

# AFRICA IN STRUGGLE

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**Solidarity with the  
Southern African  
Revolution**

**revolutionary  
marxist journal  
- black africa**



# AFRICA IN STRUGGLE

The Africa in Struggle journals are produced by Revolutionary Marxist militants in order to create a debate on the African revolution.

Revolutionary militants struggle for the creation of Leninist parties necessary for the victory of socialism in Black Africa.

Revolutionary Marxists proclaim their adherence to the programme of the Fourth International.



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Dr Nkrumah.

## FROM PAN-AFRICANISM



## TO INTERNATIONALISM

The debate about revolution by stages and socialist revolution cannot remain abstract. African militants must be able to foresee what the dynamics of the class struggle will be and how a victorious revolutionary crisis will unfold.

Perplexed and short of arguments, many comrades who support the theory of revolution by stages fall back on defensive arguments: how to conceive the victory of socialism? To build a workers' state in Senegal or in Dahomey? How to face up to neo-colonial Africa and imperialism?

The peasant majority, the weakness of the proletariat, the demographic weakness, the insufficient development of productive forces. . . all this would seem to inhibit anti-capitalist efforts.

We should point out first of all that reformist experiences, as was the case of the Nkrumah regime (where the laws of the market and the capitalist mode of production were not questioned), have not prevented an imperialist reaction. To believe that one can progress by small leaps because this doesn't upset the major western powers is to believe that imperialists are idiots, which is always a fatal mistake.

In the imperialist age, the question of the nature of revolution no longer depends on given national idiosyncracies. These are themselves the result of the international domination of capital. Therefore our strategic anti-capitalist answer emerges directly from the leninist analysis of imperialism. But, for all this, do we believe in the possibility of a victorious proletarian revolution in one African country, in the middle of neo-colonial reaction? No!

The internationalist dynamic of the permanent revolution in black Africa is to be found on its own doorstep! The main conclusion of the revolutionary marxist analysis is the existing reality of the socialist revolution. But this is not the only conclusion. In black Africa, it is a question of destroying the neo-colonial state or of breaking the colonial domination in so far as it is the intermediary for capitalist and imperialist domination. However, nothing on the contrary compels us to build workers' states on the ruins of national states. It is even obvious that the necessary development of productive forces, resistance to international counter-revolution, demographic needs, the necessary extension of energy sources etc. . . IMPOSE first a regional, then a continental dimension for the building of socialism.

This means that:

- At first, one is unlikely to see the development within one country of a widely implanted avant-garde organisation able to raise the question of power, without at the same time seeing a movement - however weak - developing in neighbouring countries with similar objective and subjective situations.

- In addition the revolutionary crisis of one country, whether successful or not, cannot help but produce a similar effect, even if less intensive, in neighbouring countries.

- The victory of the working class and of its avant-garde party, that is to say the destruction of the bourgeois state and the building of a workers' state representing the interests of the toiling masses and the poor peasants, cannot take place without inducing an unprecedented mobilisation throughout the whole region, if not the whole continent.

- In such a situation the arbitrary frontiers imposed by imperialism will appear to all, including the masses, as an outdated yoke to be broken.

The attitude of the young worker state is therefore to support and help the revolutionary developments which its appearance has prompted, not only because this is an internationalist duty but also because its own existence and its ability to solve the political and economic questions of the transitional period depend on the existence or otherwise of a regional entity allowing true democratic planning, a real development of productive forces and sufficient military strength to resist counter-revolution. The coming to power of a workers' and peasants' government must incite the revolutionary leadership to internationalise the revolution, both spontaneously and voluntarily, and to join up with the avant-garde groups of the region.

This is why, from its first steps, the African revolutionary marxist avant-garde incorporates certain perspectives in both practice and strategy:

- by advancing internationalist slogans for unity of the African workers' struggle,
- by fighting all the pan-African, multiclass and ethnocentric illusions propagated by petty bourgeois nationalism which pretends to be more unitary than Nyerere, who in turn claims to be more unitary than Gowon, who in turn etc.,
- by seeking debate, unity of action and solidarity with all organisations fighting for the socialist revolution,
- by giving itself the political and organisational means of developing into a political force on a continental scale.

That is to say to articulate the debating structures for the joint formulation and the integrated development of all the revolutionary marxist groups in black Africa,

- by working for the development of this force in those countries where it does not exist,
- by working in close collaboration, on a regional scale:

- 1) for clearly elaborated necessities and 2) for common organisational needs,
- by actively participating in the building of the IVth International.

These are absolutely vital questions in order to analyse the soundness of a political line. For example today it is not enough to make an abstract appeal to socialism without specifying the internationalist implications at the programmatic and organisational level.



Finally, a mass insurrection which is not initially defeated has every chance of continuing as a region-wide mobilisation and opposition. The building of a revolutionary marxist avant-garde on the continental scale is also necessary in relation to the military task of fighting the imperialist counter-offensive.

UTOPIA? — NO!

First of all, it is necessary to make a precise analysis of each of the many associations and organisations which carve the African continent into a multitude of neo-colonial cartels and groups.

At least within the limits of this short article, one can start from the assumption that they are without exception all pro-imperialist structures. Within the last decades these regroupings have been reduced. Thus one can cite at random: the Communal African and Malgachian Organisation (CAMO); the Organisation for the Development of the Senegalese Valley (ODSV); the Economic Community of West Africa (ECWA); the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (CEUCA); the Economic Association of Oriental Africa, the Council of Agreement etc. . . not forgetting the Group of Tchad Lake Riverside States and the many bilateral commissions.

Within the format of imperialist plunder, each of these associations attempts to standardise its market. Both imperialism and the African bourgeoisies are perfectly aware that the structure of the existing rump states is not sufficient for even minimal industrialisation. Now, in a few years we have passed from a conception, in the imperialist brain-trusts, of the African countries being maintained only as suppliers of raw materials to a conception whereby a certain amount of local industrialisation is necessary and encouraged. It is also necessary to recognise the lack of those factors which would have allowed the implantation of industries in the African countries taken individually.

In February 1972 the Economic and Social Committee of the EEC found the Ivory market too small, being incapable of offering new perspectives to local industry. It proposed better regional cooperation for Togo and Dahomey, starting with an international exploitation of the Aveta cement works; and it deplored the narrowness of the Nigerian market. Pompidou officially declared himself in favour of these regional groupings.

Since then hardly a day goes by without some or other jumped-up "expert in the economics of the underdeveloped countries" justifying the regroupings. Naturally, no mention is made of the contradictory maintenance of the arbitrary frontiers, because the dual economic regrouping/micro-state is strictly necessary for imperialist domination. For their part the African bourgeoisie is too well aware of its weakness not to hang on to the present political geography of Africa, and not to remain at the head of those states which are both a source and an outlet for its process of accumulation.

One of the most explicit quotes on this matter comes from the secretary-general of the Organisation of African Unity, Eteki. In connection with CAMO's relations with the OAU, he said:

"To a certain extent the OAU does not exclude sub-regional organisations. They can constitute concentric circles of solidarity which will lead to general solidarity. The only thing the OAU wishes is that these organisations should not be the focus for political orientations which differ from that determined by the states within the OAU. CAMO appears to be leaving aside all political tendencies in favour of directing its efforts towards technical cooperation among its states. We think this is a good thing, and we can but encourage and watch with sympathy these technical and cooperative efforts between CAMO members, all of whom are active members of the OAU."

For its part, the crisis in CAMO demonstrates the necessity of switching from regroupings determined by ties with the old colonial powers to regroupings on a regional basis determined by larger interests (for example the EEC). The last CAMO conference suggested "turning to" economic matters!

So imperialism has known for a long time how to plan its strategy on both the regional and continental scale. In its own way the bourgeoisie is internationalist. But we know that African unity seen from this angle not only cannot solve the problem of underdevelopment, but can still less liberate the African masses from all domination.

Nkrumah had conceived the need to widen the market, to create a genuine African economy by means of industrial belts built in regional areas. But Nkrumah's fundamental error was to conceive African unity as a conglomeration of states, without taking into account their class nature. Under these conditions it was never possible to lay the cornerstone of African unity (in the Nkrumah sense).

Is our internationalist problematic still utopian? Could it be a trotskyist invention?

On the contrary, we give a class answer to a question which is chronic even among bourgeois circles. But we furnish an answer which is not only economical but also political, organisational and ideological, and which includes a resolution of the national and ethnic question.

Under these conditions, the odds are that the dynamics of class conflict will remodel the African geo-political map anew. We do not make paper decisions about the future workers' state in Senegal, Mauritania and Mali. Only the line of conduct starting from a revolutionary crisis in one of these countries will define, on its own, the limits of the struggle. We refuse all spontaneism in this matter, which means that the revolutionary avant-garde must analyse and theorise those dynamics. This is particularly acute in the case of Guinea, where the PAIGC believes it can build an independent economy within the national framework; or again in the case of Cabinda where imperialist appetites are already clashing.

Another important point is not to confuse Biafra and Eritrea: micro-nationalism orchestrated by imperialism, and genuine colonial domination.

Again it is important not to confuse revolutionary victory in one country with the real possibility of building socialism on a large scale. Here is to be found the basis of our internationalism within the perspective of a United Socialist States of Africa.



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# ZAMBIA, the heightening political crisis

Events in the past month have brought to new heights the political crisis now affecting Zambia. The UNIP (United National Independence Party) government is now recognisably threatened on both left and right. It is probably less popular than ever amongst the urban population which constitutes the only significant barometer of political thinking.

Foremost in articulating opposition to the regime were the students at UNZA (The University of Zambia in Lusaka) where a consistent campaign was conducted from the beginning of the new year against government foreign policy on Angola. Policy in that area has been determined by a number of considerations which were outlined at length in our article 'Zambia - Repercussions of the Angolan Civil War' (Inprecor No 43, 5th February 1976). Briefly these are:

1. The desire to reopen full trading relationships with the white south following the total failure to achieve any significant measure of import-substitution through attempted industrialisation programmes.
2. A fear of the dynamic involved in a victory for MPLA: an event which has already shown that it is likely to accelerate the process of opening full scale war by the oppressed population against the remaining strongholds of white racism. Such a development could rapidly open the way to a sustained anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist mobilisation throughout southern Africa.
3. Of late an actual dependence upon South Africa through the now well known measures of economic support provided by the Vorster regime to Zambia's ailing economy.

It was this open collaboration with the forces of imperialism and racism which above all fuelled the protests of Zambia's university students. This generation has been brought up on a diet consisting of constant evocations of the sacrifices the country has supposedly made to support its brothers and sisters struggling against the white regimes. Thus the increasingly obvious contradiction of these principles involved in Zambia's Angolan policy was certain to raise big doubts. When a relatively small group of militants began to explain the roots of this policy and to campaign for its reversal they met with a mass response which went far beyond their wildest hopes or expectations. This development was a crystal clear lesson in the intrinsic relevance of international issues to the awakening of the consciousness within the new-colonialist countries existing between the Zambian ruling group and imperialism. As such they have given a clearer illumination than could a thousand articles for the more conscious sections of the population of the real class nature of the regime.

Serious organisation in solidarity with MPLA began at the university as soon as the new term opened on 5 January. The campaign was initiated largely by supporters of the 'Frantz Fanon Society', a socialist discussion group which has acted as a focus for the regroupment of radicals on the campus. This body is the only overtly political organisation at UNZA, where attempts to establish a branch of UNIP have been frustrated for many years by opposition from students expressed through their union.

Their agitation met with an immediate response from the mass of students, culminating in a one day strike called on 15 January whose objective was to demand that the government immediately reverse its stand on the Angolan civil war and give full support to MPLA. On that occasion the campus was occupied by striking students and mass meetings were held throughout the day to discuss the reasons behind the action. Every effort was made by the authorities to suppress any news of this event. While it was headlined on Luanda radio it was ignored by the Zambian press, radio and TV. Throughout the day the campus was surrounded by armed police, but no attempt was made to enter the premises.

All traffic was diverted on the Great East Road which passes the front entrance of the university in order to avoid passing travellers observing the big posters which had been erected proclaiming solidarity with MPLA.

Indications of the government's concern with the situation at UNZA only became publicly manifest on Sunday 25 January when demonstrations were staged in Lusaka and copperbelt centre. Ndola, in support of official policy on Angola. At the latter the featured speaker, Central Committee member, Frank Chitambala, indirectly revealed the real reasons behind the event when he mentioned 'misguided foreign lecturers' at UNZA who had supposedly been 'fomenting trouble amongst students' by whipping up support for a line opposed to government's foreign policy.

In Lusaka news of the demonstration plans came late to UNZA activists. They were therefore able to engage in preliminary leafletting aimed at dissuading potential participants only at Evelyn Hone College, a further education establishment. Their efforts led to not a single student from that institution participating in the demonstration. But militants were still able to somewhat disrupt the plans of UNIP. Arriving at the demonstration assembly point before the organisers, they distributed large numbers of leaflets explaining the reasons for giving support to MPLA. They were read and digested by the 800 or so Lusaka secondary school students who had beenajoined into attendance in order to march to State House (the presidential residence) to display their solidarity with the government's stand. Their efforts became clear during the course of Kaunda's speech. Utilising his well known gimmick of crowd involvement he on several occasions bellowed the question: 'Who do we support?' In response to this instead of the hoped for answer of 'A government of national unity', came a clear chant of 'MPLA!'

After these opening salvos events moved rapidly towards confrontation. On the evening of 28 January Kaunda came onto radio and TV with a speech announcing the institution of a full 'state of emergency' throughout the country. Since Zambia had been under a 'partial' state of emergency since Rhodesian UDI in November 1965 it was difficult immediately to assess what were the precise legal changes introduced now. But great emphasis was laid on the suspension of all guarantees under Article Three of the constitution which is concerned with elementary democratic and civil rights. Its revocation amounted to a total removal of any basic freedoms of speech, assembly etc. and to arming the police force to enter any premises without warrant.

Saturday 31 January saw the first arrest under the new powers when Lionel Cliffe, a British lecturer at UNZA was detained for 28 days. No reasons were given, but his wife stated that police had removed literature on Angola from their house on the campus. Ironically Cliffe was well known as an activist in the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique Angola and Guine in Britain between 1971 and 1974. Prior to this he had worked for ten years at the Tanzanian university of Dar es Salaam where he had acted for a long period in an advisory capacity to the government. Zambia's position on Angola was demonstrated very starkly by the detention of an individual whose record showed Cliffe's detention threw the university into a state of ferment which culminated in a general strike on 5 February. On this occasion student anger was directed particularly at two members of staff accused of collaboration with the government attempts at repression. As Dean of the Arts and Social Science Faculty, Ndem, a Nigerian, had refused to call a meeting of staff to discuss Cliffe's jailing. Mutukwa, a Zambian colleague of Cliffe's in the Political Science Department, was accused of being a party to the government's attempts to implicate the former in the organisation of pro-MPLA actions on the campus. The strike demanded the immediate dismissal of these two men.

\* Government response was rapid. On Saturday 7 February armed police surrounded the campus. The excuse was an incident



in which a student who was well known to be amongst the numerous police agents at work in the area pulled a gun on a group of colleagues who had begun to taunt him in the refectory. A near riot situation had developed and the police stooge appears to have been lucky to have escaped from the premises without injury.

A full blockade was now effected so that those inside could receive no food and the half of the campus inhabitants who had gone to the centre of Lusaka for the day were prevented from returning to their lodging and forced to sleep rough. Simultaneously three more members of staff were arrested.

1. A Dutchman, Siemensma, who was reported to have been sending (presumably accurate and therefore embarrassing to the government) reports to the media in Holland on the situation at UNZA.

2. An Italian lecturer in the Department of Sociology, D. Longhi, who was stated to have been 'instrumental in attempting to secure the release of Cliffe'.

3. Perhaps most embarrassingly for the government, a stateless South

African refugee, Robert Molteno, who had been on the staff for eight years. In that time he is known to have acted as a government advisor for several periods. He is also known to the entire first year secondary school population as the author of a prescribed textbook entitled *The Zambian Community and Its Government* which is compulsory study for the newly introduced course in Civics. The latter has the object of inculcating an admiration for the one party state and its institution in the minds of young Zambians and it must be said that Molteno's book does as good a job as possible on the difficult task of making the former appear 'humanist' and democratic. But on this occasion his crime appears to have been to take government spokespersons at their word and to have been centrally involved in organising the production of a letter which was signed by 75 members of staff protesting Cliffe's detention as a blow against the principles of academic freedom and calling for his immediate reinstatement 'with honour'.

## Africa in struggle

### supplement no.1

## ZAMBIA

### Humanist rhetoric — capitalist reality

### order now!

Clearly the decision to finally close the university was heavily influenced by the fact that there now appeared to be assembling a solid bloc of staff and students opposed to the government's repressive policies. On the night of 7th police moved onto the campus and escalated their brutality in a clear attempt to provoke a confrontation which could enable closure to be blamed on the students. These tactics largely failed. But on Monday 9 January Education Minister, Mulikita came onto the radio to announce indefinite closure of UNZA which he said was being effected in order to avoid the 'inevitable bloodshed and damage to property' which would ensue were it to remain open. Students were issued with 10 Kwacha each for travel expenses, bundled into buses under police and army supervision and dumped at Lusaka's main bus station to await transport to their homes. 21 students were added to the 4 lecturers in detention. They included the entire executive of the students union and a number of known activists in the organisation of the events of the previous week. This move clearly made it absolutely impossible to consider keeping the university open for fear of the protests which would follow.

Thus was ended four weeks of intensive political ferment at the university in the course of which hundreds of students had been radicalised and had come to appreciate the real nature of their 'humanist' government's policies in at least one crucial area. Government spokespersons prided themselves on having given a salutary lesson to upstart students and above all to those lecturers who had 'infiltrated' the institution as 'agents of superpowers'. But the Zambian public was clearly less impressed. The following Sunday 15 February the government controlled newspaper the *Sunday Times* printed one of its supplements entitled 'the people talking' which involve comments on a topical current event by 20 or 30

'members of the public'. Not one person could be produced to express outright support for the closure of UNZA in the special devoted to this issue. The general level of comment was best summarised by the individual who described the fact that the government could spend so much energy on dealing with a couple of thousand student dissidents while displaying remarkably little fervour in tackling the economic problems affecting the average member of the public. An early impression would suggest that, far from having achieved its objective of alienating student activists from the mass of the population, the government may have acted in a way which has contributed to cutting down barriers between the two groups. It is not yet known when the university will reopen and no word has yet appeared on the fate of the detainees. But it appears likely that when the student population does return to the campus it will not have undergone any significant demoralisation or reduction in its capacity for anti-government mobilisation.

Central to continued morale will be the fact the MPLA has itself become victorious, and that, despite attempts to cover this up in various complex formulae, Zambia will be forced to grant de facto if not de jure recognition to the new government — a move dictated above all by the desire to ensure the rapid re-opening of the Benguela railway. In this new situation it is going to be actually embarrassing to say the least to continue to hold 25 persons in detention for any lengthy time for advocating a course of action now forced by events on a reluctant administration.

Thus when students do return to UNZA it is certain that they will be collectively conscious that the course for which they fought has been victorious. Such a situation will place the struggle for a further development of political consciousness on extremely favourable terrain.

But opposition at the University to the government's stand on Angola was not the only threat facing the government in this period. On the copperbelt a massive response was evoked by the government's plans to integrate mine housing with that of the local authorities. Hitherto mineworkers have been accommodated in mine houses frequently located in compounds entirely separate from those of the rest of the population. In these they have enjoyed rents on average well below those of local authority tenants. Some services such as water have been supplied free and, due to the more efficient nature of management, essential matters such as the maintenance of property have been more promptly dealt with. Thus the announcement that local authorities would now take over management of all mine houses was greeted with dismay. In Chingola, Kitwe and Luanshya the official commission of inquiry detailed to investigate the issue was greeted by rowdy meetings organised by local branches of MUZ (Mineworkers' Union of Zambia). At Rokana mine in Kitwe on 21 January it was prevented from carrying out any public hearings by a siege of their meeting place by thousands of miners.

Amongst those quick to capitalise on the situation were the remnants of the UPP (United Progressive Party), a 1971 break-away from UNIP led by ex-Vice President Simon Kapwepwe, which was banned in 1972 immediately prior to the introduction of the one party state. But trading on their historic base of support on the copperbelt (Mufulira was the only place in which they managed to win a parliamentary election during their brief existence) ex UPP activists who have always maintained informal links began to organise to rebuild their support. They undoubtedly played an important role in certain of the mobilisations against the commission. This party is of course in no sense a progressive 'opposition to UNIP'. In fact one of its main planks in the early nineteen seventies was for the reopening of full economic relations with the white south. The leadership furthermore was always composed overwhelmingly of Bemba, the tribal grouping dominant on the copperbelt, who had seen themselves excluded from political office by Kaunda's constant emphasis on maintaining a balance in leading positions. Thus its support has often tended to be based on crude tribalism.

The active re-emergence of this tendency was accompanied by a renewed polarisation inside Zambia's one party parliament. Here leading spokesperson for the right is undoubtedly Arthur Wina, ex-Minister of Finance and MP for Livingstone who is now a leading businessman and chairman of the ZNCCI (Zambian National Council for Commerce and Industry). In parliament on 21 January Wina launched a full scale attack on the continued closure of the Rhodesian border to Zambian traffic by road or rail, charging that its reopening despite any political considerations, was an economic necessity for the country. He was immediately supported by large numbers of Members of Parliament, some of whom used the opportunity to launch attacks on Zimbabwean freedom fighters who were accused of having failed to use the correct tactics in unifying and thus miraculously liberating themselves. Zambia, it was said, was exhausted with supporting these ungrateful traitors to Africa. Despite the speaker of Parliament's attempts to put down the



shutters on this debate by declaring that the matter had been conclusively dealt with in Kaunda's refusal (24 January) to consider the question, Wina popped up again on February 4. His new speech speech broadened out into what could reasonably characterised as the beginnings of a manifesto for the right. Once again he demanded the border be re-opened to 'save a collapsing economy'. He went on to attack the easy target of the government's totally ineffectual attempts to promote cooperative farming in Zambia.

'We should give support to commercial farmers before we use our money on experiments in collectivised farming etc. It is not groups of people who are going to feed the nation but individuals'. He went on to draw unfavourable comparisons with the situation in Malawi which, he claimed, was able to feed itself and even increase agricultural exports because of its unashamed faith in private enterprise farming.

On the same lines Malambo MP, Whiteson Banda, declared 5 February that 'development programmes will never succeed without the help of foreign investment. The Party and Government's shift towards socialism is scaring away would be investors and, if not relaxed, will lead to the collapse of the economy'.

Thus the past few weeks have seen the clear re-emergence of a right wing tendency which is impatient to despatch with the clap trap of Kaunda's 'humanism' and verbal commitments to socialism (however far away are the actions of the government from this goal) in favour of an explicit orientation towards the development of a clearly private enterprise economy.

Further potential embarrassment to the government were economic measures taken at the end of January. On 30 January Minister of Finance, Mwanashiku, presented his budget which increased prices of petrol, beer, tobacco and other 'luxuries'. But on Sunday 1 February came an announcement of penal increases in the price of maize meal, the staple food of Zambia's population. A 50Kg bag of breakfast meal was increased from K4.10 to K9. Roller meal was upped from K3.20 to K3.96. In an attempt to justify the former Kaunda was actually quoted as saying that breakfast meal was a luxury food, eaten only by the 'apamwambas' (top people). In fact, as was pointed out by numerous members of the public asked for comment by the press, roller meal was so crudely manufactured as to be virtually uneatable and to involve a large amount of waste. Hence breakfast meal had been generally used by larger and larger sections of the population to whom the doubling of its price was a body blow for their living standards. Unfortunately statistics are not yet available on the rate of inflation over the immediate past period. But in the first six months of 1975 the low income index increased at an annual rate of 14 per cent while wage increases are legally limited to 5 per cent per annum. The latest increase on Zambia's staple food will without doubt accelerate the rate considerably....and serve only to fuel the flames of discontent already quite apparent. Thus the immediate perspective for the Zambian government is one of difficulties on every front. Despite its present disclaimers it remains extremely likely it will try to gain temporary respite through the further development of trading and financial links with the white south, a reopening of the Rhodesian border providing it with its quickest, potential route to the sea, and (after a decent interval) recognition of MPLA in Angola to ensure use of the Benguela railway.

But these measures will not resolve the problems arising from the gross imbalance of its 'mono mineral' economy and the conjunctural effects of world wide recession of the imperialist economies.

The crucial task in the immediate future will be to convince the radicalised student population of the need to begin work directed towards the working class whose living standards are under attack. It is certain that at least one of the considerations involved in the government decision to close the university was the fact that radical elements involved in the struggle to win support for the MPLA were already beginning to pose the need to take a clear public stance and even attempt to initiate actions on the question of the price increases described above. That leap in consciousness which has taken place on Angola must now be used to develop a more rounded understanding of the precise nature of Zambia's neo-colonialist regime.

Such a task is all the more urgent because the thoroughly bourgeois politics of individuals like Wina and Kapwepwe have a superficial attraction which can lead to their winning in the immediate period big influence amongst workers. While in the long term their projects are even less likely to secure economic development and a rise in prosperity than are those of the UNIP government, they possess a superficial attraction because of their promise to arrest the decline in living standards.

It seems likely therefore that we are moving into a period in which the credibility of the UNIP leadership will dwindle still further in the face of a growing threat from both left and right. It is of decisive importance that the left whose potential has been

revealed by events at UNZA over the past month now begins to develop the capability to intervene on much wider fronts.

John Blair, 20 February 1976.



# PORTUGAL SPAIN

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# VIOLENCE AND ZIMBABWE

A marxist type revolution, contend petty bourgeois African Socialists and social democrats, involves an unnecessary bloody clash between two opposing forces — it means war and violence. As Bourguibi of Tunisia once put it "Even though I choose socialism, I am opposed to class struggle. I do not believe in the necessity of struggle among men. Once it takes root, a war of extermination is inevitable, as one of the two opposed classes must disappear. . . Humanity's fate lies in the survival of the motivation for collaboration among men." The question must be posed; *Does revolutionary marxism mean an inevitability of violence and civil war?*

In the 1840's and 1850's Marx and Engels were quite explicit on the point that capitalism would have to be overthrown forcibly — that in the last resort the struggle between classes amounts to the brutal clash between people. This unequivocal insistence on the necessity of violence was influenced by the pattern of the French Revolution and the course of the failed revolution of 1848. Later, in the 1860's and 1870's, Marx and Engels altered their opinion, pointing out that different paths to the transformation of the social relations of production are possible. The actual nature of the revolution, e.g., whether violent or non-violent, will depend upon the conditions prevalent in individual countries. Such conditions as the nature of the state (fascist — social democrat), the composition of the bourgeoisie and its relation to the state, the political status of the territory i.e. colonial, neo-colonial or imperial.

Although both Marx and Lenin held the position that under certain realizable conditions a peaceful revolution is possible, we must view this proposition in relative terms, i.e., in relation to civil war. In other words, a completely peaceful revolution is unlikely, not because the revolutionary forces are violence prone but because there will always be sections of the bourgeoisie who will resist the revolution to the end. The basic question in the revolutionary process is who is to rule the country, i.e., whether the bourgeoisie or the workers. This vital question cannot be decided in some cordial amiable fashion. The bourgeoisie will not commit suicide as a consequence of 'morally correct' arguments, nor by reference to some constitution or over a conference table. The stakes involved are too high — it is the life or death of the bourgeoisie and bourgeois state. Even in a situation where the dictatorship of the proletariat was established through the framework of social democracy this would not avert a clash between sections of the bourgeoisie and the workers' forces. "As long as class society, founded on the most deep-rooted antagonisms, continues to exist, repression remains a necessary means of breaking the will of the opposing side." (Trotsky)

But this is not to say that a socialist revolution of necessity must cumulate in civil war. The important point here is that the movement towards socialism involves a struggle which has as its logical aim the displacement of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois state, and that in this struggle violence is inevitable, but the extent and nature of the violence will depend upon the internal and external circumstances of each country. The determining factor in the last analysis is the degree to which the bourgeoisie and other reactionary forces are both willing and able to resist the overthrow of capitalism. To quote Trotsky, "The problem of revolution, as of war, consists in breaking the will of the foe, forcing him to capitulate and accept the conditions of the conqueror. The will, of course, is a fact of the physical world, but in contradistinction of a meeting, a dispute or a congress, the revolution carries out its object by means of the employment of material resources — though to a less degree than war. . . The degree of ferocity of the struggle depends on a series of internal and international circumstances." (3)

## Armed struggle in Africa

It would at this point be ridiculous for us to make any generalised statement concerning the necessary path of revolution in Africa, except of course, those points already mentioned above. To present well worded prescriptions on the means and strategy of revolution in Africa would be presumptuous — it is for African revolutionaries in each country, through practice based on revolutionary marxist principles and thorough knowledge of the particular conditions of their country, to decide on how best the struggle must be carried out. Having said this, we can, based on the objective conditions, both internal and external, plus the experience of other liberation struggles, say unequivocally that the struggle for liberation in Southern Africa can only be completely successful if waged with arms. Here we are dealing with deeply racist bourgeois fascist states, very closely tied to both the indigenous and international bourgeoisies, that are totally incapable of committing suicide.

The experience of the ex-Portuguese colonies confirms the futility of peaceful struggle in situations where the oppressor has no intention of changing the social order, not even by employing a neo-colonial solution. All the nationalist groups of the ex-Portuguese colonies attempted, at one time or another, to attain a peaceful solution to the colonial question. For instance, in the early stages of their struggle, both the UPA and the MPLA relied exclusively on peaceful methods. They publicised the situation in Portuguese territories, called upon Portugal to negotiate for reforms in Angola — Salazar refused to recognise these groups, let alone negotiate with them. On 3rd Feb 1961 the MPLA staged a peaceful demonstration march to Luanda prison to demand the release of thousands of political prisoners arrested by the PIDE (the Portuguese secret police). The Portuguese seized upon this as an opportunity to massacre some three thousand Africans. It was as the result of such experiences that the nationalist groups came to the conclusion that liberation will only come through the 'barrel of a gun'. The objective conditions, both internal and external, dictated the means, — and not some subjective desire for adventure.

The experiences of the Portuguese ex-colonies are by no means unique. Andreas Shipanga in a brief history of SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation) recounted; — "In 1961 we held a very important National Congress in Windhoek where we examined our progress since 1958, in particular the result of our diplomatic efforts at the United Nations. Representatives of our people had gone to New York to petition the UN and we continued clinging to the illusion that the United States could really do something to get South Africa out of Namibia. But now we look back on that day in December when our people were shot down in cold blood and saw what the UN did with the information and petitions it got from SWAPO . . . the action it took. We came to full agreement: it was nothing but fine-sounding resolutions piling up in the UN archives. This recognition led us to the decision at the Congress of 1961 to prepare for eventual armed struggle in Namibia." Here again, the internal and external circumstances in which the Namibian struggle finds itself dictates an all-out armed struggle for the liberation of that country.

## Zimbabwe

Currently Nkomo is in the process of negotiating a settlement with the Smith regime in the name of the Zimbabwean people. Needless to say the present talks on the part of Nkomo and his cronies are an attempt by the African petty bourgeoisie to attain within the racist capitalist Rhodesia concessions in return for pacifying the Zimbabwean people. Nkomo has already been earmarked for the position of Prime Minister in a neo-colonial solution to the present problem confronting both the Rhodesian and international bourgeoisies. We need not here dwell on what is the



obvious reactionary role of Nkomo and his ANC supporters. To talk of negotiation with an adamant and racist regime as that of Rhodesia, especially in a situation where imperialism has already suffered a major defeat, is counter-revolutionary.

The whole scenario of settlement talks is designed for, at the most, a neo-colonial solution — as an instrument for transferring the economic and political power of Rhodesia to the Zimbabwean people it is irrelevant. The process of negotiation pre-supposes the possibility of reconciling the interests of the opposing forces. The position and interests of the Zimbabwean people are diametrically opposed to those of both the Rhodesian state and bourgeoisie, and as such cannot be reconciled without the Zimbabwean masses remaining dispossessed of their economy. Any settlement reached between the aspiring African petty bourgeoisie and either the Smith regime or the Rhodesian bourgeoisie must be unacceptable — that is, unless one believes that the Rhodesian state and bourgeoisie are immediately prepared to commit class suicide.

The staging of the Nkomo/Smith talks has its functions both for the Smith regime and international capitalism. The talks provide Smith with time to build up his military defences against what he knows as the imminent all-out arms attack on the racist minority. By going through with the talks Smith hopes to gain some degree of credibility in the eyes of western imperialist nations, on whom



he must in the last analysis rely for the future existence of racist oppression in Zimbabwe. Although Smith, has up till now been adamant on the point of not conceding majority rule to Africa, there can be no doubt that as the guerilla attacks intensify there will be internal pressure upon him to reach a settlement which constitutionally concedes majority rule to the African but whose application would include a transitional period long enough to postpone the whole question of complete self-determination to a further date. Smith must present some constitutional package which will be acceptable to the aspiring African petty bourgeoisie, if he hopes to survive. If he can seduce Nkomo and his supporters with some measure of constitutional power and at the same time guarantee the properties of the white minority against nationalisation, he would not only have managed to lay the basis for the division of the Zimbabwean people, as between those who want and are carrying out the struggle for complete unconditional liberation and those who are willing to accept a classical neo-colonial solution, Smith or the white Rhodesian minority will have guaranteed themselves the complete support of imperialist countries. In such a situation, the intervention of such a force as the UN or the imperialist nations themselves would be interpreted as the defence of the Zimbabwean people against the attacks of communist rebels. The position of Nkomo and his fraction of the ANC is providing the basis for a neo-colonial solution which itself will serve as means for imperialism to further divide the Zimbabwean people, and transform Zimbabwean liberation fighters into rebels.

The Smith regime is not the only one with an interest in the prevention of intensified all out armed struggle in Zimbabwe. The position of South Africa is clear up to the point that she would prefer Smith to accommodate the Zimbabwean petty bourgeoisie and avert a war which would inevitably place South Africa in a dilemma situation, both politically and strategically. Through her involvement in Angola, South Africa has not only suffered a moral and physical defeat but also she has damaged her detente image with some important African states, such as Nigeria. Vorster will probably exercise more pressure on Smith in an attempt to force him to accommodate the Nkomo section of the ANC into the political framework of a new Rhodesian constitutional structure. By intensifying his efforts towards gaining a peaceful solution in Rhodesia, Vorster may hope to regain some political prestige and goodwill amongst some African states. But perhaps more important

than this, an all out armed struggle in Zimbabwe would place Vorster and his government in a most precarious position, for although her most sensible policy in such a situation would be to keep out of the conflict in Rhodesia and consolidate her own position in South Africa, there will definitely be strong pressures upon Vorster to intervene militarily to save both the whites and the economic investments of South African in Rhodesia. Such an intervention would be disastrous for both South Africa and world imperialism. Militarily and strategically, intervention would extend her boundaries, therefore her area of defence — she already has to contend with the growing struggle of SWAPO in Namibia, which means the deployment of vital troops. Politically a military intervention in Zimbabwe will definitely have a greater effect of infuriating many African states and in particular African workers and students, than was the case with her intervention in Angola. Such an intervention would make it more difficult for the western imperialist nations to intervene if the situation arrived which dictated such action.

The South African bourgeoisie are not the only ones anxious to see some sort of settlement in Rhodesia. The British government has suddenly regained interest in Rhodesia, and as whence before she could conceive of sending troops over to Rhodesia, she can now lay the basis of such an intervention if the circumstances arrived which dictated such an action. The explanation is simple: ten years ago when African states were naively calling on Britain to militarily remove the Smith regime the Zimbabwean people had not organised themselves into a fighting force capable, not only of defeating the Smith regime but challenging the hegemony of international capitalism in the country.

The solution which the Wilson regime is attempting to implement in Zimbabwe is that of neo-colonialism — a plan for which it has the support of the US, South Africa, Zambia and Tanzania. If this plan fails and armed struggle intensifies then Britain in collaboration with the other western powers will attempt to use the UN in Zimbabwe in more or less the same way as it was used in the Congo — to smash the progressive forces and instigate a reactionary pro-western regime. If British camouflaged intervention does not work, then Britain will find herself in a situation where she will either have to intervene directly or sit back and watch events take their course in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa in general. The British government would prefer not to be put in a situation where she would have to send troops into Rhodesia; such a move would be internally and internationally (i.e. in relation to African states once imperial role that British troops would place in such a situation became evident) disastrous. Britain is prepared to sacrifice Smith in order to avert a situation which would seriously test international capitalism. A friendly pro-western black neo-colonial regime, although not perfect, is at this point much preferable to an intensified armed struggle which would mark the end of white imperialist domination, not only in Zimbabwe but in the whole of Southern Africa.

Most African states would prefer to see an end to all armed struggle in Southern Africa, particularly in Zimbabwe, not because of some humanitarian quest for peace and tranquility in the continent but because an intensified armed struggle in Zimbabwe cannot but have its effect in their own neo-colonies. The effects of the struggle of the MPLA (especially with the implication of the South African troops) has already shown itself to have had a progressive effect upon workers and students in many neo-colonies. In Nigeria, students not only demonstrated in support of the MPLA, but demanded that the Mohammed regime send troops to fight alongside the MPLA against imperialism spearheaded by racist South Africa. In Zambia, the situation in Angola greatly contributed to the imposition of a full state of emergency and the arrest of Lionel Clift. There can be no doubt that a concerted struggle against the racist European Rhodesia, one with the aim of instilling the African's Zimbabwe will have a profound effect upon the class and nationalist consciousness of workers and students throughout Africa. Neo-colonial African leaders are well aware that an anti-imperialist fervent engendered by armed struggle in Southern Africa could have the effect of engendering an anti-capitalist struggle in their respective neo-colonies. The reactionary role of Kaunda in the attempts to stifle the struggle of the Zimbabwean people is clear. Both he and Nyerere have been collaborating with Britain, South Africa and the US in imperialist efforts to instil a neo-colonial solution in Zimbabwe. As reported in the Observer (22.2.76) "Britain has been authorized by President Kaunda of Zambia and President Nyerere of Tanzania to promise Smith that if Rhodesia agrees to revert to a British colony, they will do all they can to stop the fighting." The OAU, Zambia and Tanzania have in fact been holding back arms and ammunition meant for the ANC freedom fighters.

The aversion of intensified all out armed struggle in Zimbabwe will only serve the interests of both imperialism and the neo-colonial regimes of the continent. The Smith/Nkomo talks provide



no answer to the situation of economic and physical exploitation and oppression of the Zimbabwean people. The only problem that it could solve, and here only temporarily, is the present crisis of imperialism in Southern Africa. The interests of imperialism and the African masses are absolutely contradictory and irreconcilable. At this point a peaceful solution means a neo-colonial solution because of the simple fact that international capitalism is not going to hand over to Africans the control and ownership of the Southern African economies. The only interests that may be reconciled in Rhodesia are those of the aspiring petty bourgeoisie, represented by people like Nkomo, and the economic interests of imperialism, even at the expense of the political position of the white minority.

This is why the struggle in South Africa must be pushed beyond the bounds of a mere eradication of minority government to the complete overthrow of capitalism. This is not to reject the nationalist context of the struggle at this point, but to pose two courses open to the Zimbabwean people; firstly, the displacement of the white minority regime by an aspiring African petty bourgeoisie, who will fulfil their neo-colonial position by protecting the economic interests of world capitalism at the inevitable expense of Zimbabwean workers and peasants, or secondly, the concerted challenge of both the political and economic hegemony of both the white minority and international capital, — one as a consequence of both the internal and external circumstances in which the struggle is taking place, requires the use of a substantial amount of violence.

One point should be stressed. We are not of the opinion that the use of violence, either in general or specifically in Zimbabwe, automatically means the success of the struggle in terms of creating the conditions in which a socialist society can be built. No — this of course is not the case. What is the case is that given the prevalent conditions in Zimbabwe successful liberation means the complete displacement of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois state, and the complete withdrawal of the economy from the orbit of international capitalism. Given the stakes involved it is extremely unlikely that both the Rhodesian bourgeoisie and international capitalism will concede these fundamental changes without military resistance.

The crucial mistake made by so many moralists when they accuse marxists of being violence prone and are quick to support non-violent methods for the liberation of the colonised peoples of Southern Africa, is that they confuse means and end and they fail to grasp the fact that morality has never liberated a physically and economically subjected people. The laws that govern capitalism and imperialism have little to do with morality — basically we live in an amoral world and if we are to conquer the oppressing classes we must approach the situation from a realistic and amoral stand. Marxism does not conceive of force and violence as ends, they are means which the objective conditions of the struggle to overthrow the oppressor forces dictate. Violence is not employed for its cathartic effects on the masses, nor as a channel for the release of pent up aggressive impulses created by a lifetime of economic exploitation, and physical and mental oppression. The aim of the colonial revolution, which in order to be successful must be carried through to a socialist revolution, is the absolute victory of the proletariat and peasants, the total displacement of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois state. These basic requirements for the building of socialism cannot be attained, given the present objective situation in Southern Africa, without the employment of violence and terror.

1.3.76

— Tunde Anthony.

# DETENTE AND DISARRAY 1975

It looks increasingly likely that the year 1975 will go down as a period in which the struggle for the liberation of the remaining outposts of white supremacy on the continent was successfully defused and derailed. The main factors involved in achieving this were (i) the collaboration between the neo-colonialist states of black Africa and the white racism stronghold of South Africa who possessed an equal interest in ensuring that no ongoing struggles disturbed their dreams of a new "detente" in the area (ii) the appallingly inept leadership of the liberation movements, particularly in Zimbabwe, who have been thrown into total disarray by the easily predictable turns of events this year.

The latest search for a "settlement" in Rhodesia has now been going on for a full year since October 1974. It arose basically out of four factors:

1. Since UDI in 1965 Smith has in fact always sought a settlement if it was possible on his own terms. Thus the Tiger and Fearless talks with the British government (1966 and 1968), the new constitutional proposals of 1971 and the admission of the Pearce Commission and the series of talks initiated in 1972/3 with Muzorewa, leader of the ANC, a movement then totally committed to the peaceful road to political change. Although Rhodesia's economy has survived the farce of UN economic sanctions which have been busted with impunity by all the major capitalist powers, a much higher rate of economic growth could have been achieved if there had been no constraints at all on trade. Above all Smith's ambition of bringing a million new white settlers into the country in order to stabilize white supremacy could go beyond paper dreams if contact with European countries especially was completely untrammelled. Thus Smith has always been willing to make a settlement of some kind if it could bring about Rhodesia's complete reintegration into the capitalist economy. But of course such a settlement would have to be (and this continues to be the case right up to the present) based on some forms of guarantee for the continuation of white supremacy.

2. The UF government's anxiety to reach a settlement was increased by the stage which was reached by early 1974 in the guerilla war in the North East of the country waged by the guerillas of ZANLA (armed wing of the former ZANU). The success of their war was shown by the decision August 1974 to initiate a massive exercise of "regrouping" the population of the area into new settlements, surrounded by floodlights and barbed wire which were an exact imitation of the "strategic hamlets" notorious in Indochina. Such a step was necessary in order to cut off the increasingly active guerilla bands from their base in the local population and turn the countryside into a free fire area where the "security" forces could hunt down the armed combatants. This was an important reflection of the increased effectiveness of the ZANLA fighters. Along with the stepping up of Smith's provisions for the call up of all able bodied white males up to the age of 40 for military training each year, it marked a new stage in the development of the struggle and a sign of the increasing pressure to which the whites of Rhodesia were being subjected.



3. But the decisive turning point for Smith came with the Lisbon coup, April 25th 1974. It was immediately clear that this was the end of the line for the Portuguese colonialists in Angola and Mozambique. Two central props of South Africa's buffer state policy were removed at a stroke. Rhodesia was no longer an essential component of the walls which Vorster had hoped to construct around the white "laager". Instead it could be an isolated outpost surrounded by black ruled states with whom South Africa had an increased need to reach an accommodation. At least one of these states, Mozambique, had come into being as a result of prolonged armed struggle. At this stage it could be reasonably expected that its rulers would be more than sympathetic to the call to support the Zimbabwean freedom fighters and to cut the crucial Umtali-Beira rail link which carries more than 80% of Rhodesia's trade.

It is of course important, particularly in the light of subsequent events, to appreciate that Vorster's policy switch was not, and is not, something which makes it inevitable that change will come about in Rhodesia and Namibia. The fact that two out of the four bricks in the wall of the laager had disintegrated did not mean that South Africa would simply abandon the other two to their fate. On the contrary it would only be if it became too much trouble to maintain them in position that they would be abandoned by their sponsor. Whether that became the case was entirely dependent on the extent to which opposition to white supremacy would develop within the two territories.

4. Finally, Vorster himself reacted very quickly to the changed situation within which he now operated. It is now known that very rapidly contact was established with Kaunda of Zambia. A recent report said that the latter's special advisor and diplomatic emissary, Mark Chona, has made more than 20 trips to Pretoria in the last eighteen months. For both sides a settlement of the Rhodesian issue was the central point at stake.

(a) For Vorster, with his buffer-state policy crumbling, there seemed no alternative but to try and seek an accommodation with the black states to the north which would guarantee the frontiers of South Africa itself against potential guerilla invasion. In addition a "detente" would open the way to greatly increased trading opportunities for the Republic's industries and allow it to resume its logical position as doyen of a southern African sub imperialist stretching up into Zaire, Zambia and Malawi.

(b) For Kaunda, the new detente period has coincided with the most serious economic crisis since Independence in 1964. This is of course a direct result of the world wide recession of the imperialist economy which has struck hardest at its weakest components. In 1974 93% of Zambia's exports were of copper. In the first three months of that year these brought in K244,960,000. But in the same period 1975 only K110,849,000 was earned from that source. Other exports earned K15,696,000 and K14,249,000 respectively. In the first three months of 1975 the balance of payments deficit was running at an annual rate of K140 million. In addition the copper slump hit government revenue disastrously. Government income for the first four months of 1975 was K43 million short of the budget figure. Most of this shortfall is accounted for by the drastic decline in mineral revenue (Jan-April 1974: K75 m; Jan-April 1975: K16 m.).

A settlement of the Rhodesian issue would benefit Zambia economically in two ways:

- (i) it would enable trade to be expanded once again with South Africa and particularly with Rhodesia. The latter provided 40% of Zambia's imports in 1964, but of late, especially after the 1973 border closure a mere 2%. Most of these products of Rhodesia's more developed industries have not been replaced by Zambian manufactures but vastly more expensive imports from Europe, Japan, etc.
- (ii) it would provide the opportunity to re-open Zambia's cheap route to the sea via the Victoria Falls Bridge, Salisbury, Umtali and Beira.

Zambia's economic problems provide the essential backcloth for that country's willingness over the past year to take virtually any steps necessary to forward a settlement in Rhodesia. For an whole period it had been possible for Kaunda, buoyed up by relatively high copper prices, to pose as a foremost advocate of the destruction of the white racist regimes of the south. Such verbal gestures cost nothing and indeed fitted in with his aspirations to take an independent state capitalist Zambia out of the orbit of South African sub imperialist and to diversify her sources of trade and investment.

But seven years after the Mulungushi reforms of 1968 heralded this new orientation, Zambia's economy is in its worst ever state. Most indicative is the fact that, despite an whole series of agreements made with multi-national companies from a wide variety of capitalist states, whose aim was to stimulate the manufacturing sector, expansion there is at a standstill (employment in manufacturing: June 1972: 42,560; June 1974 43,130). Now the realities of life as a minor part of the imperialist world are coming home

sharply to the Zambian ruling class. With no chance of a substantial hike in the price of copper until at least the end of 1976, nil growth in her own manufacturing and agricultural sectors and a pressing problem in satisfying the demands of a burgeoning urban population, any even temporary relief will come as a breathing space for them.

It is in this context that we must see the diplomatic moves of the Kaunda regime around the Zimbabwean question.

The first indication of the "detente" moves which had without doubt been going on secretly for several months, came in October 1974 when Kaunda and Vorster exchanged compliments in public speeches expressing their mutual concern with a settlement of "the outstanding issues of Rhodesia and South West Africa". Kaunda's future evolution was heralded by his hailing of Vorster's statements as "the voice of reason for which we have been waiting". Neither at this stage nor at any later one did Kaunda allow the fate of the 18 million non whites within South Africa itself to disturb his dealings with their oppressors.

In December the first attempt at negotiation of the Rhodesian issue took place in Lusaka. To facilitate this Smith was forced to release leading nationalist detainees such as Nkomo and Sithole. The agreement which came out of these talks supposedly provided for the release of all Rhodesia's political detainees and the holding of a constitutional conference to discuss progress towards majority rule. In Zambia it was hailed as a great victory for Kaunda's diplomacy and the press spoke confidently of an independent Zimbabwe within a matter of months.

Of course it was easy to see that such dreams had small chance of being successfully realised. For Smith the purpose of the Lusaka talks was only to buy time and hope to demobilise the most militant elements of the nationalist movement; particularly the armed struggle wing. The regime immediately began a big propaganda campaign in the north east which used the Lusaka agreement, with its provision for a ceasefire in the liberation war, to attempt to demobilise the guerilla forces. But it was not just Smith who was involved in these efforts. Immediately after the Lusaka talks their black African sponsors, Nyerere, Kaunda, Machel and Khama, press-ganged the nationalist leaders present into signing a unity accord by which ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI, three groupings hitherto committed to armed struggle as the road to liberation

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were grouped under the leadership of Muzorewa's ANC which had throughout advocated the peaceful, non-violent road to change. Without doubt the hope was that the new formation under its "moderate" leadership could be pressured into a quick settlement which would of necessity involve some compromises with the principle of "majority rule now".

But this new unity agreed between 16 leaders and imposed without any form of democratic discussion by the memberships of the organisations involved, never became a reality. Each group kept its structures intact. Indeed the comrades of ZANU rationalised this quite correctly in their monthly publication by explaining that their interpretation of the agreement involved seeing ANC as a united front of organisations for the purpose of conducting negotiations and reaching an agreed line but having no powers to dissolve its individual constituents. In the North East the ZANLA nationalist fighters showed by their continuing actions that they had no intention of adhering to the phony Lusaka ceasefire.



Clearly it was this intransigence which led the Zambian government in April 1975 to demonstrate its fidelity to the new detente orientation. The murder of Herbert Chitepo, ZANU's external chairperson, by a bomb planted in his car in a Lusaka suburb, was used as an opportunity to round up more than 70 leading nationalists. These were arrested, immediately after Chitepo's funeral and no detailed information has since been forthcoming about their identity, their precise number or subsequent fate. Nor has it yet been established, despite the existence for six months of a prestigious international commission of enquiry, who murdered Chitepo. At all events his death was of considerable use to the Zambian government who were able effectively to destroy ZANU's external organisation and thus to disrupt support to the guerillas fighting within Rhodesia.

That Zambia was becoming an increasingly hostile environment for freedom fighters was quickly shown by the chauvinist campaign orchestrated by the government controlled press against the supposedly totally ungrateful Zimbabweans. Zambia, it was constantly stressed, was making all manner of human and material sacrifices on behalf of people whose refusal to unite as directed and whose engagement in all manner of internecine struggles, was actually disrupting the success of the Kaunda inspired detente exercise. At no time in this campaign did the Zambian press ever acknowledge that it was conceivable that there could actually exist principled political or tactical differences between elements in the nationalist movement. The culminating point of this campaign came with a demonstration of several thousand persons stage managed by the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) in Ndola at which slogans were raised calling for the expulsion of Rhodesian nationals and an end to any forms of assistance to their struggle.

Confirmation that the Zambian government was intent on destroying the militant wing of the Zimbabwean resistance came on 16 September when there occurred the funeral of a Zambian army officer allegedly killed by guerillas at a training camp in Kabwe. It was also stated that 11 Zimbabweans had been killed in the ensuing melee. But unpublished reports from other militants suggest that the death toll amongst the militants at the hands of the Zambian armed forces was nearer to 25. Furthermore all attempts to see the bodies failed which raised grave suspicions about the nature of the deaths which befell these fighters.

Backing evidence for Zambian complicity in the attempt to frustrate freedom fighter activity throughout southern Africa came with the news that leaders of all liberation movements operating in Zambia had been asked in early September to provide a dossier on their members resident in the country. Amongst the pieces of information demanded were the pseudonyms used by individuals along with their homes in the countries from which they originated. Since the demand for this information came immediately after the meeting 26 August at the Victoria Falls between Kaunda and Vorster and since such information could be of use only to the security services of the white racist states it was easy to deduce what was to be its function. When this manoeuvre was publicised to the world through the Reuter press agency it was immediately denied by the Zambian government. But our own knowledge of these moves at least 10 days before they received any publicity constitutes concrete proof of their veracity.

To their credit, the leaderships of all the liberation movements have refused to supply this information. But the demand for it gave concrete proof, if any were still needed, of the effective removal of Zambia from the ranks of safe refuges for freedom fighters. Certainly the vast majority of Zimbabwean militants committed to the armed struggle have now withdrawn to Tanzania or Mozambique. It is no accident that for the past few weeks, despite the official HQ of ANC's external wing being Lusaka, Muzorewa, Sithole etc. have operated from Dar es Salaam, while most SWAPO members have decamped to safer places in Southern Angola.

The latest episode in the attempts by Kaunda and Vorster to impose a settlement on their respective clients, came on August 26th at Victoria Falls where, to an orchestrated campaign of publicity, Smith was brought for the first time face to face with the official leadership of the Zimbabwean movements. In addition Kaunda and Vorster met for the first time and had long hours of discussion.

At the end of the talks the public positions of the participants were indicative of their real outcome:

1. Smith said they had broken down and he would now initiate moves to convene constitutional talks with "other leaders of African opinion".
2. His immediate adversaries, ANC, insisted that they had made many concessions but had been unable to accept Smith's insistence that further detailed discussions take place inside Rhodesia, unless he in turn guaranteed diplomatic immunity to all their representatives eg. Sithole, who were under threat of arrest inside the country.

3. Vorster and Kaunda were the only participants who appeared to think that the talks had not been a failure but a useful beginning upon which to build in the future. Clearly this arose from their determination to lean on their cohorts to reach a settlement, rather than from any sober assessment of the steps forward taken at Victoria Falls. Since the abortive talks the real situation has to a certain extent been clarified:

1. As we have detailed above Zambia's self-proclaimed reputation as a 'front line state' in the liberation of the white racist dominated southern part of the continent has taken a severe beating at the hands of its own actions. Almost all its once large population of freedom fighters have wisely decamped from what is now hostile territory. Most significant too is the evidence which is coming to the fore of a split in the once apparently solid front formed by Kaunda, Nyerere, Machel and Khama. Three events in the past two months may be more than straws in the wind:

(a) When the four heads of state met in Lusaka early September with the proclaimed intention of analysing the Victoria Falls experience and the future of the Zimbabwean struggle, they were unable to produce any kind of agreed statement on the outcome of their deliberations. This was in marked contrast to previous such gatherings which have always resulted in renewed declarations of the mutual solidarity of these states in their attitude to the entire region.

(b) When in September Nyerere became the first head of state to visit Mozambique a joint statement was issued by him and Machel which laid stress on the fact that Vorster's detente moves had not been accompanied by any sign of real change taking place within the white racist stronghold itself and reaffirmed solidarity with all the movements struggling against the apartheid system. In contradiction to the tone of this statement is Zambian spokespersons' reluctance over the past period to make any reference to the situation inside South Africa itself.

(c) When the new Tanzam railway was formally opened on the eve of Zambia's 11th Independence celebrations, a noticeable absentee from the ceremonies was Nyerere, who could logically have been expected to be present as Head of State of the joint sponsor of this venture.

Having pointed to these indications that differences may have arisen between Zambia on the one side and Mozambique/Tanzania on the other, it is necessary to stress that these have not yet, nor are likely to, assume any fundamental proportions. They are likely rather to constitute only differences of emphasis which may be explained by: (a) in the case of Mozambique a more recent experience of the armed struggle against a white racist regime (b) in the case of Tanzania a considerably lower level of economic development which means paradoxically that its economy is rather less susceptible to the dire consequences of the world economic crisis than that of the more developed Zambia. In addition its greater distance from the Republic of South Africa and its position as being far less historically integrated into the southern African market makes it far less dependent than Zambia upon developments in the area.

It is particularly necessary now to raise a very big question mark over the fact that the Mozambiquan regime has so far refused to take that action which is open to it to act, even within the bounds of UN policy, by strangling the 80% of Rhodesia's trade which goes through the port of Beira. Such a move could be of massive material assistance to the task of bring the Smith regime to its knees. Mozambique's failure to take this step marks a qualitative shift to the right in the political positions of the FRELIMO leadership.

2. The past two months have seen the reopening of that political differentiation within ANC which was only papered over by the Lusaka unity agreement of December 19. Immediately upon the collapse of the Victoria Falls Talks Nkomo's former ZAPU faction set about the task of installing itself as the group with whom Smith could set about negotiating. The culmination of this attempt came at the end of September when a supposed conference of ANC which was attended only by Nkomo supporters who travelled from his stronghold of Bulawayo, was held in Salisbury. This event was in effect sponsored by the Smith regime who provided free transport and accommodation for participants. At it, Nkomo was inevitably elected as President of the reconstructed ANC. At the time of writing he has just emerged from the first of a series of talks scheduled with Smith who described them as "very fruitful". Such compromises which can possibly lead to the offer to this faction of token representation in a new "multi racial executive" in Rhodesia, fall fully within the logic of Nkomo's politics for the past twenty years. Although at this point in time he continues to mouth the demand for "majority rule now" we have no doubt that, with the right offer from Smith, this can prove to be as temporary as his supposedly uncompromising stand after the Victoria Falls conference for total diplomatic immunity for all leading members of ANC before the opening of any negotiations. If the



Smith-Nkomo manoeuvres succeed in deluding even a significant minority of the population they will constitute a powerful delaying obstacle on the road to the overthrow of white minority rule. It is actually to the advantage of the militants of the ANC who are firmly committed to immediate majority rule and to the armed struggle that the Nkomo faction has so clearly delineated its compromising stance at this stage. Unfortunately the leadership of that wing which remains formally committed to the continuation of the fight is currently proving to be highly qualified in verbal "Chimurenga" but sadly lacking in the will to give its protestations concrete manifestations.

While the Muzorewa wing has dissociated itself from Nkomo's present manoeuvres and declared that the armed struggle is the only way forward it has actually totally failed to prepare the way for the intensification of the guerilla war.

(i) By being a party for the past nine months to the demobilisation of the guerilla movement sponsored by the Zambian government it has itself been directly responsible for the Zimbabwean freedom struggle reaching its lowest point for a number of years.

(ii) While it remains formally committed to the liberation war it is interesting to observe that the first issue of its new magazine, "Revolution", published at the end of September, contains not a single report of any action in the field. Instead it is devoted to a series of essentially factional attacks on the Nkomo wing. Nor have we any indication that the leaders of the Zimbabwe Liberation Council intend to emulate the example of most known guerilla leaders, most recently of the present leadership of Mozambique and actually get involved in the struggle with their forces in the field. It would therefore be absolutely incorrect to place any kind of confidence in the existing leadership of the ANC's external wing or to render it any kind of political support. Fortunately there are some indications that the future of the Zimbabwean struggle does not rest in their hands. Several indications of the possibilities which exist for a substantial mobilisation against the Smith regime have been given in the past period:

(i) When those forces in Zimbabwe claiming public allegiance to the ANC's external wing called a meeting in Salisbury, 18 October there attended according even to the official reports of Smith's police, 35,000 persons, while the organiser claimed 100,000. Such a turnout completely dwarfed the attendance at the Nkomo organised rally in September. Despite the confusion and lack of direction of its leadership it is clear that the uncompromising, albeit paper, positions of the external wing, are able to evoke a massive response amongst Rhodesia's Africans. Unfortunately the meeting was broken up under police instructions without any discussion taking place. This combined with the continued lack of direction shown by the Muzorewa wing leadership means that no planning is going on for the mobilisation of the urban population in support of the ongoing guerilla struggle, and that many people will certainly have left Salisbury that day somewhat confused and disorientated about the perspective for struggle.

(ii) Despite the detente associated demobilisation of the armed struggle in the north east there have been several incidents in recent months which testify to the continuation of the fight. In one of these Rhodesia's News Agency claimed that FRELIMO forces had made incursions across the border. But it was obvious that involved in the incident which led to at least 20 deaths, were not FRELIMO, but Zimbabwean freedom fighters. Again Smith's troops made in early October yet another raid into Botswana, making it certain that guerilla forces had become re-activated on the western frontier.

(iii) Reports received from Rhodesia's schools, especially boarding establishments in the north east, indicate that hundreds of youth are absconding in order to participate in the freedom struggle. Most of these are assumed to be fleeing across the border with Mozambique. In the region around Umtali all movement near the border has been restricted at night time and several deaths have arisen out of infringements of this curfew.

The struggle in Rhodesia continues therefore . . . but largely, we would estimate, in a spontaneous and unco-ordinated fashion. A prime task of militants within the armed wing of ANC will be to throw over that tradition which they have inherited from ZANU in which there was a total lack of political life and avenues for democratic discussion within the liberation army. Such a tradition was the main reason why several hundred Zimbabwean freedom fighters have lost their lives in factional fights over the past year. In addition it is vitally necessary that the new generation of freedom fighters reduce its dependence on the surrounding states. While it is possible and correct at this moment to exploit those divisions which appear to the opening up between Zambia and her erstwhile partners in the detente exercise, it would be politically naive and potentially suicidal to think that there is any fundamental reason why Tanzania and even Mozambique, which remain, for all the rhetoric, firmly within the capitalist world, should not follow the same path as Zambia. It is therefore urgent



for the Zimbabwean freedom fighters to establish firm bases within the country which can provide them with that same continuity of political intervention and security which can only come from being solidly entrenched there.

Of course this is not to discount the importance of external solidarity with the struggle. But this will not come in meaningful and reliable fashion from pandering to the leaderships of neo-colonial African states. It will only come from the construction of real links with the peoples of Africa. This is why it is urgent that wherever comrades in the continent have any kind of influence they should set about the building of forms of solidarity with the Zimbabwean struggle which are direct and quite independent of the whims of the neo-colonial regimes. Of course this argument applies with even more force to the solidarity movements which we must build throughout the advanced capitalist countries whose governments will be the most involved in the manoeuvres to create an "independent" Rhodesia remaining totally dependent on them. But while these movements will play an important role in assisting the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, its ultimate success will be guaranteed only by the reconstruction of a new leadership which will decisively break with the past practices of all existing wings of the movement and will be firmly rooted in the masses, urban and rural, who are the only guarantors of success for the revolution.

John Blair, 6th November 1975.

## International Marxist Group



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# 'AFRICAN SOCIALISM'

## IN TANZANIA

Perhaps the best known exponent of African Socialism is Julius Nyerere. Nyerere's declared purpose of building in Tanzania a new form of socialism, one based on the traditional attitude of mind of the African; a socialism not preceded by class struggle but stemming from the united actions of all; a socialism not led by the proletariat in alliance with the peasantry but one led, prescribed, and engineered by the bureaucratic petty-bourgeoisie; these ideas have made Nyerere probably the number one heart-throb of liberals and social democrats throughout the Western world.


Nyerere's obvious attraction to petty-bourgeois Western romanticist and twentieth century philanthropists is at this point of little importance, what is important is the effect that the kind of moralist nationalist orientated anti-revolutionary Marxist mystifications propagated by Nyerere and others like him, can and does have on sections of the African petty-bourgeoisie who are potential allies of the African masses, particularly those abroad – isolated from the class struggles prevalent in all African neo-colonies. The objective and subjective appeal of nationalist rhetoric should not be underestimated, particularly where it advances progress-sounding easy solutions to the socio-politico-economic predicaments of African societies, especially solutions that ascribe the African petty-bourgeoisie leading positions within these societies.

The determinant factors for the implementation of Tanzania's supposed socialist strategy of development was less Nyerere's utopian socialist orientation than the consequence of both external and internal pressures on T.A.N.U. Economically impotent and politically weak, confronted by the problems of economic development and the social/economic expectations of the masses who had actively supported the nationalist movement during the struggle for political independence, the new Tanzanian ruling elite was very insecure. Like their counterparts in other newly independent African states, Tanzania's newly invested political elite had to consolidate its position if it hoped to survive. Its greatest fears were not necessarily related to external forces, but those stemming from the revolutionary potential of the indigenous working masses. For instance, following independence the relationship between the government and the unions was less than cordial, the latter pressed for rapid Africanisation and demanded better living standards for workers, and were partly successful in pushing up wage rates. The government's answer was the Trade Disputes (Settlement) Act, which made strikes illegal. In 1964 the existing thirteen trade unions in Tanganyika (Tanzania) were dissolved by the government by legislation, instead the umbrella union organisation, the National Union of Tanganyika Workers, was created – with its officials nominated by the government. Today the N.U.T.A. is the sole union organisation in Tanzania.

Having attained formal political power T.A.N.U. was confronted with the problems of economic development – the question was, development with what? Tanzania has not the resources to be an attractive proposition for foreign private capital.

Following independence the government made efforts to attract foreign capital; for instance, with the aim of acquiring investors and retaining those already existing, the government passed an act of Parliament protecting foreign investments. But nevertheless foreign investors were not forthcoming. In fact, between independence and 1966 there was a net outflow of private long-term capital from Tanzania. Unable to attract the required foreign investments, Tanzania based its development on another source of foreign finance. In its first Five Year Plan, the government projected a total government expenditure of sh. 2,040m and it envisaged that 78% of this would be financed from foreign aid. This heavy reliance on foreign aid proved to be totally unrealistic. By the end of the plan period total government expenditure barely reached sh. 1800m of which only a third came from foreign finance (loans approx sh. 560m and grants approx sh. 40m).

Admittedly Tanzania lost a substantial amount of aid due to her external policies: lost sh. 150m in aid as a consequence of, firstly breaking diplomatic relations with Britain as a result of which the latter cancelled a £7½m interest-free loan, and secondly its reluctance to capitulate to the political demands of West Germany's Hallstein Doctrine.



Aware of the difficulties of obtaining sufficient foreign investments and aid, the Tanzanian government was forced to seek an alternative approach to development. For three days in February 1967 the National Executive Committee of T.A.N.U. met at Arusha to discuss and formulate a new strategy for development. The outcome of the meeting was the 'Arusha Declaration', a document that epitomises Tanzania's path to socialism. Basically the Declaration acknowledged the inability of Tanzania at attracting sufficient foreign finance, its over riding emphasis was the imperative need for self-reliance and the crucial part to be played by T.A.N.U. in providing the leadership necessary for the attainment of the country's socialist objective; it called for the nationalisation of the major means of production, but this did not mean an exclusion of foreign private investment – foreign investors were welcomed but as minority partners in joint ventures with the government. The declaration stated; 'Our aim is to make foreign investments feel that Tanzania is a good place in which to invest because investments would be safe and profitable, and the profits can be taken out of the country without difficulty. We expect to get money through this method. But we cannot get enough.'

### NATIONALISATION

In pursuance of the Arusha Declaration a programme of nationalisation was launched in 1967. The programme affected all enterprises "commanding heights of the economy". All banks were nationalised, during one week twenty-four companies were nationalised and the government took a controlling interest in seven others.



Nationalisation, although posed in socialist terms, was not anti-capitalist nor did it involve a complete break with international capitalism. Basically, what it meant was that ownership and control of a large sector of the economy was bought by the ruling class, giving them a base in the economy, something they desperately lacked before.

Throughout their programme of nationalisation 'Full and Fair' compensations were offered to all former owners. The paying of compensation of any sort cannot be in the interest of the masses. Firstly, paying compensation can only further indebt the already impoverished workers and peasants, whose economic state is the direct consequence of the brutal exploitation by imperialism, and secondly, to pay compensation is to implicitly, if not explicitly accept the bona fide ownership by the bourgeoisie of the means of production and resources of production and in a way vindicate imperialist exploitation and economic plunderings of the labour and land of the oppressed masses: - it is, in short, a betrayal of the masses. The transformation of the social relations of capital means the complete displacement of the bourgeoisie, without any form of compensation. But it is not too difficult to understand why the Tanzanian petty bourgeoisie, like their counterparts in other African countries, paid compensation to the imperialists, who had not only historically exploited the colonial peoples but had underdeveloped their economies. The payment of compensation is one way by which the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie can attain a measure of ownership and control of their economy without breaking their historical relationship with international capitalism.

The relationship between Tanzania, as a peripheral, and the West, as centres of international capitalism, was maintained in other ways. Whereas in Kenya, imperialism maintained its hold over the economy through direct ownership of capital, in Tanzania imperialism maintained a pervasive influence over the economy through managerial control. Although nationalisation brought majority ownership into the hands of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie, control remained largely within the hands of foreign capitalist management. For instance, many of the former foreign owners entered into managerial agreements with the government and parastatal holding companies, and where the management were replaced was almost always with new management partners from Western capitalist countries. In addition the government and parastatal sectors extensively use Western management consultants; Loxley and Saul (1) give the example of the American company, McKinsey, a company well known amongst business circles in the West for their conservative approach to management. Another factor serving to keep Tanzania within the orbit of international capitalism is the training of her parastatals' managerial personnel, many of whom are trained in western business schools and companies. This means that the techniques and approach to management of these capitalist trained managerial personnel is bourgeois oriented, one compatible with capitalist structure and system of production. The ethos, elitism and aims of capitalist managerial systems are irreconcilable with socialist development.

Nationalisation is not an automatic path to the socialisation of the means of production. Nationalisation has been a trend in many neo-colonial states in Africa, and it is one which will increase as a consequence of the insecurity of African petty bourgeois regimes, the pressures from anti-imperialist movements and the aspiring national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie on the state to indigenous ownership of the economy. These same forces have forced also the neo-colonial states to introduce measures designed to make it increasingly more difficult for foreign companies to transfer profits and dividends to the metropolitan companies. This is not only true for self-declared socialist orientated states like Tanzania, but also for those states like Nigeria, who exhibit little delusions of socialist development.

An important development which should be kept in mind in considering the absolute value of the indigenisation of the means of production are the changes in the pattern of international capitalist economy. Imperialist direct economic investment in Africa, although still very high, will decrease substantially as its investments become less and less secure and the outflow of its profits and dividends become more restricted. The pattern of imperialist investment will tend to focus on joint ventures with the government and parastatals as minority partners. This pattern is already evident, not only in Tanzania but also in many other African countries.

These changes in the economic relationship between the metropolitan countries and the neo-colonies have not only been endangered by developments within the neo-colonies, but also reflect the transformations of the world capitalist economy and the international movement of capital. "The main flow of capital export is no longer from the metropolitan countries into the colonies but between the metropolitan states themselves. In the underdeveloped countries the emphasis of foreign investment has shifted from the pure production of raw materials to the manufacture of consumer goods." (Mandel 'Late Capitalism' NI B)

Today, imperialist domination and exploitation of colonial and semi-colonial economies is not primarily a function of direct foreign ownership of these countries' means of production but that of unequal exchange rate between the metropolitans and the colonies and semi-colonies. As Mandel points out in the chapter 'Neo-Colonialism and Unequal Exchange' (Late Capitalism) "Unequal exchange henceforth will be the main form of colonial exploitation, the direct production of colonial surplus-profit will play a secondary role." Samir Amin estimated that the volume of losses incurred by the colonies and semi-colonial countries as a result of unequal exchange was approximately \$22 billion a year in the mid 60's. This sum, as Mandel points out, can be compared with a total gross income of \$12 billion from private foreign capital investments in 1964. Imperialism is able to accrue such high super-profits from unequal exchange because the colonial and semi-colonial economies are tied to international capitalism and to the world capitalist market. For instance, in 1968 over 75% of the total of Africa's foreign trade was with the major centres of international capitalism. Although Tanzania has a substantial trade link with China, her economy is still very much tied to the world capitalist market - trade with the international centres of capitalism still very much dominates her foreign trade.

With such high super-profits accruing from unequal exchange rates it becomes vital for imperialism to maintain neo-colonial regimes which, not only protect imperialist investments but also those that will ensure the continued existence of the neo-colonies as peripherals of international capitalism. There is only one solution for the masses of the neo-colonies, whose perpetual poverty and exploitation is ensured by the continuation of the present politico-economic relationship between its business and political elite and western capitalism, and that is to break all links with international capitalism. This cannot be achieved merely by indigenizing ownership, the question is not one of replacing European capitalists with African ones, but the complete displacement of the bourgeoisie, whether in black, yellow or white skin. Only the African proletariat in alliance with the advanced sections of the peasantry are finally capable of doing this.

### Ujamaa for the poor, land for the rich.

Probably Tanzania's experiment in the building of socialism is best known by its policy of "ujamaisation". The policy of ujamaa is basically an attempt to structure agricultural communities at the base of the Tanzanian system, through which the peasants themselves will be able to transform their reality by building self-reliant communities. That this policy has so far failed is reflected in the measure of success that the ujamaisation programme has had since its implementation in 1967. So far only about one million peasants have been incorporated into ujamaa villages. This means a residual of approximately 12 million to be ujamaised. The Tanzanian petty bourgeoisie having realised the apparent failures of its major policy has become desperate and have altered their approach to the implementation of ujamaa, from a position where the movement by peasants into ujamaa villages was voluntary it became compulsory. Now the whole peasant population must be in ujamaa villages by 1976. The tactics of TANU cadres have increasingly been marked by force - villages have been attacked and crops burnt. Even with these gangster politics it has become clear, even to the TANU leadership, that the 1976 target is totally unrealistic.

Those peasants who have, so far, been moved into ujamaa villages have come from the lower stratum of the peasantry, people with little or no land. Virtually no attempt has been made to carry out the policy in the North and North West of the country where the wealthiest and most capitalistic farmers are to be found. Where attempts have been made to incorporate the rich peasants into ujamaa villages these have been fiercely resisted for obvious economic reasons. What has become apparent is the alliance of interest between the middle and rich peasants (kulaks) and the bureaucrats whereby the latter secures the economic interests of the former by protecting their lands from the ujamaa programme, while the former secures the political positions of the latter by landing their powerful political backing.

The ujamaa villages as they now exist are a far cry from the original concept of ujamaa as conceived by Nyerere. Very little has been done towards the setting up of co-operative farming. It seems that the main object of the TANU bureaucrats is to herd poor rural people into physical structures - i.e. to create villages out of the present scattered peasantry. Of course, this may make the provision of social and auxiliary services and utilities cheaper to set up - but this is not socialism, it ignores its very bases i.e. the socialisation of production.

Aside from the inadequacies of the Tanzanian leadership, the failures of the country's rural and agricultural policies is very much related to the strangling hold of the capitalist market on the neo-colonial economies. These economies are largely orientated to ex-



ports of primary products, which means that as a consequence of unequal exchange, these economies exchange increasing quantities of indigenous labour (or the produce of labour) for a constant amount of metropolitan labour (or the product of labour). The effect of this is that firstly; for the individual peasant this means that while the product of his labour increases his returns change negligibly, in fact with falls in the world prices as was the case with sisal (Tanzania's largest export), his returns in fact decrease. All in all the peasant's economic conditions do not improve at any rate comparable with the increases in his economic production. Secondly, these economies cannot accrue sufficient surplus-product to attempt adequately the solving of their agrarian problems and the launching of full-scale industrialisation. Thirdly, unable to industrialise at a necessary pace, dependent upon single or two-product production most of which leaves the country in the form of exports, which means very little or no savings, these neo-colonies are very susceptible to economic crisis caused by movements in the world market prices or crop disasters, such as that caused by drought. For instance, Tanzania at present is in the midst of a severe economic crisis, probably its worst since independence. During last year her exports declined, while her imports payments mounted, causing a balance of payments deficit for 1974 as compared with a T£15m surplus in 1973. Most of this deficit resulted from the sharp rises in the cost of oil imports, but another factor was the drought which exacerbated her problems by stagnating agricultural production. This has meant that Tanzania, a predominantly agricultural country, has had to import large quantities of food grains for domestic consumption.

### Socialism on Credit.

We have already mentioned the unrealistic heavy reliance by the Tanzanian petty bourgeois regime on foreign aid in its first five year plan. The irony of Tanzania's socialist development is that since embarking on her utopian socialism she has attracted a substantial amount of aid from liberal voluntary organisations in the West, particularly from Sweden and Canada, (perhaps this is not such as irony). She has also obtained substantial aid from Western capitalist governments, including those of Sweden, Canada, the USA and Britain, which resumed her aid in 1974 – the other principal donor is China.

For a country seeking self-reliance, Tanzanian has heavily relied on foreign aid. Between 1961 and 1972 an average of 34% of total development budget came from foreign aid. In the 1975-76 budget, the government proposed to spend a total of T£181.35m on recurrent expenditure and T£129.5m on development expenditure, of which 55% is expected to be raised from foreign aid. Nyerere's visits last year to European capitalist countries was part of an effort by the Tanzanian regime to acquire foreign finance for their development programme. During his visit to Britain one of his few performances was that at the Lord Mayor's banquet attended by the financial capitalists of the City. As reported by the Observer, Nyerere "explained why he had nationalised foreign firms and why he still wanted to do business with the City". His meek and prostituting performance was rewarded by a standing ovation by the City gentlemen.

Socialism based on imperial finance is a contradiction in essence. Nyerere half understood this when in the Arusha Declaration it stated; "Independence cannot be real if a nation depends upon gifts and loans from another for its development. . . How can we depend upon foreign governments and companies for the major part of our development without giving to these governments and countries a great part of our freedom to act as we please? The truth is that we cannot." Foreign aid donors tend to be finance capital, skill and foreign exchange intensive projects, which means a greater dependence upon foreign capital imports. These projects tend to be technologically inappropriate which means a further dependency on external labour. The projects are not necessarily those most needed by the country in its present state of social/economic development. Aside from these considerations, foreign aid is an expensive means of development. Between 1971 and 1972 external debt servicing cost Tanzania sh 80m or 4.5% of the country's export

earnings. It has been estimated that this year the amount will have risen to 5.2%. A conservative projection to 1980 gives the country's debt servicing cost as 10% of projected export earnings at that date. These figures are by no means shocking when compared to many other African neo-colonies, but this only goes to show the extent to which other African countries are entrapped in the neo-colonial web.

## A conclusion

To talk of building socialism without a socialist revolution is nonsense. Nyerere's utopian socialism led by a 'socialist' conscious petty bourgeois leadership and engineered by a national bureaucracy with an economic base in international capitalism is a fallacy. TANU is not a vanguard party, its leadership may have represented the immediate interests of the masses during the pre-independence national era, but the objective interest and prevalent conditions of Tanzania today demand a new leadership, one that can only be provided by a vanguard party composed of the proletariat, the advanced sections of the peasantry and that section of the petty bourgeoisie that is completely committed to a revolutionary socialist revolution, having relinquished all its connections with the bourgeoisie (both international and indigenous). It is only these class based forces that can successfully push the colonial revolution to its logical end, i.e. a socialist revolution.

There is no doubt that the most immediate task of revolutionary marxists in Tanzania, as in all other neo-colonies, is the building of a revolutionary vanguard party equipped with a class programme which amongst other things sets forth a series of demands which stems from the present conditions and consciousness of the various layers of the masses; a programme designed to raise the political consciousness of the masses and unalterably lead to the conquest of power by the proletariat and the advanced peasantry.

Such a programme and the demands incorporated must be based on the concrete realities of the Tanzanian society and as such cannot be prescribed by marxist revolutionaries outside of the continent, who are alienated from these realities. But it is evident that amongst these demands must be included the following basic demands;

1. Tanzania must break all links with international capitalism, which includes capitalist management.
  2. Workers ownership and control of the means of production. That the nationalisation programme implemented by TANU be carried to a socialist conclusion, which involves the complete expropriation without compensation of the bourgeoisie (including the local representatives of international capitalism) and the institution of genuine workers participation at every level of management.
  3. The expropriation of the land of the rich peasants (kulaks) and capitalist farmers. The indiscriminate (i.e. in terms of class) implementation of collective ownership and the collectivisation of production.
  4. The right of workers to organise themselves in defence of their living standards, independently of the State. – trade unions must be independent of the government.
  5. The right of the masses to form themselves into political organisations which express their class interests, independent of and unmolested by the government. For as Fanon wrote, the single party in Africa is a form of 'the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, unmasked, unpainted, unscrupulous and cynical'. The idea of a national homogeneity against imperialism and the socio-economic legacy of colonialism is a rationalisation by the ruling class to justify and perpetuate its position – there exists no homogeneity of interest in Tanzania or any other neo-colonial state.
- That TANU is incapable of meeting these demands of the masses is undoubted. It is the job of marxist revolutionaries to mobilise the masses for the ultimate aim of transforming these and other socialist demands to create reality.

TUNDE ANTHONY



**'IT IS THE JOB OF MARXIST REVOLUTIONARIES TO MOBILISE THE MASSES FOR THE ULTIMATE AIM OF TRANSFORMING . . . SOCIALIST DEMANDS TO REALITY!'**





## DJIBOUTI

# A TURBULENT FUTURE

by C. GABRIEL

There is an Issa proverb that says: Even the jackal makes out his will before traveling across this country.

As the last place in Africa still ruled by French colonialism, the French Territory of Afars and Issas (FTAI) may look like a shocking anachronism in 1976.(1) A hopelessly arid land of 23,000 square kilometers with 130,000 inhabitants, 85,000 of whom live in the city of Djibouti — that is the primary and decisive feature of this French colony. In reality, this demographic concentration in the main city constitutes one of the particular features that determine the social and political questions of the territory. Apart from its function as a port, Djibouti also has an international airport and is the terminal of a railway that links Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, to the sea; the railway is the decisive axis of the Ethiopian economy. In addition to this economic dimension, Djibouti and the FTAI represent a linchpin for French imperialism in its strategic aims in the region relating to the Indian Ocean, the Arabian peninsula, the route of the oil tankers from the Arabian Gulf, and the Red Sea. In spite of its desire to oversee half the planet from Djibouti, French colonialism has nonetheless managed to survive here only by dint of the most sordid tricks, the most important of which remain border rivalries and the ethnic fragmentation of this region of East Africa.

During the nineteenth century, taking advantage of the opening of the Suez Canal, France hoped to make the port of Djibouti a rival of Aden. But this remained a pretentious ambition. At the time of the arrival of the French, there were two ethnic groups in this region: the Afars, or Danakil, in the North and West (about three-fourths of the territory) and the Issas (a group related to Somali ethnic groups) in the South. The Afars and Issas had long been Muslims. Both groups are essentially nomadic and are assembled in "tribes" that are

sorts of family clans. Nevertheless, the social organization and the relations among "tribes" varied among the two ethnic groups.(2) Almost exclusively engaged in pastoral activities, these populations did not satisfy French colonialism's need for a work force, particularly for the construction of the railway (1897-1917) and the port. This work was done partly by Arab workers from Yemen and Aden and above all by Somalis of the Issaq group, which originates from what was then British Somaliland. This situation was quite favorable to French colonialism's policy of division.

Moreover, the Afars and Issas were not restricted to the lands of the FTAI. There are about 250,000 Afars in all, four-fifths of whom live in Ethiopia. All the Afar people, whether they live in Ethiopia or the FTAI, have their own internal structures, among which are the nineteen "great sultanates." The FTAI includes the sultanates of Tadjoura and Gobard, as well as part of the sultanates of Aoussa and Raheita. Afar society is very rigorously stratified into "age classes" within which certain tribes and notables are dominant.

The Issas, on the other hand, belong to the larger, Somali group. The political unification of the great majority of this group was not realized until 1960, when the Republic of Somalia was created. Superficially, it can be admitted that the cohesion of the Somali group is weaker than that of the Afars.

The Somali portion of the Issas tend their flocks in the FTAI as well as in Ethiopia and Somalia. When the borders were drawn between Ethiopia and the French and British colonies during the nineteenth century, the real interests of these populations were not at all taken into account. Neither the areas of human travel nor the limits of the sultanates were respected. Hence was born a profound resentment among the populations and a terrible confusion of ethnic and political questions.



The presence in Djibouti of a strong contingent of Arabs stimulated discontent among those people on the fringes of Afar or Issa nomadism who aspired to live on the resources of the port. Issa petitions were addressed to the governor demanding the withdrawal of foreigners, mainly Arabs. Before the second world war, the Arabs controlled a good part of port real estate.

In 1946 the first representative council was "elected." Four Afars, three Arabs, and three Somalis, only one of whom was Issa, were members of the indigenous body. That same year, a Somali of the Gadaboursi group, which originates from then British Somaliland, was sent to the Council of the Republic as a representative of the territory. This situation fostered conflict between the Issas and other Somalis, while also creating the illusion that there was a community of interests of Afars and Issas against "foreigners." Thus, a Club of Somali and Danakil Youth was formed in 1946; its slogan was "land to the Issas and Danakil (Afar)." Its leader was Mahmoud Harbi, along with Hassan Gouled, the present head of the opposition, and Ali Aref Bourhan (an Afar), the present president of the council and a stooge of France.

In 1950 an election was held; beforehand, the Issas had convinced Paris to redraw the electoral lines in such a way as to definitively weaken the representation of Arabs and non-Issa Somalis. Issa notables were then able to dominate the whole of indigenous political life. In 1953 Hassan Gouled (an Issa) was elected councillor of the republic, and in 1957 Mahmoud Harbi became first vice-president of the government council. Nevertheless, in 1958 when de Gaulle proposed his famous referendum on the French Community, Harbi campaigned for a "no" vote and waged a battle for independence. His appeal won only about 25 percent of the vote in a country in which electoral trickery is a permanent institution and a good part of the tribal notables cast votes for their entire family and clans. Moreover, (and this was a result of this very factor), a majority of Afars voted "yes."

The French government later dissolved the territorial assembly and promulgated a new election law reducing the weight of the Issas. The administration threw itself into a campaign to attract the Afars, who were still not very numerous in the city of Djibouti, and in 1959 it was an Afar, Ahmed Dini, who acceded to the post of vice president of the council; in 1960, another Afar, Ali Aref, took over the post. In 1963 yet another new electoral law further strengthened the representation of the Afars in the territorial assembly. The colonial administration reigned as master in close liaison with the Afar chiefs and notables.

French identity cards were denied to some Issas on the most miserable pretexts of administrative processing. This situation, aggravated by nomadism, led to an absurd imbroglio in which brother and sister had different nationalities and thus not the same rights. Young Issas who had always lived in the FTAI were refused French nationality and were thus denied any jobs in the administration, the essential sector of salaried labor. This mass of unemployed youth constituted the turbulent sector of a poverty-stricken urban population.

Discontent was generally diverted by the fact that the French administration on the whole accorded French nationality and electoral rights to the great mass of Afars, even those who had lived in Ethiopia. Thus,

conflict between the two ethnic groups, a genuine diversion of the masses, was liable to break out at any moment. This was topped off by the effects of the closing of the Suez Canal in 1967, the widespread corruption of indigenous leaders, and so on.

When it was announced that de Gaulle would visit the territory in August 1966, a secret opposition committee including both Issas and some oppositional Afars was founded. While en route to Phnom Penh, where he was preparing to give the United States some lessons in decolonization, de Gaulle stopped in Djibouti, where he witnessed a murderous riot during which the demonstrating population was machine-gunned by colonial troops.

One month later, the French government decided to propose a "referendum" on the future of the territory. The usual trading in influence, trickery, and the policy of attracting the Afar chiefs produced the usual results: The referendum came down to a simple arithmetical operation, the manipulated Afar group giving a victory to the "yes" vote. One figure sheds a good deal of light on these assertions: between 1958 and 1965 the Somali electorate increased 55 percent, while the Afar electorate increased 197 percent!

Following the referendum, the indigenous political team led by Ali Aref stabilized its power to some extent. It went so far as to publicly call for the expulsion of all Somalis from public and private employment. Thus, the 1,200 Somali dockers were replaced by Afar workers. Somalis who had not immediately returned to their jobs in the administration after the referendum were laid off. And, in the supreme note of irony, the territory changed its name: It was no longer called "French Somaliland," but instead "the Territory of Afars and Issas." The council elected in July 1967 included two Issa ministers.

Nevertheless, this terrible ethnic antagonism could not be maintained unflinchingly as sedentarization and urbanization grew in Djibouti, as Somalia and Ethiopia bolstered the centralizing power of their state apparatuses, as poverty and repression remained the common lot of the populations. The opposition between the two groups must be interpreted in the light of objective facts. The French presence, which created a centralizing administration, halted the clan wars and placed all clans under the same tutelage, while still basing itself on the subjective rivalries and interests of the notables. French favors were successively bestowed upon the Arab and Somali outsiders at the time of the construction of the railway, on the Issas from the end of the second world war until 1958, and on the Afars since that time. The period is now favorable to the emergence on the political scene of new generations of Afars and Issas, anti-colonialist and ready to merge themselves into a common crucible of struggle.

### **An agitated region**

The ethnic questions that partially fueled political life in the French Territory of Afars and Issas constitute but a sample of the incredible national and ethnic imbroglio of this whole region of Africa, and especially Ethiopia and Somalia. Obviously, the problem of borders relates above all to the battle over the division of economic resources.

In 1952 the United Nations granted Ethiopia permission to attach Eritrea to its territory in the form of a federa-



tion, a decision that in 1962 was converted into a colonial and purely and simply repressive annexation. The ports of Massaua and Assab (in Eritrea) represent not unimportant props for Ethiopian trade. Nonetheless, for various reasons these ports are not at all prepared for significant investment. That is why Djibouti, linked to Addis Ababa since 1917, remains the essential outlet to the sea for the Ethiopian economy. Since the railway was completed, the future of the French Territory of Afars and Issas has virtually constituted an element of internal politics in Ethiopia. The railway became an Ethiopian company in 1959 and its headquarters was transferred to Addis Ababa. In the last analysis, Ethiopia can consider the French presence as a guarantee for its own interests.



Things are of the same order from the Somali standpoint. In 1941 British Minister Lord Bevin raised the idea of a "Greater Somalia" assembling all the Somali ethnic groups scattered among Kenya, Italian Somaliland, Ethiopian Ogaden, British Somaliland, and Djibouti into a British protectorate. This idea was later taken up by Somali nationalist circles. In 1960, after the creation of the Republic of Somalia, which unified the Italian and British ex-colonies, these aspirations were used by the new state to bolster its credibility among the populations. Tension in the region increased rapidly. In 1963 and 1964 there were sharp clashes between the Ethiopian and Somali armies. An intervention by the Organization of African Unity in 1967 rendered the conflict more discreet. Somalia, a country of three million inhabitants, has only a small army and could not oppose the Ethiopian army, which is aided and trained by the United States and Israel.

This situation later evolved. The Mogadiscio regime (Somalia) made a diplomatic turn toward the Soviet Union, obtaining enough military aid so that before the outbreak of the Angolan crisis, Somalia was the second largest customer for Soviet arms in Africa, after Egypt. With the announcement of a possible change in status for the French Territory of Afars and Issas, the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia heated up again. Ethiopia, which insists on denying the existence of the Eritrean nation and which is clinging to Oqaden, the subsoil of which contains oil, now stands very close to French policy. For its part, Somalia is exhibiting firmness, relying on African diplomacy, which in its majority favors independence for the FTAI.

## The time of decolonization

Portuguese decolonization and the departure of the Spanish from West Sahara makes France the last colonial power in Africa. Since the announcement of the independence of the Portuguese colonies, it has become obvious that Paris cannot remain silent about the status of the FTAI. Most of the African states, even those that are closely linked to French imperialism, have turned toward support for the project of independence for Djibouti. At this time, the Ligue Populaire Africaine pour l'Indépendance (LPAI — African People's League for Independence), led by Hassan Gouled, came forward in the opposition. Ali Aref, a corrupt small-time politician who sees himself as a genuine feudal potentate, began suggesting that the LPAI represented nothing and was only a den of dangerous agitators funded by foreigners (presumably Somalis). The French government, essentially seeking to preserve its own interests, initially put pressure on Ali Aref to at least hold out the possibility of a dialogue with the LPAI. A real weathervane, Ali Aref was the warmest advocate of remaining in the French Republic until the French government itself began to speak of a "process leading to independence." On May 22, 1975, Olivier Stirn, French colonial minister, received some representatives of the LPAI, thus recognizing the representativity of the group. On September 12, 1975, reporting on an interview he had had with French President Giscard d'Estaing, Ali Aref stated: "In the future, our ambition is to peacefully integrate ourselves into the concert of nations which form our environment and with which we feel the need to cooperate fraternally and loyally. We are going to make new contacts abroad, in particular with the Organization of African Unity, with a view toward preparing the final stage in our political evolution."

Nevertheless, this outward appearance on the part of the French government and Ali Aref does not represent an abandoning of imperialist claims. The French army and police lose no opportunity to harass and imprison the militants of the LPAI or to repress the populations. On December 29, 1976, Ali Aref affirmed that Djibouti's accession to independence was irreversible. "The majority of the population, 90 percent of them," he said, "want this independence, but not at any price. . . . We want a military and economic guarantee from France as well as a guarantee from the OAU that our borders will be respected." He further asked for the maintenance of a French military base, stressing that this military presence would not only guarantee the integrity of Djibouti but would also preserve equilibrium and peace in the region.

Ethiopia and Somalia have since recognized the territory and have renounced any annexation, but Somalia has protested vigorously against a "neocolonial project" that would maintain an imperialist military threat on its borders.

## The opposition

In February 1972 the Union Populaire Africaine (African People's Union), an organization with a large Issa majority, led by Hassan Gouled, fused with the Ligue pour l'Avenir et l'Ordre (League for the Future and Order), which included Afars around Ahmed Dini Ahmed who opposed Ali Aref. The new group took the name Ligue Populaire Africaine (African People's League).



Until 1973, this organization concentrated essentially on making electoral gains. But on the occasion of a decree of the Constitutional Council on November 28, 1973, sanctioning a policy of electoral fraud, it decided to give up any electoral competition. In February 1975 the group Action pour la Justice et le Progrès (Action for Justice and Progress), a pro-Giscard formation (!), joined the League. After that, the African People's League adopted the name Ligue Populaire Africaine pour l'Indépendance (African People's League for Independence). Since November 1974, Hassan Gouled had been waging a campaign for negotiated independence. The LPAI has won recognition from both the OAU and the Arab League.

In France, the LPAI is supported and aided by the reformist opposition, mainly the Socialist party, to which the LPAI seems closely linked. The LPAI constitutes a peculiar political formation. Although led by a team certain of whose members (such as Hassan Gouled) are dubious old politicians, it now rests on a genuine inter-ethnic mass base, which lends it the role of a quasi-mass organization in the suburbs of Djibouti. Neither of the two armed groups, both of which are based abroad, can claim such a base.

The Front de Libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS — Somali Coast Liberation Front), which was responsible for the kidnapping of about thirty French children from a schoolbus, is generally under the influence of the Somali government. This influence may intensify if we are to believe the current rumors that the group's former leader is now in prison in Mogadiscio and that he has been replaced by a successor who is closer to Somali positions.

As for the Mouvement de Libération de Djibouti (Djibouti Liberation Movement), which is supported and aided by Ethiopia, it has now been reduced to issuing appeals that conform to the pro-French policy of Addis Ababa. For the immediate future one thing is certain: The French government will not be able to avoid a dialogue, even if indirect, with the LPAI. This organization, reformist, would most likely be satisfied with a liberal program.

In addition, generally speaking, the geographical and social configuration of the French Territory of Afars and Issas broadly limits the possibilities for a guerrilla campaign waged through infiltration. The overall situa-



tion is determined by what happens in Djibouti, and only an organization deeply implanted among the urban population will be able to assert itself against the colonial power.

## The crisis of French imperialism

In spite of the current concessions and operations, the French government's attitude toward Djibouti more generally goes back to imperialist policy throughout this region and particularly in the islands of the Indian Ocean. The repression is as important as the strategic interests involved.

Djibouti is a military garrison of about 7,000 men since the latest events. In "normal times" about 6,000 soldiers are stationed there, along with a squadron of F-100 combat aircraft, some troop transport forces and helicopters, and a naval force. This apparatus is integrated into the French military array in the Indian Ocean, along with the island of Réunion (2,000 men) and the island of Mayotte. Since the situation in the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) has resulted in the withdrawal of French troops from that country, Djibouti has become the decisive nub of this whole apparatus. Because of this and because of the independence of the Comoro Islands, the French government has relied on the bourgeoisie of the island of Mayotte to provoke a spontaneous "self-determination" of the populations of this island in favor of remaining French.

All this represents one aspect of imperialist repression. The other aspect is even more sordid. After the riots of 1966, an electrified barbed-wire barricade, reinforced by a minefield and watched from above by observation towers, was constructed around the city. This barricade isolates the capital from the rest of the territory. The aim is to prevent thousands of Issas who were expelled from the city in 1966 from returning. To get through the barricade you have to be white or else be able to prove French nationality. The troops regularly open fire on people trying to pass through. Legally, these deaths are identified as "accidental." In June 1968 Omar Osman Mabeh, head of the opposition, was sentenced to death on charges of having committed an attack.<sup>(3)</sup> More than half of the jury designated to try him were Europeans, and not just any old Europeans. Included were the director of the industrial credit national bank, the director of Shell, a large importer, the director of maritime shipping, and the head of general affairs for the colonial administration.

Up to now, Ali Aref has been able to maneuver. He has received implicit support from Ethiopia in exchange for strangling the rebellion of Sultan Ali Mirah, an Afar chief, against the authority of the Ethiopian state. In addition, he has been content to reject the LPAI as "nothing but foreign agents" linked to Somalia. But the crisis of French colonialism is not limited to the small territory of Djibouti, and the French bourgeoisie consequently finds itself compelled to make compromises in order to dam up a process that would eventually threaten the island of Réunion and the Antilles.

Although the economic crisis has been extremely tragic for the French Territory of Afars and Issas, Ali Aref has been content to assert that the economic situation is rather healthy and to add, "My chauffeur makes more than a Somali general." (Agence France-Presse, January 20.) Can such a puppet serve for very long as the main political tool of the French government? On Feb-

**continued p. 21**



# IS THE USSR AN IMPERIALIST COUNTRY?

Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the Chinese leaders have termed the USSR an imperialist country. This designation is by no means a new one. It has appeared regularly in the writings of members of tendencies which consider that the USSR is a capitalist country.<sup>1</sup> There is even a *certain logic* in this position. For if the USSR is really a capitalist country, and if we have been witnessing a real expansionism on its part, then this—in the epoch in which we live, termed by Marxists the epoch of imperialism, 'highest stage of capitalism'—can be nothing other than imperialism in the classical sense of the term.

The aim of this article is to examine this theory according to which the USSR is 'imperialist'. Leaving aside versions of it which have by now been forgotten, it will concentrate on views which have some influence within the revolutionary vanguard today: the position developed by Tony Cliff and the International Socialism group; the position of the Chinese Communist Party and its followers throughout the world; and the position of the French organization *Révolution!*

## Tony Cliff and 'Russian Imperialist Expansion'

The International Socialist position was developed by Tony Cliff in his *Russia: a Marxist Analysis*, which contains a chapter on 'The Imperialist Expansion of Russia'. State capitalism is therefore, in his view, an imperialist capitalism.

In discussing Cliff's views, I shall deliberately ignore certain of his arguments concerning the Russification of the Soviet republics. This aspect of a manifestation of great-Russian chauvinism already existed—and was de-

nounced at the time by Lenin—in 1922-3, i.e. at a time when, even according to Cliff, there was not yet any question of Russian imperialism.

Cliff's overall theoretical approach to the question is somewhat individual. He begins by asserting correctly that the indiscriminate use of the term 'imperialism' to denote different forms of expansion generates confusion. He then recalls the criteria developed by Lenin in *Imperialism: Highest Stage of Capitalism* to characterize imperialism. Then he attempts to show that one of these criteria (the export of capital) does not apply to certain cases (Japan). Since, after this, he feels justified in abandoning this criterion, he considers that its non-applicabil-

<sup>1</sup> Erich Farl, 'The State Capitalist Genealogy' in *International*, Vol. 2, No. 1. For some typical examples see:—

(a) R. Louzon, 'L'héritage du Czar ou celui de Lénine?', *La Révolution Proletarienne*, 1 August 1929; *Contre le Courant*, 21 September 1929, p. 11.

(b) Daniel Logan, 'L'explosion d'impérialisme bureaucratique', *Quatrième Internationale*, February 1946, pp. 5-10.

(c) Tony Cliff, *Russia: A Marxist Analysis*, International Socialism, London 1963, pp. 176-191.

(d) *Peking Review* (and other publications from People's China), *passim* since 1968.

(e) *Cahiers Révolution!* No. 3, 'Révolution et contre-révolution en URSS', Paris 1972, pp. 62-4.

(f) Milovan Djilas, 'Thèmes contemporains', *Questions Actuelles du Socialisme* No. 1, April-March 1951. (See also E. Germain's refutation, 'The Theory of State Capitalism', in *Fourth International* No. 112, September-October 1951). Djilas's article represented the official view of the Yugoslav leadership in the early fifties—a view, however, which they subsequently abandoned.

<sup>2</sup> Lenin, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Moscow 1967, Vol. 1, p. 745.



ity to the Soviet Union has no significance whatever, and that, in spite of that non-applicability, the USSR is indeed imperialist. In this way, as we shall see, he forgets what he himself had taken as his starting-point, i.e. that the indiscriminate use of the term imperialism leads to confusion. For to abandon the Leninist definition of imperialism leads inevitably to using the term for all cases of economic and territorial expansion.

Let us take a closer look at the arguments we have so summarily outlined. The criterion used by Lenin to distinguish imperialism from the other stages of capitalism and referred to by Cliff is the following: 'the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance.' This feature itself results, as Cliff recognizes, from the tendency of capital to go where the rate of profit is highest and, in a more general way, imperialism results from the decline of the rate of profit as the organic composition of capital ( $c/v$ ) increases.

Now Japanese imperialism, Cliff asserts, which all agree in characterizing as an imperialism, does not have this feature. At the time when it was exporting vast quantities of capital to Manchuria—its only important colony prior to the Sino-Japanese war—profits were high in Japan itself. Cliff notes that Japanese investments in Manchuria went up from 97.2 million yen in 1932 to 263 million yen in 1936 and to 1.103 million yen in 1939, while average profits were extremely high: between 16 and 20% in 1936 and 1937 (see pp. 178-9). The source of Cliff's error is here plain to see. He takes as his starting-point the fact that there were high rates of profit in 1936. But the starting-point which he should have taken is 1. not an absolute rate of profit but changes in the rate of profit, and 2. not rates of profit in 1936 but those in 1930-31—i.e. at the moment when Japanese capital began to move into Manchuria on a large scale.

Henri Claude<sup>3</sup> informs us in this respect that the profits of all Japanese industrial companies taken as a whole fell from 531 million yen in 1928 to 268 million yen in 1931. It was precisely at this moment that Japanese capital began to invest massively in Manchuria. Inversely, the figures given by Cliff himself for 1936-7—a period in which the rate of profit was exceptionally high (and in which it moreover incorporated the profits from Manchuria)—show that at the moment the tendency to invest in Manchuria was declining: 378 million yen in 1936; 263 million in 1936; 348 million in 1937.

The first part of Cliff's argument thus rests on an incorrect selection of facts. However, it allows him to ignore the key criterion: the quest for a higher rate of profit.<sup>4</sup>

Having admitted that the USSR does not have this feature of imperialism, Cliff then develops an argument which can be summed up as follows: the aim of Russian imperialist expansion is to provide itself with the means to close the gap which separates Russia from the capitalist West; essential elements in this policy were the dismantling of factories in the satellite countries and their removal to the East; the use of 'unequal exchange' in commercial dealings with the satellite countries; and the installation in these countries of Russian enterprises. The dismantling of factories and the 'joint stock companies' now belong to the past (it should be noted that this chapter of Cliff's book was originally published in 1955). Moreover, this dismantling is not an export of

capital, but rather the precise opposite!. As for the 'unequal exchange', we shall be discussing this below when we examine the views of Peking.

## The Chinese Positions

Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and in particular since Chou En-lai's speech of 23 August 1968 to an official reception offered by the Rumanian ambassador in Peking, when Chou declared that 'the clique of Soviet revisionist renegades has degenerated long since into social-imperialism and social-fascism'<sup>5</sup>, the term 'imperialist' has been used by the Chinese leaders on numerous occasions in referring to the Soviet Union. According to the Chinese, the USSR carries out imperialist policies in two spheres: in the people's democracies and in the colonial and semi-colonial countries.

### *The People's Democracies*

The 'USSR revisionists', it is alleged, use Comecon to pillage and exploit the peoples of East Europe.<sup>6</sup> Czechoslovakia, for example, is a 'Soviet revisionist colony'.<sup>7</sup> In Mongolia too, 'the Soviet revisionists' follow a policy of colonial domination, forcing Mongolia to develop its stock-rearing and pillaging the country by demanding exorbitant prices for exports to it of Soviet industrial products.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, the Soviet republics of Kazakhstan and Central Asia are allegedly transformed into grain-stores or into producers of wool and cotton, while being unable to develop their local industry. Moreover, their agricultural produce is bought up at low prices, while they have to pay top prices for what is supplied to them.<sup>9</sup>

However, these denunciations of Soviet 'imperialism' in East Europe have become muted since the 1971 right turn in Chinese foreign policy.

### *Asia, Africa and Latin America*

In the countries of these three continents, 'Soviet revisionist social-imperialism' is said by the Chinese to infiltrate under cover of economic and military 'aid'. 'By giving "aid", Soviet revisionism aims not only to pillage the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, but above all

<sup>3</sup> Henri Claude, *De la crise économique à la guerre mondiale*, OCIA, Paris 1945, p. 8.

<sup>4</sup> It should be added that Cliff's entire line of argument on Russian imperialism is merely a secondary aspect of the theory of state capitalism. Indeed, according to Michael Kidron, one of the principal theorists of the IS group, imperialism is only the penultimate stage of capitalism (see Michael Kidron, 'Imperialism: Highest Stage but One', *International Socialism* 9, Summer 1962). A capitalist country may therefore have 'passed beyond' the imperialist stage.

<sup>5</sup> *Peking Review*, 26 August 1968, p. 9. See too the 'explanatory note' in *Peking Review*, 2 September 1968, p. 12.

<sup>6</sup> *Peking Review*, 2 December 1968, p. 24; 13 January 1969, p. 23.

<sup>7</sup> *Peking Review*, 4 November 1968, p. 44.

<sup>8</sup> *Peking Review*, 29 July 1969, p. 19.

<sup>9</sup> *Peking Review*, 25 August 1969, p. 31.



to control politically the beneficiary countries in order to establish its colonial domination as new tsars.<sup>10</sup> Although the Chinese leaders recognize that the USSR often only asks for a very low rate of interest (2.5%) on its loans, they consider that the 'real rate of interest is to be found in the high prices of their goods' and that what is involved is in fact a disguised system of usury.<sup>11</sup>

It is above all with respect to India that Soviet aid policy is criticized.<sup>12</sup> According to the Chinese, Russian economic 'aid' is nothing but a simple export of capital. The USSR has become India's second biggest creditor, to the tune of 10.22 thousand million rupees since 1955. Through its aid to the public sector in India, the USSR controls 30% of steel production, 35% of oil refining, 20% of electricity production, 60% of power station equipment, 85% of heavy machinery production, 75% of production of electric motors, 80% of oil prospecting and extraction and 25% of aluminium production. India will have to export increasing quantities of goods to the Soviet Union and import increasing quantities from the latter, thus becoming more and more dependent.

#### *Critique of the Chinese Positions: a new Kautskyism?*

The Chinese positions on social-imperialism differ from those of Cliff in that they do not take as their starting-point the definition of imperialism given by Lenin. Yet that definition, despite its incomplete character, remains the most scientifically correct definition of imperialism to have been put forward up to now. Let us recall it briefly, well-known as it is:—

'a) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life;

b) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this "finance capital", of a financial oligarchy;

c) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance;

d) the formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves, and

e) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed."<sup>13</sup>

The two first criteria are linked to the analysis of the development of the relations of production in the capitalist countries. We shall not discuss them here (but see our 'The State Capitalist Genealogy' in *International*, Vol. 2, No. 1). The last two criteria are the consequence at a world level of the functioning of the system. The kernel of the definition, which forms the crucial intermediary link between the first two and the last two criteria, is the third: the export of capital which becomes more and more important and which aims, as we said earlier, to find the possibility of making higher profits and thus of combating the tendency—inherent in capitalism—for rates of profit to decline. The Chinese hardly discuss this aspect of the problem.

In the same work in which he gives this definition (*Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*), Lenin criticizes Kautsky, the representative of centrism in the workers' movement. He reproaches him with considering that imperialism is simply one policy among others, which may equally well be replaced by another policy, i.e. a question of choice, rather than an organic tendency of monopoly capitalism. The Chinese positions on the USSR are, in fact, nearer to this view of Kautsky's than they are to that of Lenin, inasmuch as they make no reference whatever to what conditions imperialism (the tendency of the rate of profit to fall), and inasmuch as Soviet aid to the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America is often pre-

sented as a means which the USSR uses for the purpose of establishing its political domination.

There are two further arguments used by the Chinese leaders to prove that the USSR has imperialist policies:

a) arrangements like that with India, whereby the USSR buys goods manufactured in India thanks to Soviet aid, are presented by the Chinese as a measure for the subordination of the Indian economy;

b) the phenomenon—also, as we have seen, denounced by Cliff—of unequal exchange, above all in relations between the USSR and the people's democracies.

The first argument does not show that what is involved is imperialism, quite the contrary. For the arrangements under which the USSR buys products made in India are not necessarily a measure of subordination at all. Indian governments have long sought to safeguard the economic development of the country by arranging to pay for their imports in non-convertible national currency, in order to push the countries who supply them to spend the currency obtained either in India itself or in exchange for Indian products.<sup>14</sup> This has been the case since the fifties with the USSR, the GDR and Poland.

As for 'unequal exchange', it should be noted that this criticism is made with respect to the people's democracies, and not with respect to economic and commercial relations between the USSR and the countries of the 'third world'. This problem has often been debated in the past with respect to exchanges within COMECON. These exchanges have certain specific characteristics<sup>15</sup>:

—the contracts were based, from the end of the war until 1951, upon current world prices;

—from 1951 until 1956, world prices in 1949 and the first half of 1950 were taken as a basis, in order to avoid the price fluctuations provoked on the world market by the Korean War;

—in 1957 the average 1956 prices were used;

—after 1957, hard prices were used for the entire period of the various trade agreements—in other words world prices 'corrected' to eliminate the fluctuations provoked by speculation or by the conjuncture;

—after 1962 the average of world prices between 1957 and 1961 was adopted;

—a further revision of prices was made in 1965-6, and the average of world prices for the period 1960-64 was adopted.

Now, the use of world market prices inevitably introduces an inequality between the countries involved, because of the unequal degree of economic development of each. As Marx explained in *Capital*, trade allows advanced countries to sell goods at a price which is higher than their value. At the same time, this does not alter the fact that this price is lower than that at which the less developed countries could themselves produce the same goods. For the quantity of labour incorporated in the exporting country is much less than that which the less advanced country would have to put in. Thus international trade between the 'socialist'

<sup>10</sup> *Peking Review*, 14 July 1969, p. 25.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 26-7.

<sup>12</sup> *Peking Review*, 24 January 1972, article 'Soviet Revisionism's Neo-colonialism in India', p. 20.

<sup>13</sup> Lenin, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Moscow 1967, Vol. 1, pp. 745-6.

<sup>14</sup> *India. A Reference Annual*, 1960, Delhi 1960, p. 339.

<sup>15</sup> According to D. F. Fokin, *Vneshnjaja Torgovlja SSSR (1946-1963)*, IMO Moscow 1964.



countries involves a continuous drain of value from the poor countries to the rich countries.<sup>16</sup>

Here the criticism levelled by the Chinese is based on a reality. It will remain valid as long as there is exchange of goods at world prices. However, it should be noted that the solution to this problem is hard to find in economic terms: for it would be practically impossible to carry out exchanges systematically on the basis of the costs of production in each producing country. If such were indeed the case, the producing country would very often find it more advantageous to reorient its exchanges towards the capitalist world. Let us take an example. Suppose for a moment that Britain is a workers' state exporting cars to Yugoslavia and importing in return raw materials (copper, zinc, mercury, etc.). If the costs of production were taken as the basis, Britain would have to export its cars (which we can assume for the sake of the example to cost less than the world market price, since they would contain less crystallized labour than elsewhere in the world) extremely cheaply. On the other hand, it would have to import raw materials at very high prices. Consequently, it would go elsewhere for its raw materials and would sell its cars to other countries (Scandinavia, for instance).

Thus, the problem is by no means one related solely to imperialism. The solution of such a problem in the framework of the workers' states can, therefore, only be sought in another direction: the international coordination and planning of investment, aid, interest-free loans, etc. to permit the economically less developed countries to 'catch up' with the more advanced ones.

It should furthermore be noted that there are cases in which the USSR *buys* at prices above the world market. When the USSR and Cuba signed the 1965-70 sugar agreement—in 1964—the price fixed (6 cents a pound) was below the world market price. But all forecasts suggested a decline in world market prices, and indeed for almost the entire period covered by the agreement world prices were *below* 6 cents a pound. Moreover, the price fixed for the Chinese-Cuban agreement covering the same period was based on the terms of the Russian-Cuban agreement.

Thus all the criticisms levelled by the Chinese leaders, rather than adding up to a critique based on Marxist criteria, appear instead to be merely polemics against particular political actions on the part of the USSR (e.g. the occupation of Czechoslovakia).

### The position of 'Révolution!'

The position of the French group *Revolution!* is more nuanced. It flows from the group's position on the class nature of the Soviet Union. For *Révolution!*, the USSR is not (yet) a capitalist state. As early as 1927-8 power was won by a 'new exploiting class'. The latter is forced by the economic crisis to orient itself towards the restoration of classical capitalism. Thus the thesis of *Révolution!* is situated midway between the notion of a 'new class' and that of a 'new bourgeoisie'. It sees a new class which is in the process of becoming differentiated and of giving birth gradually to a new bourgeoisie. This process, however, is far from being completed. The comrades of *Révolution!* consider, therefore, that the Chinese position on 'social-imperialism' is without theoretical foundation<sup>17</sup> and that one will only be able to speak of imperialism when capitalism is fully developed (i.e. when the law of value dominates the entire social process of production in the Soviet Union).

Nevertheless, according to these comrades, the USSR is already inserted within 'the imperialism concert' (has

been since Yalta), having entered it 'for the purpose of redefining new spheres of influence'. During the last few years, the turn 'towards an active imperialist policy' has been particularly marked.

In the positions of the *Révolution!* group, the definition of this turn 'towards' an imperialist policy is marked by a predominance of the 'political level'. In reality, what they call 'insertion within the imperialist concert' covers Russian efforts to maintain the *status quo vis-à-vis* imperialism. But this is not an imperialist policy. At most, it is a policy of complicity with imperialism, i.e. a policy characteristic of a conservative bureaucracy.

The comrades of *Révolution!* also denounce the fact that, under cover of economic aid, Russian capital competes with American capital for the economic domination of certain countries. However, they do not offer any detailed explanation of the mechanism of Soviet aid which, in most cases, does not lead to economic domination of the firms or sectors which receive it, but on the contrary to a reinforcement of national bourgeoisies and national capitalism (sometimes 'state capitalism') in the 'third world' countries to which it goes.

### Conclusion

In October 1939, Trotsky wrote as follows concerning the 'imperialism' of the Soviet Union:

'Can the present expansion of the Kremlin be termed imperialism? First of all we must establish what social content is included in this term. History has known the "imperialism" of the Roman state based on slave labour, the imperialism of feudal land-ownership, the imperialism of commercial and industrial capital, the imperialism of the Tsarist monarchy, etc. The driving force behind the Moscow bureaucracy is indubitably the tendency to expand its power, its prestige, its revenues. This is the element of "imperialism" in the widest sense of the word which was a property in the past of all monarchies, oligarchies, ruling castes, medieval estates and classes. However, in contemporary literature, at least Marxist literature, imperialism is understood to mean the *expansionist policy of finance capital* which has a very sharply defined economic content. To employ the term "imperialism" for the foreign policy of the Kremlin—without elucidating exactly what this signifies—means simply to identify the policy of the Bonapartist bureaucracy with the policy of monopolistic capitalism on the basis that both one and the other utilize military force for expansion. Such an identification, capable of sowing only confusion, is much more proper to petty-bourgeois democrats than to Marxists.'<sup>18</sup>

The theories of 'Russian imperialism' or 'social-imperialism' offered by the Chinese bureaucracy, or by groups like the International Socialists and *Révolution!*, attempt to provide us with an 'elucidation'. But this turns out, on analysis, to be an extremely fragile one, like every explanation based on analogies. It in no way arms us to study concretely the contradictory behaviour of the Soviet bureaucracy.

end

<sup>16</sup> See Henri Valin, 'L'évolution du COMECON et les problèmes posés par la division internationale du travail entre Etats ouvriers bureaucratisés', *Quatrième Internationale* No. 23, November 1964.

<sup>17</sup> *Cahiers Révolution!* No. 3, pp. 62ff.

<sup>18</sup> Leon Trotsky, *In Defence of Marxism*, New York 1965, p. 26.



bruary 23 Ethiopia let it be known that it would favor an agreement between Ali Aref and the LPAI.

Effectively, the new Ethiopian regime is confronted by a centrifugal process throughout its entire territory. The armed struggle in Eritrea has enabled the People's Liberation Forces and the Eritrean Liberation Front to gain control of the countryside and penetrate the cities. The government's "agrarian reform" has driven the feudalists to rebel against the regime and galvanized the peasant masses to struggle for deeper reforms. The Afars led by Ali Mirah are in rebellion, Somalia has laid claim to Ogaden, and so on. Since Ethiopia is a basic axis of imperialist strategy in eastern Africa and since the Djibouti affair constitutes a credibility test for the local regimes, it is understandable that French colonialism should assume an important task in maintaining the equilibrium of the imperialist system as a whole.

The demand for the immediate independence of the French Territory of Afars and Issas, with the complete and unconditional withdrawal of French troops, must be a central slogan for the French workers movement. On February 10, 1976, in an action revealing of both the crisis in the army and the crisis of imperialism, a soldiers' committee at a French air base published a communiqué denouncing the sending of draftees to Dji-

bouti. This communiqué declared, among other things, "We are not destined to serve French imperialism and to repress a people struggling for their independence. . . . The soldiers' committee calls for support to the struggle of the Afar and Issa peoples for their independence." That is an example that should be followed.

February 25, 1976

#### FOOTNOTES:

1. As far as off-continent Africa is concerned, France also maintains its domination over the island of Réunion and the island of Mayotte in the Comoro archipelago.

2. Of the 130,000 inhabitants of the FTAI today, there are about 11,000 Europeans, 8,000 Arabs, 50,000 Afars, and 60,000 Somalis, of which 45,000 belong to the Issa groups, and 15,000 to the Gadabouri, Issaq, and Darod groups. But not all these people benefit from "French nationality." Thus, there are 3,000 "French citizens" among the Arabs, 47,000 among the Afars, 24,000 among the Issas, and 6,000 among the other Somali groups.

3. Pardoned, he was released in March 1975 under the pressure of a FLCS commando group that had taken the French ambassador to Somalia as a hostage.

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## CHINA

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The understanding of Chinese foreign policy is an essential task for African militants. Of late China has supported the FNLA, this at a time when the FNLA-UNITA, backed by South African imperialism was fighting against the stalinist backed MPLA. This is the latest innovation of Maoist foreign policy in Africa. During the 1960's China, supported many left nationalist regimes like Tanzania, Somalia etc, alongside with imperialist puppets like Mulele in the Congo; also at that time the MP A. Then China gradually changed its line; first by giving support to UNITA and finally to the imperialist backed FNLA. The logic of Maoist foreign policy would therefore appear questionable, but as the following article by P. Rousset shows it does indeed have a certain logic.

We shall return to the issue of China in future numbers of this journal.

# CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY: THE THREE WORLDS OF TENG HSHIAO-PING

—by PIERRE ROUSSET—

The Chinese delegation to the sixth special session of the United Nations, held in April 1974, was led by Teng Hsiao-ping. That in itself was something of an event. In 1965 Teng had been the general secretary of the Chinese Communist party. During the Cultural Revolution he was, along with Lui Shao-chi and Peng Chen, one of the main leaders to be demoted. In Peking at that time he was called the "number two Chinese Khrushchev." For seven years he was not heard from. Then, about a year before his triumphal entry into the UN, he discreetly reappeared. Today he has once again become one of the most important leaders of the Peoples Republic of China.

This quiet rehabilitation, unaccompanied by any self-criticism from either Teng or his former detractors, occurred while the anti-Confucious, anti-Lin campaign was going full blast.

That says a lot about the existence in China of a bureaucratic layer that has installed itself in power and is perfectly capable of settling important political problems completely outside the control of the masses. The Cultural Revolution, despite the mass mobilization that it gave rise to, did not overthrow this bureaucracy. It only modified the relationship of forces both within the bureaucratic layer itself and between the bureaucracy and the masses.



But more important than the personal reemergence of Teng was the programmatic speech he made during the UN special session, which was devoted to a discussion of raw materials. During the discussion, the semicolonial raw-material-producing countries tried to forge a bloc against the imperialist countries.

## Teng's three worlds

Not so long ago, the Chinese CP considered the world as divided into four great blocs: The two "superpowers" constituted the first bloc, the socialist camp the second; then there were two "intermediate" blocs, one made up of "secondary" imperialist powers (that is, imperialist powers other than the United States), the other of underdeveloped or dominated capitalist countries. Now it is true that the intervention of the Chinese delegation during the April UN session was obviously affected by tactical concern with having China be accepted into the "third-world" bloc that was forming at the session. But in his speech, Teng Hsiao-ping went further than that. He formulated an overview of the world situation that revised the Chinese CP's earlier theses on several points and went a long way toward casting Chinese diplomacy in a more consistent light. In a single paragraph he defined the existence of three distinct worlds whose alignment determined the orientation of Peking's foreign policy.

"In this situation of 'great disorder under heaven,'" Teng declared, "all the political forces in the world have undergone drastic division and realignment through prolonged trials of strength and struggle. A large number of Asian, African, and Latin American countries have achieved independence one after another and they are playing an ever greater role in international affairs. As a result of the emergence of social imperialism, the socialist camp, which existed for a time after World War II, is no longer in existence. Owing to the law of uneven development of capitalism, the Western imperialist bloc, too, is disintegrating. Judging by the changes in international relations, the world today actually consists of three parts, or three worlds, that are both interconnected and in contradiction to one another. The United States and the Soviet Union make up the First World. The developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and other regions make up the Third World. The developed countries between the two make up the Second World."<sup>(1)</sup>

The most remarkable feature of the theses developed by Teng Hsiao-ping is the total marginalization of the role of the class struggle in the real sense of the word. The international arena, according to Teng, is dominated by the struggle of the "poor countries" against the "rich countries," of the "small" against the "large."

## Third world: 'motive force' of revolution

There is nothing new in the Chinese leaders' assigning a decisive role in the dynamics of world revolution to the third world. Lin Piao's well-beloved theory of the "zone of storms" clearly showed the Chinese CP's relative skepticism about the capacity of the Western working class to overturn the capitalist system. During the period of the Cultural Revolution the Chinese CP leaders assigned a somewhat more important role to workers struggles. But the theses that are being defended now, as we shall see, do not amount to a new "reliance" on the third world. Just the opposite. But they do indicate three sorts of shifts that tend to systematize, theorize, and generalize features that had already been present in the practice and conceptualization of China's foreign policy in the neocolonial world:

\* The historic tasks assigned to the struggles of the third world are reduced to the search for effective independence from imperialism and "hegemonism." Says Teng: "The numerous developing countries . . . still face the historic task of clearing out the remnant forces of colonialism, developing the national economy and consolidating national independence. . . . They (the developing countries -- INPRECOR) constitute a revolutionary motive force propelling the wheel

of world history and are the main force combatting colonialism, imperialism, and particularly the superpowers."<sup>(2)</sup>

The terminology Teng uses here shows that he is not simply making a declaration intended to comment on a conjunctural event, but rather is attempting to present a strategy for a whole period. The viewpoint expressed here is one of the elements that explains the extremely one-sided analysis the Chinese CP made of the "oil battle," an analysis that "forgot" that the increase in the price of oil benefited mainly the



## 'In this situation of great disorder under heaven. . .

multinational corporations and the indigenous bourgeoisies of the oil-producing countries and not the people of the third world. And we are of course leaving aside the "other problems" with which countries like India and Ethiopia are confronted!

\* The Chinese CP's examination of the conditions necessary for realizing the historic task of achieving independence in the colonial and semicolonial countries completely ignores the social structure of the states involved. This was brought out most clearly by Huang Hua, vice chairman of the Chinese delegation, in his May 1 speech to the UN plenary session. Huang declared that "the necessary prerequisite . . . in safeguarding their (the developing countries' -- INPRECOR) political and economic independence and developing their independent national economies (is) that they should terminate the economic monopoly and plunder by imperialism, sweep away these obstacles and take all necessary measures to protect their economic resources and other rights and interests."<sup>(3)</sup> In no way is the socialist revolution presented as an indispensable condition for achieving real independence from imperialism and the world capitalist market.

\* Most serious of all, however, is the complete assimilation of peoples and "their" governments -- regardless of the governments concerned. Teng Hsiao-ping flatly declares that the "people of the developing countries have the right to choose and decide on their own social and economic systems."<sup>(4)</sup> This is a novel notion of "choice" for a Marxist! If the majority of the anti-imperialist "people" of the third world "choose" the capitalist system, then the Chinese bureaucracy can accord the designation "anti-imperialist" to ultrareactionary and repressive regimes like the shah's in Iran or Haile Selassie's in Ethiopia. The same label can be bestowed on a man like Leopold Senghor, the president of Senegal and one of the most fully-formed products of neocolonialism in former French Africa. Senghor was recently received in Peking by Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung. In his welcoming speech, the Chinese prime minister did not hesitate to salute the Senegalese government, which, it seems, "pursues a policy of nonalignment, opposes imperialism, colonialism, and hegemonism."<sup>(5)</sup> One asks oneself why this assimilation of people to "their" government is not extended to the Soviet Union and North America. For by Teng Hsiao-ping's reasoning, is it not the people of these two "superpowers" who are exploiting the third world?

Chinese diplomacy allows of exceptions to this general rule only in cases of "puppet governments" or of colonial adminis-



trations confronted by already-developed revolutionary governments or fronts (the PRG in South Vietnam, the GRUNK in Cambodia, the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, etc.). But even here, the degree of exception has proved to be extremely limited. Mao's China has declined to break diplomatic relations with the-Chilean junta and has recently accredited a new ambassador representing the junta. Likewise, Nixon's trip to Peking showed that while Peking's recognition of the PRG might not be called into question, the Chinese bureaucracy would not hesitate to define its international strategy without bothering about the grave difficulties it created for the "brother" peoples of Indochina. And today, Maoist policy on Angola is manifesting the same priority of defending state interests and relations. Chinese support has been given to Holden Roberto's Angola National Liberation Front, the right wing of the Angolan national movement that is much less representative than the MPLA.(6) The Chinese government has even recently sent 112 instructors to Kinshasa to aid in organizing Holden's "army." This support to the ANLF is determined by the relations that exist between the Peoples Republic of China and the government of Zaire, which is headed by Joseph Mobutu, one of the murderers of the African revolutionary Patrice Lumumba. This is part and parcel of the whole Maoist policy on central Africa.

## The struggle against 'hegemonism'

So the openly proclaimed top priority of Maoist strategy in the third world is not to bolster revolutionary armed liberation movements, but to try to form a bloc with all the states of the third world as they are now constituted. The aim of this "bloc" is to struggle against the "imperialist" and "hegemonist" policy of the two superpowers. Its main axis is a common defense of "state sovereignty."

In this sense, Peking's foreign policy, while motivated by a bureaucratic conception of state interest, clearly differs from that of the Soviet leadership. The Chinese leadership decided that the opening toward Washington was necessary to enable China to reenter the arena of international diplomacy (to get into the UN, etc.) and to definitively put an end to the economic blockade that was depriving the Chinese economy of material resources that it needed. These were the primary considerations during Nixon's visit to Peking -- to the exclusion of all others, like the Indochinese revolution. This policy of "peaceful coexistence" accepted by the Maoist leadership dealt a severe blow to revolutionary movements in the third world. But it did not give rise to a concerted and protracted détente policy analogous to Moscow's. For one thing, U.S.-Chinese relations are marking time. But the main thing is that the search for a "bloc" with the developing countries implies denunciation of both the "great powers." And while for a time the emphasis seemed to be mainly on the especially pernicious danger to the third world of Soviet "social imperialism," a good dose of criticism is now being directed at both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The "détente" is now continually being described as illusory. On the other hand, Peking considers the struggle for "hegemony" being waged by the two superpowers as involving a constant threat of new world war. It is difficult to separate propaganda from analysis in Maoist assertions about the danger of war, whether between the Soviet Union and the United States (armed conflict between the two sometimes being presented as "inevitable") or between the Soviet Union and China. But since the clashes between Soviet and Chinese troops over the Ussuri River in 1969, tension has clearly grown. The pretext for the clashes was exact delineation of the border between China and the Soviet Union. Since the arrest last March of a Soviet helicopter crew that had strayed over the Chinese border, the Kremlin has suddenly hardened its position. It is now claiming title to part of the Chinese province of Heilongjiang, and particularly is demanding control over the important waterways of this region in which the Amor (Heilung in Chinese) and Ussuri rivers flow together.

This increase in Chinese-Soviet tension is very probably partly explainable by internal political factors. The "Chinese danger" is one of the rare themes on which the Soviet leadership can still count on finding broad popular support. But

Moscow would also be uneasy about the emergence of a new nuclear power on its Asian border. According to Melville Maxwell, the Soviet regime had even established contact with the Kennedy administration to discuss a "preventive" nuclear attack on Chinese nuclear development sites.(8) As of 1973 forty-five Soviet divisions were stationed along the Chinese frontier, as compared with only fifteen in 1967. But, according to the London Institute for Strategic Studies, that would be insufficient for a real attack on China. Moreover, the international context, which is marked by the end of Peking's diplomatic isolation, combined with the fear of nuclear conflict would make such a move very difficult and excessively costly politically.



Painting shows Chinese women taking artillery class. How seriously does Mao take "the danger of war"?

Nevertheless, the struggle against "hegemonism" and the possible danger of war continues to dominate Chinese diplomacy: condemnation of the Asian "collective security" pact proposed by Moscow as an attempt to isolate China, denunciation during the visit of Cypriot leader Makarios to Peking of the competition of the "superpowers" in the Mediterranean, and so

It is in this area that Chinese foreign policy has suffered its most serious setback. The Chinese and Iraqi delegations were the only ones to abstain when the UN Security Council voted to send troops to the Golan Heights to separate Syrian and Israeli forces. The Middle East crisis and the Palestinian question had been one of the main axes of Chinese foreign policy. But Peking has not succeeded in detaching any of the Arab states from the "great powers," nor has it been able to win a favorable hearing among the leaderships of the Palestinian organizations, which are more closely concerned with the Soviet Union.

## Europe: a 'complex' case

"The contention between the superpowers extends over the entire globe," declared Teng. "Strategically," he continued, "Europe is the focus of their contention." (9) Since the imperialist bloc has "disintegrated," part of the Second World (composed of industrialized countries) is supposed to rally to the cause of the Third World. In fact, "The hegemonism and power politics of the two superpowers have also aroused strong dissatisfaction among the developed countries of the Second World." (10) To be sure, this is not a simple problem: "The case of the developed countries in between the superpowers and the developing countries is a complicated one. Some of them still retain colonialist relations of one form or another with Third World countries, and a country like Portugal (the speech took place before the Spínola coup -- INPRECOR) even continues with its barbarous colonial rule. An end must be put to this state of affairs." But: "In varying degrees, all these countries have the desire of shaking off superpower enslavement or control and safeguarding their national independence and the integrity of their sovereignty." (11)

This Maoist analysis and the tasks that logically flow from it



are especially serious. The emergence of a united European capitalist power of the sort that the Chinese CP is calling for would represent the birth of a new imperialist "superpower" to take its place beside the United States. A section of the European bourgeoisie desires this sort of European integration. It would put the European bourgeoisie in a better position to deal with both American competition and the current rise of the Western working class. Worse, a united European bourgeois state with its own government, its own army, and its own diplomacy, could be constructed only on the basis of the crushing of the working class and the defeat of the present upsurge. That would be the only way to allow for the necessary industrial reorganization and investment in the reorganization of production. And furthermore, the emergence of this new power would not put an end to international "tensions." On the contrary, it would provoke (and would have been created by) an exacerbation of world interimperialist competition -- competition for the plunder of the third world and the penetration of the workers states by the developed capitalist world. Revolutionaries cannot be for or against "Europe" in general or the Common Market in particular. They can only be against the Europe of the trusts and for a workers Europe.

The Chinese leaders also turn a blind eye to the counterrevolutionary role of Japan, a role that has been intensified by the strengthening of Japanese imperialism relative to U.S. imperialism. This is not because of an "error" of analysis. It is a manifestation of a world outlook determined by the narrow point of view of a state bureaucracy that is seeking to cash in on the "positive" aspects of the policy of each government in such a way as to bolster its international and internal position. It tries to justify this through the "theory" of primary and secondary contradictions. Peking Review occasionally reports on European workers struggles. But the main thrust of Chinese foreign policy is to find "positive aspects" in the policy of existing governments or of bourgeois oppositions seeking to come to power. Peking made no secret of its preference in the French presidential elections: Chaban-Delmas, who was described as representing the continuation of the Gaullist policy of independence. But as a last resort, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was preferable to Mitterrand, who was saddled with a host of disadvantages: He represented the "Atlanticism" of the Socialists and would have allowed "revisionist" ministers from the Communist party into his government.

While it might have been somewhat "surprising" to see Peking Review report with satisfaction the speech of the most reactionary representative of Swiss general staff, who demanded the "strengthening of national defense," the case of Britain was most "astonishing" of all. At the end of May, Edward Heath, the leader of the Conservative party of Britain, who had just been defeated in the elections, was received in Peking as a chief of state. He got a triumphant reception and was even granted a one-and-a-half-hour interview with Mao Tse-tung. Chinese protocol is extremely exacting, and it is not by accident that these honors were bestowed on the leader of the British opposition. In his speech Teng Hsiao-ping shamelessly sang the praises of the foreign policy of the Conservatives and during the toast proposed at the banquet he "forgot" the unfortunate Mr. Wilson: Heath took advantage of the opportunity to deliver a real election-type speech, touching on Europe, NATO, and the situation of the "medium-sized powers."

The Maoist leadership sometimes tries to justify its opportunism by claiming that it rejects "interfering in the internal affairs of another country." (That is one of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.) But it seems that what's good enough for the Chilean junta is not good enough for the Labour government in Great Britain. And the reason is simple: Heath is a supporter of "Europe" (capitalist Europe, that is), while Wilson, under pressure from broad layers of the workers, is making noises against the Common Market.

As for the "Peoples Democracies" (which Teng Hsiao-ping includes in the Second World), the Maoist leadership has a clear preference for Rumania, since the Bucarest regime has shown some independence from the Kremlin. And Rumania has the sad privilege of being the first bureaucratized workers state to have decided to make significant investments in Pinochet's Chile.

## The development of Asian communism

In spite of the failures it has suffered in the Middle East, in spite of the continuing American intervention in Indochina, and in spite of the extent of the continued Soviet presence in Asia, Chinese diplomacy has been able to ring up some success. Economic trade with advanced capitalist countries is expanding rapidly and has provided China with much ultra-modern equipment. (France, China's eighth largest supplier and fourth largest customer, has just opened in Peking the largest industrial fair it has ever organized abroad.) It is this need for economic trade that accounts for Peking's failure to advance any concrete demands about Macao, which, along with Timor, is Portugal's Asian "province." Peking considers Macao, as well as Hong Kong, to be part of China. But Macao -- again like Hong Kong -- is an essential transit and financial exchange center between the capitalist world and the Peoples Republic of China. This is what led Ho Yin, a multimillionaire who serves as Macao spokesman for the Chinese Communist party, to declare that the overthrow of the Caetano regime in Portugal would change nothing in the status or structure of Macao.(13)

For the Maoist leadership, this qualitative and quantitative increase in commercial exchanges with the capitalist world is essential for enabling the Chinese economy to make a new leap forward. In itself, there is nothing wrong with carrying on such trade. But there is quite a lot wrong with the political moves the Chinese bureaucracy has made to foster that trade.(14) A diplomatic offensive is being aimed at Africa, especially central Africa. (Since January, four African heads of state have visited Peking: Kaunda of Zambia, Boumediene of Algeria, Nyerere of Tanzania, and Senghor of Senegal.) The "battle for raw materials" has enabled China to integrate itself into the third-world "front." But more especially, the situation is evolving very quickly in Southeast Asia and in the Far East.

In April 1974 Peking signed an accord on Sino-Japanese air transport with Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. The signing touched off a furor in Taiwan. To obtain this agreement, Tokyo had to tolerate the rupture of its airline link with Taiwan, which has been an important transit point and will cost the Japanese economy quite dearly. The pro-Taiwan lobby in Tokyo seems to be really running out of steam.

Malaysia in its turn has established diplomatic relations with China, sending its prime minister, Abdul Razak, on a trip to Peking. Malaysia was the first non-Communist country of Southeast Asia to do this. Peking is also rapidly developing its relations with Thailand (which sent a mission to Peking in December 1973) and with the Philippines, whose government is headed by the extremely pro-American Ferdinand Marcos. Even Suharto's Indonesia seems prepared to change its attitude (gradually) toward China. But all this will inevitably have serious consequences for the Communist parties of Asia. The trip of Khieu Sampan, leader of the Khmer Rouge, to Vietnam and China probably resulted in the recentementing of ties between China and the FUNK. But the announcement in 1971 of Nixon's trip to Peking provoked the first serious political break between China and the Vietnamese Communist party -- a break that has only widened since then and that will affect all the Indochinese Communist movements.

Japan has now become the world's second imperialist power. It is intervening in Southeast Asia and was the target of mobilizations during Tanaka's trip to South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In all of these countries there are more or less developed guerrilla movements led by Communist parties of Maoist inclination. Now these movements will once again face an alternative: take their distance from Peking or "moderate" their actions. During his speech welcoming Abdul Razak, Chou En-lai alluded positively to the "neutralization" of Southeast Asia, a project that strongly resembles the plans of the extremely anti-Communist states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). He did not repeat these allusions upon the departure of the Malaysian prime minister. But they remain disquieting nevertheless.





## mao's china has declined to break diplomatic relations with the junta's chile

After the overthrow in October 1973 of the Bangkok military regime by the popular and student mobilization, the Communist parties of Thailand and Vietnam pointed out the reactionary character of the new government and called for continuing the struggle. Peking Review, however, was silent on the statements and military actions of the Thai Communist party. (Significant guerrilla zones exist in Thailand.) The New China News Agency (Hsinhua) limited itself to publishing in its daily bulletin a belated recapitulation of the main actions of the Thai CP. (16) There was not a word about the political positions taken by the Thai CP.

The Maoist leadership has just recently given some support to the Communist party of the Malaysian Federation by distributing the declaration published after the defection of many insurgents (some leaders among them) to the government in northern Kalimantan (the island province of Malaysia). (17) But it appears that the development of Chinese diplomacy has touched off hard debates within the Malaysian CP. (18)

Further west, the Indian Maoist currents have yet to emerge from their crisis, and China's policy on Pakistan and Bangladesh has crushed all possibility of the pro-Peking CPs developing any revolutionary activity in these two countries.

China's foreign policy, along with its inconsistency on questions of working-class strategy, has also been one of the factors leading to the disintegration of the Maoist movement in the developed capitalist countries. The Mao-spontaneist tendency has little by little abandoned its strict adherence to China. The Mao-Stalinist organizations have for the most part been reduced to sects, thanks to the twists and turns of Chinese foreign policy. And the Mao-centrist organizations are no longer able to define a consistent orientation on many questions, often taking refuge in silence.

The present development of the regional situation will most likely accelerate a process of breakup and recomposition among the Asian Communist movement. And this in a continent where the class struggle is especially developed and where Maoist influence has been deepest. That breakup and recomposition may be one of the major consequences of Chinese diplomacy.

For the Maoist leadership, "the east wind is prevailing" and the world situation is "excellent." The sense of this metaphor must be regarded as somewhat elusive. The disappearance of the workers states (with the emergence of "social imperialism") and the disintegration of the "socialist camp" would seem to indicate a situation that is other than excellent. The international tasks the Chinese CP has set for itself ill accord with supporting workers and revolutionary struggles throughout the world, struggles that are now developing quickly, especially with the new potential rise of the colonial revolution in several areas (Africa, Southeast and South Asia) and (the most important thing) the deepening class struggle in Western Europe. Once again, the objective conditions for the world socialist revolution are manifesting their maturity. The essential weakness of the present international revolutionary up-

surge remains the disorganization and confusion of the vanguard. The essential task of an internationalist leadership standing at the head of a workers state like China would be to aid in the recomposition of a real world communist movement. The Maoist leadership, however, is aiding in its splintering. □

### Footnotes:

1. Supplement to Peking Review, April 12, p. 1.
2. Ibid, p.11.
3. Peking Review, May 10, 1974. It is true that Huang Hua expressed some reservations about the UN document presented by the third-world countries. But they amounted only to regretting the use of terms like economic "interdependence" and "world division of labor," which could be taken over by the great powers.
4. Supplement to Peking Review, April 12, 1974, p.V.
5. Peking Review, May 10, 1974, p.14.
6. On this subject, see the article on the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies published elsewhere in issue of INPRECOR - No 2. (20.6.74) (also see our pamphlet on ANZOLA)
7. The capital of Zaire, formerly the Congo.
8. See Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1974, "Le Conflit Frontalier entre le R.P.C. et l'U.R.S.S." (The border conflict between the Peoples Republic of China and the U.S.S.R.)
9. Supplement to Peking Review, April 12, 1974, p.11.
10. Ibid. p.111.
11. Ibid. p.11.
12. Pékin Informations, November 26, 1973 (French edition of Peking Review).
13. See Far Eastern Economic Review, issues of May 6 and May 13.
14. The problem is not only one of international policy. It also rebounds on the sort of internal development chosen. INPRECOR returns to this problem in future issues (No 10)
15. It appears that Cambodia is the only issue that still gives rise to real anti-imperialist mass mobilizations in China.
16. Cahier de la Chine Nouvelle, March 22, 1974. On the other hand, there were many dispatches reporting attacks in the Bangkok press against the Soviet Union. There was even an account of a badminton tournament being held in Thailand. Let us recall that aside from the Indochinese CP, the Thai Communist party is the strongest one in the region and that it is of Maoist orientation.
17. Pékin Informations, April 19 and April 29, 1974.
18. See Far Eastern Economic Review, December 24, 1973, and January 14, 1974. This information must be looked at with some caution, especially as regards the extreme form of the conflict. What is certain is that the CP in northern Kalimantan has just suffered a very serious split. But while a link between that split and Chinese foreign policy is possible, it has not been demonstrated that one exists.

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# LETTERS 1

Send to:

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97, Caledonian Road,  
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AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS South Africa  
49 Rathbone Street,  
London W1A 4NL.

Women's Section

17th February 1976

Dear Friend,

Greetings on March 8, International Women's Day, from the women of South Africa.

International Women's Year— 1975 — has drawn to a close, but the fight for the complete independence of women continues, all over the western world, but particularly in those parts where social and national emancipation are incomplete.

In order to guarantee equality of the sexes, the UN General Assembly's Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee has followed up International Women's Year by proclaiming the 1976–85 decade to be one of "equality, development and peace" for women. So the implementation of equality is envisaged to be a fairly long-drawn-out process.

In the countries of Southern Africa where the national liberation movements are gaining strength great strides are inevitable. The struggle to eliminate the last vestiges of white domination in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa is broadening in scope and drawing ever broader sections of the oppressed peoples into action, and women are making their contribution on an ever-increasing basis of equality.

The liberation of Guinea Bissau and Mozambique from Portuguese colonialism has led to a striking improvement in the status of women in these countries; and in Angola where South African imperialist aggression is hindering the complete liberation of the Angolan people, women are playing a vital role not only in the armed forces of MPLA but also in the task of reconstruction and the restructuring of society in free Angola. In struggles involving the whole people, women are inevitably brought forward and enabled to make giant strides in their progress towards equality.

## COMMENT

We thank you for your letter of 17th Feb. We return your greetings for International Women's Day. We do so particularly because women in Africa have played a leading role in the struggle against colonialism and racialism and for socialism. In South Africa in particular women have been in the front line of the defence of the black working class against the merciless attacks of the white supremacist bourgeois regime. In the armed struggle that has begun the liberation of the workers and peasants in Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, African women have been in the forefront. In Namibia and Zimbabwe that armed struggle continues and in these areas too women have begun to assert themselves and to claim their rightful place in the front line of the revolutionary struggle. By these means the women of Southern Africa have set a heroic example to the oppressed masses and to the working class throughout the world.

We assure you that the Fourth International will maintain its solidarity with all those in combat against colonialism and white supremacy in Africa. We echo the calls raised in your letter for the release of all South African political prisoners, and for the end of South African interference in Angola. We will continue to use our press and the human resources of our organisation to expose the atrocities of the Vorster and Smith regimes and the complicity therein of British and American imperialism. We will continue to struggle with such power as we have against those regimes and their British and American backers.

We restate that we support all organisations taking the side of the masses against imperialism, against racism and against capitalism in Africa. We do so because we also consider it our duty to raise certain criticisms, of the ANC in particular, and to clearly state the political differences that make us unable to give support to all the demands and slogans around which you fight. Two issues above all separate us from you and we consider them of fundamental importance. Both show themselves in your letter to us:

(1) While we fully support the cause of the equality of women and are fully in favour of the smashing of the South African regime we do not consider that the appeals of the United Nations or of the Organisation of African Unity constitute any kind of basis for advance on these two issues. The UN has proved completely unable to take action against the Smith and Vorster regimes. When the Angolan masses needed military aid this came not from the American capitalist dominated UN but from the Russian and Cuban

In the country of greatest repression, South Africa, although women are the most oppressed politically, legally and socially, they nevertheless played a leading part in the resistance movement throughout the 65 years since Union. Today the Women's Section of the African National Congress of South Africa has a multifold task — of defending the women of South Africa, of all races, against the oppressive apartheid rule; of protecting family life increasingly disrupted and destroyed by the inhuman pass laws; of asserting the honour of women against the iniquitous Immorality Act and the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act; Job Reservation Act; of mobilising and organising women to fight alongside their menfolk in the liberation movement; of propagating their cause and winning support from the freedom-loving peoples of the whole world.

It is in this critical situation facing our organisation in South Africa that we in the African National Congress (S.A.) Women's Section are approaching you to show your solidarity with our cause. We desperately need all the help we can get so that we in turn can help our people to achieve their liberation. There are many ways in which you can help — by giving financial, material or moral aid to our movement, by organising your own solidarity activity, by fighting lies of the Vorster regime and its allies, by boycotting South African goods and by implementing the decisions of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity calling for the total isolation of the South African regime in every sphere — diplomatic, economic, cultural and educational.

RELEASE ALL SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL PRISONERS

EXPULSION OF ALL SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA

Yours sincerely,

Hetty September  
Secretary  
Women's Section

workers' states. The UN is not only ineffectual but practically serves only as a political bargaining place for the bourgeoisies of various countries (1). The participation of representatives of the workers' states in its deliberations redounds as much to their discredit as their military aid to the Angolan masses is creditable. The world bourgeoisie may be embarrassed by Smith and Vorster and may go so far as to pass pious resolutions against them. It will never aid the resistance against them for in the midst of the struggle for national independence the spectre of revolutionary socialism rises up, a spectre which these people consider it their constant task to exorcise. (2) Moreover, as the complicity of the leaders of the Chinese people with the CIA and American imperialism over Angola has shown the support of those controlling the workers' states for the struggles of the masses is by no means guaranteed. For all these reasons it is vitally necessary to reassert the positions of Marx and Lenin that it is the masses themselves, and above all the working class, who alone are able to carry through the fight for national independence and for socialism.

(2) We consider you to be subject to serious misunderstanding concerning the equality of the sexes. Ever since the Communist Manifesto of 1848 sexual equality has been a demand of revolutionary socialists. The form in which it was raised by Marx, by Engels, by Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky was in the call for the abolition of the family. The institution of the family is the main obstacle to the equality of women. It is by this means that women are reduced to the status of child-rearers and hand-maids to their men. The family in any form is not compatible with full equality for women nor with socialism. The oppression of women is not abstract but real, actual, daily and with an identifiable social root — the family. The masses themselves have already outgrown the family. Every revolutionary struggle tears women out of the home and makes domestic tasks and the care of children the responsibility of the whole of the community. This was so in the Paris Commune in 1870 and is so in the struggles in Southern Africa today. The inhumanity of the pass laws is not contained in their destruction of family life. To be sure the pass laws destroy human relationships and wrench lover away from beloved. But it is not necessary to propose subjection to the men as the alternative to repression of the white supremacist regime. On the contrary it is only in the knowledge and determination that this is not how matters will end that the women of South Africa will be able to stay in the forefront of struggle. In the same way the answer to the Immorality



Act is not the vague and abstract notion of "protecting women's honour" but the political principle that women themselves, and only they, shall control their own bodies. It is women who have children and it must be women who decide whether children are had or not. Moreover the equality of women must include the full right of sexual choice - a choice not subject to the marriage contract and a choice that ensures there are no longer women who take the part of victim in relationships of love and sex.

The two issues we raise, we consider to be of fundamental importance for revolutionaries. We are only too happy to work with you or with others against the Smith and Vorster regimes. But we will continue to raise and explain our political positions and to argue for the road of revolutionary socialism. We welcome and have always welcomed debate within the workers' movement and welcome your comments on this document and will print them in our journal. In the meantime we call on you to discuss with us the building of solidarity with African freedom fighters by socialists and the workers' movement in this country.

**DOWN WITH SMITH AND VORSTER!  
DOWN WITH THE IMPERIALISTS IN AFRICA!  
LONG LIVE THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN AFRICA!  
LONG LIVE THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIALISM IN AFRICA!**

revolutionary greetings,

Janice Mills

- (1) The OAU has also compromised itself time and time again with the forces of imperialism. Its passivity during the struggle in Angola is just one more incident in its history of vacillation and compromise.
- (2) Even now British imperialism is preparing, fruitlessly we hope, to save Smith from the wrath of the people of Zimbabwe.

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## LETTERS 2

Extract of letter received from Eddie Madangua of the Anti-Poverty Movement of Nigeria ..... dated 20th October 1975.

..... "As regards *Permanent Revolution* briefly my position is this:

The so-called national bourgeoisie in Nigeria (and in many other countries of the Third World) are in fact pro-imperialist. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie are also pro-imperialist. Any social revolution worth the support of any organisation which claims to be Marxist must at least be anti-imperialist. And the fight against imperialism is at the same time – if it is to be meaningful – a fight for socialism.

It follows initially therefore that the bourgeoisie, who are bitterly opposed to socialism, cannot be an ally in the fight against imperialism. As far as the petty-bourgeoisie class is concerned, its lowest strata can be used at the initial stage of the revolution under the keen eye of the proletarian party, but the revolution must quickly pass from its national character (necessarily influenced too by the peasants) to a socialist one, if the revolution is not to fail.

The state itself during the transitional period to socialism and during socialism itself must be the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is because during the transitional period, the peasantry whose landholdings would not have been wholly collectivised is still – potentially at least – a reactionary class. And when socialism has been achieved with the complete socialisation of both the industrial and agricultural means of production, then the peasantry for

all practical purposes is to be regarded as a part of the proletariat.

In short, a National Democratic revolution must, if it is to be supported by Marxists – *exclude* the national bourgeoisie. Indeed the term "progressive bourgeoisie" is a contradiction in terms; for the bourgeoisie long since ceased to be progressive, either in the advanced capitalist countries or in the third world, where capitalism has been imported. Furthermore, Marxist movements, taking part in any revolution must ensure that it occupies such a position in it that it can swiftly alter the course if the revolution – whatever may be its initial character – to a socialist one. To do otherwise would lead to drowning in midsea.

The permanency in Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution has a double meaning. First, the non-compartmentalisation of a socialist revolution within a national boundary, and second the impossibility of completing the building of socialism in just one country.

I have already outlined my opinion on the first aspect of the permanency. As regards the second aspect, I would only say here that imperialism being a worldwide force, can only be destroyed completely by a global assault. It may be weakened in different parts of the world, but this will not kill it, and as long as it lives, by its global nature, it will affect the building of socialism in any part of the globe – especially in those parts of the world where it has exacted the greatest tolls. Indeed, I cannot imagine the completion or an appreciable progress in a socialist construction in Nigeria, while Niger, Chad, Cameroon (and maybe Ghana, Togo and Dahomey) remain neo-colonies. It is inconceivable .....

Trotsky's idea of a permanent Revolution is valid theoretically and practically. It is a sound Marxist exposition. But, Marxism being a science (as distinct from a dogma) and hence subject to continuous growth, the interpretation and application of a Marxist thesis must respond to each unfolding reality. In short, permanent revolution in the era of imperialism must have specific characteristics peculiar to that era.

## COMMENT

Above, is an extract of a letter recently received from a leading militant of the Anti-Poverty Movement of Nigeria. While being in general sympathy with the contents of this letter, we would like to take this opportunity of developing a theme with which the comrade has not dealt. While many militants agree in principle with the Trotskyist movement, they have yet to translate this into practise. Many are unable to come to grips with what appears to be an insoluble problem, the cultural and political backwardness of the Nigerian masses, and the absence of any developed Marxist traditions of organisation. To this we would reply that the central tasks facing revolutionary Marxists, particularly in view of the proven willingness of the masses to struggle, is the building of a revolutionary vanguard party on the one hand, and on the other a class programme equipped with slogans which can raise the consciousness of the Nigerian masses.

It is now 7 months since the regime of General Gowon was overthrown in a military coup which brought Murtalla Mohammed to power in a holding operation for the Nigerian ruling class. Faced with an unprecedented wave of strikes and workers mobilisations in the preceding period, where the working class began to become aware of its own potential, adopting the slogan 'Its the Workers turn to govern', and with the inability of the Gowon Regime to curb this growing militancy, Mohammed was seen as a last hope solution to the ruling class. However, for all the new regimes rhetoric about national unity, the abolition of corruption etc. it has not been able to provide, in the words of 'Africa' magazine, "a panacea to the nations problems". The blatantly corrupt and clumsy mismanagement of the Gowon regime created the impression that the root of the crisis facing Nigeria was technical in character. At least that was the hope of the Nigerian ruling class. Thus, the claim of the new regime that this could be put right by proper management of the government and resources, and through the elimination of corruption is used in order that the actual structure of the economy etc. is not challenged. The new regime seeks to divert attention away from the issues of class conflict and the reorganisation of society on a socialist basis, and the present efforts, in the words of Mohammed, to eliminate "laziness, idleness and corrupt practises", and to replace them with the virtues of

"discipline and a sense of purpose" are precisely designed to cover up the contradictions of the capitalist neo-colonial state.

Clearly, a great social crisis exists today within Nigeria, but not only in terms of that facing the ruling class; the Nigerian working class, despite the upsurge of the last period is also confused and fragmented – it is at an impasse. Despite their ability and willingness to struggle in a determined manner against exploitation and oppression, this has yet to be generalised, refined and consciously directed through the intervention of the revolutionary vanguard. Thus, the central problem facing the Nigerian working class is that of revolutionary leadership. The situation clearly poses the most important questions facing revolutionaries – what is to be the practise of the vanguard? – what should be the correct slogans adopted and directed towards the masses in relation to the neo-colonial regime? The situation in Nigeria today is further complicated by heterogeneous structure of much of the Nigerian left; this leading to a situation whereby political positions are compromised in the name of abstract 'unity'. However, revolutionaries must be able to give concrete answers to concrete situations; they must have an analysis of the dynamics of the political situation, and be able to assess the relationship of forces, stating their position very clearly in relation to other tendencies in the workers movement. Concretely, this means to build the nucleus of a new vanguard organisation. It means to break out of the political straitjacket imposed by heterogeneous political formations, not in a sectarian manner, but because the present situation in fact compels every tendency to clearly state its position on strategy and tactics. The United Front however, is a positive development in terms of the unity of the working class and its allies, providing the vanguard distinguish themselves both politically and organisationally. Trotsky explained the consequences for any party that failed to recognise the urgent need for the unity of the class:

"In these clashes (with capital, the state etc.) – insofar as they involve the vital interests of the entire working class, or its majority, or this or that section – the working masses sense the need for unity in action, of unity in resisting the onslaught of the capitalism or unity in taking the offensive against it. Any party which *mechanistically counterposes itself* to this need of the working class for unity in action will unfailingly be condemned in the minds of the workers." (1)

Revolutionary Marxists should therefore fight for the right to organise tendencies within the mass movement and in full view of the masses, in order that while the broadest possible unity in action exists, revolutionaries are able to fight for the correct positions to be adopted by the movement, which will raise the consciousness of



the masses, and carry forward both qualitatively and quantitatively the struggle for socialism. Unless this occurs, no heterogeneous political formation can carry out the tasks facing the working class and poor peasantry, nor indeed can they survive in the conditions of struggle that exist within the neo-colonial state in Nigeria today.

The tasks that the revolutionary vanguard will have to face today are immense, not least of all the formation of a clear class programme, but there can be no shortcut, and it must aim at building an implantation in the mass movement. It must strive to raise the political consciousness of the mass of workers through intervening with a clear class programme equipped with transitional

demands: "stemming from today's conditions and from today's consciousness of wide layers of the working class and unalterably leading to one final conclusion: the conquest of power by the proletariat" (2) Clearly the masses will never achieve revolutionary consciousness if the vanguard does not intervene in the class struggle.

#### KOLA ORUBA

(1) *On the United Front, from "The First Five Years of the Communist International" by Leon Trotsky.*

(2) *"The Death Agony of Capitalism and the tasks of the Fourth International."*

Below we print the text of a leaflet that was put out at the time of the mobilisation of students at Lusaka University (Zambia). While we do not agree with all the formulations used in the leaflet, we are glad to reproduce it in our journal to popularise an exemplary struggle by students of the neo-colonies. We fully support the actions taken by these students against the Kaunda regime, and solidarise with all political prisoners of the regime.  
RELEASE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS NOW!

#### UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA STUDENTS' UNION

Statement on Angola issued on the occasion of a demonstration held by students of the University of Zambia in support of MPLA on 15 Jan. 1976.

Having recognised that the stand taken by our government on the Angolan situation is extremely reactionary and retrogressive, we the students of University of Zambia, through our union, wish to dissociate ourselves completely from this opportunist, hypocritical, imperialist and impossible stand. At one and the same time we wish to make our stand explicit - that without a speck of reservation we with full force support the anti-imperialist, therefore revolutionary MOVIMENTO POPULAR DE LIBERTAO DE ANGOLA (MPLA). We hereby state some of the reasons for our support of MPLA and our adamant vote of NO CONFIDENCE in UNITA/FNLA.

1. MPLA, the movement we support, was founded in 1956 as a mere nationalist movement employing peaceful means to destroy the imperialist Portuguese colonialism whose sins in Africa and indeed the world are too well known to be stated here. MPLA realised the impossibility of effectively combatting imperialism, which manifested itself as classical Portuguese colonialism, through peaceful means. This is why, in February 1961, they took up arms, not for an insatiable thirst for blood but for genuine liberation of Angola. MPLA could not and still can not manufacture its own weapons hence its reliance on sympathetic countries for arms. Because of its international proletarian obligation to aid all anti-imperialist movements as a starting point to the attainment of socialism, the Soviet Union right from 1961 has been aiding the MPLA. The Soviet Union as historical facts show, did not start aiding MPLA after 11th November 1975!

2. FNLA came to the scene much later than MPLA. Because FNLA started off as a tribal movement it could not join forces with anti-imperialist, anti-tribalist MPLA. FNLA depended, for its leader's (Holden Roberto) brother-in-law, CIA agent and America's righthand man in Africa, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. Mobutu having got into power through CIA and NATO, obviously got his arms for the "defence" of the now imperialist Zaire against anti-imperialists (eg. Lumumba) from his sponsors viz. CIA and NATO. We must

state here that Portuguese colonialism was backed by the US, therefore, CIA and other NATO countries. Portugal which is the poorest European colonising country, weak economically and militarily only managed to maintain a colonial war through this assistance. Noting further that FNLA got its arms from Zaire which in turn got them from the CIA and NATO (where Portugal is a member), it is inconceivable, contrary to the dictates of logical reasoning, to imagine that FNLA could use NATO weapons to destroy NATO interests. This boils down to the fact that FNLA was and is fighting for imperialism, the bulwark of world reaction.

3. Jonas M. Savimbi, the bearded quisling, pseudo-revolutionary, professional traitor, the cunning fox and one-time Roberto's foreign minister, formed UNITA, the latest of the three to appear. He was backed by Portuguese colonialism the same establishment he purports to have been fighting against. Evidence is contained in the letters he wrote to the Portuguese authorities and their replies which we shall make public. Savimbi, an employee of PIDE of Portugal and BOSS of white South Africa, both institutions built on Gestapo standards and fiercely opposed to African development and freedom from imperialism, today masquerades as a liberator of Africa - what nonsense! Savimbi's UNITA is fighting hand in glove with South African regular troops. White South Africa is the most bar-

baric, savage, grotesque, brutal racist police state in the entire known history of mankind. This is its nature. It has never been known to champion the cause of freedom hence its presence in Angola under the pretext of fighting for "freedom" is bizarre irony. "Freedom" to white South Africa means the right for international monopoly capital to freely exploit the resources of Angola. Such is white South Africa; the country which Savimbi finds justice to fight alongside with.

4. Hilgard Muller, white South Africa's foreign minister, claimed they were in Angola to protect its borders (NAMIBIA), against communism. What does this mean to us? It means that white South Africa is scared stiff of a stretch of socialist countries surrounding it as this could activate the people of South Africa to intensify their struggle against the diabolical system of apartheid. White South Africa knows well that the struggle in Angola is preparing ground for a sure-to-victory socialist struggle in Namibia which will then move to Zimbabwe and more important to white South Africa itself.

5. In the name of basic sanity USSR and Cuba's presence can not be equated with South Africa's. To exonerate the presence of South Africa on the basis that Cuba and USSR are there, as has been maintained by Kaunda of Zambia, supporter of UNITA, Leopold Senghor the black Frenchman who is more French than the French and all the running dogs of imperialism, stinks of abject mental deficiency. White South Africa's total lack of respect for the Blackman's life is unparalleled. But the Soviet Union, to the contrary, has always been a consistent ally of liberation movements. Egypt, Algeria, Chile, Zaire (during Lumumba's period), Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Albania, Cambodia, Vietnam, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cuba and even China have all benefitted from Soviet assistance, like that being given to MPLA but none of these are today puppets of the Soviet Union. Whereas UA assistance to any people in the world has always been motivated by egoistic, self-seeking interests. Cases in point are South Korea, Mobutu's Zaire, Caetano's Portugal, white South Africa, Chile to mention but a few.

6. Savimbi spends more time in the neo-colonial state of Kaunda's Zambia than in Angola where he doesn't enjoy the luxuries of Mulungushi village.\* Zambia has established a sound working relationship with UNITA by way of letting UNITA use the Zambian press, television and radio services for its treacherous propaganda. Though Zambia confesses neutrality it is in essence a supporter of UNITA and hence the presence of BOSS, CIA in Angola.

"Zaire and Zambia are the main black African backers of FNLA and UNITA respectively. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi has been given quiet assistance by Zambian President Kaunda including office facilities in Lusaka... Meanwhile, base camps for the American and other mercenary forces have been set up in both Zambia and Zaire stocked with weapons shipped from the United States and elsewhere by the Zaire government according to the CIA mercenary specifications." (Source: THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Monday January 5, 1976, p.13, printed in Great Britain).

It is indisputable that the Zambian government supports UNITA, a movement whose long standing treachery has been made explicit. This compels us to charge Zambia ruling clique headed by Dr. Kaunda "our beloved President" with CRIMINAL TREACHERY.

(copy of original duplicated leaflet)

\* Mulungushi village is a state-owned area in Lusaka used for housing foreign visitors to the capital, originally built for the OAU summit in 1969.

## ZAMBIAN STUDENT LEAFLET





- Hill, P. 1962 "Some Characteristics of Indigenous West African Enterprise" *Economic Bulletin of Ghana*, Vol. VI
- Hill, P. 1968 "The Myth of the Amorphous Peasantry: A Northern Nigerian Case Study". *Man*.
- Hill, P. 1970 "Studies in Rural Capitalism". Cambridge University Press, London.
- Hill, P. 1972 "Rural Hausa". Cambridge University Press, London.

Polly Hill's position as a seeming authority on the socio-economic relations characterising contemporary rural West Africa has been well established in academic circles. No doubt this is partly due to the detailed nature of her studies, which are thrown in sharp relief against the general paucity of literature in this field. But, primarily Hill's pre-eminence can be traced to the allure of her major thesis. Running through her analysis of rural West Africa is a major theme: namely, that whilst economic inequality is in clear evidence, rural stratification is not. Or, using Hill's prosaic terminology, the "Myth of the Amorphous Peasantry", should not be replaced by a 'myth' of structurally differentiated rural populations. This thesis, which debunks a once common idea among bourgeois economists of an undifferentiated peasantry, and yet is not 'tainted' by any undertones of a class analysis, is clearly enough to establish Hill's reputation with liberal academics.

The task of revolutionary Marxists must be to overturn Hill's thesis, and recognise not only the extent of economic inequality but also the existence and nature of the class divisions in rural African social formations. Even though many of Hill's findings regarding the extent of inequality should be recognised as valid, her conclusions must be repudiated; a task which is readily accomplished due to largely ideosyncratic and unsound analytical stance which forms the cornerstone of her thesis.

The whole question of the elucidation of potential or actual class alignments in rural Africa is, of course, a critical one. It demands serious attention from revolutionary Marxists in order that the fallacious analysis of the ideologues of 'African Socialism' can be rejected, and so that the theoretical and practical problems which arise when the Fanonist emphasis on the revolutionary potential of the African peasantry is examined can be appreciated. To its credit, Hill's work does highlight many aspects of the inequality which is virtually endemic in rural West African economic activity. A most detailed example centres on Hausa farmers in the Northern Nigerian village of Botagarwa, but other of Hill's studies deal with such phenomena as 'Ghanian capitalist cocoa farmers' and 'Cattle ownership on the Accra plains'. In addition aspects of her work facilitate a greater appreciation of the nature of economic activity in small agricultural communities. The extensive glossary which forms a part of rural *Hausa* especially merits scrutiny as important points regarding a whole range of ideological and juridico-political supports of the status-quo of manifest class exploitation can be gleaned from it.

Despite this Hill's conclusion must be rejected and a fundamentally different analysis built upon her findings. For example, even though she explicates a high degree of economic inequality in Batagarwa, Hill is still content to declare that "Rural West African society being commonly 'classless' the onus of proof lies on those who would find this village a special case". If this declaration is allowed to pass uncontested the socio-economic divisions which do vitiate rural Africa will be overlooked. The vast majority of the population of Africa is rural and thus any analysis of the actual and potential dynamics of African social formations must be based on a full appreciation of rural social-economic relations.

Hill's social taxonomy of Batagarwa underlines the central fallacy in her general thesis. Her whole schema is impressionistic, subjectively derived, and theoretically unsound. Whilst Hill is prepared to dissect the village into four 'economic groups', based on the ability of individual farming units "to withstand the shock of a late or very poor harvest", she incessantly disclaims the applicability of any class based terminology. Although Hill's "economic groups" are adequate predictors of a large range of social and economic inequality there is no perception of the essential root of the inequality, which is located in the process of the socio-economic reproduction of the specific social formation. In this reproduction not only the relations of production, but also the relations of exploitation involved in the exchange process are central to the delineation of social structure. Hill's classification, which is based simply on observable levels of inequality, is inadequate to the crucial tasks of explaining the causes of the inequality, considering how the inequality is maintained and enhanced, and postulating under what conditions economically differentiated groups will act in defence or pursuance of their social, political, and economic interests — that is, take part in class action.

In the case of Batagarwa this essential root of inequality is centred on the production and storage of grain. Rich peasants buy grain at harvest time when prices are lowest from poor peasants, and resell the grain just prior to the next harvest when prices are at their highest. Poor peasants are forced to sell their produce, due to their lack of storage facilities, and their often chronic state of indebtedness. Hill regards this process as essentially usurious, but then merely states that poor peasants "render positive economic assistance" to the richer peasants. There is no realization of the analytical importance of the manifest relations of exploitation that are involved in this production and storage syndrome, or the implications that such relations have for the delineation of social structure. Given that this primary inequality is reinforced by socio-economic distinctions based on, saliently, the purchase of sale of labour power, the ownership of capital resources and livestock, and the level of status and remuneration from extra-agricultural occupations, class categories, in terms of rich, middle, and poor peasants, are clearly applicable to Batagarwa.

In the case of the cocoa farmers of Ghana Hill's designation of these farmers as capitalists is valid. Yet she argues that due to the symbiotic relationship that exists between such farmers and the cocoa sharecroppers ("abusa" men) a class analysis is inapplicable. But clearly no matter how close the ties of interdependence may be, the relationship is a stratified one. The sharecropper depends upon the landowner for his means of livelihood, that is, access to the land. This system of sharecropping on Ghanaian cocoa farms entails the exploitation of the labour power of one party by the other due to the unequal power structure that exists between them. Again a class analysis is merited, and not precluded as Hill would have us believe.

Another weakness of Hill's work lies in the various parameters of her studies. There is no recognition that the configuration of social relations at the micro level is affected by the wider national (and international) social formation. Any delineation of rural social structure which fails to give weight to external supports of the social situation is artificially limited. It is the case that the rich peasants and capitalist farmers have advantageous social and familial connections with the national bureaucracy, and these impinge on the rural class structure in the form of further support for the primary economic inequality, by government policies favourable to the interests of the rich peasants and capitalist farmers. Note should also be taken of the increasing participation of urban bourgeois elements in commercial farming. The existence of urban part-time commercial farmers has given rise to a rural proletariat who derive virtually all their livelihood from the sale of their labour power. As such, the poor peasant structure of rural social formations is broadening and solidifying.

In place of Hill's untenable classless thesis, it should be recognised that in many parts of rural Africa class groupings exist, which although they tend to lack a coherent class consciousness, have the potential, have potential to partake in class action, be it revolutionary or reactionary. For example, the Agbekoya rebellion of 1968 in Nigeria, illustrated that the economic grievances of the middle peasantry could result in class action directed against both the rich peasants and the urban bureaucracy. The importance of a revolutionary potential in rural Africa cannot be overstressed. To this point in time it has been harnessed for national liberation purposes only. However, the class forces do exist in Africa, that is middle and poor peasants, and an urban proletariat, for an advance to the waging of true revolutionary struggles.

Ben Equiano



# ANGOLA:



## RESOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

The following text on Angola was approved by the February 1976 meeting of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International.

### I.

**1** The formation of an independent state in Angola is the outcome of a political and military struggle waged by many social and political forces. In spite of the existence of an anticolonialist tradition and the scope of the forces mobilized in the armed confrontation, the struggle went on for fourteen years, because of the following specific factors:

a) Portuguese imperialism's interest in controlling the very considerable resources of the country, especially since it could not seriously rely on a neocolonial reconversion because of its economic and political weakness;

b) the necessity for the fascist regime in Lisbon to maintain its colonial empire or suffer the breakdown of the overall sociopolitical equilibrium on which it was based;

c) the presence in Angola of a significant contingent of colons who were propelled by their racial interests and privileges to defend the traditional colonial structures to the very end;

d) the character of the Angolan socioeconomic structure, which was more developed than that of the other Portuguese colonies, which implied more substantial potential for a dynamic of permanent revolution;

e) the absence of a national bourgeoisie of any degree of solidity;

f) the difficulty for the United States to play the card of neocolonialism at the expense of the old colonial power and to contribute to a relatively peaceful reconversion; this was a result both of Washington's politico-military links with the Lisbon regime in the framework of the Atlantic Pact (which involved aid to the Portuguese army) and of the U.S. desire not to endanger the political equilibrium of the Iberian peninsula (the events following April 25, 1974, confirmed just how well founded this concern was from the standpoint of the imperialists).

**2** In the course of the war, transformations occurred that accentuated the weight of some of these factors and, in the final analysis, reduced imperialism's political maneuvering room. In the countryside the traditional structures were shaken, especially in certain re-

gions, by military operations, "preventive" repressive measures ("strategic hamlets"), and massive immigration (mainly to Zaire). At the same time, capitalist agriculture based on production for the world market was increasingly strengthened, at the expense of subsistence agriculture. As for the industrial economy, very important foreign investment was made in basic sectors (oil), in the small- and middle-sized transformation industry, and in the commercial network. This process was stepped up at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s.

The result of these combined developments was that the relative weight of the capitalist structures increased, the working class became more numerous, as did other wage-earning sectors, the urban petty bourgeoisie was also strengthened, and the bourgeoisies of capitalist countries other than Portugal became increasingly interested in controlling Angola (the United States and the West European powers, mainly Britain). The war was also prolonged because the anticolonialist movement was deeply divided and the neighboring neocolonial states played an extremely ambiguous role. On the one hand, they could not avoid aiding the liberation movements; on the other hand, they tried to control them and fit them into their own political projects, going so far as to become vehicles for imperialist pressure. (The Congolese governments aided the FNLA to the detriment of the MPLA, fostering the wait-and-see military attitudes and equivocal political attitudes of the Holden Roberto leadership; Zambia vacillated in selecting its main ally.)

**3** The defeat of Portuguese imperialism was not solely military. In reality, it was determined by the colonial army's inability to crush the armed struggles of the Angolan people, by the major military defeats suffered by the imperialists in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, by the fact that the economic burdens of the war were becoming increasingly intolerable for Lisbon, and by the increasingly serious political consequences in the metropolis of the unending prolongation of the conflict.

During the first phase after April 25 the Spinoist project was to accept the accomplished fact of the complete victory of the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, to acquiesce to Frelimo's control of Mozambique (while not abandoning attempts at blackmail and pressure or rearguard battles), and to maneuver in Angola with the aim of preserving more direct influence and more substantial control than in the former colonies. Such an attitude was linked to the far greater importance of Angola to Portu-



gal and to imperialism in general, both economically and strategically. But the decisive element was the division of the Angolan national movement and the possibility of exploiting this division politically and militarily. Because of the revolutionary crisis in the metropolis and the paralysis of the Portuguese bourgeois army, the Portuguese government was unable to carry its operation through successfully and found itself compelled to pull out. But other imperialist and neocolonialist forces (United States, South Africa, the countries of capitalist Europe, Zaire, Zambia) plunged into the open breach, thus contributing more or less directly to the outbreak of the civil war.

## II.

**4** The Angolan national movement dates back to the 1920s; ideologically, it goes back even to the end of the past century, and it has its roots in anticolonial struggles extending over four centuries. But it was in the middle and late 1950s that this movement began to acquire considerable influence and to express itself in organized forms. The armed struggle began after the colonial regime rejected any concessions and under the impetus of African and world events (formation of a series of independent states on the continent, the Algerian war, the victory of the Cuban revolution, etc.). Varied social and political forces participated in the movement: the urban petty bourgeoisie, the radicalized intelligentsia, militants and cadres coming out of the proletariat and peasantry, emigrés in the Congo, etc. It is almost symbolic that the initiatives that marked the opening of hostilities (in February and March 1961) were taken by the two social and political components that were active at the time (nuclei emerging from the petty bourgeoisie and poor masses in the cities, essentially under the influence of the MPLA, and nuclei emerging from the peasantry and the emigrés in the countryside, under the influence of the UPA, predecessor of the FNLA). From the beginning, both the breadth of the layers mobilizing or susceptible to mobilizing in the anti-imperialist struggle and at the same time the difficulty in establishing a united political and organizational framework were felt.

**5** During the period 1961-1966 the FNLA, led by Holden Roberto, succeeded in establishing a relationship of forces clearly in its favor.

The MPLA, whose original base was essentially urban, was harder hit by the repression unleashed in the wake of the 1961 actions and did not succeed in developing a base outside of the Cabinda enclave. Especially between 1961 and 1964 the MPLA went through a very critical phase during which, among other things, it maneuvered with small questionable groups and was seriously affected by a crisis of leadership that even led to the departure of the Viriato de Cruz group (a group claiming adherence to Marxism and to Maoist conceptions). Because of its orientation and its international links, the MPLA was particularly hampered by the action of the Congolese government, which sabotaged its activities and tried to eliminate it from the political scene.

The FNLA was in a better position to resist the repression because of its peasant base. It was able to take advantage of its presence in the border regions and the base it had among the masses of emigrés. It enjoyed aid from or tolerance of the successive governments of the Congo. In face of U.S. rejection of requests for mate-

rial aid, it tried to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet conflict by initiating an opening toward Peking; it succeeded in getting the Organization of African Unity to recognize the government it had set up, the GRAE (Revolutionary Angolan Government in Exile). Even the tribal component (Bakongo) — always stronger in the FNLA than in the MPLA — represented a factor of strength at the time, since it assured, among other things, the vital links with the emigration and the Congo.

**6** The situation started to change beginning in 1966. The MPLA took the initiative again and, utilizing the forces it had consolidated in Cabinda and enjoying the tolerance if not active support of Zambia, opened up new zones of operation (in the East, the North, and later in the Northeast). In 1968 the MPLA declared that it held control of one-third of the territory. The strengthening of the MPLA was aided by its more flexible conception of guerrilla warfare and its efforts at organization in the liberated zones, where popular bodies arose in the form of village committees. Thus, it succeeded in overcoming the narrow framework of its previous sphere of action and in emerging as a force operating on a national scale.

During the same period, the FNLA adopted a fundamentally wait-and-see attitude, relying almost exclusively on its bases in the North and its Congolese "rear areas." Pressure from the Kinshasa government contributed to this orientation. Further, the FNLA suffered a split with the departure of Savimbi, who then formed the UNITA. For a long period, UNITA remained very weak, but its existence, under the leadership of a man with very important tribal connections like Savimbi, in any case represented a major obstacle to a national extension of the influence of the FNLA (and, likewise, an obstacle to a supplementary extension of the zone controlled by the MPLA). The change in the relationship of forces in the field was not without international repercussions: the MPLA strengthened its links with the workers states and the so-called progressive governments (while the FNLA established relations with China); the MPLA achieved a rectification of the attitude of the states of the OAU, a number of which established special relations with the MPLA and, in fact, assured it a status equal to that of the FNLA-GRAE.

**7** When the fascist regime in Lisbon collapsed, the Angolan national movement was still divided into three major tendencies. On several occasions, especially in 1972, attempts at unification had been made under the impetus of certain African governments, but without achieving any real results. There were new attempts in this direction in 1974. But it was only at the beginning of 1975 that the Alvor accords permitted the formation of a single government, under the auspices of the former colonial power.

The MPLA was threatened with being put in the position of paying the price for this operation, for three reasons:

- The FNLA and UNITA made a common front, utilizing tribal factors against the MPLA;
- The FNLA and UNITA were favored by the alliance with the neighboring neocolonial governments (with the sole exception of the Congo-Brazzaville, whose influence was necessarily limited);
- The FNLA and UNITA enjoyed the priority support of the imperialist powers.

The MPLA hoped to take advantage of the sympathy of a wing of the MFA — which led it to sow illusions in



the MFA and the Vasco Gonçalves government — but in practice it won only very limited and ephemeral advantages in this sphere during the administration of Rosa Coutinho. In addition, it suffered a very deep internal crisis, which divided it into three tendencies and exposed it very dangerously to the influence of neocolonial governments during a certain period.

In this context, the Alvor accords, later confirmed in Nakuru, were the basis of a broad neocolonial operation, at least potentially. But the outbreak of the civil war placed everything in question.

### III.

**8** The concretization of the Alvor project implied the constitution and maintenance of delicate balances among many interested forces, both Angolan and foreign (compromises among various social layers and different ethnic groups and regional formations, among various political and military apparatuses, conflicts of interest among various neocolonial states and various imperialist powers). Directly or indirectly, the Portuguese situation introduced other elements of disequilibrium and contradiction on several levels. But in the final analysis, it was the dynamic of the movement of the masses in the cities, especially in Luanda, that played the decisive role in the outbreak of the crisis. The socioeconomic changes that had gone hand in hand with the colonial war had strengthened the specific weight of the urban layers. With the fall of the Caetano regime, all the previous balances were overturned. Petty-bourgeois layers occupied or hoped to occupy the positions abandoned by the fleeing colons. The intelligentsia wanted to seize the opportunity to play an important role in the administration and in the management of the country in general. The working class, whose numerical strength had been increased consequent to the relative industrialization, organized and mobilized to assert its rights and to achieve less miserable conditions. The proletarian and plebian masses of the urban slums in turn organized and mobilized in self-defense against the desperate actions of the hardline colonialists and racists.

Strikes, demonstrations, and mobilizations came one after another up to the great demonstration that assembled tens of thousands of people in Luanda and up to the holding of a national assembly of rank-and-file committees (a general strike had already occurred in Luanda in September 1973).

It was precisely the dynamization of these exploited urban layers, who were unable to be integrated into a neocolonial framework, that blew up the structure erected by the Alvor accords.

**9** The mobilization of the Luanda masses was not the result of a deliberate political initiative by the MPLA. In large measure it developed independent of the will of the MPLA leadership and largely outside its organizational framework (in fact, the MPLA's apparatus was not yet established when the mass mobilizations broke out). But because of its traditions, its previously developed roots, the character of at least some of its cadres, and its character as a national and not regional or tribal movement, the MPLA was in the best position to benefit from such a movement by enormously expanding its audience. Moreover, the MPLA faced a very concrete choice: either follow the Alvor orientation through to the end by fighting for a strict applica-

tion of the accords, which would have implied, among other things, the disarming of "civilians" and entering into conflict with the movement of the masses, or integrate itself into this movement and take over leadership of it in an attempt to channel it at the same time. Given all the other elements acting against it and given that it lacked a sufficiently broad base among the peasantry, the MPLA could only choose the second solution.

The FNLA, on the other hand, which has no real base in the cities and which counted on being the main beneficiary of the Alvor accords, if not immediately at least in the medium term, launched an offensive against the movement of the masses, accompanied by a bloody repression. The aim was to impose its own control in the capital by cutting the ground from under the feet of its rival organization.

For its part, UNITA completed the turn that led it to drop its socialistic demagogy, abandon any attitude of neutrality, present itself to the Portuguese as the partner in the best position to aid in neocolonial reconversion, and line up with the FNLA. Its regional character, which permitted it to win a significant base, also made it easier for it to take positions against the movement of the urban masses in Luanda and to commit itself against the organization that enjoyed the confidence of these masses.

### IV.

**10** The concrete genesis of the civil war, the cleavage among the indigenous movements, and the international alignments shed unambiguous light on the fundamental nature of the Angolan conflict. On the one side are fundamentally ranged the social forces that have objective interests in struggling for consistent national independence and in rejecting neocolonial compromise solutions; this potentially inscribes these forces within a dynamic of permanent revolution, of the growing over of the national revolution into social revolution. These forces are: the decisive layers of the urban working class — both in industry and services — layers of the agricultural wage-earners, the plebian masses cast out of the economic and social structure by colonialism, broad sectors of the petty bourgeoisie affected by the wave of radicalization, sectors of the poor peasantry that participated in the armed struggle directly or indirectly and underwent their first experiences in political mobilization and organization by entering into conflict with the structure of traditional rural society.

On the other side stand those forces that cling to the privileges of the past, as ludicrous as these may be, those who have an interest in the establishment of a neocolonial society, those who do not want to sever the imperialist umbilical cord definitively, those who want to defend what remains of traditional society. These forces are: the remnants of the colons, the well-off layers of the petty bourgeoisie, the embryonic nuclei of the national bourgeoisie, the traditional chiefs and their acolytes. The outbreak of the civil war in conjunction with the movement of the urban masses reflects in a condensed — and simplified — form the sociopolitical content of the military confrontation.

The fact that the FNLA and UNITA are supported by American imperialism, the major European imperialist powers, the racists of South Africa, and the bloc of the most conservative or even reactionary neocolonial states, while the MPLA enjoys the support of the workers states (with the ignoble exception of China), primarily that



of the Soviet Union and Cuba, and the neocolonial governments which are still unable to jettison either the traditions of struggle of their national movements or the mass sentiment that still exists or which want to polish up their "progressive" images confirms and strengthens the analysis of the dynamic of the indigenous forces. Moreover, it is clear that a possible victory for the FNLA-UNITA bloc would not only mark a success for the counterrevolution in Angola, with a tragic consequence of bloody repression, but would also strengthen the positions of imperialism in this region of very great strategic importance, would breathe new life into the South African racists, and would lead to the formation of more reactionary regimes in a series of African countries.

**11** The intervention of the imperialists in the Angolan civil war was inspired by their need to defend their extremely important economic, political, and strategic interests in Angola itself and above all throughout this region of Africa.

The U.S. government was subject to contradictory pressures: On the one hand, there were tendencies favoring an intervention because of specific economic interests or political considerations. On the other hand, there was resistance from groups that were concerned about the negative consequences for their interests in a series of African states that could result from a basic commitment to the FNLA-UNITA bloc and to the Pretoria regime; further, some politicians were more inclined to play the card of integrating the MPLA into a neocolonialist project. But the overall political and strategic stakes involved compelled Washington to opt for supporting the FNLA and UNITA. If this support has so far not been translated into a direct military intervention, it is because of the situation created by the recent defeat in Vietnam and the fear of provoking a rebirth of the antiwar movement, especially among the Black minority. For its part, the South African regime was propelled to intervene because of its desire to defend long-standing economic interests and because of its concern for maintaining its strategic and political ramparts. The Pretoria regime committed itself especially because it is now being undermined by a serious crisis, a crisis that could come to a head in the event of a victory of the anti-imperialist forces in Angola and possibly in other countries of the region, stimulating the struggle of the most important proletariat of all Africa and placing the very existence of the regime in question.

The action of the Soviet bureaucracy is explained by its desire to play an important political role both in the region and in Africa in general and its determination not to relinquish at the decisive moment the advantages it may draw from the support it has long-since granted the MPLA. At the same time, the Soviet bureaucracy is motivated by the need to make gains against China in the international communist and workers movement and among the masses of the colonial or semicolonial countries. Nor may it be excluded that the internal situation in the Communist party of the Soviet Union on the eve of its new congress may be involved. The Cuban intervention, while reflecting the basic political accord between Havana and Moscow, has special importance because of the very fact of its massive and direct character; this intervention represents a genuine challenge to American imperialism, in the best traditions of revolutionary internationalism.



**12** The definition of the character of the civil war and the comprehension of the potential for a dynamic of permanent revolution, based on the analysis of the social forces and not of the political organizations, are not in contradiction with characterizing the MPLA as a movement with a petty-bourgeois leadership. The nature of the MPLA has been petty bourgeois since its origin, both because of its social composition and because of its political conceptions and orientations. To the extent that it acquired a mass influence, became an important component of the anti-imperialist movement, and committed itself to a prolonged armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism, the MPLA is, more precisely, an expression of a revolutionary petty-bourgeois nationalist current. The ideological and political influence exercised from the beginning by elements with Stalinist or Khrushchevist training is not in contradiction with the MPLA's ideology as a whole. This is true not only because petty-bourgeois revolutionaries can utilize Marxism, especially a deformed Marxism, as an ingredient in their conceptions, but more concretely because Stalinist theses on the revolution by stages and bureaucratic conceptions of the relationship

### the dynamization of the urban masses blew up the structure erected by the Alvor accords

with the masses tend to coincide with the line of collaboration with the so-called national bourgeoisie, the conceptions of the state and party, and the bureaucratic methods of organization which have characterized and still characterize the MPLA. The fact that the MPLA organized committees in the liberated zones and, immediately after April 25, 1974, called for the creation of committees in the cities must not obscure the fact that these committees were conceived on the basis of paternalist and authoritarian criteria, that the internal functioning of the MPLA itself has always suffered from very serious bureaucratic deformations, that even during the past several months the MPLA's takeover of the mass movement in Luanda has entailed a restructuring of the committees from above, with the elimination of cadres and militants denounced as ultraleftists or anarchists and with severe purge measures.

**13** The rapid and substantial successes won by the army of the People's Republic of Angola are not the result solely of military superiority; they are explainable politically above all. While the FNLA and UNITA proved incapable of mobilizing the masses in their zones of influence or of raising the morale of their troops, the MPLA was able to rely on a solid urban base to start from. Up to now, the peasant masses have not played an active role. Nevertheless, their mobilization remains essential not only for a definitive victory in the civil war, but more generally for the future of the Angolan revolution. The decisive point remains the conquest of a broad peasant base. Any possible underestimation of these problems would have very negative consequences not only on the current military conflict but also and more generally on the future of the Angolan revolution. That is why it is a political priority to struggle for an agrarian reform that breaks the power



of the large landlords and capitalist farmers, loosens the vice of poverty of subsistence agriculture and its remaining tribal structures, guarantees the small and middle peasants adequate prices for their products and allows them to escape the claws of the middlemen, and aids the population of the countryside in resolving the elementary problems created by the colonial war and the civil war.

At the same time, measures expropriating imperialist property — in any case a legitimate response to the combined military attacks against the People's Republic of Angola — would have the effect of solidifying the ranks of the anti-imperialist forces through concretely demonstrating to the masses that they are being called upon to fight in defense of their most pressing interests.

But the struggle for consistent anti-imperialist objectives must go hand in hand with the revolutionary and democratic rank-and-file organization of the masses. The experiences of the past two years, especially at the height of the urban mobilizations, must be maximally capitalized on by the relaunching of democratic and revolutionary bodies whose leaders are elected by the masses and can be removed if they do not accomplish their tasks, leaders who do not enjoy any material privileges. The strictest respect for democratic rights, including the right of expression of the various political currents and organizations, is a necessity that is particularly felt after centuries of colonization and long years of merciless imperialist repression. A mass democratic revolutionary organization opposing any bureaucratic grip or authoritarian constraint also represents a crucially important instrument for the struggle against traditional reactionary structures and tribal remnants. Militants who have gone through the struggle experiences of the past two or three years and who have assimilated the lessons of the anticapitalist struggles of the masses of other countries, including East Europe, can and must play an important role in this battle. Finally, the anti-imperialist struggle of the Angolan masses will be strengthened to the extent that tight links are established with the revolutionary movements of southern Africa, which, through their struggle, are weakening the racist regimes of Pretoria and Salisbury, ramparts of imperialism in this part of the continent.

**14** The catastrophic military defeats of the FNLA and UNITA have compelled the imperialist and neocolonial forces to revise their policy. Some neocolonial governments have already made a turn: They have recognized the People's Republic of Angola and are seeking a compromise with the MPLA. The imperialists of the United States and West Europe could follow them down this road, working out a wide-ranging operation to integrate the People's Republic of Angola more or less quickly into a relatively "progressive" neocolonial project. Well-off petty-bourgeois circles, embryonic nuclei of the "national" bourgeoisie, an entire constellation of profiteers and careerists provide the material base for such an operation. The rightist tendencies of the MPLA, which had already been leaning toward compromise solutions, particularly with UNITA, may play the game through to the end. This project of the MPLA leadership — expressed, for example, in the basic law of the People's Republic — is not at all in contradiction with such a neocolonial operation, as is confirmed, among other things, by the recent overtures toward Zaire and Zambia.

In face of such a possibility — and in any case to prevent the rapid defeat of the enemy from paradoxically having negative consequences for the revolutionary struggle — it appears all the more necessary to mobilize

and organize the masses into democratic bodies that guarantee mass autonomy of any exploiting class and any bureaucratic apparatus. This task, which will not be accomplished by the petty-bourgeois leadership of the MPLA, will have to be taken up on a priority basis by revolutionaries linked to the mass movement.



**15** The resolution on Africa adopted at the Eighth World Congress of the Fourth International in 1965 declared in regard to Angola:

"It is clear that a genuine revolutionary Angolan leadership does not yet exist and that internal conflicts and struggles of the nationalist movement will probably continue to appear for a whole period. In determining which field of action they will give preference, the fundamental criterion for revolutionary Marxists is who at a given stage exercises real mass influence and who is actually fighting, because that is where the logic of the revolutionary struggle most easily permits the formation of a revolutionary vanguard. The line of a leadership or a few leaders cannot be a decisive criterion, all the less so in the case of insinuations or suspicions about this or that person. . . . Without hiding its criticisms and while developing its own concepts on the nature of the Angolan revolution, the Fourth International will continue to solidarize with the forces in actual struggle, which are primarily the peasant forces organized at the present stage essentially in the FNLA. The Fourth International holds that the unification of the FNLA with other existing forces (which the FNLA says it favors in principle) would prove profitable, naturally on condition that it be realized in the struggle, on the basis of a clear anti-imperialist and anticolonialist program, without which the indispensable unity in the armed struggle would suffer."

Although the criteria applied were correct and the analysis of the relationship of forces in the field was basically accurate, a self-criticism is nonetheless necessary; it can be synthesized in the following terms:

a) The February 1964 resolution of the United Secretariat and the resolution of the Eighth World Congress overestimated the possibilities of the FNLA's overcoming its tribal origins and the consequences of its regional dependence and thus of escaping the influence exercised by the neocolonial Congolese governments, vehicles for imperialist pressure.

b) The same resolutions did not take account of the MPLA's possibilities and capacities of relaunching action in other parts of the country and underestimated the role that could be played in that event by its ideology, which is more progressive than that of the FNLA.

c) The Fourth International delayed considerably in the analytical verification of the situation in Angola and consequently in making the necessary political and tactical adjustments. Even the resolution of the Tenth World Congress in February 1974 limited itself to the very general assertion that "the furtherance of the process of permanent revolution . . . can only be carried out on the basis of a clarification within the MPLA and Frelimo" and pointed to "the task of building revolutionary Marxist cadres."

**16** In the civil war that broke out on the eve of the formal proclamation of independence, the Fourth International chos the camp of the People's Republic of Angola founded by the MPLA against the holy alli-



ance of imperialists, racists, and indigenous reactionaries. It stands on the side of the masses who are mobilizing to defend the independence won through a determined armed struggle, to defend their primordial interests against all exploiting layers and classes, both foreign and "national," for the expropriation of the capitalists and landed proprietors and the formation of a workers and peasants government based on democratic revolutionary committees, direct expressions of the masses.

Such an attitude in no way implies that the Fourth International abandons its criticisms of the MPLA leadership, which it characterizes as petty-bourgeois nationalist and not as proletarian communist, and which will not be able to carry out the task of building a workers state. Alignment in the same camp and solidarity in a common struggle are not in contradiction with the indispensable battle for the political independence of the working class and revolutionaries and for the construction of a proletarian revolutionary leadership and a revolutionary Marxist organization.

Angolan revolutionary Marxists unreservedly commit themselves to the military struggle against the reactionary holy alliance until the definitive victory, for the defense of the People's Republic of Angola, for the complete independence of Angola. In their political campaign they emphasize the necessity for an active and conscious mobilization of the masses, for their organization into democratic and revolutionary committees, the delegates elected and revocable at all times; they further emphasize the defense of democratic rights for all those fighting in the anti-imperialist camp. They carry out an indispensable task of theoretical and political clarification on the nature and strategy of the revolution in Angola by attempting first to regroup the cadres and militants who have already undergone experiences in struggle and mass mobilization and have critically reflected on these experiences.

**17** The Fourth International must take an active part in a campaign of solidarity with the People's Republic of Angola organized on a world scale. This campaign should demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all imperialist and neocolonialist forces; it should call for political and material aid from the workers states and the international workers movement, the halt of all shipments of arms and matériel to the FNLA-UNITA bloc, and the recognition of the MPLA and the People's Republic of Angola.

The Fourth International denounces the attitude of the Chinese bureaucratic leadership, which, after aiding the FNLA, is now adopting a hypocritical neutral attitude, thus giving a practical demonstration of the nefarious character of its conceptions and analyses and of a policy based on denouncing the USSR as the main enemy, a policy actually aimed at reaching a compromise with American, European, and Japanese imperialism.

African revolutionary Marxists, conscious that the defeat of the imperialists and neocolonialists in the Angolan civil war would have enormous repercussions throughout the continent, would create favorable conditions for the overthrow of the racist regimes of South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, and would undermine the bases of the reactionary neocolonial regimes, will campaign for militant support to the People's Republic and the Angolan fighters in the circles of the African political vanguard, in the mass organizations, in the trade unions, and in the organizations of workers and students abroad.

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