARTICLE STATED THAT "A VOTE FOR MITTERAND IS A VOTE FOR A COALITION BETWEEN WORKER AND CAPITALIST PARTIES", SHORTLY AFTER ARTICLES REPORTING THE F.C.R. POLICY OF VOTING FOR MITTERAND ON THE SECOND ROUND FOR DIFFERENT REASONS.

6. FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY DEFEND THE I.T. AGAINST BOURGEOIS ATTACKS

The SWP leadership has refused to put forth an adequate defense of the Internationalist Tendency which has been the target of a series of attacks not only on the part of the House Internal Security Committee of the U.S. Congress, but on the part of a number of its pimp journalists. This slander campaign which has charged that the I.T. along with the International Majority is a group of terrorists and murderers was answered -- only after many protests on our part to the PC -- by a weak tea liberalistic statement by Cde. Barnes. We submitted a letter to the Militant signed by Cde. John Barzman which was not only a strong denial of these charges, but which was well within the norms of Leninist conceptions on these questions. You refused to print it but instead put forth a position which lacked even a convincing defense against these attacks. We hold you responsible for any individual victimizations that will be made of our comrades in this regard.

7. FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT THE F.I. CALL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CHILE SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN

We must devote some space to discussing the Party's Chile work since it is now being used as the basis for further factional attacks on the part of the leadership of the Party. Indeed, the formation of a "Majority Faction" in the YSA is based on the actions of the IT around the May 11, 1974 Chile demonstrations. All four members of the YSA leadership who called this majority faction are members of the Party working directly under

the P.C. of the Party, and all four are members of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction. The truth of the matter is that the Party has rejected the essence of the International's line on Chile, and as a result, has decided to boycott the International's campaign.

To quote but a few sentences of the September 19, 1973 statement of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International -- a statement which you opposed, but which passed nonetheless: "It is necessary now to build an active campaign of solidarity throughout the world in the best tradition of the mobilizations for Vietnam". There is no excuse for a fundamentally different line in the United States on Chile work as compared to other countries. In dealing with Vietnam, the International had made a valid distinction between belligerent countries and others. There is no provision in the statement of the F.I. for a different approach in those countries directly involved in Chile, since none of the imperialist powers are involved in Chile in the way that the U.S. was in Indochina. Further in the statement, we find unambiguous demands and slogans: "For immediate, massive, and militant solidarity with the Chilean proletariat! Halt the criminal hand of the assassins! Demand the reestablishment of the Chilean people's elementary democratic rights! Demand the immediate release of all political prisoners! Defend the right of asylum for political refugees from the other countries of Latin America and their right to travel to any country of their choice! Extend political and material aid to the heroic resistance of the Chilean workers!". Clearly, the basic line here is one of organizing a campaign based on solidarity with the Chilean working class.

The line of the Party in relation to Chile is completely undistinguishable from that of the Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA). In fact, the USLA has been turned into the Party's vehicle in the Chile movement, thereby destroying whatever credibility USLA had as a broader civil libertarian movement. At the same time, the Party's line has been totally restricted to a civil libertarian approach. No one rejects the necessary functions of a USLA type organization, however, the role of the revolutionary party cannot be restricted to this. In the U.S., there is the possibility for building a viable struggle campaign around Chile solidarity. It has the possibility to broaden the revolutionary sector of the movement, and give leadership to broader sectors of the masses. However, the Party has failed to explain what happened in Chile, and what lessons can be drawn from this by revolutionaries internationally. It has failed or refused to attempt to build an explicit movement of solidarity with the resistance fighters in Chile. It has not even tried to build a defense movement on a class basis. Instead, it fights those inside and outside our movement who orient to the building of such struggle organizations. The refusal of the Party to support solidarity with the resistance (whatever the actual extent of that resistance) places it to the right of the CP in the minds of many independent militants. This role in action, coupled with articles typified by the "Chile-the resistance was futile", and "Chile-there was no revolutionary party", portray us in the minds of radical militants as part of the problem rather than the solution.

The Party's record in building the May 11 Chile demonstrations was despicable. The Party gave only token support to these demonstrations. This was evident by the refusal of the Party to even mobilize its own ranks for these rather important demonstrations of international solidarity. In New York, where the Party has close to 400 members if not more, the demonstration was half that size. In Chicago, only a handful of branch members were turned out for the demonstration; the other comrades were sent on completely routine sales in other parts of the city. In Washington, D.C., the Party put sales at a "Human Kindness Day" event on a higher priority than the Chile demonstration. In Houston, the sixth largest city in the U.S., with a Chicano population of over 30%, where we have a large branch and YSA, no demonstration took place. In the Bay Area of Northern California (San Francisco, Oakland, Berkeley), the largest demonstration in the country took place around a set of demands including "Solidarity with the Resistance". After being defeated in the planning meeting the members of the Party who had defended a straight civil libertarian approach -- USLA demands only --, walked out of the meeting. The fact that this demonstration was the largest in the country is tied to the fact that it was not simply a civil liberties type demonstration such as the CP with the assent of the Party was able

to engineer in other parts of the country. While it is true that the Bay Area is a radical stronghold, it is no more so than New York City where any sect can summon a demonstration of one hundred on a weekday during working hours. In the Bay Area, the Party by its civil libertarian approach has alienated the most militant elements that it should be providing leadership for. It is largely due to this negation of the role it should be playing that the Maoist groups have been able to grow over the past period and are now able to begin winning over a significant layer of Black militants.

The LTF leadership of the Party has claimed that these actions sponsored through USLA constituted an implementation of the international solidarity campaign of the F.I. along tactical lines determined by the national grouping, i.e. the SWP. When one compares the Chile effort of the SWP with for example, its Mid-East activities during a period of crisis, such a claim is revealed to be a sham. But even if more effort had been put into this "campáagn", its line would still not have been in conformity with the campaign of solidarity called for by the F.I. In this regard, we do not demand that the SWP or YSA hand out the statement of the USFI, or that we, as members of the IMT, should dictate the tactics by which the general line of this international campaign should be implemented. But we do insist that the essential ideas contained in this call be incorporated into all of the SWP and YSA's interventions, and that this general line of building a solidarity movement on Chile be implemented. For us, the SWP's work on the Chile issue has been characterized by a boycott of the international campaign of the F.I., abstentionism toward the real activities taking place, sectarianism toward the openly anti-imperialist wing of the movement, and opportunism in its failure to raise consciousness in the movement. This is clearly demonstrated in the series of events described below.

8. HARASSMENT OF COMRADES DEFENDING THE F.I. LINE ON CHILE

Comrades of the I.T. who have urged the Party leadership to emulate the action of sections of the Fourth International in Chile solidarity work have been denied a hearing in the Party branch meetings, and have been intimidated from making the most minimal expression of international solidarity with the struggles of the resistance fighters in Chile. We have been referred to as "disloyal" and "indisciplined" for the horrendous crime of passing out the statement of the F.I. on Chile, or selling a special issue of the Old Mole -- newspaper of the Revolutionary Marxist Group, Canadian sympathizing section of the Fourth International -- on Chile which contained articles by Cde. Jean-Pierre Beauvais. I must mention that these tasks were undertaken by IT comrades in addition to the tasks that the Party assigned us and not in place of them. For this, we have publically been made the object of the abuse and bureaucratic rage of such elements as Cde. Barry Sheppard in Los Angeles, and Cde. Pearl Chertov in Chicago, who hurl threats and insults at us in public without regard for the fact that elements from the scandal-sheet vampire sects and others are around to witness these scenes. Our comrades have the right to sell the press of the International and they have the right to hand out the statements of the F.I. We would prefer that the Party implement that line in its own tactical form, but if the Party refuses to do this, then we will, without shirking other assignments, continue defending the line of the Fourth International. We acknowledge having done it on May 11th and we promise to do it again when the need arises. On May 11th, we took this action only after trying to motivate the Party leadership in the branches around the country to fulfill its tasks. For our attempts, we were threatened with draconian measures, voted out of order by ranks acting under factional discipline. We do not accept orders that say we cannot sell the International's press or give notice to the radicalized elements that the Fourth International is a revolutionary organization and not a civil liberties society of humanitarians. We are now being told that we do not have the right to sell INPRECOR as well as the Old Mole. This of course we reject. In relation to point 8., let me elaborate.

A. The refusal of the SAN FRANCISCO branch to grant assignments to three IT comrades who live and work in the San Jose region (sixty miles from San Francisco) with regard to the existent Chile committee there. Despite the fact that this is the only Chile committee

in the area and that it has held several meetings which have drawn four or five hundred people or more, including a meeting for Harald Edelstamm, the Party refuses these comrades the right to do political work there. It is true that this committee was formed under the leadership of the CP, which is strong in that area, however a significant wing of the organization is far to the left of the CP and is looking for a political alternative to it. It is not only the factional attitude which excludes ITers from political work but the refusal of the Party to pose as a political alternative for these left radicals whom the Party considers as "ultra-lefts" and therefore persona non grata. Instead it prefers abstentionism and refuses the right of these comrades to engage in political struggle. We totally reject these conceptions.

B. The attempts to stop comrades in MADISON from intervening in a large conference on Chile April 4-7, and their helping to build that conference. The conference despite the shortsightedness and sectarian attitude of the LTF leadership in the area was a huge success that not even those who had opposed it could deny. In addition, the LTF refused to actually build a picket action which the YSA had endorsed at the time of this conference. This action could have brought the conferees into a militant protest of the Chilean junta and focus attention on the revolutionary prisoners being held. Instead, the action was abandoned to the sectarian Spartacists. The I.T. comrades who alone supported the conference and urged the YSA leadership to intervene were further harassed from defending the line of the Fourth International and handing out its statement at this conference.

C. In PHILADELPHIA, where IT comrades were put under discipline never to sell the International's press under any circumstances, the Party failed to participate in a very militant demonstration on April 28th against a reception being given to the commanders of the Chilean and Brazilian naval ships in the Philadelphia port. The chants of this most vigorous demonstration were "Down with the Junta, Solidarity with the Chilean Workers and Peasants!", "Don't Dine the Swine, Grant Asylum to the Refugees from Torture and Death!", and "Chile Si! Junta No!". Many of the civilian guests at this reception were convinced not to attend. Only the IT comrades participated in the demonstration. An IT comrade, Robin Block, who has a token assignment on the USLA fraction in Philadelphia raised in the fraction meeting preparing the May 11th demonstration that in addition to the USLA approach, the Party should have its own speaker at the demonstration to speak on the lessons of Chile from a revolutionary point of view. She also moved that the Party have picket signs in its own name expressing solidarity with the resistance fighters in Chile. When these motions were defeated in the fraction, the comrade requested the right to make a minority report; this request was denied. At the branch meeting Cde. Robin raised these motions from the floor, with only limited time to motivate them -- i.e. the three minute time limit for "business". Her motions were defeated on the grounds that to have our own speaker would be sectarian, and that if we did have a speaker, she or he should give a USLA line; that picket signs supporting the resistance was against the line of the Party, and in addition that we did not know whether there was a resistance. At the demonstration, comrades of the IT handed out fifty xerozed copies of the FI statement on Chile, in addition to their handing out the official USLA fact sheet which was their regular assignment and took up most of their time. The organizer of the branch, Cde. Barry D., after seeing them handing out the FI statement, forbade them to distribute any more FI statements. When the comrades presented Cde. Barry with a written order for them not to hand out the F.I. statement and asked him to sign it. He refused but kept it for further reference. Needless to say the IT comrades continued their distribution of the FI statement as well as their regular assigned tasks. At the next branch meeting the organizer, Barry D., brought in a motion from the exec directing the IT comrades not to function in this indisciplined manner again. This policy is completely unacceptable and the leadership of the IT informs tendency members that in circumstances similar to those which occurred in Philadelphia, they should not obey any restrictions on selling the International press or distributing the statements of the F.I. It is our understanding that the actions of the Philadelphia leadership were not specific restrictions but general prohibitions of these rights -- this we do not accept.

D. In WASHINGTON, D.C., where our efforts to get a motion through the YSA to mobilize fully for the Chile demonstration were defeated along with a motion to put out the statement of the FI on Chile at the demonstration, the majority of the branch and YSA were sent to the "Human Kindness Day" event because "we could sell more Militants there". However, comrades of the IT did distribute the F.I. statements and for this were harassed. For instance, Cde. Les of the IT was called in and asked if he wanted to remain in the SWP. The clear implication being that his action in handing out the statement of the FI on Chile endangered his membership in the Party. Now we are informed that Cde. Rene is being brought up on charges for handing out this statement. The charge is indiscipline. Comrades of the leadership it is you who are responsible for these charges being brought, I hereby inform you that Cde. Rene did not act alone in this regard and that if you are serious about these charges you must proffer them against the national leadership of the IT who take responsibility for these actions. Please do not attempt to victimize one single YSA comrade. We demand an immediate dropping of the charges against Cde. Rene.

E. NEW YORK CITY. In the New York region, three YSA locals were put under a form of trusteeship because they proposed, in addition to carrying out USLA work, to hand out the F.I. Chile statement and to sell the Old Mole. They were even forbidden to use hammer and sickles on their posters -- it is necessary to state that these were posters of the Young Socialist Alliance not USLA where we all agree the hammer and sickle would be out of place. The Long Island YSA which held a very successful public meeting on Chile in its area was informed that it, along with the Paterson and New Brunswick locals of the YSA in New Jersey, could not make up their own signs for the Chile demonstration as is the usual custom, but that the New York City YSA would make up the signs for the three other YSAs. At the demo itself, the IT comrades were ordered verbally that they were only to sell the Militant and Young Socialist and to desist from selling the Old Mole and handing out the statement of the F.I. on Chile. Cde. Mirelowitz of the YSA NEC, and the LTF of the SWP, who gave these orders refused to sign a statement to that effect and so the IT comrades continued to sell the Old Mole and hand out the FI statement in addition to selling the Militant and the Young Socialist. Notwithstanding, Cde. Mirelowitz continued to spend his entire time at the demo by coming over to the IT comrades and demanding that they stop selling the Old Mole and handing out the FI statement. In the New York Party branches, the leadership pushed the rejection of our proposals to have an internationalist approach to the demonstration rather than just a USLA approach. We were forbidden to bring banners and signs that would use the slogans of the F.I. or reflect solidarity with the resistance. These decisions were respected. However, our comrades did sell the Old Mole and hand out the Chile statement. They were harassed in the same manner as was done in the other areas but no orders in writing were given. In the wake of the demonstration, accusations such as "indiscipline" were leveled against the IT by Cde. Doug Jenness, but no formal charges were brought. We were also described in the branches as a "disloyal tendency" -- this under an "informational" report with no discussion. The SWP branch organizer characterized the actions of the tendency as being "a nationally coordinated breach of discipline". He stated that no charges would be proffered but that the matter had been referred to the Political Committee. In New York as elsewhere, the IT comrades did sell the Old Mole and did hand out the FI statement in addition to carrying out their regular assignments. However we reject the position that this was an act of indiscipline and demand that the PC put forth a statement on this matter. We inform you in advance that we do not accept any general prohibition of sales of the International's press or distribution of the statements of the FI. We do not accept federalism in the place of internationalism.

F. CHICAGO: At a meeting for Harald Edelstamm, the IT after having recommended the distribution of either the FI statement or a statement of the Party that would contain the essence of the FI approach on Chile was told that no material other than that authorized by the branch could be handed out. The IT comrades brought copies of the FI statement to the meeting, and Cde. Dave Wulp, the assistant organizer and a member of the National Committee, was made aware of them but offered no objection to them being handed out; this of course was with the understanding that the other assignments of the intervention would be carried out. NO ONE disagreed with this approach at the time. Cde. Pearl Chertov, the organizer, however, did raise a public commotion because one of the IT com-

rades who was selling USLA badges was also passing out the FI statement. We proposed that the comrade give up one or the other task, that is if they were selling USLA badges they should not hand out FI statements, and vice versa. However, Cde. Pearl made it quite clear in the most boisterous way that no member of the LTF would hand out the statements of the FI. Therefore we asked that the IT comrade assigned to USLA badge sales be switched to selling Militants or ISR's which would allow them to hand out the FI statements. This was accepted by Cde. Pearl, although not without the help of Cde. Dave Wulp's urgings on this course. However, Pearl did make it clear to all and sundry within a six block radius that a section of the SWP was totally opposed to having anything to do with the passing out of the statements of the FI. On the Chile demonstration of May 11th in Chicago, the IT comrades again were harassed in the same crude manner by Cde. Pearl because of their sales of the International's press and the distribution of the statement of the FI. In the branch meeting following the demonstration, a report similar to that given in other branches was given by the leadership of the Chicago branch. The IT was given THREE MINUTES to respond and discussion on this matter was closed. In a second report, under USLA work, an evaluation of the May 11th demonstration was given in a report that was over twenty minutes long. One speaker of the IT was given three minutes and then denied a request for a two minute extension, several other LTF speakers were heard and then the discussion was closed even though several IT comrades requested to speak on the question. When we asked that the discussion be continued, we were ruled out of order. Since this has been the typical procedure in the Chicago local for over two years (refer to the contribution by Cde. Nadja "The Chicago Branch of the SWP: An Anatomy of Corroding Democracy" in SWP DB Vol. 31, No. 22, July 1973, which was never answered) the IT left the branch meeting in protest of this organizational strangulation of political discussion. Subsequently the Chicago leadership has raised objections to the sales not only of the Old Mole but of Inprecor at political events in the area. In addition it is becoming the habit in Chicago to deny IT comrades assignments at political events in order to insure that they do not sell the International's press there. Instead, they are assigned to routine press sales at street corners while these events are taking place elsewhere. This raises certain dangers in that it amounts to a complete isolation of the IT from all political processes: isolation inside the Party, inside the youth; in Party and youth external assignments; and now from being able to even observe and carry out sales tasks at political events in general. This is meant to demoralize and provoke the IT comrades.

G. LOS ANGELES: At the May 6th branch meeting of the Westside LA SWP, the IT comrades spoke on the importance of the upcoming Chile demonstration and made a "recommendation" that the FI statement on Chile be handed out in conjunction with the sales of our press and campaign literature. Cde. Barry Sheppard and other LTFers pointed out that this was not consistent with the Party's USLA intervention. Indeed, even SWP election campaign statements restrict themselves to opposing US complicity. Cde. Sheppard stated: "The FI puts out many statements but that doesn't mean that we have to circulate them all.. we didn't hand out their statement on Bolivia, for example". Cde Sheppard then made a motion that the branch sell the Militant at the demonstration. This was meant to have the ITers vote against this motion, which was ridiculous. Cde. Judi S. of the IT asked Cde. Barry whether he would accept as a friendly amendment combining distribution of the FI statements with sales of the Militant. Barry refused the amendment. While he never stated that FI statements could not be handed out, he called on the comrades to concentrate on Militant sales and proposed that the intervention be based on the demands of USLA. The IT comrades anticipating objections to their combining their regular assignments with the distribution of the FI statement on Chile drew up a typed order to the effect that they should not under any circumstances hand out the FI statement. On arriving at the site of the demo, the IT comrades were greeted by Cde. Sheppard who ran over to them and shouted "You are ordered not to hand out those (FI statements) out". The comrades attempted to explain to Cde. Sheppard that getting the line of the FI out was not only their responsibility but his also, and offered to allow him to distribute some of the statements also, but to no avail. The more the comrades tried to reason with him, the more frantic he became. Not wanting Cde. Sheppard to suffer heart seizure, the IT comrades offered

not to hand out the statements if Cde. Sheppard would sign the affidavit so ordering them. At this request, Cde. Sheppard became even more frantic and grabbing the prepared statement, he crumpled it up and threw it into the face of one of the IT comrades, yelling: "Fuck that statement... I will not take responsibility for physically stopping you from handing out the FI statement". In the subsequent branch meeting, the ITers were accused of a flagrant breach of discipline, of not realizing that they were members of the SWP first, and of being "arrogant apostles of Pabloism". The comrades were told by the branch organizer Stu S. that no charges would be made on the local level but that the national leadership would take up the question.

Similar situations to the ones described above have taken place in Houston, Saint Louis, and in other areas.

H. Cde. John Barzman of the IT was invited to speak in MINNEAPOLIS by an ad hoc Revolutionary Caucus formed to press a militant position in the May 11th demonstration. This contingent was made up of forces both friendly and unfriendly to the policies of the Fourth International and the Party. Cde John of course notified the Party of this invitation and requested that he be allowed to fulfill the assignment. This was with the understanding that John would speak as a member of the Socialist Workers Party. Members of the Caucus had heard John speak as a Party spokesperson several years ago and thought he would add to the speakers slate. Cde. Lew Jones of the Party National Office immediately phoned John to forbid him to fulfill this engagement even though it meant that the Party would have one less speaker at the demonstration. The reason given was that the Caucus as a whole were opponents and ultra-lefts. The underlying reason for this action is the sectarian attitude the Party has toward groups that are explicitly anti-imperialist or revolutionary, and on the other hand, the continued enforcement of the rule that no members of the IT will be able to act as Party spokespersons even if it means the Party as a whole loses opportunities. That this policy is not solely used against members of the IT but the IMT as well can be seen by one other case in point. During the process of the building of the May 11th demonstration in Minneapolis, a member of the Revolutionary Marxist Group of Canada was invited to speak in Minneapolis by the Liberation Affairs Committee at Macalester College on the question of Chile. The SWP branch in that city was asked to co-sponsor this meeting for a representative of a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International. The SWP refused on the grounds that the RMG was an opponent group to the LSA/LSO. The growing interest in the politics of the FI is due in great part to the sales of the FI's press in the area by Cde. Jeff M. of the IT. This interest was such that even though some of the groups in the caucus are opponents of Trotskyism they invited FI spokespersons such as the comrade of the RMG and Cde. John B. of the SWP to speak. John would have been one of the two speakers that this group put forward at the Chile demo. Considering that such groups as PL and the anti-Pabloite Class Struggle League were among the Caucus, this was a rather remarkable situation.

The entire situation leading up to the May 11 demo in Minneapolis is noteworthy in the sense that the Revolutionary Caucus was the main instigator and builder of the demo. They had larger turnouts at planning meetings, and they did not put their own positions ahead of holding a united demonstration as did the SWP. That is the Revolutionary Caucus wanted a demonstration that would encompass not only slogans and demands of the USLA type, but they wanted one slogan giving explicit support to the resistance of the working class and revolutionary movement in Chile. However, when the SWP refused this demand and threatened to split the coalition, the Caucus despite their extant majority gave in to insure that a demonstration would be held. The only support the SWP position received was from a dyed in the wool pacifist who is opposed to armed resistance as a matter of religious conviction. The SWP also attempted to split the coalition over the question of whether a march should be held in addition to the rally, but was not able to do so when the Caucus retreated on that question also. The fact that Cde. Jeff was placed under discipline not to sell the Old Mole at the demonstration and then given the assignment of carrying the USLA banner to insure that he could not sell them, indicates the height of

factional fever that affects the LTF. Even after he had carried the banner for a period and become tired, the leadership refused to allow another comrade to relieve Cde. Jeff for fear that he would sell the demoniac press of the RMG. All this notwithstanding, it is a tribute to Jeff's revolutionary endurance and the shortcomings of bureaucratic ukaze that he was still able to sell twelve copies of the Old Mole. Rather than seeing these sales as a sign of indiscipline on the IT comrades' part we view the leadership's role as completely negating the democratic norms of our movement and encourage IT comrades to continue selling the press of the International in that area.

9. FACTIONAL RECRUITMENT POLICY

The factional attitude toward members of the IT and supporters of the Fourth International is not restricted to those already within the Trotskyist movement but has been extended to those who wish to be in the Socialist Workers Party or the Young Socialist Alliance. We have protested in the past the bureaucratic exclusion of Comrade Milt Zaslow from rejoining the Party in Los Angeles, so we will not go into that matter again. However, it is our knowledge that Cde. Zaslow through his organization, the Socialist Union, has been able to bring a good number of people around the basic ideas of Marxism and the present positions of the Fourth International. It should be the policy of the party to recruit these individuals, each and everyone of them who support the positions of the FI and are willing to abide by the discipline of the SWP, as Cde. Zaslow himself was completely willing to do when he applied for membership. The attitude that the Party has adopted in its actions in excluding comrades such as Zaslow, coupled with its completely undemocratic attitudes toward supporters of the IT in the Party, has caused at least one comrade in Los Angeles to leave the Party and join the Socialist Union in order to be able to develop politically and better carry out the role of a supporter of the FI in the U.S. Now while we do not at all condone such a choice and while we urge all supporters of the political line of the Fourth International to join the Socialist Workers Party, we must assign the chief blame for this existent situation to the leadership of the SWP and the policies they have carried out in their harassment, exclusionary policies, and generally repressive attitude toward minorities in the Party.

In addition to the Socialist Union in Los Angeles, there is the Revolutionary Marxist Collective in Berkeley. This group which was called to my attention by the organizer of the Berkeley SWP branch, has put out a pamphlet on Chile and been engaged in Chile work in the Bay Area. In fact, they seem to have more of an influence on the main Chile solidarity group in the area, NICH (Non-Intervention in CHile) than does the Party. This was seen in the preparations for the May 11th demonstration in that area where the RMC was able to convince the NICH of the importance of putting forth an explicit call for solidarity with the Chilean resistance while the Party totally opposes this position from a civil libertarian viewpoint. While the pamphlet of the RMC on Chile makes some errors, it is basically supportative to the line of the FI and in fact openly acknowledges this support. Of the members that I am familiar with, and to this I owe part of my knowledge to Cde. Jeff P., the Berkeley Branch organizer, one was once a member of the DMG and another was formerly in the YSA several years back (he is now a very militant trade unionist and a political activist in the Bay Area). One other person was formerly a very prominent member of the La Raza Unida Party and had spoken in the past at Party and YSA educational conferences and forums. It would seem to me that the Party would want to recruit these comrades since they consider themselves supporters of the positions of the FI. Instead the Party treats this group as it does the Socialist Union, as political opponents. This is not only wrong, it is a disservice to both the International and the Party itself. We want all the supporters of the Fourth International inside the Party where we can organize and coordinate the carrying out of the line of the International under the Party's discipline. Of course, we must state that the Party leadership seems bent on seeing that supporters of the FI are outside the Party, including the ITers.

It has also come to our knowledge that there is a group in Baltimore, the Baltimore Marxist Group which also is supportative to the positions of Trotskyism and the Fourth International. It is our understanding that they participated in the May 11th Chile demonstration in Washington, D.C. The inability of the Party to even attempt to attract these groups and we would suppose many others such as thr groups (or at least some of them) in Minneapolis that I mentioned above, is a result of factionalism. It will be the purpose of the Internationalist Tendency comrades to recruit these comrades, each and every one of them, individually and without exception, to the Socialist Workers Party. Based on the fact that they agree with the politics of the Fourth International and agree to abide by the discipline of the SWP, they must be accepted into membership in the Party. Part of the tasks of the Parity Commission that we propose will be to take up such questions in order to build the Party.

This factional recruitment policy has previously been applied to comrades of the YSA petitioning for membership in the SWP. When these comrades are suspected of sympathies for a minority---first the P.O.T., and now the I.T.---they are systematically subjected to a series of assignments, tests, and unbridled attacks designed to demoralize them and drive them away. Any number of excuses are conjured to avoid admitting them to membership. For years the party leadership has refused to recruit at-largers out of YSA regional locals because many have been dissidents. When such dissident comrades do move to party centers, they are assigned to series of 5 classes on the "Organizational Principles of the Party". These classes are repeated ad nauseam until the candidate gives up. Comrades such as Cde. Larry N. and Butch H. in Chicago, or Jim M. in Houston, who have between one and four years seniority in the YSA, have been denied membership because they have supported the I.T. in the YSA. These practices must cease.

10. FACTIONAL TRANSFER POLICY

The general situation towards transfers of comrades from one area to another is handled in a completely factional manner by the Party leadership. For members of the LTF transfers from one branch to another are immediate and without delay for members of the IT they take months. We protested this in our letter of October 29, 1973 which we appendix to this statement. Transfers for Cdes. John B. from Houston to Chicago took over two and a half months, while the transfer of Cde. Butch H. from Chapel Hill, N.C. to Chicago took over four months in spite of the fact that he wrote the YSA National Office on four separate occasions. At the present time Cde. Mark Lause has been waiting for a transfer from the Houston branch of the Party to the St. Louis branch for over three months. There are several cases of this same situation. This policy is just a part of the whole pattern of showing how it does not pay to be a member of the I.T. The situation in regard to how LTF members are given first class treatment is typified by the case of Cde. Jean S. whose transfer from the Philadelphia branch to the Houston branch was not only handled smoothly and quickly but Cde. Jean was even placed on the Houston exec. committee before she ever reached Houston. Compare this with the IT comrade who has to sit in a branch for two and three months without being able to participate in the meeting itself because she or he has not yet been transferred. See the letter on this from J. Barzman to Lew Jones of 11/4/73.

11. IRRESPONSIBLE ACCUSATIONS OF INDISCIPLINE IN THE YSA

The charges that are made in the recent Majority Faction declaration of the Young Socialist Alliance (a call for a faction in the youth by four members of the Party assigned to the youth, who are also leading members of the only other existent faction in the U.S. Trotskyist movement, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction), "wherever possible the I.T. functions as a single disciplined faction of both the YSA and SWP members, carrying out public activities in violation of the decisions of both the

YSA and SWP". First, this charge is false in that the IT is not a faction, secret or otherwise, it is a tendency. Second, we have not carried out any violations of YSA or Party discipline, public or private. Third, it is a gross violation of the self--professed norms of the independence of the YSA and the SWP for four comrades of the SWP in the YSA to make charges against comrades of the SWP in the YSA. If these comrades are serious, they should bring these charges against us in the Party and try us in the Party for our so-called "violations of SWP discipline". Why are these plethora of charges of indiscipline against Party members made again and again without any charges being proffered? Is the leadership waiting for a grant trial at some as yet undisclosed future date? Is it the norm to make charges without proffering charges so as to prevent the air from being cleared? Are these charges all sound and fury without any facts? Are they slanders and smears in order to isolate comrades from functioning as full members of the Party? The national leadership must act on this question.

The I.T. has held joint meetings with SWP ITers and YSA ITers. Both the IT in the Party and the YSA are based on their support to the IMT. Both organizations, the SWP and YSA are in fraternal solidarity with the Fourth International and as such, part of the world Trotskyist movement. We have not hidden the fact that we hold joint meetings, in fact, we have informed the Party about it in the past. Both the IT of the SWP and the IT of the YSA held a joint meeting at the most recent YSA convention and announced it to the convention and invited Party and YSA comrades to attend. A comrade of the IMT was also present, Cde. Charles; Cde. Gordon Fox also attended this meeting on assignment for the LTF or the Party leadership, as did comrade Cindy Burke. No charges were ever brought against us for this. For further information on this question, I refer you to the correspondence of Cde. J. Shaffer to Nelson Blackstock, dated Dec. 2, 1973, in answer to allegations along the same line in Blackstock's letter of Dec. 1, 1973. In conjunction with this, I sent this correspondence to the PC with my letter of Dec. 10, 1973. If the IT comrades in Texas were wrong in inviting YSA members to a meeting of the SWP IT, why were no charges proffered by this time? Comrades, by stating that we are breaking discipline but not bringing us up on specific charges, you make a mockery of Party disciplinary procedures and turn it into a circus.

12. DENIAL OF MINORITY RIGHTS IN BRANCHES AND LOCALS

The refusal of the Party and YSA branches and locals to allow members of the I.T. to make minority reports in tasks and perspectives discussions as a matter of policy. This has most recently occurred in Houston and Chicago. Our members are put on executive committees but if they seek to function, they are given no rights. In the same way different evaluations of the May 11 actions were denied minority reports in numerous branches.

At a recent joint educational for SWP and YSA members in the Houston branch on Cuba, the I.T. comrades were attacked both as a Tendency and as individuals by name. A major part of the educational was given over this attack. However, when I.T. comrades asked for the right to answer these political attacks and personal attacks, they were refused the right. When they tried to make answers, they were ruled out of order. This is not an isolated case at all. In branches all over the country, attacks are continually made on the I.T. without giving the right to reply. In some cases they are given three minutes after a twenty minute attack has been made on them or their positions. In the YSA in Houston the organizer has charged the I.T. with being "reformist, Stalinist, trying to wreck the YSA and being disloyal". In this same branch the Party organizer agreed with a new YSA member

that the I.T. comrades were "anti-communists". Clearly this slander campaign knows no bounds.

13. VILE PERSONAL SLANDER

In the Los Angeles Branch after the I.T. comrades had asked that a member of the YSA reported to be a "police agent" be given a trial before dropping him from membership, the I.T. comrades are now referred to as "cop lovers". Cde. Barry Sheppard, if he is not directly responsible for this, and anyone who has watched him function has to consider this possibility, is indirectly responsible. The I.T. comrades for very good reasons defend the norms of Leninist democracy, not only for themselves but for others also. As it turned out, there was no conclusive evidence that this person was an "agent". There was, however, evidence that he was extremely suspicious and mentally mixed up, and on that basis the I.T. comrades voted to drop him from membership. However, we feel that a trial in this case was quite correct and educational. In some circumstances, actions must be taken immediately, but this was not one of them, and a trial was quite appropriate. But to refer to comrades as "cop-lovers" is a filthy and vile act.

14. ATTEMPTS TO DENY I.T. POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN THE LABOR MOVEMENT

The situation created in the Los Angeles branch where Comrade Ned M., a member of the I.T. who is an elected representative of the union, functioning on the State Executive Board of the Social Service Employees Union, gives further evidence of the factional attitude of the LTF leadership. Cde. Ned, after having informed the branch of the perspectives of building a caucus in his union in order to push for an escalator clause in the upcoming contract negotiations, and after having that perspectives approved by the branch, was put under discipline to withdraw from the caucus after it was formed and in the middle of the pre-strike actions. He was also withdrawn as the speaker at a forum (the only forum that a member of the I.T. has been offered in over two years) after the forum had been publically advertised and given wide notice among union members.

After having the branch's approval, Cde. Ned and other union members had formed a caucus which was not an anti-leadership caucus, as such, but which in a fairly pedantic and non-polemical manner, argued for the inclusion of a cost of living escalator clause in the contract and issued leaflets to that effect. Cde. Barry Sheppard, after seeing the leaflet and seeing Cde. Ned's name on it, ordered Ned to report to his office immediately. Ned did so and was accompanied by another I.T. member, Cde. Gene W. When they entered Sheppard's office, Sheppard screamed at Cde. Gene, "Get out." When Ned stated that unless Gene was allowed to stay, he would leave. Sheppard said, "Then you get out, too." However, as both comrades sought to carry out his orders, Cde. Barry changed his troubled mind and told them both to stay. Sheppard informed Ned that the only role he was to play in the union was to sell Militants. Despite the fact that this comrade had always informed the leadership as to what activities he was carrying out in the union, he was now told he must do nothing in the midst of what could have been a major strike action on the West Coast of the U.S. Ned was not even consulted on the articles that appeared in the Party's press concerning the situation around the strike actions. This not only reflects the factional role the leadership but their complete disinterest for the use of our trade union cadre and the general political interests of the working class. Sheppard maintained that to come out for the escalator clause would be an anti-union leadership action and therefore wrong. The situation as stated above was

nothing like that. This is not to say that at some point anti-leadership caucuses will not be a necessity; however, this situation had nothing in common with such cases. Copies of the literature of the escalator clause caucus make this evident. Cde. Sheppard can supply the PC if they are so interested.


FOR A PARITY COMMISSION

I feel that these sixteen points cover the situation adequately. If the leadership wants further proof of its own factional actions, they can be provided. In fact, the I.T. is requesting each of its local areas to draw up an accurate report on these actions over the last few years so as to be able to give this information to the appropriate national and international bodies should it be necessary. We append a copy of our letter of October 29, 1973, to the United Secretariat for reference.

It is our hope that further letters like this will not be necessary, however, the Party leadership has failed to encourage such hopes by their past actions. If the leadership does not act to correct this situation now, we will have no choice but to petition the International Control Commission to hold a thorough investigation of these matters. We feel the investigation of the situation in the IMG in the past offers a suitable precedent for such action. That was the case which the Party published in fine detail in a special document.

We urge that a Parity Commission at both national and local levels be set up to work out these matters and to change the functioning of the SWP and YSA so that there can not only be unity in the Party but also that our comrades of the I.T. can be allowed to fulfill their role as revolutionaries. We did not join the Socialist Workers Party to be treated as pariahs and to be excluded from revolutionary practice. We joined the Trotskyist movement in opposition to the policies of bureaucratic misleadership as found in the Stalinist and Social Democratic organizations. We wish to remain in the Socialist Workers Party and build it as the Party of the American socialist revolution but we fear that you want to split this Party and to drive us out of it. We ask that you show by a reversal of your past policies and actions that this is not the case. Only your actions can solve this crisis, comrades.

With revolutionary greetings,



Bill Massey
Internationalist Tendency

cc: IMT
IT
Ken Anderson