

A Report on Recent Developments
in the Japanese Section

Most of the comrades in the Japan Revolutionary Communist League (JRCL) and the Japan Communist Youth (JCY) were recruited out of the post-1967 youth radicalization in Japan, which they called the "new radical movement."

That entire milieu was marked by strong ultraleft tendencies from the beginning, and since 1970 there has been a process of deep sectarian degeneration of nearly all the major far-left organizations that grew out of it. Violence within the far left has become chronic, and several small sects have given up public activity in favor of individual terrorism.

The Japanese Trotskyists, although they naturally tend to reflect certain weaknesses of the milieu they come out of, have been an attractive force precisely because of their principled opposition to terrorism and to violence within the left. The JRCL is probably the only major far-left group that has not suffered a decline in membership in the period since 1972.

In recent years, as recruitment of students has fallen off and many student comrades have left school and gotten

jobs, the composition of the JRCL and JCY has changed. The majority of members now are workers, and many of them belong to important trade unions. In order to carry on more effective work in the unions, and in view of the continuing decline of the far-left milieu, the Japanese comrades in the early 1970s decided to make a turn, as they express it, "from a united front with the radical groups to a united front with the masses." This decision was concretized during the Lockheed bribery scandal and the parliamentary elections of 1976 in a slogan calling on the SP and CP to form a united front to bring down the LDP regime and establish a workers and farmers government. The decision to raise the slogan for an SP-CP government and to conduct a propaganda campaign around the elections was not an easy one. Every major far-left group opposed the JRCL's position as a "capitulation" to the SP and CP. Many of the younger comrades, especially in the JCY seemed to be uncomfortable with the new governmental slogan, and the party leadership was not really able to mobilize comrades for the election campaign on the scale they had hoped to. Nevertheless, the experiences of 1976 marked an important

step forward in the development of the party (see Appendix 1).

But in early 1977, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda announced the government's intention to push through completion of the New Tokyo International Airport in the Sanrizuka section of Narita City, which had long been delayed due to protests by farmers whose land was to be confiscated for the airport (see IP/I, July 3, 1978, p.812). Ever since the SP and CP withdrew their support for the Sanrizuka farmers, the campaign against the airport has been one of the few major struggles in Japan in which far-left organizations have played a leading role. Most of the far-left organizations reacted to Fukuda's announcement with the most unrestrained ultraleft rhetoric, as if the prime minister had thrown down the gauntlet to them. The largest ultraleft group, the Chukaku Faction, boasted that they would throw all their forces into the campaign against the airport, and pledged to "stage the future of our organization on the outcome of this fight."

The JRCL and JCY had been supporting the farmers' campaign for several years, and they too sought to help organize a new round of protests against the completion

of the airport. But the young comrades in particular felt that this had to be done in such a way as not to let the Chukaku Faction and other far-left groups outdo them either on the level of rhetoric or of daring tactics in demonstrations. After some discussion, the JRCL leadership decided in early 1977 to take what they termed a "dual approach:" mass actions and confrontations by small groups (see Appendix 2).

During 1977 and 1978, the comrades have been involved in a series of confrontations with police at the airport site, and over 150 of them have been arrested, with several facing serious charges. All other areas of party work have been subordinated to the campaign against the airport, in which the JRCL now plays a larger role than any other far-left group.

This turn toward concentrating on the anti-airport campaign has been accompanied by a shift in the JRCL's propaganda. Articles aimed at supporters of the SP and CP have appeared much less frequently in the pages of the party's paper Sekai Kakumei (World Revolution). In particular, the slogan of an SP-CP government, which was a

central theme in 1976, has hardly been raised at all since the beginning of 1978. While constantly calling for "bringing down the LDP government," and sometimes adding the abstract call for a workers and farmers government, Sekai Kakumei almost never presents this as a demand upon the Social Democratic and Stalinist leaderships any more.

This shift has been codified to a certain extent in general programmatic terms. In contrast to the strategy projected in 1976 of winning workers away from the reformist parties through a systematic campaign for a united front with the SP and CP against the LDP government, recent articles in Sekai Kakumei have stated that the Sanrizuka struggle has now become a pole of attraction which can draw workers away from the reformist parties, even if the SP and CP are not forced to support the farmers. Some authors have clearly asserted that the united front of far-left groups and radical independents around Sanrizuka can bring down the LDP government by their own efforts, and in fact almost did so in March 1978 (see Appendix 3).

Another element of the JRCL's pre-1976 propaganda which has returned to prominence in the pages of Sekai Kakumei is

the concept of "revolutionary violence." According to this idea, the popularization of revolutionary violence was key to the rise of the youth radicalization, but the spread of terrorism and sectarian violence within the far left has given revolutionary violence a bad name, and driven radicalizing young people away from the far left as a whole. Thus in order to reverse this process, the reasoning goes, the JRCL must set an example of real revolutionary violence, in order to differentiate itself from the sectarians and lay the basis for re-emergence of the radical movement. This concept is expounded in the JRCL pamphlet "Revolutionary Violence and Violence within the Movement," a series of polemical articles written in the early 1970s which was reprinted in 1977 (see Appendix 4).

Although the campaign against the airport is continuing (the government plans to displace more farmers to build two additional runways), the level of participation in anti-airport demonstrations has declined somewhat since the spring of 1977. Even though the role of the JRCL within this campaign has become more prominent, in the absence of

large numbers of independents the Chukaku Faction and other sectarian groups still carry a lot of weight as organizers of the movement. Rather than fighting to differentiate themselves and the anti-airport campaign from the sectarians, the JRCL has toned down its public criticisms of them, at least since the spring of 1978.

One very serious problem facing the anti-airport movement is the political impact of isolated acts of sabotage by some of the sectarian tendencies. The Chukaku Faction and several other sects have openly proclaimed their intention to paralyze the functioning of the airport by means of "guerrilla strikes" against the airport and related facilities. Since the opening of the airport in May 1978, there has been an ongoing series of such actions, with ultraleft groups publicly taking responsibility in many cases. A sample of the actions reported in the Tokyo daily Yomiuri Shimbun includes flying balloons and shooting fireworks in the path of jetliners approaching the airport, disabling radar navigation equipment, broadcasting radio signals which interfere with plane-to-ground communications, crashing a stolen car filled with incendiary devices into the airport bus terminal

in downtown Tokyo, and dumping agricultural pesticides into a drinking water reservoir near Narita. One can easily imagine how these types of actions enable the government to discredit and slander the anti-airport movement, even in cases where there is no proof of who carried out the action or why. One example of the political harm this has caused is that the air traffic controllers' union, which originally protested the opening of the new airport as unsafe (see IP/I, September 11, 1978, p.1013), recently issued a statement blaming opponents of the airport for the threat to air safety, and calling for more severe police measures (see Appendix 5).

During 1976 and early 1977, the JRCL publicly polemicized against these sorts of sabotage tactics, pointing out that "you cannot effectively mobilize people by means of a guerrilla struggle that substitutes one's own sect for the masses" (Sekai Kakumei, May 23, 1977). But these kinds of polemics have gradually disappeared from the pages of Sekai Kakumei, and on at least a few occasions the JRCL has explicitly indicated approval of isolated acts of sabo-

JRCL/9

tage, even though the JRCL and JCY are apparently not using such tactics themselves. The Communist Party has seized on this mistake to launch a vicious slander campaign against the comrades (see Appendix G).

The editors of Sekai Kakumei -- even in their replies to the Stalinist slanders -- have simply avoided mentioning or commenting on the acts of sabotage which have been played up in the bourgeois media to slander the anti-airport campaign as "terrorist." It was reported in the Yomiuri Shimbun (September 16 evening edition) that police raided several buildings in Narita, including six "connected with the JRCL," supposedly "as part of an investigation into the incident in which the Chikunami relay station was disabled by saboteurs who cut its cables." (No evidence linking the JRCL to that incident was ever made public, either before or after the search, and no arrests have been made in the case.) Yet even in the face of this implicit accusation fed to the press by the cops, there has been no response or denial (or even a protest against the search) in any of the three issues of Sekai Kakumei since then.

Rather than differentiating the party and the anti-airport campaign from the sectarian groups, the comrades' current approach can only lead the average worker or student to confuse the JRCL with the Chukaku Faction and all the others. This hurts the party and impairs the anti-airport campaign much more than anything that is gained by maintaining a tenuous working relationship with the sectarians.

There have been some other notable changes in the JRCL's activity since 1976. In the 1976 shunto (spring labor offensive) and parliamentary elections the party tried to carry out the largest possible propaganda intervention, but similar campaigns were not launched around the 1977 or 1978 shuntos or the June 1977 elections, since those coincided with major demonstrations at the airport site. (The only election activity since 1976 that I'm aware of was carried out in May 1978 by the JRCL branch in Tachikawa, which endorsed and helped campaign for an independent city council candidate, a well-known local radical with whom they have long had a working relationship.)

In response to deepening discontent within the unions, and

in preparation for the upcoming parliamentary elections, a substantial part of the Socialist Party and Sohyo leaderships have recently adopted a more aggressive posture toward the ruling LDP, including by calling demonstrations around a series of issues. Articles in Sekai Kakumei have discounted the significance of those calls to action, rather than encouraging readers to get involved in the demonstrations and demanding that the Social Democrats not scuttle the campaigns they have initiated. When the Nagasaki Sohyo council called a demonstration by trade unionists against the nuclear-powered ship Mutsu, the JRCL and JCY boycotted Sohyo's ^{rally} demonstration and held their own, "militant" ^{rally} ~~march~~, as did various sectarian groups (Yomiuri Shimbun, October 16 evening edition).

On September 12, the Fukuoka branch of the JCY made a serious mistake, one that to my knowledge is completely unprecedented for them. They were persuaded to take part in a physical confrontation to prevent the Communist Party from carrying out a film showing. The Fukuoka comrades sent a report of the confrontation to Sekai Kakumei, which

was printed without comment (see Appendix 7). It should be noted that the Buraku Liberation League, whose local organization apparently organized the confrontation because they regarded the film as derogatory to Buraku people, is not some far-left sect but rather a real, mass-based organization, widely recognized as the most authoritative representative of the Buraku people in Japan. The CP has slandered the BLL for a long time, and in the absence of a strong tradition of internal democracy in the Japanese left it's not hard to imagine how healthy activists who hate the CP could be provoked into responding that way. It would be much harder for the JOY comrades to stick by their principles and refuse to join with the BLL on this than if some degenerate sect were proposing to attack the CP.

Nevertheless, the comrades in Fukuoka made a mistake, and the editors of Sekai Kakumei have implicitly condoned it. According to the October 16 issue of Sekai Kakumei, the CP has now gone to court to demand that charges (including trespassing and assault) be brought against 54 individuals involved in the incident.

While the general impression I get from reading Sekai Kakumei is that the JRCL is turning back toward its pre-1976 line, it is important to note the limitations of this process.

The JRCL continues to express its opposition to violence within the movement. A strong statement was printed in Sekai Kakumei condemning the Chukaku and Kakumaru factions for their September 30 clash at Yokohama National University, in which one activist was killed. Our position on the need for democracy within the student movement was also spelled out in an article denouncing the sectarian Kaiho Faction for attacking and injuring four JCY comrades at Kyushu University. Indications are that the clash with the Communist Party in Fukuoka was an aberration rather than representing a change in policy by the party and the JCY, and we can hope that the national leadership will have discussions with the young comrades involved and convince them that they made a mistake.

Although in practice, and to an extent in their published

resolutions, the comrades have clearly moved away from the orientation they adopted in 1976, they have not explicitly repudiated any of the positions or actions they took during the Lockheed scandal and the 1976 elections. There are also certain differences in the way individual leading comrades write about the SP and CP. Parliamentary elections will be held again probably in January or February, and we can hope that the party will attempt to intervene in those elections in one way or another. The new upsurge of activity and the turmoil within the SP and Sohyo certainly provide openings which may encourage comrades to seriously consider how to reach the broad layers of workers who have not been drawn into the Sanrizuka struggle. One example of this is in Osaka, where the endorsement of a bourgeois candidate for governor by the prefectural council of Sohyo has led to a storm of protests and an ongoing debate, with several major unions announcing that they will defy the central leadership and support the incumbent governor (a CPer) instead (Yomiuri Shimbun, September 14). The Osaka branch of the JRCL has a number of members in Sohyo unions, and

there will surely be a receptive audience for the JRCL's explanation of how the labor movement ought to intervene in the elections.

Although I have not had access to the JRCL's internal bulletins and circular letters for the past year, it would appear that the membership and close periphery of the JRCL and JCY have not increased, even though the comrades have gotten a lot of publicity as a result of events at the airport. The main rally at this year's Asian Youth Conference (July 23) was attended by only 760 people, although attendance in previous years had been over 1000 and comrades had been projecting a substantially bigger turnout this year. It is clear even from letters to the editor in Sekai Kakumei that a certain layer of comrades now feel uneasy about some of the mistakes that have been made, and a discussion is at least beginning to take place on some level (see Appendices 8, 9 and 10).

-- Dan Dickeson

October 19, 1978

Appendix 1

A. OK. Without going into the previous history of our movement, the situation created by the Lockheed scandal meant that the JRCL had to make an important turn in our work.

The Eighth National Congress of the JRCL was held in January 1976. At that time we analyzed the development of the objective conditions in East Asia and within Japan, and concluded that the political situation was entering a period when the question of a workers government would be posed. This was the theme that ran through all our discussions at the congress. But we didn't carry the discussion through to the point of becoming concrete, to the point of discussing specifically the question of how we would respond in practice to the new situation that was opening up.

That was in January. Less than two months later the Lockheed scandal broke, and we ran right up against that very concrete question. For us the problem revolved around formulating a slogan demanding that the SP and CP form a workers and farmers government. But at that stage the JRCL wasn't really up to the tasks posed by the situation. During March and April, the initial period of mass actions protesting the scandal, we responded mainly on the level of carrying on an internal discussion whose main purpose was to get a real understanding of the situation itself.

But we came out of that discussion as the only current in the Japanese left that grasped the real significance of the Lockheed scandal. We were the only ones who sought to link the scandal to the question of power for the working class, with emphasis on the need for a workers government and workers control of industry. We propagandized for bringing down the corrupt LDP government, and for nationalizing under workers control all the corporations involved in the scandal. In all of this we emphasized the necessity of a workers united front.

We were the only current that tried to respond to the scandal this way, and we took the initiative in trying to organize united actions. We initiated a series of actions involving those left groups whom we could draw into a united front. The first of these were during the *shunto*. In Sendai and in Osaka we worked among young union activists carrying out actions that projected the Lockheed scandal as a key theme of Sohyo's struggle. And building on that momentum, we initiated a united demonstration in Tokyo on June 20 that drew about three thousand participants.

Another task facing us is to reach the rank and file of the CP and SP. The reformists' capitulation to the LDP on the JNR fares issue sealed the fate of the working-class parties in the election. Of course a whole series of factors have demoralized SP and CP supporters, but that defeat—coming just before the elec-

tion campaign opened—was decisive. And of course that demoralization and confusion is continuing beyond the elections—in fact, the poor showing of the SP and the CP has only made it worse.

We now have to try again to politically win over those layers of activists by helping them draw the lessons of these defeats, explaining our governmental slogan and our call for a united front. It's basically the same thing we were trying to accomplish last spring and summer, but now under different conditions. This is our first task right now, to speed the process of political differentiation that's going on within the unions, and to build our own influence among those workers.

Our second major task is to help mobilize the working class to support the Buraku liberation struggle⁵ and the struggles in solidarity with the Korean people. Objectively these struggles are linked with the interests of the labor movement, but they have always been isolated from the unions. We try to take these questions into the unions, to link the movements in action.

For example, we propose that local

5. The Buraku people are descendants of the "untouchable" caste in precapitalist Japan. They suffer severe discrimination in employment, housing, education, marriage, etc.—IP

unions carry out strikes in solidarity with the Buraku Liberation League. Also, as I mentioned before, the whole problem of Korea is being discussed more and more by sections of the SP and the Sohyo leadership. We want to pose solidarity with the South Korean people's struggle as a key task of the unions.

Q. Is there anything else you'd like to add?

A. These experiences of the past year sort of illustrate where we're at in the development of the JRCL. We established the party and built up our apparatus in the youth radicalization, and from about 1972 to 1975 our main activity has aimed at building up our influence within the working class. That is, educating ourselves, accumulating cadres, and establishing some strongholds—or if not strongholds at least a certain influence in some places.

We're now preparing a big rally that we'll hold on February 5 to mark the twentieth anniversary of our movement in Japan. That rally will also mark the beginning of the JRCL's advance into the working class, of our direct challenge to the hegemony of the SP and CP, of a new stage in the struggle to organize the vanguard of the Japanese socialist revolution under the banner of the Fourth International. □

[This is the concluding part of an interview with JRCL Political Bureau member Jiro Kurosawa. The interview was conducted in Tokyo on December 29, 1976, and published in Intercontinental Press, February 21 and March 7, 1978.]

Appendix 2

[The following is an excerpt from a statement by the JRCL Central Committee which was published in Sekai Hakumei, April 4, 1977.]

We will do our best to build the Sanrizuka struggle on the basis of a clear overall strategy. Concretely, this means we must carry out two main tasks.

The first task is to organize broad masses of people in a united front under the banner of the Solidary Committee to mobilize at Sanrizuka ... We have to build the Sanrizuka struggle into a nationwide political campaign, and in so doing draw together all popular struggles into a tremendous united front against the government.

Our second task is to assemble the most militant fighters into a quantitatively and qualitatively powerful armed contingent for an all-out struggle at the airport site. This SYJS [Student/Youth Joint Struggle] contingent, consisting mainly of JCY comrades, will be in the front ranks of every battle against the state's riot police, unafraid of being victimized, beating back all attempts at repression, struggling to achieve victory in the showdown confrontation at Sanrizuka.

Neither of these tasks can be considered "more important" than the other. Like the two wheels of a bicycle, each is essential. Without mass mobilizations, all-out confrontations are futile, and without violent all-out struggles, mass mobilizations are powerless. The JRCL is striving to play the role of a vanguard party in the Sanrizuka struggle, and thus we must take up both of these tasks.

Appendix 3

[The following is an excerpt from the article "The Present Conjuncture of the Political Situation in Japan and the New Framework of the Class Struggle" by Yoshichi Sakai, which appeared in Sekai Kakumei No.544, October 9, 1978.]

The Sanrizuka struggle has stood in clear contrast to the decline and collapse of "progressive" local governments [a series of city and prefectural administrations headed by SP and CP politicians have been defeated in elections in the past two years] and the miserable defeat of the shunto [spring labor offensive] this year. The Sanrizuka struggle, continuing from the construction of the concrete fortress at the end of last year up through the February 6-7 battle with the police at the fortress, finally succeeded in smashing the government's attempt to open the airport by the end of the fiscal year as a result of the dramatic victory of March 26 [the occupation of the control tower and smashing up of its instruments]. That tremendous political blow threw the Fukuda government into a situation of governmental crisis. Thus the struggle between us and the government over Narita Airport became literally the central axis of the political situation. Fukuda's political future was staked on the second attempt to open the airport, which is why the LDP government used all of its repressive apparatus to force the opening of the airport on May 20. The political forces fighting on the side of the Sanrizuka farmers -- primarily the JRCL and JCY, who were responsible for the victory of March 26 -- then fought against the second attempt to open the airport on May 20 in a fierce confrontation with the fully mobilized repressive apparatus of the Fukuda government. But the

Fukuda government was able to force through the opening of the airport on May 20 by means of a full mobilization of its repressive apparatus, and so the struggle entered a new conjuncture characterized by a standoff. As a result, the situation of direct governmental crisis which prevailed from the time of the victory of March 26 up to May 20, subsided.

The reformist leaderships, led by the bureaucratic leadership of Sohyo, have capitulated to the LDP government, and the established reformist movement has become impotent. Since the beginning of 1977 Fukuda has done his best to extend this state of affairs to all the mass movements of workers and farmers, and to maximally consolidate the class dominance of the big bourgeoisie and the LDP governmental regime over the political situation as a whole. But the Sanrizuka struggle stood in the way of that attempt, and the victory of March 26 threw Fukuda's LDP government into a situation of governmental crisis during the period leading up to the second attempt to open the airport on May 20. Although the Fukuda government did succeed in opening the airport by force on May 20 by utilizing its entire repressive apparatus, the degree to which the LDP governmental regime was able to recover, and the degree to which it was able to establish the class dominance of the bourgeoisie in relation to the masses of workers and farmers, were severely limited by the victory of March 26 and the fierce struggle carried out on May 20. The big bourgeoisie and the LDP government have been able to force the Sohyo bureaucracy, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party to continue capitulating as they have since the 1974-76 period, and thereby to deepen the crisis within the reformist move-

ment, but they have not been able to smash and "break through" the Sanrizuka Airport Opposition League and the militant forces fighting on the side of the Sanrizuka farmers. As a result, the Opposition League and the militant forces fighting on the side of the farmers, through the struggles of March 26 and May 20, subjectively secured their position as a political pole of attraction in the class struggle in Japan.

Appendix 4

[The following is an excerpt from the article "On the Use of Violence and Violence in General" by Yoshichi Sakai, which originally appeared in Sekai Kakumei No.232, April 5, 1971, and has been reprinted in the pamphlet "Revolutionary Violence and Violence within the Movement."]

Politics inevitably turns into war. In fact, without turning into war in the truest sense of the word, politics cannot rise to victory. War is the extension of politics, and it is in war that politics assumes its most extreme and highest form. Consequently, war and violence are for us the most sacred field of endeavor. We can never allow mindless or anarchistic violence, sectarianism or opportunism to intrude upon this field. It is a field that demands firm discipline, complete order, a system of centralized responsibility and a thoroughly thought-out conception of the political goal. These are things we must keep clearly in mind today.

Today it is clear that at least within Japan, the political situation of the mass movement has not yet entered the stage in which war becomes decisively dominant over politics. We firmly oppose all the various political tendencies that view the present political situation of the mass movement as one in which war has become decisively predominant.

On the other hand, it is completely clear that even within Japan, a stage is now opening up in which the radical mass movement that has surged forward in the struggles since 1967 must inevitably confront the state power in direct clashes. The problem is how to turn the open, direct clashes and confrontations between these new radical struggles and

and the present state power in Japan into confrontations between the state and all the people, in particular the working class. In other words, how to organize the working class and all the masses for an open, direct, generalized confrontation against the present state power, and form new, radical political people in the process. Clearly this is a very difficult task. But the struggles of the farmers at Sanrizuka and Kitafuji demonstrate that unless this is done, the new radical movement itself cannot help but degenerate into reformism and popular frontism.¹⁾

It is in this sense that we say that Japan is entering a stage of mass struggles for power. We have asserted time and time again in Sekai Kakumei that since the December 20, 1970 anti-American riots in Koza, Okinawa, the anti-military and anti-colonial struggle there has clearly entered the stage of a mass struggle for power throughout the island, as the struggles there are turning into battles between violent, organized forces.

Only when these kinds of mass struggles for power have been thoroughly fought out over an entire period, only through that process will war become dominant over politics in the situation of the mass movement.

[The following is an excerpt from a review of the pamphlet "Revolutionary Violence and Violence within the Movement" which appeared in Sekai Kakumei No.518, April 10, 1978.]

Restore the Good Name of Revolutionary Violence

The pamphlet also contains the article "The United Red Army²⁾ and Our Position" (written in March 1972), which makes

a sharp and devastating criticism of the line of "military struggle" cut off from the people's struggles.

"We do not jeer at this tragedy....But we make a clear distinction between terrorism and revolutionary military actions....We have asserted over and over again that the military question is one of the tasks in our struggle, and we have shown in practice that we mean it."³⁾ But we pursue this task in accordance with the needs of the class struggle at its present stage of development.

The correctness of our approach was shown absolutely clearly throughout the struggles of March 26. We're not using guns or bombs at this point, but we have succeeded in organizing a mass, all-out struggle to surround, break into and occupy the airport control tower.

For many people today the word "Trotskyist" conjures up images of the Chukaku or Hakumaru factions,⁴⁾ and there are many who take the errors and the bankruptcy of those sectarians as evidence of the bankruptcy of Trotskyism. This little pamphlet is one that should be read by everyone who was watching the red helmets⁵⁾ on March 26.

Notes

1) This was written shortly after the Socialist and Communist parties had withdrawn their support for the farmers who were resisting confiscation of their land for the construction of Narita Airport. The CP leadership in particular tried to cover its shameful betrayal by pointing to the ultraleft actions of some of the smaller groups involved in the struggle, claiming that while they still sympathized with the farmers they couldn't be involved in a movement that had been "taken over" by "violent criminal" elements. The message to CP supporters was clear: the only alternative to the CP's politics is ultraleftism.

The farmers rejected the CP's propaganda, defended the slandered activists, and correctly placed the blame for violence on the police.

2) The "United Red Army" was an ultraleft sect that grew out of the same nucleus as the better-known "Japanese Red Army Faction," which has carried out a series of terrorist actions in the Middle East. The United Red Army went underground in the late 1960's, with the stated purpose of organizing a guerrilla war in the sparsely populated mountains of Nagano Prefecture. In 1972, fourteen of its members were found dead, killed by their own comrades in an internal dispute. The incident had a deep demoralizing effect on ultralefts throughout Japan.

3) The JRCL has rejected the terrorist conceptions of many of the ultraleft sects, and counterposed the "military strategy" of working to win over soldiers in the Self

Defense Forces. Virtually every other current in the Japanese left has the incorrect policy of expressing their opposition to the Self Defense Forces by ostracizing individual soldiers.

4) These are two large, ultraleft sectarian groups whose theoretical positions are similar to those of the "state capitalist" groups in the West, although the Communist Party labels them "Trotskyites." Since 1971, the two groups have carried out a grotesque campaign of violent attacks against each other, sometimes murdering rival activists.

5) The JRCL and JCY activists often wear red helmets in demonstrations. Other far-left groups have helmets of different colors.

Appendix 5

[The following article appeared in the Tokyo daily Yomiuri Shimbun, September 10, 1978 (page 3).]

TRANSPORT MINISTRY WORKERS UNION ISSUES STATEMENT, STRONGLY DENOUNCES EXTREMIST ACTS

On the eve of the September 17 rally which will mark the climax of one hundred days of struggle by opponents of Narita Airport, the Transport Ministry Workers Union, representing air traffic controllers and other airport personnel, adopted a statement at its annual convention September 9 calling for "defending airline safety against the destructive actions of violent extremist groups."

The statement characterizes the extremists' repeated acts of sabotage directed against air traffic control and radar navigation equipment as inexcusable, "adamantly condemns the wrecking actions of violent extremist groups," and makes a strong call for "the authorities to take all necessary measures."

The union's annual convention has been in session for the past four days at Mizukami Hot Springs in Gunma Prefecture. On September 7, right in the middle of the convention, an incident occurred in which radar beacons at Ami and Mamotani in neighboring Tochigi Prefecture were sabotaged by cutting cable connections. In response to this, union locals representing employees at Narita and Haneda airports, as well as the Tokyo Air Traffic Control Office, issued an appeal which was subsequently drawn up in the form of a statement and approved on the last day of the convention.

Appendix 6

[The following article appeared in the
May 29, 1978 issue of the CP daily Akahata.]

THE J.R.C.L. -- ITS MANEUVERS & ITS REAL NATURE

by Ryusuke Toyoda, Akahata Theoretical Department

The recent rampage of wrecking activity by violent gangs of fake "leftists" opposed to the opening of Narita Airport has at last revealed the true nature of those anti-social, criminal organizations. Among those groups, the "Fourth International" faction [JRCL], a long-time violent Trotskyite gang, has recently been thrust into prominence as a result of its violent wrecking activity, especially since its members destroyed the airport control tower March 26. The JRCL is also involved in other maneuvers, as well, such as putting out fraudulent propaganda in Fackikawa City in alliance with a certain city council candidate there who has connections with them.

"Let a few planes fly in, then strike the big blow!"

The JRCL has made Narita its stronghold, occupying four of the over thirty "unity houses" that have been erected near the airport site by the various factions of violent fake "leftist" gangs. Along with the Chukaku Faction, the JRCL has become a leading force among the many Trotskyite gangs engaging in maneuvers out there.

The JRCL refers to the destruction of the control tower as a "people's victory." They have since escalated their hooliganism, announcing plans to break through the airport gates on opening day (May 20), and in the meantime are

running around throwing Molotov cocktails and "clashing" with the police.

They have declared that "there are countless ways of paralyzing and destroying the functioning of the airport. Whatever the tactics, any action that will help shut down the airport is correct" (JRCL newspaper Sekai Kakumei, May 8). Asked whether they intended to undertake "forms of struggle" in which innocent passengers might get caught up, they affirmed "Yes, we might" (Fuji TV, "78 Nippon"). That is, they have reached the point of publicly calling for individual terrorist acts against ordinary citizens. As part of their "all-out offensive," they have endorsed even outrageous acts that threaten to cause aircraft accidents, such as cutting the cables leading to a radar navigation beacon (a crime for which the Chukaku Faction issued a statement claiming responsibility).

And now they are arrogantly proclaiming their intention to carry out even more antisocial, criminal acts in the future. "One proposal is to concentrate our entire offensive on opening day, but another way is to let them go ahead and open the airport, let a few planes fly in, and then strike the big blow" (quoted in [the weekly magazine] Shukan Gendai, April 20).

These facts show that the JRCL really is an antisocial gang of criminals.

"Opening a huge crack in the power structure...?"

In order to rationalize this sort of rampaging hooliganism, the JRCL claims that "the Sanrizuka struggle" is "one of the

most important challenges that we must consciously take up in order to spur on the Asian revolution" (Sekai Kakumei, March 13); and they claim that their actions have "opened a huge crack in the power structure" of the Fukuda cabinet.

But far from "opening a huge crack in the power structure," they are in fact just putting on an act at the encouragement of the LDP government, which has a policy of letting them off easy. This was evidenced by the unaccountable "negligence" of part of the police guard during the incident in which the control tower was wrecked. This sort of violent, rampaging hooliganism has had the effect, even at Narita, of making it easier for the LDP government to undemocratically force its projects through over the opposition of local residents, and has actually played the role of assisting the LDP in its schemes to strengthen "anti-subversive" legislation. This fact -- that while disguising themselves as "leftists" they actually help the LDP carry out its reactionary maneuvers -- is the most dangerous thing about the political role the JRCL plays.

Maneuvering their way among workers and students

The JRCL has cultivated a somewhat different image from the other Trotskyite gangs. They put on a show of rejecting the "violence within the movement" practiced by other gangs such as the Chukaku and Kakumaru factions, and in addition they adopt the posture of asserting that "we think workers and farmers involved in various struggles today must come together in a united front in order to win....and in fact in the elections we even call for a vote for the Socialist

and Communist party candidates" (Moto Imano, quoted in [the weekly magazine] Shukan Posuto, April 14).

However, all this is nothing but a tactical maneuver on their part in an attempt to infiltrate workers' and students' groups. The JRCL started out as the Japanese section of the worldwide Trotskyite organization the "Fourth International," and after repeated splits they still consider themselves to be the true inheritors of Leon Trotsky's political legacy. The Trotskyites raise the slogan "against imperialism and against Stalinism," but in fact they are "anti-imperialist" in name only. Their actual conduct has demonstrated time and time again that they are really counterrevolutionary political groups whose primary objective is the "anti-Stalinist" one, namely to destroy the Communist Party and the world Communist movement.

Although the JRCL from time to time deceptively claims to "oppose the 'anti-imperialism and anti-Stalinism' line" (Sekai Kakumei, April 10), in practice they remain loyal to this counterrevolutionary ideology. They see themselves as a movement that "has survived in the crossfire of imperialism and Stalinism internationally" (ibid.), and seeks "to liberate the workers under the influence of the CP from the spell of Stalinism" (Sekai Kakumei, February 13). Thus while making these kinds of pronouncements as a tactical maneuver, the JRCL seeks to deceive workers and students through "revolutionary" verbiage, in order to dupe them into participating in its criminal, provocative rampages.

It is an increasingly important task for us to expose the true nature of the JRCL and the dangerous role it plays, and to smash the Trotskyites' maneuvers.

[Translator's Note:]

The quotations from Sekai Kakumei in this article are genuine. I am unable to verify the accuracy of quotations from other sources.

While the quotations from Sekai Kakumei are textually accurate, it should be noted that the author has presented some of them out of context to serve his own purposes. For example, the paragraph in the May 8 Sekai Kakumei article from which two sentences were extracted actually reads as follows:

There are countless ways of paralyzing and destroying the functioning of the airport. Whatever the tactics, any action that will help shut down the airport is correct. Of course we demand that such actions be carried out with the strictest discipline, with the intention of striking a damaging blow to the airport, not of causing injury to people. Only these kinds of actions will receive popular support, and be able to deal a truly effective blow to the enemy. [emphasis added]

The Akahata article omits the second half of this paragraph, inserts a statement made on television by an unnamed individual who is supposedly a member of the JRCL, and asserts on the basis of this that the JRCL is "publicly calling for indiscriminate terrorist acts against ordinary citizens."

The only specific action cited as an example of such "terrorist acts" was carried out by members of a different organization.

Appendix 7

[The following article appeared in
Sekai Kakumei No.542, September 25, 1978.]

STOP THE SHOWING OF "RIVER WITHOUT A BRIDGE"!

YSJS¹⁾ Carries Out a Militant Struggle Together with the BLL²⁾

FUKUOKA -- The Fukuoka Youth/Student Joint Struggle Coalition against Narita Airport and the Mutsu, along with the Kyushu University C Front, joined together September 12 with the Fukuoka Council of the Buraku Liberation League to carry out a determined and militant struggle to stop by force the showing of the film "River Without a Bridge (part 1)" organized by the Communist Party's Zenkai. ³⁾

The BLL had called on various labor unions and militant groups to join in an action to block the showing of the bigotted film, which was scheduled for 6:30 p.m. that day in the small (250-seat) auditorium of Citizens Hall. (At the last minute, the CP pushed the time back 30 minutes, to 7:00 p.m.)

A rally against the film showing began a little before 5:00 at nearby Suzaki Park. Among the 50 participants in the rally were comrades from the BLL Fukuoka Council, Fukuoka YSJS, the C Front, the Buraku liberation committees of the Fukuoka Municipal Workers Union and the Fukuoka Prefectural Workers Union, the Kyushu University Struggle Committee, and others. The BLL contingent included a wide range of people, from old-timers to scholarship students.

Shortly after 5:00 we moved off to the square in front of Citizens Hall, and held a brief rally where we reaffirmed our determination to stop the film showing. The CPers who

had already come to the hall were startled to see dozens of protesters, and they hurriedly lined up about ten of their people in front of the entrance. But there was no stopping our militant fighters. When comrades of the youth section of the BLL shouted out "Let's make damn sure that bigotted film isn't shown!", they were answered by a chorus of "Right on!"

We go into action. Step by step, in a scam formation⁴⁾ eight abreast, we close in on the CP-Zenkairon defense line. Our opponents, a bunch of ex-gebamin (thug squads organized on campus by the CP's youth group Minsei) types, link arms and close ranks. A comrade yells out, "Hell, there's just one line of them. Let's kick their asses!" Our contingent shouts in unison, "Down with the CP, stop the film showing!"

We bust through the defense line with no trouble at all, and run up the stairs toward the lobby. As soon as the defense line outside the door is broken, the CP sends another 20 or so activists down to block us from reaching the top of the stairs. We expected lots more; this isn't near the kind of defense they need to pull off such a provocative, bigotted film showing. We shove them aside in no time.

But it's still too early to celebrate. We haven't prevented the film showing yet, we just won the first battle. Immediately we sit down in a tight packed formation at the top of the stairs in order to block off the auditorium.

Downstairs, the CPers can't seem to get their shit together. Now and then some of them start shouting at members of the BLL. Some people, not realizing what's going on, come up the stairs expecting to see the film; after a

little persuasion from us, they go grumbling back down. Outside, older members of the BLL in their yellow vests distribute leaflets to the people who have gathered to see the film, denouncing the bigotted film and calling on people not to go see it.

A little after 6:00, the manager of the hall comes up the stairs all arrogant. Immediately we start denouncing him and the city authorities for having let the place be rented by groups hostile to the Buraku movement, something they've never done in the past. But the manager shows not the slightest sign of repentance for having aided and abetted the CP. After a heated debate he shamelessly snaps "I order you to get out of here!", turns and goes back down the stairs.

It was apparently at this point that the cops were officially asked to intervene. Police cars and paddy wagons drive up. One vehicle pulls up right in front of the entrance, and a warning is issued in the name of the Chief of Police for all those inside the hall to come out. "Bullshit!" comes our reply. Our militant squad becomes more determined than ever as the tension mounts.

It sounds like the cops have started moving in. We remain seated, and continue chanting slogans. "Condemn the showing of the bigotted film!" "Down with the bigotry and hostility of the CP-Zenkairon!" "Down with the authorities who gave permission to use the hall!" "Shame on them for calling in the cops!"

Soon we hear agitated voices downstairs. Former CP Diet member Hiroshi Isayama roars at the cops, "Throw

them out at once!" The first part of our contingent, sitting farther down the stairs, struggles tenaciously against the riot cops. The cops attack in force, four or five on each of us, beating, kicking, stomping.

Each of us is grabbed by the hands and feet and carried down the stairs by four cops, then thrown outside the front door of the hall. Once outside, we strike up a chorus of slogans, shouting our condemnation of the repression and violence of the cops. The last of our contingent -- by now over seventy people -- is finally expelled after a 30-minute struggle.

The sight of those CPers, who stood clapping their hands and laughing as they watched this spectacle, is something we'll never forget. They finally scurried into the hall, protected by a thick cordon of cops, shortly after 8:00. The BLL council held another impromptu rally on the spot to denounce the showing of the bigotted film.

This marked the first time that city officials have given permission for the hall to be used by the CP's Zen-kai ren. The CP's ongoing campaign against government funding of BLL-administered programs has scored some partial successes recently, and now they're lining right up with the city administration, pushing the government's fake integration line. We of the YSJS, along with the Fukuoka BLL council, are determined to smash the hostility of the CP, smash the Fukuda government's integration policy, and carry on the fight to free Kazuo Ishikawa.⁵⁾

Notes

1) Youth/Student Joint Struggle (Seigaku Kyoto), the name given to a series of local committees formed by the JOY starting in 1977 to mobilize participants for "militant contingents" in demonstrations against Narita Airport.

2) Buraku Liberation League (Buraku Kaiho Domei), the main organization of the Buraku people, an oppressed minority in Japan. For details see Intercontinental Press, December 6, 1978, p.1754.

3) A narrow "anti-discrimination" group set up by the CP, counterposed to the BLL. It has never had very much support in Buraku communities, and has depended entirely on the CP to sustain its activities.

4) A very compact formation in which marchers link arms and form a very tight block several rows deep, with everyone pushing in the same direction.

5) Ishikawa is a frame-up victim from a Buraku community, whose defense case has been a major campaign of the BLL.

Appendix 8

[The following letter appeared in the "From our Readers" column in the May 8, 1978 issue of Sekai Kakumei.]

RUN CANDIDATES IN THE ELECTION

A general election will be held by the end of this year, if not earlier. We definitely ought to intervene in that election by running our own candidates.

Depending on further developments in the Sanrizuka struggle,¹⁾ the fight we have been waging there may lead to a situation in which the entire Fukuda cabinet will resign and the Diet will be dissolved. In such a situation, it would be completely irresponsible for us not to run our own candidates in the election. It would mean in effect that we fall back into the position of being a left alternative to the SP and CP only on the level of tactics. For us, the key thing must be to establish an independent political current counterposed to the reformists.

Of course, calling for the formation of a political current independent of the reformists in no way implies that we stop trying to force the SP and CP into a united front. We will continue to campaign for an SP-CP united front.

But we absolutely must make a showing in the general election. Our intervention in the election, putting up candidates and running a campaign, will teach us how to carry out many new tasks. In the past period we have viewed the Sanrizuka struggle as the main axis of the class struggle in Japan, and we have turned all our efforts in that di-

rection. Recent issues of Sekai Kakumei have read like "Sanrizuka Diary." Of course it was this sort of concentrated effort that enabled us to win our victory on March 26.²⁾ But it seems to me that the new horizons opened up by that victory call on us once again to respond not only to the exigencies of the Sanrizuka struggle, but to a whole range of political tasks.

Many of the young comrades who have joined our movement in the course of the struggles at Sanrizuka have unquestionably displayed a great spirit of militancy and self-sacrifice. What they need now is to become more politically sophisticated. That political sophistication will be essential to running an election campaign.

Finally, I would like to add one small suggestion: that we change the name of our newspaper. I think the name "World Revolution" is unsuitable for the paper of our movement today. In the past, when the activity of our party was still limited to polemicizing about our program within a very narrow milieu, "World Revolution" was no doubt a clear and effective name to use. But today, as we face the task of winning over broad layers of working people, that name is no good.

I propose the name Akatsuki no Kane.³⁾ I think it has a nice ring, suggesting hope for the future.

(signed) Koichi Hanabusa

Chiba Jail (indicted in connection
with the events at Sanrizuka)

1) The struggle against construction of the New Tokyo International Airport on land confiscated from the farmers of Sanrizuka, a village which has now become part of the city of Narita in Chiba Prefecture.

2) A group of six demonstrators occupied and partially destroyed the control tower during the demonstration against the airport on March 26, 1978.

3) Literally, "the bell at daybreak." This is a metaphor often used to refer to the announcement of good news.

Appendix 9

[The following letter appeared in the "From our Readers" column in Sekai Kakumei No.531, July 10, 1978.]

WHOEVER POISONED THE RESERVOIR HAS NOTHING
TO DO WITH THE PEOPLE'S JUST STRUGGLE!

For me here in jail, the incident in which agricultural pesticides were dumped into the Hokusō drinking water reservoir was an extremely disheartening event.

Of course in the final analysis, responsibility for the incident must be laid at the feet of the Fukuda government and the Airport Public Corporation which have opened Narita Airport by force and violence.

And for people living near the airport, even the shrill chorus of the bourgeois media, which is screaming all about "indiscriminate murder plotted by extremists," is probably drowned out by the roar of the aircraft noise that comes down "indiscriminately" on their homes.

Nevertheless, I betterly condemn whoever put the poison in the reservoir.

Don't misunderstand me. I fully approve of any hit-and-run or "guerrilla" action that strikes a blow at the functioning of Narita Airport -- but only so long as that guerrilla attack is linked to the main battle, the fight to draw masses of people into the struggle against the airport, to form stronger armed action squads, to isolate our enemies and expose their fraudulent demagogy, in order to force them to close down the airport once and for all.

But who the hell do you think drinks the water from that reservoir? Are those people the enemy? Are they people who will inevitably go over to the enemy side?

No! They are the very people we have to win over to our side!

And does anybody think that people can be broken away from supporting the government through threats, or by creating the kind of panic that occurred when the poison was discovered?

Whether this incident was some kind of provocation staged by the government, or even if it actually was the act of some mistaken supporters of the Sanrizuka struggle, I think we need to launch a systematic campaign against "terrorism" in order to make it clear that these sorts of actions have absolutely nothing to do with [the people's just struggle]*.

Lenin, in "What is to Be Done," once pointed out that in essence, both reformists and terrorists have the same problem -- "lack of faith in the class."

Our efforts to form a political current independent of the reformists must at the same time include a struggle against terrorism, which is just another form of opportunism.

But except for the article on "The bankruptcy of the Red Brigades" [reporting the events in Italy], there have not been any articles in Sekai Kakumei taking up this problem.

At the present time, when the bourgeoisie is trying to slander the Sanrizuka struggle as "terrorist," shouldn't we be carrying out a systematic campaign on the theoretical level, criticizing terrorism and firmly insisting on the need for [the masses to rise up]*, instead of just organizing actions at the airport site?

I think such a campaign would also be an effective criticism of the sects that engage in violence within the

movement. After all, the political ideology of those groups is nothing but a cross between terrorism and bureaucratic suppression of opposing views.

(signed) Kiichi Sasaki

worker

Chiba Jail

(indicted in connection with
the events at Sanrizuka)

*(Translator's Note) These brackets appeared in the letter as it was printed in Sekai Kakumei.

Appendix 10

[The following article appeared in the
"Discussion" column of Sekai Kakumei
No.542, September 25, 1978.]

FOR A DIALECTICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE MASS MOVEMENT

--A criticism of the article

"Expose the Emergency Powers Proposal (2)"

by Itaru Muraoka

The issue of granting the Self Defense Forces special lawmaking powers in the event of a "national emergency" has suddenly attracted a lot of attention. The Socialist and Communist parties are starting to organize a movement against Fukuda's proposal. The Komei Party as well has now altered its original stance and come out in opposition. In view of all this, Fukuda is starting to become more discreet in the way he pushes this particular attack on democratic rights.

Fukuda's partial retreat reveals once again the fragility of the "offensive" he has recently launched, proposing a whole series of blatantly reactionary measures. This is not to say, however, that we should disregard or view lightly the way in which ruling class politicians have been stepping up their reactionary statements and actions (while keeping an eye on how the opposition forces respond). In fact, it is an urgent task for us to view the fight against emergency powers as a major struggle and to go on a campaign around this issue.

In last week's Sekai Kakumei, the second article in the series "Expose the Emergency Powers Proposal" concluded with the following statements.

Without a struggle against the reactionary line of the Chinese bureaucracy it will be impossible to build a campaign against the authoritarian, anti-people policies of the Fukuda government, symbolized by the proposal to establish emergency legislative powers....

The Socialist Party, Sohyo and the Communist Party have called for a "people's movement on the same scale as the struggles over the Security Treaty, the Japan-South Korea treaty and the U.S. occupation of Okinawa." But the content of this proposed movement would be defense of the Constitution, with its guarantees of civilian control over the Self Defense Forces. Consequently, it would be nothing but a way of disarming the working people, seeping under the rug the lessons of the "Chilean road to socialism"....

Now, these statements are all quite correct, and even seem obvious to conscious members of the JRCL. But we should never confuse what's obvious to us with what's obvious to the masses (I don't think I need to quote from Lenin to convince comrades of this). I would guess that the author of the statements quoted above probably realized that these things are not obvious to the masses, even as he was writing them.

In order to influence and develop the masses' consciousness, it is not enough just to write things down in terms that reflect the level of understanding of vanguard layers. Abbreviated reports given in internal meetings serve an entirely different purpose from articles in our newspaper, whose task is to educate the masses. In that sense, I think that the sentences quoted above represent a mistake, an attempt to impose the party's position and our way of thinking on the reader in an "ultimatistic" way.