

In Defense of Marxism

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The Development of the Theory of Permanent Revolution in Russia

by Joseph Hansen

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Who We Are

Bulletin in Defense of Marxism is published by an independent collective of U.S. socialists who are in fraternal solidarity with the Fourth International, a worldwide organization of revolutionary socialists.

Supporters of this magazine may be involved in different socialist groups and/or in a broad range of working class struggles and protest movements in the U.S. These include unions and other labor organizations, women's rights groups, antiracist organizations, coalitions opposed to U.S. military intervention, gay and lesbian rights campaigns, civil liberties and human rights efforts. We support similar activities in all countries and participate in the global struggle of working people and their allies. Many of our activities are advanced through collaboration with other supporters of the Fourth International in countries around the world.

What we have in common is our commitment to the Fourth International's critical-minded and revolutionary Marxism, which in the twentieth century is represented by such figures as V.I. Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and Leon Trotsky. We also identify with the tradition of American Trotskyism represented by James P. Cannon and others. We favor the creation of a revolutionary working-class party, which can only emerge through the conscious efforts of many who are involved in the struggles of working people and the oppressed and who are dedicated to revolutionary socialist perspectives.

Through this magazine we seek to clarify the history, theory and program of the Fourth International and the American Trotskyist tradition, discussing their application to the class struggle internationally and here in the United States. This vital task must be undertaken if we want to forge a political party in this country capable of bringing an end to the domination of the U.S. imperialist ruling class, establishing a working people's democracy and socialist society based on human need instead of private greed, in which the free development of each person becomes possible.

Bulletin in Defense of Marxism is independent of any political organization. Not all U.S. revolutionaries who identify with the Fourth International are in a common organization. Not all of them participate in the publication of this journal. Supporters of this magazine are committed to comradely discussion and debate as well as practical political cooperation which can facilitate eventual organizational unity of all Fourth Internationalists in the United States. At the same time, we want to help promote a broad recomposition of a class-conscious working class movement and, within this, a revolutionary socialist regroupment, in which perspectives of revolutionary Marxism, the Fourth International, and American Trotskyism will play a vital role.

Bulletin in Defense of Marxism will publish materials generally consistent with these perspectives, although it will seek to offer *discussion articles* providing different points of view within the revolutionary socialist spectrum. Signed articles do not necessarily express the views of anyone other than the author.

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What Next for South Africa?

by Mfanafuthi Prof' Ndlovu

The following is the text of a talk given at a public meeting May 6, 1994, at the City University of New York Graduate Center in New York City. The meeting was sponsored by Bulletin in Defense of Marxism, International Revolution, and Socialist Action.

Chairperson's Introduction

Thank you, comrades. I'd like to join in welcoming you to this important meeting and to thank you very much for making this effort. I am impressed with the fact that this meeting is the result of the joint effort of three publications that are on the left.


The meeting is going to discuss events that are not only very important for our country but also, I think, have a significance for the world. I think it is also significant that a meeting such as this one should take place on the basis of a collaborative effort by groups on the left. We don't take an event like that in itself for granted. In our times organizations on the left have not been much known for working together. There is a tendency to be at one another's throat, to criticize without exploring possibilities of joint effort. I think it is really commendable on the part of the three publications that they came together to discuss an event of tremendous significance, indeed of international significance. I think by that factor alone they give a strong indication that they truly are internationalists.

I shall not comment much on the events themselves because I don't want to detract from what Prof' will be saying on this. I think he is profoundly well informed and I think that we will benefit from his insights. He belongs to Workers Organization for Socialist Action (WOSA). This is one of the tendencies in our country on the left. In other words there are organizations that approach the social problem more broadly than — or, if one may say so, that

transcend — the populist approach, which is the main stream. There are a good number of people in our country who are inclining in this direction already. This itself is an indication of a feeling quite widespread, especially among the young, that maybe this is the moment for the creation of types of political formations that we have not had up to now.

The present stage, which crystallized in the elections, very largely grows out of the political efforts of the oppressed people in South Africa organized mainly in the form of national liberation movements, or populist movements. We've come to this pass now, which is so similar in many ways with what happened throughout the Third World — Asia and Africa — some 30 years ago when various countries attained the grant of independence and in the last 30–35 years find themselves in the situation where they're still grappling desperately, and with very little hope that they will succeed, in the battle with underdevelopment after independence.

We are informed by the understanding of those events as we look at South Africa at this particular moment of great jubilation. Jubilation on the passing away of apartheid, of this crude form of repression and subjugation that our people have labored under for almost three and a half centuries. But we have a sense also that maybe it's not the occasion to extend the jubilation too long. Because this historical moment seems to resemble what I've just referred to, which happened about three decades ago: the grant of independence, the grant of a new constitution and the extent of the vote to the masses



of the population, the transformation of the populist organizations into political parties in the control of the state confronted with the problem of underdevelopment. It is fair to say that hardly any were able to grapple with this situation successfully. We have to look at these things against that perspective and ask ourselves the questions, "What is the historical effectiveness of the populist movement in South Africa? What are the perspectives for the future?" Comrade Ndlovu will lead us in that discussion, and I have no doubt that he will be making for us all an extremely useful contribution to our knowledge.

Mfanafuthi Prof' Ndlovu

Thank you, comrade chairperson. I bring you greetings from the South African working class. I am going to talk from a written speech. I do that in order to avoid getting carried away, because I intend to keep my input as short as possible so that we can have more time for questions.

First, I want to explain briefly my opinion on why a presentation on South Africa is important. I believe I don't have to dwell on that. The world that we live in has become a global economy. Business has destroyed the boundaries that divide our different countries. As early as 1977 the amount of investments in South Africa (in Eurodollars) was \$200 million. And by the end of 1977 the amount invested was more than \$350 million in Eurodollars and other Eurocurrencies. For that reason I believe that developments in South Africa will have a direct and important effect on all countries of the world, especially the United States.

South Africa is a very rich country. I'm going to bore you with some statistics just to demonstrate how rich South Africa is, to show that we have no reason to be homeless in South Africa. The total size of South Africa is 472.4 square miles, which is twice the size of Texas. The value of our import industry is \$21.2 billion, and that industry is controlled by the following countries: the United Kingdom controls 12%, Germany 19%, and 68% is controlled by the United States. The value of our export industry is \$23.8 billion. Japan controls 9% and the United States controls 43%. As of June 1992, so-called direct

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Editor's Note

The 20th century has been defined by some as "the age of permanent revolution," referring to the theoretical perspectives of Leon Trotsky, elaborated here in a classic exposition by Joseph Hansen. Trotsky's theory is intimately related to Karl Marx's views on world revolution, discussed in these pages by Dan La Botz.* It is also intimately related to the actual dynamics of our time, as our British comrade Paul Clarke seeks to show. Corroboration for this can be found in discussions of recent events in South Africa (by Mfanafuthi Prof' Ndlovu), El Salvador (by Michael Livingston), and Haiti (by Jackson Kandinsky). The continued relevance of revolutionary Marxism emerges as a lesson of recent world events — providing an appropriate focus for our current issue.

Also relating to this insight are articles by Zhang Kai on China, Kirill Buketov on Russia,

Marilyn Vogt-Downey and Michael Smith on Hungary, and Tom Garvey on the Middle East and Korea.

With Linda Thompson's article on matriarchy, we are pleased to kick off a discussion on the nature of female oppression and the women's liberation struggle. In upcoming issues we also anticipate further discussion articles on the question of building a revolutionary party in the U.S., as well as on the future of (or alternatives to) Canada's New Democratic Party, and on the fluid situation in Mexico. In addition, our September issue will include coverage of the important gang peace conference in Pittsburgh, plus the struggle against racism and police brutality in the Park Hill area of Staten Island, New York.

*We do not endorse La Botz's polemical footnote against Michael Löwy.

Stormclouds Over Korea

by Tom Garvey

The Clinton administration is circling in on North Korea with the single-mindedness of a hungry shark. The media has painted a picture of a crazed and irrational North Korean leadership, ready to engage in dangerous brinkmanship. It has acted under the assumption that the U.S. should be the arbiter and enforcer of who should and should not have nuclear weapons. Few commentators have paused to consider seriously the motivations of the North Korean government, or the plight of the North Korean people. One should not make apologies for the totalitarian government of North Korea; however, the nature of that government is no excuse for the U.S. government to brutalize the people of North Korea as it did in the Korean War and has threatened to do ever since.

During the Korean War, the U.S. government engaged in massive and, according to standards set up after World War II, illegal bombing and napalm raids on Korean cities. Truman warned

that nuclear warfare was not out of the question. Later, in 1957, in violation of the armistice agreement, the United States became the first country to bring nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula. Since then, it has conducted simulated B-52 bombing runs over North Korea, and engaged in the "Team Spirit" military exercises — the largest such exercises conducted by the U.S. — right off the Korean coast. Last year, the head of U.S. Strategic Command announced that nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles once aimed at the Soviet Union will now be trained on North Korea.

The North Korean government expressed willingness to continue talks, hoping to end the U.S. trade sanctions in return for concessions on the nuclear issue. However, the U.S. has become even more belligerent. In September 1991, the Bush administration withdrew the U.S. tactical nuclear warheads in the South (replacing them with even more powerful conven-

tional weapons), but in March 1993, the Clinton administration returned nukes to the peninsula. That is when North Korea withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty in protest.

With this history in mind, it is easy to see why North Korea might be a little hesitant to give up any hope of nuclear capabilities without a toning down of U.S. belligerence. It also becomes clear why the U.S. has had to push and prod South Korea and Japan so hard to get them to offer their lukewarm statements of support. Meanwhile, a U.S. diplomat interviewed by National Public Radio said that China's cooperation with the U.S. was a *quid pro quo* of the recent decision granting China most-favored nation status. So, is North Korea really a threat to world peace? Well, it is not North Korea that has been beating its chest with superior weaponry off the coast of the United States for forty years. It is quite the other way around. □

June 11, 1994

Sarah Lovell (1922–1994)

It is with deep sadness that the Editorial Committee of Bulletin in Defense of Marxism reports the death of veteran socialist Sarah Lovell, a founder of this journal. Our September issue will feature an in-depth appreciation of her life and work. The following message was sent to comrade Sarah by the participants of the Bulletin IDOM supporters' conference in Pittsburgh, May 28, 1994.

Who are assembled at the Second Conference of Supporters of the *Bulletin in Defense of Marxism* send you our warmest regards.

We know that from the 1930s as a member of the Young People's Socialist League to the early 1980s as a veteran of the Socialist Workers Party, you contributed to the labor and socialist movements in the spirit of Cannon and Trotsky. When that spirit was betrayed and driven from the SWP, you were one of a stalwart few who stood fast — continuing to defend American Trotskyism and to demonstrate its continued relevance.

Over the years — in the face of often difficult realities — you have continued to be a socialist, a trade-union militant, a feminist, an anti-racist fighter, a working-class internationalist, a revolutionary Marxist. You have been for many an inspiring example, a comrade who has worked with great thoughtfulness, warmth, and vitality to defend, advance, and apply revolutionary

socialist principles in the world around us. And you have been for many of us a deeply valued friend.

We are sorry that you cannot be with us as we face the challenges before us at the present moment. We begin our conference keenly aware of your essential efforts in helping to launch and produce the *Bulletin in Defense of Marxism* in its earliest days, in helping to maintain it from 1983 through 1992, and in helping to relaunch it on its present basis. Your inspiring example strengthens us as we move forward to continue your work.

*Comradely,
Participants in the
BIDOM Supporters' Conference*

Frank Lovell urges those wishing to give a gift in memory of Sarah to make a donation to "Bulletin Builders Fund," P.O. Box 1317, New York, NY 10009.

A version of the following announcement appeared in the June 16 New York Times

LOVELL — Sarah Rebecca, died on June 14, 1994, at age 72, of cancer. She was a printer and editor, a feminist and socialist. Born in Brooklyn, NY, joined the Socialist Youth Movement in 1938. A leader of the Socialist Workers Party until expulsion for Trotskyism in 1984. After expulsion, helped found the monthly magazine *Bulletin in Defense of Marxism* and was its copy editor and circulation manager for its first 100 issues. Sought public office in Detroit on the SWP ticket. Associated in the 1950s and 1960s with the Friday Night Socialist Forum in Detroit, serving intermittently as its organizer and publicity director. Moved to NY with husband in 1969. Editor of *Trotsky Speaks*, co-editor with George Breitman of two of the fourteen-volume "Trotsky Writings" series, *Writings of Leon Trotsky [1932]* and *Writings of Leon Trotsky [1932-1933]*. Later coedited *A Tribute to George Breitman, Writer, Organizer, Revolutionary*, and edited *The Struggle Inside the Socialist Workers Party 1979-1983*. Early member of the Coalition of Labor Union Women and National Organization for Women. Joined the International Typographical Union in Seattle and worked on leading dailies in San Francisco, Detroit, and New York. She is survived by daughter, Joan, in Detroit, and husband, Frank, in New York, and two sisters, Anne Gordon and Mollie Kerchner.

Imperialism in Haiti: What's Behind Shifts in U.S. Policy?

by Jackson Kandinsky

At last Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide has stated where he stands on military intervention. In a June 3 *New York Times* interview, Aristide said the U.S. should be "moving toward a surgical action to remove Haiti's military Junta from power. . . . The action could be a surgical move to remove thugs within hours. Once we do that, we could have the international community in the country within the framework of agreements we have already signed. Not in the framework of a military intervention."

Aristide's intervention remarks came after the May 21 start of the U.S.-initiated UN trade embargo of Haiti, excepting only food and medicine. That action by imperialism brought military force to bear on Haiti, with several U.S. vessels in nearby Puerto Rico and a beefed-up force in nearby Guantánamo.

The total embargo reduced the options left to imperialism. They include little other than direct military intervention if the embargo doesn't succeed in forcing the junta to reach a compromise with Aristide (and of course Aristide with the junta). With U.S. ships already in Haitian waters the invasion has begun. But the real target is the Haitian mass movements and ultimately nearby Cuba.

The new embargo was applauded by Aristide as well as his supporters on the liberal and social democratic left. A previous embargo by the UN and OAS (Organization of American States) had been largely ineffective.

Some basic truths of the "new world order" have been revealed for all to see. Washington felt threatened by the massive vote by Haiti's poor that made Aristide president in early 1991. Even though there no longer existed the tame threat of a Stalinist Soviet Union as a potential ally for an insurgent Haiti, Aristide spoke for the poor and that was something the imperialist masters in Washington would not tolerate. They stabbed him and the Haitian people in the back at every step. And now Aristide, after a long political drift to the right, is doing Washington's bidding. There is a ruthless logic in this — no matter how difficult the revolutionary road may be in this epoch, without a far-sighted revolutionary strategy those who fight for liberation will be crushed.

After the military coup September 30, 1991, and the more than 5,000 deaths that have followed, social democratic illusions have been shattered once again. Lenin's view of the state has been confirmed at terrible cost. Imperialism remains forever its vicious self.

Liberals Beat the War Drums

U.S. policy seemed to shift tactics toward late April this year after pro-Aristide liberal political figures voiced their opposition to U.S. Haiti policy and Clinton's illegal interdiction policy for refugees.

In an about-face April 21 Aristide called U.S. refugee policy "racist." The statement was long overdue. Previously Aristide had echoed the Clinton line on refugees, using the excuse that Haitians should stop fleeing the brutal dictatorship in dangerous, overcrowded vessels. Aristide's hope was to deliver something to Clinton's racist constituency in exchange for illusory U.S. efforts on Aristide's behalf. Last January, the focus of a conference in Miami called by Aristide's "Lavalas" (the "flood" in Creole) movement was dutifully changed, at Washington's insistence, from refugee rights to a vague call for Aristide's return.

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No to the U.S./UN Embargo! No Military Intervention in Haiti!

by Jackson Kandinsky and David Weiss

Liberals, social democrats, and even some Marxists believe the UN embargo somehow supports democracy in Haiti. But embargoes, like invasions, are enforced by guns. The question for Marxists is, "Whose guns?" Does imperialism have a dual nature — one progressive and the other repressive? No!

The U.S. began the first of several embargoes on Haiti in 1806, as punishment for Haiti's successful slave revolution, which won independence from France in 1804.

Today, the U.S.-led United Nations embargo on Haiti, enforced mainly by U.S. war vessels, says its purpose is to support democracy and restore President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Not true! Washington trained the coup leaders and funded spy operations on the democratic sector, including on Aristide himself. Washington sabotaged Aristide's populist reforms, called him "crazy," and claimed he violated "human rights."

Lenin dismissed the mythical democratic "international community," by calling the League of Nations a "thieves' kitchen" and a "pack of wolves." The League, formed in 1920 to promote "peace," was conceived by President Woodrow Wilson, the "antiwar" Democrat who ordered the bloody Marine invasion and occupation of Haiti in 1915, which lasted 19 years!

The U.S./UN embargo assists imperialism by:

1. Coercing concessions from Aristide by force of arms.
2. Creating a diplomatic last step and a rationale for invasion.
3. Creating a political playing field for reformists, i.e., Aristide's utter prostration before the military and U.S. diplomacy, intentionally preempting revolutionary organizing.
4. Reducing international solidarity to a political tug of war on the enemy's turf. Only imperialism can win.
5. Placing Imperialist firepower near mass movements.
6. Legitimizing a democratic cover scenario for interventions and a precedent for all intervention worldwide. Most threatened is Cuba.

Trotsky, like Lenin, was for workers' sanctions, not imperialist embargoes or sanctions. Concerning the League of Nations trade sanctions against fascist Italy after its 1935 invasion of Ethiopia, Trotsky wrote:

The parties of the Communist International [i.e., the Stalinist parties] try to appeal especially to the more revolutionary workers by denouncing the League (a denunciation that is an apology), by asking for "workers' sanctions," and then nevertheless saying: "We must use the League when it is for sanctions." They seek to hitch the revolutionary workers to the shafts so that they can draw the cart of the League.

Workers' action can begin only by absolute opposition to the national bourgeoisie and its international combinations. Support of the League and support of the workers' actions are fire and water; they cannot be united. (*Writings of Leon Trotsky [1935-36]*, p. 201.)

The struggle for democracy can only be seen within the context of the permanent revolution, that is, independence from imperialism, land distribution, democratic rights, etc. Underground elements exist in Haiti today, and their counterparts surely must exist among the half million Haitian expatriates in the U.S. Without building a mass proletarian party, the struggle against the Haitian ruling class, U.S./UN intervention, and the perfidious role of reformists cannot succeed.

International solidarity movements must call on trade unions and workers' parties to organize mass protests demanding, "Hands off Haiti!" and "Asylum for Refugees!" Revolutionaries must fight for trade unions to organize workers' sanctions if needed, i.e., refusing to load goods, etc. Food and medicine could be sent to grassroots movements and perhaps later invited defense brigades.

A task of revolutionaries today is to build such a solidarity movement.

Don't Believe Your Eyes!

by Kirill Buketov

There was a piece that ran in the Op-Ed page of the *Globe and Mail* on May 20. Headlined "Don't believe all you read about a Russian slump," it was written by Radek Sikorski, who is identified as a former deputy defense minister of Poland. The article was reprinted from the *Wall Street Journal*.

As you can tell from the title, Sikorski maintains that the gloomy news from Russia is vastly overstated. His article picks up from there:

Arriving here after several years' absence is a curious experience. Having read in Western newspapers of a 24 percent drop in Russian industrial output in January and February, of miners whose salaries had not been paid for months, of pensioners dying of starvation and the alarming rise in the suicide rate, one is at first surprised to find street lamps glowing and public buses still running.

Yet not only is Moscow not in its death throes, but the city appears to be in the midst of a boom. The number of foreign cars is growing exponentially, bright posters advertise computers and cat food [he doesn't specify whether this is for animal or human consumption; consumption of cat food is widespread among the homeless and other beneficiaries of Reaganomics in the States today], and hundreds of well-stocked shops throng with customers, most of them Russian. One employee at Manhattan Express, the night club where Moscow's prettiest prostitutes pick up their clients, told me that these days they charge Russians more than foreigners, because Russians are richer.

The boom is even beginning to reach well beyond the confines of the capital. The head of a major Western advertising agency in Moscow told me that most of his Western clients have more than doubled their sales in the past year, and most sell their goods in the provinces. In a tawdry shop near the Mongolian border, I witness heavy trading in Snickers bars and French perfume....

Opponents of capitalism are still battling to regain power. Their most effective ammunition is their ability to exaggerate the pain of transformation, even in the face of rising living standards. That is not difficult; they can formulate all of their arguments using ill-informed comments made in the West.

Although he says the same argument applies to the situation in Poland, Sikorski makes no attempt to address the fact that voters in both Hungary and Poland have recently voted for political parties of the left because of their frustration with the privation caused by the move to unfettered capitalism. Sikorski's view shows only that people look at social phenomena in a way which reflects their position in society. If you're living in a five-star hotel, visiting the Manhattan Express night club, and driving

about town in a Cadillac, you'll see only an insignificant part of Russian life, far from the general reality.

Yes, you can now see a good many fashionable shops in Moscow. But I'm certain that in these shops you won't meet any of the workers or miners about whom Sikorski writes so contemptuously. Yes, the city has been hit by a wave of foreign cars; Russia is where large numbers of the cars stolen in Western Europe now finish up, and also the final destination for many four-wheeled coffins that would long ago have been junked in the West. Is this evidence of "rising living standards"? Hardly.

The abundance of foreign cars has another side to it. One of the main reasons why a certain number of better-off Russians can now afford imported cars is because the government has spent billions of dollars in scarce foreign exchange to artificially inflate the buying power of the ruble. This is great news for importers, but it's devastating Russian manufacturers. Russian-made cars, cheap and sturdy, used to find a ready market in the West. Now they can't even compete at home, largely because the rigged exchange rate is providing heavy subsidies to foreign competitors. The car industry here is collapsing. Once prosperous auto workers are now on short time, wondering how to feed their children. The vehicle enterprises are talking about mass firings.

Sikorski was surprised to see buses still running in Moscow. He obviously didn't have to wait for one. If he had, he'd have realized that there are a third fewer of them than there used to be. At least the fact that fares have been rising much faster than inflation wouldn't have bothered him. Public transport here is in a critical state. New construction on the metro has virtually halted, and lack of funds is preventing proper maintenance. About a month ago, there were three accidents in one day involving metro trains. If you can possibly afford to buy a cheap, beat-up used car from the West, you probably will. But I wouldn't call it progress.

Among all my personal acquaintances, who are mainly teachers, scientists, and journalists, there isn't a single person who could allow themselves to visit a night club or to regularly buy groceries in a hard-currency store. Sikorski obviously saw what he wanted to see. He clearly had no wish to visit the Moscow basements full of homeless people — 30,000 of them, according to reports. Unlike their Western brethren, they're far too poor to buy cat food. Nor did he care to visit factories and talk to workers about their lives, or to talk with former teachers and

scientists forced to work on street stalls to make ends meet.

Nevertheless, he managed to communicate freely with a prostitute in a bar. There's a real "achievement" for market reform! On the streets of Russian cities, it's now easy to meet women selling their bodies. Years ago, Sikorski would have had to spend a week searching for a prostitute.

Only a few days ago I returned from Tula, an industrial city south of Moscow. There I'd spent several days working with the trade union committee of the metallurgical combine Tulachermet — one of the more prosperous large enterprises of Russia. Spending a few days in the dusty workshops of this provincial plant, I developed a rather different understanding of the Russian situation than did Mr. Sikorski, whiling away a few days in the company of prostitutes in the bars of Moscow.

"Don't believe all you read about a Russian slump"? To do this, I'd have to disbelieve my own eyes, and wonder whether I myself existed at all.

According to the big-business paper *Finansovye Izvestiya*, industrial output in March this year was down by 52.9 percent on the level of January 1990. This is far more than the decline in output in the Soviet Union during the Second World War. What Hitler couldn't do with bombs and shells, Yeltsin's reformers have done with free-market dogmas.

The fall in industrial production since March 1993 was 29.9 percent. So much for Sikorski's "boom"! What about his "rise in living standards"?

Government statisticians claim that average real incomes rose during 1993 by 11 percent. "Average" is the key word here. As late as 1990, the incomes of the wealthiest 10 percent of Russians exceeded those of the poorest 10 percent by a factor of about five. That figure is now reportedly about 12; Russian society is rapidly becoming more unequal.

The number of dollar millionaires is increasing — but strangely, huge numbers of people insist that they're getting poorer. In a poll taken in February, 47 percent of the people questioned assessed the material situation of their families as "poor" or "very poor" — up from 38 percent in July.

Still, the statisticians insist that total consumption rose last year, even though production fell dramatically. How could this be?

What happened was that investment continued its catastrophic slide of the last few years. Instead of being spent on rebuilding and modernizing Russian industry, resources went to increasing the sums spent on imported luxuries in Sikorski's fashionable shops. Meanwhile, the levels of investment were clearly inadequate even to maintain existing production. Russian industry was being allowed to fall to bits.

In economic terms, what's occurring in the Russian economy today is pure self-cannibalism. It goes ahead because the people running the Russian economy are basically the same party-state nomenklatura as before, with the

same highly developed skills in thieving the property of the enterprises they work for.

Ultimately, there'll be nothing left to steal, and grossly inadequate investment, together with the continuing collapse of internal demand as millions of workers are sacked, will wipe out much of what remains of the Russian economy.

At that point, the fashionable shops and the prostitutes will find their customers disappearing, taking off to their bank accounts in the West.

This isn't being flippant. Early in May three leading German economic think tanks warned Western lenders not to put money into Russia,

saying economic collapse there was accelerating. The Russian reform process, the experts concluded, was not working.

So, I think with Radek Sikorski in the Polish defense ministry, the Poles should be worried for their security. □

Teamsters Nearing Major Democratic Reforms

by Charles Walker

Eliminating the Conferences will make it clear that the union is not a country club for officers or a family business to be passed on from one generation of officials to the next.

— Ron Carey

On March 21, IBT General President Ron Carey sent shock waves of anger and disbelief through the Teamster old-guard bureaucracy when he dispatched representatives to the headquarters of the four USA area conferences with authority to demand all conference documents, including sensitive records concerning "...the authorization and payment of allowances, expenses, and benefits or other moneys payable by the Conference to its officers, agents, employees, vendors, or service providers."

Carey also ordered the conferences to notify him in advance of increases in conference officials' compensation, and the sale or transfer of assets, in order to prevent the looting of members' dues from the treasuries.

The End of the Olive Branch Period

Carey's action was an unmistakable sign that he would disband the conferences and was no longer counting on the self-reform of the bureaucracy that opposed him before and after he was elected as the first general president of the 1.4 million Teamsters to be chosen by the rank and file.

The area conferences are nominally subordinate bodies, mainly responsible for organizing, and for coordination of contract bargaining. In fact, the conferences are degenerated political patronage machines whose lifeblood is \$14 million in yearly dues deducted from the membership's wages.

Business Unionism Corruption

On May 25, Carey convened a hearing before the General Executive Board on his motion to disband the conferences, with the first order of business a report by Carey's investigators, detailing an outrageous rip-off of members' dues and democratic rights: "The Eastern Conference maintains a top-heavy organization that uses well over half of its budget (\$4,013,010) in

ways that provide no services or benefits to members. Out of 32 Conference employees, only 6 provide direct services in bargaining or grievance handling." An ordinary rank-and-file member is not eligible to hold office in the conference. It is headed by Walter Shea, who has never been a working Teamster and has never been elected by the membership to any union office.

The Central Conference (CCT) officials increased assessments by \$850,000, then raised their own salaries, resulting in a net drop of \$700,000 in assets. The report notes, "Between 1989 and 1993, Policy Committee members' salaries rose over 400% from a total of \$120,000 to \$500,000." Further, "There is no evidence that these exorbitant salary increases were connected to any significant change in responsibilities or workload."

"In another example of waste, the Central Conference Policy Committee holds meetings lasting no more than a few hours at luxury golf resorts outside the Conference — in California, Arizona, and Florida."

The Western Conference (WCT) was found to use "extra salaries" as political payoffs. The day after Carey removed Chuck Mack, president of Bay Area Joint Council 7, as an international representative, the Western Conference created a new position, paying Mack \$30,000 per year, in addition to his other two salaries. The conference chieftain who fattened Mack's bank account is WCT Chair Mike Riley, who raised his total Teamster salaries to \$314,528 in 1993, while members are paying over \$50,000 a year to provide for Riley's five vested pensions.

The Southern Conference (SCT) head, Jerry Cook, isn't shy about shaking down the petty cash box. Until recently, he was part owner of a restaurant where conference employees were sent for their lunches, free to them, but paid out of petty cash.

The Money Trail

The legendary vote-buying of Tammany Hall has nothing on the SCT, which supplied more than \$320,000 in grants to supporters during

1989-93. "Virtually all of these grants were given to Local Unions whose principal officer was either an employee or an officer of the Conference. Grants are usually given to smaller Local Unions. The votes of these smaller unions are used to control elections for the Policy Committee. During this period, over \$70,000 in grants...was given to Local 920..." whose principal officer received \$66,819 in conference salary and \$46,420 in allowances in 1993. Local 920 has only 132 members! "This pattern of providing grants to Local Unions based on political connections is pervasive."

The report observes that, "small locals in every conference have disproportionate voting power," because each local has two votes, regardless of size. A majority of votes represents only 21 percent of the members in the East, 15 percent in the Central, 17 percent in the South, and 10 percent in the West.

A New Beginning

The evidence of systematic corrupt practices and unyielding undemocratic structures is indisputable. The continued existence of the conferences is incompatible with further democratic reform and the strengthening of the Teamsters Union. In their place, Carey may construct a number of trade divisions, which would coordinate nationwide planning and bargaining strategies for almost all bargaining units. In such a fashion, he could combine the power of locals that bargain with national corporations, but do not have the benefit of a national contract, the way UPS, freight, carhaul, and others do. With the responsibility for the divisions in the hands of popularly elected officials, members could realistically demand the accountability the conferences now deny them.

As of this date, the IBT hearings have recessed until June 6. Shortly thereafter, the Teamsters may proceed to construct a union that can serve as a model deserving the widest emulation. □

May 24, 1994

Impressions of Budapest

by Michael Steven Smith

Anti-Semitism is the socialism of fools.

— August Bebel

I and the public know,
What all schoolchildren learn,
That those to whom evil is done,
Do evil in return.

— W.H. Auden
September 1, 1939

We were in Budapest in April. My cousin Susan, the family genealogist, found our long-lost relatives. We went to see them — my mother's first cousin Antal "Anti" Orban, age 85, and his family. They had changed their name from Oppenheim because of anti-Semitism. She found them through a missing family bureau in Israel. She learned that they had changed their name to Orban and then looked it up in the Budapest phone book in a Chicago library. We had thought they had been killed. This year marks the 50th anniversary of the winter of 1944–45 and the decimation of the Hungarian Jews, who were deported to Auschwitz and other camps that winter and slaughtered even though the fascists knew they would lose the war. I had always thought that my relatives who had stayed in Hungary — my grandparents came to the United States in 1912 — were gone.

Anti's son, Vili, his wife, Mari, and his granddaughter, Natalia, met us as we came through customs, embraced us, and took us in and around. Vili showed us the old synagogue on Dohany (Tobacco) Street in the Jewish quarter, where his grandmother Fani, my grandmother's sister, had lived. The synagogue is a massive 19th century Moorish-like building with twin onion-shaped steeples and a façade of exquisite brickwork. A Christian won the competition and designed it. The only larger temple in the world is the one on Fifth Avenue in New York City. Twenty-thousand Jews lived in the synagogue over the winter of 1944–45, packed in, no heat, little food. Seven thousand died. They are buried in a mass grave in the courtyard. A beautiful weeping willow made of steel stands as a memorial to the 600,000 Jews murdered that winter. Names of families are engraved on the metal leaves. One inscription condemns "the fascist beasts." But animals don't kill needlessly, systematically, hatefully.

We met Anti and his wife, Mancini, also 85 years old, at a restaurant across the Danube from our hotel. They told us that they had been captured in 1942, two years before most of the Jews were taken, probably not so much because they were Jewish, but because they were Jewish Communists. They told us they had joined the Communist Party in 1935 when they were 26 years old. They were in good company. Hungary had had a short-lived revolution in 1919 led by Bela Kun, a Jew. It was defeated after only two months. So, too, that year the German


revolution was defeated, and the great Jewish heroine Rosa Luxemburg was martyred. The Soviet revolution of 1917, only two years old, was already beginning to be contained, isolated, and rolled back. Admiral Horthy, a rightist Hungarian aristocrat, came to power, supported by the Hungarian fascist Silver Cross. Mussolini, Hitler, and Franco also came to power as a shadow spread across Europe. I told Anti and Mancini that my wife Debby and I shared their ideals, that we, too, were socialists. "We joined with our hearts," Anti replied. "You joined with your heads."

Anti was deported to a slave labor camp in 1942, the year I was born. Mancini was put in a concentration camp. Their four-year-old son Vili, who is now a lawyer like me, was hidden with a Christian woman. Anti was with Mancini's brother. They talked about escaping. Only Anti was in favor of it. He escaped, stole weapons from the Germans, and went into the woods, where he joined up with the partisans and fought in three countries for three years. He showed us his uniform, which is covered with medals — a genuine hero. Mancini's brother died in the camp. Mancini was liberated in 1945 by the Russians. She came back to Budapest looking for her son. She found him. But he said, "You are not my mother; my mother was beautiful." She was seventy pounds and bald.

After the war Anti's brother Carl, my mother's other first cousin, emigrated to Israel rather than stay in Hungary. I saw him in 1959. He was living in a one-room place north of Tel Aviv in what had been the Arab quarter before the Zionists chased the Arabs out in the 1948 war. His son answered the door. He was a few years younger than me. He was wearing a cast-away shirt of mine that my grandmother had sent. Carl's job was making silver trinkets for tourists. He had no refrigerator and asked me to ask my family in Chicago to help him get one. When we were in Budapest Anti told us that Carl's son had been shot dead on the last day of the 1967 war. Carl died last year.

Anti told the story of Carl being invited to dinner. He was — we are — related to Oppenheim, the South African diamond mogul. The mogul sent a letter inviting Carl for dinner at a hotel in Jerusalem. Carl showed up. So did fifteen other relatives of Oppenheim. But Oppenheim did not come. Instead he wrote a note which his secretary read. It said, "Please enjoy this dinner. It is the only thing you'll ever get from me."

We had received an introduction from Annette Rubinstein to two friends of hers whom she had met when she taught literature in Budapest. We called them, and Sandor and Susan came over to our hotel to visit. They were in their seventies and still very much politically



The Dohany Street Synagogue in Budapest

engaged. Sandor had been a professor of city planning at the university. Susan still teaches literature. They were former party members from a Jewish background. They told us they were afraid to tell their six-year-old granddaughter that she is Jewish for fear that she would let it slip in school and suffer after. We talked to them about why. They told us that anti-Semitism had made a comeback.

Of the 800,000 Jews in Hungary, 600,000 were killed. Eighty thousand now live in Budapest, but before the war a quarter of the city was Jewish. They had been in Hungary since ancient times. We drove past a Roman ruin where a Hebrew tombstone had been found. The Jews were prominent in the arts, banking, commerce, literature, and the law in what was a highly cultured place.

Since the reintroduction of the capitalist market, the few remaining Jews have been scapegoated for the current social and economic chaos. Susan and Sandor said there was a reverse land reform that gave land back to the aristocrats, breaking up the formerly productive collective farms. Now land lies fallow. Some farms are golf courses. Ruination comes to many socially owned factories which were put on the market and sold. Unemployment is high. Inflation is high. Tuition, social security, and medical care are no longer freely provided. Insecurity abounds.

They explained that in the last years of the "Communist" government, before the reinstatement of the market economy, the government allowed persons to accumulate capital and make small investments. The professional Jews were able to do this. So when privatization put nationalized property on the block and the market was installed, a minority of citizens, including Jews, made out well. But most people are worse off. The anti-Semites blamed the Jews, and fools listened because there is always a grain of truth

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Hungarian Communists Voted Back into Power, But...

by Marilyn Vogt-Downey

A Gallup poll in the “Eastern bloc” countries showed in January 1991 that Hungarians were the most pessimistic population surveyed. While the poll showed that their worries were widely shared by citizens of other formerly Communist Party-dominated countries, to almost every question the Hungarians responded with not only the bleakest expectations but also the most depression about what the past year had left them (*New York Times*, January 2, 1991).

The *New York Times* just six months later, demonstrating the intrinsic opposition of the interests of workers and the interests of capitalists, reported that the progress of the market reforms in Hungary was being assessed in capitalist investor circles as “the closest thing in Eastern Europe to a success story” (June 24, 1992). The depressed and pessimistic workers are an inseparable part of the “success story” of the Hungarian market reforms.

Three years earlier, in February 1988, when the government was still controlled by the Hungarian Stalinists, government television reported that nearly one-fourth of the country’s population of 10.6 million lived in poverty. The most severely affected were pensioners and families with two or more children. Some 25,000 families in Budapest, the capital, were in arrears on their rent, and about 150 apartments each week had their electricity cut off because tenants couldn’t afford to pay their bills. This reflected the depth of the poverty because rent and electricity costs were subsidized and kept very low by standards in the capitalist world.

In the face of this poverty, what was the government going to do? The television news announced that the government would be raising prices for essential foods by 16 percent! (*New York Times*, February 6, 1988.)

This reflected the policies of the government of the Hungarian Stalinists, officially called the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP).

Precursors of Perestroika

The HSWP had already embarked on a program of market reforms even before the ruling bureaucracy in the Kremlin under Mikhail Gorbachev began to do so in the late 1980s in an effort to attract international loans and capitalist investments. However, the decision by the Kremlin to pursue such economic “restructuring” [perestroika], i.e., convert from bureaucratic planning to the introduction of market mechanisms, considerably accelerated the process in Hungary.

It was not the market reforms so much as the Kremlin’s glasnost — or the decision to loosen up the censorship, something that had not been on the agenda of the HSWP — that really proved the HSWP’s undoing.

As the key HSWP leaders set about making themselves more accessible to the world media to bolster their image, their responsibility for the bloody political repression of the past decades — particularly their complicity in the Kremlin’s repression of the popular rebellion of 1956 — could not help but come back to haunt them.

The collapse of the HSWP began in the first days of 1989 when its Central Committee ruled that the 1956 rebellion was at least in part a legitimate “popular uprising” rather than simply a “counterrevolutionary” uprising, as it had traditionally claimed. From then on, it was all over. The more truth that was unearthed and publicized, the more crimes and duplicity the party had to admit and vice versa. Many survivors, relatives of survivors, and unofficial historians went to work to reestablish the facts and formed organizations to do so.

From Anti-Fascist Partisans to Stalinist Practitioners

The HSWP came to power after Soviet armies drove out the Nazi occupiers and their local Fascist allies. Many HSWP cadre had played important roles in the partisan war against the Nazi occupiers during World War II, but of course the top leaders were closely linked with the Stalinist bureaucracy of the USSR. From the start, the HSWP was crippled by its Stalinist, undemocratic methods of functioning. Layer upon layer of prominent party figures became victims of the purges and repression that swept the Eastern bloc in the late 1940s and early ’50s up until Stalin’s death in 1953 as the Kremlin apparatus and their local agents sought to insure firm political loyalty. In fact, the widespread aspiration to be rid of this repressive Stalinist heritage was what mainly fueled the mass rebellion of 1956. The Hungarian rebellion was echoed throughout the bureaucratically dominated workers’ states, including in the USSR, where a “thaw” in the political atmosphere took place, with various ups and downs, during the Khrushchev era, roughly 1954–64.

Up to the end of 1988, the HSWP was still defending its Stalinist heritage and insisting firmly that it would not yield power or grant political concessions. However, by September 1989 — in less than one year — it was negotiating with opposition forces to organize multiparty elections. Its ignominious collapse was one of the most spectacular of those that swept away Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe that year.

Beginning in early 1989, over the course of only a few months, the HSWP surrendered its position as the sole ruling party as stipulated in its own constitution. It conceded that Imre Nagy and other leaders of the 1956 rebellion had been tried and hung wrongfully and illegally. It rehabilitated them and hundreds of other workers and youth who had been hung and buried in

mass, unmarked graves. By July 1989 the HSWP was even forced to allow a massive funeral in Budapest to honor Nagy. It stripped Janos Kadar, leader of the 1956 counterrevolution and still president of the HSWP, of his rank and posts and expelled him from the party’s Central Committee. The HSWP’s authority evaporated.

In October 1989 it held an extraordinary conference, where it changed its name to the Hungarian Socialist Party and officially declared that it rejected “orthodox Marxism.” When it asked its 720,000 members to reregister as members of the new party, only 30,000 did so. The HSWP became a shadow of itself almost overnight. Following a November 1989 national referendum showing that the majority of voters favored election of a new parliament in the spring of 1990, the Hungarian parliament — controlled by former Stalinists — voted on December 21 to dissolve itself as of March 1990 to make way for these elections.

Thus, the HSWP abdicated power. But not before it did its last bit of damage. With its last breath, to accommodate the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the parliament voted to adopt an austerity budget for the next year that was to cripple the economy, sharply increase prices, and freeze wages.

As a result, before the HSWP was even defeated in the March 1990 elections, Hungary had been drastically transformed: the Roman Catholic Church had been welcomed back, British media mogul Robert Maxwell had been allowed to take over the main government newspaper, and the Canadian real estate tycoon Albert Reichman (owner of the infamous Olympia & York conglomerate and the largest commercial landlord in the world in the mid-1980s) and many other foreign vultures were being encouraged to reach in and grab what they could.

By July 1990, when the new government was still just establishing itself, the number of foreign joint ventures had increased sixfold over the number a year before (1,800 as opposed to 280). Protests by workers against price increases and by peasants against the selling off of collective and state farms became common.

The new government, the one that ruled until the recent May 1994 elections, was led by the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), which won the parliamentary elections in 1990. The HDF is a petty-bourgeois party devoted to rapid reinstitution of capitalism. The president of the HDF government was Arpad Goncz — like Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, a writer and former political prisoner during the period of Stalinist rule. Like Havel, Goncz was not a social or political thinker and had no links with the working class. Such figures present no problem to international investors: the “privatiza-

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Behind the Upsurge of Workers' Struggles

by Zhang Kai

The following article first appeared in the March issue of *October Review*, a revolutionary socialist magazine published in Hong Kong.

Upsurge of Labor Disputes

Since China started her market reform, labor disputes have increased. Here are the official figures:

In November 1993, when Tian Xiaobo, the deputy head of the International Cooperation Division of the State Ministry of Labor, attended a symposium on labor management in foreign capital enterprises in China, he revealed that since China formulated the "Temporary Ordinance on Handling Labor Disputes" in 1987, 1 million labor dispute cases had been dealt with. Among them, 710,000 cases were settled by the Conciliation Committee formed by the management and the factory trade union. 290,000 cases were ruled by a verdict of the Arbitrary Committee on Labor Disputes. About 1,000 cases were settled in court.¹

This means that on average there have been 143,000 cases of labor disputes in China every year, an average of 400 cases per day.

Just in the first six months of 1993, in Shenzhen, the municipal labor bureau received 2,535 persons appealing about labor disputes and handled 10 sit-ins and strikes which involved 4,135 persons. "Of these, 80 percent of workers had legitimate reasons."²

The term "labor disputes" covers workers' strikes, which are usually referred to officially as "stoppages of work." Labor departments reveal that incomplete statistics from 15 provinces and municipalities covering the first six months of 1993 showed that there were over 220 cases of workers stopping work or undertaking collective appeal actions for the following reasons: arbitrary dismissal of workers, arbitrary extension of working hours, neglect of workers' health, suspended payment of workers' wages.³

In the first half of 1992, there were over 100 cases of labor disputes in factories with joint foreign and local capital.⁴

The following are some concrete instances of strikes:

At the end of February 1993, 1,200 workers from a shoe factory financed by Korean capital in Tianjin collectively went on strike to protest intensive labor, low pay, and hard working conditions. At the end of March, over 800 workers working in the Cannon Factory in Zhuhai City, owned by Japanese capital, went on a collective "stoppage of work" and paralyzed the factory for some days. On May 11, 4,100 workers from the San Mei Electricity Appliance Factory and the Mei Jing Shoe Factory stopped work.

Within the 75 days from March 9 to May 23, 10 more factories run by foreign capital were affected by the wave of strikes, and in the 12 strikes, 7,263 persons participated directly, causing an accumulated loss of 18,147 working days.⁵

Minister of Labor Li Boyong, told a Hong Kong newspaper that in the whole of 1993, "strikes, slowdowns, collective appeal actions, demonstrations, parades and protests numbered no less than 10,000 cases, and enterprises with joint foreign and local capital are particularly problematic."⁶ From this data can be seen that labor disputes have been increasingly frequent and acute, despite the fact that the Chinese Communist Party deleted the right to strike from the Chinese Constitution in 1982.

Harsh Working Conditions

Workers have found that in the reform toward a market economy, capitalist exploitation has been a major means for factories to gain profits. This is especially serious in factories run by foreign or private capital. The state accords favorable privileges to the capitalists. Local authorities, in particular, in vying for investments, compete in offering concessions at the expense of the interests of the workers. For example, existing labor protection laws or regulations are not respected, and their violations are not heeded. For the capitalists, there is no worry about the hiring of workers at a very cheap price, since the reserve army is huge: tens of millions in cities and towns, and over 100 million from the villages. There have been reports of the harsh working conditions imposed on the workers:

1. Workers are forced to work overtime. A recent survey by the Guangdong Provincial Federation of Trade Unions shows that in enterprises run jointly by foreign and local capital, 61 percent of the workers work over 6 days a week, without any rest day. 34.7 percent of the workers feel that they have been compelled to work overtime. 20.1 percent of workers receive no pay for their overtime work.⁷ The Guangdong Provincial Labor Bureau conducted a survey of 14,000 workers from 17 enterprises run by joint foreign and local capital and found out that for most of the enterprises, the working day is 10–12 hours, and there is no rest day. This is a violation of the official regulation that the working day be 8 hours.⁸

2. Safety is neglected. There are no special precautions taken against dust, poison, and noise pollution. Facilities, including those to

safeguard against industrial hazards, are seriously lacking. A sample survey on the health record of 260 workers from enterprises run by joint foreign and local capital in a city in Guangdong Province showed that 46 of them suffered from anemia or abnormality in white blood cells or platelets.⁹ In Zhejiang Province, in a body check conducted by the Occupational Health Prevention and Cure Department on 117 workers from rural enterprises, 37 workers suffered from symptoms including dermatitis, papule, and pharyngitis.¹⁰

3. Wages are low and benefits are mean. For example, in a general check in Shenzhen City, it was found that quite a portion of laborers earn only 140 yuan a month. One woman worker worked an equivalent of 36 working days in one month, and her total wages were 134.4 yuan.¹¹ In a shoe factory in Xiamen, the workers' wages are only 105 yuan per month, which is 47 percent lower than the minimum wage stipulation in the city. The factories still deduct from workers' wages all sorts of penalties. The majority of labor dispute cases in Xiamen are due to the low remuneration.¹²

In "some" of the privately run factories in Qingdao, Xiamen, and Tianjin, workers' wages amount to only 50–70 percent of the minimum wage. At the same time, workers are forced to pay various kinds of fees, such as a fee for the working uniform. Penalties are also many.¹³

4. Labor intensity is strengthened, and the quota is arbitrarily set. In a joint investment watch factory in Zhuhai, the labor quota for a worker per shift is set to be 4,000, whereas in Japan the labor quota for a similar job is 2,500.¹⁴

5. The factories do not sign any labor contract with the workers, and workers are vulnerable to unemployment. In 1992, in Shenzhen, the municipal government conducted a sample survey of 280,000 workers from over 2,000 factories and found that 17.9 percent of them had not had their labor registration formalities done. In Shantou and Zhuhai, factories that did not sign any contract with workers constituted 70 percent and 90 percent, respectively, of all factories run by foreign capital.¹⁵ Even when there are contracts, the terms are often unfavorable to workers.

Industrial Hazards

Industrial hazards have become a serious problem. From the relevant figures announced by the state since 1990, industrial deaths in state-owned and collectively owned enterprises had

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The Oslo Accords and the Intifada

by Tom Garvey

Tom Garvey was a leader in the Harvard University Students Against War in the Middle East and active in the movement for Palestinian rights at Harvard University. He is a sympathizer of the Fourth International.

Since this article was drafted, Baruch Goldstein, perhaps with collaborators, gunned down at least 29 Arabs worshipping at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron. The Israeli government's effort to reign in violent Israeli settlers has been half-hearted at best, but it has kept the Arab community in Hebron under curfew for three weeks, only allowing them to leave their homes occasionally for food. The Israeli Army has fired live rounds at Arab demonstrators and killed several in the past month. Nevertheless, even as the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories continue to suffer this latest wave of repression, the PLO, after some militant posturing, has come back to the negotiating table. The Arafat leadership has again shown that it needs to make a deal regardless of the consequences for the Palestinian people.

Meanwhile, supporters have been peeling away from the Arafat camp at an ever faster rate. The Unified National Leadership of the Intifada (described below), after being silent since the Oslo Agreement, issued a new leaflet just hours after the Hebron massacre. It calls for a rejection of Arafat's peace plan and a resumption of the Intifada.¹

* * *

When Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat shook hands in Washington on September 13, many who sympathized with the Palestinian cause believed that finally the Palestinians' problems were on their way to being solved. The final agreement granting Palestinians "limited autonomy" in Jericho and the Gaza Strip has been delayed long past its December 13 deadline, but whatever happens, the events of the past few months show that the interests of Arafat and his collaborators have converged with those of the Israeli government and capital. The root causes for this newfound friendship and its implications for the Palestinian people can be drawn not from the statements of good will by the various diplomats, but from the material conditions and conflicts in Palestine and in the Middle East as a whole. More than anything else, these negotiations were spurred by the Intifada (Arabic for "the Uprising") and the

threat it posed to Arab and Israeli capital and the entire order in the Middle East, from the large-scale interrelations of capital to the gender relations which characterize the society.

The PLO and Middle East Autocracies

The leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization has always been integrated with the autocratic regimes of the Arab states, and therefore with the Arab bourgeoisie. The PLO's first president, Ahmed Shuqairy, had represented both Syria and Saudi Arabia at the UN, and he authored the PLO charter with the official sponsorship of Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egyptian government by agreement of the Arab Summit Conference of 1963 (a meeting of the autocratic regimes of the Arab countries).² (Nasser was the dictator of Egypt from 1952 to 1972 and the foremost figure of Arab nationalism.)

In 1965, outside of the PLO, the organization al Fatah (which means "victory" in Arabic) was formed under the leadership of Yasser Arafat and launched highly publicized guerrilla attacks on Israel from Jordan. During the 1967 war between Israel and the Arab states, Fatah won some of the few victorious battles against the Israeli Army.³ After the Israeli victory, Fatah was invited into and basically took over the PLO. It thereby gained the official sanction of the Arab regimes and lent its then-considerable popularity to the PLO. The Saudi government, one of the most repressive regimes in the world, was the PLO's largest sponsor, and poured hundreds of millions of dollars into al Fatah.⁴

This sort of "generosity" had its *quid pro quo*. The Palestinian National Charter specifically states that the PLO "shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state."⁵ In practice, this has meant that the PLO has refrained from making common cause with many other victims of oppression in the Middle East or from rallying mass actions for its cause in the other Middle Eastern countries. Nor has it raised a complaint over the oppression, at times more severe than Israel's, of Palestinians by the governments in these same countries. For instance, in 1970, Jordan's King Hussein, a purported

friend of the PLO, cracked down ferociously on the Palestinians and the PLO in the infamous Black September massacre.⁶

With Arafat and the Palestinian National Council's public statements of gratitude, Arab autocrats have used the Palestinian cause as a populist/nationalist pretense to distract from their own repressive and exploitative practices. For instance, in 1980, Hafez Al-Assad, dictator of Syria, stated: "Syria and the Palestinian revolution are in one trench, something which must be understood by both friend and foe."⁷ By Syria, of course, he meant himself. Edward Said is a former Palestinian Council Member who resigned in January 1994 in protest over Arafat's concessions to Israel. He asserts that Arafat sees "himself as a leader who hobnobs with kings and presidents" — not as a fighter for the downtrodden.⁸

The PLO is backed by non-Palestinian Arab capital, and it is also backed by Palestinian capitalists outside of Palestine, and small business people in the Occupied Territories.⁹ Although the rank-and-file PLO supporters in the territories and refugee camps are workers and peasants, Arafat and his collaborators are worlds removed from them.

The Palestinian elite seeks to have a state which it can dominate so as to relate on an equal basis with the elites and rulers of other states, and where its investments will be privileged. This puts it in opposition to the democratic aspirations of the Palestinian people. Nonetheless, it also wants to harness these same aspirations to carve out as large a state as possible and to win other concessions from Israel.

The Intifada, Class, and Gender

The Intifada, or Uprising, that began in the Occupied Territories in 1987 has shaken the order that had existed since 1967. The groundwork was laid during the 1980s. Members of the different factions of the PLO and the Palestinian Communist Party competed with each other to organize the people of the Occupied Territories in women's groups and trade unions. In part because of factional competition, they were forced to organize sectors previously left out

1. "The Voice of the Intifada Above All Others: A Special Statement Issued by the National Leadership of the Intifada, reprinted in *News From Within* (the English-language monthly of the Alternative Information Center in Israel), March 1994.
2. See Walter Laquer and Barry Rubin, eds., *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, New York: Penguin Books, 1984, p. 131.
3. See F. Robert Hunter, *The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 14.
4. *International Viewpoint*, October 1993.
5. The Palestinian National Charter is reprinted in Laquer and Rubin, p. 370.
6. See Peter Mansfield, *The Arabs*, New York: Penguin Books, 1992, p. 293.
7. Hafez Al-Assad, speech, March 8, 1980, reprinted in Laquer and Rubin, p. 621.
8. See *Z* magazine, December 1993.
9. *International Viewpoint*, October 1993.

due to dogmatic understandings of who was and was not important. They targeted migrant laborers and women working in homes and factories as well as male factory workers. Their activities went far beyond those of modern Western trade unions in that they took over administration where the occupiers left off. They provided such necessities as day care and health care, and provided settings for socializing and community-building. As a result, by the time the Intifada began, enough popularly legitimate, extragovernmental institutions were in place that the Palestinians were ready to step in and administer themselves when the power of the occupiers was compromised by the uprising.¹⁰

In 1987, the Palestinian battle against the Israeli government took on a mass character on an unprecedented scale. From the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967, the Palestinians had engaged in civil resistance. Commercial strikes, marches, and stone-throwing at soldiers of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) took place regularly for the first twenty years. Meanwhile, Israeli land theft drove more and more Palestinians into urban areas, increasing the potential for mass mobilizations.¹¹ The younger generation of Palestinians who had grown up in towns under occupation and in the refugee camps grew more and more restive.

On December 8, 1987, four Palestinian laborers were killed when the truck bearing them from their jobs in Israel was struck by an IDF transport truck driven by a man whose brother had purportedly been killed by Arabs. The collision was deemed an act of revenge, and the funeral for the four men became a demonstration. Israeli soldiers used tear gas and bullets in an attempt to break up the crowd, but instead of dispersing, as they had done before in similar situations, the demonstrators fought back with stones and iron bars. Similar demonstrations spread across the territories. The resolution of the demonstrators brought in other sectors of society, and the Palestinian masses mobilized against Israeli oppression. In Jerusalem, during the first six months of the Uprising, there were 32 general strikes.¹² The mass demonstrations brought Israeli economic reprisals, and the Palestinians also began to boycott Israeli goods.

This made economic business-as-usual impossible. Hundreds of neighborhood committees that had been formed through the trade

union and women's organizing efforts during the 1980s took over government functions such as education, health, police activity, and food distribution. In 1988, perhaps "ninety percent of the people in Gaza belong[ed] to political groups" such as the ones described above. This percentage included women and elderly people as well as male youths.¹³ The different factions that had formed the popular committees came to a reconciliation in April 1987, and in the Intifada, they found common cause. In January, 1988, they issued their first communique as the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNL or UNLU), which has led the Intifada ever since.¹⁴

Women and the Intifada

The Intifada's leaders "on the ground" have been drawn from the urban working class and residents of the refugee camps.¹⁵ Also, the transformation in the role of women in Palestinian society, which had been going on for decades, has accelerated sharply. With many men incarcerated or exiled, women have flooded into previously male-dominated occupations and, in turn, taken leadership positions in the lower echelons of the Intifada even in the traditionally conservative rural villages.¹⁶ However, women have been mostly denied leadership roles in the higher bodies of the UNLU.¹⁷

Women's organizations have actually taken a more active role in the grass-roots administration of the uprising than have traditional, mostly male-constituted labor unions.¹⁸ Women, along with youths of both sexes, have been the vanguard of the struggle. In one famous demonstration in the midst of the Intifada, women, disgusted with the quiescence of the men of their town, marched through the streets chanting "Where are you, men of Ramallah?"¹⁹ (Ramallah is in the West Bank, north of Jerusalem.)

Although it has been seriously challenged by the women's militancy, the persistence of Palestinian patriarchy has seriously hampered the Intifada. Young women are often employed by their close relatives, or by employers who may call upon the women's male relatives to keep them in line. In this cooperative relationship, the male relatives, regardless of their class, control part of the value created by women's labor in the workplace as well as their domestic labor in the home.²⁰ This links them to the Palestinian

employers, who are in turn linked to Israeli and Western capital. This contradiction is a major force behind the emergence of the bigoted and misogynist, but militantly anti-Israel Islamist movement.

Right-Wing Islam and the Intifada

The rise of so-called fundamentalism is an extremely complex phenomenon which needs full analysis. However, a summary will have to suffice for now.

There are many right-wing Islamist groups including the Islamic Jihad and other, smaller tendencies. Hamas is the largest Islamic militant group in Palestine and, during the Intifada, has been the second most influential political force in the Occupied Territories, after the Fatah faction of the PLO.²¹ At this point, it may well have surpassed Fatah in popularity. Hamas is the military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, a conservative Islamic organization formed in 1928 in Egypt with branches in several countries throughout the Middle East.²² Many of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood are clerics employed by an association called the *waqf* (which means "religious endowments"). The *waqf* is controlled by Jordan and owns an enormous network of mosques, charitable institutions, and various more secular capitalist enterprises such as land holdings.²³ Until the Intifada, the Muslim Brotherhood abstained from conflict with the Israeli government, but in December 1987, younger leaders were spurred by the rising tide of the struggle and pushed the organization to form the Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas.²⁴ (In Arabic the word *hamas* means "enthusiasm, zeal.")

Much of the growing appeal of Hamas is due to its contradictory combination of reactionary social aims with an uncompromising public stand against the negotiations. Hamas caters to the interests of a broad social layer that is angry at the conciliationist maneuvering of the PLO, but is equally afraid of the forces of social change — especially in gender relations. The clerics stand at the head of a movement including small merchants, shopkeepers, landowners, large numbers of students, impoverished refugees in the camps, and rural villagers.²⁵ To the clerics and small traditional capitalists, both the social revolutionary potential of the left wing of the Intifada and the infiltration of Western capital

10. See Joost R. Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991, p. 55.

11. See Don Peretz, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, p. 7-9.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

13. *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, Spring 1988, cited in *ibid.*, p. 86.

14. Hiltermann, pp. 175, 178. Also, *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, Spring 1988, p. 89.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

17. Hiltermann, p. 207.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 206.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

21. See Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994, p. 85.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 83.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-21.

with its multinationals may spell doom. Meanwhile, to many men of all classes, control over the women in their families is an important economic advantage. They are pulled by both their opposition to Israel and by their patriarchal status.

The Palestinian women of the working and peasant classes are therefore the lynchpin of Palestinian struggle. It is up to those whose immediate interests are opposed to both Israeli occupation and patriarchy to simultaneously prosecute the struggle against each. Only a strong anticapitalist, nationalist, feminist movement can create a pole of attraction that leads to a full revolutionary transformation of society.

Palestinian Capital

The Intifada has never fully broken from the Palestinian ruling elites — the capitalist men whose interests can never be fully separated from Israel's or the West's. Palestinian capitalists are sometimes heads of Palestinian labor unions, making them tools of capital, not labor. For instance, Samara Natsheh, owner of a Hebron spinning factory, is also the secretary general of the Hebron Spinning Workers' Union.²⁶ This is fairly common.

As the struggle has worn on, Palestinian capitalists have been squeezed more and more by the strikes and curfews, and they have broken ranks. At the same time, Palestinian workers, more and more aware of their own power, have been willing to challenge the exploitative labor practices of Palestinian employers who have tried to take advantage of the national solidarity created by the uprising to hold down wages and sell shoddy goods.²⁷

The Intifada's challenges to the traditional elites, coupled with its inability to fully free itself from those elites, has led to disarray and confusion. It has given rise to the fiercely misogynistic, though outwardly militant nationalist, right-wing Islamic movements like Hamas. Meanwhile, the Palestinian capitalists are preparing to sell out the Intifada to Israel.

Arafat and the Intifada

From its beginning, Arafat has tried to undermine the Intifada, not just because it threatens the Palestinian elite, but because it resonates with Arab masses elsewhere who might be inspired to rise up against their oppressors and Arafat's allies. Just as the mobilization reached a fever pitch in 1988, the PLO leadership began to concede some of its most important positions to Israel — the beginning of the process that has led to the current negotiations. Arafat used the Palestinian people's desire for results to push

the Palestinian National Council to the right. At his urging, the PNC unilaterally recognized the Israeli state and endorsed UN resolutions 242 and 338, something the PLO had previously refused to do because these resolutions make no mention of the Palestinian people and concern only the Arab and Israeli states.²⁸ The UNL banned Palestinians from negotiating with any Israeli leaders who opposed Palestinian rights, but Arafat supported meetings with the Israelis in defiance of this order.²⁹ This served to confuse the Palestinian people, whose efforts could have extracted enormous concessions from Israel. Meanwhile, Israel grew more and more skillful at exploiting divisions and deflating mobilizations. It stepped up repression using mass arrests, beatings, torture, and house demolition.³⁰ And it tightened its economic blockade.³¹

As the crisis deepened, Palestinian businesses in the Occupied Territories withdrew their support for the Intifada. The local leadership, unprepared for such betrayal, lacking the necessary political and theoretical training, became disoriented.³² The Intifada has mostly degenerated into small, violent acts by a few militants except in the Gaza Strip, where the masses have stayed mobilized. However, in the West Bank, the potential for mass mobilization lies just beneath the surface, as demonstrated by "massive expressions of popular support" for a hunger strike by political prisoners in October 1992.³³

Imperialism and the Accords

Commentators often cite the expulsion of the Iraqi Army from Kuwait in the Gulf War and the PLO's support for Saddam Hussein as a major impetus for the PLO's conciliatory stance. That is an exaggeration. The PLO offered to negotiate and began indirect contacts with Israel long before the Gulf War. The PLO's position, however, did serve to further confuse the Palestinian people and to weaken the PLO at the bargaining table. Arafat and his collaborators did not make a clear distinction between the autocratic nature of the Iraqi regime and the necessary unconditional opposition to U.S. attacks on the people of Iraq, but simply supported Saddam Hussein's autocratic regime. Arafat tried to pose as a radical Arab nationalist so as to win back some of his rapidly dwindling support, but Saddam Hussein is not particularly loved by the Arab masses. In addition, Arafat offered no practical methods of mobilization, so his statements were a useless but dangerous gesture. Now, Arafat has come back to his old patrons, the Saudis. Concessions to the U.S. and Israel even deeper than the ones originally intended were

almost certainly a *quid pro quo* for renewed Saudi support.³⁴ The Intifada seems to have mostly wound down, and Arafat has bet all of his political chips on this negotiated settlement.

The accords represent a victory for Zionism, and if carried through completely, the successful achievement of a long-held Zionist goal. The Arab governments have barred Israeli products and capital from Arab markets — a handicap for Israeli capitalists.³⁵ Therefore, the left wing of Zionism, the Labor Party of Israel, has long hoped to relinquish direct responsibility for the Palestinian-inhabited parts of the territories taken in 1967. Until 1988, when, in the face of the Intifada, Jordan officially gave up claims to the West Bank, Israel had hoped to work out this sort of arrangement with the Jordanian government. The situation became even more acute recently with the transformation of the U.S. role in the region.

Without Soviet opposition, the United States feels that it can take a more direct role in Southwest Asia and Africa, as evidenced by the Gulf War and the intervention in Somalia. The Palestinian conflict is a sore point between the U.S. government and the Arab people, and the U.S. wants to promote its image as a peacemaker in the region. Israel will still be an important part of U.S. policy, but it cannot be as antagonistic toward the governments of its Arab neighbors as it has been.

Israeli and U.S. capitalists have big plans for the Middle East, and Arab and exiled Palestinian capitalists, though probably not pleased to be junior partners, plan to play along. There is talk of a "Middle Eastern common market" between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and the Palestinian region which would also give special privileges to the United States vis-à-vis the EC and East Asia.³⁶ The PLO-administered territories would serve as a transit zone for some Israeli goods, and a source of cheap labor for projects of Israeli capital with Palestinian capital playing a secondary role. (This is already going on to some extent.) The pacified Middle East would be a major part of the U.S. sphere of influence.

The \$2 billion promised by the industrialized countries is not nearly enough to achieve even modest economic prosperity for the majority of Palestinians. According to Walid Salem, Palestinian activist and academic, "the needs of Gaza alone in the area of infrastructure and job creation for the whole active population have been evaluated by experts at a sum oscillating be-

Continued on page 41

26. Hiltermann, p. 82.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 180-182.

28. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 are reprinted in *ibid.*, pp. 197-198.

29. Hunter, pp. 184-188.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 271.

31. Peretz, p. 72.

32. Hunter, p. 266.

33. See *New Politics*, Winter 1994.

34. *International Viewpoint*, October 1993.

35. *International Viewpoint*, November 1993.

36. *Ibid.*

Tragedy, Farce, and Hope in El Salvador

by Michael Livingston

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The traditions of all the dead generations weigh like a nightmare on the brain of the living.

—Karl Marx¹

On the other hand, the logic of the class struggle does not exempt us from the necessity of using our own logic. Whoever is unable to admit initiative, talent, energy, and heroism into the framework of historical necessity, has not grasped the philosophical secret of Marxism. But, conversely, if we want to grasp a political process — in this case, the revolution — as a whole, we must be capable of seeing behind the motley parties and programs, behind the perfidy and greed of some and the courage and idealism of others, the proper outlines of the social classes, whose roots lie deep within the relations of production and whose flowers blossom in the highest spheres of ideology.

—Leon Trotsky²

The cycle of revolution that opened in Latin America with the Cuban Revolution appears to have ended in the ballot boxes of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and other Latin American countries. What did the revolutionary movements accomplish? What do they do next? What can we learn from these movements? Revolutionary socialists stand in solidarity with all who struggle against oppression and exploitation, with all who fight for a revolutionary transformation of society. I believe that there can be no genuine solidarity without criticism and no valid criticism without understanding. Because of this belief, I will try to answer these questions by examining recent developments in El Salvador. It is my hope that the analysis presented here, partial and abbreviated as it may be, will provoke further debate and analysis among revolutionary socialists and thus deepen our ability to stand in solidarity with those opposed to oppression in Latin America.

The El Salvadoran Elections

The elections recently completed in El Salvador represent a stage in the peace process set in motion by the January 1992 peace accords signed by the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Movement (FMLN). (See “The El Salvadoran Revolution: Victory or Defeat?” in *Bulletin in Defense of Marxism*, No. 108, pp. 7–8, 20.) Those accords brought about what members of the U.S. government and the FMLN called a “negotiated revolution.”

The elections occurred in two parts. The first part ended in the March 20 election for the

office of president, the Legislative Assembly, the Central American Parliament, and mayoral seats. In this first selection, Armando Calderón Sol, of the right-wing ARENA (Nationalist Republican Alliance) party, failed to get the 50 percent plus one needed to win the presidency outright. Calderón Sol won a bit over 49 percent of the vote and was forced into a runoff election with the second-place finisher, Rubén Zamora. Zamora represented a coalition of three groups: the Democratic Convergence, the FMLN, and the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and won approximately 25 percent of the vote in the March 20 election.

The FMLN and the Democratic Convergence did not do as well in the races for the Legislative Assembly and the crucial mayoral races. In the 84-seat assembly, ARENA won 40 seats, and the ultraright National Conciliation Party (PCN), which since the 1991 legislative elections has voted with ARENA, won three seats. This gives the far right majority control of the Legislative Assembly. The FMLN won 21 seats, making it the second largest party in the assembly. The Democratic Convergence (running separately from the FMLN and MNR for the assembly seats) won one seat. This gives the left a total of 22 seats in the assembly. The Christian Democrats won 18 seats. The Movement of Unity Party (PMU), a group representing evangelical Christians, also won one seat. In the races for the 252 municipal governments, ARENA won over 200, including San Salvador (where ARENA easily beat the FMLN’s Shafik Handal) and most of the departmental capitals. The FMLN won 16. In the races for seats in the Central American Parliament, the FMLN won 5 of El Salvador’s 20 seats. In the runoff election between Calderón Sol and Zamora, held on April 24, Calderón Sol won approximately 66 percent of the vote, according to early press reports. Calderón Sol’s five-year term begins June 1. Calderón Sol represents the right wing of ARENA and had strong associations with ARENA founder Roberto d’Aubuisson and the Salvadoran death squads.

In the March 20 election, 52 percent of the eligible voters (1.4 million out of 2.7 million) cast ballots. In the April 24 runoff, 37 percent of the eligible voters (1 million out of 2.7 million) cast ballots. The election process was marked by fraud and systematic barriers to participation. Registration was a difficult and time-consuming process, requiring a birth certificate (a rare item in a poor country torn by civil war) and frequent trips to often distant registration centers. After people had registered, the government issued voter identification cards (carnets),

which were required for voting. Over 300,000 individuals who had legally registered, many of them FMLN supporters, could not vote because they did not receive their carnets in time for the elections. This represents 11 percent of eligible voters.

On voting day, when public transportation was given a holiday, many voters had to travel considerable distances to get to their polling places. (Voting places were organized by last names, not neighborhoods, as they are in the U.S.) The location of many polling places was not announced until a few days before the election. An estimated 12 percent of those who had carnets and went to the correct polling place were denied the right to vote because their names did not appear on the computerized list of eligible voters. Many polling places throughout the country opened late, and most were horrendously crowded. People had to wait in line, often in the heat with little to drink and few restrooms, for hours. Many polls closed promptly at 5 p.m., denying those who had been standing in line a chance to cast a ballot. ARENA supporters and the military intimidated voters at some polling places. Finally, technical observers from opposition parties were barred from the computer center where votes were being tabulated by the ARENA-controlled Supreme Election Tribunal.

The campaigns leading up to the elections curiously mixed U.S.-style electioneering with death squad violence. In TV and print ads, ARENA repeatedly linked the left to war and terrorism, while the left coalition, in its TV and print ads, never linked ARENA to human rights violations and death squad activity. The left’s slogan, “Real Solutions,” was vague at best, and it offered few concrete proposals during the election campaign.

Accompanying this U.S.-style campaign was a wave of death squad activity, much of it directed at the left. The UN reported that 15 candidates and election workers were killed in the three months prior to the March 20 election. On April 24, an FMLN election monitor was assassinated. While the exact number of FMLN cadre assassinated since the signing of the accords is not known, the best current estimate is approximately 50, mostly upper- and middle-level cadre. Other upper-level cadre, such as Nidia Diaz, have barely escaped assassination attempts. Diaz was one of the FMLN leaders elected to the Legislative Assembly.

The U.S. media generally reported both elections as fair and hailed them as the first peaceful elections since the end of the Salvadoran civil war. The Salvadoran media dubbed them the “elections of the century.” One exception to the

1. Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 10.

2. Trotsky, 1905, translated by Anya Bostock, New York: Vintage Books, 1977, p. 37.

generally favorable coverage was a *New York Times* editorial (March 23, 1994) which criticized the elections as “clearly marred by incompetence” and “bureaucratic bungling.” Citing the main instances of fraud, the *Times* called for “maximum pressure on the Supreme Election Tribunal to clean up the voting registry before the next round of elections in April, so that people who have agreed to exchange their guns for ballots will feel they made the right choice.” This from the liberal paper of record, which seems little interested in the actual fairness of the elections and quite interested in the perception of fairness by former supporters of the FMLN.

As a mechanism of democratic control, the elections were a farce. As a space in which the FMLN and other organizations could organize and spread their ideas, the elections presented a valuable opportunity. Sadly, this opportunity was too often wasted by the FMLN as it engaged in a U.S.-style image-driven campaign.

The FMLN should pay close attention to the fate of M-19 (the April 19 Movement, which waged a guerrilla struggle in Colombia in the 1970s and '80s). After negotiating an agreement with the Colombian government, M-19 gave up armed struggle in exchange for the opportunity to participate in the writing of a new constitution for Colombia. Antonio Navarro Wolff, one of the leaders of M-19, served as one of three co-presidents of the Constitutional Assembly. In 1991 (when the new constitution was adopted) and 1992, M-19 appeared to be an influential political force in the country.³ Yet during this period a number of M-19 cadre were assassinated, and in the most recent elections held on Sunday, May 29, M-19's presidential candidate Navarro Wolff received only 3.8 percent of the vote.⁴

As Carlos Vilas argues:

A former guerrilla organization will often win more votes than expected in its first electoral outing. That is usually the result of its “coat-tails” — the guerrillas have a positive popular image, they are courageous, they are untainted with the old ways, they will get things done, they are a shot in the arm for the political atmosphere. But good intentions quickly bog down in bureaucracy, parliamentary majorities block reforms, and people begin to notice that the guerrillas have gradually grown into the style and appearance of the old political professionals.⁵

In light of Vilas's analysis, the election results in El Salvador may be the high point of FMLN influence. Vilas warns: “The decline of M-19 in Colombian electoral politics, after its excellent debut in the elections for constitu-

tional assembly, is an example of what may happen” in El Salvador.⁶ Whether or not it does will depend on the organizations that make up the FMLN.

A Negotiated Revolution?

Beyond the obviously fraudulent features of the elections, we can ask how much did the Salvadoran masses gain at the ballot box and in the peace accords? To answer this question we must both review the main provisions of the accords to see how many of them have been carried out, and be clear on a basic Marxist distinction — the distinction between state and regime. This distinction is described by Petras and Morley:

The state includes the permanent political institutions of society: the military, the judiciary, the civil bureaucracy, the top officials in the central bank, etc. Moreover, these permanent political institutions are integrated with the system of class rulership; together, they form “the state.” State formation is the product of historical developments that are rooted in the conflicts and growth of a particular social formation. Regimes, on the other hand, are composed of the transitory officials who occupy the executive and legislative branches and who usually devise policies within the parameters of the state and interests of the dominant classes. When regimes differ substantially from states, a crisis emerges — which is usually resolved by the overthrow of the regime by the state. This distinction between regime and state is crucial to understanding (1) the limits of Latin American political change in the 1980s [and 1990s], (2) the continuities of socioeconomic policy embraced by the civil-electoral regimes, and (3) the willingness of the United States to tolerate or even promote regime changes (“democratization”) that preserve the (authoritarian) state that represents and defends imperial interests.⁷

This distinction is familiar to all North American revolutionary socialists, at least implicitly. We know that we don't support Democrats because they essentially represent the capitalists, and we know that electing “good” or “progressive” Democrats to office will not alter the basic rule of the capitalist class. We do engage in election campaigns as a way of spreading our ideas and analyses, and as a way to foster independent mass action. If, as a result of hard work and changed conditions, revolutionary socialists were to gain office, they would use elected office as a way to continue the spread of socialist ideas and as a tool to deepen independent political action by the working class.

The U.S. tolerates and in many instances fosters regimes that have the participation of leftists as long as the regime does not challenge

the structure and power of the state, as revolutionary socialists would do if they held office. If the regime does challenge the rule of capital, it will be overthrown, as was the case in Chile in 1973 or Guatemala in 1954, by the state in conjunction with the United States government.

No Change in the State

To evaluate the nature of the “negotiated revolution,” we must ask ourselves a fundamental question: has the nature of the state and the class interests it serves changed? An examination of the implementation of the peace accords provides the answer — and the answer is, No!

The peace accords did not alter the fundamental structure of the state, but they did include several provisions that would have modified the state structure. The accords included restructuring of the military, including disbanding the National Police and the creation of the National Civilian Police free of elements who violated human rights during the war, land reform and social programs for ex-combatants; and investigation of and prosecution of human rights violations.

These accords have barely been implemented. The new civilian police force consists of the old, repressive National Police under a new name. Land reform and social programs have barely been implemented. The Truth Commission issued its report, but few prosecutions have resulted from the report. For instance, eight army officers named in the report are still on active duty. Further investigations have all but ceased. The FMLN has no way of forcing compliance with the accords (other than through mass pressure) and there is no mechanism that prevents the gains achieved through the accords from being reversed.⁸

The ARENA government of Alfredo Cristiani, considered more moderate by the U.S. media than the recently elected Calderón Sol, pursued an International Monetary Fund-style austerity policy that has hurt the Salvadoran masses. The Cristiani government also initiated a long-term reform in the Salvadoran tax structure (a change the FMLN will not be able to stop at this point) that will shift most of the tax burden to the poor and away from the Salvadoran rich and transnational corporations. This taxation policy will also destroy the FMLN's development strategy of fostering cooperatives and small-scale economic development to meet basic human needs.⁹

The case of Colombia is again instructive. M-19 was granted more concessions by the Colombian government than the FMLN in El

3. See Marc Chornick, “Is the Armed Struggle Still Relevant?” *NACLA Report on the Americas*, Vol. 27, No. 4, January/February 1994, p. 10.

4. *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, May 30, 1994.

5. See Shafik Jorge Handal and Carlos M. Vilas, *The Socialist Option in Central America: Two Reassessments*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993, p. 130.

6. *Ibid.*

7. James Petras and Morris Morley: *Latin America in the Time of Cholera: Electoral Politics, Market Economics, and Permanent Crisis*, New York: Routledge, 1992, pp. 1–2. Petras and Morley's work represents an important revolutionary Marxist analysis of the current conjuncture in Latin America. At a time when analysis of the regime is increasingly dominated by liberal and social democratic discourse, their book is a “must read” for revolutionary socialists.

8. Mike Zielinski's “From Bullets to Ballots” in *Z* magazine, May 1994, pp. 36–41, provides a good summary of the elections and the unfulfilled provisions of the accords. I strongly disagree with a number of his conclusions about the achievements of the “negotiated revolution.”

9. For an analysis of the Salvadoran tax reform and its consequences, see J. Michael McGuire, “Taxation: A Road to Peace in El Salvador,” *Peace and Change*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1994, pp. 141–164.

Salvador. Yet after helping to write a new constitution, M-19 has become an inconsequential political force, and the progressive provisions of the Colombian Constitution are "a still unrealized framework for a new democratic politics."¹⁰ In other words, M-19 has given up a struggle for revolutionary change and not much has changed in Colombia.

The structure of the Salvadoran state remained intact; there was no negotiated revolution. What was achieved was the legalization of the FMLN as a political group and a diminution of the military violence against the Salvadoran masses. These two achievements will give the FMLN political opportunities, and more importantly, will provide the Salvadoran mass movements with political space to grow and organize. These are no small feats in a country where 75,000 people were killed, mostly by the military and death squads, and hundreds of thousands were displaced or terrorized. But this is not a revolution.

What Next for the FMLN? What Next for the Salvadoran Revolution?

We make our own history, as Marx observed, but we do not make it just as we please or under conditions chosen by ourselves. Given this, could the FMLN have done anything other than negotiate a partial surrender (which for all the posturing, is the true nature of the accords)? If they had continued their fight, could they have achieved state power, as the Sandinistas did in 1979? To both of these questions, I answer, No.

The objective conditions facing the FMLN made it impossible for them to achieve a revolutionary transformation of society, *given the strategy of revolution they adopted*. The intense brutality of the Salvadoran military, made graphic and vivid in the recent *New Yorker* article that described the El Mozote massacre,¹¹ the \$7 billion in military and economic aid from the United States, the U.S. training and advisers, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and the problems faced by Cuba — all these global factors made an FMLN victory unlikely and the possibility of a Salvadoran revolution surviving (if it did manage to achieve state power) remote. Another important consideration was the understanding, by the FMLN, the U.S. government, and some elements in the Salvadoran ruling class, that a military stalemate had developed and could persist indefinitely.¹²

The objective conditions made revolution difficult. Under those objective conditions, the revolutionary strategy of the FMLN made it impossible. The key to the FMLN's strategy of revolution is that it put the technique of armed

struggle, a tactic, above politics. The FMLN is not alone in this. Indeed, since the Cuban Revolution much of the Latin American left has equated a strategy of armed struggle with revolutionary strategy, as if armed struggle were the only way to make a revolution. This error, as Carlos Vilas points out, is the left-wing equivalent to the right-wing fallacy of equating democracy and elections.¹³

This error originated with the Cuban Revolution and the debates on the *foco* strategy. The Cuban Revolution demonstrated an alternative to the Stalinist strategy of accommodation and coexistence. The revolution inspired the masses of Latin America and shocked the Latin American left, long dominated by Stalinism. Yet from the beginning, the Latin American left tended to treat armed struggle as the only route to revolution.

The defeat of *focos* throughout Latin America in the 1960s, especially Che Guevara's group in Bolivia, did not lead to a rejection of the strategy of armed struggle. Instead, leftists assumed that the strategy was still valid but had been misapplied. Returning to the experience of the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions (which had been an important intellectual source for Che's work on guerrilla warfare), many groups in Latin America adopted the Prolonged People's War strategy (PPW). Two important instances of this turn to PPW are the FSLN in Nicaragua and the groups that would later form the FMLN in El Salvador. Within the PPW strategy, the armed struggle is primary. While the political is not ignored, it is secondary. Thus, the PPW led to the creation of political-military organizations that, while carrying out political work among peasants and, to a lesser degree, urban workers, primarily engaged in armed struggle. The important debates within the FSLN in Nicaragua and among the organizations that later made up the FMLN in El Salvador mostly centered on the degree of political work that was to accompany the military struggle, the nature and extent of cross-class alliances, and the timing of insurrectional actions.

In Nicaragua, for example, a split occurred in 1975 between the majority under Carlos Fonseca, Tomás Borge, and Henry Ruiz, and a minority led by Jaime Wheelock. The majority, which followed the FSLN's original strategy, adopted the name GPP (the abbreviation for "Prolonged People's War" in Spanish). The minority adopted the name Proletarian Tendency and focused on political agitation among urban workers. In 1977 a third faction emerged, called the Terceristas. This group sought to combine the strategies used by the other two factions and argued that the time was ripe for an insurrection by a multi-class alliance against the Somoza

dictatorship. The primacy of armed struggle was never questioned within the FSLN. But the relative significance of political struggle was debated, with the Proletarian Tendency giving considerable emphasis to the political.

Similarly, in El Salvador, the revolutionary organizations had a primary orientation toward armed struggle and placed less emphasis on political work. The emphasis on political work did vary between organizations and over time, however. For instance, the split in the ERP (Ejercito Revolucionario Popular — Revolutionary People's Army), which led to the formation of the FARN (Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional — Armed Forces of National Resistance) in 1975, resulted from a harsh debate in the ERP over political work. The debate also resulted in the ERP's killing of Roque Dalton, leader of the faction that would later form FARN. Other revolutionary groups in El Salvador, such as the FPL-FM (People's Liberation Front — Farabundo Marti) founded by Cayetano Carpio, also adopted a PPW approach. While these organizations sometimes engaged in significant political work (such as during the late 1970s), they also virtually abandoned political work during certain periods, such as the early 1980s.

The strategy of armed struggle, leavened with a strong emphasis on political work, proved successful in Nicaragua. It has not proven successful in any other country in the last 34 years. Furthermore, I would argue that under the changed global conditions it will not be successful again. These global conditions, which include the collapse of the former USSR and its East European client states, the increased capitalist penetration of Latin America, and the increased urbanization found in the region, make it unlikely that a *strategy* of armed struggle will lead to a successful revolution anywhere in Latin America.¹⁴

My conclusion may seem sectarian and unduly critical, but in fact it is the conclusion of most groups that have been involved in armed struggle over the last several decades. For instance, M-19's leader Antonio Navarro Wolff argues:

The triumph of the revolution through force of arms that allows the complete restructuring of politics and institutions is not the same as reaching power through elections where you have to govern within the limitations of existing institutions. We chose the latter path because of the impossibility of the former.¹⁵

Navarro Wolff adds: "I believe it is not possible to win a civil war in this country through revolutionary action."¹⁶ For "revolutionary action," read "military struggle."

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10. Chernick, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

11. Mark Danner, "The Truth of El Mozote," *New Yorker*, December 6, 1993, pp. 50-133.

12. See Livingston, *op. cit.* for a more detailed discussion of U.S. strategy and the factors leading up to the negotiated end to the fighting.

13. Handal and Vilas, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

14. The presence of a large peasantry seems crucial to the success and viability of rural armed struggle as a strategy. Presently, over 70 percent of Latin Americans live in urban areas. In El Salvador, 47.7 percent of the population lives in urban areas. See Tom Barry, *El Salvador: A Country Guide*, Albuquerque, NM: Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center, 1990, p. 177.

15. Chernick, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

No Historic Compromise with Imperialism

by Paul Clarke

The following article originally appeared in *Socialist Outlook*, a revolutionary socialist monthly newspaper published in Britain. It is reprinted here with some minor editorial changes, for purposes of style.

Socialist Outlook Editors' Introduction

In the last three years a series of key liberation struggles have entered a phase of negotiations and even negotiated settlements — Palestine, South Africa, El Salvador, and Ireland, among others. These negotiations and peace deals have opened a widespread debate on the left internationally about whether this represents victory or defeat for the liberation forces, and even in some sections of the left about whether a new *modus vivendi* with imperialism is possible. Here PAUL CLARKE opens the discussion with a personal contribution to the debate.

Each situation has to be analyzed individually, but it is hard to deny that a pattern is emerging. Sinn Féin in Ireland, for example, specifically refers to the peace processes in South Africa and Palestine as a model for what they are attempting. No analysis of specific peace deals is thus possible without reference to the overall balance of class forces internationally. Indeed, this is precisely the context in which the leaderships of national liberation movements place their own strategy and tactics.

Imperialist Victories

Since the late 1970s a tremendous international offensive of imperialism has been taking place, in response to the emergence of the long wave of economic crisis which became obvious to all during the 1974–75 economic recession.

This offensive combined a savage attack on the working class in the advanced capitalist countries, an attempt to restructure the global economy to the detriment of the working class and the oppressed, and the militarization offensive under Reagan and Bush, which targeted Third World liberation struggles and the post-capitalist states.

The imperialist offensive threw the international working class movement and liberation struggles onto the defensive. And it succeeded, during the 1980s and early 1990s, in imposing some harsh defeats. But none of these victories for imperialism succeeded in stabilizing its economy. World imperialism has a tremendous interest in trying to pacify “unstable” sectors of the world in order to get out of its own crisis.

These processes can be illustrated in relation to the events in Central America and the Caribbean. The victory of the Nicaraguan revolution in 1979; the general offensive of the Salvadoran FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) in January 1980, and the emergence of the Maurice Bishop New Jewel Movement government in Grenada posed immense dangers for imperialist stability in the region.

All of these countries are very small, but the political dynamic in the region, which included a revolutionary guerrilla struggle being waged in Guatemala, threatened to destabilize Latin American and the Caribbean.

The response of U.S. imperialism was of course to unleash counterrevolutionary war: U.S. advisers and military aid in El Salvador, the contra rebels in Nicaragua. These moves wrecked the Nicaraguan economy and fought the FMLN guerrillas to a standstill. There would be no easy repetition of the Cuban experience. The leaderships of both these revolutions were posed with immense new problems about how to continue the revolutionary process.

The outcome, as we now know, was the [electoral] defeat of the Sandinistas by the UNO coalition in the 1990 elections and the peace deal negotiated in 1992 in El Salvador.

The international context facing such struggles was a very different one to that which had existed in the 1959–60 period when the Cuban revolution was won and a workers state consolidated. Then, for its own reasons, and within a general framework of “peaceful coexistence,” the Soviet leadership had been prepared to underwrite Cuba and to militarily defend it. By the 1980s, and especially with the advent of Gorbachev, Soviet aid to liberation movements was radically curtailed. The advice given to Nicaragua was *not* to follow the Cuban example and make a radical break with capitalism.

Even as late as the mid-1970s, the Soviet leadership was prepared to act differently. In 1976, when southern Angola was invaded by South African troops, Russian pilots flew thousands of Cuban troops and Russian military advisers to the country to drive the South Africans out. The U.S., traumatized by the recent defeat in Vietnam, dared not intervene.

But the militarization offensive of Reagan and the rise of *perestroika* radically changed the international context in which such struggles were fought.

South Africa and Palestine do not, however, fit easily into such a picture of the worsening international balance of forces for liberation movements. The mid-1980s township insurgency in South Africa and the *Intifadeh* in Palestine in the late 1980s threw reaction in both regions onto the defensive.

For both the apartheid regime and the Israeli leadership, a peace deal became urgent if the conditions for capitalist stability were to be maintained. In particular, the recession in the South African economy and the impatience of foreign investors represented an immense pressure on Pretoria to do a deal. And under Bush, Israel's Washington benefactor became increas-

ingly politically embarrassed by perpetual crisis in a part of the world which it regards as crucial to its strategic interests.

Nonetheless, in both these arenas the liberation movements had taken a heavy toll in terms of repression and were themselves faced with great problems about how to continue the struggle.

Negotiations and Peace Deals

Before examining specific negotiations and peace deals under way, it is important to consider some of the general principles which guide revolutionaries in such situations.

There is nothing unprincipled about negotiations or peace deals as such. No trade unionist who refused to engage in negotiations with the bosses would be taken in the least bit seriously, but of course no trade unionist who agreed to disband the union in exchange for ending a strike would be taken seriously either.

This general point can be illustrated, for example, by reference to the 1972–73 Paris peace talks between the Vietnamese leadership and the United States.

Sectarian forces denounced these peace talks as a “sellout.” This turned out to be absurd when just two years later the Vietnamese army marched into Saigon.

In fact, the peace talks were about creating a face-saving formula to enable the United States to withdraw the vast majority of its troops from the country. Whatever formal concessions were made by the Vietnamese Communist Party to achieve this objective, a vital one for eventual victory, the peace deal did not amount to surrender. The crucial thing was that the Vietnamese insurgent forces kept their weapons, did not disband their forces, but held back the struggle for a short period to enable the Americans to withdraw and “keep face.” Far from being a “sellout,” the withdrawal of U.S. forces put the seal on a military defeat that the U.S. had suffered.

Indeed, every victorious liberation struggle has ended with negotiations. It is not the fact of negotiations but the real content of what is agreed that matters.

Neither is it wrong to make compromises if these are necessary to achieve the main goal. For example, the Evian agreement which ended the Algerian war imposed harsh economic conditions on the incoming FLN government: a big price was paid for French withdrawal. With historical hindsight, it is difficult to be sure that a better deal could have been achieved.

Moreover, no national liberation struggle and no revolution is guaranteed victory. Faced with insuperable obstacles to continuing armed

struggle, a responsible leadership has to know when to retreat.

But in such cases, for the clarification of the masses and to create the basis for future struggle, it is important not to present defeats or setbacks as victories. It is one thing to declare that a certain phase of the struggle is over and can go no further — for example, declaring an end to armed struggle. It is another thing to proclaim that this in itself amounts to “victory” when everyone knows it does not. That is a prescription for undermining the revolutionary goals of the movement, demobilizing the masses, and demoralizing the political cadres of the liberation movement.

The ending of armed struggle poses the question, “What next?” It is one thing to end it to continue the struggle by other means. It is another thing to end it, as has happened in Colombia, and then for the former guerrillas to collapse into right-wing social democratic politics.

All negotiations with an enemy include bluff and deceit — on both sides. That is the art of negotiation. The 1973 Paris peace accords between the Vietnamese and the United States certainly included bluff and deceit from the Vietnamese; whether the U.S. negotiators were aware of it is a moot point. So deals cannot be solely judged by their formal terms. The key question is what the revolutionary forces or liberation movements do in practice, but, of course, practice also involves what they say about them.

The classic case of a negotiated peace carried out by revolutionary forces was, of course, the Brest-Litovsk peace deal negotiated with the Germans by Trotsky on behalf of the Soviet government. This deal involved huge concessions, including territorial concessions, by the Bolsheviks. It was characterized as robbery and an imperialist diktat by the Russian government. It was furiously attacked by the “left” Bolsheviks, notably Bukharin, who demanded a continuation of “revolutionary war” against Germany and argued it was betraying the German workers.

But Lenin and Trotsky insisted that allowing the Bolshevik government to collapse would be betraying the German workers. After a fierce faction fight, the peace deal was sanctioned by the Bolsheviks. But the Soviet government never made any concession on their revolutionary objectives.

On the contrary, they used the peace negotiations to carry out revolutionary propaganda, and Trotsky even distributed revolutionary leaflets to German troops at the negotiation site.

A New Deal with Imperialism?

The debate in the international left on imperialism goes way beyond these questions of negotiated peace and deals. It involves the whole strategic question of how to confront imperialism today. This debate is skewed by a massive collapse to the right, under the impact of the collapse of the Berlin wall, the defeat in Nicaragua, and the Gulf war.

Social democratic currents in the Brazilian Workers Party and other sectors of the Latin American left, for example, theorize that it is possible to do a “new deal” with imperialism which avoids semicolonial subjugation. From this perspective, the end of the Cold War and of superpower rivalry has created conditions for a new “third way” between utopian models of socialism or simply being the victims of imperialist exploitation.

This kind of theorization underpinned the extraordinary declaration of the Salvadoran FMLN leader Joaquín Villalobos that El Salvador “cannot be considered a capitalist country.”

The idea that freed from the conflict with the Soviet Union, American imperialism can be made to see that it is in its interest to adopt a benevolent attitude to the “Third World” is actually the height of utopianism. For the simple fact is that it is *not* in the interests of U.S. capitalism, in a period of crisis, to extend largesse to the Third World.

This kind of theory replaces a materialist economic-political theory of imperialism with an idealist geopolitical one that at the heart of imperialism was the confrontation with the Soviet Union.

In fact, the notion of a “third way” for the Third World had much more going for it in the 1950s and 1960s. Then bourgeois nationalism in the Third World was much stronger. It was possible for the ruling leaders in *some* Third World states (for example, the oil exporting states) to negotiate a new arrangement with imperialism which gave the indigenous ruling classes a greater share of imperialist superprofits. Naturally, the benefits of these new arrangements stayed largely in the pockets and Swiss bank accounts of domestic rulers. But the living standards in many Third World countries did improve. Some more radical nationalist governments did develop the material infrastructure of their countries with some benefits for the masses — although this was never a “noncapitalist” model of development.

This relationship of forces has now totally collapsed under the weight of the world economic crisis. A new third way is thus dead in the water.

This debate has great relevance, for example, to the discussion about what kind of measures should be implemented if the PT (Workers Party) should come to power in the 1994 elections in Brazil. Indeed, this discussion concentrates the whole debate about the way forward against imperialism today.

The Question of Power

A revolutionary movement can only become the government party or take part in government with the perspective of a more-or-less rapid mobilization of the masses to take power. This is not because of some doctrinaire imperative learned from textbooks or a line-by-line study of Lenin and Trotsky; neither is it because of an abstract sectarian model. It is because of the dynamics of the class struggle.

A revolutionary movement in the government signals alarm for the bourgeoisie and the mobilization of counterrevolution to overthrow that government. It means a race between the mobilization of revolution and the mobilization of counterrevolution.

For revolution to win this race, a revolutionary government has to take immediate measures to answer the concrete material needs of the masses, and that means challenging the economic power of the bourgeoisie. It means acting in a way to deepen the self-organization and mobilization of the masses, including measures of workers’ control, and, for elementary self-defense of the masses and their social gains, arming the working class.

The precise timetable of socialization of major industries is not the issue here. The Bolsheviks carried out their major nationalizations in 1918, far too “early” in the opinion of Lenin, under the impact of working-class mobilizations and seizures of bosses’ property. The dynamic of the class struggle demanded it. For Lenin, it was either repression of the mass movement or going ahead with the nationalizations.

But he never hid the fact that he considered that the revolutionary forces had too little expertise to run industry themselves, and a more gradual transition would have been preferable. In this case, politics — the dynamics of the class struggle — overrode strictly “economic” considerations.

To many, including in Latin America, this kind of discussion seems totally unrealistic in the concrete conditions of Brazil today. There are two arguments used for saying it is unrealistic: first, the international balance of class forces, second, the state of domestic politics in that country. If either of these arguments were valid, it would be necessary to say that it would be irresponsible for the Workers Party to take the government under such conditions. And it would be necessary to ask what kind of political profile and practice had enabled the PT to take the government when a real workers’ government was not on the agenda.

In any case, the assumption of government by the PT in the most populous country of Latin America would profoundly modify the international relationship of forces. It would electrify Latin America and be an important element for the remobilization of class movements of the oppressed. Brazilian domestic politics would be totally recast.

A PT government would immediately be on trial: either it would progressively take measures in the interests of the workers or it would capitulate to imperialism and domestic reaction. If it did the former, it would face a tremendous campaign of destabilization by imperialism and the domestic bourgeoisie. Its only answer would be the revolutionary mobilization of the workers.

An historic compromise with the domestic ruling class is even less likely than a compromise with imperialism. Imperialism has had to tolerate post-capitalist states for a long period;

the domestic ruling class will tolerate nothing which challenges its power and privileges.

An attempt at marginal reforms would totally discredit a PT government: it would be forced to administer the austerity dictated by the crisis of the world capitalist economy. Most likely in this case, the forces involved in the PT would split into class-struggle and class-collaborationist components. But a split implies a sector of the mass movement going into opposition to "their" government. A reformist solution would crash against the anticapitalist dynamics of the mass movement.

A Democratic Stage?

Discussing in one category movements as diverse as the Central American revolutionary movements, [the Brazilian PT], the PLO, the ANC, and Sinn Féin conceals important differences between them. The PLO is a bourgeois nationalist movement, whose radical sectors have declined over 20 years. It has no goal of socialism but simply that of a Palestinian homeland. The Salvadoran FMLN and the Sandinistas were very different, posing revolution and socialism as goals as well as "national liberation" from imperialism. Sectors of the FMLN and FSLN made explicit reference to Marxism and even Leninism in a way that the leadership of the dominant Fatah wing of the PLO would never consider.

But for all these movements the question of a solution to democratic and national questions was posed center-stage. In every country dominated by imperialism, national and democratic questions come to the fore. These include questions such as the creation of genuine national unity and independence, the solution of the land question, the dismantling of the old reactionary oligarchy to create political democracy, and so on.

When posed in that way, the *all-round* solution of national and democratic tasks requires a break from imperialism and local reaction. It is a *revolutionary* task. How could you solve the land question in El Salvador without crushing the local oligarchy which dominates the latifundia? And, obviously, crushing the oligarchy requires revolution — whatever term is used to describe it.

How can there be a real lasting solution to the Palestinian national question without the defeat of imperialism's local agency — the Zionist state? And that requires a revolutionary mobilization not only of the Palestinians, but of Arab and Jewish workers in the whole region.

There is no artificial dividing line between national and democratic questions and the "social" question — the question of power. That is why Marxists reject the old Menshevik-Stalinist idea of two strictly divided "stages" of the revolution in oppressed countries. But this should not be interpreted as implying the impossibility of national or democratic *gains* as part of the ongoing struggle.

For example, the post-World War II upsurge of the colonial revolution created a rash of newly independent states as the imperialist oc-

cupying powers withdrew. No one could deny that these were real gains for the national struggle. Marxists argued, however, that this process created semi-colonies — countries still dominated by imperialism. Moreover, while arguing that the democratic tasks remained unsolved, it would be foolish to deny that in some independent countries — Brazil is an example — there are democratic gains for the masses, i.e., real steps toward formal political democracy, however, partial or fragile.

The intertwining of democratic and revolutionary tasks was at the heart of Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution."

The essence of that theory is *not* the idea that without socialist revolution real gains for the masses are impossible. It is the idea that securing and extending these gains requires a continuation of revolutionary struggle; otherwise, they will go backwards. It is, moreover, the idea that partial gains in the national liberation struggle, for example the establishing of a formally independent state, crystallizes a new relationship of class forces which itself involves exploitation of the masses and subordination to imperialism.

Take India. Who could deny that the driving out of the British was a victory? But then who could deny that this victory incarnated the role of the domestic Indian bourgeoisie, which cruelly exploits its own masses? Or that India was still dominated by imperialism?

Thus, while rejecting the idea that there is an inseparable divide between "democratic" and "socialist" stages of anti-imperialist struggles, or that the *solution* of the democratic and national tasks can be separated from the solution of the "social" question, the question of working-class power, Marxists should not fall into the trap of denying the possibility of partial democratic and national gains. These gains, however, recast the struggle in a different way; they do not conclude it.

Moreover, insofar as such partial victories are secured by negotiations and peace deals, there is an overwhelming criterion by which Marxists judge: what is the effect on the dynamic of the mass movement? Is it mobilizing or demobilizing? Does it enable the revolutionary or national liberation forces to regroup their strength for a new stage of the struggle, while securing partial gains? Or does it amount to calling off the struggle and conceding victory to reaction?

It is by these criteria that the current rash of peace negotiations has to be judged.

Fallout in Central America

In the last three weeks two leading members of the Salvadoran FMLN have been assassinated by the reactionary death squads, which still exist. This is symbolic of the failed promises given to the insurgent forces which ended with the 1992 peace deal. Land reform has hardly begun. Former FMLN guerrillas have not been given the jobs promised. Murderers and torturers in the army have not been punished. The oligarchy is still in place.

It is true that the FMLN leaders faced an impasse of the military struggle when the peace deal was concluded. The masses were war weary and demanded peace; the guerrilla war had been fought into the ground by the military aid provided by the U.S. A transition to a different form of struggle — one based on the neglected mass organizations, especially in the towns — was on the agenda.

But the peace deal itself, and the reception given to it in sectors of the left internationally, mystified the process under way and gave crucial concessions to reaction which are unacceptable from a revolutionary standpoint.

In particular, the decision to integrate sectors of the FMLN fighters into the national army was profoundly wrong. This either hands over insurgent fighters to be used by the class enemy or submits these same fighters to the tyranny of bourgeois military discipline.

The issue here is not armed struggle versus other forms of struggle; the issue is the class character of the state and the political independence of the popular masses under the leadership of the working class.

Typical of the response of the left internationally was the widely read but now defunct U.S. *Guardian* "non-aligned" left magazine, which characterized the deal as a "negotiated victory." Even if it were necessary to accept everything in the peace deal, then socialists would have to characterize it as a diktat imposed by imperialism and reaction, not a "victory."

In order to portray this as a victory it is necessary to radically redefine the goals of the movement to the right.

In Nicaragua the 1990 electoral defeat of the FSLN unleashed a sharp process of political differentiation in the Sandinistas. Theories of "co-government from below" created an impossible tension — between those who wanted to defend the gains of the revolution, particularly the mass organizations, "from below," and those who put the stress on "co-government." The result has been the growing social democratization of the right wing of the FSLN, in particular those grouped around Sergio Rodriguez. These people openly defend a market economy and a close, albeit "new," relationship with the United States.

What we are seeing in Central America is a situation where defeats are leading to a terrible political collapse in left wing forces.

South Africa and Palestine

The mid-1980s upsurge in South Africa was the culmination of a 20-year struggle of the Black masses, which made old-style apartheid unworkable. The National Party leadership under de Klerk has moved radically to destroy this old system. Parliamentary democracy on a universal franchise *is* being introduced. If this process is carried through successfully against the resistance of the right wing and Inkatha, however, the central core of the system — racial capitalism — will survive intact. When ANC leaders say that expectations among the masses are "too

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The Development of the Theory of Permanent Revolution in Russia

by Joseph Hansen

This is the first of two lectures given by Hansen in 1961. They have been transcribed, edited, and prepared for publication by Walter Lippmann with the assistance of Leslie Evans and Jamaka Perrier, without whose collaboration this project would not have been completed. The lectures were available for a time in the Education for Socialists series of tapes published by the National Education Department of the Socialist Workers Party.

Introduction

Today we will take up the theory of the permanent revolution, as such. The Stalinist view is that it is something ultra-radical. Somehow, it's tied in with counterrevolution. Exactly how is not too clear, but in some way or another, the theory of permanent revolution is tied in with counterrevolution. And they present the view that it was some kind of theory advanced by Trotsky in the early days of the Russian revolution which was very much opposed by Lenin and that Lenin spent a great deal of time fighting this theory.

Among the Social Democrats — another area of the radical movement — you'll find very little material on the permanent revolution or its theory. It's very little discussed among them. One reason for that, of course, is that in Social Democratic circles, little attention is paid to theory. Theory rates very low among the Social Democrats. A more basic reason for the lack of discussions on the theory of permanent revolution among Social Democrats is that they see no difference, or very little difference, between Lenin and Trotsky. They consider the views of the two as identical. And still worse, they consider the views of Lenin and Trotsky as being in essence the same as those of Stalinism. Or they will put it this way: that the foundations that were laid by Lenin and Trotsky led inevitably and logically to Stalinism, and that therefore, in essence, Leninism or Trotskyism is the same as Stalinism. So you will find very little among them about the theory of the permanent revolution.

In our own party, the Socialist Workers Party, we find various levels of understanding of the theory of the permanent revolution. Among some of the comrades, those who are perhaps newer to the movement, it's a rather mysterious formula that's somewhat difficult to understand. Exactly what it consists of remains rather vague, and it's not too clear in their minds exactly what is meant by permanent revolution — this rather strange combination of words.

Among other comrades, the theory of permanent revolution remains somewhat vague. And yet it seems to be a theory that is confirmed by everything that happens. Whether it happens in China, or Cuba, or Latin America; no matter what happens, it confirms the theory of the permanent revolution. So you'll hear some comrades tossing off, "Well, this confirms the theory of the permanent revolution." Exactly what the theory is, and how it is confirmed, remains somewhat vague.

In opposition to this, there's another view, which holds that the theory of the permanent revolution is a very exact prescription, a formula of great exactitude, which has been put in doubt by the Chinese revolution and by the Cuban revolution. It will be admitted among these comrades that, in certain aspects, the theory of the permanent revolution has been confirmed, but in other aspects

it has been put very much in question by the events in those two countries. These are more or less the ways the permanent revolution is viewed in our own party and in the leading sections of the radical movement in the United States.

Origins in the Experience of the 1905 Revolution

In order to understand the theory, I think it's best to go back to the origin of it, right from its very beginnings, so that we see it as it arose. And then as it rose and left conflicting views, we can much easier find the exact character of this theory, and, I think, understand it better. Above all, this is a theory that is based in experience. This is one of the things that must be especially noted about the theory of the permanent revolution. It originated in experience. It originated in the experience of the Russian revolution of 1905. Now this revolution was led by Trotsky. He was the leading figure in that revolution. And if you hear very little about the Russian revolution of 1905 in the literature of the Communist Party today, it is only because they cannot write about it without talking about Trotsky's role. He was the leader of that revolution. He was supported by the Bolsheviks, and he worked in collaboration with the Bolsheviks. Lenin was abroad at the time, and the Bolshevik representative in St. Petersburg was Krasin. Krasin represented the Bolsheviks, and he worked very closely with Trotsky. And the Bolshevik press printed material written by Trotsky, and they arrived at joint formulations, the Bolsheviks and Trotsky. But Trotsky, as the head of the St. Petersburg Soviet, was the leader of that revolution. And it was in the experience of that revolution, the things that he saw in that revolution, that he derived his theory. That's one side of the origin of the theory of the permanent revolution.

Theoretical Tradition

The other side of it is that it has a long theoretical tradition. Actually it goes back to a suggestion made by Karl Marx in 1850, which in turn was derived from the experience of the 1848–1850 revolutionary wave. That was a big revolutionary wave that occurred in Europe at that time, sweeping many countries. And it was from what Marx and Engels saw in that revolution that they derived the concept that a revolution which begins against feudalism, or against feudalistic heritages, which is begun by the bourgeoisie, inevitably tends toward a socialist stage. That's putting it very, very briefly. Trotsky picked up this theory in 1904–1905 and looked at it in the light of the experience of 1905, and from this, derived his theory.

We can make a conclusion about the theory of the permanent revolution so far as that side of its origin is concerned. There's

Trotsky on Permanent Revolution

“The Way Out Lies Only in the Victory of the Proletariat of the Advanced Capitalist Countries”

Introductory Note: The following are excerpts from Trotsky's own summary of his theory of permanent revolution. He wrote this summary in the Introduction (datelined Prinkipo, November 30, 1929) to the first edition (in Russian) of his book *Permanennaya Revoliutsiya*, published in Berlin in 1929.

This is a convenient, brief account, in Trotsky's own words, of the same ideas Joseph Hansen, formerly one of Trotsky's secretaries, was presenting to young people newly joining the revolutionary Marxist movement in the early 1960s.

Hansen's presentation, in the form of a talk, contains repetition and simplified language aimed at his particular audience at the time. His discussion of the same ideas in the book *Dynamics of the Cuban Revolution* is in more condensed form, for a reading audience. But we feel it is important and valuable to make available this full transcript of Hansen's talk. His tapes on permanent revolution and Cuba were a vital part of the internal educational life of the Socialist Workers Party in the 1960s, but as we understand it, they are no longer circulated among SWP members today.

Readers will undoubtedly note the consistency between Trotsky's summary here, Hansen's transcript, and Marx and Engels's views on world revolution and permanent revolution, as set forth in this issue of *BIDOM* by Dan La Botz.

— George Saunders

The permanent revolution, in the sense which Marx attached to this concept, means a revolution which makes no compromise with any single form of class rule, which does not stop at the democratic stage, which goes over to socialist measures and to war against reaction from without; that is, a revolution whose every successive stage is rooted in the preceding one and which can end only in the complete elimination of class society.

To dispel the chaos that has been created around the theory of the permanent revolution, it is necessary to distinguish three lines of thought that are united in this theory.

First, it embraces the problem of the transition from the democratic to the socialist revolution. This is in essence the historical origin of the theory... The theory of permanent revolution, which originated in 1905... pointed out that the democratic tasks of the backward bourgeois nations lead directly, in our epoch, to the dictatorship of the proletariat and that the dictatorship of the proletariat puts socialist tasks on the order of the day. Therein lay the central idea of the theory. While the traditional view was that the road to the dictatorship of the proletariat led through a long period of democracy, the theory of permanent revolution established the

fact that for backward countries the road to democracy passed through the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus democracy is not a regime that remains self-sufficient for decades, but is only a direct prelude to the socialist revolution. Each is bound to the other by an unbroken chain. Thus there is established between the democratic revolution and the socialist reconstruction of society a permanent state of revolutionary development.

The second aspect of the “permanent” theory has to do with the socialist revolution as such. For an indefinitely long time and in constant internal struggle, all social relations undergo transformation. Society keeps on changing its skin. Each stage of transformation stems directly from the preceding. This process necessarily retains a political character, that is, it develops through collisions between various groups in the society which is in transformation. Outbreaks of civil war and foreign wars alternate with periods of “peaceful” reform. Revolutions in economy, technology, science, the family, morals, and everyday life develop in complex reciprocal action and do not allow society to achieve equilibrium. Therein lies the permanent character of the socialist revolution as such.

The international character of the socialist revolution, which constitutes the third aspect of the theory of permanent revolution, flows from the present state of the economy and social structure of humanity. Internationalism is no abstract principle but a theoretical and political reflection of the character of world economy, of the world development of productive forces, and the world scale of the class struggle. The socialist revolution begins on national foundations — but it cannot be completed within those foundations. The maintenance of the proletarian revolution within a national framework can only be a provisional state of affairs, even though, as the experience of the Soviet Union shows, one of long duration. In an isolated proletarian dictatorship, the internal and external contradictions grow inevitably along with the successes achieved. *If it remains isolated, the proletarian state must finally fall victim to these contradictions. The way out for it lies only in the victory of the proletariat of the advanced countries.* Viewed from this standpoint, a national revolution is not a self-contained whole; it is only a link in the international chain. The international revolution constitutes a permanent process, despite temporary declines and ebbs. [Emphasis added.]

actually more experience speaking for the theory of the permanent revolution than for the basic theory of socialism on the main sequence. By the main sequence I mean that first you have feudalism, then capitalism, and then socialism. That's the main sequence as worked out by Karl Marx, in the light of his studies. So far, the main sequence has not been observed. That is, we have not seen a sequence where you reach the highest stage of capitalism and then socialism. That would occur in the United States, or Great Britain, or Germany, or one of the industrially advanced countries. We have not seen that yet. We've not had that experience.

What we have had is the experience of backward countries moving toward socialism. And for that, the theory of that experience is contained in the permanent revolution. Let me pose that again: what the main sequence is. That first in the development of society, at a certain point, we reach feudalism. Feudalism prepares the basis for capitalism. Capitalism advances technology to such a high degree that it is possible to go to socialism. So naturally, that would seem to occur along a straight sequence through the industrially advanced countries such as, primarily, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and the United States. That leaves open the problem of countries that still remain at a feudalistic level in the world of today, where you also have industrially advanced coun-

tries. The question arises, “What about those countries?” What about countries that in the modern capitalist world still have feudalistic heritages, or are largely feudalistic. That was the question that the theory of the permanent revolution came to answer. (I'm moving in just gradually here on the theory itself, approaching it from various angles.)

Pre-1905 Debates

In Russia before 1905, there were various views about the Russian revolution, the coming revolution. These primarily revolved around the problem that, since Russia was under tsarism and the main economy was feudalistic in character, what would its role be? What about its coming revolution? What would be the role of the Social Democrats, who at that time were the revolutionaries in Russia?

The Populist View

The first to take up this question were the populists. These were idealistic democrats, who believed in democracy *per se*. Very idealistic about it. They saw the coming revolution in Russia as being democratic in character. In other words, it would sweep away tsarism, would sweep away the feudalistic survivals in Russia, sweep away serfdom, which existed not only in the countryside but also in the factories in Russia, sweep all those things away.

And they saw the peasantry, which constituted the overwhelming majority of the population in tsarist Russia, as the main power in that revolution. And the Populists, the idealistic democrats, hoped that it would be possible in Russia to skip over the capitalist stage completely. In other words, in Russia, the peasantry would prove to be so revolutionary that by sweeping away tsarism, they could jump right across capitalism and come directly to socialism.

They saw this as being possible through the existence of communes in Russia. In other words, there were many peasant communes in Russia, and they visualized the possibility that, by the peasants taking power, they could directly convert these communes into some kind of socialist system in Russia, without going through the capitalist stage. That was the Populist view. This was the view that existed in the 1880s and even earlier in Russia, and continued through the 1890s. It was met [and answered] first of all by Plekhanov. And that was one of Plekhanov's great roles in the Russian revolution; that is, in the theory of the Russian revolution.

Plekhanov's View

Plekhanov saw the coming revolution in Russia as bourgeois in character. Bourgeois in character because it would be powered by the peasantry and because its main tasks would be bourgeois. In other words, it would have to sweep away the feudalistic heritages, sweep away serfdom, and give capitalism a possibility to develop quite freely in Russia. And consequently, he visualized this revolution as coming logically under the leadership of the bourgeoisie, since it would be a bourgeois revolution; therefore, the leaders should be bourgeois. That's the logic of it.

As for the working class, he visualized it as a component in this revolution, the coming revolution. Since the leadership would be under the bourgeoisie, he saw the workers as being in alliance with the bourgeoisie. Actually, he divided the bourgeoisie up into its various sections: the most reactionary section, the middling section, and the liberal bourgeoisie. He gave the role of the leadership to the liberal bourgeoisie, and he saw the revolution as being consummated under their leadership in alliance with the working class. The outcome of the revolution was conceived as the establishment of a democratic republic, where there would be complete democracy in Russia. This would open up a big political arena, where the working class would be completely free to organize its party or parties and to vie for leadership in the country. Eventually as capitalism expanded and grew stronger, it would be possible in this arena, where all different tendencies could clash, that the workers would gain so much strength that eventually there would be a clash between them and the bourgeoisie, and then the stage of the socialist revolution would open in Russia.

In other words, Plekhanov held to the standard Marxist view of the main sequence. Feudalism, capitalism, then socialism. And he held to that view, which was shared throughout the Marxist movement at that time, in Western Europe and everywhere, that the socialist revolution would come first in the industrially advanced countries like Great Britain, Germany, or the United States, and after it conquered in these countries, then it would sweep into the more backward countries, those which were industrially backward and on a much lower level. That was his view.

Lenin's View

Now we come to Lenin's view, which was somewhat different. First, where Lenin agreed with Plekhanov, because there was a fundamental agreement with him in one respect, at least. Lenin agreed that the coming revolution was bourgeois in character. And you can find any number of articles and references in Lenin, where he describes the coming revolution — that is before 1905, and before 1917 — that the coming revolution in Russia would be bourgeois in character. He saw its principal task as the solution of

the agrarian problem, because that was the biggest problem in Russia, where the predominant population was peasant, and where their main need was for land on which to work, on which to establish their farms, and to break up the old landlord estates in Russia.

That was the principal task, and this was closely associated with the national problem, because the peasantry was divided up into any number of different nationalities. In each nationality, there was, of course, a bourgeoisie within that particular nationality. So he saw these two problems in interrelationship — the agrarian problem and the national problem.

From this, Lenin derived the view that the class of key importance in Russia was the peasantry. And that's one reason that when you read a lot of Lenin, you're amazed at the amount of attention he places on the peasantry. For example, some of Lenin's best studies on the peasantry deal with analyses of the actual class structure in Russia and its comparison with the class structure in other countries. One of his studies deals with the peasantry in the United States. And it is really amazing to read what Lenin says about the United States, about the peasantry in the South, their relationships to the farmers, all the different sectors of the American farmers and peasantry. He made that study of the United States in order to cast a new light on the problems in Russia.

He was very much alive to this problem, and he placed it right up at the top of the agenda, which seems rather strange, when you always think of Lenin as being a socialist, you know. Why would he pay so much attention to the agrarian problem? For the same reason, you have his studies on the national question, which was intimately linked with the agrarian problem: because he saw those as the key problems in Russia. The peasantry was the great power that would make the revolution and assure its success in Russia.

Now, up to that point there is no disagreement between Lenin and Plekhanov. They see eye to eye on this question. The coming revolution in Russia is bourgeois in character. But now Lenin has a difference with Plekhanov. The difference is that Lenin does not trust the bourgeoisie as leaders of the peasantry. He doesn't see it as being possible that the Russian bourgeoisie will actually lead the peasantry in this coming revolution. And the reason for that is that the bourgeoisie in Russia had any number of ties with the landlords. Their interests were closely associated with those of the landlords. Therefore, it would be very difficult for them to break those ties and lead the peasantry into cleaning out the whole landlord system and serfdom in Russia, or whatever vestiges of it remained. Consequently, he saw the role of leadership falling to the workers in Russia. And that was something new. No one had had that view before, that the leadership of the revolution in tsarist Russia would be the working class. And from this we come to the main difference between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks.

The Mensheviks' View

The Mensheviks followed Plekhanov's view that the leadership would naturally and logically fall to the bourgeoisie, and therefore it was politically necessary for the workers to make a close alliance with the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks under Lenin distrusted the bourgeoisie and said the main leadership is going to fall on the workers. Therefore, the key question is to make an alliance between the workers and the peasantry. That is the key problem. And therefore, you have to study the interests of the peasantry, formulate them correctly, and lead them. But in order to lead them, you have got to have a party of the workers. So this was the theoretical basis for Lenin's extreme stress on the need for a working-class party in Russia. Because a tremendous task would fall on this party, not only of leading the workers, but through the workers, of leading the peasantry. That was the basis of Lenin's

view on the primary role of the party. The organization of the party, of course, followed from the conditions in tsarist Russia, where they had to work underground.

Lenin's View

Lenin came to this view, that once a government came to power in Russia led by the workers and powered by the peasantry, that this government would be a "democratic dictatorship of the workers and the peasants." That was his formula, and he repeated it year after year after year, right up until 1917. Now, this is a very interesting formula, "democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants." And it is quite wrong for us at this stage to simply dismiss it as being wrong, because it wasn't wrong. What it was, was a first approximation of what kind of government would come to power in tsarist Russia. A first approximation, and it was a very wide formula. As Trotsky describe it, it was an algebraic formula, which would be filled in by the coming revolution.

Lenin deliberately made this a vague formula, "democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants." He made it vague, and he left open completely how this formula would be filled in by the revolution. He visualized varied possibilities. It could be possibly a peasant government, in which the peasants played the biggest role. Or it could turn out that at a certain stage, the peasants would recede, the workers wouldn't be quite able to retain leadership or hold leadership, and the bourgeoisie would take over, the liberal bourgeoisie. And he even left open another possibility, that the workers would retain leadership in this revolution, leading the peasantry in this government which he visualized.

He was extremely cautious about foreclosing the possibility of the peasantry in Russia actually playing an independent political role. He thought the peasants might have that capacity. And what's most important about this is to understand that when Lenin visualized the peasantry as playing an independent role, he visualized them as playing not a socialist role but a petty-bourgeois role. In other words, he excluded the peasantry completely, as did Plekhanov, Trotsky, all of them, from being socialists or of following a socialist policy. He visualized them as following an independent policy of their own in distinction from and even in opposition to that of the working class. And he was very cautious about eliminating that possibility. He wanted to keep that open, because he viewed the peasants as allies in the struggle against the big bourgeoisie, but not as socialists, and not as socialist allies. The socialist allies of the Russian working class he saw in Western Europe and elsewhere.

He called this kind of government which would come to power a dictatorship, because he foresaw a desperate resistance by the capitalists and by the tsarists. And since he saw that it would not be a socialist government but some other kind of a government, it would, nevertheless have to exercise dictatorial measures against these elements, who would resist the revolutionary upsurge, who would resist the measures that would have to be taken. And therefore it would be a dictatorship, a governing regime which would exercise itself as a dictatorship against the landlords, the capitalists, and the tsarists. Among the tasks that he foresaw for this democratic dictatorship would be, first of all, the solution of the agrarian problem. In other words, it would give land to the peasantry, end all traces of serfdom and tsarism, and it would solve the national problem by permitting any nationality that wanted to break away, if it wished, from Russia.

Its essential task would be to widen the whole bourgeois framework, make possible for capitalism to really get going in Russia. It would establish political democracy, which is one of the characteristics of the bourgeoisie. They are the great establishers of political democracy in the opening stages of the capitalist revolution.

That's a long time ago; that's not today. But in the opening stages, in the main sequence, political democracy belongs to the bourgeoisie.

And the Russian revolution, he foresaw, would give a big impulse to the socialist revolution in the West, even though it was a bourgeois revolution in Russia. It would give a tremendous impulse to the socialist revolution in the West. And by doing that, it would open up big possibilities in the case of a victory in Western Europe and the establishment of socialism in the industrially advanced countries — it would open up big possibilities then for linking the Western revolution in with the Russian revolution, and thereby bringing socialism into Russia. In brief, what he foresaw was the establishment of a bourgeois republic, the establishment of a free class of farmers, like we have in the United States.

He said that in so many words, that the revolution would result in the establishment of farmers like in the United States. That, in brief, what would happen if they had a successful revolution would be the establishment of the American pattern. Not the German pattern, where the revolution occurred under very contradictory circumstances, with the reactionary Junkers taking power and opening up the possibilities for capitalism. So what Lenin was fighting for was the establishment of the American bourgeois system in tsarist Russia, strange as it may seem to us looking back, but that's what he was actually fighting for. In other words, he was fighting for the American model in the Russian revolution in those days. All right now, we've finished with Lenin, and we come to Trotsky.

Trotsky's View

Trotsky's main disagreement with Lenin was not on this sequence. It was not on this overall view. You see, that's where the Stalinists distort it. They say that this was the main dispute between Lenin and Trotsky. But it was not. The main dispute between Lenin and Trotsky was on internal party politics. I'll spend just a word or two on that. The Social Democracy in tsarist Russia had split between a majority and a minority. And as you all know, *menshevik* means minority [supporter], and *bolshevik* means majority [supporter]. Those are the Russian terms for those words. The split was not well understood in those days in the radical movement, either in Russia or in other countries. And many attempts were made to heal this split. Trotsky's main concern in the internal party politics of the Social Democracy in those days was to heal this split. And his formula for that was to make concessions to the Mensheviks, which Lenin vigorously objected to. But no one could quite understand why Lenin objected to this, because the leaders of the party minority were wonderful comrades with tremendous talents and great capacities.

Trotsky had the theory that as the class struggle developed in Russia, this would automatically force both the majority and the minority to develop revolutionary policies at a certain stage, and this would bring them together. And he was just anticipating this bringing together by his policy of trying to conciliate the two sides, especially that the Bolsheviks should make some concessions to the Mensheviks in order to fuse the party. That was the main disagreement between Lenin and Trotsky. Not the problem of the permanent revolution. It is very important to keep that in mind.

Now, Trotsky's forecast of the revolution: he agreed with Plekhanov that it would be bourgeois, and was against the Populists on that point. And he agreed with Lenin that the main sequence would be bourgeois, and that the workers would lead this revolution in alliance with the peasantry, that the workers would have the leadership. So there was complete solidarity with him on this main view. His feeling was, however, that the algebraic formula of the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants could

be filled in, that it wasn't necessary to leave it so vague, with so many different possibilities.

Lenin left a lot of possibilities open. Trotsky said we can fill in this formula; we can put in more exact terms exactly what is going to happen. We don't have to leave it so vague. And as a matter of fact, he said, if we leave it vague, we run into certain dangers when the revolution comes. There can be misunderstanding of what is going to happen, or there can even be disorientation as to what will happen. But we *can* fill it in; and if we fill it in as he saw it should be filled in, this could lead to some very unexpected consequences. And it was precisely because of these unexpected consequences that the Social Democrats should be prepared. He meant by that both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks.

Trotsky based himself primarily in the beginning on his experience in 1904 and the early part of 1905. In 1904, he saw that the liberal bourgeoisie was not leading. They had all kinds of positions and meetings calling for an end to tsarism, or for reforms and all that sort of thing, but they actually were not accomplishing very much. And they seemed to be getting into a blind alley. Still worse, the Social Democrats and those who followed them, and who put hopes in the liberals, were also landing in a blind alley. He saw that the peasant movement at that time in Russia was creating very favorable conditions for victory. There were movements all over Russia. It was quite clear that there was a developing revolutionary movement in Russia.

But he also saw that the peasantry could not assure a victory, and that this could only be assured by an armed uprising of the working class, and that the first stage of this armed uprising would be a general strike. That was his view at the beginning of 1905, and he wrote a pamphlet along those lines, stating what these conditions were and forecasting the possibility and the necessity for the workers to take the leadership, and to prepare for an insurrection against tsarism.

His reasoning went along the following lines. (I will just indicate his reasoning here so as to bring out more clearly the theory of the permanent revolution.) The revolution in tsarist Russia, he said, would be a bourgeois revolution. He is in agreement with Plekhanov and with Lenin on that. The agrarian reform was the main question in tsarist Russia. But the bourgeoisie cannot lead this because of the existence of a powerful working class.

In previous revolutions — in France, for example — it was possible for the bourgeoisie to lead the revolution because it had no fear of an alternative leadership or of opposition from a new class, such as the working class. But in Russia, a very powerful working class existed, and its mere inclusion in the revolutionary struggle would inevitably project it toward opposition to the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie could see this, and therefore would be very, very hesitant about leading even its own revolution. In addition to that, they had very close ties with the landlords, which would prevent them from taking the necessary measures against the landlords in Russia.

All right now, if the bourgeoisie is excluded from leadership and the peasantry cannot lead it, as we will come to in a minute, that leaves the city petty bourgeoisie. Is it possible for the city petty bourgeoisie to lead the bourgeois revolution in tsarist Russia? Trotsky thought that it would not be possible, because the city petty bourgeoisie would be torn in two directions. One direction, toward the working class, and the other direction, toward the bourgeoisie. And, therefore, they would not be capable of leading this revolution.

The Peasantry Excluded from Leadership

What about the peasantry — Lenin's view that it might be possible for the peasantry to lead this revolution? The question of whether

or not the peasantry could lead this revolution was a possibility which Lenin had left open. Trotsky thought that it was excluded. First of all, the peasants were geographically scattered over a tremendous country, the largest country in the world. Communications between them were very poor. And those were the days before radio and TV, you want to remember. Extremely scattered. And they were not homogeneous, even in their class outlook. For even though they were all petty bourgeois, there were still different layers of them, extending all the way from those who were primarily workers, that is, semiproletarian, semipeasant, to layers who were quite well-to-do, who had their own farms, and who even hired labor. So they all had different kinds of interests as a class. And in addition to that, they had different interests according to the section of the country that they lived in. Therefore, it was impossible, in his opinion, for the peasantry to unite and to get a leadership which would give them a revolutionary program.

He based this also on historical experience. The historical experience in modern Europe, and that included Russia, showed that in every instance of a revolutionary situation or of a revolutionary uprising, the tendency of the peasantry was to find its leadership in the cities, either in the petty bourgeoisie or in some other section of the city. And that this would occur in Russia. And, therefore, the only available leadership that was left — the whole situation boiled down to just one possibility — and that is the working class.

Working-Class Leadership

Trotsky foresaw the possibility of the Russian working class leading this coming bourgeois revolution. And therefore, he saw the possibility of the revolutionary party of the working class, which at that time was the Social Democrats, coming to power in Russia before the Social Democrats would come to power in such countries as Germany or Great Britain.

That was a very startling view in those days, because throughout the Social Democratic world it was held that the main sequence would prove to be the correct one. That is, the revolution would occur in the most industrially advanced countries and then go to the backward countries. And now Trotsky was saying, well, look, it's possible in a backward country for the Social Democrats to come to power even before they do in an advanced country.

Behind this reasoning of Trotsky's there were even more profound conceptions than the ones I've just indicated. They were really deep and quite interesting, in my opinion. And I think everyone should be very familiar with them, because in our time today they have an exceptional importance. Here are just some of the main ideas that lay behind Trotsky's conceptions.

Uneven and Combined Development

First of all, our world develops in an uneven way. One part of the world can develop in one area at an extremely rapid rate and reach very high peaks, while another part of the world remains backward and is not yet developed. And under capitalism, and expanding capitalism moreover, this process occurs at an accelerated rate. In other words, capitalism can get extremely modern developments, great new developments in science or technology and bring these into backward areas as it expands. So that from the law of uneven development we get another law, the law of combined development. And that is, you can take the most modern developments, and they become fused with the most backward, outmoded relations.

Any number of examples of this I am sure will occur to you. I can recall one just offhand in the field of technology, thirty years or so ago in Mexico, where they were first beginning to put in highways. They put in the first main highway in Mexico in 1934 and 1935, from Laredo down to Mexico City. There you would

see a great big road roller, brand new, the paint still fresh on it, you know, from Cleveland, rolling down the road, and since they needed some water in front in the road, to dampen down the road a bit, here was a group of four or five workers carrying buckets of water, and with pieces of brush that they'd dip in the water and sprinkle on the road like that, you see. This most primitive system was common all over Mexico, sprinkling the highway for this great big modern roller. And they would wait for them to get the road sprinkled and would then slowly roll along the road and bang down the road.

Or you take another example that is right here today, in Brazil. In Brazil, it is only now that modern technology is really developing at great speed. It's a common experience there that a youth, the age of some of you sitting in the room here, would learn how to fly an airplane before he would learn how to drive a car. It is quite common there. Air flight is very common all over Brazil, but the highways are not so well developed, and automobiles have not had the development there that they have had in the United States; therefore, you become an air pilot, normally, before you would become an automobile driver.

Or take the case of the South Sea islands. Here these people were in the Stone Age, completely excluded from all history, and just existing there in the Stone Age, and suddenly an American warship comes up there and tells them all to get off their island. Why? Because they're going to test an H-bomb there. So they come into the modern world right under the explosion of an H-bomb. Or in Africa, in the jungles where the first wheel that the natives will see there will be the wheels of an airplane coming to earth. Any number of examples like that.

And this combined development also applies to ideas, and the field of ideas. So that you can have a people who are in the Stone Age, and the first modern ideas they get will be the most ultra ones, developed in the very latest stages of science and technology. Now this was true of the Russian workers.

Trotsky made a big point of this. That the Russian workers, fresh from the countryside, and that is, fresh from their peasant backgrounds, from their family surroundings in Russia; the first ideology they got when they went to work was Marxism. And the most modern Marxism, too, as it was worked out and developed by men like Trotsky and Lenin.

Now it is really a strange thing, if you stop to think about it. It would be as if you went back into England during the stage of the rise of capitalism and the era of primitive capitalism, primitive accumulation, when the peasants were being driven off the land and their farms were being converted into sheep walks, to produce wool, and they were pushed into the cities, to become a proletariat; as if, at that stage, hundreds of years ago, these primitive British peasants were to be armed with the most modern Marxism. That's the kind of combination it would be. Or if, in the United States in the early days, way back in 1600–1650, when they began to work this country, if the workers in this country at that stage, instead of being armed with the Holy Bible, were to be armed with Karl Marx. That's the combination that you had. And that's what existed in Russia.

According to Trotsky, this gave the Russian workers a qualitatively greater political weight even though they were a small layer quantitatively in the country, and a small percentage of the population; still they had a greater qualitative weight politically in the life of Russia than the American workers had in the life of the United States. This is because in the United States, the workers were very backward politically, even though they had a very advanced technology. These are some of the basic reasons Trotsky said gave the Russian workers their special capacity to lead the Russian peasantry as against the Russian bourgeoisie.

You see what all of this thinking of his led up to — it led precisely to the question of the working class. And, flowing logically from that was the importance of the party as visualized by Lenin. But Trotsky had not quite yet made that link. He still had a big difference with Lenin on the party, which was not resolved until 1917.

With Trotsky's view of the leadership of the working class in the coming bourgeois revolution in Russia, what would happen when the Social Democrats came to power? That became the key question — what would happen when they got into power? And actually he, and those who agreed with him, were very much interested in this question, as were all the Social Democrats. Trotsky developed his theory in relation with a friend of his by the name of Parvus.

In the beginning, the theory of the permanent revolution had these two names associated with it — the theory of Parvus and Trotsky. So let me give you Parvus's view now, because it is just a little different from Trotsky's. He agreed completely with Trotsky, Lenin, and Plekhanov in the main sequence, in the main development of their ideas, up to this point: that the revolution would be bourgeois; the peasantry would be the main power, their question would be the main question; it would be led by the working class, they would thrust the dictatorship into power, and this dictatorship would be proletarian.

The View of Parvus

Here is what Parvus thought: that all these developments would put the Social Democrats in power. They would have the government. They would be the ruling party, the governing party. And he visualized it like this: that what would happen in Russia would be the same as in Australia. In Australia they had a labor party which was in charge of the government. So Parvus had this kind of formula: that in Russia there will be a Social Democratic party in power like the Australian Labour Party. But the rule will be bourgeois. And what you will have is a Social Democratic provisional government.

Let me just explain this, because it is a very important point. In Australia, when the continent was opened up there, the economy was capitalist. And there was a very rapid development in Australia of a capitalist economy. But the workers were very strong in Australia, and they voted a labor party into power there. And for many years this Labour Party ran the government in Australia. But it ran a capitalist government. It was like the British Labour Party in Britain in 1945. This existed for years in Australia and was quite a phenomenon in its time. All the Social Democrats were interested in it, and tried to explain it. How was this form of capitalist rule possible, in which the capitalists were protected and developed? That is, the markets, the development of the capitalist industries, the exclusion of feudalism, and all that sort of thing were carried out under a Labour Party regime. So that you had what is called a Labour government in Australia, but it ruled for the bourgeoisie. It was a strange combination.

All right, that's what Parvus foresaw for Russia. That the revolution would be bourgeois, but the government would be Social Democratic, and that it would act as the Australian Labour Party had acted — it would maintain a system of small farms like in the United States and give a political arena for the working class. But essentially, what it would be doing would be ruling for the bourgeoisie, a Social Democratic government ruling for them. And his view was that it would be impossible for this government, for a long time to come, to carry out a socialist revolution, a socialist insurrection. That was excluded in the view of Parvus.

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Marx's Theory of World Revolution

by Dan La Botz

Marx and Engels grew up in counterrevolutionary Europe. The spread of the new social order created by the French Revolution had been halted in Europe by the defeat of Napoleon in 1814. From 1815 to 1848 an alliance of conservative powers, the Holy Alliance created by Austria's Prince Klemens Metternich, held sway. Russia, Austria, and Prussia, three feudal monarchies, and England, the pre-eminent capitalist country, dominated Europe and cooperated in preventing any new movements for democracy from arising. They were later joined by the restored French capitalist monarchy.

Any movement that threatened the status quo, whether it was democratic, nationalist, or socialist, had to face the force of the Holy Alliance, which was prepared to intervene everywhere in Europe. "Consequently," as the historian Arthur Rosenberg puts it, "the international European counterrevolution spontaneously produced a revolutionary International."¹

The revolutionary International of the 1820s, '30s, and '40s was made up of French and Italian Liberals and Polish nationalists, among others. Especially after the Polish revolt of 1830, all radical forces in Europe tended to come together in an informal, but nonetheless very real, democratic International. "It was recognized as an absolute necessity that, in the event of a new revolt in a particular country, the democrats and revolutionaries of the other countries should do everything in their power to prevent the allied monarchs from intervening in the insurgent region," writes Rosenberg. "From this it followed that the revolution could not be allowed to remain isolated in one country, but that it would have to spread as quickly as possible to the rest of Europe."²

So it was that revolutionaries, democratic and socialist, were forced by circumstances to become internationalists as well. It was in this period after the Polish uprising of 1830 and before the revolutionary movement of 1848 that Marx and Engels first became politically aware and active, beginning their researches into socialism and becoming involved in socialist groups. They were formed in that internationalist tradition.

1. Marx and Engels's Early Writings

Marx and Engels, in the earliest of their writings, in which they differentiated their views from those of other Young Hegelians and German radicals of the 1840s, already argued, albeit rather abstractly, that the socialist revolution was only possible on a world scale. The underlying premise of Marxian socialism is the idea that abundance makes it possible to abolish classes and the state, and institute communism; so long as there is scarcity, there will be classes, a repressive state, and all the rest of the "crap" of class society. However, in a world where there is an international division of labor and nations are interdependent, abundance is only conceivable on the basis of cooperation among the most developed nations. So even in their earliest and most philosophical works, Marx and Engels wrote of the socialist revolution as a world revolution.

In the *German Ideology* they wrote that

...this development of productive forces (which itself implies the actual empirical existence of men in their *world-historical*, instead of local, being) is an absolutely necessary practical premise because without it *want* is merely made general, and *destitution*, the struggle for necessities, and all the old filthy business would necessarily be reproduced; and furthermore, because only with this universal development of productive forces is a *universal* intercourse between men established, which produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the "propertyless" mass (universal competition), makes each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, and finally has put world-historical, empirically universal individuals in the place of local ones. Without this, (1) communism would only exist as a local event; (2) the *forces* of intercourse themselves could not have developed as *universal*, hence intolerable powers: they would have remained home-bred conditions surrounded by superstition; and (3) each extension of intercourse would abolish local communism. Empirically, communism is only possible as the act of the dominant peoples "all at once" and simultaneously, which presupposes the universal development of productive forces and world intercourse bound up with communism.³

While written in the Hegelian philosophical language of their youth, the meaning of this passage is clear, and it anticipates in its abstract way many of the actual difficulties of future revolutionary experience. Only the world development of the productive forces — that is, of industry — makes for the abundance which will make a communist revolution possible. And only the development of those forces creates the propertyless proletarian masses who are the agents of revolution. And once the revolution begins it must happen "all at once" and "simultaneously" in the most developed nations or it is doomed to fail because it would be surrounded by non-communist societies, and by interacting with them "each extension of intercourse would abolish local communism." A communist revolution in one nation would be destroyed by its interaction with the capitalist world. A workers' revolution is only possible as world revolution.⁴

Also in *The German Ideology* Marx and Engels wrote that because of the world market "[the] proletariat can...only exist world-historically, just as communism, its activity, can only have a 'world-historical' existence" (p. 47). In still another passage they wrote that "individuals must appropriate the existing totality of productive forces" but "this appropriation must have a universal character corresponding to the productive forces and the intercourse" (p. 83). In other words, the workers must take over the economy, but precisely because it is a world economy, the workers must take control of the world market so that they can rule and reorganize the world.⁵

2. The Communist Manifesto and the Revolution of 1848

A few years later Marx returned to this issue of world revolution in the *Communist Manifesto*, written on the eve of the revolutionary upsurge of 1848. The notion of a revolution simultaneously and "all at once" had been drastically modified:

Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each

1. Rosenberg, *Democracy and Socialism*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1965, p. 71.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

3. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964, pp. 46-47.

4. In one sense there has always been "the world," but in another, "the world" is a capitalist creation. Before the rise of capitalism, while there was international trade, there was not a world market. While there was politics, there was no world politics. While there were wars, there were no world wars.

5. It should be kept in mind throughout that for Marx only the working class, the class of wage earners, of whom the industrial workers form the core, is a truly revolutionary class. In his view, neither peasants, nor the petty bourgeoisie, nor the intellectuals could be a truly revolutionary class because their objectives were limited to improving the situation of their group, rather than being driven to eliminate the characteristic condition of the society: wage labor and the production of commodities for the market. Only the working class is driven to constant and consistent organization and to struggle against the capitalist class. The peasantry, isolated, ignorant, and, even in its grinding poverty, concerned about its property, its small plot, may be driven as toiler to take the side of the workers, if the workers can put forward a program to solve their problems. The petty bourgeoisie, usually vacillating and unreliable, and sometimes treacherous, can be won to follow the working class lead, if the working class is decisive. In Marx's view, in the last analysis, only the working class can organize socialist society. So, when Marx refers to socialist revolution he is talking about a revolution of wage workers organized in political parties.

country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.⁶

this 3-volume edition is referred to hereafter as *SW*.

However, it is clear that this is a national revolution only "in form," while in substance it remains a world revolution and requires revolutionary successes in at least several of the most developed industrial nations. As Marx put it in a later passage in the *Communist Manifesto*:

The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself *the* nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word. National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto. The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat.⁷

Civilization, for Marx, refers first to economic development, to industry and productivity. Socialist revolution is possible only on the basis of united action "of the leading civilised countries at least."

This idea of "united action" is a more political way of saying what Marx had said earlier about the world-historical and universal characteristics of socialist revolution. But it makes the same point for the same reasons; the workers must break the unholy alliance of reaction and the capitalist domination of the world market.

The publication of the *Communist Manifesto* was to be shortly followed by the outbreak of the 1848 Revolution, a European-wide revolution that would deepen the experience and the theory of the socialist movement immensely before ending in counterrevolution and defeat. The revolution began as a movement against the aristocracy and the monarchy aimed at sweeping away feudal privilege and creating parliamentary democracy, and insofar as it was animated by the petty bourgeoisie and the working classes together, it tended to create what Marx called the "social republican revolution," that is, a bourgeois revolution that was radically democratic and took up social questions: work, wages, the price of bread.

However, in June of 1848, the French working class took to the barricades in a struggle for its own demands and for the first time in history there was a real proletarian revolution. After that, throughout Europe, the bourgeoisie saw not only the aristocracy above them, but the workers below, not following, but pushing for-

ward and upward and threatening to raise their own social demands. The bourgeois democratic revolution revealed the possibility of being turned into a workers' socialist revolution, and from that moment the bourgeoisie tended to recoil from revolution and rebound into the arms of the aristocracy.

The 1848 Revolution confirmed Marx and Engels' view that a world revolution was taking place; capitalism was replacing feudalism throughout the world as a system. It was also a world revolution in the geographical sense, as waves of revolution had washed back and forth across Europe, sweeping away monarchs and nobility, raising the bourgeoisie to power, bringing a backwash of aristocratic counterrevolution, then a new wave of bourgeois revolution, stirring up the working class in conflict with the bourgeoisie, then causing the bourgeoisie to ally itself with the aristocracy in another wave of counterrevolution and repression.

"European revolution is taking a circular course," wrote Marx. Having begun in Italy, it "assumed a European character" when it hit Paris, then struck Vienna, and Berlin. Likewise there was a "European counterrevolution" beginning at Naples, Italy, and "assuming a European character" in Paris, then moving to Vienna, and Berlin. Marx expected the process to begin once again: "*The crowing of the Gallic cock in Paris will once again rouse Europe.*"⁸

It remained Marx's belief after the counterrevolution of June 1848 in Paris, and throughout the period of the 1848-49 revolution, and even into the early 1850s, that the Parisian working class would soon rise to lead a new and stronger revolutionary wave which would sweep out across Europe in a revolutionary war. Then:

With the victory of the "red republic" in Paris, *armies* will rush from the interior of their countries to the frontiers and across them, and the *real strength* of the fighting parties will become evident.⁹

The workers of Paris would carry the revolution, a "social republican revolution" tending to become simply a proletarian revolution, across the continent of Europe. However, even such a revolutionary movement would not, Marx argued, be big and strong enough to survive. For against the radical democracy and workers' revolution stood a country like a bulwark of reaction: England. A successful European revolution would have to launch a war against England, and because of England's position as a world empire, the workers would have to carry out a world war. The concept of a workers' world war is the most developed expression of world revolution at this point, and it is one to which Marx will return and on which he will base his entire outlook, so we quote a

lengthy passage from the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung (NRZ)* of January 1, 1849:

But England, the country that turns whole nations into her proletarians, that spans the whole world with her enormous arms, that has already once defrayed the cost of a European Restoration, the country in which class contradictions have reached their most acute and shameless form — *England* seems to be the rock which breaks the revolutionary waves, the country where the new society is stifled before it is born. England dominates the world market. Any upheaval in economic relations in any country of the European continent, in the whole European continent without England, is a storm in a teacup. Industrial and commercial relationships within each nation are governed by its intercourse with other nations, and depend on its relations with the world market. But the world market is dominated by England and England is dominated by the bourgeoisie. Thus, the liberation of Europe, whether brought about by the struggle of the oppressed nationalities for their independence or by overthrowing feudal absolutism, depends on the successful uprising of the French working class. Every social upheaval in France, however, is bound to be thwarted by the English bourgeoisie, by Great Britain's industrial and commercial domination of the world. Every partial social reform in France or on the European continent as a whole, if designed to be lasting, is merely a pious wish. Only a *world war* can break old England, as only this can provide the Chartists, the party of the organized English workers, with the conditions for a successful rising against their powerful oppressors. Only when the Chartists head the English government will the social revolution pass from the sphere of utopia to that of reality. But any *European war* in which England is involved is a world war, waged in Canada and Italy, in the East Indies and Prussia, in Africa and on the Danube.... The table of contents for 1849 reads: Revolutionary rising of the French working class, world war.¹⁰

There is perhaps no other passage in Marx's writings which captures his vision of world revolution so completely. The alliance of conservative powers in Europe, and English domination of the world market, preclude the possibility of a successful revolution in anything less than the entire world. Even a Continental revolution is doomed to defeat if England still stands. The workers will have to strike out of Paris against the rulers of Europe, and then gathering their forces lead an attack by the Continental working class against the British bourgeoisie, putting the Chartist workers in power in England.

This view of world revolution was not just something churned out by Marx the journalist in the heat of revolution. The essay *The Class Struggles in France*, also originally published in *NRZ*, was a work which both Marx and Engels considered to be of enduring value. It

6. Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969, Vol. I, p. 118;

7. *SW*, Vol. I, pp. 124-5.

8. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Revolution of 1848-9: Articles from the Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, New York: International Publishers, 1972, p. 160.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 148-9.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 204-5.

was reissued as a booklet in 1850 and often reproduced; Engels wrote a new introduction for it in 1895. In that essay Marx holds exactly the same view and expresses it in similar, though less impassioned language. He ridicules the idea of a successful workers' revolution in France if it did not immediately turn its attention to England. He writes in two passages:

Just as the workers thought they would be able to emancipate themselves side by side with the bourgeoisie, so they thought they would be able to consummate a proletarian revolution within the national walls of France, side by side with the remaining bourgeois nations. But French relations of production are conditioned by the foreign trade of France, by her position on the world market and the laws thereof; how was France to break them without a European revolutionary war, which would strike back at the despot of the world market, England?¹¹

And in the second passage:

It [the revolution] is not accomplished anywhere within the national walls; the class war within French society turns into a world war, in which the nations confront one another. Accomplishment begins only as of the moment when, through the world war, the proletariat is pushed to the van of the people that dominates the world market, to the van of England. The revolution, which finds here not its end, but its organizational beginning, is no short-lived revolution.¹²

It is a striking description: the war within turns into a revolutionary world war, and the working class conquers the world market and thus the world. The converse also turns out to be true: failure to conquer the world market leads to a counterrevolution which, through world war, rolls back over the nations and back into the heart of the revolutionary state, defeating the working class.¹³

The conception of world revolution became a basic premise of the world view of Marx and Engels, and a decade later, in the 1850s, when they expected an economic crisis to lead to a revolution throughout Europe, including in England, they worried that even a European-wide revolution might not be big enough to break the power of world capitalism. "The difficult question for us is this: on the Continent the revolution is imminent and will immediately

assume a socialist character," wrote Marx to Engels in 1858. "Is it not bound to be crushed in this little corner, considering that in a far greater territory the movement of bourgeois society is still in the ascendant?"¹⁴

Clearly what is on their minds here is not the military or political issues so much as the social and economic questions. There will still be a world market, perhaps now dominated by the United States, which would strangle even a European revolutionary movement.

3. Permanent Revolution

The experience of the 1848 Revolution led Marx to a fundamental revision of his analysis of bourgeois democratic revolutions and of liberal bourgeois and petty-bourgeois politics. (Marx often referred to them as the liberal party and the democratic party.) It also led to a revision of his revolutionary strategy. The new analysis and the new strategy he gave the name "Permanent Revolution."¹⁵

At the time of the outbreak of the 1848 Revolution, Marx believed the bourgeoisie would lead its petty bourgeois and working class allies to overthrow the monarchical and aristocratic regimes and create a capitalist republic. He foresaw that immediately thereafter the liberal bourgeoisie would turn against the petty bourgeois democrats and the working class. The communists, allied with the petty bourgeois democrats, would continue the struggle for the "social republic," a radically democratic society incorporating working class demands and socialist demands, such as the nationalization of industry.

After the defeat of 1848, however, Marx became convinced that the working class could in no way rely upon the petty-bourgeois democratic party. The democrats might support wages and hours legislation and even public works, but only because they "hope to bribe the workers by more or less concealed aims and to break their revolutionary potency by making their position tolerable for the moment."¹⁶ The program of the democrats was mainly in their own interest: less government spending, lower taxes for small business and higher taxes on big business and the landlords, public credit institutions for small business. They offered the workers higher wages and state employment, but

Marx saw these as charity measures — today we would say welfare state measures. He argued that this lower middle class program of reform was to be rejected because it would divide the working class and divert it from its goal of revolutionizing the society completely.

Marx went on to propose a program for the workers: The workers must be organized independently. They must form clubs and group together in a national organization, and that organization must raise the workers' independent demands. They must put up their own candidates to retain that independence. The workers must form their own revolutionary workers' government alongside the democrats' government. The workers must remain armed and organized and on no pretext give up their arms. The workers must force the democrats to nationalize as much of the means of production as possible. In any case, the workers must always make more radical demands than the democrats and keep forcing them to the left.

The struggle was for socialism. So the working class would have to adopt a program that Marx called "Permanent Revolution." The workers must not stop at the stage of the bourgeois democratic state or even the "social republic," but must continue to struggle until they achieved a workers' state beginning to institute socialism. However, argued Marx, it would not be possible to do so within the context of a national revolution.

While the democratic petty-bourgeois party wish to bring the revolution to a conclusion as quickly as possible, and with the achievement, at most, of the above demands [alms, charity], it is our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent, until all more or less possessing classes have been forced out of state power, and the association of proletarians, not only in one country, but in all the dominant countries of the world, has advanced so far that competition among the proletarians of these countries has ceased and that at least the decisive productive forces are concentrated in the hands of the proletarians. For us the issue cannot be the alteration of private property but only its annihilation, not the smoothing over of class antagonisms but the abolition of classes, not the improvement of existing society but the foundation of a new one.¹⁷

11. *SW*, Vol. I, p. 213.

12. *SW*, Vol. I, pp. 271-2.

13. The idea of world revolution was the common property of the revolutionaries of the generation of 1848, including the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin. Of course Bakunin had a different conception of revolution, in which "the people," and not the working class, was the agent. He was not a democrat, but an elitist, who declared: "One hundred revolutionaries, strongly and earnestly allied, would suffice for the international organization of all of Europe. Two or three hundred revolutionaries will be enough for the organization of the largest country." Nonetheless the similarities are worth noting; in his "Appeal to the Slavs," written in 1848, Bakunin stated: "The world is split into two camps; on one side the revolution, on the other the counterrevolution... [The] people that had so long been driven by the chains of diplomacy finally became aware of their shameful condition. They realized that the welfare of nations could not be assured so long as there existed, anywhere in Europe, a single people bowed under the yoke; that the liberty of people, in order to be won anywhere, had to be won everywhere. And, for the first time, the peoples demanded in one united voice a liberty that was true and complete, liberty without reservations, without exceptions, without limitations. Away with the oppressors! was the universal cry. Liberty for the oppressed, for the Poles, the Italians, for all! No more wars of conquest, nothing but the last supreme war of the revolution for the emancipation of all peoples." (See *Bakunin on Anarchy* New York: Vintage Books, 1971, pp. 62-7.) In 1869 Bakunin would write: "No political or national revolution can ever triumph unless it is transformed into a social revolution, and unless the national revolution, precisely because of its radically socialist character, which is destructive of the State, becomes a universal revolution" (*ibid.*, p. 154). Clearly the idea of world revolution was a common legacy of the 1848 experience.

14. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1955, p. 111; hereafter referred to as *SC*.

15. See the excellent discussion in Hal Draper, "The International Meaning of Permanent Revolution," in *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution*, Vol. II: *The Politics of Social Classes*, New York: Monthly Review, 1978, pp. 241-246.

16. *SW*, Vol. I, p. 178.

17. *SW*, Vol. I, pp. 178-9.

The term “permanent revolution” appears several times in the writings of Marx and Engels (not two as suggested by Baruch Knei-Paz in his book *The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1978, pp. 155–6). The earliest reference to “permanent revolution” of which I am aware is in Marx and Engels *Holy Family* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 145), originally written in 1844 and first published in February 1845. There they wrote that Napoleon “...perfected the Terror by substituting permanent war for permanent revolution.” It occurs twice in the “Address to the Communist League” in the passages cited here. It also appears in French in a joint statement of some members of the Communist League, the Blanquists, and the Chartists who formed the Société Universelle des Communistes Révolutionnaires: “The aim of the association is the downfall of all the privileged classes, to subject these classes to the dictatorship of the proletarians maintaining the revolution in permanence until the realization of Communism, which is [or has to be] the last form for constituting the human family.”¹⁸

The permanent revolution also appears in *The Class Struggles in France*:

[The] proletariat rallies more and more round revolutionary Socialism, round Communism, for which the bourgeoisie has itself invented the name of Blanqui. This Socialism is the declaration of the permanence of the revolution, the class dictatorship of the proletariat as the necessary transit point to the abolition of class distinctions generally, to the abolition of all the social relations that correspond to these relations of production, to the revolutionizing of all the ideas that result from these social relations.¹⁹

Marx concludes this discussion in the “Address to the Communist League” with the rousing words: “Their battle cry must be: The Revolution in Permanence.”

It is clear from this passage that the theory of permanent revolution is subordinate to the general theory of world revolution. It is not a theory about how workers can lead a socialist revolution in an underdeveloped or backward country (as it is often described); rather it is a theory about how the workers’ world revolution may first begin and come to power in a backward country. The workers may first come to power in a backward country like the Germany of 1848, but they cannot create socialism there; socialism requires “all the dominant countries

of the world” and the “decisive productive forces.” Permanent revolution means not only that the workers must carry out both the democratic and socialist tasks of the revolution but also that they must carry out both the national and the international tasks. The revolution will be first a national democratic one, but it will also become an international socialist revolution. We saw earlier that for Marx that meant the destruction of the world market, the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie. For Marx in that period the center of the world market was England.

Thus, in a passage from *The Class Struggles in France*, in which the term “Permanent Revolution” is not used, but in which clearly the method is employed, Marx writes:

While, therefore, the crises first produce revolutions on the Continent, the foundation for these is, nevertheless, always laid in England. Violent outbreaks must naturally occur rather in the extremities of the bourgeois body than in its heart, since the possibility of adjustment is greater here than there. On the other hand, the degree to which the Continental revolutions react on England is at the same time the barometer which indicates how far these revolutions really call into question the bourgeois conditions of life, or how far they only hit their political formations.²⁰

If we translated this from the language of the 19th Century to that of the 20th, we could say: Revolutions may break out in the backward or underdeveloped countries (in the “extremities”), but the real question is to what extent they react on the center of capitalism (in “its heart”). Today, of course, that would be the United States, Japan, and Germany, not England. There is no denial that revolution may break out in an undeveloped country, but to succeed it must affect the “heart,” the advanced industrial capitalist countries which are also the center of world trade and the world market.²¹

4. The First International

The 1850s turned out not to be the revolutionary decade that Marx and Engels hoped for, but a decade of reaction in which no radical initiatives of any significance were possible. However, by 1863 things had changed; once more the prospect of world revolution seemed to be opening up. On June 11 of that year Engels wrote to Marx: “A European movement seems to me very probable, because the bourgeois has now once more lost all his fear of the Communists

and if necessary will again join the fray.”²² The Polish insurrection of 1863 led Marx to conclude: “This much is certain — the era of revolution has once more fairly opened in Europe.”²³

It was the Polish events that led to the founding of the First International (the International Workingmen’s Association) in the fall of 1863. Marx became its secretary and a member of its General Council. The organization involved not only socialists from the Continent but also more conservative British trade unionists, so there could be no allusion to revolutionary aims, at least in the founding address of the organization. Nevertheless, Marx and Engels saw the First International as a vehicle of workers’ revolution. A few years later, in November of 1867, after the organization had made considerable gains on the basis of international labor solidarity, Marx, still hoping for revolutionary developments, wrote to Engels: “Things are moving. And in the next revolution, which is perhaps nearer than it appears, we (i.e., you and I) will have this powerful engine [the International] in our hands.”²⁴

The revolution was expected as a “European movement,” in particular an international development involving France and England as, respectively, the most politically and economically mature nations. It is still England that is the rock which breaks the wave of revolution, as they had put it in 1848. It is still England as the seat of the world market that must be revolutionized. Just as in 1848, so Marx writes in January of 1870:

Although revolutionary initiative will probably come from France, England alone can serve as the lever for a serious economic revolution. It is the only country where there are no longer any peasants and where landed property is concentrated in a few hands. It is the only country where the capitalist form — that is, labor combined on a large scale under capitalist entrepreneurs — has taken over practically the whole of production. It is the only country where the great majority of the population consists of wage laborers. It is the only country where the class struggle and organization of the working class by the trade unions have attained a certain degree of maturity and universality. It is the only country where, thanks to its domination of the world market, every revolution in economic relationships must directly affect the whole world. While on the one hand landlordism and capitalism have their classic seat in this country, the material conditions for their destruction are

18. Hal Draper, *Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution*, Vol. III: *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986, pp. 185–6.

19. *SW*, Vol. I, p. 282.

20. *SW*, Vol. I, p. 289.

21. Given the consistency and coherence of Marx and Engels’ writings on the subject of world revolution and permanent revolution from the period of 1848 up through the end of their lives, I believe Michael Löwy, a leading theorist of the Fourth International (United Secretariat) is quite wrong when he writes that “it is not possible to speak of a coherent and systematic theory of permanent revolution in Marx.” (See his *The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development: The Theory of Permanent Revolution*, London: Verso NLB, 1981, p. 8.) The problem for Löwy is that he does not agree with Marx and Engels nor for that matter with Trotsky on the issue of permanent revolution or world revolution. Those three believe in world revolution — that is, a revolution which, though it might break out anywhere, would lead rather quickly to revolution in several of the most developed countries. Löwy, on the other hand, is a fan of the various Stalinist national revolutions in Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam, and Cuba (p. 107), which occur not as a result of an international crisis, nor even as part of one international movement, and which even involve antagonistic national and international currents. (Cuba and China, for example, not even being part of the same political and military bloc.)

22. *SC*, p. 141.

23. *SC* [1942 Edition], p. 144.

24. *SC*, p. 194.

on the other hand the most mature here. The General Council is now in the fortunate position of having its hands directly on this great lever of proletarian revolution; what folly, yea, one might almost say, what a crime it would be to let this lever fall into purely English hands. The English have at their disposal all necessary material preconditions for a social revolution. What they lack is the spirit of generalization and revolutionary passion. Only the General Council can provide them with this, and thus accelerate a truly revolutionary movement here and, in consequence, everywhere.²⁵

This letter, written as a polemic against the anarchist followers of Bakunin, is a real distillation of key Marxist concepts: the concentration of capital and the predominance of industry; the growth of the working class and the decline of agricultural labor; the organization of workers in the labor unions. And among the other key ideas: that of world revolution. Marx says "... a serious economic revolution," that is, socialism, is only possible if it includes England. Why? In part because: "It is the only country where, thanks to the domination of the world market, every revolution in economic relationships must directly affect the whole world." It is only with a revolution in England that socialism is a possibility. The revolution "will probably come from France," backward, underdeveloped France — relative to England. From France, which is an extremity and not the heart of the system. But a revolution in France cannot stay within national walls; it must become world revolution. The revolution must move from the extremities to the heart. The wave must break the rock and not be broken by it.

The growing militancy of the European working class in the late 1860s did, in fact, lead to the expected revolution in France, but it failed to break out of the national walls, or even out of the walls of Paris: the Paris Commune of 1871. The Commune did not extend its power beyond Paris, though there were followers and sympathizers in other cities, and being isolated, it was destroyed in just a few weeks. The experience of the Commune led Marx to revise his theory of the state, arguing that workers could not seize the bourgeois state, but would have to smash it and create a workers' state. Precisely because the revolution had not spread beyond Paris, there could be little direct influence on Marx's theory of world revolution, but there were at least two important new developments. First, the Paris Commune had grown out of what Marx called, "the most tremendous war of modern times," the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. It was the war which had led to the political crisis and thus to revolution, and while not necessarily understood or developed at that time, it became

increasingly clear in the 1890s that war might in the future be the most likely cause of revolution.

Second, the working class of Paris had failed to spark an international revolution in part because of lack of initiative, but also because there was such a determined counterrevolutionary International. The French bourgeoisie and the Prussian Army had cooperated in the crushing of the workers. "Class rule is no longer able to disguise itself in a national uniform; the national governments are one against the proletariat," wrote Marx.²⁶ The unity of the oppressors once again demonstrated the need for the unity of the oppressed, for an international movement for world revolution.

5. Economic Studies: *Capital*

In the long period of relative conservatism and quiet between the end of the 1848 Revolution and the Polish rising of 1863 Marx and Engels dedicated themselves largely to their intellectual work, which in Marx's case was the study of capitalism. The outline of the work which Marx planned would begin with capital, then take up a study of the state, and then foreign trade and the world market.²⁷ Marx, of course, never completed the project, and those last three points — the state, foreign trade, and the world market — were never systematically dealt with. The purpose of the study of capitalism was to determine the laws of motion of the system and its limits. One can imagine that Marx would have elaborated his theory of world revolution further in the chapters and volumes which were never completed.

Before he began these studies, Marx had put forward the view that not only were economic relations in general the foundation of society, but that an economic crisis had led to the revolution of 1848. In *The Class Struggles in France* he wrote:

The eruption of general discontent was finally accelerated and the mood for revolt ripened by two economic world events. The potato blight and the crop failure of 1845 and 1846 increased the general ferment among the people. The dearth of 1847 called forth bloody conflicts in France as well as on the rest of the Continent.... The second great economic event which hastened the outbreak of the revolution was a general commercial and industrial crisis in England.²⁸

In a new "Introduction" to the pamphlet in 1895 Engels wrote that after the revolution, in the spring of 1850, Marx had had the time to study the economic history of the previous ten years and had concluded that he had in fact been correct about the economic basis of the revolution, that

the world trade crisis of 1847 had been the true mother of the February and March Revolutions, and that the industrial prosperity, which had been returning gradually since the middle of 1848 and attained full bloom in 1849 and 1850 was the revitalizing force of the newly strengthened European reaction.²⁹

The rather simple and direct relationship between crisis and revolution, boom and reaction which is put forth here did not manifest itself in the crises of the 1850s or the later decades of the 19th century. Though there were many crises, there was no general revolutionary development again until after the turn of the century. If the crisis of 1847 had led to the revolution of 1848, apparently not every crisis led to revolution. While Marx showed the specific relationships between the economic crisis and political developments in his historical writings on the 1848 Revolution, he never put forward a general theory about the relationship between economic and political developments, though it seems clear he believed there was a direct relationship. At some point the strain of economic crisis can lead to political pressures and revolution, but Marx creates no theory of how that takes place.

The product of Marx's studies of the economy was, of course, *Capital*, the first volume of which was published in 1867. In Chapter XXXII, near the end of Volume I, Marx writes that the increasing concentration of capital and socialization of labor will lead to revolution, and concludes in a famous and rather rhapsodic passage:

The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.³⁰

Nothing in the chapter explains exactly how the economic crisis becomes a political crisis; it merely asserts that it will happen.

Subsequently in the third volume of *Capital*, published posthumously by Engels, Marx spelled out in greater detail what he saw as the cause of the economic crisis, namely "a continually falling rate of profit."³¹ He writes:

But the main thing about their horror of the falling rate of profit is the feeling that capitalist production meets in the development of its productive forces a barrier which has nothing to do with the production of wealth as such; and this peculiar barrier testifies to the limitations and to the merely historical, transitory character of the capitalist mode of production; testifies that for

25. "Circular to the Swiss Romansh Federal Council" [written about January 1, 1970], in Karl Marx, *On The First International*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973, pp. 171-2. This is Vol. III of Saul K. Padover's edition of "The Karl Marx Library."

26. SW, Vol. II, p. 240.

27. See Karl Marx, *Theories of Surplus-Value* [Volume IV of *Capital*], Part I, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969, p. 14.

28. SW, Vol. I, pp. 209-210.

29. SW, Vol. I, p. 187.

30. Karl Marx, *Capital*, New York: International Publishers, 1967, Vol. I, p. 763.

31. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 213.

the production of wealth, it is not an absolute mode, moreover, that at a certain stage it rather conflicts with its further development.³²

The falling rate of profit, then, indicated a coming catastrophic crisis for capitalism. The periodic crises associated with the business cycle were steps toward the brink: every depression led to a greater concentration of capital; every increase in the concentration of capital led to what Marx called an "increasing organic composition of capital," that is, led to a greater increase in machinery relative to labor, which in turn led to a fall in the rate of profit, bringing capitalism toward its secular crisis, towards its apocalypse.

Still, the links or mediations between economic catastrophe and political revolution are not explained or developed. Marx clearly intended, as his outline indicated, to eventually link the economic and political crises (economic relations and the state) and to show the mediations between them. The economic theory was seen as underpinning the political theory, and ultimately the national economy and the nation state would be set in the context of the world market, all of that undergirding a theory of world revolution.³³

Marx and Engels never completed the project in the original outline: a theory of capitalist economics, politics, and the world market. It was left to the next generation of revolutionary socialists to develop those theories, and the theory of world revolution.

6. Marx's Theory of World Revolution: Some Conclusions

The idea of a world revolution was present in the earliest works of Marx and Engels and became increasingly complex as they enriched the theory with the experience of the revolutionary workers' movement and with their own understanding of capitalist economics and politics. There is a continuity between their earliest and their later works, only that the later discussions of world revolution are less abstract. From the writings of Marx and Engels on world revolution and permanent revolution we can extrapolate a theory, even if that theory was never systematically explained in one place. The central ideas of that Marxist theory of world revolution are the following:

1. The leap from capitalism to socialism through revolution is a world-historic revolution in the Hegelian and Marxist sense that it is a leap from one epoch to another and from one social system to another.
2. A socialist revolution is a world revolution because it can be successful only if it encompasses a number of the most advanced indus-

trial countries, for only then will there be the economic power, which is the basis of political and military power as well as of economic prosperity, which is the foundation of socialism.

3. The world revolution can only succeed if it overthrows the nation (or nations) acting as organizer and center of the capitalist world market; it is only possible for the revolution to be victorious if the center of the world market is conquered by the workers. It is only when the revolution overcomes that world market that it will be able to avoid being destroyed by trade with the capitalist countries, and will be able, on a world scale, to end competition among the working class.
4. A socialist revolution in one country will entail a revolutionary war against capitalist countries, in alliance with the revolutionary forces within those nations. Marx advocated various revolutionary wars in his writings (Germany against Denmark, France against Europe, Europe against England, etc.) because a revolution could only be militarily and politically victorious if it took the initiative to challenge the reactionary powers that threatened it. The revolution must be spread, if necessary through revolutionary war.
5. Finally, Marx and Engels advanced the idea that the world revolution would be the result of a world crisis of capitalism, which itself was caused by certain economic contradictions within the system.

The theory of world revolution is the foundation for all of Marx's other writings on politics: it is the framework of analysis, it is the basis of strategy, and it represents the ultimate objective of the movement, that is, the conquest of world power and the socialist reorganization of society. The theory of world revolution encompasses various aspects: military, geopolitical, and economic. It is the latter, the economic aspect, which is the most important. It seems clear from reading Marx's works over a number of decades that he felt that any socialist workers' revolution within national boundaries could be threatened by counterrevolution from within, by invasion from reactionary forces from without, but above all by the world market. In particular any isolated socialist nation which traded on the world market would be caught up in competition with the superior productivity of the surrounding capitalist nations.

The theory of permanent revolution must be seen in this context. Certainly for Marx, it is best seen as a sub-theory, a subordinate part of the general theory of world revolution. It should be understood this way: Permanent revolution is not about the possibility of a successful work-

ers' revolution in a backward or underdeveloped country (such as Germany in 1848); rather, it is about successful workers' revolutions in the most advanced countries possibly beginning in backward countries with a workers' seizure of power.

For Marx, the success of any revolution in his time was always dependent upon the conquest of England, which was the center of the world market. The revolution might begin anywhere, even in one of the extremities, but it must end there at the heart. Marx never conceived of a successful socialist revolution in either an underdeveloped country, or backward country, or even in any single advanced or developed country (with the possible exception of England, at that time the dominant power). It was only possible to carry out a successful socialist revolution on the basis of successful workers' revolutions in the most developed countries.

The socialist revolution, for Marx, is a dynamic process which moves from one nation to another — but within a relatively short period of time. Marx certainly never held the idea that the revolution might last generations; such a view would clearly conflict with his views on the dangers of counterrevolution through military conquest or economic competition, particularly with his view of the power of the world market. All of Marx's experience, and the experience of his generation, seemed to indicate that if the revolution did not spread within a few years, or decades at most, it would be destroyed by counterrevolution, foreign invasion, or an adverse economic position exerting pressure through the world market. The radical phase of the French Revolution had lasted only from 1789 to 1796, and the revolution's power was completely spent in Europe by 1814 with the defeat of Napoleon, a total of 25 years. The 1848 Revolution began with the financial crisis of 1847 and was defeated in 1849 with scarcely another ripple. The resurgence of the working class in the mid-1860s was crushed by the defeat of the Commune in 1871. No experience in Marx's lifetime or in the generation preceding him indicated that a revolutionary movement had anything more than a few years to either conquer or be crushed.

Marx's preoccupation with the world market, particularly in the writings of the 1848 period, but in others as well, make it clear that for Marx the destruction of the world market holds the same place at the level of international politics as the destruction of the state holds at the level of national politics. That is, if there can be no socialist revolution in one nation without the destruction of the bourgeois state, so there can be no international socialist revolution without

32. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 242.

33. Marx wrote little on the theory of the world market, which was to be the culmination of his studies of the capitalist system. His various writings about colonialism, mostly journalistic, are interesting, but don't form a coherent theory of the world market or world revolution. In *Theories of Surplus Value* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971, Vol. III, p. 253) Marx makes an interesting reference to the essential role of the world market in capitalist production: "But it is only foreign trade, the development of the market to a world market, which causes money to develop into world money and abstract labour into social labour. Abstract wealth, value, hence abstract labour, develop in the measure that concrete labour becomes a totality of different modes of labour embracing the world market. Capitalist production rests on the value or transformation of the labour embodied in the product into social labour. But this is only [possible] on the basis of foreign trade and of the world market. This is at once the precondition and the result of capitalist production."

the destruction of the world market. And if the workers state must be organized at the national level, so a collective plan for international cooperation must be organized to substitute for the world market. For it is the world market which represents the full power of capitalism, even more than any national state or the power of several national states combined. Political power is ultimately based on economic power, productive power. Engels writes that either po-

litical power works with the economic power and accelerates it or it works against the economic power and "succumbs to it." So, though the working class of any particular nation may take power, it will either destroy the world market, "or succumb to it."³⁴

The failure to destroy the world market means the inevitable destruction of a workers state by it — in one form or another. It is only in the context of a conception of world revolu-

tion and of the centrality of the world market that one can understand both the rise of revolutionary socialism and its defeats. The theory of world revolution has a corollary, the theory of world counterrevolution.

It was defeat and counterrevolution which gave rise to Stalinism and bureaucratic Communism. □

What Next for South Africa?

Continued from page 1

U.S. investments in South Africa amounted to just over \$871 million. South Africa remains among the world's largest producers of mineral resources like vanadium, gold, diamonds, manganese, chromium, platinum, and coal.

Global Role of South Africa's Minerals

There was a study that was commissioned by the West German Economic Ministry in 1985. That study found that if South Africa were to cut its supply of chromium to the German market, Germany would experience a drop of 28% in its GDP almost overnight, with a loss of one million jobs. Now a cut of manganese would have the same effect on the German economy, and a cut of our supply of asbestos to Germany would have just a slightly less effect.

One of South Africa's conglomerates, DPS, controls 90% of the world's \$5 billion diamond market. South Africa contains the world's largest reserves of the so-called platinum group metals. These metals are platinum, palladium, iridium, rhodium, and ruthenium. In the petroleum industry, platinum is used as a catalyst to produce high octane gasoline for aircraft and vehicles. Platinum has become a critical metal for the U.S. transportation industry in the last decade by virtue of environmental laws. If the world supply of platinum were to be cut because of disturbances in southern Africa, this fact alone could drive the price of gasoline far higher than OPEC ever could.

Now I want to give you some statistics to show you what effect the operative capitalist system has had on the majority of South Africans. The population of South Africa as of January of this year was 41.7 million, 86% of it made up of non-whites. I'm deliberately using the term "non-white" because Blacks in South Africa have been divided by the regime. The most effective way of ruling over people is to divide them. Blacks are divided into three groups: what is called Blacks, or Africans, make up 75.8% of the population; Coloreds — who are people of mixed blood — make up 8% of the population; and Indians make up 2.4%. Whites make up 13.8% of the population. According to a recent study by the Wall Street Journal the per capita income of Blacks is one-tenth of that of whites in South Africa, with 95%

of Black families earning less than \$20 per month. Twenty-five percent of the total Black population is unemployed, while only 3% of the white population is unemployed. Blacks make up 75% in a population of 41.7 million, but they own less than 15% of the land, and they control only 2% of the national wealth. And they hold only 2.4% of the managerial jobs in the country.

A classical case is the mining industry. Now, in South Africa industry is dominated by the mining industry, yet there has been only one Black mining manager in a period of 77 years. The government spends 3.5 times the amount on education for white children vis-à-vis Black children. There are more than 7 million people who live in shacks, 12 million who don't have access to clean water, and 23 million who have no electricity. In order to bring Black education on par with white education, it would require the state to employ 40,000 teachers and spend \$7.4 billion. Only 2.9% of Blacks in South Africa are architects or surveyors. There is no single Black actuary in the whole of South Africa because Blacks have been discouraged over the years from studying math. There are 307,000 vacancies in white schools throughout the country, as against thousands of classroom shortages in Black schools. The literacy rate is 99% among whites and 50% among Blacks. This means that 50% of the Black population can neither read nor write. The unemployment rate in the formal sector at the moment is 46%.

Free At Last?

Much has been said on TV and in the print media, especially the New York Times, about the current or recent political dispensation in South Africa. We have seen people singing on TV saying, "We are free at last." I want to address briefly my opinion in answering that question as to whether Blacks are free at last or not. I will do that by analyzing the constitution of the so-called new South Africa. I accept that constitutions don't change the world, but they do shape it, and the new constitution of South Africa contains clauses and formulations that will ambush the transformation process in crucial respects.

The South African constitution is divided into two main sections. There is a section that is called the binding principles, or the constitutional binding principles. The clauses that are

contained in that section are clauses that are not going to be negotiable by the Government of National Unity. That is, the government that will take office as of next week is not allowed to touch those clauses. They will only be reviewed in 1999. So those constitutional clauses are binding on the incoming government. Their hands are tied behind their backs as far as those clauses are concerned.

In this section of the constitution there are two main clauses. The first clause guarantees property rights. As I've explained previously, Blacks make up 75% of the population, but own less than 15% of the land. This clause means that the status quo is going to remain until 1999. The incoming government will have no right of changing the binding clauses of the constitution which have anything to do with the land. The only provision that has been given as far as the land is concerned is that the 26 parties that were negotiating at the World Trade Center agreed that a constitutional court should be put in place. The constitutional court will have powers to resolve disputes.

Now, in 1971 there was an act which was called the Homeland Act, which made it possible for whites to own 87% of the land. There are people who can still identify their land and can still identify the thieves that stole their land. The only provision that is given by this clause is that if A can prove that B stole his land, A can take B to court. If there is an agreement between the two parties, that B will give the land back to A, the state is going to repay B — who is a thief — according to market prices. So it is based only on the condition of a willing seller. There is no provision for restitution. That is as far as land is concerned.

The second clause that is contained in that section of the constitution covers jobs in the public sector. In South Africa the public sector is the largest employer. If you look at jobs that are in the public sector, especially jobs that are in the top five categories, 97% of those jobs are held by people that were employed by the racist de Klerk government. According to this clause, those jobs will be guaranteed for five years. These are crucial and very strategic jobs. We're talking magistrates here, we're talking judges, we're talking all the army generals. It means that for a period of 5 years the army will continue to be controlled by people that were ap-

34. Frederick Engels, *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science (Anti-Dühring)*, New York: International Publishers [n.d.], p. 208.

pointed by de Klerk. The government that is coming into power will have no right to change that; it can only be reviewed in 1999 when we have the next elections, if we have the next elections. Maybe we'll talk about that later.

Reviewable Clauses

I'm going on now to the second part of the constitution. The clauses that are contained in this part of the constitution will be reviewable or negotiable by the government that is coming into power. According to the new constitution, if the ANC (African National Congress) gets 66.6% of the votes in the current elections they will have a right to change any of the clauses in the second part of the constitution without having the need of persuading any of the parties that would be represented in Parliament. But those who have been following the negotiations know that there is no way that the ANC will get the 66.6%. I've just picked out a few of these clauses to make my point. The first clause deals with regional councils. This clause enables existing councils, which are predominately in exclusively white areas, to have 30% of the seats guaranteed. That means that after the elections if a new regional council body is to be put in place, elections will only be for 70% of the seats; 30% of the seats are guaranteed, and that is meant to protect the white right wing who are occupying council posts in different exclusively white areas.

The other clause deals with the right to strike. The new constitution provides workers the right to embark on industrial action, but what is more important with this clause is that it contains the very controversial condition that workers can only strike over issues that are related to collective bargaining. Now, you know that the reason why there are elections in South Africa today, one of the main contributing factors, is that the country was rendered ungovernable through mass action and that pressure on the government came mainly from the labor movement. So this is a direct strategy on the part of the ruling class to end mass action once and for all.

The last clause which I'm going to touch on quickly is the clause that grants employers the right to lock out workers. Those who have been following events in South Africa will remember that this clause was included in the constitution in the second week of October 1993. It resulted in a march that COSATU [the Congress of South African Trade Unions] embarked upon. COSATU is the biggest labor federation in South Africa. When workers discovered that people who are supposed to represent them in negotiations had agreed for the lockout clause to be included in the constitution, they marched to the World Trade Center. The march was targeted specifically at the ANC and SACP (South African Communist Party). [SACP leader] Joe Slovo came out of the World Trade Center and addressed a group of workers and assured them, "No, comrades, don't worry. We are getting into power after April, we are going to get 70% or more of the votes, and we'll change that clause." So workers left, but some

workers didn't take his word, they insisted that there must be a stayaway to force the 26 negotiating parties to withdraw that clause from the constitution. A stayaway was agreed upon; it was supposed to be held on November 15, 1993. The next thing we knew, the general secretary of COSATU is on TV announcing that the stayaway was off.

Now, comrades, if there's one thing that the regime has done which has worked very effectively, it is to cripple the structures of all mass formations, like civic organizations, like unions, so that when that announcement was made the mass formations were so weak that they didn't have the power to challenge this extreme bureaucracy. So workers convinced one another, "We'll wait for April, comrades will get into power, and they will change the constitution." Now, as I said earlier, we have been following the polls and there is just no way in which the ANC will get the required 66.6%. So that clause is not going to change, it's going to stay in the constitution for the next five years.

What are the implications for the new political dispensation that has been agreed upon mainly between the two major players, the ANC and the Nationalist Party. It has only granted Blacks the right to vote. We've had experiences around the world, in fact, there was one in this country, when the African American people were granted the right to vote in the early 60s. But if you look at them today economically, you'll find that that right to vote has not brought any changes. There have been no meaningful changes to their lives. And this is what we're getting in South Africa, the right to vote. Voting is important. We have fought for the vote, it is an important step forward, but the point that I want to make is that a vote is not a magic formula.

The Future Struggle

The likelihood is that 70% or more of the population in South Africa will continue to be marginalized after the elections. There will be no meaningful changes in their lives. There is going to be a restructuring of class alliances. There is going to be a trade for the white working class in favor of the Black middle class. As you know, South Africa has been structured in a way that the whites have always been protected. The changes are going to create a situation in which the white working class is going to be dumped or jettisoned in favor of the Black middle class, because it is imperative that the ruling class use the Black middle class as a buffer between itself and the working class.

They are going to de-racialize the system because they don't need apartheid anymore. Apartheid in South Africa has been like a scaffold. You know, when you build a house you need a scaffolding to hold your walls together, but as soon as your foundations are strong and you've laid your roof you don't need a scaffolding; you throw it away. So apartheid is not needed in South Africa anymore because of the inequalities between those who are poor, who are predominately Black, and those who control

production, who are between 12 and 16 white families. In fact statistics prove that 0.1 percent of the population in South Africa controls more than 80% of the wealth.

They are going to create a Black labor elite through a social contract. This social contract will exclude the unemployed and will create a situation where the labor elite will feel that they have a vested interest in having the system perpetuated. Violence is going to continue in South Africa. It's important for the ruling class to maintain violence. I encourage you to get a paper written by an American professor named Samuel Huntington where he explains the importance of violence in a situation like South Africa. He argues, and I agree with him totally, that violence enhances the appeal for reforms among radicals because it increases the cost and the risk of the revolution and it assures the general population, which is predominately ignorant and apolitical, of the government's ability and intention to maintain order.

The most important thing that violence does is that it keeps the working class divided. The incoming government is aware that it has raised expectations on the part of the working class, and that there is no way in which they can meet those expectations. And if the working class can unite, it can only unite against the government of the day, so it is important that violence be perpetrated. We are going to see a continuation of violence in South Africa which is going to be funded or financed by the state as they have always financed violence since 1991. I'm sure you must have seen articles that were run by the *New York Times* a few months ago [revealing the role of the government and its police agencies in organizing violence].

The polarization between the social forces will be so great in South Africa that it cannot be bridged peacefully." Therefore, it is my strong belief and my analysis that we are going to see a very repressive transition in South Africa. We are going to see military features on the part of the Government of National Unity.

I was reading a report a few weeks ago when I was in South Africa and, according to this report, as of November 1993 South Africa owed the IMF plus or minus 183 billion rand which is just over \$60 billion. Now in November last year the Transitional Executive Committee took an additional \$800 million from the IMF. This is money that has been set aside by certain forces within the ANC. It is money that has been set aside to finance a public works program. The intention is to build a few low cost housing units immediately after the elections and to create some jobs, so that the new government will have something concrete to point to, so that they can appease the working class, so that they can say to people, "Look we're working on this thing. You can see houses have been built in whatever area. Please be patient."

So we are expecting some repressive means because what is happening in South Africa at the moment is that the outgoing racist government is now privatizing all remaining state companies, so that the new government will have no

source of income, so that it is going to be impossible for them to finance all the social programs. South Africa cannot lean on the IMF forever. You also know that the money that comes from the IMF comes with conditions. In fact Mandela has said already that there might be a need for the government to increase taxes sooner than expected. And this is expected because the money from the IMF comes with conditions, so eventually the masses will realize that the new government is not able to fulfill their promises and the new government will be compelled, in order to keep up with their payments to the IMF and the World Bank, to increase taxes and also to enter into some kind of social contract with labor where they could freeze wage increments.

That can result in only one thing. If there is something that I'm proud of about South Africa, it is that it is a country that has over the years, because of oppression, developed a very vibrant culture of mass action. So there's going to be dissent and the new government will have no option but to use the army to suppress the people. They have no option. I'm sure there are very good comrades within organizations like the ANC who would like to avoid as much as they can applying such a means. But I don't think they have an option, because on the one hand they will not be able to fulfill their promises and will have continuous pressure from the IMF. Already, for the past three years in South Africa they have not been able to keep up with their payments in their current debt. They have only been able to service their debt, not their capital amount. Now they are taking more money from the IMF, so the situation can only get worse.

I want to conclude by explaining briefly what we see as our task and our way forward. Our objective is to unite under the umbrella of a

mass workers party all those who refuse to accept the crumbs from the master's table. In the new South Africa there is going to be a shift from race to class which will assist us in organizing the white workers, who are currently drawn to the right wing, into mass formations like trade unions and a mass workers party. I must just tell you that in South Africa there is a growing layer of the poor within the white working class. You go to some regions in South Africa where there are whites who can hardly afford to buy shoes. Now because of ignorance they blame this on the Blacks. They say that de Klerk and those around him have sold out to Mandela. They don't realize that it is because of the capitalist system that their conditions are this way.

So the shift from race to class will enable us to convince those people within the white working class to join the mass formations. Our other objective is to make sure that we instill class consciousness and the politics of class independence, because we believe that a genuine freedom that will not only benefit the Black working class but will also benefit the large Black majority in South Africa can only come through the working class itself. We believe it is an illusion that a multiclass organization like the ANC can bring about a change that would benefit the working class. You see, the problem with organizations like the ANC is that, as I see it, they are multiclassed. Within the ANC you find millionaires who are ANC members; you also find workers who are unemployed. So there is a conflict of interest.

We believe it is imperative for us to build a strong mass working class party that will represent workers that are unemployed and workers that are employed, to unite all those people who rely on earning an income into a strong class

organization. We believe that it is important for us to agree on a revolutionary transitional program that would be guided by both objective and subjective conditions. Our task now is to mobilize the masses to create those conditions that will enable us to overthrow the government, so that we will be able to replace the capitalist system, which is based on individual profits, with a system that is based on human needs.

We have also learned from countries like Cuba that it is very important to build alliances with like-minded people in other countries. We have no illusion that we can solve our problems in South Africa on our own without linking up with people in other countries. As I explained earlier, business has created a situation where multinationals have become a new type of business organization. We believe that the system of capitalism that we are fighting is an international system. It is therefore imperative that if we are to come up with a solution, it must be a solution that is international. And we don't see any other solution except socialism.

There's a lot of confusion that is created deliberately by the media who argue, "How can you guys keep talking about socialism? Socialism has failed in the Soviet Union." I just want to say for the record that in the Soviet Union, the system that they had there was a system that was able to destroy capitalism, but it was definitely not socialism. There hasn't been any country on the face of this earth which has practiced socialism. We haven't seen socialism. I think we should view experiences in countries like the Soviet Union positively, as experiments or case studies that will help us in the fight for the establishment of a socialist system. But there has been no socialism yet on the face of this earth.

Thank you very much. □

China: Behind the Upsurge of Workers' Struggles

Continued from page 8

risen over a period of 3 years, amounting to 15,146 persons in 1992. The death rate in rural enterprises rose by 4.7 percent in 1992 compared to 1991, and reached 7,152 persons.¹⁶

The English *China Daily* quoted the Labor Bureau that between January and August 1993 about 11,600 workers died because of industrial hazards, a rise of 12.9 percent compared to the same period the previous year.¹⁷

In 1993, over 5,000 workers died in mine accidents, of which 3,476 died in mines operated by townships.¹⁸

The State Council, in view of the increasing hazards, issued a notice in July 1993 urging respect for industrial safety, citing the several major accidents earlier in the year. The editorial of *People's Daily*, October 31, 1993, acknowledged that the whole country must accord great attention to safe production, and that the leadership should bear the blame for the hazards.

Not long after the above pleas, two serious accidents happened. On November 19, a fire broke out in a Hong Kong capital-run toy factory in Shenzhen, and 84 workers were burned to death. On December 13, a fire broke out in a Taiwan capital-run textile factory in Fuzhou, and 61 workers were burned to death. In the former case, all windows in the factory-dormitory were sealed, and over 300 workers had to fight their way out from only one narrow corridor. The factory had before the fire bribed the fire services department to issue an endorsement of the safety measures in the factory. In the latter case, all staircases in the dormitory were chained with locks, and the factory claimed that the measure was to prevent workers' theft.

The iron law of profit-seeking and super-exploitation under capitalist market mechanisms defuses the effect of formal legislation to protect workers' rights and interests. Workers have to struggle against their exploitation with their own collective strength. That is why we

have seen this upsurge of workers' struggles in recent years. □

March 14, 1994

Notes

1. *Wen Hui Bao*, November 27, 1993.
2. *Workers' Daily*, January 30, 1994.
3. *Workers' Daily*, January 18, 1994.
4. *Workers' Daily*, August 22, 1993.
5. *Workers' Daily*, January 2, 1993.
6. *Express Daily*, March 14, 1994.
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The Myth of Women's Inferiority

by Linda Thompson

The following is based on a speech given by Linda Thompson, adjunct professor of Women's Studies at Southern Connecticut State University. It was presented at the University of Maryland Baltimore County campus in April 1992.

Thompson has been active in the socialist movement for over 30 years, was a Freedom Rider in the civil rights movement, and a leader of the antiwar movement in the 1960s. She toured England speaking on the abortion rights movement in the U.S. and is a leading member of the National Organization for Women and the environmental movement.

I am very pleased to be asked to speak on Matriarchy and the Myth of Women's Inferiority tonight because far from being a rather esoteric issue it goes straight to the heart of the struggles that women are facing today. Susan Faludi has written a fine book called *Backlash*, which deals with the phenomenon that the feminist movement is confronting today, the resurgence and promulgation of the myth of women's inferiority.

There is a polarization going on in this country today between forces of the right such as the so-called right-to-life movement and the deepening and broadening radicalization of the majority of American women. This phenomenon is also seen worldwide. In this struggle women need to be armed theoretically as well as politically in order to counter the psychological attacks upon us which are designed to demoralize and defuse our movement.

A Black scholar, Asa G. Hilliard has said, "A person who loses his or her memory is disabled." This is why the topic of matriarchy and ancient women's "herstory" is relevant to the struggle today. We need to know our past in order to shape our future, and we need to start by not inventing a past, but by exposing the centuries of lies which have kept our true history from us. The more research I do, the more I am astounded by the rich heritage which has been denied to all women and men, workers and people of color — a store of knowledge which can guide us in building the new society which is so desperately needed to replace the decaying, degenerate system of capitalism, which is threatening the globe with extinction.

Matriarchy

The issue is whether or not there was a period of history when women and people of color were not only not subordinate but were in fact revered and predominant in society. The question of gender and race here are intertwined, because there is evidence that an ancient Third World civilization existed in North Africa, and stretched from Ethiopia to India in the ancient Cushite Empire. It was led by a black race in which women predominated. Matrilineal ancient civilizations also existed in China, Europe, and in North and Central America. This is, of


course, a very controversial topic and the subject of a debate that has raged and abated in anthropological circles since the late 19th century. The topic comes to the fore in times of social ferment when women and intellectuals in general question the White Male Eurocentric world view which is presented in Western institutions of higher learning.

The question came to prominence in the early 1970s with the rise of the second wave of feminist agitation in the U.S., when women were questioning their oppression and seeking to find its origin. It is again coming to the fore, I believe, because the feminist movement is struggling to deal with the backlash which would have us go back to the home. There has been new research done by both Black and feminist scholars which has given us valuable new information to work with. Some of the feminist work has been of a rather idealist, nonmaterialist nature; nevertheless, it has compiled valuable new archeological and historical documentation of women's high position in early cultures. Such research should never become wishful thinking, creating an idyllic past, but must conform to strict scholarly standards documenting evidence to disprove the lies we have been taught.

The only argument against the theory of the matriarchal origins of society advanced in bourgeois academia is that there is no real evidence supporting this assertion. However, one finds voluminous documentation of a far more reliable character than that put forward by opponents of this view when the topic is investigated. It's true that contradictory facts abound; so then the question is not whether or not documentation exists, but which documentation appears more logical and verifiable, and which are we to believe. I would like to present some of the results of my research tonight so that you may be the judge.

A History of the Debate

I am going to go over four sources of evidence to prove that there were ancient societies of people of color in which women played leading social, political, military, and spiritual roles. The first is in the oral histories of the earliest tribal societies and their counterparts which still exist today. I think that it is racist to discount the



oral histories of people of color as "myths," while accepting the written "his-stories" of white males as fact. In the traditions of most hunting and gathering societies women are credited with creating society, and the skills of civilization and lineage are traced to a distant ancestress. Many tribes also document the time when society changed to rule by men.

The second source is the writing of the contemporaries of the advanced matrilineal societies which existed before the class societies of Greece and Rome. In Western tradition "civilization" began with the rise of the Greek and Roman empires, and everything significant was done by these early patriarchal societies. However, early Greek and Roman philosophers, historians, and scientists of all kinds received their education in Egypt, and many from world-renowned female scholars like Hypatia. She was later murdered by the Roman patriarchal forces who were ascending to power in that period of change.

Most of the ancient writings which remain — such as the works of Strabo, Pliny, Josephus, Herodotus, and Diodorus Siculus — all refer to Egypt and the Cushite Empire as being led by women of a dark race. Many of these scholars traveled to the ancient Third World empires and were eyewitness to the elevated status of women in these societies. It was not until the late 19th century that their work was either questioned or ignored and their version of ancient society discounted by European scholars.

The third source of information we have is the works of the original pioneers in the field of anthropology, who researched ancient writing and documented the new archeological finds streaming into the West from excavations of ancient Third World sites. Giants like Lewis Henry Morgan, Bachofen, and Briffault were evolutionists and demonstrated how human society originated in the maternal clan and then progressed through the stages of (1) hunting and gathering, (2) agriculture and the domestication of animals, and (3) the formation of class society with the advent of private property.

I have chosen not to use Morgan's designation of the three great stages of evolution — Savagery, Barbarism, and Civilization — because I feel that they are loaded terminology and

carry very racist connotations to most people, though I in no way think that Morgan was a racist. In fact, his work *Ancient Society* displays a respect and reverence for earlier cultures that is rare in Western research. Most of his theoretical work came from his work with the Native American Iroquois people on this continent. I prefer to use economic designations for these three epochs of history, which I feel is more clarifying anyway.

The same can be said for the work of Marx and Engels, which also displays great respect for the early communal and egalitarian organization of society of early women and men. Their work is an additional source of documentation of the matriarchal origins of civilization. Engels wrote *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* as a compilation of the extensive research that Marx had done on early society. Marx's notebooks are full of material that shows the awe and respect he held for early societies that were led by women. It was his study of early classless societies which led him to formulate many of his ideas on modern socialism.

Engels's work is a classic in spite of the fact that it was not meant to be a serious study (it is not even book length). However, the genius of Marx and his methodology shine through the pamphlet, written by Engels after Marx's death. Its brevity and clarity are the reason that it enjoyed a resurgence of popularity in the second wave of feminism in this country and worldwide and has had a deep and lasting influence on many women struggling to understand the origins of their oppression.

Reaction

The alliance of the revolutionary Marxists with the scholarly research of the ancients and the pioneer anthropologists on the issue of the matriarchal origins of civilization provoked horror and dismay on the part of bourgeois academicians, who sought to disprove and discredit this theory with its obvious revolutionary implications. New schools of thought arose in Britain and in the United States to give the official patriarchal version of the origin of society — i.e., the origin of civilization in the West under the Greek and Roman patriarchs.

In the field of anthropology Franz Boas in the U.S. founded the school of Historical Particularism, which put forward the idea that each culture has its own unique and independent history. Malinowski founded the functional school, which set the goal of describing the functions of customs and institutions in society, and A.R. Radcliffe-Brown in Great Britain founded the school of structural functionalism, which saw individuals and customs as a function of maintaining the system. They studied the structure of societies in isolation and ignored evolutionary process and cultural impacts and change.

The effect of their work was to support the status quo. Both schools are reactionary in that they ignore evolution and see no order or sense in cultural change. It is true that these schools contributed vast amounts of documentation of

various cultures around the world before either their demise or change under the impact of Western culture; however, theoretically it all amounts to little more than a hodgepodge of uncoordinated information which obfuscates rather than clarifies the evolution of human society.

New Wave of Evolutionists

After World War II there was a general dissatisfaction with the lack of theory and coherent analysis of the origins of civilization within the field of anthropology, which led new scholars to reexamine the work of the original evolutionists and correct some of their errors. Their work was spurred by new archeological evidence which documented the existence of similarities and stages in cultures worldwide. Anthropologists such as Leslie, White and Steward never accepted Marxist propositions but gained popularity in the 1960s and 1970s. They were cultural materialists who rejected historical materialism and the theory that production determines the major features of a society.

However, their evolutionary analysis set the context for much of the new feminist and Black research of today, which is examining the origins of society and drawing many of the same conclusions that the ancients and early anthropologists did, that dark races led by women developed and led highly advanced civilizations before the rise of patriarchy and the Greek and Roman empires. Some are materialist, some are not, but their scholarly research and documentation is solid and illuminating. Writers such as Merlin Stone (*When God was a Woman*), Riane Eisler (*The Chalice and the Blade*), Marija Gimbutas (*Goddesses and Gods of Old Europe*), Jacquetta Hawkes (*Dawn of the Gods — the Minoan and Mycenaean Origins of Greece*), Ruby Rorlich-Leavitt (*Women in Transition: Crete and Sumer*), and many others are contributing valuable new research to the origins of civilization around the Mediterranean and in Europe.

They, like many white scholars, seem to have a blind spot, however, to the role that Africa played in the origin of civilization. It is to more recent work, including by African and African American scholars, that we must turn to complete the picture of the origins of ancient advanced societies. Cheik Anta Diop (*The Cultural Unity of Black Africa*), Martin Bernal (*Black Athena*), Chancellor Williams (*The Destruction of Black Civilization*), and others such as John Henrik Clarke and Yosef Ben Jochannon have all provided brilliant contributions to demonstrate the African origins of civilization, and Cheik Anta Diop (Senegalese) and Ivan Van Sertima (American) in particular have documented the leading role that Black women played in this ancient world.

However, it is fitting that it is a Black American woman, Drusilla Dunjee Houston, in her 1926 work *The Wonderful Ethiopians of the Ancient Cushite Empire*, who truly provides us with the scope and grandeur of the ancient Cushite Empire, which stretched from Ethiopia and Lower Egypt through Arabia, Persia, and

Babylonia to India. She also documents the amazing contributions of the Black race and its women to the development of astronomy, philosophy, mathematics, architecture, writing, and the arts. Her work was ignored for years by the predominantly male scholarly world, but the book has been reprinted and is now available from the Black Classic Press.

So one can see that there is a voluminous amount of documentation of matrilineal societies and the predominance of the female in early culture. There is a wealth of scholarship from which to choose. One only has to decide which side in the debate appears more coherent and logical. I think upon examination that this view squares with early accounts in ancient histories, the Bible, and the Greek playwrights, and most oral histories of earlier cultures. This view also is being confirmed by new archeological evidence unearthed at numerous sites in the ancient world, such as the excavations by James Mellaart at Catal Hüyük and Hacilar. As excavations descended to earlier periods of history the evidence of women's preeminence in these cultures was more apparent.

How Could It Have Been Suppressed?

If this total reversal of the patriarchal Western version of history is true, how and why could it have been so totally suppressed? It is true that anthropology and archeology are sciences, but scientists bring their own prejudices and world view to their work. The sexist and racist prejudices of the upper-class white males who had the money and time to do much of the initial interviewing and excavations limited their vision and seriously undermined the validity and value of their work. This process is still going on today.

For example, male anthropologists would go into areas of the world and fail to interview the women, relying exclusively on male informants. Many times the male informants would neglect to inform the interviewer that the houses were built and owned by the female, as in the Hopi culture. Again oral histories were discounted and dismissed as "myth" and significant cultural traditions were totally misinterpreted in the attempt to place them in the context of a Western paradigm.

Archeology is filled with inconsistencies and contradictions, especially in Egypt, as European males struggled to impose patriarchal scenarios on ancient matriarchal societies. For example, they could not cope with the most resplendent tombs being those of the female and dismissed the significance of this fact by saying that they were the Pharaoh's mother or by ascribing the largest burial site to a male when it was that of the ruling female. Many male scholars are simply not comfortable with this epoch of history, preferring either to bypass it entirely or attempting to ascribe a white or a male face to a society which we can only begin to try to understand. It is the efforts of the Black scholars which are beginning to resolve these confusions.

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Nationalism, Marxism, and the Irish Question

The Communists and the Irish Revolution, edited by D.R. O'Connor Lysaght. LiterEire Publishers, Brookside Publishing Services, Dublin, Ireland. \$14.70.

Reviewed by Dafydd Rhys

Often the study of historical documents and debates, while it may seem pointless, allows us to look beyond current truisms and gain a view of the broader picture. So it is with the timely publication of *The Communists and the Irish Revolution*, edited by the Irish Trotskyist D.R. O'Connor Lysaght. This book contains an exhaustive collection of articles and excerpts by Russian revolutionaries, spanning the years 1899 to 1936.

Recent events have emphasized the scale of reaction that is faced in the six counties of Northern Ireland. Armed neofascist gangs roam the streets and kill Catholics at random. These gangs have links with the British security forces and sections of the Unionist bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie is the most reactionary section of the British bourgeoisie and yet commands the support of a large section of Protestant workers. The Northern Irish trade unions are in turn solidly right wing and have a tremendous backward influence on the British labour movement. Little is changed by the London-Dublin declarations and agreements of the last few months. This is indeed the "carnival of reaction" that James Connolly predicted over 70 years ago.

The collections contains a wealth of information and insights on the struggle in Ireland, which can be grouped into three main themes. Firstly, Lenin's defense of the right of nations to self-determination prior to 1916, secondly, the debate about the nature of the 1916 Dublin rising, and thirdly, the positions of the Soviet government and communist International on Ireland after 1917.

Marx on Ireland

Lenin's defense of self-determination prior to 1916 was aimed at refuting the positions of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Radek from the Polish Social Democratic Party and figures such as Nikolai Bukharin and Grigory Piatakov in his own party. Lenin drew heavily on the writings of Marx and Engels about Ireland in this defense, and in so doing, not only ably defended the notion of self-determination but also showed how Marx's viewpoint was rooted in a concrete analysis of the political situation in Britain and Ireland.

Marx began by believing that Irish liberation would only be won through the victory of the British working class movement. But by 1867 he was expressing the view:

I used to think the separation of Ireland from Britain impossible. I now think it inevitable, although after the separation there may come federation.¹

Marx argued that the British working class should make repeal of the union with Ireland a central part of its program. This change of views was based on the understanding that while the British working class had fallen under Liberal influence and was completely subservient to the capitalists, a liberation movement had developed in Ireland, the Fenians, which had assumed revolutionary forms. Under these conditions it was the duty of British socialists to support Irish independence, not only in the interest of the Irish struggle but also with the aim of educating British workers in the spirit of democracy and national equality.

In advocating independence Marx's aim was not the permanent separation of Ireland, but a democratic federation, freely entered into by both sides. This predisposed a change of government in the oppressor nation, an event which he hoped would be greatly accelerated by a successful independence struggle. His remark that "after the separation may come federation" was always faithfully repeated by Lenin, who understood that the aim of independence was greater unity, on an equal basis, between the working people of both countries.

By 1914, Lenin was able to draw a balance sheet of Marx's position. He concluded that both the Irish people and the British working class had been too weak to solve the Irish question. Half a century had thus elapsed before the question was finally being solved by the reforms of the British Liberals, and even then in a compromised and half-hearted manner. The importance of Marx's position was as an example of the policy that the working class of an oppressor nation should adopt toward national movements. It was a practical illustration of the importance of defending the right of nations to self-determination and served as a:

...warning against that "servile haste" with which the Philistines of all countries, colours, and languages hurry to label as "utopian" the idea of changing the frontiers of states that have been established by the violence and privileges of the landlords and bourgeoisie of one nation.²

The Test of Practice

Lenin was always ready to subject his ideas to the test of practice and when the Irish rose in rebellion in Easter 1916 he seized the chance with relish. The opening shots in the debate were fired by Karl Radek, who saw the defeat of the rising as conclusive proof of his view: "The Irish revolution... has come to an end." For Radek, the Irish question was essentially a land question, which had been solved by the land reforms of 1903. This meant that the Irish farmers abstained from the rising, reducing the struggle to a "putsch" by an isolated group of petty bourgeois idealists. In common with Luxemburg and

Piatakov, he believed that the division of the globe among a few imperialist nations meant that the days of progressive national movements were over, since economic independence and the creation of new bourgeois states on the European model of the 18th and 19th centuries was now impossible.

Trotsky took a more sympathetic view of the rising and understood that the working class, as well as the petty bourgeoisie, had participated. But Trotsky also felt that the basis for an Irish national revolution had disappeared. It was left to Lenin to defend the rising. He did so by explaining that the division of the world between a few superpowers would exacerbate, not extinguish, national struggles. "Imperialism breathes new life into the national question," he wrote in notes for a lecture on imperialism. Lenin understood that the question of self-determination was a question of political democracy, of a nation's right to decide which state it wished to be part of. Such questions of politics have a relative autonomy from economics.

Anyone who called this momentous event a "putsch" was, he said, "either a hardened reactionary or a doctrinaire hopelessly incapable of picturing a social revolution as a living thing." Since precisely such abstract, doctrinaire socialism dominates the revolutionary left in the imperialist countries, it is worth quoting Lenin's rebuttal in full:

For to imagine that social revolution is conceivable without revolts by small nations in the colonies and in Europe, without the revolutionary outbursts of a section of the petty bourgeoisie with all its prejudices, without a movement of politically non-conscious, proletarian, and semiproletarian masses, against landlord, church, monarchical, national, and other oppression — to imagine that means repudiating social revolution. As though one army will line up in one place and say, "We are for socialism," while another will do so in another place and say, "We are for imperialism," and that will be the social revolution! Only from such a ridiculously pedantic angle could one label the Irish rebellion a "putsch."³

Our doctrinaire friends may still wish to mutter that this is irrelevant to the imperialist metropolises, where the working class overwhelmingly predominates. They should take care; there are rumbling national questions throughout Western Europe, and Black nationalism remains a powerful attractive force in the USA. In addition, it was Lenin himself who drew a parallel in later years between the alliance of the working class and peasantry which laid the basis for the October revolution and the alliance which would have to be built between the proletariat proper and the petty bourgeoisified, semi-aristocratic layers

of workers in imperialist countries, who would enter the battle "with all their prejudices."

The events of 1916 made clear to Lenin that the Irish question was far from being solved by the Liberal reforms. In Lenin's eyes the mistake of the Irish was not in having risen, but in having done so prematurely. Despite this, they had contributed by their actions to developing the collective experience necessary for the "general onslaught." Subsequent history has shown that both Radek and Trotsky were wrong in dismissing the Irish national question. Lenin stood head and shoulders above them all in the depth of his analysis and his sympathy for the Irish movement.

Soviet Power

The third main theme of the collection is the response of the young Soviet government and the Communist International (Comintern) to the Irish struggle. The documents are marked by an uncompromising denunciation of British rule in Ireland and support for the national struggle. The example of Ireland is further used to expose the hypocrisy of the imperialist rulers, who demanded that the Soviet state unreservedly respect the right to self-determination, while actively oppressing their own colonies. Trotsky is particularly pointed in his reply to the British Labour MP Arthur Henderson, who had served in the War Cabinet, and in 1920 was loudly demanding a Soviet withdrawal from Georgia. For Henderson, he said, the domination of one quarter of the human race by the British ruling class was not a question of politics, but a fact of natural history.

These democrats, with all their Fabian, emasculated [sic] and feeble socialism, have always been and always will be slaves of public opinion. They are thoroughly imbued with anti-democratic, exploiter, planter, and parasite views on races which are distinguished by the colour of their skins, by the fact that they do not read Shakespeare, or wear stiff collars.⁴

The collection ends with an exchange of letters between Nora Connolly O'Brien, daughter of James Connolly, and Leon Trotsky, where Trotsky makes the following observation:

The revolutionary tradition of the national struggle is a precious good. Would it be possible to imbue the Irish proletariat with it for its socialist class-struggle, the working class of your country could, in spite of the numerical weakness of your population, play an important historical role and give a mighty impulse to the British working class now paralyzed by the senile bureaucracy.⁵

Which summarizes the importance of the national struggle for both the Irish and British working classes, and underlines the tragedy of the present impasse.

Excerpts from the writings of Karl Kautsky and Joseph Stalin are then incorporated as appendices. The quotes include Stalin's stupid observation that British oppression in Ireland had worsened during World War I

because "power had passed to the landlords." According to Stalin's schema, national oppression was a product of feudalism and landlordism, and hence, if it had worsened, this could only mean that the landlords were back in charge. A wonderful example of forcing reality to fit your theory, a method which all too often masquerades as Marxism.

Self-Determination and Separation

There is an important distinction between defending the right of nations to self-determination and actively advocating that a given nation should separate. The example of Britain and Ireland in the mid-19th century is an illustration of the conditions under which socialists should not only defend the right of self-determination but actively campaign for independence. The working class of the oppressor nation was dominated by reactionary ideas and leadership, which prevented it from making common cause with the oppressed nation, while the national struggle of the oppressed nation had assumed a mass character.

Two examples will serve to illustrate the point. After the defeat of the 1905 Russian revolution, national movements emerged in a number of the oppressed nations within the tsarist empire. The strength of national feelings influenced many socialists within these nations. Yet Lenin did not advocate separation. It was, for him, an open question as to whether a given nation would separate from the tsarist empire.

Whether the Ukraine, for example, is destined to form an independent state is a matter that will be determined by a thousand unpredictable factors. Without attempting idle "guesses," we firmly uphold something that is beyond doubt: the right of the Ukraine to form such a state. We respect this right; we do not uphold the privileges of Great Russians with regard to Ukrainians; we educate the masses in the spirit of recognition of that right, in the spirit of rejecting state privileges for any nation.⁶

As to the specific question of Polish independence, advocated by the Polish Socialist Party, Lenin answered in the negative. He explained that Marx and Engels had supported the independence movement in the last century, "when Russia was still dormant and Poland was seething." The situation was now completely transformed:

Independent democratic movements, and even an independent proletarian movement, have arisen in most Slav countries, even in Russia, one of the most backward Slav countries.⁷

This held out the possibility of a common fight against tsarism by the Russian workers and those of the oppressed nations. By showing themselves to be implacable opponents of all national oppression and privilege, Lenin hoped that the Russian workers would win the confidence of the masses of the oppressed nations. This confidence would lay the basis for a genuinely free and equal unity with the Russian workers and peasants, within a common state.

In contrast, when national sentiment grew within the Ukraine in the 1930s, Trotsky advocated an independent Soviet Ukraine. He did so for two reasons. Firstly, because he understood the international significance of the Ukraine, which was "crucified by four states" at that time. Secondly, he understood that the rise of Stalinism had shattered the national hopes of the Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian language was suppressed, local Communists were purged for the crime of "nationalist deviation," and millions had died during the forced collectivization of agriculture. This was leading to an exodus of Ukrainians away from communism toward various forms of nationalism. Under these conditions, with the Russian working class atomized and crushed by the weight of the bureaucracy, Trotsky actively supported the Ukrainian struggle for independence.

The question of the fate of the Ukraine has been posed in its full scope. A clear and definite slogan is necessary that corresponds to the new situation. In my opinion there can be at the present time only one such slogan: A united, free and independent workers' and peasants' Soviet Ukraine.⁸

He clearly hoped that such a struggle would act as a beacon to the Russian working class and help to awaken it to political life. But to postpone the struggle until this occurred, in the name of working-class unity, would have been criminal. The American Hugo Oehler attacked his position, and argued that a successful struggle by Ukrainian workers should lead them not to separate but to "drive deeper into the Soviet Union against Stalinism."⁹ To this Trotsky replied:

...one must not shut one's eyes to the growth of separatist tendencies in the Ukraine, but rather give them a correct political expression.¹⁰

Three Trends

There are, broadly speaking, three historical currents among Marxists on the national question. The first, represented by such figures as Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Radek, denies the validity of the national question in the name of an abstract internationalism. Such national nihilism preaches an indifference to nationality which can easily lead to an indifference to oppression and to the national feelings of oppressed nations. To paraphrase Marx, those socialists of an oppressor nation who deny "all nationality" often unconsciously understand the unity of nations to mean the absorption of other nations into their own "ideal" nation.

The second trend is that of national opportunism, which takes the guise of either denying the importance of the national question in order to draw nearer to one's own bourgeoisie (Kautsky) or elevating the national question above all others and imposing permanent national divisions on the workers (Otto Bauer). The third approach, that of Lenin, maintains the importance of the national question and of the need to struggle against all national inequality and national superiority. Such an approach accepts that nations may need to

separate, in order to grow close at a later date. It sees the need for working-class unity but stresses that this unity must be built voluntarily, and must address the demands of the oppressed nations. At the same time, it says plainly that national liberation is impossible within a patchwork of independent capitalist states, all of which face a world market dominated by a few oppressor nations. The key to national liberation remains the socialist revolution and building a voluntary socialist federation.

Anyone interested in the Irish struggle or the national question will learn a great deal from this book. Above all else, it illustrates how Marxists should proceed from the facts in analyzing the national question, as in all others. Marx's call for Irish independence,

resurrected by Lenin and the Communist International, was based on a real assessment of the state of the working-class movements in Britain and Ireland. There is much to be learned from this approach in our study of the many national struggles and conflicts which are proliferating today. □

Notes

1. V.I. Lenin, "The right of nations to self-determination," April-June 1914, extract in *The Communists and the Irish Revolution*, D.R. O'Connor Lysaght (ed.), LiterÉire Publishers, Dublin, 1993, p. 34.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
3. V.I. Lenin, "The Irish rebellion of 1916," July 1916, *ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

4. L. Trotsky, "Public opinion, social-democracy, communism," February 1920, *ibid.*, p. 85.
5. L. Trotsky, Letter to Nora Connolly O'Brien, June 1936, *ibid.*, p. 104.
6. V.I. Lenin, "The right of nations to self-determination," April-June 1914, in *Questions of National Policy and Proletarian Internationalism*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 63.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
8. L. Trotsky, "The Ukrainian Question," April 1939, in *International Marxist Review*, vol. 4, no. 2, Autumn 1989, p. 70.
9. H. Oehler, "The Ukrainian Question: a Reply to Trotsky's Polemic," November 1939, in *Revolutionary History*, vol. 3, no. 2, Autumn 1990, p. 3.
10. L. Trotsky, "Independence of the Ukraine and Sectarian Muddleheads," July 1939, *Writings of Leon Trotsky [1939-1940]*, Pathfinder Press, New York, 1977, p. 44.

The Myth of Women's Inferiority

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In the white Western view, all true civilization began with Greece and Rome, and nothing significant was done before that time. They have been aided in their cover-up by the widespread destruction that was wreaked upon the matriarchal agricultural societies when the patriarchy came to power. Riane Eisler and Marija Gimbutas document the violent overthrow of the matrilineal cultures in Europe and around the Mediterranean by the invading patriarchal Indo-Europeans.

Cheikh Anta Diop in *The African Origins of Civilization* and *The Cultural Unity of Black Africa* and Drusilla Houston in *The Wonderful Ethiopians* document how the patriarchy invaded and battled the more peaceable agricultural societies over centuries of time. At times they were successful and victorious, then repulsed and driven out, only to advance again at a later time until ultimately they were successful in destroying ancient tribal structures and rooting out the communal property relations upon which it was based. The patriarchy, still based on tribal communal property relations, was already becoming corrupted and entering a decline. It fell from within and without, but not before it mounted numerous military campaigns against the invaders.

Merlin Stone (*When God Was a Woman*) documents how, during the patriarchal takeover, buildings, stelae, worshipping sites, and temples were all destroyed, leaving little evidence of the cultures which had preceded. We must remember the overt hostility which the Hebrews, the Romans, and later the conquering Europeans in the age of colonialism had toward the indigenous matrilineal societies from Egypt to North Africa to Hawaii, which they conquered and overturned. The bloody massacres and the destruction of the idols and temples of the Goddess worshippers are recorded in the Bible in Deuteronomy 12:2-3 in the following commandment from Yahweh, the Hebrew patriarchal God:

You must completely destroy all the places where the nations you dispossess have served

their Gods, on high mountains, on hills, under any spreading tree; you must tear down their altars, smash their pillars, cut down their sacred poles, set fire to the carved images of their Gods [which were black and female] and wipe out their names from that place.

If anyone might ask why there is not more evidence of matriarchy, I cannot think of a better answer.

The destruction was systematic in the Mediterranean and North Africa with the rise of Judaism, Christianity, and the Muslim religion. The large libraries at Alexandria in Egypt were burned by the Romans, and the extensive Mayan libraries in South and Central America were destroyed by Catholic priests. Sacred Hebrew texts, early egalitarian Christian writings, and the ancient writings of India were rewritten to conform to the patriarchal version of "his-story." Patriarchs rewrote the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament to expunge reference to the dominance of women in earlier societies.

Merlin Stone documents conclusive evidence of Goddess worship and the preeminence of women lasting well into the early stages of the Roman Empire, which has been relegated to the back rooms of museums and libraries around the Mediterranean — and ignored by patriarchal scholars. Ivan Von Sertima has a slide show showing extensive black Ethiopian influence and leadership in Egypt and in the New World. This is vehemently attacked by mainstream scholars, who insist that the achievements of Egypt were made by males of a light-skinned or Indo-European race.

The cover-up still continues. When the bourgeois scholars became aware of what was to them shocking and disturbing discoveries by James Hellaart in Catal Hüyük regarding the status of women in these ancient societies, funding for his archeological excavations at Hacilar were suspended. In the intervening years the excavations have not gone forward, in spite of the tremendous importance of this work to our understanding of

early civilization; extensive damage has been done to the site by grave robbers, rendering them useless for further investigation. When extensive remains of gigantic monolithic ruins were discovered off the coast of Spain, the Spanish government prohibited work from being carried out there. This is interesting, given the fact that considerable evidence of the matriarchs who ruled the ancient Iberian peninsula has been discovered in the form of artifacts and magnificent sculptured likenesses of these female rulers.

It is not so hard for me to believe that all evidence of these facts could have been covered up and hidden from us, because in my own short lifetime I can see how male scholars can rewrite history. Numerous books have come to my attention on the 1960s in which the roles that women played in building the giant antiwar movement and the role that Black women played in the building of the civil rights movement have been completely omitted. To anyone reading these accounts it would appear that males are the only ones who played any significant or leading role in that era. If they can do that in a brief thirty years, think what they can do with history that is thousands of years old.

This is the reason that I believe Marx and Engels were so vague on the transition from matriarchy to patriarchy. They simply did not have the information at their disposal, including the archeological evidence that we now have. In *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, Engels states that society evolved through "savagery" or "primitive" egalitarian hunting and gathering societies through "barbarism" into patriarchy and private property or what they and Morgan term "civilization."

They were correct in this sequence but were vague on the so-called period of "barbarism" and the transition to patriarchy because they dealt only with the abolition of the clan structure in Greece and Rome, which were then backward colonies of the ancient Cushite Empire, according to Martin Bernal,

who wrote the three-volume history of Greece *Black Athena*. They never attempted to deal with the transition in the highly advanced and civilized matrilineal cultures in

the Third World, which continued in one form or another until the time of their total extermination by the Roman Empire. It is in this history that the downfall of women and the

overturn of collective property relations can be revealed. □

Imperialism in Haiti: What's Behind Shifts in U.S. Policy?

Continued from page 3

In early April things began changing. Randall Robinson, executive director of TransAfrica Forum, an anti-apartheid organization, began a fast on behalf of Haitian refugees and Aristide. Six Democratic members of the Congressional Black Caucus were arrested in front of the White House; they denounced Clinton's racist immigration policy and stridently called for U.S. intervention in Haiti. On May 3 President Clinton praised Randall Robinson's fast and reaffirmed his "support" for Aristide, adding that the U.S. could not discount the "military option." This formal shift occurred after Clinton pressured Lawrence Pezzullo, the U.S. special envoy to Haiti, to step down on April 29 as a scapegoat for U.S. diplomatic failures. On May 8, Black Democrat William Gray, III, became Clinton's new envoy to Haiti. Dubbed a "coalition builder," he was head of the House Budget Committee during Reagan's second term, when he helped organize the bipartisan assault on the poor and minorities in the U.S.

How real then is the threat of intervention? Very real, says former Haiti envoy Pezzullo. He wrote to Secretary of State Warren Christopher to express his "concern" that the U.S. was heading toward "unilateral military intervention in Haiti." The State Department has been analyzing U.S. intervention/and or escalation in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia for the past year and a half.

Simultaneously with the implementation of the embargo the Justice Department revealed it was preparing drug indictments against 13 Haitian army officers, including coup leader General Raoul Cedras. The move is seen as preparing the way for a possible Noriega-style case against the coup leaders, leading to an invasion. However, a booby trap will be lurking for the Clinton administration, since most if not all of these Haitian officers have for years received CIA money as part of a nonexistent Haitian drug enforcement agency (SIN) used for spying on and repressing the mass movements.

Already the Pentagon has placed the ready-action forces of the 82nd Airborne on alert twice in recent months. On May 13 the *Boston Globe* reported war games involving 40,000 U.S. troops over 18 days. Although the administration denied any connection with Haiti, these maneuvers, which included amphibious assaults, were held in several places, including the Bahamian island of Great Inagua, which is about as far from Haiti as the U.S. base in Guantánamo, Cuba. The operation was coordinated by the U.S. Navy Atlantic Command, which maintains the cur-

rent U.S. encirclement of Haiti and was previously operating the refugee camps for HIV-positive Haitians at Guantánamo.

The May 11 *Los Angeles Times* quoted several anonymous diplomats and officials as saying the U.S. will invade with some 600 troops, perhaps by July 1. These sources "think it will take six months to re-establish Aristide, prepare for [parliamentary] elections in December and at least pretend they have reformed the military and created a new, civilian-run police force." Although the Clinton administration quickly denied the article's assertions, a May 30 *New York Times* article revealed that 650 Marines were sent to Guantánamo for training the previous week. U.S. intelligence officials said a U.S.-led force in Haiti would remain for years.

Nevertheless the administration is split on intervention. High-ranking military and State Department officials are opposed to military intervention in Haiti (*U.S. News & World Report*, May 9). Most disposed to military action is national security adviser, Anthony Lake, says *U.S. News & World Report*, citing anonymous sources. The dominant view among intervention advocates, says *U.S. News*, favors unilateral U.S. invasion followed by a UN/OAS peacekeeping mission.

So far U.S. and UN officials say they are waiting at least several weeks for the embargo to work before possible military action.

Are the intervention threats only a well-advertised bluff, aimed at frightening the junta into an agreement? Only Clinton and those whose orders he follows really know. If a bluff works, a cheap victory would be achieved without scenes of Black victims of U.S. racism enraging the African-American community and inflaming antiwar sentiment, not to mention the resistance of the Haitian people.

There are other questions. Would U.S. imperialism commit troops in defense of Aristide and his popular base? Or has Aristide become too disconnected from his popular base? Would the U.S. intervene when former President Bush and other prominent Republicans say Washington should "dump" Aristide because he is "uncompromising" and CIA reports say he's "crazy"?

One thing is certain, of all the "trouble spots" in the world Haiti would be Clinton's best chance to disown his "wimp" reputation. Better Haiti's 7,500 poorly trained and organized army, than the militarily more difficult situation in Bosnia, Somalia, or Rwanda. The liberal pro-intervention columnist Anthony Lewis wrote on June 3: "What is needed now is a signal of determination. The most likely place is Haiti..."

So far, several OAS states, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela have rejected any proposed U.S. military intervention, but they are reportedly warming to the multinational invasion idea. Also opposed is OAS Secretary General, João Baena Soares. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe has opposed using French troops in a U.S. mission, but implied future reconsideration by advising the U.S. to wait four months for sanctions to work.

Clinton to Black Boat People: Go to Hell

What motivates much of U.S. Haiti policy is the overtly racist immigration policy toward Haitians. The U.S. denies Haitians are political refugees and views them as "economic" refugees instead, a formula inherited from the Reagan administration. U.S. immigration routinely grants asylum to Cubans, Eastern Europeans, etc. For example, in 1993, 96% of the 50,000 refugee applicants from the former Soviet Union were granted. Of the 2,179 Haitian refugees that applied for legal status in 1992 only 234 were approved. Since the late 1970s only a few dozen Haitians have been granted political asylum.

Most Haitian refugees are interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard in international waters and automatically returned to Haiti, without even the pretense of an asylum appeal hearing. This policy flagrantly violates U.S. and international asylum laws. The current interdiction policy was begun by President Bush in May 1992 and continued by Clinton in his famous campaign betrayal of the Haitian refugees. Clinton announced a new policy in May of this year, but it has not yet been implemented. Since Clinton's announcement about 1,500 refugees have been returned to the brutal dictatorship, where they face jail, torture, and death.

Aristide's "Wimp" Factor

Over the last year Aristide has become softer on intervention. Last November, at a star-studded press conference, which included Jesse Jackson, Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY), and Randall Robinson, Aristide did not contradict open calls for military intervention made by these participants (see box). These unambiguous calls for military intervention must surely have been cleared beforehand by Aristide.

Aristide himself left little to the imagination, "As you and some others mentioned, if I ask [for] military intervention, I will be impeached by my constitution. But if the Haitian people finally is free from those

thugs, criminals, they will be happy." Robert White, former U.S. ambassador to El Salvador, now an adviser to Aristide, said of the ousted Haitian president: "He has come as close as one can get within the bounds of respect for [the] Haitian Constitution."

In late May, Aristide spoke to his Haitian supporters at an invitation only meeting in New York. Repeatedly asked his position on intervention, he stated: "Intervention is a divisive issue."

The Governor's Island Accord: A Watershed for Aristide

"Don't examine it, just sign it."

— UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide on signing Governor's Island Accord (*New York Times*, August 3, 1993)

Aristide signed the accord under terrific U.S. pressure. Aristide was besieged by telephone calls from U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Vice-President Al Gore, and members of Congress, bullying the Haitian president to sign, mixed with threats to withdraw support for him.

UN mediator Dante Caputo presented the Accord on a "take it or leave it" basis. Caputo threatened to immediately lift the embargo if Aristide did not comply. UN Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali told Aristide, "Don't examine it, just sign it."

In reality Aristide's backtracking on intervention was formalized with the signing of the UN-brokered July 3, 1993, Governor's Island Accord in New York. The U.S./UN twisted Aristide's arm to agree to "amnesty" for the coup makers, an act denounced by many grassroots organizations in Haiti. The Accord also called on General Cedras and police chief Michel François to resign their posts, while leaving their likely reassignment ambiguous. The agreement called for Aristide to name a new prime minister, subject to the approval of the pro-junta parliament. Once those steps were completed Aristide was to return to the palace on October 30, 1993.

Lastly, and most relevant to the current intervention threat, the Governor's Island Accord and side agreements included the separation and retraining of the Haitian army and police, aided by the introduction of some 1,600 international army and police "trainers" and "advisers."

However, the Accord was never implemented due to the refusal of General Cedras and Michel François to resign, preventing Aristide's return on October 30. This was made clear when the USS Harlan County, carrying 216 U.S. and Canadian police "trainers," was ordered back from Port au Prince harbor by Clinton October 12, after an unruly demonstration by several dozen Ton-Ton Macoutes at the Port au Prince dock. (What was not picked up by the U.S. media

were the U.S. flags carried by several Macoute goons)

Even with that setback for the Governor's Island Accord, it is seen as the basis for any new settlement. Many politicians and journalists, both pro- and anti-Aristide, envision "beefed-up" defensive capabilities for foreign personnel. Aristide's pro-intervention interview in the June 3 *New York Times* (cited above) implies a long-term military occupation justified by the Accord's provisions for 1,600 military and police "trainers," with sidearms only. U.S. officials have said foreign "trainers" must have "dissuasive force" (*New York Times*, May 13, 1994). One diplomat said this would mean, "bigger weapons." Obviously, under military occupation the U.S./UN would possess all the "protection" they'd need.

The same day the June 3 *Times* article appeared Aristide spoke at an annual policy conference benefit for TransAfrica and put intervention in the context of the Governor's Island Accord. Said Aristide, "I do believe that action can be taken to rid the nation of the thugs who have taken her hostage and to restore democracy to Haiti. Therefore swift and determined action should be taken to remove the coup leaders within the framework of the Governor's Island agreement. I will not waste time describing what this action would be. The international community knows how to proceed."

The Governor's Island Accord: The Face Behind the Mask

I think our mission in Vietnam is very clear. We are there at the request of the South Vietnamese Government to provide training.

— Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, March 15, 1962, President of the World Bank, 1968-81

It is worth further examining the Accord since the mainstream media and the liberal press isn't talking about it. In reality the Accord amounted to a disguised form of intervention.

According to a September 17, 1993, report by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) four police and military assistance programs were to be initiated during the transition. The Accord provided for 1,600 UN military and police "advisers" (*à la* Vietnam) to "professionalize" their Haitian counterparts. Both military and police programs were to be overseen by UN Special Envoy Dante Caputo. A stated objective of the Accord's side agreements were to separate the police forces from the army, train a new Haitian army, provide police training, and aid in construction projects, such as roads and new army barracks.

The training of Haitian soldiers, under the Accord, would be done by U.S. personnel. The following information on the proposed U.S. personnel is based on research done by the Haiti Anti-Intervention Committee in New York):

1. A Special Forces/Green Beret unit from Ft. Bragg, N.C. According to *Soldier of Fortune* (SOF) magazine, a well-connected monthly for mercenaries, "Special Forces... started America's overt involvement in the ground war... (in Vietnam)... (and)... trained more than 50,000 Vietnamese 'irregulars' They've trained the military in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala. They're in Kuwait. They work with the CIA."

In 1991, some 2,000 Special Forces teams were deployed to 75 countries. The November 1993 SOF (in the article "Gurus of Guerrilla Warfare," by Lt. Col. R.B. Anderson) predicted that the Special Forces "will play an increasingly vital role in projecting U.S. interests abroad... [and] will provide Congress with its biggest bang for the buck." The Special Forces are described this way: "Masters at keeping a low profile... [they] are politically acceptable to foreign nations, [and] this allows the U.S. to have an effective, low-cost forward presence."

2. International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). This is an FBI operation that trained police in El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, Bolivia, Panama, etc. Organized in the mid-1980s, it is jointly funded by the State Department and the Justice Department.

ICITAP would deploy some 30 police trainers to teach some 5,500 Haitian security personnel. It would set up an "Urban Disorder Unit" and is developing a five-year program for Haiti.

3. International Military and Education and Training (IMET). The IMET funds the School of the Americas (SOA), based at Fort Benning, Georgia. Panama's *La Prensa* newspaper called it "The School of Assassins" when it was relocated to Georgia from its earlier location in Panama. Graduates include: General Hector Gramajo, mass murderer of Guatemalan Indians; Roberto D'Aubuisson, head of El Salvador's death squads; Lt. Colonel Michel François, Haiti's chief cop and coup leader; and also former Port-au-Prince Mayor Franck Romain, a notorious torturer.

According to the book *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism* by Noam Chomsky and Ed Herman, the U.S. trained a total of 567 Haitian soldiers between 1950 and 1975. Congressional documents show the U.S. continues to train Haitian soldiers uninterrupted by the 1991 coup.

In addition, the WOLA report said the Governor's Island Accord provided for "police monitors" for "guidance and advice." Their deployment is to help "discourage civil unrest" during the transition, but "their mandate may also be defined to undertake training of the Haitian police at a latter stage, specifically to establish a police academy."

I.F. Stone's magnificent book *The Hidden History of the Korean War* exposed the UN 40 years ago for what it is — a fig leaf for U.S. aggression!

Imperialism and the Uses of Embargoes

The on-again, off-again embargoes have been used by U.S. imperialism to force Aristide to make concessions. After the Governor's Island Accord was signed the OAS "oil and arms" embargo was lifted almost immediately, before the junta had shown good faith, thus easing the pressure on the coup makers to continue their mayhem.

With the resumption of the "oil and arms" embargo last October, the *New York Times* reported (October 21, 1993) that Haiti's "friends" (the U.S., Canada, France, and Venezuela) at the "same time" pressed Aristide to include in his government "conservative critics close to the military."

Since then three "right wingers" have been included in Aristide's future cabinet. One, Jean Beliotte, now Aristide's minister of defense, was also minister of defense under a previous military dictatorship. Louis Dejoie, a wealthy businessman and Aristide's minister of commerce, has urged Aristide to make even more concessions and stop being "inflexible."

The day after the recent UN embargo was approved, the *New York Times* reported (May 7, 1994), that "diplomats warned that unless today's new sanctions achieved their political goals relatively quickly, Father Aristide's position could become more difficult if Haitians, or Haitian political leaders, believed that he was not doing enough to reach a settlement with the military."

Cheap Labor — The Bottom Line

According to a study released by the National Labor Committee (NLC), funded by U.S. trade unions, U.S. companies in Haiti are concentrated in the assembly industry, which produces primarily apparel, softballs, toys, etc. Workers there are paid \$0.14 an hour, sometimes as little as \$0.09 an hour and receive no benefits. Since the coup, unions have been smashed. U.S. firms pay no taxes and export duty free. The NLC revealed that despite a supposed UN/OAS embargo, 1993 U.S. imports from Haiti were actually up almost 50% over 1992. In the case of apparel exports were up 93% over 1992.

Prominent importers from Haiti are Sears Department Stores, Wal-Mart, and Penneys. Wilson Sporting Goods imports most of its softballs from Haiti.

Some 50 U.S. corporations were "legally" able to export from Haiti despite the embargo due to loopholes established for U.S. businesses by President Bush and reaffirmed by Clinton. These loopholes have supposedly been closed by the May 21 UN embargo.

The Dominican Republic, home of former Haitian dictators and Macoute thugs, has received \$840 million in U.S. aid since 1980 and continues to allow contraband to flow across its border into Haiti. Dominican President Joaquín Balaguer, whose hostility to Aristide increased after the Haitian's criticism of slave labor practices for Haitian

workers in the Dominican Republic, still counts on "most favored nation" trading status with the U.S. Thousands of Haitians are working under slavlike conditions on sugar plantations that belong to the Quayle family of Indiana and on the plantations of the Dole family, the relatives of Senator Robert Dole.

This exploitation has been key to depressing the wages throughout the Caribbean Basin and acts as a downward pressure on wages throughout the Hemisphere.

During Aristide's administration the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), a well-known CIA conduit, allocated \$26.7 million to oppose labor reforms. Within a few weeks after the coup there wasn't a single union at any assembly plant. If the U.S. invades it will be to insure the continued profits of these corporations rather than Haitian democracy or workers' rights in Haiti.

CIA Revelations

A series of revelations last November blew the cover off any U.S. democratic pretensions in Haiti. CIA money had gone to Haitian army officers — including dictator General Raoul Cedras. Cedras provided the U.S. with information on dissent, including reports critical of Aristide.

The *New York Times* reported that "several of the principal players in the present situation were compensated by the U.S. government," providing Washington with information on everything from cocaine smuggling to political ferment. The CIA's chief Latin America analyst described General Cedras as belonging to "the most promising group of Haitian leaders."

In addition, the CIA created an anti-drug task force starting in the mid-'80s. It continued to function until a month after the coup. It received up to \$1 million a year in U.S. tax dollars for equipment, training, and finance. Said a U.S. official, "The money that was spent to train these guys in the counter-narcotics field boggled the mind... They were turning it around and using it for political reasons, against whatever group they wanted to gather information on." The *Los Angeles Times* revealed what all Haitians already knew — the CIA sought to fund anti-Aristide candidates in the 1987 election, during which Aristide called for an election boycott. Supposedly, the Senate Intelligence Committee halted the operation — supposedly.

A revealing article appeared in *Time* magazine November 8, 1993, profiling several North American CIA-types in Haiti.

One, Lynn Garrison, calls himself a "friend" of Haiti and is always at the side of General Raoul Cedras, whether skin diving with Cedras or lending advice. Garrison says he worked "with Americans" to try to overthrow Muammar Qaddafi in 1970. He has longstanding contacts within the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency. Says Garrison, "The Haitians are just too nice. I'm the mean son of a bitch around here." He also brags:

"Everything the U.S. Senate knows comes from me."

A friend of Garrison is Kevin Kattke. He helped Oliver North prepare the 1983 invasion of Grenada and was on hand in 1986 when Baby Doc fled Haiti on a U.S. Air Force Plane.

Henry Womack is another Garrison associate. Womack helped construct a Contras base to attack Nicaragua. Womack lives with the sister of Michel François, Haiti's vicious police chief, and her husband in South Florida. Womack says he offers Haiti "a White man's thinking." This "thinking" includes a scheme to secure U.S. aid loans to transport New York City garbage to Haiti for reprocessing.

Aristide's Lavalas Movement: What Went Wrong?

The movement centered upon Aristide was from the start organized by middle-class left-of-center political forces. Once in power they quickly abandoned the perspective of relying upon the masses of impoverished workers and peasants that brought Aristide his electoral victory of 67%.

Aristide's movement was not at all a revolutionary movement, as he himself acknowledged. For example, Aristide's program in the 1990 elections promised to distribute land, a critical question for 80% of Haiti's population, but mainly state lands, often of poor quality. During his election campaign he said, "We give guarantees to the bourgeois because Lavalas means united we are powerful... We are saying to you we are with you. You don't have to be afraid."

Aristide did attempt to reform the selection of corrupt rural sheriffs; he legalized unions and sought a raise in the minimum wage from \$0.33 to \$0.50 an hour; he attempted to increase literacy and remove legal barriers to women — all cut short by his reformist strategy leading to the coup.

Aristide and his followers never built a formal political party, despite repeated assertions that one was to be built from the grassroots up. A Haitian supporter of Aristide could not cast any kind of binding vote on any aspect of Aristide's policies. The opportunity for such a party was there, but it was deliberately missed. Nationwide peasant organizations, such as the Peasant Movement of Papaye (MPP), and the trade union CATH (Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers) overwhelmingly supported Aristide and could have formed the backbone of a workers and peasants party. Despite Aristide's populist identification with the poor — he himself is from an impoverished background — and despite his promises to mobilize the masses, he never relied upon them, preferring, as soon became apparent, to make deals with imperialism, the army, and the Haitian bourgeoisie.

At the June 3 TransAfrica conference referred to above Aristide said, "Our government has and will continue to build the human bridge between the rich and the poor. That is why we chose to include members of the

bourgeoisie in our government to foster understanding within our society." At the conference Aristide called for "professionalizing" the army in accordance with the Governor's Island agreement and still reverently referred to his relationship with the army during his administration, "We celebrated a marriage with this army, and with it, for seven months, worked to protect human rights in Haiti and combat drug trafficking."

At the heart of the problem is Aristide's social democratic conception of the state. To his vast adoring following he has not contributed one iota to understanding the tasks necessary to liberate Haiti. Those tasks are building a revolutionary mass workers and peasant party modeled on the party of Lenin and Trotsky. That would mean mass organizations would possess the means of defense that is essential for revolutionary change in Haiti. The suicidal social democratic alternative has once again cost the workers movement thousands of lives. To speak of "professionalizing" an army with Green Beret "advisers" instead of smashing it to bits is to have learned nothing.

As yet "far left" Haitian organizations have not organized a viable alternative to the

bankrupt Aristide leadership. The emotional ties that bind the Haitian masses to the charismatic Aristide are deep and have been won by Aristide's genuine personal bravery in the face of army and Macoute violence. How much longer it will be before the masses learn that that is not enough for a true revolution, only time will tell.

Building an Anti-Intervention and Solidarity Movement

Recent events, such as Randall Robinson's fast and the arrest of several Congresspeople at the White House, have propelled Haiti into the forefront of U.S. foreign policy debate. These liberal political figures and pro-intervention, opportunist politicians must not be allowed to appear to dominate the movement in support of Haiti. In reality they don't. For several years now a growing number of activists in the U.S. have become aware of Haiti. Much of that movement has been centered around church activists, who, despite excellent intentions, often act without an effective strategy. The middle-class political of the Aristide leadership and the middle-class character of much of the leadership of what is referred to as the "10th Department"

of Haitians in the U.S. (Haiti has 9 departments) too often rely on the good graces of pro-intervention politicians like Jesse Jackson and the Congressional Black Caucus.

A grassroots network would ideally be centered on authentic Haitian working-class organizations in close alliance with the African-American community and the peace and labor movements. Revolutionary socialists should waste no time in building such a movement.

In New York "The Haiti Anti-Intervention Committee" has formed out of the former Shut Down Guantánamo Committee after freedom was won for the HIV-positive Haitians languishing in Clinton's Guantánamo INS concentration camp. It has produced an informative pamphlet entitled, "Why We Oppose U.S./UN Intervention in Haiti," available by mail for \$3. The committee is trying with few resources to help build a national network of anti-intervention activists. HAIC can be contacted at P.O. Box 755, Fort Washington Station, New York, N.Y. 10040-9998 or by phone at 212-592-3612. Donations are desperately needed. □

June 7, 1994

The Oslo Accords and the Intifada

Continued from page 11

tween five and six billion dollars."³⁷ However, the money will bolster the position of Arafat and his collaborators against any opposition in the enclaves. The PLO negotiators have agreed to hand over control of the enclave economy to the joint Palestinian-Israeli Economic Cooperation Committee³⁸ and the World Bank.³⁹ Neither of these forces is likely to take into account the needs of the average Palestinian. As Edward Said said in his article in the December *Progressive*, "Almost certainly, most Palestinians will remain as they are, economically speaking, although now they are expected to work in private-sector service industries partly controlled by Palestinians, including resorts, small assembly plants, farms, and the like."⁴⁰

What Has Been Gained?

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said on a recent TV interview that the Palestinians were given nothing except the recognition of "the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people." Is that indeed all that has been won? Certainly, no one should stop the Israeli Defense Forces from withdrawing from anywhere, but how meaningful is this with-

drawal? Did the Palestinians really get the Israelis off their backs? Were there any major concessions made by the other side that could possibly make up for what Arafat has given?

According to Edward Said, the Palestinian and Israeli negotiators have colluded to have all UN resolutions against Israel other than 242 and 338 effectively nullified. This includes Resolution 194, which entitles Palestinians exiled in 1948 to compensation or repatriation, and other resolutions that condemn Israel's illegal annexations and horrendous human rights violations.⁴⁰ Arafat has surrendered practically every important item in the Palestinian National Charter, including the call for a secular democratic state in all Palestine, for the right of return for all Palestinians, and for the battle against Western imperialism.

Fifty-five percent of the area of the occupied territories has been taken over by Israeli settlements and land thefts, including 40 percent of the Gaza Strip. Eighty percent of the West Bank's water supply goes to the Israelis. Israeli settlements and roads criss-cross the Territories, isolating Palestinian population centers from each other.⁴¹ There are no plans to significantly change this situation. The

possibility of a Palestinian state seems to be ruled out entirely. Rabin has stated unequivocally that there will be no state for the Palestinians. He has stated, "...I continue to maintain my position against the establishment of an independent Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan."⁴² According to a Reuters report in the *Boston Globe* (December 28, 1994) Israeli negotiators have been so brazen as to complain that "the PLO was trying to turn limited self-rule into the basis for an independent state."

The establishment of two tiny enclaves administered by Arafat and his collaborators, aside from being a raw deal for the people within them, leaves out the question of the rest of the Palestinians in the territories taken in 1967, and the over fifty percent of Palestinians outside of the West Bank and Gaza. There are promises that "autonomy" will eventually be granted to a greater area, but they may well be broken, and this will not be meaningful autonomy. The true intentions of the Israeli government became even clearer on December 29, when Rabin announced plans for 10,000 new housing units in and around Jerusalem beyond the Israeli sector.⁴³

37. *Ibid.*

38. *The Progressive*, December 1993.

39. *International Viewpoint*, October 1993.

40. *Z* magazine, December 1993.

41. *News From Within*, March 1994.

42. *Ma'ariv*, February 13, 1994, reprinted in *The Other Front*, February 16, 1994.

43. National Public Radio News, December 29, 1993.

Meanwhile, Israel and the United States will maintain indirect control of the interior of PLO-administered territories through the Arafat leadership. Although negotiators have spoken of future elections, behind the scenes they have agreed that such elections will never take place.⁴⁴ According to Tikva Honig-Parnass, editor of *News From Within*, even if the elections were to take place, the accords say that the decisions of the body created, the Palestinian Administrative Council, would be subject to the approval of the Israeli Military Administration.⁴⁵

All candidates for the "strong police force" of Palestinians mentioned by the accords are being "thoroughly screened" by the Israeli government. A large percentage of this force is being brought in from Palestinian exile communities because the Intifada has created so much solidarity within the Occupied Territories that there are few locals that could be part of a reliable repressive force. And if the Israeli government's Palestinian proxies fail it, it has its own troops stationed in settlements throughout the territories in strategic positions, ready to intervene at a moment's notice.

A major sticking point in the negotiations has been over control of the border crossings. On December 29, the teams apparently reached a compromise. Said Israeli Police Minister, Moshe Shahal, "[The] Israeli police force will be responsible on the first line, that every person who enters the territories, whether Gaza or the West Bank, will have to pass through an Israeli authority and then there will be Palestinian representatives who will be responsible for those who are entering the area to have access to Gaza or Jericho."⁴⁶ Later reports show that this has yet to be ironed out, but the fact that it is even a question shows the character of these negotiations.

Arafat and his supporters and patrons will have their own interests in mind, and they will not look kindly on Palestinian democracy. Right now, Israel has more troops deployed in the Occupied Territories than ever before, and it has used those troops to assassinate anti-Zionist militants. Edward Said states that the period just prior to the signing of the accords saw the worst repression in the Occupied Territories ever. This will clean out some of the leadership of the Intifada and smooth the way for Arafat. Israel has not agreed to release more than a few of the 14,000 Palestinian political prisoners that it still holds, probably for the same reason.⁴⁷ In other words, the Palestinian people will still have the

Israeli state on their backs, but they will now have a Palestinian regime there as well. Said Rabin:

I prefer the Palestinians to cope with the problem of enforcing order in the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians will be better at it than we were, because they allow no appeals to the Supreme Court and will prevent the [Israeli] Association for Civil Rights from criticizing the conditions there by denying it access to the area. They will rule there by their own methods, freeing — and this is most important — the Israeli soldiers from having to do what they will do.⁴⁸

Arafat's wing of the PLO will play a role similar to that of the Inkatha Freedom Party in the Bantustans of South Africa, or that of corrupt leaderships in some Native American reservations — they will be enforcers for the rule of the colonizer. If the accords are successful, Israel will have carried out a divide-and-conquer strategy. Now, when Palestinians want to throw off Israel's domination, they will face not just Israeli soldiers. They will have to face Arafat's soldiers as well. And the United States government, the most powerful enemy of liberation movements anywhere, will be freer to act than ever before.

At least in the PLO-administered territories, the Palestinians may get some minimal progress in a few areas such as their enormous public health crisis. They may finally be allowed to cover their sewers — something Israeli soldiers have physically barred them from doing. However, in the long run, the accords carry enormous setbacks.

Prospects for Palestine

It is easy to get caught up in examining the simple pros and cons of this agreement on paper and forget the big picture. There are certainly some aspects of the Palestinian condition that may improve marginally. However, the agreement cannot be supported, first, because of the thoroughly undemocratic nature of its negotiation and implementation. It is a back-room deal which carries all sorts of *quid pro quos* and secret agreements. The diplomatic process must be laid bare and no deals should be made behind the backs of the Palestinian people. Nobody elected by the Palestinian people has had a chance to vote on these accords despite vague promises of elections in the distant future. Israel and the United States have appointed Fatah as the steward of these enclaves. On these grounds alone, the accords are unjust.

Even if there were a proper body to vote on this question (perhaps such a body could be based upon the Unified National Leadership), these accords ought to be rejected unequivocally. If consummated, they will be an alliance between U.S., Israeli, non-Palestinian and Palestinian Arab capital against the Palestinian masses and will help bolster the role of U.S. imperialism in the region as well as crush Palestinian hopes for liberation. Nothing less than the establishment of a secular democratic Palestine and a secular democratic Arab nation with all the rights that implies, with the full right of return for all exiles, and the release of all political prisoners can be a real solution.

Although the Intifada has reached a serious lull, and there is no significant movement in the United States to cut off aid to Israel, the left, here and in Palestine, must not despair. U.S. imperialism, for all of its bluster, is in crisis. Against Saddam Hussein, a dictator unwilling to and incapable of rallying the masses, U.S. imperialism won only a partial victory. In Somalia, against a local power broker who was able to muster popular support, it was largely defeated even without a serious antiwar movement here.

The Palestinian movement, even without ideal leadership on top, is capable of much more. The Intifada — a true mass movement — has pressured the Israelis far more than any PLO diplomacy. It has seasoned grass-roots leaders and a militant population which is not likely to settle for half-way solutions. The instability of the situation has been underlined by the enormous unpopularity of the accords and of Arafat since the Hebron massacre. Under such circumstances, it would be unwise for the left here or in Palestine to try and endorse the accords on any grounds, even with qualifications.

Instead, the left must be clear and independent in its positions. If it does this, its fortunes may shift quickly, as fortunes have often done in the Occupied Territories. A new leadership is needed — one that encourages rather than muffles the mass character of the Intifada. Such a leadership must further the Intifada's natural opposition to the capitalist and patriarchal elites of Palestinian society and broaden its internationalism to encompass non-Palestinian Arabs. It must be willing to challenge the entire patriarchal and capitalist order of the Middle East and the world. □

May 6, 1994

44. *The Progressive*, December 1993.

45. *New Politics*, Winter 1994.

46. *Boston Globe*, December 30, 1993.

47. *Progressive*, December 1993.

48. Quoted in the publications *Yehudit Yeheskeli* and *Yediot Ahronot*, September 7, 1993; translated from Hebrew by Israel Shahak in *Lies of Our Times*, December 1993.

No Historic Compromise with Imperialism

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high," they understand the reality of the situation. Formal democracy will not meet the demands of the masses for jobs and houses, and the township system will remain intact.

The debate between revolutionary and non-revolutionary sectors of the mass movement revolves around the *goals of the struggle*. From that perspective there is nothing necessarily unprincipled in negotiations with the government to introduce formal democracy. The real debate is not negotiations versus non-negotiations: the crucial issue is whether or not to make an "historic compromise" with racial capitalism — i.e., to call off the struggle. It is this question which has led sectors of the popular movement to refuse to participate in *these* negotiations.

The peace deal under way in Palestine poses parallel problems. Rabin's Labor Party government has produced minimal concessions, not to dismantle the national oppression of the Palestinian people, but to guarantee it. The object of the exercise is to demobilize and call off the Intifadeh struggle. Even if the deal is imposed, there is no question of evicting the Zionist settlers, who have taken 60 percent of the land in the West Bank. There is no question of bringing back the majority of Palestinians, who live outside Gaza and the West Bank. There is no question of any change in the status of the Palestinians as subordinate to the Zionist state.

Once again the issue is not for or against negotiations; the issue is whether or not to make an "historic compromise" and call off the struggle.

New Era of Democracy?

A central mystification of the post-Gulf War "New World Order" is that we are in an epoch of the peaceful resolution of disputes to bring about "democracy." The "forward march of democracy" thesis is based on the idea that democracy is making ten-league strides in Eastern Europe and in the so-called "Third World," all this propelled by the good offices of the United States.

It is true that the U.S. sees stability being ensured in some countries by toppling old dictatorships — for example, in Zaïre, Malawi, and Haiti. But this is entirely contingent and tactical. It does not apply, for example, to the army dictatorship in Indonesia, the world's fourth most populous country; nor does it apply for the people of Kurdistan, whose democratic right to have their own state is fiercely opposed by the U.S. Dozens of similar examples could be given.

We are not living in a new heyday of bourgeois democracy; we are living in a world of deepening crisis, of militarization, of growing racism and xenophobia and widespread attacks on democracy and democratic rights. And we are living in a world where the harshness of the international class struggle is deepening, precisely because of the depth of the economic crisis of world imperialism, now in the grips of its longest-ever economic crisis.

The tactics of the imperialist rulers in this period are varied and experimental: they are in uncharted waters. Every form of capitalist rule combines repression and concessions with an ideology designed to secure the "consent" of the oppressed. "Democracy" and the "peaceful resolution of conflicts" are key weapons in the ideological arsenal of imperialism because they correspond to key needs and demands of ordinary people — freedom and peace. Socialists, of course, are partisans of peace and democracy. It is precisely for that reason that we are opposed to any historic compromise with imperialism, which is inimical to both.

But the assertion of this point in propaganda is inadequate. The slogans of peace and democracy have to be appropriated by the working class and the oppressed in action. And this involves fundamental ideas about forms of struggle and alliances.

Permanent Revolution

The present wave of negotiations and peace deals involves not just profound strategic debates, but a shake-up and recomposition of the political forces involved. In each situation a right and a left wing will emerge, a conflict between class struggle and class compromise.

This represents, in a certain way, the political wearing out of a series of leaderships of liberation struggles, not only because of defeats but also because of inherent limitations in their strategies, goals, and alliances.

For example, no analysis of the Middle East peace process can be abstracted from an analysis of the Arafat Fatah leadership, which has always been a bourgeois nationalist movement, which has always been authoritarian and bureaucratic, and which has never had a strategy based on the self-organization and mobilization of Arab workers in the whole region.

In today's conditions of economic crisis and imperialist offensive, the political space for a series of former strategies and alliances is eroding — for example, strategies based on alliance with the Soviet Union or support from radical bourgeois nationalist regimes have largely collapsed.

For revolutionary and liberation forces in many parts of the world, this means a profound strategic reassessment. A good example is the process now under way in the different wings of the Philippine Communist Party.

Marxists have every interest in intervening in these debates and addressing those forces who reject an historic compromise with imperialism. Every such discussion involves concrete elements based on the specificities of particular struggles.

But there are common guidelines, which can only be briefly outlined here.

The first is the understanding that the struggle for democracy is an anticapitalist struggle. This directly implies the impossibility of a long-term strategic alliance with the "national" bourgeoisie or a "stagist" conception of revolution. It also implies the necessity for the class independence and self-organization of the working class and oppressed.

The second crucial issue is the democratic self-organization of the masses in struggle, and thus a rejection of bureaucratic militarism.

Armed struggle, or armed self-defense, is a frequently necessary tactic in anti-imperialist struggle. But the effects of fetishization of armed struggle, or its elevation outside any democratic control, are always corrosive and result in bureaucratic degeneration and substitutionism.

Rejection of an alliance with the "national" bourgeoisie implies an alliance centered on the working class, uniting the oppressed. That cannot be done without the self-organization and championing of struggles by women and also by victims of national and racial oppression.

But that in itself requires democratic forms of struggle and mass organization, not bureaucratic or militarist ones.

International Solidarity

When those fighting imperialism go down to defeats, this represents not something "local," but a crystallization of elements of the world situation. *The key force responsible for defeats is that which has made the biggest compromise with imperialism — the labor bureaucracy in the advanced capitalist countries.*

Imperialism's worldwide offensive is facilitated by every capitulation which they make. It is normal for socialists to have their own strategic views about the international struggle. But such views are entirely worthless without the fight against capitalism and the bureaucracy at home and the struggle to rebuild movements of international solidarity. □

The Development of the Theory of Permanent Revolution in Russia

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And Trotsky and he at that point agreed on this, but Trotsky already had a little difference on that question. And this became the separation between Parvus and Trotsky.

Differences Between Parvus and Trotsky

Trotsky thought that in Australia the proletariat had not come to power because the class struggle was not very sharp, not very well developed. They had a virgin continent to cover, but in Russia, the proletariat could come to power only through a tremendous insurrection, with all the peasantry, a vast class, with tens of millions, associated in this revolution, this revolution would have such scope that its own logic would force the proletariat to go much farther than they had gone in Australia. So therefore, what would happen would be that the working class in power would begin as a proletarian dictatorship.

By that he meant that they would come in as a governing party, like Australia, but they would exercise it as a dictatorship to begin to take measures against those who would resist the revolution: the tsarists, the landlords, the big capitalists. That would be the beginning, and he emphasized this very, very strongly: the proletariat in power as a governing party, but the rule was still the bourgeoisie. Then they would have to take a series of measures, by the very dynamics of the revolution. These measures would be to squeeze in on the capitalists through progressive income taxes, by putting control over their industries. A whole series of steps of that character. And he saw a series of democratic measures that would be taken by this government. And I'll list them again.

Tasks of the Dictatorship

First of all, they would carry out the agrarian reform, smash the landlord system, free the peasantry, open up farming. Progressive taxation, that is, the income tax, which in those days was quite a novelty. (You're all familiar with it now.) It would establish compulsory education, another bourgeois measure. It would destroy at least part of the army and all of the police. These are Trotsky's own formulations. And it would establish a militia.

Now a militia, let me emphasize, so that you understand this very clearly, a militia is not a proletarian institution. A militia is a bourgeois institution. That's why it's in the Constitution, in our bourgeois constitution in the United States. A militia is specified there not as a socialist measure, but as a capitalist measure. And in many sections of the United States in the past century, many states and cities had militias. That's a normal system. I think the Swiss still have a militia, although it's quite capitalist. But it's a very democratic measure, because it spreads out the armed power, you see, into the whole population. So Trotsky put this down as one of the points of democracy that would be undertaken by the proletarian dictatorship still resting on bourgeois rule.

The Revolutionary Process

Then, he said, what would happen would be that the class struggle would continue after the proletariat had their dictatorship. The class struggle would continue throughout Russia, at times reaching even the extent of civil war, as the bourgeoisie resisted this dictatorship and tried to go back to where they were before. And this could occur over an extended period of time. The proletariat exercising their governing position, and the bourgeoisie and the landlords and the tsarists resisting it, so that over a long period of time there would be this extended resistance. The class struggle would continue, and there would be a whole series of steps that would have to be undertaken.

Because of the development of the class struggle, under the proletarian dictatorship in Russia, this dictatorship would have to undertake more and more sweeping measures, controlling the bourgeoisie, moving in on their possessions. And finally, it would reach the point where it would have to alter the property relations. He said he thought that that would be inevitable. And when the proletarian dictatorship reached the stage where it altered the bourgeois property relations, this would open a socialist revolution in Russia. At what point that would occur, he didn't predict, because that could only be told by the class struggle.

Thus, as Trotsky visualized the beginning of the revolution, it would be powered by the peasantry, led by the workers, and the workers would establish their own government, the Social Democratic government. This government would act as a dictatorship, excluding the tsarist elements, the bourgeois elements, the landlords, and all the reactionary forces like that in Russia, excluding them from coming back to power. In holding this position, they would carry out a prolonged class struggle inside of Russia, and would inevitably take deeper and deeper and deeper measures, more and more progressive measures, until it touched their property relations. And once it touched them, that would signal the opening of a socialist revolution. Therefore, this whole process was a continuous revolution. That's where he got the term "permanent revolution."

He used the word "permanent" because that's what Marx used. But the whole process, you can see, is a continuing process. And that was his main point.

Thus, viewed as a whole, from the beginning of the process to the end of the process, when the socialist revolution opens up, this revolution is *both* bourgeois *and* socialist. It's one and the same time, if you take a long enough gap of time. I mean, if your gap of time is just a little part of the revolution, one part is bourgeois and another part is socialist. But looked at as a whole, it's both bourgeois and socialist.

Once the socialist revolution opens up in Russia, then there would be a tremendous impulse to the socialist revolution in Western Europe. This already would have been given by the beginning of the bourgeois revolution in

tsarist Russia. But especially when you reach the socialist stage, this would give tremendous impulse to socialist revolution in Western Europe, and the natural consequences would be the extension of this revolution on a worldwide scale: the socialist revolution. And that was Trotsky's view.

He held that whatever the episodic opening stages of this might be, that this would be the pattern for all backward countries. In other words, he generalized this and said that it would apply to all backward countries.

But he had this one proviso, which in our times has become quite important, that there could be episodic variations in the opening stages of this process. There could be variations in the opening stages of it. Now we'll come to that point a little bit later, but he had that proviso in there. But he didn't elaborate on that. He simply posed this whole question of the proletariat coming to the fore, of its establishing its dictatorship and then carrying out this whole series of measures, which would lead to a socialist revolution. And that was the theory of the permanent revolution. So you can see it wasn't too complicated.

Lenin's Objections

What were Lenin's main objections to this? I'll go into those. Lenin's main objection was that it underestimated the revolutionary political capacities of the peasantry. He wanted to leave open the possibility of the Russian peasantry, whom he considered to be quite shrewd, would prove itself capable, at a certain point, of developing its own party, of putting its own party into power. He wanted to leave that open.

Trotsky's Answer

Trotsky's answer was this (now remember, this was not the main dispute between them — this was only a side dispute): Trotsky's answer was that historical experience first of all shows that in modern times, the peasantry always follows a city class. That's due to the fact that modern transportation is hinged around the cities. Railways, for example, always come to certain points, and where the points come together, that's where the cities are established. You can follow that in the United States if you want to. The first cities, big cities, in modern times, were all established around railway centers. And the same for communications. All of these are in the cities. And communications and transportation, of course, are connected very closely with the market. And the peasants are commodity producers whose whole production hinges on the market. And therefore, they come under the rule of the city. That's in modern times.

In addition to that, the proletariat is the only class that is the natural ally of the peasantry against big capital. Peasants are always against big capital, because they are gouged by the big capitalists. So the workers have a natural ally there in a struggle against big capital if they don't have a natural ally in the fight for socialism.

The proletariat is the only class that is capable of advancing its own interest while still safe-

guarding the peasants. In other words, the workers can go ahead with the nationalization of industry and the institution of a planned economy and still take care of the peasantry. Give them cheap credit, let them stay on their farms, give them fertilizer, machines, all the things that they need in order to have a high standard of living. The proletariat is capable of that.

It is also the only class capable of opening up completely new perspectives for the peasantry. Under the bourgeoisie, the only perspective the peasant has is to become either a capitalist, or shift over to become a landlord at one point or another. But the proletariat can open up the perspective of collective farming, as against capitalist farming, capitalist agriculture; it can open up the perspective, eventually, of socialism. And the proletariat is the only class with a sufficient concentration of forces in the cities, and with sufficient knowledge, to overcome the capitalists and the landlords in a revolution. That is, if they're backed by the peasantry. So that was Trotsky's answer, and that's where the debate stood up to the time of the October revolution.

Resolution of the Debate

The debate was definitively settled by the October revolution, once and for all. The debate was ended by that. In the February revolution of 1917, the Kerensky regime, which was a capitalist regime, and a very democratic one, was mistaken by the Old Bolsheviks as a democratic dictatorship. They applied Lenin's theory: you're going to have a democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants. And so when they saw Kerensky come to power, with any number of progressive measures, the Old Bolsheviks, including Stalin, saw that as the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, and therefore they supported it.

Lenin admitted that there was a certain truth to this: that that could be discerned in this formation of what he called the Kerenskiad. Nevertheless, all that it was, was bourgeois democracy, and it was proving in practice that it was incapable of solving the main problems. It was incapable of solving the agrarian problem; it was incapable of solving the national problem; it was incapable of solving the question of war or peace. It insisted on keeping Russia in the war. And therefore, he had to break with this Kerenskiad, this alleged democratic dictatorship, forthwith.

In brief, that was an admission that Trotsky was right on the incapacity of the bourgeoisie to lead this revolution and, as a matter of fact, Lenin had had that viewpoint, too. But his formula had left open that possibility, and it gave the opening for the Old Bolsheviks to make a big mistake.

So Lenin rearmed his party with the April Theses, a series of theses in which he actually adopted most of what Trotsky's views were. And because of this, Lenin was accused of Trotskyism. In April of 1917 the Old Bolsheviks said he'd sold out to Trotsky. It was a kind of a joke then, because they were all in the same party, and all regarded each other as very close

collaborators. His rearming of the party consisted of filling in his formula of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, filling that in with the content which Trotsky had worked out as early as 1904 and 1905, twelve to thirteen years before. And then came the October revolution. And then we saw how the theory of the permanent revolution was carried out in practice.

First of all, the proletarian dictatorship was established through the Bolshevik party. The Bolshevik party came to power and exercised a dictatorship in the sense that it permitted no democratic rights to the capitalists or to the landlords and moved very decisively against them. And that, first of all, it carried out the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Bolsheviks did that. They carried out primarily the agrarian reform. That was the first great, sweeping measure they took insofar as the main problems of Russia were concerned. That's leaving aside the question of war and peace, and all like that; but the internal problems, the domestic problems — the Bolsheviks carried out the agrarian reform, their first great measure.

And then they had a number of other democratic measures of that kind that they took. This stage lasted eight months to a year, about that long, this stage under the Bolshevik dictatorship. They would have preferred to let it last a little longer, but the resistance of the bourgeoisie and the landlords and the tsarist elements was so stiff and so desperate that they had no choice but to cut this stage short.

And because of that they ran into a series of difficulties in the following years that they finally had to rectify matters in the twenties by opening up the New Economic Policy. They would have preferred to have a longer stage, where they took their time about implementing these bourgeois-democratic measures and moving slowly and more carefully, in a better organized way, toward the socialist stage of this same revolution.

So they began invading bourgeois property relations rather early, from their viewpoint; within eight months to a year they began the socialist stage of the revolution. Throughout this time, they were changing the state. They were the governing party and they came in on an old state apparatus, the tsarist state. They came in and they took that over. Instead of smashing the whole thing, they had to take it over, and this was one of Lenin's big complaints, that they had to take that state over instead of smash it. Later on, this led to one of the sources of Stalinist strength, from the very fact that this state in many respects [remained] — parts of it were intact. And they only altered it to a certain degree. That's all they could do under the conditions. But they began changing the state structure and to establish proletarian rule, which is a little different from just proletarian government.

Proletarian rule meant that they had ended bourgeois property relations, had excluded those now, had opened up the possibilities for

the workers to manage industry and eventually to institute a planned economy. In other words, once a planned economy is instituted, that means proletarian rule, because that's the interest of the proletariat, to carry on economy in a planned way. This opened up the socialist stage in the Russian revolution.

In those days, everybody agreed, including Stalin, that the socialist stage could only be concluded on an international level, by extending the revolution into Western Europe, into America, and the rest of the world. And as forecast, the October revolution gave a tremendous impulse to the socialist revolution in the West. Revolutions broke out all over, including in Germany. It would have been possible in a relatively short time for the socialist revolution to have swept all of Europe, if it had not been for the betrayal of the Social Democrats. That of course is another big story, how they betrayed that revolution.

Official Theory of the Bolsheviks

The theory of the permanent revolution was the official position of the Bolsheviks after October up until 1924. It was the official theory of the Soviet Union, of its government, of all the leading officials, up until 1924. Trotsky's works on this question, his articles on this, were used as textbooks in the Soviet Union. It was the standard view of the Soviet government up until 1924. But in the fall of 1924 a new theory was advanced by Stalin, called the theory of socialism in one country, which in direct opposition to the theory of the permanent revolution held that it was possible to build socialism in a single country.

Stalin thereby revised the concept of socialism as an international revolution, which was maintained by the theory of the permanent revolution, and he revised the role of the Communist parties. Instead of becoming the leading parties of the proletariat with the aim of carrying out a socialist revolution, Stalin revised the concept of them, converting them into pressure groups, groups which merely put pressure on governments, and which defended the Soviet Union in this peculiar way of putting pressure on other forces.

All this was done, of course, under the mantle of Leninism. And here is a strange twist. Stalin picked up Lenin's formula of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry and counterposed this to the theory of permanent revolution. He said this was the correct theory, Lenin's theory was correct, and Trotsky's was wrong. And in order to prove his point, he dug up all the old quotations he could find of where Lenin had said something against Trotsky on this question and magnified these differences, exaggerated them, and then went still further and said Lenin was correct as against Trotsky. That was the main content of this big debate at that time.

Thus, the main lesson of the October revolution began to be lost about October 1924, and in our days now the only ones who really advance it and press it are the Trotskyists. □

Impressions of Budapest

Continued from page 6

in a stereotype; that is why stereotypes are so powerful and durable. Anti-Semitic speeches are given in the Parliament and reprinted in the papers.

My cousin Vili quit his lawyer job with the new government, telling us that since what he called "the changeover" he couldn't be a "chameleon." Like his parents, he, too, was a member of the party. He told us that "Martin Luther

King had a dream; I had an illusion." His 16-year-old son, a rebel in his own way, re-embraced orthodox Judaism and left home to go to a yeshiva in Toronto, changing his name back to Oppenheim. Vili later had a massive heart attack. He now works with his wife Mari wholesaling textiles. And smokes a lot.

Meanwhile, the old Communist party, now calling itself Socialist, did extremely well in the recent elections, winning with a majority of the

vote. Evidently, more and more Hungarians are feeling that while political democracy is good, it needn't come with capitalism's predations, that economic decisions ought to be made according to human needs, not private profit, and that a great and ancient people needn't be scapegoated for the misery capitalism brings with its baggage. □

May 27, 1994

Hungarian Communists Voted Back into Power, But...

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tion" process doesn't need a plan or organization; it simply needs time and an absence of obstacles. Goncz obliged on both counts. The process of selling off state property, begun under the HSWP, accelerated at a dizzying pace.

The Source of the Depression

These were the conditions as of January 1991 when the opinion poll showed the Hungarian population the most depressed in Eastern Europe — a tall order considering the notoriously bad conditions faced by the populations of Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania, not to mention the devastation of the working classes in Poland and East Germany.

In some towns in Hungary virtually the entire workforce has become unemployed with the closure of plants and mines as the result of cuts in subsidies and the general economic collapse. Tens of thousands of workers are now homeless, many of them young men shown on television sleeping in train stations (*New York Times*, October 23, 1990). Electricity, food, rent, and medical costs have soared out of the reach of vast numbers of workers and their families. Among the Hungarian gypsy population, the unemployment rate is estimated at between 45 and 50 percent (*New York Times*, November 7, 1993.) They are the last hired and first fired, hard hit by the rising number of plant and mine closings and staff reductions.

Meanwhile, profiteers like George F. Hemingway from the United States have built financial empires for themselves — chains of restaurants, food stores, and sporting goods stores throughout what is now called the Hungarian Republic (*New York Times*, May 5, 1992).

Although poverty is becoming generalized, a few people are getting very rich.

Who's In Charge?

It is no longer a narrow layer of Communist Party bureaucrats that is drawing up the economic plans for Hungary and the rest of the former Soviet bloc countries and the former USSR. The economic programs are now drawn up by foundations financed by imperialist lenders and dictated by the International Monetary Fund to suit the lenders' own needs, and not the needs of the populations who live there.

As before, the workers have no voice in the matter unless they mobilize in powerful mass protests, as they have from time to time to force the Hungarian government to retreat from specific decisions. Although there have been numerous protests over price increases, no significant new, independent organizations representing the workers' interests have emerged to take the lead.

"Ethnic Conflicts" in the Making?

In the midst of the widespread hardships, retrograde forces are involved in trying to exacerbate national, ethnic, and religious differences so as to keep the workers from uniting against those in power. Some of the 660,000 unemployed youth are being recruited by "right-wing mentors" to promote a type of Hungarian chauvinism that includes military training — an ominous indication that private financiers may be organizing their own private armies, the kind that have proven so destructive against independent social movements in the newly independent republics of Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Bosnia.

Prominent figures in the HDF party have fostered the notion that foreigners, particularly Jews, are plotting to place Hungary under foreign domination. Foreign domination has become a volatile issue as many see how goods produced locally are crowded off the market by imported products; this helps shift the blame for local plant closings from the IMF austerity budget that the Hungarian government itself is imposing.

In the May parliamentary elections, the voters, "bitter at the decline in their living standards, gave the [ruling] Hungarian Democratic Forum only 12% of the vote" (*Financial Times* [London], May 5, 1994). The HDF won only 37 of 386 seats. This overwhelming popular repudiation of the government's policies is on the scale of that suffered by Boris Yeltsin and Yegor Gaidar's Russia's Choice party when it was trounced in the December 1993 elections in Russia. The HDF came in even behind its rival the Alliance of Free Democrats, which won 70 seats. The former Communists of the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) won 209 seats!

However, if the masses expect that the HSP will really bring improvements, they will be disappointed. Although some of the leaders

may appear to champion the cause of the workers and pensioners whose living standards have plummeted as a result of the reforms, that does not represent the main line of the party.

According to the *Financial Times* of May 4, 1994, opinion polls show that "the Socialists command the most concentrated support among the 'top leaders.'"

"If the Hungarian bourgeoisie have a party at all, it is the socialist party," remarked a politician who supports the market reforms.

The elite in Hungary — those who wield mobile phones as they are chauffeured through Budapest in their Mercedeses and who frequent the new boutiques and gleaming hotels — did not spring up overnight. In Hungary, where the market reforms began in 1968, the nomenklatura, the leading Communist party officials, have had several decades "to translate their political power to economic weight" (*Financial Times*, May 4, 1994).

Whatever personalities fill whatever posts, the HSP has no dispute with the market reforms and while calling for curbs in the "excesses" of the market, has promised to continue to promote the market economy and privatization of property (*New York Times*, May 30, 1994).

The designated new prime minister, Gyula Horn, was a high-ranking apparatchik and government minister of the HSWP. He participated in the suppression of the 1956 rebellion, although he is now trying to minimize his role in those events. In the 1960s he moved up quickly in the party ranks to occupy important diplomatic and ministerial posts. He is interested in making foreign investors, not Hungarian workers and peasants, happy.

Even if the popular vote for the former Communists may express misplaced hope for a return to some of the advantages workers and ordinary people enjoyed under the previous system (job security, subsidized social benefits), it is also a clear sign to the imperialists that they have been premature in their assumptions that the battle to "free" Hungarian resources for their own plunder has been won. □

June 12, 1994

BIDOM Supporters Hold National Conference

A national conference of formal supporters of *Bulletin in Defense of Marxism* was held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on May 28–29, 1994. (To be a formal supporter, one must agree with the magazine's "Who We Are" statement, actively participate in its production and circulation, have a current one-year subscription, and pay an additional \$20 per year.) There were 34 registrants at the conference. Among the items receiving favorable attention by the conference were the following:

- a reaffirmation of the "Who We Are" statement (see inside front cover of magazine);
- a statement defining aspects of the magazine's political perspectives, which also projects an educational conference in 1995 and another decision-making conference in 1996 (see below);
- the adoption of various cost-cutting measures;

- a decision to maintain a monthly printing schedule for the next six issues of the magazine, which will then be reviewed by the Editorial Board to consider the advisability of less frequent publication;
- a decision to establish working groups within the Editorial Board for the purpose of obtaining broader participation in expanding circulation, raising funds, and soliciting articles.

One of the questions on which discussion focused was whether the formal supporters of the magazine should transform themselves into a new socialist organization, for which the magazine could then serve as a "line journal." This position was rejected by a clear majority of those present. The *Bulletin in Defense of Marxism* remains a magazine of Marxist theory and analysis, supported by people affiliated to

different groups, as well as by unaffiliated individuals. While some who have been involved in our magazine have drifted away, even more have initiated, renewed, or intensified their involvement. The number of formal supporters has jumped from slightly more than 40 in September of 1992 to 85 in September of 1994. (Additional supporters are more than welcome to help us get over the 100 mark!)

A 37-member Editorial Board was elected at the conference. In turn, the Board will elect — by mail — a new Editorial Committee before the end of the summer. There was a considerable amount of very frank (at some points sharp) discussion, but most participants came away feeling that the conference had been quite fruitful. □

The Political Perspectives of *Bulletin in Defense of Marxism*

The "Who We Are" statement of *Bulletin in Defense of Marxism* states:

What we have in common is our commitment to the Fourth International's critical-minded and revolutionary Marxism, which in the twentieth century is represented by such figures as Lenin, Luxemburg, and Trotsky. We also identify with the tradition of American Trotskyism represented by James P. Cannon and others.

Some of the ideas we derive from this program and tradition and from these leading figures deserve to be explained more fully.

The conflict between the working class and the capitalist class is constant and irreconcilable. Working people must organize themselves into their own class organizations — particularly trade unions and a labor party — to defend their interests, to take political power, and to transform society along socialist lines.

The spontaneous rebellions of workers and the oppressed, and mass struggles for reforms, require intervention by conscious revolutionaries in such a manner as will lead to the overthrow of capitalism. The alternative to socialism ultimately is barbarism.

The revolutionary vanguard of the working class must be gathered around the Marxist program in its own democratic and disciplined organization. This must be done globally to combat and overturn imperialism. The struggle against all forms of oppression — based on race, nationality, gender, religious orientation, etc. — must be taken up by the working class and be seen as essential to its struggle for liberation.

Struggles for democracy — to be won fully — necessarily spill over into the struggle for workers power, and workers democracy is at the heart of any genuinely socialist struggle. The organized revolutionary vanguard must develop a transitional program which can mobilize masses of workers and the oppressed in struggles for immediate and democratic demands in a manner that moves their consciousness and actions into challenging fundamental aspects of the capitalist system.

The revolutionary Marxist political perspective is applicable to the United States, and must be integrated with the radical traditions of the U.S. working class. The primary responsibility of U.S. revolutionaries is to organize a working-class revolution in the United States. To this end, we must labor to build an effective Leninist party infused with

the perspectives of Trotsky and the other pioneers of revolutionary Marxism, as well as the revolutionary elements in the tradition of Eugene V. Debs, the Industrial Workers of the World, and other traditions of U.S. working-class radicalism.

These perspectives are fully consistent with each other and with the needs of the labor and socialist movements here and throughout the world. We are committed to rebuilding a strong, durable U.S. sympathizing section of the Fourth International on this basis. While Fourth Internationalists in the United States — including supporters of the *Bulletin in Defense of Marxism* — are not now united in such an organization, we will utilize our magazine to advance this goal. We will seek to reach out to others to win them to this banner, and also to work with others who are not fully in agreement with our perspectives, for the purpose of advancing the interests of the oppressed, the working class as a whole, and socialism. The magazine will be utilized to advance these purposes.

We are committed to gathering again — in a 1995 Socialist Educational Conference, and in a 1996 decision-making conference of magazine supporters. □

Tragedy, Farce, and Hope in El Salvador

Continued from page 14

In El Salvador, a similar conclusion led the groups making up the FMLN to embrace elections. What is clear, and clearly a tragedy, is that while many of these groups acknowledge the limitations of armed struggle, they also give up their commitment to revolutionary change. In its place they embrace a social democratic political program which makes them junior partners of the capitalist class, both in the core countries and in Latin America. Typical of this transformation is the political trajectory of the ERP and its leader Joaquín Villalobos. Still, not all of the groups that embraced armed struggle appear willing to give up the struggle for socialism. Mike Zielinski, political director of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, notes:

The primary fault line separates the FPL (Forces of Popular Liberation), the FMLN's largest group, and the ERP (recently renamed as the Expression of the People's Renewal). ERP leader Joaquín Villalobos has shown a much greater willingness to embrace the business sector and de-emphasize building a movement rooted in the urban poor and landless farmers. Last summer the ERP officially redefined itself as a "social democratic" party. While acknowledging the need to create cross-class alliances, the FPL stubbornly clings to its Marxist faith, advocating a politics which places the interests of historically marginalized workers and peasants at the forefront of its program.¹⁷

Zielinski also notes that "most observers anticipate a realignment [of the groups within the FMLN] in the near future."¹⁸

Are there no alternatives other than the futile use of armed struggle vs. social democratic electioneering? Obviously yes, and the alternative was advocated by Joseph Hansen and others between 1968 and 1978 during the debate on guerrilla warfare within the Fourth International. That alternative is what Hansen defined as "the Leninist strategy of party building," whereby the revolutionary organization follows a strategy

corresponding to the concerns and needs of the masses themselves by participating in their struggles, learning from them, advancing well-timed transitional and democratic demands, fighting opposing [reformist or sectarian] currents, and building a leadership capable of following through to victory. This is the strategy of organizing a revolutionary socialist party.¹⁹

Hansen warned against "shortcuts" that would draw members of the embryonic vanguard organization away from the Leninist strategic perspective: "To deviate from this can

only encourage adventures or inspire bombastic propaganda that soon reveals its emptiness."²⁰

One of the more seasoned leaders of the FMLN, Shafik Jorge Handal, in a 1991 interview with Marta Hamecker, put forward a self-criticism of the FMLN strategy which corresponds to Hansen's insights. Handal — general secretary of the Salvadoran Communist Party — distinguished himself in this interview with an uncompromising denunciation of Stalinism (the historic tradition of Handal's own party) and of social democratic reformism, to which he counterposed the orientation of Lenin, "the outstanding theorist of this century in the field of socialism."²¹

Handal himself felt that the FMLN (in part under his leadership) had deviated from Leninism by trying "to manage the masses as they would the army, by giving orders, a form of verticalism," adding: "This is precisely one of the reasons why the mass movement in El Salvador was diminishing beginning in 1987, even though the masses remained revolutionaries, progressives..." One example was

making workers' struggles coincide with the dates of military plans. So strikes were called that couldn't be pulled off because the masses wanted to make them sooner, they needed them sooner... Another example was our attempt to "radicalize" the mass movement by introducing the element of street violence.

The lesson learned: "If the vanguard tries to force the masses forward, believing that they can do it strictly through proclamations, or try to impose slogans and forms of struggle that are not understood, the masses will not follow."²²

This lesson, the fruit of painful and bloody setbacks, has not been absorbed by the substantial segments of the FMLN that have abandoned pseudo-Leninist "vanguardism" for reformist electoralism. The tragedy in El Salvador, and in Latin America, is that large groups of revolutionaries are abandoning a struggle for social transformation. The farce is the electoral game being played out in El Salvador and other Latin American countries, a game in which the native capitalists and foreign imperialists always win. The hope is the vibrant mass movements that have developed in El Salvador and throughout Latin America,²³ the search for a new revolutionary strategy by some segments of the Latin American left, and the courage, experience, and commitment of many hundreds of thousands of Latin Americans who have worked and fought against oppression during, before, and since the Cuban Revolution. The Fourth International and its political perspective can play an important role in this drama. It is time we did so. □

June 1, 1994

Letters

Correction

The May-June 1994 issue of *Bulletin in Defense of Marxism* includes a reprint of an article I wrote for the Workers Unity Network discussion bulletin titled, "On Democratic Decision-Making in the Labor Party Movement."

In that article, I stated, "The union movement is the largest mass organization in the country." But in *BIDOM*, words were added so that the sentence reads, "The union movement (united in the AFL-CIO) is the largest mass organization in the country." The parenthetical phrase should not have been added. It makes the sentence factually wrong. The largest union in the country, the National Education Association, is not part of the AFL-CIO. Nor is the United Electrical Workers (UE), one of only two national unions that have taken a clear-cut position for a labor party. Nor are other smaller and lesser-known union formations.

Jerry Gordon
Cleveland

Some Irish Catholics Do Vote for Protestants

Recently, I received the March edition of *BIDOM*. Reading Hayden Perry's review of *The Closing of the Apartheid Mind*, I saw the phrase, "Unlike Ireland, where no Catholic would vote for a Protestant..." [This is factually wrong.]...

At present there are seated in Dáil Eireánn three Protestants, three Jews, and one non-Catholic of, I think, Hindu stock. None of these could have been elected on the votes of the non-Catholics of their constituencies alone. To suggest, then, that no Irish Catholic would vote for a Protestant is to stereotype Irish Catholics in a particularly defamatory manner.

Of course, I would have given my first preference for only one of the non-Catholic deputies, but that decision would have been political rather than religious; after all, I am not a Catholic but a post-Protestant Marxist.

D.R. O'Connor Lysaght
Dublin, Ireland

17. Zielinski, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

19. Hansen, *The Leninist Strategy of Party Building: The Debate on Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America*, New York: Pathfinder Press, 1979, p. 163.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 201.

21. Handal and Vilas, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

23. Handal and Vilas, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-108

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The Manifesto of the Fourth International Socialism or Barbarism on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century

This document was adopted by a meeting of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International (FI) in 1992. It is the product of months of discussion within that world organization and an extensive process of rewriting and revision from an original draft proposed before the FI's World Congress in 1991.

The FI is an international organization of revolutionary Marxist parties and groups from dozens of countries throughout the world. It was founded in 1938 under the leadership of Leon Trotsky, dedicated to a consistent and forthright struggle for the common interests of working people and the oppressed in all nations — to their mobilization in struggle against capitalist exploitation, colonialism, and bureaucratic dictatorship, and against all forms of racial and sexual discrimination.

It should be clear, from the perspectives presented here, that the FI remains true to that purpose today. This, in itself, stands as a major accomplishment in a world where many former leftists and radical activists are rushing to embrace the "new realism" of a capitalism that has supposedly "triumphed over socialism" during the cold war.

But reality is a far cry from the "new world order" proclaimed by U.S. President George Bush after his victory against Iraq in 1991. It is, as the Manifesto points out, a world of increasing disorder — of insecurity, crisis, preventable hunger, poverty, and disease. These things are more the rule than the exception for most of the billions of people on this planet.

In short, we are living in a world that cries out for a renewed commitment to the fight for social change, for a more just and humane political and economic system. Just such a commitment, and a perspective on how those needed changes can be brought about, will be found in the pages of this pamphlet.

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This book focuses on the waves of expulsions which hit the Socialist Workers Party from 1981 through 1984. It provides an inspiring record — and reaffirmation — of the revolutionary ideas and commitments of those who were being forced out of the organization to which many had given "the whole of their lives." also included are: substantial pieces by SWP leaders Jack Barnes and Larry Seigle defending the expulsions; a critique by representatives of the Fourth International; letters and a talk by pioneer Trotskyist James P. Cannon, originally published under the title *Don't Strangle the Party*. A substantial introductory essay by Paul Le Blanc, "Leninism in the United States and the Decline of the Socialist Workers Party," relates the 1981-84 experience to

broader questions of "the vanguard party" and Leninism, the history and character of American Trotskyism, the development of the U.S. working class, and the realities of world politics in the 20th century.

Volume Three:
Rebuilding the Revolutionary Party
edited by Paul Le Blanc, 148 pages
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This book consists of eight documents. The longest, written in 1983 by Paul Le Blanc and Dianne Feeley, is entitled "In Defense of Revolutionary Continuity" — a response to SWP leader Jack Barnes's attack on Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution. Also included is the founding platform of the Fourth Internationalist Tendency, a lengthy 1988 analysis of the SWP by Frank Lovell and Paul Le Blanc, and two major documents produced by the FIT when the Socialist Workers Party formally broke from the Fourth International in 1990. The volume concludes with three documents dealing with the need for unity among revolutionary socialists in the United States.