



# INTERNATIONAL

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SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS  
of the  
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL



A declaration of the Unified Secretariat of the  
Fourth International on the Moscow Treaty

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# FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

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## Editorial Notes

NEVER has humanity known such a revolutionary epoch as that through which it has been passing now for nearly half a century. The history being made is that of the end of capitalist domination and the establishment, throughout the whole world, of Socialism. The triumph in previous centuries of the bourgeoisie affected only a few countries; benefited only a few million men. Today, three thousand million human beings, amongst them the most disinherited of the disinherited, are in process of constructing a world where they will no longer be mere objects of a privileged minority.

The death pangs of capitalism and the growth of Socialism are both taking forms that are in many respects extraordinary. The most economically advanced countries—those usually considered “ripest” for Socialism—are showing, contrary to all estimates, the maximum resistance to revolutionary transformation; since the end of the second world war this has even had the appearance, albeit spurious, of a renovation of capitalism. The Soviet Union, and the other countries of the same order, have experienced as a result of the scars of the past, political regimes which sometimes have aspects as odious as those of capitalist countries, and which the new order has not succeeded in eliminating. As for those countries where capitalism was introduced by external means, in the form of imperialism which built up the level of misery and aggravated backwardness, contrary to being a progressive factor, such countries are now endeavouring to cross in a few leaps the gap which it has taken the hitherto most materially and culturally advanced countries centuries to traverse.

In this world of revolutionary transformation the most extraordinary contradictions are affecting the conscious direction of humanity. From its birth the workers' movement has had its combative bodies and its bold thinkers. Up to the present, vicissitudes have certainly not been lacking. But the present revolutionary era started in October 1917 under a leadership of calibre and with a revolutionary party the like of which history had never known. The lessons of the formation of such a vanguard, one might have thought, would permit the accelerated

formation of a world revolutionary vanguard. The Bolsheviks themselves were engaged in this enterprise, sowing fear throughout the capitalist world. What became of it? The Bolshevik party was crushed and the States from which capitalism had been eliminated were led by a bureaucracy which suffocated revolutionary initiative. The traditional workers' parties, especially in the economically advanced capitalist countries are immersed in a reformism impervious to the gigantic events which human history has witnessed. In the colonial countries, the leaders have been able to hurry matters along, but among the difficulties that they have had to solve is that of the creation of a vanguard revolutionary party.

This contradiction finds its most grotesque expression at international level. What is left of the Second International gathers together in general indifference the stale politicians who are in every respect the loyal servants of capitalism. As for the Communist International, served up as a burnt offering by Stalin and his imperialist “allies” during the war, there still occur the conference where the bureaucratic leaderships perform like diplomats defending their particular and contradictory “national” interests. The concept of revolutionary internationalism is the one that suffered most during the period that permitted the rise of Stalinism, and it remains the idea which has made least progress during the years of decomposition of Stalinism. The bureaucratic rule and political control of the Stalin period held down to a great extent the necessary organisation which would assure the political unity of the mass struggle. This unity is now more urgent than ever in a world where every major struggle acquires an international importance, where tension inflamed in any corner of the globe can provoke the most formidable international consequences.

In such conditions where the world revolution is a living fact, where revolutionary Marxism is being confirmed and enriched beyond all expectation, the organisation which is its embodiment, the Fourth International, maintains a numerical weakness in paradoxical contrast to the strength of the ideas which it defends.

Too slowly for our minds, but definitely nonetheless this contradiction is being removed. The international crisis of Stalinism is also an expression of a tendency towards a renewal of revolutionary leadership in the world. But there is nothing automatic about this process of constructing a new leadership, and an essential element of it is still the life of the Fourth International today, of its organised cadres, who have always pursued the tasks initiated by the Bolsheviks and the Communist International. It has continually participated in and identified itself with the mass struggles.

It has above all, shown its democratic structure by the regular holding of Congresses. Since the end of the World War, these have taken place in 1948, 1951, 1954, 1957, 1960, and 1963. The democratic confrontation of conflicting opinions on various aspects of the world situation has taken place in our movement. The Fourth International has certainly known its difficult moments. The vast forces which weigh on the whole world and which everywhere provoke tension and division have certainly not passed us by. Bound up with the upsurge of revolutionary activity in the world, the last Congress has just surmounted a troublesome division which had affected it for ten years. The significance of this decision is that it will certainly lead to considerable numerical increases, especially in view of the fact that this rapprochement is the fruit of a strict appraisal of current problems in a world so full of revolutionary promise. It is at one and the same time a common understanding of the powerful movement of hitherto colonial people, and a wish to bind ourselves to these movements, to participate in them, and thus to help render powerful blows to the capitalist system, whilst enriching Marxism on the basis of new experiences of mankind, unforeseen in the classics of Marxism.

There is also a common perspective regarding the momentous events which are jolting the Worker's States, particularly the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties. The Fourth International is rediscovering its basis there, on ground where all the savagery of Stalinism could not destroy the traditions of October, traditions perpetuated in the name of Trotskyism.

Finally there is full confidence in a renewal of the best revolutionary traditions in that country where the workers' movement was born, a confidence in Socialism and the Workers' International. The emergence after such a period of young people rebelling against the apparatus testifies that this renewal cannot be now far distant.

The reunification of the International Trotskyist movement has been increasingly sought after by all Trotskyists conscious of the eminently revolutionary character of the present age, and aware that old divisions emanated from protracted differences which considerably reduced the possibility of the Fourth International's intervention in events. The obstacles which hampered the road to unification arose from groups essentially incapable of seeing current events in their entirety—an entirety affected by the rise of the movement against Imperialism in the underdeveloped countries and the forces which are shaking the bureaucracies in the workers states. By an overwhelming majority the Trotskyist forces of the world today find themselves in agreement at the end of a period of negotiation, and are uniting to act as a single Fourth International, an International more than ever faithful to its past, acting as a World Party and ruled by Democratic Centralism.

This reunification is not just the simple amalgam of people added together from fused organisations. This reunification cannot fail to affect all those aware of the strength of the Trotskyist movement in the realm of ideas, and has been brought about precisely because of the divisions which have affected the International. The Fourth International addresses itself precisely to these people in order that they can rejoin its sections and help intensify their activities.

The regroupment and increased cohesion of the World Trotskyist forces are the principal gains of the World Congress of Reunification of the Fourth International, and will find their daily echo amongst the increasing number of militants, bridging the divergences and difficulties and ensuring the transition of the Fourth International, the world organisation of cadres, whose historical validity has been proved, to a position where it will lead the masses to triumph in the World Socialist Revolution.

# THE DYNAMICS OF WORLD REVOLUTION TODAY

*(Adopted by the Reunification Congress of the Fourth International,  
June 1963.)*

## I.

### THE GENERAL BACKGROUND

#### 1.

THE classical scheme of world revolution assumed that the victory of socialism would occur first in the most industrially developed countries, setting an example for the less developed. "The more advanced countries show the more backward ones their own future," wrote Marx. For the victory of socialism, Marxism generally held that a highly developed industrial base and a powerful proletariat as well as a strong and politically conscious labour movement were indispensable objective and subjective preconditions which could appear only with the full development of capitalism.

It is true that after the revolution of 1848, Marx voiced some misgivings about one of the political assumptions underlying this schema; namely, the capacity of the bourgeoisie to carry out a classical bourgeois-democratic revolution in countries where capitalism is still immature but where a modern proletariat already exists. Later Engels further undermined this schema when he pointed out that the relative weakness of political consciousness among the British working class was due precisely to the fact that Britain was the most advanced capitalist country, holding a world monopoly on high productivity.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Trotsky in 1905 in his theory of permanent revolution, which held that the working class would find itself compelled to carry out tasks historically belonging to the bourgeoisie, and Lenin in 1914 in his theory of imperialism which included the view that the imperialist chain would break first at its weakest link, showed that they had come to understand the main consequence of the law of uneven and combined deve-

lopment; namely, that the proletariat might well come to power first in a backward country as a result of the contradictions of the world capitalist system, as a whole. Both Lenin and Trotsky were firmly of the opinion that the victory of the revolution in such circumstances would prove to be only the prelude to the victory of the socialist revolution in the key capitalist countries and a means of facilitating the final outcome. It was in this spirit what the Bolsheviks took power in October 1917 and founded the Third International in 1919.

The revolution followed a more devious path than even its greatest theoreticians expected. We know what a heavy price mankind as a whole and the workers and peasants of the first workers states in particular have had to pay for this detour.

The betrayals by the reformist bureaucracy led to the defeat of the German and Central European revolutions of 1918-21, isolating the first victorious revolution to backward Russia and thereby paving the way for the bureaucratic degeneration of the Soviet state and the Communist International over which the Stalinist bureaucracy established tight control. The Comintern became transformed from an instrument of world revolution into an instrument of diplomatic manoeuvre in the hands of the Kremlin thereby blocking, first unintentionally and then with calculated purpose, the victory of the proletarian revolution in many promising situations in many countries. At the end of the second world war, Social-Democratic and Stalinist class-collaborationist policies, in combination with the efforts of Western imperialism, led to the stabilization of a capitalist economy and a bourgeois state in several imperialist countries where the victory of socialism was objectively possible and even imminent.

As a result of the successive failure of the two major revolutionary waves of 1919-23 and 1943-48—and of the minor one of

1934-37—the main center of world revolution shifted for a time to the colonial world. The victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, following the postwar revolutionary wave in Europe, opened an uninterrupted series of colonial revolutions. All the victorious revolutions after 1917, including the establishment of workers states through revolutionary upheavals in Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam and Cuba, thus took place in relatively backward countries while the possibility of early revolutionary victory in the imperialist countries was postponed.

## 2.

The view must be vigorously rejected that this development, unforeseen in the classics of Marxism, was more or less fatally determined by objective factors or by lack of revolutionary energy or will among the workers in the imperialist countries. No one can seriously deny that since 1917 various mass upsurges and even uprisings of the working class made the overthrow of capitalism objectively possible in many imperialist countries. (Germany and the whole of Central Europe 1918-20, Italy 1919-21, Germany 1923, Britain 1926, Austria 1933-34, Spain 1931-37, Belgium 1932-36, France 1935-37, Italy 1943-48, France 1944-48, Britain 1945-50, etc.). Nor can it reasonably be denied that in innumerable general strikes, occupations of factories, mass demonstrations that have toppled governments, and even insurrections threatening the foundations of bourgeois state power, that the proletariat of the imperialist countries (excepting the United States) has shown again and again its understanding of the general need to reconstruct society along socialist lines and its willingness to carry out the task. The failure of all these attempts is not due to any innate incapacity, to any political "backwardness" or to "corruption," but to the treacherous role of the official leadership which has repeatedly preferred not to utilize the objective possibility of taking power, or to deliberately destroy that possibility. The European proletariat has been hit harder by such betrayals than any other sector of the world working class as is clearly shown in the cases of Germany and Spain.

The crisis of revolutionary leadership exists, of course, in the colonial and semi-colonial countries as well as in the advanced countries. Many defeated or aborted revolutions bear witness to this crisis—from the Chinese Revolution of 1925-27 to the more recent defeats in Guatemala and Iraq. But in possible outcome of the struggle, a big difference is evident between inadequate leadership in a backward country and similar leadership in an imperialist country: *the enemy facing the working population is immeasurably stronger in the latter.*

Confronted with the powerful and well-experienced bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries, the working class can achieve victory only under a genuine revolutionary Marxist leadership which is able: (1) to establish unity of action inside the ranks of the proletariat; (2) to mobilize to the fullest extent the latent and often hidden revolutionary potentialities of the working class; (3) to outmanoeuvre a very astute and supple capitalist-class leadership which has learned how to transform reforms into a powerful brake upon revolutions; (4) to win over a part and neutralize another part of the petty bourgeoisie (the mass basis of capitalism in the imperialist countries) without surrendering its own class objectives. The absence of an explosive agrarian problem is an important element in strengthening and stabilizing capitalism in most imperialist countries.

The situation is different in the backward countries. Confronted by ruling classes, rotten to the core and lacking mass support, the revolution draws into struggle the mass of the working population, including the poorest peasants and pauperized petty bourgeoisie, bringing about collapse of the traditional order and its state, and exerting such pressure on centrist working-class parties and similar formations as to bring them to power.

Under anywhere near normal capitalist conditions, it should be remembered, "There do not," as Lenin said, "exist situations without a way out from an economic point of view." The failure of a revolutionary wave in an imperialist country gives way eventually to some form of temporary relative economic stabilization and

even to fresh expansion. This inevitably postpones new revolutionary uprisings for a time, the combination of political setback (or even demoralization) of the working class and a rising standard of living being unfavourable for any immediate revolutionary undertaking.

In the colonial and semicolonial countries, on the other hand, the very weakness of capitalism, the whole peculiar socio-economic structure produced by imperialism, the permanent misery of the big majority of the population in the absence of a radical agrarian revolution, the stagnation and even reduction of living standards while industrialization nevertheless proceeds relatively rapidly, create situations in which the failure of one revolutionary wave does not lead automatically to relative or even temporary social or economic stabilization. A seemingly inexhaustible succession of mass struggles continues, such as Bolivia has experienced for ten years. The weakness of the enemy offers the revolution fuller means of recovery from temporary defeats than is the case in imperialist countries.

To sum up: the victories and defeats since 1917 express the relationship of forces between the old ruling class and the toiling masses on a world scale. The fact that the revolution won first in backward countries and not in the advanced is not proof that the workers in the advanced countries have shown insufficient revolutionary combativity. It is evidence of the fact that the opposition which they have to overcome in these countries is immeasurably stronger than in the colonial and semicolonial world. The weakness of the enemy in the backward countries has opened the possibility of coming to power even with a blunted instrument. The strength of the enemy in the imperialist countries demands a tool of much greater perfection.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that the three main forces of world revolution—the colonial revolution, the political revolution in the degenerated or deformed workers states, and the proletarian revolution in the imperialist countries—form a dialectical unity. Each force influences the others and receives in return powerful impulses or brakes on its own

development. The delay of the proletarian revolution in the imperialist countries has in general undoubtedly prevented the colonial revolution from taking the socialist road as quickly and as consciously as would have been possible under the influence of a powerful revolutionary upsurge or victory of the proletariat in an advanced country. This same delay also retards the maturing of the political revolution in the USSR, especially inasmuch as it does not place before the Soviet workers a convincing example of an alternative way to build socialism. Finally, the upsurge of the colonial and political revolutions, hampered by the delay of the proletarian revolution in the West, nevertheless contributes in helping the proletariat in the imperialist countries to overcome this delay.

## II.

### THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

#### 1.

From the close of the second world war, and most noticeably after the victory of the Chinese Revolution, continual mass movements have drawn one backward country after another into the process of permanent revolution. The general causes of this wave are to be found in the weakening of the old colonial powers during and after the second world war; the attraction exercised by the advances of the Soviet Union and especially the new China; the dawning mass awareness of the wretched material and moral conditions throughout these countries; the power displayed by the movement for national independence and its identification in the eyes of the masses with the possibility of overcoming misery, living standards, low cultural levels, and exploitation and oppression of all kinds; the worsening of the international terms of trade for the countries exporting raw materials, especially since the end of the "Korean war boom"; the contrast between the enormous economic expansion of all the industrialized countries and the near stagnation (or lowering) of the standard of living of the masses in most of the colonial and semicolonial countries in the past decade—these are some of the main causes of the general upheaval in the colonial world.

As a development in world history, the colonial revolution signifies above all that two billion human beings—men, women and children in areas where the tradition for centuries has been to live as passive subjects, condemned to super oppression and to super exploitation, utter humiliation and destruction of their national traditions, even their national identity when they have not been made the target of mass slaughter and extermination—suddenly acquire a voice, a language and a personality of their own. Basically, the colonial revolution is the irrepressible tendency of those two billion human beings to become at last the masters and builders of their own destiny. The fact that this is socially possible only through a workers state provides the objective basis for the tendency of the colonial revolution to move into the tracts of permanent revolution.

In the process of world revolution, the colonial revolution—first the Chinese Revolution and then the whole chain of upheavals—has prevented any temporary stabilization of the imperialist system on a world scale such as occurred after 1921. It has turned the international relationship of forces against capitalism, forced imperialism to fight—and in most cases lose—a series of defensive battles and wars which it has launched in its efforts to halt the advance of revolution in the colonial world. It has thereby given tremendous impetus to anti-capitalist forces everywhere in the world. It has provided the Soviet Union and the other workers states the necessary breathing spell needed to overcome the qualitative advance in the military field which came into the hands of imperialism as the second world war reached its climax.

## 2.

The colonial revolution could not by its own forces bring about the downfall of imperialism. Paradoxically, it has not even been able to undermine the relative economic stability of the imperialist countries. Contrary to the general revolutionary Marxist assumption following 1919, the collapse of the colonial system did not lead to an immediate economic crisis or breakdown in the imperialist countries; it coincided with the biggest relative expansion of capitalist production and foreign trade they have experienced in half a century.

Among the multiple causes of this apparent paradox, one is of outstanding importance. So long as the newly independent states, emerging through the colonial revolution, are held by bourgeois or petty-bourgeois leaderships within the limits of the capitalist mode of production and the capitalist world market, the real power of imperialism is not broken in these countries. *Its rule merely shifts from direct to an indirect form.* As foreseen long ago by revolutionary Marxists, the basic strategy of imperialism, confronted with the colonial revolution, has been to modify its form of rule while seeking to maintain its essential content. In some cases, of course, this transformation has cost imperialism real losses and it has sought to avoid the dangerous shift in the form of its rule, sometimes by desperate and bloody colonial wars.

The transition from direct to indirect imperialist rule involves a redistribution of the surplus value produced by the colonial masses in favour of the colonial bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie at the expense of the imperialist power. Inasmuch as it also entails acceleration of the process of industrializing the colonial countries, it even signifies modification of the international division of labor, granting an increased share of the world market to the colonial bourgeoisie in the production of certain industrial consumer goods (especially textiles) and narrowing the imperialist countries in an increasing degree to the export of investment goods.

This aspect of neocolonialism corresponds to certain inherent needs of the imperialist bourgeoisie itself, the changing industrial structure forcing it to seek new markets for means of production rather than for consumption goods. So-called "aid to the under-developed countries" boils down to underwriting financially the effort to secure provisions for these needs, the expected political and social consequences being but by-products of successfully meeting the main economic necessity. But the limited nature of this industrialization process under bourgeois auspices as well as the picayune amount of imperialist "aid" leave the real needs of economic development in the colonial countries scarcely touched. Basically their socio-



economic structure thus remains as it was under direct imperialist rule. They continue substantially as producers and exporters of raw materials and foodstuffs, completely dependent on the price fluctuations of the world market. They continue to carry the burden of tremendous unemployment or under employment in the countryside. Even the limited industrialization process occurs at the cost of inflation and a lowering of real wages; i.e., at the cost of increased misery for the working masses.

Since the colonial revolution up to now has in the main been held within the framework of the capitalist world market, it has not inflicted staggering economic blows to the capitalist world economy as a whole nor touched off major economic crisis in empires. Only one imperialist economy, because of its peculiar economic structure, seems doomed to collapse the moment it loses its colonial holdings—Portugal.

But this does not mean that the colonial revolution has not affected the mechanism of imperialist economy. Its most noticeable consequence has been to slow down the export of private capital to the backward countries and to impel national or international public (government) bodies to assume the role normally undertaken by private capital in the heyday of imperialism. Grave monetary, financial and economic contradictions flow from this. In the imperialist countries in the past ten years, the reluctance of private capital—in the face of relatively rapid expansion—to export its surpluses to backward countries caught up in the process of colonial revolution has constituted a major problem. Government investment guarantees and insurance can mitigate but not overcome the block.

As long as the great majority of the newly independent countries remain within the framework of the capitalist world market, these difficulties constitute a "lesser evil" from the viewpoint of world capitalism which can be handled, more or less, within the system—at least for the time being. *Only if the main semicolonial countries were to break out of the capitalist world system by becoming workers states would the colonial revolution deliver economic*

*blows of such proportions as to rapidly create the gravest economic and social crises in the imperialist centres.*

So far as real perspectives are concerned, it is not excluded that these countries will become workers states before the political revolution triumphs in the Soviet Union and before the proletarian revolution scores a decisive victory in one or more of the important imperialist countries. However, it would be inadvisable for revolutionary socialists to base themselves on this unlikely variant. Such a perspective implies not only the continuation of the process of permanent revolution in the colonial world (which is sure to occur) but also *the victorious conclusion of this process in many countries within a specified time limit* (before victories elsewhere). A policy based arbitrarily upon any one of the many possible time sequences in the development of the three main sectors of the world revolution could lead to exceedingly grave political errors.

### 3.

The objective conditions for the process of permanent revolution in the colonial countries rests basically on the inability of the colonial bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalist leaderships to solve within the framework of the capitalist mode of production fundamental problems created by economic and cultural upsurge. This is expressed most acutely by the incapacity of capitalism to undertake radical agrarian reform. The subjective conditions are determined by the fact that the colonial masses generally do not distinguish the conquest of national independence from the conquest of a high material and cultural standard of living. As long as living conditions do not improve, independence seems incomplete, inadequate and even unreal. This means that *in the long run* no social, economic or political stabilization is possible in these countries without the victory of the socialist revolution. *Temporarily*, political stabilization can be achieved by bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalist leaderships which continue to be identified in the eyes of the masses with a real anti-imperialist struggle for national independence and which succeed in selling the masses the idea that the process of social upheaval and economic

development is actually under way. The outstanding cases of relative success in this were Peron in Argentina, Nasser in Egypt and Nehru in India. Even in these instances, the political equilibrium has proved to be quite unstable, indicating what would occur with the appearance of an alternative working-class leadership able to mobilize the general anti-imperialist feelings of the masses around basic, concrete, revolutionary goals which the traditional leadership cannot realize; for example, radical land reform in India.

For all these reasons, the most probable perspective for most of the backward countries is a succession of protracted social revolutionary crises which bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalist leaderships will desperately try to contain or to canalize but which, despite inevitable setbacks, will periodically leap over these limits. This protracted period of instability and social crisis does not imply the *automatic* victory of proletarian forces or of revolutionary peasant forces led by a Marxist leadership; that is, the *automatic* establishment of workers states. As in the case of equating the *beginning* of the colonial revolution (under bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalist leadership) with its *victorious conclusion* under proletarian leadership, any idea that this process will occur automatically or inevitably within a certain time limit necessarily leads to a distorted estimate of the actual relationship of forces and replaces scientific analysis by illusions and wishful thinking. It presupposes that the objective process will solve by itself a task which can only be solved in struggle through the subjective effort of the vanguard; i.e., revolutionary-socialist conquest of the leadership of the mass movement. That this is possible in the very process of the revolution, and in a relatively short time, has been adequately demonstrated in the case of Cuba. That it is not inevitable, and that without it the revolution is certain to suffer serious defeats or be limited at best to inconclusive victories is demonstrated by much in the recent history of other Latin-American countries; for instance, Bolivia, Argentina and Guatemala.

A more precise perspective for each of the great ethneo-geographical zones of the colonial revolution (Latin America, the

Arab world, Black Africa, the Indian sub-continent and South-East Asia) can only be worked out on the basis of a concrete analysis of the specific social and political forces at work and of their more exact economic conditions. However, certain general social trends which apply to all or most of the colonial and semicolonial countries can be indicated:

(a) **The numerical and economic weakness of the national bourgeoisie.** Despite the priority granted them by history, the national bourgeoisie has proved incapable of handling the capital made available under the rubric of "aid to the underdeveloped countries" in such a way as to achieve optimum results in industrialization. This is perhaps the biggest obstacle in the way of "bourgeois solution" of the problem of economic underdevelopment. Everywhere we find the same phenomena: Of available surplus capital, a major part is diverted from industrial uses to investment in land or usury, hoarding, import of luxury consumers goods, even outright flight abroad. This incapacity of the national bourgeoisie is not the result or mere reflection of its moral corruption but a normal operation of the capitalist drive for profits under the given economic and social conditions. Fear of permanent revolution is not the least of the motives involved.

(b) **The creation of the infrastructure of heavy industry through the state, taking the form of rationalized property.** The social layer heading and embodying this process is the urban petty bourgeoisie, especially the intellectuals, the military and state functionaries. The process favours, is even indispensable, for the development of a national bourgeois state. It can clash, however, with the interests of many parts of the old bourgeois classes in the private sector—not only the traditional compradore bourgeoisie but even the industrial bourgeoisie. This is the explanation for the anti-capitalist demagoguery and nationalizations of bourgeois enterprises undertaken in countries like Egypt, Ghana, etc. The functioning of the state in this field constitutes the objective basis for the "socialism" of Nehru and even Nasser, whatever the other differences between the two regimes. The general capitalist character of the economy remains clear cut in such countries,

however, as long as (i) the state apparatus itself and the nationalized sectors remain feeding grounds for private accumulation of capital and private industrial enterprise (through corruption, theft, outright gifts, subsidies, etc.); (ii) the national economy continues to be geared to the capitalist world market; (iii) petty commodity production, constantly reproducing capital accumulation, prevails in the countryside.

(c) **The strategic role of the colonial proletariat.** In view of the peculiar socio-economic structure of these countries, the main strength of the proletariat does not lie among the industrial factory workers, who, with the exception of Argentina, form only a minority of the wage earners and a tiny fraction of the active working population of these countries. The colonial proletariat must be taken as the sum total of all those who live completely or essentially from the sale of their labour power that is, industrial factory workers, public service workers, domestic workers, miners, plantation hands, agricultural workers and the rural and urban workers who find only partial or occasional employment. The emphasis should be placed on the latter four categories—the miners, plantation hands, agricultural workers and largely unemployed—typical for the colonial economy. They are numerically much stronger than generally supposed. Even in some countries of Black Africa (Rhodesia, South Africa, Angola, Congo) they constitute from one-fourth to three-fifths of the population. In the case of the Cuban Revolution, while poor peasants were the first recruits to the guerrilla forces, the base of the revolution shifted to field workers and rural unemployed, fusing finally with the proletariat of the sugar industry and the cities. Part of the explanation for the high level of consciousness which the Cuban Revolution rapidly attained lies in the composition of its mass base.

(d) **The radical role of the peasantry.** In the form of expanding guerrilla forces, the peasantry has undoubtedly played a much more radical and decisive role in the colonial revolution than was forecast in Marxist theory. It has revealed a social nature somewhat different from that of the traditional peasantry of the advanced capitalist countries. However, to prevent any

misunderstanding or confusion, which in certain situations could lead to tragic errors (witness what happened in China after the introduction of the people's communes!), two basic distinctions must be made.

First, the distinction between the *revolutionary* role of the peasantry fighting for the conquest of land as private property (even though brought together through co-operatives) and the *conservative* role of the peasantry in the phase of the socialist transformation of property relations in the countryside. Experience in Eastern Europe and also in China has confirmed the lesson learned in Russia that wherever the peasantry stands in the forefront of the fight against the old landlord-usurer-compradore alliance in order to become master of the land, it can *as a class* be the ally of the proletariat only as long as the workers state refrains from introducing socialist property relations in the countryside. Such relations can be based only on the *poorest* sector of the peasant class and can therefore be introduced only *gradually* in a country where agriculture prevails, if grave social crises are to be avoided. It should be noted, too, that the peasantry is not universally revolutionary. The existence of a large majority of small land-owning peasants has undoubtedly served as a momentary brake on the revolutionary process in several South-East Asian countries (Malaya, Thailand, even Ceylon).

Second, the distinction between the *ingrained individualism* of the classical peasantry with a background of centuries of petty commodity production—either possessing land or aspiring to possess it; and the *predisposition toward collectivism* among rural populations still living under conditions of total or partial tribal (communal) property. This class, in contrast to the traditional peasantry, is not *per se* opposed to the introduction of socialist property relations in the countryside. It therefore remains an ally of the proletariat throughout the whole process of permanent revolution. In certain countries its existence can give a peasant uprising a powerful, semiproletarian character from the outset. Even in a favourable situation such as this, however, the level of consciousness of these masses should not be idealized. Miserably oppressed, having virtually literally “nothing

to lose but their chains," these masses can offer humanity the most shining examples of revolutionary heroism and self-sacrifice. But only education under a capable Marxist leadership and a workers state can make it possible for them to achieve revolutionary-socialist consciousness, especially the essential components of discipline, self-management and modern industrial rationality.

To win leadership among the colonial masses, the revolutionary Marxist vanguard must learn how to bring the basically progressive aspirations of the toiling masses into intimate connection with the program of revolutionary socialism. The constant struggle to educate the proletariat of the imperialist countries in the need to support the colonial revolution unconditionally must be linked with practical activity in bringing material aid to the colonial revolution. Among the freedom fighters in the colonial countries, it is a primary task to raise elementary revolutionary consciousness to the level of scientific socialism and an understanding of the dialectical interaction among the three main sectors of the world revolution today. All this cannot be achieved through some automatic process. It is an absolute necessity to educate revolutionary Marxist cadres and to build tendencies and independent parties wherever possible in all colonial countries. The building of sections of the Fourth International capable of working out concrete analyses of their specific national situations and finding concrete solutions to the problems remains a central strategic task in all countries.

#### 4.

To determine the place of the colonial revolution today in the general process of the world revolution, it is insufficient to take into consideration its consequences only in the politico-military field, where it has struck imperialism staggering blows, or in the economic area, where it has not yet seriously undermined the world economy of capitalism. We must also examine the effects of the colonial revolution on the relationship of class forces in the imperialist countries, particularly on the working-class movement, and on the conflicting

social and political forces in the bureaucratically deformed or degenerated workers states.

In most of the imperialist countries, the colonial revolution up to now has not significantly modified the relationship of forces to the expense of the bourgeoisie and the gain of the proletariat. However, in the case of France it was the Algerian Revolution which—by continuing in its heroic struggle against French imperialism despite the lack of help—prevented a decisive stabilization of the bonapartist dictatorship of de Gaulle. The French working class, which received a terrible blow when de Gaulle came to power in May 1958, was given a breathing spell, precious time in which to recover its morale and begin to reassemble its forces. In Portugal, the outbreak of revolution in Angola and other colonies proved decisive in undermining the stability of the Salazar dictatorship, creating the prerevolutionary climate which has placed the overthrow of Portuguese fascism on the order of the day. The fall of Salazar would help accelerate the Spanish revolution, weaken the bonapartist regime in France and intensify the new wave of militancy in the West European labour movement.

Up to now the colonial revolution has not contributed directly toward radicalizing the mass movement in most imperialist countries; at best it has but increased the general consciousness, already widespread among significant layers, that the world capitalist system is growing relatively weaker. But it has affected vanguard elements in an immediate way, crystallizing new revolts against the waiting, passive or treacherous attitude of the old leaderships toward the colonial revolution or fresh reactions against the generally low level of politics in some imperialist countries. This has occurred not only in France where these new layers have been most vocal but also in several other European countries, especially Spain, and in the United States where the opportunity to solidarize with the Cuban Revolution has opened the door to radical politics for a new generation of vanguard elements. In the same way the influence of the colonial revolution, especially the African revolution, upon vanguard elements in the Negro movement

has helped prepare the emergence of a new radical left wing. In all these cases, it is the task of revolutionary Marxists to seek to win the best elements of this newly emerging vanguard to Trotskyism and to fuse them into the left wing of the mass movement.

The influence of the colonial revolution on the awakening masses of the workers states has been complex and many-sided. In general the colonial revolution has helped to overcome lethargy and the feeling of political impotence. The interest displayed by these masses toward the colonial revolution (primarily the Chinese Revolution but also the Algerian and Cuban revolutions since 1959) has been great and it is still increasing along with feelings of solidarity. At the same time the problems raised by the antirevolutionary strategy of the Communist parties in both colonial and imperialist countries and by the ambivalence which the ruling bureaucracies of the workers states display toward the colonial revolution have contributed toward political differentiation within the Communist parties of the workers states, at first between sections of the youth and the bureaucracy, later between the Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev factions. However, Mao Tse-tung's opportunistic and unprincipled bloc with the most conservative wing of the Soviet bureaucracy and his resistance to destroying the cult of Stalin, as particularly evidenced in the block with the Albanian CP leadership, has limited the extent and practical consequences of this differentiation among most CP's of the workers states. An additional factor is the direct effect of the colonial revolution through such forces as colonial students who find it difficult to breathe in the monolithic atmosphere of the world Communist movement, and who at times pass beyond words to deeds to express their feelings as in the student demonstrations in Moscow and Sofia. The emergence of mass revolutionary forces led by parties or tendencies which have developed outside the realm of Stalinist control (Cuba, Algeria) has introduced a most powerful disintegrating element into international Stalinism, favouring the development of a revolutionary left wing.

## 5.

If the direct economic and political effect of the colonial revolution has not been strongly felt in the imperialist countries, the establishment of workers states in China, North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba has had powerful ramifications among the Communist parties and in the formation of revolutionary leadership as a whole.

The Yugoslav and Chinese Communist parties failed to develop their "tendency" on a wide international scale for a number of specific reasons. The Yugoslavs sought a close, opportunistic alliance with the national bourgeoisie of the colonial and semicolonial countries. This effectively barred an alliance with the fighting elements of the colonial revolution. In Western Europe they took an opportunistic attitude toward the reformist bureaucracies, with parallel crippling effects on linking up with the revolutionary proletarian movement. Progressive development inside Yugoslavia, however, have had considerable repercussions among the workers states. For instance, "revival" of workers councils has resounded especially in Poland and Hungary even though this important step is limited by the fact that the councils do not wield political power.

The Chinese Communist party has scored some successes among the Communist parties of the colonial world where Peking has special appeal because of its antagonism to some (not all) of the national bourgeoisies. In the imperialist centers and in the workers states, the Chinese appeal has been much more limited because of the unprincipled alliance with the unreconstructed Stalinists and because of the bureaucratic regime maintained in China. On these two key issues militant workers in the metropolitan centers, and workers, youth and peasants of the workers states, feel alienated from the Chinese. However, the criticisms levelled at Togliatti and similar figures have met with a favourable response among the ranks of many Communist parties.

The victory in Cuba marked the beginning of a new epoch in the history of the world revolution; for, aside from the Soviet Union, this is the first workers state es-

tablished outside the bounds of the Stalinist apparatus. Such a development, whatever the size of the country involved, was a turning point whose effects have necessarily reverberated on a tremendous scale throughout the whole world Communist movement.

In fact an international Castroist current has appeared inside the world Communist and revolutionary-socialist movement which, as was to be expected, is strongest in the colonial areas, especially Latin America and Africa. It is also noticeable in the other workers states. In Algeria the influence of Castroism again testifies to the importance of the Cuban development.

Except in Spain and Portugal, Castroism has not had great impact in Europe. Its influence in other metropolitan centers such as the United States and Japan is likewise limited. One of the reasons for this is that the Cuban leadership has not yet reached an understanding of how it can best facilitate revolutionary rebirth in these areas.

The appearance of more workers states through further development of the colonial revolution, particularly in countries like Algeria, would help strengthen and enrich the international current of Castroism, give it longer range perspectives and help bring it closer to understanding the necessity for a new revolutionary Marxist international of mass parties. Fulfillment of this historic possibility depends in part on the role which the Fourth International plays in the colonial revolution and the capacity of sections of the Fourth International to help win fresh victories.

The infusion of Trotskyist concepts in this new Castroist current will also influence the development of a conscious revolutionary leadership, particularly in the workers states, will help prevent "Titoist" deviations and better assure the evolution of mass pressure and direct action into the cleansing force of political revolution. The development of the Portuguese and Spanish revolutions, historically possible in a short period, can also give rise to new tendencies of the Castroist type which would help the Cubans and related currents to achieve a fuller understanding of the process of world revolution in its entirety.

### III.

## THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION

### 1.

The mounting political passivity and apathy of the Soviet masses after 1923 was determined by two basic factors: the defeat of the international revolution and the consequent isolation of the first workers state, and the low living standard of the masses due to the backwardness of Russia. These forced the soviet masses to become preoccupied over the daily struggle to make ends meet. The feeling that under these same conditions the Soviet state remained in mortal danger of attack from world imperialism contributed to the political passivity.

Since the decisive turn in the world relationship of forces brought about by the victory of the Chinese Revolution, all the factors that favoured political apathy among the Soviet masses have been steadily undermined; the conditions favouring a rise in mass political interest and militancy have been maturing. The isolation of the first workers state has been broken, not only in Europe but in Asia and the whole world. The rapid rise in the living standards of the masses since Stalin's death—a result of growing mass pressure on the bureaucracy under conditions of increased technological and economic progress—has enabled the people to devote part of their energies to cultural and political aims. The emergence of the Soviet Union as the second industrial power of the world, even holding the lead in several technological fields, has made its relatively low standard of living all the more incongruous and has served to stimulate increased economic demands. The threat of imperialist attack remains, and the bureaucracy uses this threat quite consciously to periodically silence the voices of opposition. However, the masses cannot help but feel the new power and standing of the Soviet Union in world affairs in the epoch of missile warfare when the leaders of the bureaucracy themselves continually boast of their ability to inflict a crushing defeat on the imperialist warmongers.

The evolution of the workers states as a whole since the victory of the Chinese

Revolution in 1949 and especially after Stalin's death in 1953 has therefore steadily removed the causes that fostered political passivity among the masses and their vanguard. In the East European workers states this development was hastened, although made more complex, by a strong feeling of national oppression among the masses. All these new factors contributed to such events as the June 16-17, 1953, general strike and uprising in Eastern Germany, to the Poznan events in the spring of 1956 in Poland, to the beginning of the political revolution in Poland and Hungary in October 1956, to the renewal of political militancy among some layers of the workers vanguard and oppositional Communists during the "hundred flowers bloom" period in China in early 1957, to the increasing pressure of the Soviet masses on the bureaucracy which won the concessions of 1953 (breaking up of the GPU power, dissolution of the slave-labour camps and a radical modification of the oppressive factory labour code), then the denunciation of the Stalin cult in 1956 at the Twentieth Congress and a continuous rise since 1953 in the mass standard of living as a result of radical changes in the bureaucracy's general economic policy, and finally the important new political concessions granted at the Twenty-second Congress, new political rights written into the new party program, partial public rehabilitation of the victims of Stalin's purges, etc.).

Mass pressure in the Soviet Union began with a general revolt against the most barbaric and arbitrary forms of Stalin's bonapartist dictatorship, in which all social layers participated. The pressure then began to become differentiated in the economic field, all social layers participating, but each with its own set of demands. From this, the movement advanced toward specific political demands, first from the ranks of the bureaucracy who demanded and obtained a stabilizing of conditions for the bureaucracy as individuals. This was done by widening the participation in the exercise of political power. Those reforms were welcomed by the workers. The first rumblings from the peasantry were demands for kolkhoz democracy, voiced publicly here and there in the Soviet Union. The ferment among the intellectuals and students, which is expressed around such issues as

freedom in art and scientific research, foreshadows demands for political democracy. Certain sectors of the bureaucracy have indicated awareness of the objective need to loosen the Stalinist stranglehold on the productive forces the better to meet the threatening military and technological advances of U.S. imperialism.

As yet, such key demands as workers management in the factories and the establishment of control through democratically elected councils have not been raised. But it is only a question of time until they begin to appear. One reason for the sensitivity of the Soviet bureaucracy toward "Yugoslav revisionism" is fear of the attraction which Yugoslav experimentation with the workers councils and self-management can hold for the advanced Soviet workers, youth, intellectuals, and even the lower layers of the bureaucracy, especially the lower ranks of the trade-union officialdom, who are in direct contact with the proletariat.

It is necessary to distinguish clearly between generalized mass pressure, the beginning of mass actions (invariably of reformist character), and the opening of the real political revolution. This distinction is not always easily made in the heat of events since it involves successive stages of one and the same process, each linked to the next and without clear boundary lines. This was clearly borne out in the case of the Polish events in 1956 and the actions leading to the first phase of the Hungarian Revolution. Nevertheless, a few generalizations can be made concerning the Soviet Union.

In the first place, the dominant trend since 1953 has been *mass pressure* rather than *mass action*. There are some outstanding exceptions: The revolt at Vorkuta and other slave-labour camps probably played a decisive role in hastening the liquidation of this whole utterly reactionary system. Some local strikes wrenched considerable concessions for the workers in housing and better distribution of consumer goods. Certain actions by students, youth groups and vanguard intellectuals may have contributed in bringing about the political concessions made to the mass at the Twenty-second Congress. But in general the pres-

sure on the bureaucracy has remained below the level of mass actions: The pressure of a formidable mass of people, slowly awakening to political life, is of course a sufficient nightmare to the bureaucracy to wring substantial concessions.

Far from satisfying the masses and lulling them into apathy, the concessions have only whetted appetites. The discontent of the masses over their low standard of living is certainly more vocal, if not actually greater in force, than it was before Stalin's death. Such seemingly paradoxical phenomenon is well known in capitalist countries. What the concessions have gained for the bureaucracy is a *General reformist atmosphere*, especially since the Hungarian events, an atmosphere in which the masses expect that continued pressure will be rewarded by substantial new concessions. They do not yet see the need or possibility of broader mass actions the scope of which would reach revolutionary proportions.

This atmosphere can perhaps last for some time, but it will not last forever. Two forces inherent in the current dialectical relation between mass pressure and bureaucratic reforms tend to undermine it. The first force is the inclination of the masses to convert into reality the political rights conceded to them on paper. At a certain point this can lead to open collision with powerful sectors of the bureaucracy. The second force is the tendency of mass demands to evolve into demands for workers control and workers management. Pressure along this line was reflected in a manifest way for the first time in the Central Committee of the Communist party at its November 1962 plenum. In fact, the greater the concessions before the stage of open clashes is reached, and the stronger the Soviet economy becomes, the more decisive will be the character of the clashes and the more favourable the relationship of forces for the masses at the time of the political revolution.

## 2.

In analyzing the interaction between the three components of the world revolution—the colonial revolution, the political revolution (above all in the Soviet Union), and the proletarian revolution in the imperialist countries—the *time element* is of decisive

importance. Even without the restoration of proletarian democracy, the Soviet Union exercises enormous attractive power on the masses of the colonial countries—if only because the Soviet Union proves what can be done in less than a half century to bring a backward country up to the level of an advanced industrial country in economic development and improved standard of living. Should a revolutionary-socialist leadership resume power in the Soviet Union in the not too distant future, with the consequent establishment of socialist democracy internally and revolutionary solidarity abroad the process of *fusing the colonial revolution with the workers states would be tremendously speeded up.*

This would take a double form in practice. The new Soviet leadership would end Moscow's general current strategy which is to depend on *alliances with the colonial bourgeoisie*. Naturally the new leadership would continue the Leninist policy of giving critical support and material assistance to bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalist leaderships in open conflict with imperialism. What it would put a stop to is the reactionary policy of subordinating the revolutionary vanguard to the national bourgeoisie. Removing this source of political and material strength, would hasten loss of control by the colonial capitalist class over the decisive sectors of mass opinion. The other side of the same policy would be rejection of the opportunist leadership in control of most of the Communist parties in the colonies today whose main strength lies in identification with the Soviet Union. The new Soviet leadership would assist those oppositional forces within the Communist parties that want to make a decisive turn to the left, or it would support the new revolutionary proletarian forces now springing up outside the traditional Communist parties, especially in countries where they are either very weak or utterly compromised in the eyes of the colonial masses because of their past errors or betrayals. In both ways the conquest of leadership of the colonial revolution by genuine revolutionary proletarian forces would be greatly facilitated and along with it, under favourable objective conditions, the tendency of the colonial revolution to end in the establishment of workers states would be greatly accelerated.



An early victory of the political revolution in the Soviet Union would at the same time hasten the process of proletarian revolution inside the imperialist countries in an even more decisive manner. The re-establishment of Soviet democracy in the USSR on a higher level—signifying for the first time since the early twenties a regime of real democracy and intellectual freedom, qualitatively superior to the most democratic bourgeois states—would end at one stroke the main objection against communism held by class-conscious workers in the imperialist countries. It would lead rapidly to the disappearance of the bureaucratic Stalinist leadership in the old CP's which would split in various directions, principally into a left-reformist wing and a genuine revolutionary-socialist wing. In countries like France and Italy, where the Communist parties, despite their opportunism, continue to control the mass movement, this would mean rapid development of a revolutionary mass party which would put the proletarian conquest of power on the agenda at the first favourable objective occasion. In countries where the Communist parties are weak secondary forces, it would favour the emergence of a revolutionary-socialist mass movement through the fusion of the left wing in the Social Democratic parties—attracted by the reborn Soviet democracy—and the best elements among the old CP militants. In this way the crisis of revolutionary leadership could eventually be overcome and new objectively revolutionary situations would open the road for the victory of the proletariat.

However entrancing the picture of the world-wide consequences of an *early* victory of the political revolution in the Soviet Union may be, the process may prove to be longer drawn out than we desire. It would of course be an error for Marxist revolutionary forces to stake everything on this one card, meantime overlooking the very real opportunities for break through in the colonial and imperialist countries before the political revolution in the USSR succeeds. Consequently it is advisable to take into account the effect which continuous technological and economic progress of the USSR and the other workers states can have on the world revolutionary process in the absence of an early victory.

## 3.

As already stated, the continuous economic and cultural rise of the workers states has an important effect in undermining the confidence of the colonial masses in any "capitalist way" of solving the problem of underdevelopment and in increasing their confidence in the socialist solution of this problem. Economic progress, especially of the Soviet Union, increases the weight of the workers states in the world economy, enabling them to break the imperialist monopoly of buying primary products from many backward countries, and putting them in position to offer an attractive alternative to the onerous imperialist grants of equipment and development projects. The further technological and economic advance of the workers states objectively favours the colonial revolution and the tendency, in the throes of this revolution, to break away from the capitalist world market. The example of Cuba shows this very clearly. It is evident that the sudden imperialist blockade and attempt to force Cuba to its knees when Washington refused to buy any more Cuban sugar would have been enormously more effective if the USSR and China had not been able to come forward as alternative customers.

The increasing weight of the workers states on the world market is quite far as yet from enabling them to play a larger role than imperialism in the foreign trade of the backward countries as a whole. It is little likely that the combined economic power of the workers states will surpass the combined economic power of the highly industrialized countries of the West for some years to come, unless of course a revolutionary victory occurs in the main imperialist sector. It must not be forgotten that the USSR and China are not economically complementary to the underdeveloped countries to such a high degree as are the West European capitalist powers. It should also be observed that as long as the political revolution does not score a decisive victory in the USSR, the Soviet bureaucracy will not be prone to utilize to the fullest extent the revolutionary possibilities that are opened up with the increasing economic power of the workers states, since this conflicts with the orientation of an alliance with the colonial bourgeoisie.

The view that the economic and technological advances of the workers states can in themselves modify the relationship of forces between the classes in the imperialist countries or contribute decisively to the overthrow of capitalism in these countries, must be rejected as false. The positive results upon capitalist society in the West of such advances can be felt objectively in increased competition for foreign markets for some industrial products, and subjectively in the slow disappearance of many reactionary prejudices against communism which were created or aroused by the crimes of Stalinism. The subsidence of prejudices will become more noticeable as the living standards of the Soviet masses come closer to those of Western Europe. But neither effect is sufficient to rehabilitate small and discredited Communist parties or to miraculously swing the opportunistic bureaucratic leadership of the mass Communist parties in France, Italy and Greece into a revolutionary orientation.

The main contribution to the development of the proletarian revolution in the imperialist countries remains therefore the effect in the labour movement of the crisis of Stalinism and the technological and economic gains of the USSR. This is evident in the growing differentiation inside the Communist parties, the possibility of real mass opposition tendencies developing within some of these parties, the increased possibility of mergers between the revolutionary Marxist vanguard and the leftward-moving mass of militants in some of these parties, and the rapid disappearance of anti-Trotskyist prejudices inside many Communist parties as a result of the decisions of the Twentieth and Twenty-second Congresses.

#### IV.

### THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN THE IMPERIALIST COUNTRIES

#### 1.

Since the postwar revolutionary upsurge in Western Europe and the postwar strike wave in the United States, great changes have taken place in the labour movement and in the objective conditions it faces in the imperialist countries. Contrary to the

expectations of both Marxist and non-Marxist economists, the capitalist economy of the advanced industrialized countries, including Japan, underwent an expansion not experienced since the first world war; i.e., for nearly half a century. The interaction of such economic growth and the treacherous opportunist policies of the traditional working-class leaderships in Western Europe and the trade-union bureaucracy in the U.S., in the absence of an alternative revolutionary leadership, made possible the temporary relative stabilization of capitalism in Europe. The main center of the revolutionary movement thereupon shifted for the time being to the colonial countries.

This temporary development fostered both revisionist and defeatist views of the proletarian revolution in the imperialist countries. Each of these standpoints rules out the possibility of the proletariat realistically struggling for power in the West for a long time to come. Since it is impossible not to note that the general world trend is running against capitalism, protagonists of these concepts expect essentially *outside forces* to eventually overcome capitalism in the imperialist centres. A theory current in leading circles among many Communist parties is that the economic progress of the USSR will eventually solve the problem of winning socialism in the West. When the living standard of the Soviet people rises above the living standards of the West European and North American workers, then these workers will automatically turn toward communism. Another theory, voiced more or less consciously by ideologists like Sweezy and Sartre, is that the colonial revolution will eventually bring down imperialism and that the vanguard in the advanced capitalist countries cannot play a much bigger role than actively aiding the colonial revolutionists.

Both theories are based on a single wrong assumption; i.e., that it is impossible for the Western proletariat to fulfill its historic mission in the next decades. This pessimistic assumption is then made less bitter by assuming that there are other alternatives which should be taken as goals of action. Under careful analysis, however, the imagined alternatives do not stand up as realistic.

Even if the USSR's *per capita* production overtakes that of the United States within the next ten years, at least another decade will be needed to overtake U.S. *per capita* standard of living, since this is a combination of current production and past accumulation of consumer goods and public welfare provisions. A catastrophic fall in the living standard of the American and West European workers due to a major economic crisis would, of course, change this perspective. But then it is obvious that the revolutionary consequences of the crisis would be much more important than the attractive power that might be exercised by Soviet economic growth.

Even if the USSR's *per capita* standard of living becomes the highest in the world, it does not follow that this in itself would break down capitalism in the West, for it would not automatically lead to depressions, economic decline and a lowering of the workers' standard of living. Those who defend this theory start from the wrong assumption that the proletariat in the West is basically "satisfied" with the present economic "prosperity" and lacks awareness of the deeper aspects of the alienation that permeates capitalist society.

As for the capacity of the colonial revolution by itself to cause the downfall of Western imperialism—we have already analysed the reasons why this is an unrealistic perspective.

The truth is that both these defeatist theories concerning the revolutionary potential of the Western proletariat lead in the final analysis to the absurd conclusion that imperialism is still assured of a long period of stable existence

The basic fallacy in all variations of these theories is their crude mechanistic economic determinism. The unspoken premise is that a working class enjoying a relatively high standard of living is unwilling or unable to fight for the overthrow of capitalism. The assumption is groundless both theoretically and empirically. On the level of theory it should be clear that the attitude of the workers is determined by many forces among which the *absolute level* of the standard of living is only one among other determinants. It makes a world of difference whether a

high standard of living is the result of working-class struggles, and therefore appears as *a series of conquests that must be defended* or whether it appears to the workers to be a "gift" from a "beneficent" set of masters. In the first case a high standard of living can give powerful impulsion to militancy rather than acting as a brake; in the second case a high standard of living can have a demoralizing effect, feeding the class-collaborationist illusions cultivated by the bourgeois spokesmen and the ideologists of the right wing of the labour movement. On the empirical level, Marx gathered considerable material showing the revolutionary effect on the British workers when they won the ten-hour day in the past century. Rosa Luxemburg called attention to the revolutionary effect of all fundamental trade-union achievements. Recent strike waves in Belgium, Spain and Italy—spear-headed by the *best-paid workers*—again proves that it is quite false to hold that the highest paid workers are automatically "corrupted" by "capitalist prosperity".

What both theory and experience do prove is that the most revolutionary consequences follow not so much from the *absolute level* of real wages and living standards as from their *relative short-time fluctuations*. Attempts to lower even slightly a hard-won high level, or the widespread fear that such an attempt is in preparation, can under certain conditions touch off great class actions that tend to pass rapidly from the defensive to the offensive stage and put on the agenda struggles of an objectively prerevolutionary significance around transitional slogans. Such struggles may even lead to revolutionary situations.

Two generations of revolutionists in the West have been educated in the belief that revolutionary situations in industrialized countries coincide with big crisis or complete breakdowns of the capitalist economy and state such as occur in war or military defeat (Germany and Central Europe after World War I, Greece, France and Italy after World War II). But again theory and history prove that this is but one road to possible revolutionary crisis in a highly developed industrial country. The big strike wave of 1936—37, and along with it the Spanish Revolution, came neither at the end of a war nor at the peak of major economic

breakdown. They came in the period of relative economic recovery between the two big crisis of 1929 and 1938. A whole series of contributing factors—the most important being the threat of fascism and the desire of the workers to make up for the suffering borne during the big economic crisis—gave this strike wave a pre-revolutionary character in the U.S. and Belgium and a revolutionary character in France. In the imperialist countries in the next five to ten years such revolutionary crisis and opportunities are much more likely to occur than crisis of the the breakdown type of 1918—19 or 1944-48.

No Marxist, of course, will deny that a long period of economic "prosperity" brings changes in the proletariat's mode of life and thought. Habits formed during long periods of misery—indifference toward personal property in consumer goods, the tendency to express immediate solidarity in sharing money, the acceptance of daily sacrifices as normal, the indifference and hostility toward many institutions and the whole superstructure of capitalism—gradually disappear. New habits and ways of thinking appear which, to superficial observers, seem "petty bourgeois." It is a mistake, however, to approach these changes from an abstract "moral" point of view—the idealization of misery, degradation and the reduction of needs to purely physiological levels is wrong in theory and very dangerous in practice! New ways of thinking and acting are important *only as they serve to retard or advance the class struggle under given conditions*. The automobile of the American worker—taken not so long ago by many people as the symbol of the "petty-bourgeois mentality of the American proletariat"—became the instrument of a completely new and radical strike technique at the end of World War II. The scooter and motor-bike of the European worker appeared during the Belgian general strike in the form of flying strike squads, an embryo of the future revolutionary defense guards of the Belgian proletariat.

If some of the obviously fine qualities of the undernourished proletariat of yesterday seem to have disappeared among Western workers, other good new qualities have appeared, precisely as a result of the higher standard of living and culture gained by the proletariat in the West. The gap between

the knowledge of the skilled worker and the bourgeois technician has virtually disappeared or been greatly reduced. Technologically the Western worker is much more capable of socialist self-management today than was his father or grandfather; and he feels more strongly the need to play a conscious, leading role in the process of production.

It is also easier for today's worker to reach an understanding of the over-all economic interaction among all the factors, the interwining of all economic problems and the needs and practical purposes of socialist planning. The increase in leisure time in many countries also means the increased possibility to participate on a mass scale in political administration, something that never existed in the past. It is not for Marxists to deny the basic Marxist truth that capitalism is the great educator of the workers for socialism, at least on the economic field.

## 2.

The mechanism through which pre-revolutionary or even revolutionary situations can arise in the framework of the relatively stabilized capitalist economics of the Western imperialist countries can be briefly stated as follows:

After a first period of rapid economic expansion fed essentially by the war preparations, by the need for reconstruction (both absolute and relative; *i.e.*, rebuilding destroyed cities and plants, modernizing outmoded equipment) in Europe and Japan, and by the big wave of technological revolution spurred by both reconstruction and preparations for a new world war, the economies of the imperialist countries have now entered a period in which the forces of expansion are slowly spending themselves and in which competition among the newly equipped imperialist countries is sharpening in a world market that is relatively smaller as a result of the victories in the colonial revolution and the economic expansion of the workers states. This increased competition, heightened still further by the constitution of the Common Market in Western Europe, will strengthen the inevitable tendency for the average rate of profit to decline. (In the final analysis this tendency

is a consequence of the new technological revolutions; *i.e.*, of the higher organic composition of capital.)

In reaction to these tendencies, the capitalist class will seek periodically to ameliorate its positions in the competitive struggle by slowing down the rate of increase of real wages, by freezing wages, or even by trying to reduce real wages, especially, in the imperialist countries where the workers enjoy the highest relative wages. The response of the proletariat to these attacks can lead to great struggles that will tend to move toward pre-revolutionary and even revolutionary situations, provided that the working class, or at least its broad vanguard, has sufficient self-confidence to advance the socialist alternative to the capitalist way of running the economy and the country. This in turn hinges essentially on the activity and influence of a broad left wing in the labour movement that educates the vanguard in the necessity of struggling for this socialist alternative and that builds up self-confidence and an apparatus capable of revolutionary struggle through a series of successful partial struggles.

This is, of course, only a generalized pattern in which various particular variants should be included: the possibility of the working class reacting violently against an attempt to limit or suppress its fundamental political and trade-union rights (against an attempt to impose a "strong" state or against an emergent fascist danger); the possibility of a swift reaction to a sudden financial or political crisis; the possibility of mass opposition against an attempt to launch a new colonial war, or against general preparations, for war, etc. The essential point for revolutionary Marxists is to link up the program of revolutionary socialism with the masses through a series of transitional demands corresponding to the specific conditions of each country and through intimate ties with the mass movement. The objective is to stimulate and broaden mass struggles to the utmost and to move as much as possible toward playing a leading role in such struggles, beginning with the most elementary demands and seeking to develop them in the direction of transitional slogans on the level of government power and the creation of bodies of dual power. (Labour to Power; For a Workers Government; a

Workers and Peasants Government; a Workers Government Based on the Trade Unions; and other variants).

In the United States the wave of working class militancy which can lead to a decisive turn in the domestic situation will in all likelihood follow a comparable pattern. It will come about as the capitalist class undermines its alliance with the trade-union bureaucracy by starting to pass on to the American working class the cost of measures required to counteract the chronic deficit of the balance of payments, mounting inflation and depreciation of the dollar accompanied by suppression of escalator clauses in collective contracts, attempts to freeze or lower real wages in order to improve the competitive position in foreign markets, increased indirect taxation of low and medium incomes, etc. The long-range tendency toward rising permanent unemployment and the relative whittling down of trade-union strength will add to the ferment. The first major moves of the capitalist class against the working class could touch off a tremendous defensive reaction, forcing some union leaders to break their alliance with the Democratic party and finally opening up the road for the appearance of a mass labour party.

The most probable variant in the next few years is, therefore, the following: the colonial revolution will continue, involving new countries and deepening its social character as more workers states appear. It will not lead directly to the overthrow of capitalism in the imperialist centres but it will play a powerful role in building a new world revolutionary leadership as is already clear from the emergence of Castroist currents. The pressure of the masses in the workers states will continue, with a tendency toward increasing mass action and the possible beginning of political revolution in several workers states. Both these developments will favourably influence the resurgence of mass militancy among the proletariat in the imperialist countries, reinforcing a tendency stemming directly from the socio-economic mechanism of advanced capitalism and the slowing down of its rate of expansion.

The possibility of a working-class victory in an imperialist country not just Portugal

or Spain but the other West European countries and Japan, Australia and Canada thus exists in the next decade. A victory in any of these countries would in turn hasten the victory of the political revolution in the key country, the USSR, if it had not already occurred, and these would react in turn to speed the victory of the American revolution. The victory of the socialist revolution in any of the advanced countries would play a decisive role in developing the economies of the backward countries at the most rapid possible rate.

## 3.

Since the close of the second world war, the imperialist powers have been engaged in feverish preparations for a third conflict. In fact imperialism has engaged in virtually constant wars, on a larger or smaller scale, in its effort to stem the advance of world revolution; the wars in China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaya, Kenya, Korea, Suez, Algeria, Laos, Angola, plus such interventions as Eisenhower's moves in Guatemala and in Lebanon and Kennedy's invasion of Cuba at Playa Giron. The master plan of launching nuclear war on the USSR and China reached dangerous levels on several occasions during the past fifteen years: during the opening stages of the cold war, again during the American invasion of North Korea, at the battle of Dien Bien-phu, during the Suez crisis, the 1960 Berlin crisis, and finally and most ominously during the fall 1962 crisis over Cuba.

Several conjunctural factors explain why imperialism has not yet launched a full-scale atomic world war, Economic expansion was still possible with the help of periodic waves of rearmament; no major economic crisis loomed as an immediate threat; the hope still exists of diverting the colonial revolution through a *de facto* alliance with an apparently "neutralist" colonial bourgeoisie. (An example is the so-called "neutral" solution of the Laos question, in which the Soviet bureaucracy assists American imperialism to impose a halt on the Laos revolution).

Other considerations gave the American imperialists pause, forcing them so postpone their timetable. At the end of World War II, the American armed forces proved unreliable

for any further wars. In the face of great protest strikes and "Get Us Home" demonstrations, they had to be brought back to the United States and a totally new force constructed. In addition, possible domestic political opposition to another war had to be contained and reduced. The years of McCarthyism cut deeply into democratic rights and civil liberties in the U.S. but it is still doubtful that the public is really conditioned to accept another world war. The experience in Korea was very revealing in this respect. It rapidly became the most unpopular war in American history, and the adventure had to be brought to a halt. The colonial revolution has played a similar role by helping to bring the Negro movement in the United States increasingly into the political arena as a potentially strong independent force which could easily link up with any moves toward a labour party among the trade unions and political opposition to another world war. The possibility of American troops becoming "contaminated" by revolutionary ideas through contact with the forces against which they must be pitted also enters into the calculations which have caused American imperialism to hesitate at going over the brink into another world war.

In addition nuclear war brings a new element to bear in war as an extension of politics—the very real possibility of suicide. A war that promises self-destruction loses its main purpose—which is victory and enjoyment of the spoils of conquest. The American imperialists have brandished the H-bomb for many years but still find themselves not quite capable of emulating Hitler in setting the torch to the funeral pyre they have put together. Thus, much as certain warmongers urge the rulers holding decisive power to take the final plunge, they have felt a still stronger compulsion to postpone the final reckoning.

Conscious of the danger that the capitalist system now faces of going down altogether, its statesmen have sought to strengthen it internally since the end of the second world war. Behind the major policies of world capitalism is the view that survival of the system can be assured, or its demise postponed, only through a world-wide strategy of defense against the forces of the world proletarian revolution. The main capitalist countries and the satellites tied to them

through interlocking military alliance NATO, SEATO, etc.) have been acting as a world capitalist police force.

But while American imperialism must necessarily mobilize world capitalism as a whole for the assault on the workers states, particularly Western Europe and Japan, the capitalist system is far from monolithic. The old imperialist powers like Britain and France, reduced to the status of mere satellites to the American colossus, may well find it highly profitable to prepare for war and to accept the American handouts needed to shore up their structures. Experience has taught them, however, that war itself is not necessarily as profitable as its preparation. And this elementary truth holds especially in the case of nuclear war which can end in the destruction of all the higher forms of life on this planet, including capitalists. They thus exhibit a strong tendency to drag their feet as doom's day draws nearer. A sudden move by de Gaulle exposes unexpectedly deep fissures in the capitalist alliances and new doubts are thrust upon the rulers of the West.

Insofar, as changes in the relationship of forces due to the colonial revolution, the class struggle in the capitalist countries, the economic situation of capitalism or the economic progress of the workers states do not threaten to put an immediate end to capitalism, a new compromise is always possible between the heads of the two main opposing camps. As long as they do not face an immediate major threat, both U.S. imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy will remain facing each other, striving to gain better positions or to avoid falling into worse ones, to strengthen their economic and military power, to acquire new allies or to avoid losing old ones, always seeking a compromise when the opponent appears ready to plunge into war. It is a dangerous game. How secure is the "security space" that each side tries to keep in reserve? It can be punctured at any time by an "error" or by a "misunderstanding" or by an act of mad folly.

In the face of nearly unanimous scientific opinion that a full-scale nuclear world war would signify the complete destruction of human civilization, if not the very physical existence of all of mankind, it is obvious

that the central strategic goal of the world labour movement cannot be a speculative victory in an atomic world war. To build communism, mankind must exist. A certain minimum material infrastructure is also necessary. Any assumption that "communist consciousness" is sufficient to build communism in a world of radioactive ruins, drops below the level of the primitive pre-Marxist utopians. *The goal must be to prevent an atomic world war.*

For a time, the development of Soviet nuclear weapons was a necessary step toward prevention of a nuclear world war. Without the Soviet A-bomb, a world war would have certainly broken out as a consequence of the local wars in either Korea or Vietnam. But at a certain point, the only means of preventing a nuclear world war is *the disarmament of imperialism by the workers of the imperialist countries.* This is feasible since atomic weapons cannot be used in a civil conflict without the capitalist class committing mass suicide—an outcome of remote possibility despite the appearance of such insane slogans as "Better dead than red."

A world nuclear war is not inevitable. The realistic alternative is to disarm imperialism by overthrowing it in its main bastions. The interacting process of colonial revolution, political revolution in the workers states and proletarian revolution in the imperialist countries has this as one of its end results. The development of this process operates in a dual way on the outlook of the imperialists. As the revolutionary forces grow stronger, the imperialists become less and less confident in their own ultimate perspective and more hesitant about staking everything on nuclear war. On the other hand the very same development increases their tendency to close their eyes to the future. When they feel that no other alternative is open but passive capitulation before the revolution, they are capable of plunging into a fatal adventure. But at a certain point, the momentum of the class struggle will place the workers in the imperialist countries in position to intervene in time and prevent imperialism from unleashing nuclear war.

In the final analysis only the victory of the proletariat in the most highly developed imperialist countries, above all the victory

of the American proletariat, can free mankind definitively from the nightmare of nuclear annihilation. This is the revolutionary-socialist solution which the Fourth International opposes to the utopian illusions of "peaceful coexistence" and "victory" in a nuclear world war. The classical alternative, socialism or barbarism, today boils down to a socialist America or the nuclear destruction of the human race.

In this way revolutionary Marxism today brings to all sectors of the world proletariat a single integrated concept of world revolution, full support to wars of liberation waged by colonial peoples being an important contribution to the coming disarmament of imperialism by the proletariat of the imperialist countries. For the same reason, transition slogans of a unilateral pacifist nature in imperialist countries, far from being "reactionary" or "utopian," as old-time pacifism was, can play an extremely progressive role provided that they are linked with other transitional slogans culminating in the working-class struggle for power.

## V

### THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

#### 1.

The year 1963 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Fourth International and nearly four decades since the label of "Trotskyism" began to be attached to revolutionary socialism. In ideas, our movement has been very productive, more than justifying its existence by this alone. In its programmatic declarations and in its participation in the class struggle on a world-wide scale it has proved itself to be the legitimate heir and continuator of the great tradition of revolutionary Marxism. Events have proved it right on so many points that even its antagonists have had to borrow from its arsenal, though in a partial, one-sided or distorted way.

The struggle led by Leon Trotsky and the Left Opposition for rapid planned industrialization of the USSR as the only means to prevent the kulak from undermining the socialist mode of production in industry and the monopoly of foreign trade was vindicated as early as 1927—28. Hardly anyone

in the world labour movement today doubts the correctness of the Trotskyist struggle against Stalin's notorious theory and practice of "social fascism" in the early thirties which paved the way for Hitler. The Trotskyist critique of the theory and practice of "popular frontism" has been shown to be correct in the most painful way, again and again, by the unnecessary defeats suffered by the working class when objective conditions were most favourable for victory as in France and Spain in 1935—37; in France, Italy and Greece in 1943—48, etc.

The Trotskyist exposures and denunciations of the crimes of Stalin in the thirties have now finally had their belated echo in official Soviet doctrine, beginning with Khrushchev's admissions at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. The validity of the Trotskyist explanation of the character of the bureaucracy as a *social force* has become accepted by all serious students of the Soviet Union. It is even reflected in the theoretical basis and justification offered by the Yugoslav government in its experimentation with workers councils and self-management. The correctness of the Trotskyist struggle for the revival in the Soviet Union of the Leninist norms of proletarian democracy received striking confirmation in the more or less spontaneous appearance of workers councils at the very beginning of the political revolution in Poland and Hungary in October 1956.

The timeliness of even some of the oldest Trotskyist positions is graphically shown by the following case. In 1923 Trotsky held that if a certain degree of bureaucratization of a workers state in an underdeveloped country is objectively inevitable, then it is the task of a revolutionary party to *limit* this to the utmost by developing all the objective and subjective conditions favouring working-class political activity and participation in the management of the state and economy. Above all the extent and gravity of the danger should not be denied, nor should the party succumb to the pressure of the bureaucracy, still less itself become an instrument for helping the bureaucracy to usurp power. In 1962 Fidel Castro voiced burning denunciations of the incipient bureaucracy in the Cuban workers state and followed this by condemning the bureaucracy as being based on *materially privileged* elements in



the state and the economy, divorced from the mass of workers. The attack Fidel Castro launched against the Anibal Escalante's of Cuba sounded like a repetition of Leninist and Trotskyist speeches heard in the Soviet Union almost forty years ago!

In the same way the theory of the permanent revolution, kept alive by the Fourth International as a precious heritage received from Trotsky has been confirmed to the hilt both negatively and positively. (Negatively, by any number of defeats of the revolution and by the inability of the bourgeois leaderships in countries like India, Tunisia, Morocco etc. to carry out a radical land reform; positively, by the fact that wherever some of the historical tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution, above all land reform, have been carried out it has been through establishment of a workers state as in Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam and Cuba).

The Trotskyist estimate of the fundamental change in the world relationship of forces which occurred with the victory of the Chinese Revolution is today accepted by the whole international communist and revolutionary movement. The Trotskyist analysis of the class nature of the Soviet Union enabled us to foresee as early as 1946—47 that even in the countries occupied and bled white by the Soviet bureaucracy in Eastern Europe, a great upsurge of productive forces would follow the then noticeable breakdown if the structure of these countries were to be adapted to that of the Soviet Union.

The Trotskyist analysis of the world situation enabled us to foresee before Stalin's death the upsurge of the Soviet proletariat and the deepening crisis of Stalinism which would eventually head toward political revolution and the restoration of Leninist-type proletarian democracy. The Fourth International was the only tendency inside the international labour movement which, at the height of West European "prosperity" and on de Gaulle's coming to power, kept faith in the revolutionary potential of the European proletariat, thereby accurately foreseeing the new working-class struggles which in 1960 began flaring up in Belgium, Spain, Italy and elsewhere.

## 2.

If we turn from the field of *ideas* to that of *organization*, the world Trotskyist movement appears to be far less successful. With the exception of Ceylon, the Fourth International has not yet achieved durable mass influence in any country. Its sections are still *nuclei of future mass revolutionary parties* rather than revolutionary parties in the full sense of the word; i.e. organizations able *under their own banner* to mobilize sizeable sectors of the working class.

This gap between the power and correctness of the program of Trotskyism and its weakness as an organized movement has been noted repeatedly, especially by new layers coming from large Communist parties and colonial revolutionary organizations. They incline to agree with the programmatic concepts of Trotskyism but remain skeptical about the organizational achievements and possibilities of the Trotskyist movement. The contradiction is a real one and deserves the most thoughtful consideration.

First of all, the problem must be brought into historical perspective. *The Trotskyist movement has no interests separate and apart from the longrange ones of the world proletariat.* It is not interested in constructing an "organization" simply for its own sake or as a mere pressure group. The organization it seeks to build is a definite means to a definite end—the victory of the proletariat on a world scale. This requires the highest possible consciousness, and therefore complete honesty and integrity, no matter how bitter the immediate consequences. These qualities often contradict rapid construction of an organization. The Fourth International has no choice but to follow this difficult course, for it is demanded by the interests of the world socialist revolution. Insofar, as it represents the theoretical and political consciousness of that mighty process, its own ultimate fate cannot be separated from it.

To assess the strengths and weaknesses of the Fourth International in a more reasonable way, it is well to compare it with its predecessors. The First International, established under the direct leadership of Marx and

Engels, never achieved great organizational strength, no matter how stupendous its theoretical accomplishments were in the history of mankind. The Second International added to the theory of Marxism and built huge organizations. But these all ended in the debacle of 1914. To achieve victory in Russia, the left wing found it necessary to split from the parent organization. The Third International moved ahead rapidly under the beneficent guidance of the Bolsheviks only to succumb to Stalinism and end finally in shameful dissolution as a war-time gift from the Kremlin to Roosevelt, the political chief of Allied imperialism. Obviously it is not easy to construct a revolutionary-socialist International and bring it to successful accomplishment of its aims.

Bearing in mind the program for which the world Trotskyist movement is struggling, it is quite superficial to accuse it of organizational stagnation. It is many times stronger today than at its inception in the days of the Left Opposition in the Soviet Union or at the time of the assassination of its founder. Less than ten sections were present at the founding conference of the Fourth International in 1938; less than twenty at its Second World Congress in 1948. Today Trotskyist organizations exist in forty countries and most of these organizations are stronger than they were ten or twenty years ago—if they existed at all at that time.

Two significant developments must be stressed. In the first place the Trotskyist movement in recent years has grown in a notable way, more or less following the general rise of revolutionary developments on a world scale. This fact in itself proves that the Trotskyist movement corresponds to the *objective needs of the world proletariat* and is not a mere passing phenomenon peculiar to particular countries for a brief phase. Especially worth noting is its success as against other oppositional trends in the communist movement which began initially with much greater strength. Among these we may list the Bordiguists in Italy, the Brandlerites in Germany, the Lovestonites in the United States, the Catalan Federation in Spain, the Communist League in Japan, and a number of others. All these “national communist” oppositional tendencies completely failed to develop into world-wide organizations and most of them have all but

disappeared or are weaker than the Trotskyist forces even in their home base. It should be observed that one competitive oppositional trend, the Yugoslav Titoists, have held state power for nearly twenty years, and yet have proved incapable of offering a serious challenge on the international field.

Secondly, Trotskyism has again and again proved its attractiveness to revolutionary-minded youth whether originating in the Social Democratic or Communist parties and in countries as different as the United States and Belgium, France and Japan, Indonesia and Italy, Greece and Britain., This is striking proof that the Trotskyist movement corresponds to a burning need on an international scale felt by thousands of vanguard elements moving away from the opportunist policies of the traditional working-class leadership and seeking ways and means of building a new alternative revolutionary leadership capable of guiding mass struggles to success.

The contradiction between the correctness of the program of Trotskyism and the organizational weakness of the movement struggling for its realization is not new. In the late twenties and in the thirties it commonly took the form of the skeptical question, “If Trotsky was so right, how did he happen to lose power to Stalin and why is he unable to regain it?”

What was lost sight of in this personal symbolization of the problem was the ebb and flow of opposing social forces which Trotsky and Stalin represented. Trotsky’s incapacity to hold power after 1924 was directly related to his capacity to win power in a situation like that of 1917. In remaining faithful to the long-range interests of the proletariat, Trotsky had to share its temporary eclipse in the Soviet Union under the rise of the reactionary social forces which Stalin came to represent and to express. With the downfall of the Stalin cult, Trotsky’s star has again begun to rise in the Soviet Union—in other words, the proletariat there is once more beginning to move into the political arena.

### 3.

In the final analysis, the fate of the Trotskyist movement is linked to the dialectical

interrelationship between the three sectors of the world revolution. This is the necessary basis for any real understanding of the organizational vicissitudes of the Trotskyist movement, including solutions for its most difficult organizational problems.

Being proved theoretically correct in the twenties and thirties did not lead automatically to the strengthening of the Trotskyist movement. Trotsky's theory explained why the British general strike of 1926 was lost, why the Chinese Revolution of 1925-27 was lost, why Hitler was able to come to power virtually unopposed, why the Spanish Revolution was defeated and why the great upsurge in the French labour movement in the middle thirties came to naught. But these defeats were defeats for the proletariat and therefore defeats for the Trotskyist movement and it suffered the most heavily of all. Its cadres were decimated, whether through discouragement, capitulation, imprisonment, or outright murder. All world reaction centred its most terrible blows against the Trotskyist movement—from Stalin through Roosevelt to Hitler. In all history no radical political movement has suffered such persecution or received so little help from sources outside its own ranks as the Trotskyist movement. That the pioneers could hang on at all is monumental testimony to the tenacity of the human will.

With the turn of the class struggle on an international scale at the end of World War II, it might have been expected that the Trotskyist movement would be the first to profit from the new upsurge. Its interrelationship with the concrete process of world revolution proved to be more complicated than that. The Trotskyist movement could benefit only in the final analysis and in the long range.

To understand this, it is necessary to go back to the most important single event in the second world war—the victory of the Soviet Union. This victory started a chain reaction, the end of which is not yet in sight. The oppressed peoples of the world turned again as they had at previous times to the first workers state for inspiration and guidance. But government power in the Soviet Union was held by the Stalinist bureaucracy. Consequently this bureaucracy—and not Trotskyism—was temporarily strengthened.

This paradox was explained at the time by the Trotskyist movement. We also forecast that the very forces strengthening the bureaucracy would soon begin to undermine it, and the end consequence would be the doom of Stalinism. It took until 1956, for this process to register even partially in the official declarations of the Soviet government, and it is only today that the world monolith has been shattered irrevocably, opening the way for new political currents that tend to gravitate toward Trotskyism. The tendency can clearly be seen in the pattern of the rise of the workers states since the end of the war—from Eastern Europe to Yugoslavia and China and finally to Cuba, the leadership has demonstrated increasing independence from the Soviet bureaucracy.

The tendency can be seen in another way. The break-up of the Stalinist monolith has been accompanied by an increasing necessity for discussion among the Communist parties, and an increasing need to deal with real issues in a reasoned way instead of in Stalin's way of substituting false issues and replacing reason by epithets, slander and frame-ups. It is instructive for instance to see that one of the major points under worldwide debate today is the necessity of extending the proletarian revolution as the only realistic way to end the threat of imperialist war. Clearly the disputants are nearing what up to now has been considered exclusively the realm of Trotskyist discourse. The victory of the Soviet Union in the war, the victory of the Yugoslav and Chinese Revolutions and most recently the Cuban Revolution, as well as the destruction of the Stalin cult, cannot help but strengthen Trotskyism. As I. F. Stone, the acute American radical journalist observed after a trip to Cuba, the revolutionists there are "unconscious" Trotskyists. With the coming of full consciousness among these and related currents, Trotskyism will become a powerful current.

This in turn will influence the development of the three sectors of the world revolution. **The appearance of mass Trotskyist parties will bring to bear a new powerful force in the political arena. Even before these parties gain majority status in various countries, their mere presence and the partial successes they will begin to register can profoundly**

influence world events by hastening the natural rhythm of the revolutionary process in the three main sectors.

## 4.

The cadres of the Fourth International carried out their revolutionary duty in keeping alive the program of Trotskyism and adding to it as world events dictated. But this does not signify that the organizations adhering to the program of Trotskyism were immune to the effects of long years of isolation and persecution. Two main problems have proved of perennial concern. At times a tendency has appeared here or there that sought a short cut to the establishment of a mass organization. Such experiments have in every instance proved disastrous, ending in the disappearance from the revolutionary-socialist movement of many of those who became caught up in these adventures. A greater problem has been the occasional rise of sectarian tendencies. In contrast to the opportunists, who seek escape from the pressure of the hostile environment by moving away from principles sectarians retreat into the books and convert the texts into dogmas. A revolutionist isolated by circumstances over which he has no control can fall into sectarianism quite unconsciously. It is therefore a more insidious danger for a small organization than opportunism, which is generally easier to recognize.

The building of an alternative leadership of the working class; *i.e.*, of new revolutionary mass parties, remains the central task of our epoch. The problem is not that of repeating over and over again this elementary truth, but of explaining concretely how it is to be done. In fact, the building of revolutionary mass parties combines three concrete processes; the process of defending and constantly enriching the Marxist revolutionary *program*; of building, educating and hardening a revolutionary Marxist *cadre*; and of winning *mass influence* for this cadre. These three processes are dialectically intertwined. Divorced from the mass movement, a revolutionary cadre becomes a sect. Divorced from the program of revolutionary Marxism, cadres immersed in the mass movement eventually succumb to opportunism. And divorced from practical testing by cadres struggling as part and parcel

of the masses, the revolutionary program itself becomes ossified and degenerates into a sterile incantation of dogmatic formulas.

The world Trotskyist movement has given much consideration to the problem of setting out with small forces to win the working class and organize it into a party capable of challenging the rule of the capitalist class. The over-all principle on which it has proceeded on the organizational level is the Leninist dictum that a revolutionist must not permit himself to be separated from his class under any circumstances. It is thus the norm for Trotskyists to belong to the union of their trade or industry and to play an active role in union affairs no matter how reactionary the union bureaucracy may be. They likewise belong to the big organizations of the masses whether they be nationalistic, cultural or political in character. Insofar as possible they advance the ideas and program of Trotskyism among the members of these organizations and seek to recruit from them.

In countries where the masses have an old tradition of class consciousness and powerful political organizations, as in Western Europe and Australia, an especially difficult problem is posed for the revolutionary nuclei. Because of this tradition and the power of their numbers, these organizations command deep loyalty from the workers. As a result of past defeats and the long period of bureaucratic control over the labour movement, the masses, when they display readiness to take the road of revolutionary action, do not begin with a fully developed Marxist consciousness but with an outlook which is closer to left centrism.

In addition to this, the bureaucratic leaderships do not facilitate bringing revolutionary Marxist educational material to the ranks. They operate as ruthless permanent factions, completely hostile to the ideas of Trotskyism and prepared to engage in witch-hunting and the use of the most undemocratic measures against those who advance fresh or challenging views.

Such are the general conditions that must be faced by the revolutionary nuclei. They have no choice but to practice "entryism"; that is, to participate as an integrated component in the internal life of the mass move-

ment. The special function of the nuclei in such situations is to advance transitional slogans that serve to bridge the gap between the inadequate consciousness of the masses and the objective need to enter into action on the road to revolution. The revolutionary nuclei actively participate in building left-wing tendencies *capable of leading broader and broader sections of the masses into action*. Through the experiences built up in these actions, they assist in transforming the best forces of these centrist or left-centrist tendencies into genuine revolutionary Marxists.

The purpose of "entryism" is not to construct a "pressure group", as some critics have charged, but to build a mass revolutionary Marxist party in the real conditions that must be faced in a number of countries. The tactic is mined with dangers and difficulties and cannot be successfully carried out unless these are constantly borne in mind. But for a certain stage of work, no practical alternative remains open. Owing to national peculiarities, the tactic has many variants. It must be applied with great flexibility and without dogmatism of any kind. The norm for those engaging in it is to maintain a sector of open public work, including their own Trotskyist publication.

No matter what the specific situation may be in which a Trotskyist organization finds itself, so long as it remains essentially a small propaganda group, it cannot play a leading mass role. Nevertheless it can work effectively in helping the masses to learn by experience through active and persistent effort at bridging the gap between their level of understanding and the objective situation. Stated in the most general way, this is also the course that must be followed to become a mass party. It is summed up in "The Transitional Program", written by Trotsky in 1938. This program must be kept constantly up to date through study of shifts in mass consciousness and through constant effort to connect up with them.

An acute problem in relation to the construction of revolutionary—socialist parties in many countries is lack of time to organize and to gain adequate experience before the revolution breaks out. In previous decades this would signify certain defeat for the

revolution. Because of a series of new factors, however, this is no longer *necessarily* the case. The example of the Soviet Union, the existence of workers states from whom material aid can be obtained, and the relative weakening of world capitalism, have made it possible for revolutions in some instances to achieve partial successes, to reach certain plateaus (where they may rest in unstable equilibrium as in the case of Bolivia), and even to go as far as the establishment of a workers state. Revolutionary Marxists in such countries face extremely difficult questions, from an inadequate level of socialist consciousness among the masses to a dearth of seasoned or experienced cadres to carry out a myriad pressing tasks. No choice is open to them in such situations but to participate completely and wholeheartedly in the revolution and to build the party in the very process of the revolution itself.

## 5.

The building of new mass revolutionary parties remains the central strategic task. To co-ordinate this work, the existing nuclei of these parties must be brought together in an international organization.

The final test of truth, as Marxists will know, is human action. Without the test of action, all theory becomes bare and sterile. The correct analysis of the world situation today is more complex than ever before. One fact alone graphically illustrates this: the peoples of more than one hundred countries are for the first time in history constantly involved in world events, sometimes in a highly explosive way. Only analysis of the world situation constantly re-examined and tested in the light of practical action can enable all the sectors of a world-wide movement to feel the pulse of history in the making. Only an International based on democratic centralism, permitting different tendencies to confront each other democratically while uniting them in action, can allow experiences from all corners of the world to become properly weighed and translated into revolutionary tasks on a world scale. It is not possible on the national field any longer to arrive at a correct analysis or action without a general understanding of world developments. Never have countries and national

sectors of the working class been so interdependent as today. The view that revolutionary movements can be built on a "national" scale or in "regional" isolation has never been so behind the times as in the age of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and travel in outer space.

what is involved is the construction of something qualitatively different from the mere sum of the national organizations. By pooling national experience and opinion in accordance with the rules of democratic centralism it is possible to build an international leadership much superior to anything within the capacity of a single section. The basic concept is not that of assembling a staff of intellectuals, however valuable and necessary this is, but of combining on an international scale leaderships that are deeply rooted in their own national soil and connected in a living way with the masses of their own country. An international leadership of that kind is capable of performing the difficult dual task of keeping theory up to date and of working out viable policies of revolutionary action on the great world issues of the day.

The necessity to build a strong, democratically centralized International is underscored all the more by the present dialectical relationship between the three main sectors of the world revolution. In the advanced countries, the International can perform crucial services on behalf of revolutions in colonial countries, opening up ways and means of appealing to the feeling of solidarity that exists even among the most politically backward workers. The International can help the fighters of the colonial revolution remain true internationalists

retaining their confidence in the world proletariat and learning to distinguish the working masses in the imperialist countries from the governments and the treacherous leaders of the traditional mass organizations. Among the advanced workers, intellectuals and youth of the workers states, the International can play a special role in helping them to dig through the debris of forty years of falsification, distortion and slander as they seek to find their way to revolutionary Marxism.

The victory of the Cuban Revolution has led some tendencies in the international labour movement to put a question mark on the necessity of building revolutionary Marxist parties, and especially on the necessity of building a democratically centralized revolutionary Marxist International. Such a conclusion is all the more unfounded in view of the fact that Fidel Castro, as a result of his own experience in a living revolution today stresses the decisive importance of building Marxist-Leninist parties in all countries.

In truth, the need to build revolutionary mass parties and a revolutionary-socialist International flows from the objective tasks facing the proletariat in seeking power, in winning it and in exercising it after the victory. The inadequacy and treachery of the old leaderships of the working class have made the need all the more imperative. The threat of nuclear annihilation has converted it into a matter of life and death for all mankind. There is no way to win world socialism except through revolutionary mass parties fraternally associated in an international organization. Difficult as the task may seem, it will be accomplished—and in time.

# THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND OUR TASKS

*(Adopted by the Reunification Congress of the 4th International, June 1963)*

## PREAMBLE

SINCE 1960 the over-all relationship of forces has continued to evolve to the disadvantage of imperialism. After the victory of the Cuban Revolution, which precipitated a prerevolutionary situation in a good many Latin-American countries, the achievement of independence conquered by the Algerian masses after seven years of bloody struggle opened up the social phase of the Algerian Revolution and created a center of revolutionary inspiration for all of Africa and the Arab world. In South-East Asia, the colonial revolution, after some years of stalemate, has resumed its march forward, particularly in Laos and South Vietnam. Despite a slowing down in growth in China, in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Poland, industrial production in the workers states as a whole has continued to develop at a more rapid rate than in the capitalist countries as a whole.

For its part, the proletariat of the imperialist countries of Europe has shown growing militancy during the past three years in defence of its standard of living; and important economic struggles have repeatedly shaken the political stability of regimes, despite the climate of relative "prosperity," particularly in Belgium, Spain, Italy and Great Britain. Even in France, the working class has begun to recover the combativity that was seriously dampened after May 1958, and has demonstrated remarkable capacity to resist when its standard of living is at stake (the miners' strike).

Despite the continued deterioration of the relationship of forces as a whole, a fact well known to its leading layers, world imperialism has nevertheless held on to such economic, military and political forces that it has by no means lost its capacity to counter-attack in face of the rising forces of the world revolution in all its diverse forms. On the economic plane, imperialism has

continued to rapidly increase its resources on the European continent and in Japan, although the rate of this expansion has begun to seriously slow down. American imperialism overcame the recession of 1960-61 and its leaders are trying to accelerate its expansion by a considerable increase in state expenditures, thereby increasing inflation and weakening the international position of the dollar. On the military plane, imperialism continues to increase its arsenal of nuclear arms, forcing the USSR in turn to engage in an accelerated armament drive in this field. In face of the new progress of the colonial revolution, imperialism has reacted both by wars of local intervention (Laos, South Vietnam, Cuba, military missions in Latin America) and by reinforced attempts to bind the colonial bourgeoisie closer through increased financial and political aid (India, Brazil, Venezuela, Iran, the Congo, etc.). Neither of these methods will prove viable in the long run, but they can hold back the final socialist outcome for some years. As to the growing interimperialist contradictions, especially among the various European imperialist powers and between some of these powers and American imperialism, this has not paralyzed world imperialism to the point of making it impossible for it to react in face of the successes of the revolution.

Under these conditions, the danger of a third world war remains real and cannot be definitely removed except by a proletarian victory in the principal imperialist bastions themselves, a victory that is being prepared in the present stage by the whole weakening of imperialism due to the progress of the colonial revolution and every gain of the workers movement in the imperialist countries. What is delaying the outbreak of this war is primarily the awareness which both the imperialist and Soviet leaders have of the immense risk of self-destruction and

the suicide of all of humanity which a nuclear world war implies. That is why it is probable that imperialism will not dare to unleash this war except as a final resort, when it has the impression that all the odds are against its survival and its vital interests are immediately threatened, while it still retains the main potential of attack. This means that the Revolution still has a period in which it is a question of weakening imperialism to the maximum on a world scale and of preparing the maximum possibilities for a proletarian victory in the imperialist countries, in order to be able to paralyze and overturn imperialism in time within its bastions.

The most important political consequences of the latest gains of the Revolution have taken place in the heart of the international workers movement itself. The victory of the Cuban Revolution was the first since 1917 to be led by a political force independent in origin from the international Stalinist world; the first also since 1917 in which the leadership was led by the objective conditions in which it found itself, as well as its own level of consciousness, to call openly for the international extension of the Revolution. In Algeria the conditions are growing increasingly favourable for a repetition of the Cuban experience. The unity of the bureaucracy in the workers states has been shattered, precipitating a political struggle, most sharply expressed in the Sino-Soviet conflict, that increasingly poses all the fundamental questions of strategy and tactics before the militants of the world Communist movement.

This means that the progress of the colonial revolution as well as that of the political revolution in the degenerated or deformed workers states has begun to escape more and more from the petty-bourgeois, centrist or bureaucratic forces which have sought to canalize them during the past decade. The pressure of the colonial masses to assure a socialist outcome to their revolution; the effort of the vanguard intellectuals, the youth and the workers to develop de-Stalinization beyond its Khrushchevist phase towards a genuine return to Lenin; the attempt of the Chinese to establish an international left faction in the ranks of the Communist movement, placing in question the fundamental orientation of the "peace-

ful road to socialism" in the imperialist countries and the "bloc with the national bourgeoisie" in the colonial and semicolonial countries: the appearance of a new vanguard in various imperialist countries—all these phenomena indicate the progress realized along the road to constructing a new revolutionary international leadership, key task in assuring a rapid success of the world revolution and avoiding a third world war. If the construction and growth of sections of the Fourth International remain fundamental elements in this process, also involved are necessary fusions everywhere with indigenous revolutionary forces that have made important progress along the road of revolutionary Marxism.

## I.

### THE WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION

The American economy emerged from the 1960-61 recession, experiencing a recovery, which if it is more sluggish than foreseen, has nevertheless made it possible to surmount without major damage the most serious Wall Street crash since 1929. What is most significant in the current evolution of the American economy is not so much the crash as the fact that *after each recession the number of jobless who cannot find employment and the idle industrial productive capacity tend to become greater*. On the other hand, the conversion of economic crisis into recessions of more limited extent and duration is paid for by a continual increase in public expenditures, above all in military expenditures, the fundamental reason for the progressive decline in value of the dollar. The effort of the Kennedy administration to accelerate the rate of growth of the American economy with the aid of a large budgetary deficit can only sharpen the contradictions of the economic policy of American imperialism during the next years, again increasing the deficit in the balance of payments and provoking a new rise in prices which will weaken American imperialism's competitive capacity on the world market.

In the long run, there is no other solution for American imperialism, confronted with the task of assuring an economic growth enabling it to hold back a little the outcome



of being "overtaken" by Soviet economy while constantly increasing military expenditures and assuring financial and military aid to the colonial bourgeoisie, above all the government "allies" of Latin America, than a real freezing of the wages of American workers, if not an attack on the standard of living gained by these workers. The pressure of massive unemployment, the transfer of American capital to countries where "labour costs" are lower, the sapping of trade-union strength and the governmental attacks against certain union privileges, together with the objective effects of automation, create progressively favourable conditions for such an attack, the social and political consequences of which could be incalculable.

The capitalist economies of Western Europe and of Japan (with the exception of Britain and Belgium) managed for the second time to avoid a recession while one occurred in the United States and Canada (this was also the case in the recession of 1957-58). The factors of long-term growth, above all the very high level of investments in modernizing and rationalizing industry, and the scope of the durable consumers goods industry, which explain the exceptional boom of these capitalist economies for the past ten years, likewise explain the reasons which have enabled them to escape this recession.

However these factors of long-term expansion are beginning little by little to become exhausted. The steel and iron industry has suffered real stagnation for three years, the result of progressive slackening of capital investment. The auto mobile industry, which already experienced a preliminary warning in the very sharp drop in 1960-61, is for the moment recovering but a flattening out of the auto market is expected by 1965. At the same time, symptoms of excessive capacity are more and more evident in the economy of capitalist Europe, thus demonstrating that *despite the absence of grave crises, the phenomenon of overproduction remains inherent in capitalist economy, and is simply finding new expressions.*

It is to be expected then that in all the capitalist countries of Europe as well as

Japan a progressive slackening in the rate of growth will occur, a saturation of the market for durable consumers goods and "new products," an increasing equalization of the level of production in most of the big industrialized capitalist countries, an inevitable exacerbation of interimperialist competition, and the *progressive reappearance in the capitalist economy of Europe, too, of recessions and unemployment.* The rate at which the atmosphere of boom will give way to a more "normal" cycle will, however, vary from country to country, and without doubt countries like Italy and especially Japan, which still have available a great industrial reserve army and whose bourgeoisie therefore have the advantage of a much lower wage scale than their competitors in the USA, Great Britain or West Germany, will be able to prolong the phase of exceptional "boom."

One of the most characteristic features of the present stage of the world capitalist economy is the fact that the colonial and semicolonial countries represent a relatively narrower and narrower outlet for the industry of the imperialist countries and partly for world commerce, interimperialist trade increasing to the same proportion (especially as a result of the establishment of the Common Market). The fundamental cause of this phenomenon resides, of course, in the feudal-capitalist structure of these countries which constitutes an objective obstacle to their economic development both in industrialization and in genuinely raising the miserable standard of living of the masses. In 1960-63, as in the preceding period, despite all the boasts about "aid" for the underdeveloped countries, and despite all the "alliances for progress," *the role of these countries in world commerce has continued to decline.* whether because of the deterioration of the terms of exchange which lower their buying power on the world market, or because of specific phenomena like inflation, the growth in military expenditure and the flight of capital abroad. There thus occurs a slowing down in the already absolutely insufficient process of bourgeois industrialization in some of these countries, particularly in Argentina, India, and even in Venezuela. The recent increase in prices of certain raw materials has not fundamentally changed this situation.

As the investment boom ends in most countries of capitalist Europe, and industries that produce plant equipment search with greater and greater anxiety for new markets, a new effort to finance the industrialization of the underdeveloped countries by means of credit will undoubtedly be undertaken by these imperialist countries in economic correspondence with their effort to stabilize a neocolonialist regime in most of these countries. Without minimizing the possibilities of temporary success which such a policy may hold, it will eliminate none of the factors which feed the discontent of the masses; and the driving forces of the colonial revolution will therefore continue to operate fundamentally throughout the colonial and semicolonial countries.

During the same period, *the economy of the workers states has continued to develop in an uninterrupted way—except for China—although at different rates.* It is primarily the industry of the most developed workers states (the USSR, Poland and especially the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia) which have undergone in the last year or two a more or less pronounced slowing down in growth; in countries like Rumania, on the contrary, the rate of growth has been spectacular. Certain plans have even substantially failed, particularly the seven-year plan of the German Democratic Republic (which was going to make it possible “to surpass West German per capita production in 1965,”) the Czech Plan and the plan for the chemical industry in the USSR. Nonetheless, it appears that the Soviet seven-year plan will be realized in its main lines in 1965.

While agriculture continues to undergo violent fluctuations from year to year, under the effects of bad weather, lack of supplies, shortage of investments and the lack of interest among the peasant masses in cooperative production, the effects of the lack of co-ordination and international integration among the economies of the different workers states are felt more and more. *The Soviet bureaucracy has thus been obliged to make an important turn in this respect and has begun to seek to transform the COMECON into an organism for international economic integration, including integrated planning (at least in certain*

fields) and international commerce and international multilateral payments. An improvement in international division of labor within the framework of the workers states would without doubt give fresh vigor to the industrial growth of countries like the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia which have suffered most from the “autarchic” tendencies that characterize the planning of each national bureaucracy.

Yugoslavia has overcome the crisis of 1961-62 which, brutally interrupting a period of exceptional economic growth, came as a consequence of bad harvests and mistakes in excessive decentralization which went so far as to undermine the monopoly of foreign trade and provoke a serious deficit in the balance of payments. This year a rate of growth of ten per cent or even higher will be once again reached, after the central control on foreign trade has been adjusted.

As for the People’s Republic of China, it has experienced three consecutive somber years because of exceptional natural calamities but also because of the harmful consequence of the excesses committed at the time of the creation of the “people’s communes.” At present, although handicapped by the cutting off of Soviet aid and by the lack of international aid or credits, the rectification of the situation appears under way, assured by a radical reversal of economic policy which flatly grants priority to agriculture and light industry and considerably slows down the development of heavy industry.

The world economic situation, taken as a whole then, still displays the main specific features underlined in previous documents of the International:

— A growing contradiction between the accelerated economic development of the imperialist countries and the retardation of the colonial and semicolonial countries which is constantly widening the gap between the level of economic development and the standard of living of the masses in these two principal zones of the capitalist world economy, providing the objective basis for constant enlargement of the colonial revolution.

— A growing contradiction between the high rate of growth in the workers states and the much more fluctuating rate of growth—generally tending to fall—of the imperialist countries.

— Growing interimperialist contradictions and competition, due to the general decline in the rate of profit and progressive shrinking of markets.

## II.

### EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RELATIONS

The Kennedy administration came to power at the end of a phase of the evolution of international relations filled with pronounced and numerous defeats and setbacks for Yankee imperialism: victory of the Cuban Revolution, establishing a workers state at the very gates of the United States; downfall of the American puppets Syngman Rhee and Menderes under the pressure of popular demonstrations; violent anti-American demonstrations in Latin America (the Nixon tour) and in Japan; the spectacular advance made by the USSR in the field of outer space devices. In addition, the Soviet bureaucracy, by again posing the question of Berlin, and seeking to force the withdrawal of American troops from West Berlin, gave the impression that it sought not only to consolidate the shaky regime of Ulbricht but even to set going a tendency at the expense of imperialism in the only sector of the world where, for the past ten years, development had taken an opposite course—the sector of European capitalism.

Surrounded by a brain trust representing New York finance capital and the most conscious layers of the imperialist bourgeoisie, the Kennedy administration has sought to react against this constant deterioration of the international situation at the expense of imperialism in various ways: by stepping up the arms drive, both in the field of nuclear rockets and conventional arms, by striving through a combination of politico-military pressure and increased financial "aid" to isolate socialist Cuba and thus prepare the overthrow of the workers state either by military intervention, by economic

blockade, or by a combination of the two methods; by strengthening the political alliance with the colonial bourgeoisie, even at the expense of the European imperialist allies; by defending American imperialism's own economic interests in relation to allies and competitors, notably by imposing on them a greater part of the "common" military and political costs ("aid" to the colonial bourgeoisie). At the same time, the Kennedy administration has made emphatically clear its readiness to launch a nuclear world war in order to block any considerable deterioration in the relationship of forces as a whole, insofar as the deterioration results from the direct initiative of the Soviet bureaucracy (Berlin, Cuba).

It is incontestable that in a good many areas, American imperialism has succeeded, thanks to this political strategy which even more than that of Dulles goes "right up to the brink," in winning several tactical successes. It still holds its positions in West Berlin, and in fact Khrushchev has retreated on this question, satisfying himself with a "wall" to stop the massive exodus from the German Democratic Republic and possibly a change in the flag under which the occupation troops remain in West Berlin. It has caused the Soviet bureaucracy to withdraw from the Congo and to withdraw its rockets from Cuba. It has momentarily prevented a new extension of the revolution in the cases of Venezuela and Santo Domingo. It has partially overcome its backwardness in the technical field of space flights, and it has maintained its quantitative superiority in the field of nuclear arms.

However, examined from a strategic point of view, the international situation during the past two years has not ceased to evolve at the expense of American imperialism. The continual attempts to overthrow the Cuban workers state, including by invasion, have failed. In neither Brazil, Mexico, nor Chile has imperialism succeeded in compelling the bourgeoisie in power to make a complete break with Cuba, because of the extremely wide sympathy of the masses for the Cuban Revolution. Serious political and social crises have developed in a number of Latin-American countries, the

movement of the masses is becoming stronger there and guerrilla war is now current in many of these countries. The contradictions within the imperialist alliance have become aggravated and inter-imperialist relations are now more strained than at any time since the Suez crisis of November 1956. The technological and economic progress of the USSR continues to outpace the slower and much more unequal growth of the American economy. New epicenters of the colonial revolution have appeared, particularly in South-East Asia (Laos, South Vietnam) compelling imperialism more than ever to disperse over numerous sectors its military, financial and economic resources which are not unlimited. The Algerian Revolution gained independence from French imperialism, and one of its first results has been a new rise of the masses in the Arab world, who in a contradictory way nonetheless bring Arab unity closer and by this fact directly threaten the immense wealth of Anglo-American petroleum companies in Saudi Arabia, in the Sultanates of the Persian Gulf, in Iraq and even in Iran.

In face of the immense revolutionary possibilities opened by events since 1960, the fundamental political line of the Soviet bureaucracy has remained deeply conservative, in fear of the dynamics of the world revolution and its repercussions in the Soviet Union itself. The "general line" of this bureaucracy still remains "peaceful coexistence" and "economic competition," implying a bloc with the colonial bourgeoisie and "the exploitation of imperialist contradictions" as the basic elements of long-term strategy in place of the revolutionary mobilization of the masses and resolute support to the most advanced movements of the colonial revolution struggling to convert it into a socialist revolution. But to the extent that this general line comes increasingly under criticism even within the ranks of the bureaucracy, particularly under the pressure of the Chinese CP, it can no longer be applied in a vigorous way without any exceptions. Thus if the Soviet bureaucracy did not give substantial aid to the Algerian Revolution, and hesitated up to the eve of independence to grant it official recognition, if the French CP displayed criminal passivity during the Algerian war; if the Latin-American CP's have applied

the brakes to the revolutionary struggle of the masses—the best aid to the Cuban Revolution—the Kremlin has nonetheless been obliged to grant economic and military aid to the Cuban workers state, permitting it to resist the blockade and the first attempts at imperialist invasion. In the same way, if the Soviet bureaucracy is associated with the "neutralization of Laos", and if it seeks to slow down the revolutionary struggle in South-East Asia it has nonetheless protected the Pathet Lao forces against direct American imperialist military intervention in Laos.

It is in its attitude with regard to the Sino-Indian frontier dispute (supplying MIG's to Nehru, eulogies to the "peaceful policy of Nehru") as well as in the attitude of the Khrushchev faction of Danger within the Indian CP (ideological and political capitulation before its own bourgeoisie) that the conservative line of the Kremlin has assumed the most revolting forms during the last period.

As in the past, the progress of the colonial revolution has been accompanied by almost uninterrupted counter-revolutionary military interventions or counter-revolutionary wars of imperialism in the past three years (in the Congo, Angola, the Dominican Republic, in South Vietnam and Laos, in South Korea, West New Guinea, Yemen, North Borneo, etc.)

It is the duty of the international workers movement and the workers states to give maximum political, economic and military aid to these developing revolutions, which at the moment are the forces dealing the most blows to imperialism.

At the same time, as in the past, the nuclear arms race continues despite all the "disarmament" conferences. It is true that a new series of nuclear tests seems to have been completed by both the Soviet bureaucracy and American imperialism. This facilitates reaching a new atomic "truce" which is to be greeted, since nuclear tests endanger the common biological capital of mankind and constitute elements of diplomatic nuclear blackmail. However, even if this truce is actually concluded—especially insofar as it corresponds to a common

interest which both the Kremlin and Wall Street have in stopping the spread of nuclear arms throughout the world—it would in no way constitute a guarantee or even a promise of actual nuclear disarmament. It would actually be nothing but a truce between two phases of accelerated nuclear rearmament. As long as international imperialism, above all American imperialism, holds a largely intact economic and military potential, all real nuclear disarmament remains largely utopian. This signifies that the risk of total nuclear war will exist as long as the potential of American imperialism exists, and that the final struggle against the nuclear danger is the struggle to overturn the imperialist bourgeoisie—a struggle which can only be brought to a successful outcome by the proletariat of the imperialist countries, the weakening of this bourgeoisie by the colonial revolution constituting at the present stage a major contribution to this future disarmament. It is in this spirit that the revolutionary Marxists have the duty to participate in an energetic manner in all the movements for unilateral nuclear disarmament in the imperialist countries.

The inter-imperialist contradictions which have become accentuated during the past few years express primarily a modification in the relationship of economic forces between imperialist powers. American imperialism has lost the position of absolute superiority which it acquired in the imperialist camp immediately following the second world war. British imperialism has seen its world position decline almost without interruption.

On the other hand, the imperialism of the West European countries (above all West German imperialism, and to a lesser degree French and Italian imperialism) and Japanese imperialism have considerably improved their relative economic positions in the world market. This evolution is expressed both by the relative figures of production and by the relative roles of the various powers in world trade.

The politico-military relationship of forces has not evolved, however, in perfect symmetry with the relationship of economic forces. American imperialism has even strengthened its monopoly of nuclear arms

since Great Britain abandoned the Skybolt project. It continues to dominate the inter-imperialist alliances like NATO and SEATO overriding the particular interests of its allies (Congo, Katanga, West New Guinea, etc.) and taking the initiative at decisive moments even without consulting them (the Caribbean crisis of October 1962). The growing tensions in the heart of the imperialist alliance, and above all the Franco-American tension which broke out after de Gaulle refused to permit the entry of Great Britain into the Common Market expressed in the final analysis this contradiction between the all-powerful military position and the relative decline in economic superiority of American imperialism.

If each of the major imperialist states pursue particular objectives in this conflict, the fundamental sentiment of inter-imperialist solidarity in the face of the progress of the revolution and the workers states remains predominant, however, and a real “reversal of the alliance” (that is to say, an alliance of one or more imperialist countries with the USSR against American imperialism) is excluded. Some temporary manoeuvres, above all in the commercial field, do not contradict this fundamental orientation (refusal of Great Britain to recognize the American export ban on certain so-called “strategic” products to the workers states; Canadian breach of the blockade against Cuba, etc.)

Since the end of the Algerian war, de Gaulle has pursued the aim of constituting a second imperialist bloc in Europe equivalent to that of the United States and associated with it on the basis of full equality. His “*force de frappe française*” (core of an autonomous European nuclear striking force) and his policy of refusing to extend the Common Market—which Washington would like to see dissolved in an “Atlantic Zone of free trade”—aim at this objective. This ambition, however, does not correspond to either the real specific weight of French imperialism, nor to the strategic and economic interests of West German imperialism which already feels restricted in “little Europe,” even taking into account its prolongation in Africa (African states associated with the Common Market). The most probable development is, there-

fore, a progressive association of the other big imperialist powers in the actual leadership of the Atlantic Alliance and a slow enlargement of the Common Market, rather than a genuine prolonged and deepening conflict between an "imperialist European bloc" and American imperialism.

### III.

#### THE PROGRESS OF THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

Since 1960, the colonial revolution has continued to develop in various epicenters: Cuba and the Latin-American revolution; Algeria and the Arab revolution; South Africa and the African Revolution; Laos and South Vietnam and the revolution in South East Asia; the Sino-Indian conflict and the Indian revolution.

The creation of the Cuban workers state constitutes the first victory of a proletarian revolution led by a political force free from the forces dominated or influenced by the Soviet bureaucracy. It marks also the arrival in power, for the first time since October 1917, of a revolutionary leadership which, in relation to objective necessity and its own conscious understanding, has systematically sought the international extension of the socialist revolution, at least throughout Latin America. For these two reasons; that is, both the objective attractive force which Cuba exercises on the disinherited masses of Latin America and the progressive differentiation which "Castroism" has brought about within the workers vanguard and the nationalist petty-bourgeois movement, the Cuban Revolution has powerfully stimulated the revolutionary rise throughout this continent.

Against this it has likewise brought about a change in the policy of American imperialism, which was characterized in the period from 1932 to 1957 above all by indirect intervention and economic and financial pressure (the so-called "good neighbour" policy). Now Yankee imperialism is resorting more and more to direct economic, political and even military intervention in Latin America.

As for the Latin-American bourgeoisie, it has undergone a process of growing

polarization between the forces seeking to neutralize the mass movement by ostensibly adapting itself to the anti-imperialist sentiments and by carrying out certain reforms which, however, never put in question the semicolonial structure of the economy and society, and the forces that seek to directly suppress the mass movement which potentially threatens capitalist property, including that held by the "national" bourgeoisie.

It is the combination of these two tendencies—the drive of the revolutionary movement of the masses under the influence of the Cuban victory, and the reactions of imperialism and the bourgeoisie in face of this drive—that explains the political and social evolution of Latin America during the past three years.

The drive of the mass movement has been particularly marked in countries like Peru, Chile and Ecuador, while in Argentina the workers movement has undergone numerous revivals, retaining intact its capacity to launch powerful strikes, in a climate of increasing economic and political disintegration of the regime (nonpayment of government workers and functionaries; continual military coups d'état, etc.). Even the most relatively stable country—Mexico has been shaken by periodic explosions of peasant revolts.

On the other hand the Alliance for Progress, which was to have been the key piece in Yankee intervention in Latin America, has proved impotent up to now, as much on the economic level (where inflation among other things has seriously slowed down industrialization) as on the political level. The incapacity of American imperialism and the "national" bourgeoisie to eliminate the objective causes of the revolutionary rise, coupled with the absence of an adequately formed revolutionary leadership, have provoked prolonged crises, of which the most typical is the one that has lasted ten years in Bolivia. The nationalist revolutionary movements are rapidly worn out and undergo a process of "flattening" and increasing polarization, caught as they are between the socialist revolution and the pro-imperialist counter-revolution. A wider margin for manoeuvre, however, exists for imperialism in the three countries where the bourgeoisie is relatively stronger than

in the rest of the continent: namely, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. In the latter country, the national bourgeoisie, backed by imperialism, may again seek to utilize Peronism—which is stronger than ever among the masses—as a block against socialist revolution.

The sharpest revolutionary crises are maturing in Venezuela, where the situation remains very tense but where Yankee imperialism has enormous interests which it will defend by all means; in Chile, where a major confrontation can occur in the elections of 1964 in view of the expectant mood of the masses in relation to these elections; and in Peru where the mass movement has reached a very advanced stage both in the cities and in the countryside.

The Algerian Revolution in its process of socialist transformation is destined to exercise tremendous attractive power on the poverty-stricken masses of the Arab people, those in the Maghreb as well as those in the Arab East balkanized into seven states (without mentioning the various Sultanates and Sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf and the colony of Aden). The nationalist bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie of these semi-colonial states will not have the slightest chance of resisting this attractive power unless they play the game of Arab unity to the end offering against a genuinely socialist Algeria some kind of big united Arab republic in which the size—and the oil resources—would finally stimulate the development of the productive forces. They will have a tendency to rally round Nasserism, which serves them at once as an instrument for anti-imperialist mobilization of the masses and as a means of channelling and organizing them in a very narrow and bureaucratic way. The most developed tendencies appear in Egypt itself, where it has unquestionably hit the economic positions of imperialism very hard, thanks to the support of the masses, but where it has in other respects maintained the mass movement under a control that has stifled all spontaneity as well as all self-action of the workers movement, giving birth to a "state capitalism" in the sense in which Engels employed this term—the former bourgeoisie transforming itself into a class of "state rentiers," the petty bourgeoisie enriching itself and progressively bourgeoisifying

itself through the management and exploitation of the nationalized sector.

That is why the victories of the "unionist" political forces in Iraq, in Syria, the struggle of the masses in Jordan and the revolution in Yemen can be considered at one and the same time as the first repercussions of the Algerian Revolution in the Arab world and as a first reaction against that revolution by the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois political forces. It is above all due to the catastrophic political errors committed by the Communist parties of Iraq and Syria that this drive toward Arab unity has been marked temporarily by a weakening instead of strengthening of the workers movement. But the latest successes of the Algerian Revolution, as well as the narrow limits which the "socialism" of Nasser imposes on the play of the productive forces of the United Arab Republic, will create propitious conditions for a new march forward of the workers movement in the Arab world, just as the progress of the Algerian Revolution will also stimulate the workers movement in Tunisia and Morocco.

The Ben Bella leadership of the Algerian Revolution has clearly demonstrated its resolution to support the various revolutionary movements of black Africa, particularly in the Portuguese colonies, above all Angola and South Africa. In this way Algeria is on the road to becoming a center of impulsion for the revolutionary movement throughout Africa.

After the spectacular successes of the struggle for political independence in 1960, the revolution marked time for a while in Black Africa. This was due particularly to the victory of neocolonialist forces in almost all of former French Black Africa and in the Congo, the murder of Patrice Lumumba and of Moumie, of a certain neocolonialist evolution in Kenya and a setback for the masses in Ghana and Guinea. If in general, the direct or indirect intervention of imperialism was the dominant factor in this victory, it must likewise be ascribed to the power of tribal forces (especially in the Congo, Ghana, Kenya), which has delayed the creation of parties of really national consciousness, and to the ultra rapid growth of neo-bourgeois forces since independence was gained, especially

in the government, among the political personnel and in the commercial sector and the "services."

Under these conditions, the revolution in black Africa moved forward again first of all in Angola, the Rhodesias and above all South Africa. In the latter country explosive materials have accumulated comparable to those in Algeria before November 1954, but still further heightened by the more ferocious degree of segregationist legislation and economic exploitation. Thus armed struggle is inevitable from the very beginning. The particular character of the indigenous population, semiproletarianized in big part, its level of cultural development and technical skill, superior to that of the other countries of Black Africa, make of the approaching South African revolution a future center of socialist revolution for all of Black Africa.

After the lull following the "peace of Geneva" and the dividing up of Vietnam, the revolution in South East Asia has in recent years resumed its march forward under the impetus of the partisan movement in South Vietnam and the civil war in Laos. The attempt of Washington and Moscow to stop this civil war has run against the reservations of Peking and Hanoi and the attractive force of the Pathet Lao on the so-called "neutralist" forces. On the other hand, the progress of the revolution in South Vietnam and in Laos has created a prerevolutionary situation in the vast frontier zone of Thailand.

An economically privileged situation and a mass of rather prosperous small peasant proprietors, as well as exploitation of the national conflict between China and Malaya, have permitted the neocolonialist masters of Malaya to momentarily subjugate the revolutionary movement in this country. The scope of the movement in Singapore forced the Malayan compradore bourgeoisie to elaborate the project of a Greater Malaya, both to contain the revolutionary pressure in Singapore and the better to repulse the effects of the advance of the revolution in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. However, the project of a Greater Malaya ran into the violent opposition of the masses in North Borneo, giving rise to a new movement of national agitation in Indonesia.

Indonesia remains the key country of the revolution in South East Asia. The revolution has stagnated there for a long period, although one cannot speak of any stabilization whatever of the bourgeois regime or of a profound setback of the mass movement. The Sukarno regime has been able to maintain itself only thanks to the ultra opportunist policy of the Indonesian CP on the one hand, which has undertaken nothing against Sukarno but placed complete confidence in him, absolutely excluding a struggle for power, and on the other hand thanks to adroit exploitation of the national sentiments of the masses in relation to various separatist movements, first in western New Guinea and then in North Borneo.

Finally the lamentable attitude of various Indian parties of the so-called left (Indian Communist party, Revolutionary Socialist party, Socialist party, etc.), their shameful capitulation in face of the chauvinist pressure and their acceptance of a "sacred union" with the bourgeoisie, enabled the Nehru regime to inflict a heavy defeat on the workers movement on India in connection with the Sino-Indian frontier conflict. Despite the spectacular retreat of the Chinese forces which had heavily defeated the Indian bourgeois army in the frontier battle, the capitalist government was able to impose on the masses the cost of veritable militarization of the country, which likewise condemned the third five-year plan to failure. Nevertheless, the objective consequences of this effort at rearmament (inflation, rise in the cost of living, spectacular growth of taxes) create favourable conditions for a revival of the workers movement, if the vanguard political forces understand the necessity of combining the struggle for the defence of the living conditions of the proletariat and of the pauperized intellectuals with agitation in favour of a genuine agrarian revolution.

In general, all the latest progress of the colonial revolution will place more and more on the order of the day the transformation of this revolution into a socialist revolution. This has already begun to occur in Algeria. A new qualitative modification in the relation of over-all forces will occur when this transformation affects the key countries of



entire geographic zones such as Indonesia, India or Brazil.

#### IV.

### THE EVOLUTION OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE IN THE IMPERIALIST COUNTRIES

In general, the main propelling force of the class struggle in the imperialist countries stems from the consequences of exacerbated inter-imperialist competition, which sets off periodic attacks against the workers, standard of living. The inevitable reply of the workers to these attacks—fostered by the atmosphere of relatively full employment continuing in most of the countries of capitalist Europe—can take an economic form, remaining limited solely to demands for wage increases, or to a reduction of hours and longer paid vacations, necessary defence measures in face of a constant intensification of labor that exhausts the physical and nervous forces of the proletariat. It can also take a more militant and politicalized form from the moment that a sufficiently large vanguard succeeds in educating the most combative layers of the labouring masses on the necessity of engaging in combat for transitional demands. In this case the struggle can lead to a big test of strength with the bourgeoisie, creating a pre-revolutionary situation and causing a rapid maturing of the problem of power, the disappearance of the climate of relative “prosperity” not being a necessary requisite.

Despite widely different specific national conditions, the big struggles unleashed by the Belgium proletariat (general strike of December 1960—January 1961), by the Spanish proletariat (miners’ strike in Asturias, April 1962, followed by a wave of solidarity strikes throughout the country), by the Italian proletariat (big metal workers’ strike in the summer of 1962), by the British proletariat and by the Finnish proletariat (strikes in the winter of 1962-63) all took place in an analogous context. Everywhere these strikes were marked by a particular firmness, lasted longer than usual and saw the appearance of a new layer of young militants who participated with marked combativeness in the battle. These char-

acteristics likewise applied to the strike of a hundred thousand metal workers in southwest Germany, the first revival of working-class militancy in this country, in a context resembling that of the general framework described above. Everywhere, in the last analysis, it was the relative strength of the vanguard, its influence on the masses and the level of demands which it launched, that proved to be the factor determining whether the struggles were kept on a strictly “trade unionist” level or were permitted to rise toward putting in question the capitalist economy and the bourgeois state as a whole.

Even in France, the only country in western Europe in which the proletariat suffered a very grave defeat—when the bonapartist regime of de Gaulle was established in May 1958 without serious opposition—the miners’ strike on March 1963 showed that the working class is ready to make a touch defence of the standard of living acquired during the “boom,” and that such a struggle creates favourable objective conditions for even a political revival of the workers movement. In addition, the policy of the Gaullist regime, by placing the Socialist party in the opposition and menacing the positions which it holds in the parliamentary regime, helped foster a rapprochement between the Socialist and Communist parties and consequently a united front of the workers. Also, thanks above all to the resistance of the Algerian Revolution, and to a certain renewal of the workers movement, the Gaullist regime was not able to become consolidated in a profound and durable way, and consequently remains at the mercy of any brusque deterioration of the economic and social conjuncture, of any unresolved structural problem abruptly placed on the agenda, which in turn can suddenly touch off the class struggle, creating the possibility of a great revival of the workers movement.

In a general way the bourgeoisie sought to profit from the temporary lull in the class struggle and a certain depoliticalization of the working class by reinforcing its repressive arsenal, “regulating” the right to strike and thus accelerating its evolution toward a “strong state.” But this evolution ran up against fierce resistance from the workers vanguard everywhere, a resis-

tance sufficiently influential to delay (Germany) or upset to a large extent (Italy, Belgium) the plans of the bourgeoisie. If this resistance can merge with the firm economic combativity seen for some years, it will then become an important factor in repoliticalizing the workers struggles.

Besides this, the bourgeoisie, especially in some countries, projected an orientation that sought, under different and even apparently opposed policies, a certain amount of pruning and rationalization of the economy, indispensable even from the point of view of the interests of capitalism, and an increasing "integration" of the working class, above all the trade unions, in "neo-capitalist" solutions. Begun in France under the Mendes-France government, developed more organically in the de Gaulle period, spelled out in the most audacious way in Italy with the left-center, this policy has not, however, succeeded in its aims despite the opportunistic and confused attitude of the traditional workers parties. This was clearly demonstrated by the economic struggles of 1962-63 (Italian strikes, which witnessed the mobilization of sectors that had been stagnant for some years, French miners strike, etc.) and by such significant events as the Italian elections of April 1963. The reply of the revolutionary Marxists and of the militant wing of the workers movement to new experiments of this kind must continue on two levels: on the one hand, to reject any "wage freeze," open or veiled, presented under pretext of "planning," of "revenue policy," etc., maintaining complete freedom of action for the union movement to profit from full employment to improve the standard of living of the workers; on the other hand, to concentrate propaganda on transitional demands like workers control and a workers and peasants government (with its concrete specific content in each country), making it easier to unmask the bourgeois character of the so-called "left-center" solutions.

Two cases in particular deserve to be underlined, West Germany and Great Britain.

In West Germany the organizations and political consciousness of the workers have been deteriorating for more than ten years.

The CP, condemned to an underground existence and to carrying all the weight of the unpopularity of the Ulbricht regime in the German Democratic Republic, is completely isolated and reduced to an impotent group of militants. The small centrist groups have been progressively dissolved, and the new centrist currents expelled from the Social-Democracy remain mostly paralyzed in their isolation from the masses. The Social-Democracy has undergone an extremely rapid evolution to the right since the Congress of Bade-Godesberg, ending in the abandonment of the vestiges of its socialist program in correspondence with the transformation of its social composition—petty-bourgeois circles, functionaries and even bourgeois elements having replaced the workers as the activists most engaged in the daily work of the party which has become an ordinary electoral machine. It nevertheless remains by far the main rallying center of the West German working class.

However, the unions, above all the big federations (metallurgy, chemical, public services) have maintained and even relatively increased their strength, and this development has occurred against a background of fifteen continuous years of annual wage increases won by means of negotiations and without big open struggles. The very low level of German wages at the beginning in 1949, and the extraordinary industrial expansion were at the bottom of this evolution. More and more pronounced objective obstacles are now being encountered: intensified international competition, the leading position now acquired in the Common Market due to low German wages, increasing weight of unproductive state expenses (especially military) in which the costs are borne more and more by the labouring masses. The bosses will be compelled to refuse the "annual round" of wage increases, and even impose a reduction of real wages through a rise in the cost of living. The recent disturbed situation in metallurgy which ended in a strike and a lock-out in south-west Germany clearly showed that this moment is close. When this occurs, the most probable outcome, even if the German Socialist party has meanwhile formed part of the government, will be a violent encounter between the unions and the bosses, pronounced radicalization of the

unions and the bosses, pronounced radicalization of the union vanguard and at least the possibility of rapid politicalization of this vanguard.

In Great Britain the evolution as a whole has been the reverse during the past years. The increased sensitivity to certain political problems, above all that of nuclear disarmament; the fierce resistance to the attempts of Gaitskell to impose his revision of "point four" in the Labour Party program; the economic bankruptcy of the Tories who imposed years of economic stagnation on Great Britain; the freeze on wage increases proclaimed by Selwyn Lloyd; the reappearance of massive unemployment and the efforts at industrial rationalization at the expense of the working class—all this has created an atmosphere of social tension and of progressive repoliticalization which today renders the British labour movement more powerful than it has ever been. The return to power of a Labour government will occur under conditions in which the masses and the militants would not tolerate without revolt mere continuation of the Tory military and economic policy; after a brief interval a new push would, without doubt, be given to the left in the Labour party.

In Spain and Portugal the dictatorships continue to grow weaker, in the one instance through a real revival of the mass movement, in the other through a colonial revolution which is widening in the Portuguese colonies. The downfall of these two regimes has now been placed on the order of the day.

In Japan, the bourgeoisie succeeded in stabilizing the political situation after the grave crisis which occurred in 1960, primarily by exploiting the extraordinary economic expansion and the rise in the standard of living accorded to the workers under these conditions, especially in the big expanding private industrial sectors. But Japanese capitalist society remains characterized by a fundamental structural weakness; that is, the existence side by side of a modern industrial sector and of an archaic sector, of relatively high wages and of starvation wages, and it is undergoing in addition the consequences of the structural decline of certain branches (coal, naval

construction), as well as the attractive force emanating from the Chinese Revolution and the power of the anti-nuclear war sentiment of the masses. These conditions as a whole remain favourable to a revival of the mass movement.

In the United States, despite the increase of unemployment and the distress in various "depressed areas," the labor movement taken as a whole remains stagnant. From time to time strikes have broken out, some of which have been long and tenacious, but which were in general defensive in character (above all against the consequences of automation) and which flowed from the growing tendency of the bosses to reinforce the anti-labour position in the general economic climate described above (creeping inflation and deteriorating competitive conditions in relation to the European competitors). This situation will not be fundamentally modified until the American bourgeoisie decide that the generally unfavourable economic evolution requires a major attack on the standard of living and wages of the proletariat in the United States. This attack can cause an outburst leading to a rupture in the alliance between the Democratic party and the trade unions, a part of the union bureaucracy taking the initiative to launch a labor party. The rate at which the New Democratic party progresses in Canada, including the electoral level, will likewise contribute to this process in the United States.

Meanwhile, if the labour movement remains stagnant in the United States and has even lost ground, the struggle for racial equality has experienced great impetus. The Negro people have taken the initiative for a whole series of reasons: industrialization of the South, emigration to the North, effects of the war, status in industry, repercussions of the colonial revolution. It is necessary to underline the growing tendency of the younger generation to question the status quo, to organize demonstrations, and to establish more and more militant organizations. To this has been added a tendency of great importance: the reappearance of nationalist aspirations, apparent above all in the progress of the Black Muslim movement,

The extreme left in America has undergone a profound decline as a whole under the pressure of long years of relative economic prosperity, combined with an erosion of democratic rights and the worst witch-hunt the country has ever known. Only the the American Trotskyists have succeeded in holding their own in face of such unfavorable circumstances. With the victory of the Cuban Revolution, the American vanguard underwent an awakening. This was felt above all in the universities. The new generation of the American vanguard is now being formed under the influence of the colonial revolution, the process of de-Stalinization, the antinuclear movement, the struggle for racial equality, and the incapacity of American capitalism to offer an assured future to the youth.

## V.

### THE EVOLUTION WITHIN THE LABOUR AND REVOLUTIONARY INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT

*The evolution within the labour and revolutionary international movement has been dominated since 1960 by the appearance of a Castroist current on the one hand and by the growing consequences of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the other.*

The victory of the Cuban Revolution, which was made not only without the leadership of the Cuban Communist party but even against its resistance and the line that it followed right up to the eve of Fidel Castro's entry into Havana, was an extremely hard blow to the Khrushchevist line of the Communist parties in all of the colonial countries, above all after the establishment of a workers state in Cuba and the implicit recognition of this state of affairs by the leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy. If the Castroist current exercises an attractive force on the student and working-class youth of the workers states (especially in the USSR itself, in Czechoslovakia and Poland) it is above all in the Latin-American and African countries that it has had profound and lasting repercussions. In some countries splits have taken place in the traditional Communist movement under the combined influence of the Cuban revolution and the "Chinese line" (particularly in Brazil,

Colombia). In other countries the CP's have felt obliged to make a wide turn to the left and to adopt either the line of armed insurrection (Guatemala, Venezuela), or even the line of armed insurrection with a very advanced program (South Africa). Besides, some autonomous forces outside of the CP have adopted the same line (the MIR in Venezuela, Juliao in Brazil, etc..)

The attractive force of the Castroist line, in face of the passivity and revolving opportunism of the traditional Stalinist leaderships, begging for a "front with the national bourgeoisie" even when they are sending them to prison, has been such that a large part of the vanguard youth in the Latin-American countries have been profoundly impressed (in Africa, the influence of the Algerian Revolution and the influence of the "Chinese line" have had a similar effect). This generally explosive situation has led, in the absence of experienced and politically mature cadres, to ill-considered military actions in some places (particularly in Venezuela).

The Sino-Soviet dispute generally acted in the same progressive way during its first phase, above all in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. In the CP's of the workers states and the imperialist countries (above all the mass CP's such as the Italian and French), it was the new impulsion given to de-Stalinization after the Twenty-second Congress, which made it possible to deepen the discussion and to broach several of the key problems of revolutionary Marxist strategy in our epoch. Two currents, diametrically opposed to each other, rapidly separated out within the current favourable to de-Stalinization: a Khrushchevist or "Togliattist" current, which is fundamentally a *Communist right* current, revisionist and neoreformist, and a *Communist left* current, for which "de-Stalinization" is only a point of departure for fighting in favor of a revolutionary Leninist reorientation of the Communist International movement.

The significance and the dynamics of the Sino-Soviet conflict are dealt with elsewhere in a separate resolution.

The mass Social-Democratic movement (largely limited to capitalist Europe, to

Japan and to Australia) and the reformist trade-union bureaucracies, which, outside of the previously mentioned countries, hold very powerful positions in North America, have especially felt the contradictory influence of the capitalist "prosperity" on the one hand, and of the more or less vigorous class battles which have occurred within the framework of this "prosperity", on the other hand. Most of the Social-Democratic leaderships have continued to evolve towards the right, not only in the domain of international politics, where they identify themselves more and more with the American line but still more in the field of economic and social policy, where they throw overboard the remnants of Marxist phraseology and align themselves wholesale on a neocapitalist line of the Keynesian type.

But within these parties, left currents have generally appeared, either in opposition to lining up with the policy of Atlantic rearmament (including nuclear rearmament), or in opposition to the antisocialist orientation as a whole. The strength of these left currents is proportionate to the strength and the violence of the class struggle; that is to say they are stronger in Belgium than in the Netherlands, in Great Britain than in West Germany, in Denmark than in Sweden, in Finland than in Austria. In several cases, some small left or centrist Social-Democratic parties have been born through splits provoked especially by the opposition to acceptance of rearmament by the reformist bureaucracy (Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands) whose influence in the mass movement remains insignificant (except for Denmark), but which play the role of serving a warning and of exerting electoral pressure on the Social-Democratic leadership.

To the extent that this socialist left becomes organized and links itself to the trade unions, absorbing the most progressive currents, in them, acquiring a real mass base and formulating a coherent program opposing altogether the capitulationist policies of the Social-Democracy as a whole, it prepares the basis for a change of leadership—especially in the absence of a mass Communist party and an old mass Communist tradition—and it can in this case profoundly influence the course of events, increasing the confi-

dence of the working class in its own forces and the outcome of the struggles it engages in. It was this factor particularly that determined the exceptional scope of the Belgian general strike of December 1960-January 1961; it is the same factor which could come into play tomorrow in Great Britain and even in West Germany, when an important revival of the class struggle occurs there.

On the other hand in the countries where the labor movement is dominated by the Communist parties, the evolution of the Socialist parties cannot follow the same trajectory. Thus in Italy we have witnessed an evolution of the Socialist party of Nenni to the right during the past few years, the right wing of this party completely assimilating the traditional foreign reformist currents, the "left" falling under the debilitating influence of Togliatti's neoreformism. In France the PSU (Parti Socialiste Unifié) was born as a center for the regroupment of Social-Democratic and centrist forces, for whom the traitorous role of the Mollet-Lacoste-Lejeune leadership during the Algerian war and the rise of de Gaulle became intolerable. But the return of Mollet to the opposition with regards to Gaullism after the end of the Algerian war and the slow evolution towards an SFIO-PCF united front has taken away from the PSU its reason for being in the eyes of the traditional Social-Democratic elements.

## VI.

### OUR TASKS

On the basis of the above analysis and that of the special resolution on the situation in the workers states, the main tasks of the Fourth International at this stage are as follows:

The Fourth International continues to warn the masses of the entire world that imperialism, engaged in a nuclear arms race which moreover constitutes one of the present bases of its economy, remains ready to utilize military means against every gain of the revolution in the world, interventions which could take the form of nuclear war when it feels its immediate existence threatened. The Fourth International warns the

masses that a nuclear war would constitute a catastrophe for humanity and that it is a prime task to prevent it from occurring.

The weakening of imperialism, which is taking place today on a world scale primarily through the colonial revolution, constitutes the most effective preparation for its future disarmament. This can ultimately be done only by toppling imperialism through the action of the proletariat of the big capitalist countries.

It is the duty of Revolutionary Marxists to participate in the forefront if not to take the initiative in launching movements for the unilateral disarmament of their own bourgeoisie, nuclear disarmament in the first place—movements directed against both the presence of nuclear arms and the establishment of NATO bases on the soil of these countries (America, West German, or “intergrated” bases). These movements must be conceived as very large mass movements, assembling all of the dynamic elements (primarily the youth) of all the tendencies of the labor movement (including the Christian labor movement) and widening even this movement to include petty-bourgeois and intellectual strata. The dangers of degeneration in these movements do not lie in widening them, but in choosing incorrect political objectives, or succumbing to increasing passivity of leadership.

The revolutionary Marxists will strive to move ahead with the most militant strata of the participants in these movements towards more radical and effective forms of action than mere demonstrations; they will try to orient them in the direction of political solution based on the conquest of power by the labor movement and they will strive to convince the masses that only the complete disarmament; that is to say, the toppling of capitalism, constitutes in the last analysis an effective solution to the problem of disarmament.

The colonial revolution is at this stage the principal sector of the world revolution. The participation of the International and its sections in leading, defending and aiding the colonial revolution constitutes therefore an essential task for our movement. Taking into account the objective situation in certain

countries and the forces which the revolutionary Marxist movement has at its disposal the Fourth International places priority on the following sectors:

#### (A) Algeria:

This is incontestably the country which, of all those currently engaged in the colonial revolution, has gone furthest in transforming its revolution into a socialist revolution and moving toward establishment of a workers state. The forces of the International, primarily those in Europe, will help mobilize the aid of the labor movement for the Algerian Revolution. At the same time, they will continue to warn the Algerian and international masses that final victory is not possible on this level without breaking monetarily and financially with imperialism, without maintaining the revolutionary mobilization of the masses, without the creation of a state apparatus based on the political organizations of democratic self-government by the masses of the countryside and of the cities.

#### (B) The Peru-Bolivia group:

It is here that the Latin-American bourgeoisie and oligarchy seem the weakest, that the mass movement has already gone through extremely rich experiences, that the situation remains prerevolutionary, that the Marxist revolutionary forces have the best possibilities to gain, in a relatively short time, a predominant position, as much among the peasant movements as the trade unions and the labor movement. The organization of land seizures with armed defense of the occupied land (in the tradition of Hugo Blanco) and the creation of a new trade-union federation, constitute in Peru the central task for the present stage in which all our Latin-American forces must co-operate. In Bolivia our forces will struggle especially to create a real left-wing leadership in the COB which can help unify the working class and peasant movements.

The revolutionary Marxists in Latin America, in general, will act as the best defenders of the Cuban Revolution and will seek to integrate themselves in the Fidelista currents, combatting the orientation of the traditional parties, and insisting on the fact

that revolutionary struggle is the best way to defend Cuba. They will help organize the poor peasants, who will be the decisive factor in assuring the victory of the revolution in the majority of countries. While frankly warning against adventures and putschism, they will support guerrilla movements, above all in Peru and in Venezuela where they already exist.

**(C) South Africa and Angola:**

These two countries, but especially South Africa, now have the most explosive situation in the whole of Black Africa, with the presence simultaneously of objective forces (importance of proletarian and semiproletarian strata) and subjective forces (level of theoretical development of the leaders of the MPLA, presence of important revolutionary Marxist cadres in South Africa), favoring in the highest degree a rapid evolution of the revolution, which is on the point of breaking out, in a socialist direction. The adoption of a correct political orientation by our movement in South Africa along the road of armed self-defense, and also the adoption of a correct policy in regard to other currents of the mass movement who are oriented in the same direction—that is to say, an orientation of steady initiative in forming an anti-imperialist and anticapitalist united front, would enable it to play a key role from the first stage of the coming revolution. Inevitably the South African revolution will in the beginning take the form of a general revolt of the masses against the *apartheid* regime; that is to say, against the state, the army and the laws upholding racial segregation. We must avoid every sectarian attitude toward this national democratic character that the struggle will take in its first phase, but understand that it will also from the beginning take the form in the countryside of a *struggle for the land*, and in the cities a struggle against a *capitalist* state and army, and express inside and in the forefront of this democratic struggle of the masses the final socialist objectives which it will realize.

**(D)** The International will likewise have to follow with special interest the activity of its parties in Asia, which hold levers for profoundly modifying the objective situation and for assuring a leap forward for our movement.

Our *Ceylonese* section has progressively corrected the wrong orientation adopted in 1960 of supporting the liberal-bourgeois government of the SLFP. Since the masses began to go into action, it has not hesitated to place itself at their head against its electoral allies of yesterday. A deeper self-criticism of the past errors would nevertheless be useful, insofar as they were founded in the last analysis on an overestimation of the purely electoral aspect, of the struggle for power in Ceylon, which could be the source of new errors, in a different form, at another stage of the class struggle in Ceylon.

The LSSP must orient today in the direction of a *united front of the working class organizations* (the LSSP-CP-MEP and the trade unions, including the CWC and DWC, which have organized the overwhelming majority of the plantation workers) and in the direction of the formula of a *really socialist united-front government*, which constitutes the most effective solution for change as against the different types of bourgeois governments which have succeeded one another in Ceylon since independence. It is necessary to launch this orientation in an aggressive way, to make it penetrate into the broadest masses, to center it, not on simple negotiations at the top, but on the creation of *united-front committees* at all levels of political life (state, province, city and district), and give it at the same time a precise class character by fighting for a program for the *united front* which will express our class position, both on the problems of power, the relations with the Commonwealth and with the workers states, the nationalization of the principal means of production, and the language problems. Conceived in this spirit the campaign of the LSSP for the united front and a government of the united front, will broaden the party's audience and its mass base, the authority which it possesses in the working class, and will block any manoeuvres of possible opportunistic partners in the front. Other tasks which the LSSP should consider include elaborating a platform of concrete immediate and transitional demands for the poor population of the countryside, drawing all the conclusions which the defeated military coup d'état imposes, and assuring the recruitment and regular political and theoretical education of militants and worker cadres.

(E) The Fourth International resolutely supports the struggle which the partisans in South Vietnam and Laos are waging in order to overthrow the regimes of the big land owners and compradore bourgeoisie, the agents of American imperialism. It calls for the rejection of all formulae that stall the revolution half way, and for a firm orientation towards the conquest of power by the poor peasants and workers.

In India the revolutionary Marxists pursue intransigent struggle against the bourgeoisie, its Congress party and its top figure: Nehru. It denounces the treason of the Dange wing of the Communist party and the American agents of the PSP, which have formed a "sacred union" with the Indian bourgeoisie, not only against the Chinese workers state but also against the revolutionary workers and peasants of their own country persecuted by the Nehru regime. They will continue the work of clarification and of revolutionary regroupment, orienting themselves more and more in the direction of a liaison with the left in the CP and elaborating a program of transitional demands which corresponds to the aspirations of the poor masses of cities as well as of the countryside.

In Indonesia the revolutionary Marxists fight against the regime of the national bourgeoisie of Sukarno and criticize the CP for its submission to Sukarno and his policies. They will strive to open a socialist perspective and elaborate a program of transitional demands leading to socialism.

On a world scale, the revolutionary Marxists today must participate in the broad discussion inside the Communist movement, in order to progressively help clarify the ideas and the strategic orientation of the Communist movement, to work for the formation of a strong, more or less integrated left Communist current, and to prepare in this way precious cadres for a new revolutionary leadership in the colonial revolution, in the workers states, and in the imperialist countries.

### 3.

This participation must take place under our own flag, with the whole of the ideas of Trotskyism, of the program of the Fourth International, without making concessions

to any tendency, because we are convinced that only our program, the authentic program of revolutionary Marxism, offers satisfactory answers to the questions that are posed and will be posed more and more by the Communist militants. Our participation has a twofold aim: persistent integration in the real mass movement, in order to win guiding positions in it; continual struggle for the construction of a new revolutionary leadership of the international proletariat. It is in order to carry out these sought for aims that our participation in the Sino-Soviet dispute therefore imports, along with critical analysis of the position of both sides, tactical choices in order to *conclude alliances which bring us nearer* to the construction of new revolutionary mass parties.

It is not a matter then of choosing allies *within* the bureaucracy, but rather *within the mass movement*, and these allies can only be *the left Communist currents*; that is, the Castroist and "Chinese" currents in the CP's of the capitalist countries (colonial, semi-colonial and imperialist), and the currents to the left of the Khrushchevist tendency (wanting to push de-Stalinization further than the bureaucracy) in the CP's of the workers states.

The effectiveness of this participation will depend, aside from its principled character and the coherent defense of our positions, on the correct understanding of a series of progressive preoccupations of Communist militants engaged in the dispute, and of the possibility of responding to them correctly. This includes:

(a) An effort to prevent imperialism from profiting from the dispute. With this in mind, we must insist on the necessity of separating relations between CP's from the relations between workers states, on the necessity of maintaining the Sino-Soviet alliance despite the heat of the discussion, on the necessity of ending the economic reprisals of the People's Republic of China by the USSR, etc. In the same way we must also insist on the idea of an international conference of all the CP's prepared by an extensive democratic discussion with the publication of all the documents, a discussion and conference that would include the Yugoslav Communists and all revolutionary Marxists tendencies, the Trotskyists among them.



(b) An effort must be made to get the discussion out of its scholastic and Byzantine character by formulating strategic and tactical problems with which the world Communist movement is confronted (in the workers states as well as in the capitalist countries) and by proposing solutions to these problems inspired not only by the classical tradition of revolutionary Marxism but also by a broad synthesis of the immensely rich revolutionary experience of the last decades. Likewise with this in mind, we must not hesitate at proposing solutions to new problems which have not received adequate answers in the past (examples; the problem of the role of armed struggle in the colonial revolution, the problem of formulating new transitional demands in the present economic situation of the imperialist countries; the problem of the reciprocal relations between party, workers councils, and trade unions in workers states; the problems of international planning of the economy, etc). Every theoretical effort undertaken by our movement in this sense is assured today of a large response in the international Communist movement.

## 4.

The situation created by the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and still more by the Twenty-second Congress is eminently favorable for the revival of our movement in the workers states themselves. We must multiply our activities in helping the elements most advanced along the road of Leninism with appropriate ad hoc material, the collaboration of prepared and enthusiastic cadres, with a special "pedagogy" and tactics, which will facilitate spreading our ideas among vanguard circles of the workers states,, especially the youth.

An important place must be given to the campaign for the rehabilitation of Leon Trotsky and all the victims of Stalin's terror

## 5.

In capitalist Europe the revolutionary Marxists will continue to integrate themselves in the mass movement. Generally, they will render their slogans and their actions more precise in two fields; that of the anti-nuclear struggle, and that of European economic "integration" and the Common Market. A series of transitional demands should today complete the traditional slogans of the Socialist United States of Europe; they must be sought for, on the one hand through an appeal for closer economic collaboration with the workers states and for disinterested aid to the countries of the colonial revolution, and through elaboration of plans in this sense which can assure full employment; and, on the other hand, through extending the public sector (nationalization without compensation or redemption, and under workers control, of the trusts having branches and plants in different countries, etc). The idea of an economic plan for the development of all of Europe, to be elaborated by a congress of workers organizations, in opposition to the neocapitalist "programming" that the Common Market envisages, must also be popularized.

The revolutionary Marxists will likewise demand the convocation of this congress of workers organizations (trade union and political) within the framework of the Common Market alone, in order to respond to the need for a common strategy of the labour movement in face of the attacks of the bosses and the governments against the living and working conditions of the masses. The revolutionary Marxists must openly consider all the conclusions to be drawn from the Belgian strike of 1960-61, of the strike of the miners of Asturias, and the strike of the French miners, which show that the economic effect of these really impressive strikes is more and more neutralized by a more rapid and free international circulation of commodities than in the recent past, and that out of this fact, *united trade-union on a European scale, as well as the organization of effective international solidarity*, become more and more the conditions for effective strike action in every country in Europe.

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# THE SINO—SOVIET CONFLICT AND THE SITUATION IN THE USSR AND THE OTHER WORKERS' STATES

*(Adopted by the Reunification Congress of the Fourth International, June 1963.)*

THE rise in the world revolution, the liberation of powerful revolutionary forces in the economically underdeveloped countries and the workers states, together with their repercussions in the workers movement as a whole, have considerably heightened a process that began before the death of Stalin and finally dealt a mortal blow to Stalinism; that is, to the exclusive hegemony of the Moscow bureaucracy over the Communist mass movement, Soviet society and the workers states. In place of this hegemony, of undisputed command, the Communist parties and workers states for some years have recognized the CP of the USSR as the "leading party" and the USSR as the "leading state" and lined up accordingly. In Soviet society, in all the workers states, the bureaucracy, no longer able to wield uncontrolled domination and maintain an all-powerful police regime, has been making concessions to the masses. In the recent period, the process of decomposition of the bureaucratic system has spread more extensively than ever. Among the Communist parties, the old monolithism no longer exists, the Soviet leadership is no longer capable of guiding them as a whole, although its authority is still dominant; differences which were kept internal for some years have become public; violent polemics have flared into full view and even the possibility of split has arisen. Among the workers states and parties in these countries the relationship is no longer one of dependence on the Kremlin; in certain cases the disputes are public. The two principal anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist revolutionary struggles of recent years (Cuba, Algeria) have been conducted by leaderships and formations in independence from the Communist parties in these countries and from the bureaucracy of the workers states—a fact that has extremely weakened the prestige and the authority of the Stalinist or post-Stalinist leaderships. Within the workers states, especially in the USSR, "de-Stalinization"; that is, the course of liberalization to which the directing bureaucracy resorted in order to safeguard its

domination, resolved none of the contradictions of Soviet society—they are breaking out in multiple forms which can pave the way for the vigorous appearance of a tendency toward genuine democratization of life in the workers states.

The most spectacular aspect of the current phase of crisis in the system of workers states and of Communist parties is the Sino-Soviet conflict which—above all after the crisis in the Caribbean and the Sino-Indian frontier incidents in the fall of 1962—took the form of an open theoretical and political conflict on key questions of international politics affecting the workers movement (war and peace, uninterrupted revolution, the revolutionary or parliamentary road to socialism, etc.). This conflict tends to polarize the left currents of the Communist movement around the problems of the world revolution. On the other hand, the existence of the Fidel Castro leadership polarizes the unorganized currents, above all the youth of the economically underdeveloped countries, and is beginning to polarize the organized tendencies in Latin America. The Yugoslav experience, however limited the level of application of workers management because of the absence of workers political democracy, exercises an attraction among the most advanced layers in the USSR and in the workers states of eastern Europe.

To the extent that this crisis develops—on a par, moreover, with the economic, social and political conflicts which have not ceased to characterise the internal life of the USSR and the other workers states—it offers testimony to the validity of the Trotskyist program in a striking way: in all the progressive manifestations of the crisis, segments of the Trotskyist program become projected, be it the question of world revolution in the colonial countries or imperialist capitals, of the struggle against the bureaucracy and for workers democracy in the workers states,

However, despite the already considerable scope which the crisis of the bureaucratic system has reached, all the tendencies which have appeared up to now within the former Stalinist framework have remained subordinated to the bureaucracies of the workers states, not one having cut itself from the bureaucratic interests and perspectives to rise to the level of the interests and perspectives of the socialist world revolution. This limitation is expressed among other ways by the fact that these tendencies reciprocally accuse each other of "Trotskyism," universally denounce "Trotskyism," and carry the discussion to the ranks only with the greatest reluctance. The Fidel Castro leadership, for its part, centers its activities in Latin America and participates only partially and in a restricted way in the debates of the international Communist movement.

The forces determining the crisis allow the polemics to be interrupted by only brief truces at the most. No bureaucratic manoeuvre can dam the crisis of the bureaucratic system in all the CP's and workers states. The possibilities are constantly growing for the Fourth International to intervene in the process in order to assure a renewal of revolutionary Marxism on the political and organizational levels.

## THE END OF MONOLITHISM IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

(A)

### THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

In the open since 1957 and extended in a big way since the "Camp David" meeting (1959), resumed again after the passing compromise made at the Moscow Conference in 1960, aggravated following the affair of the Caribbean and the Sino-Indian frontier incidents in the fall of 1962, the Sino-Soviet conflict shows once more that the extension and victory of the socialist revolution are incompatible with Stalinism and with the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy whether in the form they took under Stalin or under the leadership of Khrushchev, even when the revolutionary movement is controlled by a bureaucratic leadership.

Just as in the period before the war when the relation of forces in the world were

unfavourable to the socialist revolution, the international policy of the Soviet bureaucracy since the victory of the Chinese Revolution, which altered the over-all relation of forces in favor of the world socialist revolution, has been marked by constant effort to maintain a *status quo* which always shows itself to be nonexistent. In the postwar period, the *status quo* signified an over-all equilibrium with imperialism which must not be disturbed by big revolutionary movements and in which the key positions of imperialism must not be brought into question.

To the degree that the relation of forces has been reinforced by the economic successes of the workers states and the strength of the armaments of the USSR, the Soviet bureaucracy under the leadership of Khrushchev, while occasionally engaging in adventurist moves, has more often very strongly accentuated its opportunist course on the plane of international relations. The Soviet bureaucracy has exploited for its own aims the feelings normally existing among the Soviet masses; that is, their apprehension of a new war and their hope for material benefits after the sacrifices they made over many years to defend the Soviet regime and create a modern economy. The bureaucracy has systematized a whole series of rightist tendencies and positions which were already formulated in Stalin's time, notably in the periods when an understanding was sought with the imperialist democracies.

The important differences on this point between Khrushchev and Stalin do not relate to the perspectives and intentions of the bureaucracy but to the different conditions under which they operate and the different consequences this leads to. Stalin was able to deliver revolutions to the butchers openly and cynically (among others, the Second Chinese Revolution of 1925-27, the Spanish Revolution, the struggle of the Greek partisans). Khrushchev has been obliged to grant aid to revolutionary movements, but he has done so in an insufficient, timorous fashion while seeking agreements with imperialism or with the bourgeoisie of the underdeveloped countries, or after the revolution has already won a decisive victory,

In this same period, the Chinese leaders, having triumphed after more than twenty years of vicissitudes, had to begin from a low level of productive forces and found themselves the constant target of imperialist assaults, primarily from American imperialism which views the People's Republic of China as a new revolutionary center blocking its ambitions in the Pacific. Without raising objections in principle to seeking agreements with the capitalist states, the Chinese leaders nevertheless found in experience that for them the perspective was scarcely realistic and, still worse, that the risk existed that agreements could be concluded between Moscow and Washington at the expense of some of the interests of the People's Republic of China. They were led to orient their policy much less toward seeking agreements with imperialism than toward pursuing a policy aimed at weakening it. It must be added that the leadership of the Chinese CP feels the pressure of a living revolution which triumphed thirteen years ago while the leaders of the Soviet CP represent a bureaucracy consolidated in power for some forty years.

The fundamental cause of the Sino-Soviet conflict lies in the different needs of the bureaucracies headed by the two leaderships: the one expressing the needs of a bureaucracy feasting at the head of an economically developed country, the other at the head of a society that is still poor, unable to count on major aid from the USSR. The search for agreements and above all an over-all agreement with imperialism on the part of the Soviet bureaucracy contradicts the search by the Chinese leaders for more aid and for better defenses against the heavy pressure of imperialism. From these divergent material needs flow the differences that have appeared between the Chinese and Soviet leaders on some of the key questions of current international politics which have led the Chinese to vigorously denounce Khrushchev's orientation as well as that of his partisans throughout the world (Togliatti, Thorez, the Indian CP, the American CP).

These differences can be summarized essentially as follows:

### 1.

While the Soviet leaders insist on the possibility of guaranteeing peace even if capitalism continues to exist, and stress the necessity of seeking collaboration with bourgeois tendencies, including American imperialist circles, the Chinese never cease underlining the fact that the nature of imperialism has not changed, that in the struggle to safeguard the peace one must have no illusions about this or that tendency of the bourgeoisie, this or that imperialist leader. They recall quite correctly that the only definitive means to avoid a new world war is by overturning capitalism on a world scale and that the only method of working in this direction is to develop the revolutionary struggle of the masses. For the Soviet leaders the motor force of socialism consists mainly of the economic development of the USSR and the other workers states. According to this view the passage to socialism on a world scale will be assured above all by a Soviet victory in economic competition, the forces of the revolutionary masses throughout the world playing no more than a supporting role, even having to be restrained from "provoking" major conflicts with capitalism in particularly sensitive places. The Chinese maintain that it is the world-wide revolutionary forces that must play the fundamental role. On this main point, the position stated by the Chinese comes close, therefore, to the basic orientation of the revolutionary Marxists.

Finally, the Chinese reproach the Soviet leadership with not exploiting to the end the generally favourable objective situation that exists in the world today and with overestimating, because of opportunistic aims, the strength of American imperialism.

Khrushchev's accusations, Tito's even more, according to which the Chinese favor unleashing a world war, are evident polemical distortions. The Chinese, despite grave weaknesses which we will take up later, have never expressed such an orientation nor have they opposed any temporary compromise with imperialism. In fact, at the time of the international crisis of October 1962, they criticized Khrushchev not only for his opportunism and for trampling under foot the elementary rights of the Cuban Revolution, but also for the adventurism which led him to mount rockets on Cuban soil

## 2.

The Soviet government, advocating essentially "peaceful" competition with capitalism, seeks to establish agreements with the national bourgeoisies of the underdeveloped countries, placing in subordination to them the policies of the indigenous CP's, and, as much as possible the movements of the masses. The Chinese leaders, while displaying certain similar attitudes—notably in the case of Indonesia—express much more critical views about the national bourgeoisies, insisting on the leading role of the proletariat and on the uninterrupted character of the revolution (which puts them in opposition to the Menshevik concepts of Stalin on revolution by stages and brings them close to the Trotskyist concept of the permanent revolution). As a result, the Chinese in general have a tendency to support the most revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped countries, without being bound by the same hesitations that characterize the Soviet attitude (note, for example, their different attitudes toward the Algerian Revolution).

Khrushchev's attitude at the time of the border conflict between China and India, his support in fact of the Nehru government against the Chinese workers state, constituted the extreme expression of this difference of orientation on such an important question.

## 3.

The criticisms made by the Chinese of the neo-reformist concepts of Khrushchev and his partisans throughout the world on the "peaceful," democratic, even parliamentary road to socialism have been progressively sharpened and made more specific. The polemic against Togliatti, in particular, rising above the level of generalities to examine very closely the formulas of the secretary of the Italian CP, bellweather of Khrushchevism in the Communist parties of the capitalist countries, signified in actuality a defense of the Marxist Leninist concept of the state, which is flouted by Togliatti and his kind despite their verbal protestations to the contrary.

This Chinese criticism, moreover, has a wider bearing since the Khrushchev thesis on the peaceful road to socialism is promulgated by Communist parties in a series of colonial and semicolonial countries where a revolutionary crisis already exists or can rapidly be precipitated, and where any "democratic," "peaceful" perspective could have only catastrophic consequences at the first serious test.

\* \* \*

It is then on three of the major questions of our period—the question of the struggle against war, the question of the nature of the colonial revolution and the orientation of the revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped countries, and the question of the road to socialism above all in the advanced capitalist countries—that the Chinese concepts prove to be on the whole more progressive than the Khrushchev concepts, being analogous to certain theses of revolutionary Marxism. Hence the favourable echo given them above all among the sectors and currents of the left in the international Communist movements, for whom the Chinese attitude represents a stimulus of major importance.

Our appreciation of the significance of the ideological and political evolution of the Chinese Communists does not prevent us in the least from expressing our criticisms on a whole series of questions where their positions are erroneous and dangerous:

In the first place, their conception of the ultimate consequences of a nuclear war appear very summary; in fact, they underestimate these consequences. In addition, the Chinese at times seem to underestimate the forces still at the disposal of imperialism. Above all they fail to envisage the problem of the qualitatively new character which a nuclear war would have in relation to wars of the past, of the fact that according to a big sector of the scientific world the destruction of humanity would be threatened.

In the second place we criticize the backwardness of the Chinese Communists on the problems of de-Stalinization, to which, however, at an earlier stage they seemed to wish to contribute. Especially bad is their

attitude toward the Albanian Stalinists and even toward old Stalinist groups in the USSR, their reticence in face of the Soviet condemnation of Stalin and his "cult." This attitude can have only negative consequences; first of all, it blocks the development of a tendency that would be favourable to them in the USSR and in the workers states of eastern Europe. The left tendencies in this part of the world, if they are favourable to an international revolutionary policy, can only condemn all the old Stalinists and their nostalgia for the Stalinist epoch. Analogous considerations apply to the Communist parties in the capitalist countries, above all those which enjoy big mass influence (for example, the Italian CP).

Revolutionary Marxists, in addition, can only condemn the polemic of the Chinese against the Yugoslav Communists. This polemic, often reminiscent of the old Stalinist style, is based on evident distortion of the Yugoslav reality and the concepts expressed by the Yugoslav Communist League. Certain rightist deviations of the Yugoslavs on a whole series of problems (international political orientation, the road to socialism, attitude toward the national bourgeoisies of the "Third World," etc.) the very dangerous tendencies which flow from certain economic conceptions and which have already produced signs of unquestionable bureaucratic degeneration, must be denounced; however, they in no way justify the accusation that capitalism has been restored nor the excommunication of Tito and his partisans. Such accusations in reality injure those who launch them.

It is necessary finally to point out that the Chinese continue to refer to the 1960 Declaration of the 81 which, being mostly a text reached by compromises of eclectic nature, cannot effectively clarify the fundamental questions in discussion, remaining in fact considerably behind the positions of many Chinese documents of recent months.

(B)

#### OTHER DIFFERENTIATIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES

If the Sino-Soviet conflict is at the present stage the major one within the Communist movement, this does not exhaust the dif-

ferentiations and contradictions. Not only is there the Yugoslav current, which maintains wide autonomy and its own characteristics despite the rapprochement with Khrushchev, but in each of the two "camps" themselves there is a variegated range of differentiations and particular formations.

This holds for the Chinese and Albanians, whose concepts should not be considered to be identical, but it is especially true of the Khrushchevist grouping which, in reality, combines parties and leaderships of very different orientation, often on very important problems. Thus Gomulka's line, especially in relation to agricultural questions, attitude towards the intellectuals, de-Stalinization, etc., is very far from the example of the line of the Bulgarian CP. Thus the attitude of the leadership of the Italian CP on the question of de-Stalinization is far from that of the French Communist party which has avoided up to now any relaxation of the old style bureaucratic grip. In relation to the orientation of internal policy, if Thorez formally declares himself more faithful to Marxist concepts but tramples on them in practice, leaving out among other things any idea of a transition program, Togliatti prides himself on being a more "audacious" innovator, openly questioning the validity of certain essential aspects of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state, and insisting on a transition program conceived, however, in a complete reformist fashion.

Up to now, the break up of the Stalinist monolith has been characterized by the fact that it has followed national lines; that is, the public differences have occurred between national leaderships while each of the parties appears to maintain its unity. But the depth of the divisions and especially the depth of the Sino-Soviet conflict—which cannot really be surmounted by the always possible new attempts at compromise—shakes the authority of the bureaucratic leaderships and consequently the existing regimes of the parties. Even if no party has re-established a genuine democratic regime with the right of tendencies and if the intentional distortion of opposing positions remains a favourite method, the bureaucratic leaderships, in certain cases at least, begin to be obliged to let members of their party

hold positions divergent from the official line, while barring them from holding leading posts. The considerable differences and rather wide possibility of criticism which already exist in the Italian CP constitute the indication of a tendency which is destined to grow stronger and to become general, despite the zigzags and temporary retreats which are always possible and even probable.

(C)

### THE FIDELISTA CURRENT

In the present context of the Communist movement, a completely specific place is occupied by the Fidelista leadership which will more and more play a genuinely international role, above all, of course, in Latin America. This leadership is distinguished from other leaderships of the workers states not only from the point of view of its origins but also in relation to its positions on international and internal problems.

If some of its members individually reached Marxist positions before participating in the July 26 Movement, the Cuban leadership as such had no precise theoretical formation and it expressed even up to the taking of power confused and equivocal ideological concepts. But, thanks to profound links with the masses, especially with the most disinherited layers of Cuban society, it was more and more able to understand the genuine logic of the revolutionary process and, despite its ideological limitations, it worked in practice along a line of permanent revolution, assuring the creation of the first workers state in the Americas. Thus Cuba became the first example in our epoch of a revolution in which the leadership through its own experiences in the very course of struggle came over to the concepts of Marxism-Leninism.

Subsequent experience has proved that this is a profound conversion. In brief,

(a) The Cuban leadership is the first leadership of a workers state since Lenin and Trotsky that has addressed the exploited masses—on a continental scale—to call them to revolutionary struggle for the conquest of power. (See the Second Declaration of Havana.)

(b) Through their speeches and declarations, Fidel Castro and his comrades have shown that they envisage the problems of the Latin-American revolution under an essentially revolutionary angle, rejecting the Khrushchevist concepts of the majority of the Latin-American Communists. The speech of Fidel Castro to the Congress of American Women (January 1963) marked another decisive step forward on this level.

(c) Nationally, the Fidelista leadership, keenly sensing the bureaucratic dangers which were threatening and can still threaten the Revolution, intervened in conscious fashion, as the Left Opposition sought to do in the USSR and in the Bolshevik party, in order to appeal openly to the masses to struggle against bureaucratization and to assure a series of concrete organizational measures (following the elimination of Escalante).

Thus, the Fidelista leadership appears at this stage as the most advanced political leadership by far of all the workers states. Even if it engages only very discreetly in the current international debates, due to the fact that while its revolutionary line is without doubt closer to the Chinese line it requires Soviet economic and military aid, still it will be in a position to exercise growing international influence, above all in Latin America, but also in other colonial and semicolonial countries and even among the youth of the capitalist countries and the workers states.

## DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORKERS STATES

(A)

### IN THE SOVIET UNION

In Soviet society, the tensions and conflicts have had a tendency to manifest themselves in new forms against the backdrop of interests and basic tendencies long ago analysed by the Trotskyist movement.

De-Stalinization had very profound economic, social and political roots; it corresponded essentially to the need to defend and maintain the bureaucratic regime in conditions where Stalin's methods and concepts risked producing explosions. It consisted even of an attempted partial



solution of problems which were and still are objectively posed in Soviet society through its own intrinsic necessities, the international necessities of confronting imperialism, and its relations with the other workers' states.

On the economic level, the Soviet leaders face problems flowing from the consequences of bureaucratic management involving the development of the productive forces themselves.

Thanks to the dynamism inherent in the relations of collective property instituted by the October Revolution and also, especially in the postwar period, to the development of technology from which the USSR likewise benefitted, the rate of growth of production has been relatively high. But this does not signify that all the possibilities have been really exploited. On the contrary, vast productive potentialities are still not utilized due to the fact that on the one hand the democratic initiative of the masses is brought to bear in only the most limited way, and on the other hand, bureaucratic management provokes the phenomenon of underutilization of equipment, disequilibrium in production, quite considerable waste, etc.

Towards the end of Stalin's time, such things had reached a peak. The very meaning of Khrushchevism was to find a way out of this situation without disturbing the domination of the bureaucracy.

One of the solutions envisaged was decentralization; a whole current of the Communist movement, inspired by the Yugoslav experiment, was in favor of this measure. This was the meaning of the recasting of the industrial structure of 1957. While this reform yielded certain results by reducing some of the most monstrous difficulties, it could not avoid the reproduction of bureaucratism in the new economic structures (regional, etc.) nor the appearance of local fiefs every bit as bad as the old ones. This is why, following the results of that reform, a new shuffling of the leadership took place involving a new reconstruction of the zones and of the economic management. In the recent period tendencies toward renewed centralization have been uppermost.

This is the explanation for certain discussions and polemics among the economists and Soviet leaders. One tendency, against decentralization, seeks to return to formulations of a more centralized management, while another tendency, holding that the new difficulties that have arisen are due to insufficient decentralization, wants to extend decentralization. This is also the explanation for the growth in the functioning of the market and certain tendencies toward greater autonomy for local management (visible here, too, is the influence of Yugoslav experience).

Finally, this is the explanation for certain polemics over objective economic laws, and over the necessity of establishing new indexes and criteria of economic accounting designed to furnish more precise and more comparable data on production, norms, etc.

In addition to the reforms of the organizational structure of industry, the Khrushchevist bureaucracy recently envisaged a change even in the structure of the party and the introduction of certain means for workers participation in the management of enterprises. The real aim of the reform of the party announced by Khrushchev in November 1962, is to utilize the party more and more as an instrument integrated in the apparatus of bureaucratic control of the economy. This could achieve only very partial results (limitation of waste, economic crimes, etc.) but could not possibly resolve the problem of stimulation essential to the productivity of labour, of equilibrium among the various branches of the economy, etc., and could even give rise to political dangers. The project of creating consultative committees, following similar experiments (production meetings), eloquently testifies to the fact that the bureaucracy itself perceives where the key to a genuine solution is to be found, but it demonstrates at the same time that on this level the bureaucracy cannot go very far and that it acts with extreme caution in what it does try. Even if such committees were established, they would have no real powers but only a consultative voice; they could not therefore constitute the stimulating force of which the Soviet economy is in need.

Thus it is clear that the bureaucracy is incapable of resolving the contradictions of Soviet economy in this phase of transition, since it is incapable on the one hand of understanding economic laws in all their depth and of adapting itself to them, and on the other hand of mobilizing the main force of a socialist economy, that is the creative power of the masses. It can only continue to seek palliatives, outlining "technocratic" solutions, introducing still new forms of bureaucratic control, and leaving to the working class a completely subordinate role.

The current difficulties of the Soviet economy manifest themselves in a particularly acute and evident form in the agricultural sector which despite numerous reforms, remains backward, its rate of growth remaining very limited if it exists at all on a per capita basis. The still backward character of Soviet agriculture can be gauged by the primary fact that the population active in this domain still stands at around fifty per cent of the total active population, a percentage that cannot possibly compare favourably with that of the most advanced capitalist countries. On the other hand, the integration of the agricultural sector into the planned economy runs into major obstacles due to the fact that non-collectivist relations of production still predominate in the countryside.

The increase in autonomy for the kolkhozes the creation of more favourable exchange relations for members of the kolkhozes, for the peasants etc., made it possible to avoid the catastrophe inherent in continuing Stalin's way of squeezing the peasantry. These measures have nevertheless not made possible the rate of growth fixed many times in planning to meet the growing needs of consumption. Nor have they made it possible to progressively limit the interests of the kolkhoze members in their own small plots. Thus the kolkhozes cannot count on full utilization of the labour power at their disposal. Finally the virgin lands experiment proved to be precarious and uncertain primarily because the results are subject to great fluctuations and because problems of a social nature are posed in the sovkhoses of the virgin lands themselves.

Khrushchev experimentation likewise has not been able to find a genuine solution in the agricultural domain due to the fact that it has not touched the most profound roots of the problem. The difficulties in the agricultural domain cannot be surmounted without a massive increase in investments in the countryside, and this in turn would not be possible without a radical change in economic orientation, above all a reduction of investments in the sector of heavy industry. Moreover an orientation aiming at more harmonious economic development also implies democratic participation of the masses; that is democratic management of the kolkhozes and sovkhoses. It is only when the kolkhoze members see concrete possibilities for considerable development of the kolkhozes, thus of their own kolkhoze revenues; only when they feel that the kolkhozes are democratic communities which they themselves effectively guide, will their interest in their own private plots progressively decrease and make it possible finally to envisage a transition without tension and resistance from the kolkhoze form to perfected forms of collective management.

The difficulties of economic development and above all the persistent backwardness of the agricultural sector seriously hamper the realization of substantial progress on the level of increased consumption. The measures sharply increasing the prices of food products (meat milk etc.) taken in 1962 constitute the most apparent evidence of this.

It has been stressed that Khrushchev is attempting above all to take Soviet Society in the direction of a "welfare state" and that for him Communist society amounts to a society of "well being." His failures in this field are all the more serious. If it is true that the Soviet standard of living has not ceased to rise, it is equally true that in 1962 the rate of growth of the standard of living was weaker and in absolute terms it remains insufficient in relation to the growing needs of the Soviet masses, who hope to obtain on the level of consumption and of comfort a translation of the great economic and technical progress of the Soviet Union about which the bureaucracy itself constantly boasts.

On the cultural level, the Soviet bureaucracy has felt the need for a change in relation to Stalinist practices, first of all because dogmatism and administrative methods constitute a sterile block on scientific progress and consequently on the development of the productive forces; secondly because such an attitude bears the danger of an open rupture between the intellectuals and the regime. Hence the movement for liberalization which has developed in well-known forms and which has at times attained a rather high level. It was under these conditions that the idea was advanced of competition between different scientific schools and that artistic currents other than the official "socialist realism" appeared. The recent polemics on literature, painting, etc., are extremely significant. They demonstrate, on the one hand, the powerful ferment among layers of young intellectuals who want Soviet culture to progress to a much higher level than that of the preceding period. They have, on the other hand, singularly exposed the main limitations of Khrushchevism which have been expressed in a certain form of neo-Zdanovism in the cultural domain, above all at the beginning of 1963. It is clear that what is at stake in the conflict between Khrushchev and the young intellectuals goes much beyond the intrinsic merits of abstract painting and twelve-tone music. Khrushchev knows very well that in a society where the forms of democratic expression do not exist or are extremely limited, the most general political conflicts can find a partial or distorted reflection in artistic conflicts. The wide audience enjoyed by poets like Yevtushenko and Voznessenski testifies not only to a certain intellectual interest among the Soviet youth but also to the political significance of these manifestations. On the other hand, it is clear that if the bureaucracy admitted the idea of a plurality of scientific and cultural tendencies and of free debate among them, it would objectively facilitate differentiations on the political level, making possible even a certain crystallization around political problems that would be but a prelude to the affirmation of the right to a plurality of Soviet parties.

The political significance of the recent dispute on the cultural level was underlined all the more by the fact that in the course of debate the question was posed once more

of Stalin and the crimes of his period, including the question of the concentration camps. In reality, in the discussion of cultural questions and of the responsibilities of certain Soviet intellectuals in the Stalinist period, the question is posed more generally of the responsibility, in this same period, of numerous Soviet leaders. From this flows an extreme danger for the Khrushchev leadership itself which finds it necessary to seal up the breaches as quickly as possible.

The contradiction of Khrushchevism is once again put in the spotlight. To win the support of the masses, Khrushchev is compelled to present himself as the liquidator of the "cult of the personality," as the denouncer of the worst crimes of Stalin. In fact, each time he finds himself in difficulty in different fields, and faced by attacks from his adversaries, he resorts to a new denunciation of the "cult of the personality," seeking to give the impression that the evil might return and that he constitutes the guarantee against this. But, on the other hand, each move Khrushchev makes toward de-Stalinization incites certain layers to pose new problems, to express new necessities, to demand a more sweeping de-Stalinization. In so far as this constitutes a danger for the bureaucratic system itself, and consequently for Khrushchev, too, he must either beat a retreat or fail to carry out promises he had made.

The nature of Khrushchevism itself explains this alternation of advances and retreats in de-Stalinization, which will probably still continue even in the near future.

In recent years, the bureaucracy has had to face new problems relating to the integrated economic development of the workers states. In the wake of the development of the productive forces in the Soviet Union as well as in the other workers states, and parallel with the attempts at the economic integration of capitalism in western Europe, the necessity of economic co-ordination of the workers states was considerably increased. Above all in the second half of 1962 important measures were outlined, including the creation of a "bank for the socialist countries," which will have a long-range influence on the economic structure of the workers states composing the COMECON.

A common planning organism for all these countries is likewise envisaged. Thus the bureaucracy itself must interpret and express, although in a distorted way, the objective necessities of the economic development of the workers states. Even leaving aside certain conjunctural resistances in this or that country, the realization of this economic integration will be hampered by the existence of the bureaucracy for reasons analogous to those occurring in the various national frameworks, national bureaucratic selfishness being added to the bureaucratic interests. Without democratic economic planning on a national scale, without harmonious development within the different countries, it is impossible to carry out democratic planning and a harmonious development on the international level. The tensions and conflicts produced within the different economies under bureaucratic management will not be lessened, but multiplied within an international context. In addition it is necessary to emphasize strongly that the political needs and methods of the bureaucracy, which does not hesitate at recourse to economic sanctions, hinder the accomplishment of economic tasks. Thus a real co-ordination of the economy of the workers states cannot succeed if certain of these states are excluded; more concretely, it could be only very partial if China finds itself obliged to remain at the margin of this system. Far from accepting such an orientation, it is necessary on the contrary to demand that this economic co-ordination of the workers states should be open to substantial participation by certain underdeveloped countries where the revolution is advancing toward socialist solutions (for example Algeria at the current stage).

The bureaucratic leadership continues to come under a whole range of various social and political pressures. We have underlined many times that conflicts of interests and of orientation exist even within the bureaucracy. In recent years the most evident pressures have been those of the economic bureaucracy. It is known that it has been the pressure of managers of industry and of the agricultural sector which contributed greatly to the adoption of certain Khrushchevist reforms. But at the present stage, in the discussions on the laws of the market, on economic accounting, on

the power of managers, on the role of the market, certain managers of industry play a quite considerable role. Another reflection of these tendencies is visible in the fact that among the Soviet leaders, the number of those with a technical education and background is increasing. As for the peasant layers, their relations with the bureaucracy, even if better than in the time of Stalin, continue to remain difficult and complex. In reality the resistance and the conflicts are expressed above all on the economic level by the very great interest which the peasants maintain in their own plots, by the question of contractual deliveries in which the kolkhoz members seek to obtain the highest possible price, and by their preference for the kolkhoz market.

But it is above all in the relations of the bureaucracy with the working class, the specific weight of which has not ceased to increase, and the intellectuals that the most significant conflicts are to be found. It certainly cannot be said that wide mass action exists against the bureaucracy and that the workers express their own economic and political demands in a conscious and precise form. Yet, in recent years, demonstrations and conflicts of local and regional scope indicate the tendencies operating in depth. It is sufficient to recall the strikes of Odessa and Novocherkass, etc., in which the workers advanced economic demands and also posed questions relating to management methods. On the other hand, in certain official documents or reports of Khrushchev himself, the hostility of the workers in regard to the methods of bureaucratic control in the factory is mentioned. All this powerfully confirms the actuality of the problem of workers management.

As for the intellectuals, we have already mentioned above the quite recent significant conflicts which have occurred, and in which the implications go beyond the cultural problems. In reality the young intellectuals and even certain survivors of older generations pose more and more the problem of critical re-examination of the epoch of Stalin. Among certain layers there is quite a pronounced interest in problems such as those concerning workers councils. The

resistance of a series of intellectuals following the last relaxation carried out by Khrushchev demonstrates that, whatever may be the temporary vicissitudes, the period when the bureaucracy regulated problems by administrative measures and by forcing degrading self-criticisms is gone.

All this ferment in contemporary Soviet society is destined to become more intense and to multiply under the pressure of internal problems as well as international contradictions (the present Sino-Soviet conflict has not had notable repercussions up to now, but it most certainly will have them as it continues; in addition one should note the symptoms of the interest among the younger generation over the Cuban experience). The bureaucratic leadership will attempt to meet this situation by diverse methods, resorting sometimes to constraint and to retreats, sometimes making new concessions in the sense of de-Stalinization. The Khrushchev leadership will try most especially to safeguard its power by playing the Bonapartist game to the end. But, in general, neither one of these policies will succeed in smothering the tendencies toward renovation which have profound roots in Soviet society. Thus each step toward de-Stalinization will open new breaches, and the tendencies will move forward with the aim of obtaining new concessions, while every attempt to move backward will run into stiffer and stiffer resistance, stimulating critical awareness of the nature of the bureaucratic system on the part of vanguard layers of the working class and the intellectuals.

(B)

#### IN CHINA AND THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES

The last five years of the development of China have been characterized by events of great importance, which have cast light on the contradictory aspects of this giant-scale revolutionary experiment as well as its current limits. These limits derive from the fact that the Chinese workers state itself has a bureaucratic administration and that international economic aid has been altogether insufficient (this would be true in an absolute sense even if the Soviet government had not exerted pressure which, of course, aggravated the situation).

The years 1958-59 were characterized by the "leap forward" and the installation of communes. These two measures achieved results which must not be denied or minimized because of subsequent setbacks in the following years. The full utilization of agricultural labor remains a very valuable indication for a whole series of underdeveloped countries in which analogous problems are posed. But when the Chinese leadership sought on the one hand to transfer this experiment to the cities, and, on the other hand, convert it into a boundless "leap forward," it ran into an inevitable setback. The mobilization of agricultural labour power was pursued by means of bureaucratic methods, almost under military forms, by excessive prolongation of the work day, by irrational suppression of the necessary days of rest, something that is possible only in exceptional periods and for specific aims, but which in the long run exhausts labour power and ends in a lowering of productivity, if not to passive resistance and to camouflaged sabotage. All this was bound to have its repercussions on the industrial level where very grave errors were likewise committed (the greater part of the production of the "backyard furnaces" turned out to be useless and thus cost useless effort, ending in waste). To this must be added natural calamities of which the effects, according to the official reports, were quite disastrous.

Thus is explained the setback and the economic difficulties of recent years. These were aggravated, let us repeat, by the bureaucratic Soviet attitude which, instead of making the maximum effort to aid the Chinese workers state in an exceptionally difficult situation, withdrew the technicians, demanded the payment of debts without deferments, and substantially reduced commercial relations with China.

The attitude of the Chinese leadership, in the face of these economic setbacks, showed that it was an empirical leadership but one that did not conduct itself on the Stalinist model at the time of the forced collectivization. The movement of the communes was certainly developed at an excessive rate, without taking into account the necessary preliminary technical conditions; on the other hand, the presentation

of the conditions of collective life in the communes as an almost immediate prelude to communist society was an actual theoretical error and a propagandistic hoax. But the Chinese Communists never resorted to violence to force the peasants into the communes; they did not resort to the methods of Stalin at the time of the forced collectivization, a conclusion that is confirmed by the fact that there were no butcheries such as bloodied the Soviet fields, nor the desperate reaction of peasants such as a massive slaughter of cattle.

Likewise significant is the fact that when the consequences of the errors became clear the leadership managed after heavy internal struggles, to make a turn which gradually ended in a radical reorientation on the level of the communes as well as that of the economic line in general.

They understood the necessity of some years of readjustment, the necessity of not pushing heavy industry and more, of concentrating efforts on the level of industrial consumers goods and good products, going even so far as to affirm the priority of agriculture.

In addition, the specific character of the Chinese leadership is manifested in the concept of their relations with the masses. If it always involves bureaucratic paternalism, the emphasis remains on the necessity of convincing rather than exercising constraint. This characteristic is likewise confirmed by their intervention in the discussion within the international Communist movement where, as we have already indicated, they defend a whole series of ideas opposed to Stalinist ideas and dealing a mortal blow to Stalinist monolithism.

However, the objectively backward base of China and the political formation of the present leadership caused grave bureaucratic deformations in the Chinese workers state. As we have already emphasized, the administration of the Chinese workers state remains bureaucratic; the errors committed in the period of the "great leap forward" and of the feverish time of the communes testifies once more to this.

It is necessary again to underline the bureaucratic attitude of the Chinese leadership toward de-Stalinization. In 1956-57 it seemed to favor a development toward de-Stalinization. Mao Tse-tung wrote his theses on contradictions among the people and admitted the right to strike; on the cultural level, he proclaimed the doctrine of the "hundred flowers." But when the relaxation opened the way to the development of a whole series of tendencies, including open conflicts, the Chinese leadership turned back and has not ceased since then to be found at the rear guard in this field.

China's economic situation is objectively difficult. A considerable step forward cannot be realized unless important economic aid is granted by the other workers states and democratic mobilization of the masses is undertaken in production. These are the circumstances in which the Chinese placed the problem on an international level. For them it is in any case very difficult to conceive of a solution based on "peaceful coexistence" and long-term economic competition. But immediate pressure can be placed on imperialism through the revolutionary struggle of the masses which would create a more favorable international context for them. On the other hand, it cannot be overlooked that they want to draw the attention of the Chinese masses more to these international problems, underlining the responsibility of the Soviet leadership in restricting aid, posing the problems of the international extension of the revolution and by contrast dissimulating the other aspect of the Chinese situation, that is the necessity of real democratization of the economic and political life. Democratization of this kind would in reality bring about total utilization of the creative potentialities of the masses, a lessening of the tensions which unquestionably exist today and of the obstacles which bureaucratic administration by its very nature raises against the development of the productive forces.

At the present stage, real democratic tendencies exist only on a local scale and in probably quite limited cases. Fundamental political questions and basic orientation are always decided by the summit, by narrow bureaucratic layers.

The people's democracies have experienced an unequal development due to a series of factors: (a) the beginning level; (b) the rhythm of economic development; (c) specific political factors; (d) accidental international factors.

Certain countries like Czechoslovakia were able to exploit an existing economic structure, at least in part of the country; others like Albania had only limited productive forces. In some countries, de-Stalinization led to historic conflicts such as the Hungarian Revolution and the Polish October, while in other countries de-Stalinization has been openly rejected (Albania), or passively accepted with only a show of being applied (Bulgaria, Rumania). The internal development of some countries has had no international repercussions, while others (East Germany), have been greatly influenced by the international situation.

In a general way, the following tendencies and problems can be noted

— The necessity of international planning and integration of the workers states is becoming increasingly clear in the light of certain difficulties and imbalances. This tendency, however, is counteracted by specific national necessities or situations, by a certain "national bureaucratic selfishness."

— The development of industrialization has posed a whole series of problems (rationalization, economic accounting, struggle against waste, etc.) which in some countries (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) are analogous to those presented in the Soviet Union, while in other countries (East Germany, partly in Poland) the need is posed of assuring a higher and more regular rate of growth.

— In the countryside, the setbacks due to bureaucratic leadership are evident. Collectivizations developed at a very rapid pace, without taking into account the necessary technical preconditions, have ended in veritable crises, for example in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, the opposite line adopted by the Gomulka leadership, if it has avoided the

tensions and the setbacks of rapid collectivization, has been incapable of assuring the necessary drive to the productive forces in the countryside and the effective integration of the agricultural sector in the economic planning; in brief, a pilot socialist sector is badly needed.

— As to the standard of living, in many countries improvements continue to be limited while in others, even if they are at a higher level, crises of supply occur from time to time due as much to the insufficient development of agriculture as to the disorganization resulting from bureaucratic management.

— On the cultural level, in certain countries (East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia), the bureaucratic grip remains enormously strong, and certain timid moves have been crushed in the egg. By contrast, in other countries (Poland and even Hungary) the intellectuals enjoy a certain liberal atmosphere which, in the case of Poland, is more advanced than in the USSR itself.

After the new line was adopted by the USSR in 1956-57 in its relations with the people's democracies, the national factor, so important in the postwar period up to and including the Hungarian affair, played a decreasing role. To the degree that the vestiges of the former ruling classes disappear and the people's democracies acquire a structure analogous to that of the Soviet Union, the conflicts and problems peculiar to it tend to be reproduced likewise in the people's democracies, although in their own specific forms.

In the most recent period, the situations most susceptible to an important development are those of Poland and Hungary. In Poland symptoms exist which point to a new rise of critical left forces. In Hungary, the last elections revealed the existence of differentiated currents which managed to utilize the very limited legal possibilities to manifest themselves. In Czechoslovakia tensions have been building that could give rise to sharp conflicts, even at a not distant date. The symptoms of this have been provided by such episodes as the Barak affair, student demonstrations and workers conflicts.

(C)  
IN YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia represents a particular case in the development of the workers states. Despite certain conjunctural retardations, the general growth of production has been very important. Even in the countryside, the leadership seems to have outlined an orientation much more correct and efficacious than that of the leaderships of the other workers states of eastern Europe. It is evident that the existence of workers councils has played a very positive role, despite the limitation of the powers of these councils and certain signs of degeneration that have even been denounced officially.

The elaboration of the new Constitution which is to be adopted shows that on the level of problems relating to the structure of a workers state in the phase of transition, the Yugoslav Communists have made a very positive contribution and are ahead of the other leaderships of the workers states, even those most favourable to de-Stalinization. It must not be forgotten that a whole series of problems posed by the Khrushchevist wing were already advanced by the Yugoslavs (decentralization, necessity of economic stimulants, etc.).

Nevertheless, a whole series of aspects of the Yugoslav political economy cannot be accepted without criticism by the revolutionary Marxists. The tendencies toward decentralization were pushed to the extreme, and above all the acceptance of the free play of the market could not but carry very grave dangers which actually took on body as the leaders themselves were obliged to recognize.

In addition, decentralization did not prevent bureaucratism from reproducing itself on a local scale and favoring the development of particularist tendencies.

In reality, even in the case of Yugoslavia, it has been proved that the genuine solution resides in the real and complete democratization of the economic and political life. This cannot be realized through the establishment of workers councils whose powers are completely limited while there are no organisms of proletarian democracy in position to really determine the fundamental questions of political orientation.

III.  
THE TASKS OF  
THE REVOLUTIONARY  
MARXISTS

It is the duty of revolutionary Marxists above all to tirelessly develop their revolutionary criticism of the bureaucracy and its regime, no matter what their current forms may be. The Fourth International does not hide the fact that its strategic aim in the USSR and the people's democracies of eastern Europe remains the antibureaucratic revolution in order to carry out the program laid down in the Transitional Program (1938) and in subsequent documents of our international movement. In addition, the revolutionary Marxists of these countries have the task of working out, with the aid of the International, transition programs for the different countries, starting from the current level of the mass movement and the specific context of each country.

More generally, revolutionary Marxists must seek points of support in the present crisis of the bureaucratic system in order to offer their solutions to the problems in dispute which reflect, even in an often distorted form, the problems of the transitional phase. They must seek in particular to express themselves in a language accessible above all to the younger generation, who, if they have not undergone the worst deformations of a Stalinist education, have still not had the possibility of knowing the best traditions of critical Leninist thought.

In the Sino-Soviet conflict and, more generally in the current polemics within the Communist parties, the Fourth International condemns in the most energetic way the use of state power to resolve theoretical and political questions. It especially condemns the economic measures taken by the Khrushchevist leadership in relation to China and Albania. It again underlines the necessity of a separation between the policies of a workers state and those of the Communist party. It condemns the fact that the differences and the conflicts between leaderships of parties are met by reprisals and ruptures on the level of states.



Within the framework of the world Communist movement, the Fourth International reaffirms its critical support to the Chinese Communists in their struggle against the neoreformism of the Khrushchev leadership and of a big part of the other Communist leaderships, because it holds that the Chinese line on the fundamental problems of the anti-imperialist and anticapitalist struggles (methods of struggle against the war, conception of the colonial revolution, "uninterrupted" revolution, the road to socialism in the advanced capitalist countries) is on the whole more progressive than that of the Khrushchevists and is more capable of polarizing the currents of the left in the Communist movement.

Nevertheless, the Fourth International remains critical of the Chinese leadership on other questions of great importance (appreciation of the possible consequences of a nuclear war, attitude toward certain national bourgeoisies of underdeveloped countries, characterization of the Yugoslav workers state, attitude on the problem of de-Stalinization, etc.).

The Fourth International supports the need for an international conference of the Communist movement, prepared through an ample, democratic discussion with the participation of all revolutionary Marxist tendencies. The Fourth International should have the opportunity to participate in such a conference.

In the Soviet Union, the revolutionary Marxists must struggle at the present stage above all to extend and deepen the process of de-Stalinization and compel the bureaucracy to make the most substantial concessions to the masses and to the intellectuals. It is necessary especially to insist on the evil consequences of bureaucratic management in the economy and to advance the necessity for organisms of workers control and management in the plants.

The right of workers to defend their demands through strikes must be supported, not in an abstract way, but beginning with efforts and movements that actually occur.

On the cultural level, the revolutionary Marxists struggle against every Zdanovist

or neo-Zdanovist concept and fight for the full freedom of all the scientific schools and all the artistic currents.

They also struggle for freedom of information and especially for the right of Soviet citizens to know directly and completely the different positions which now exist or come forward in the party and state organisms. The same holds for the different existing positions in the Communist parties.

On the level of political economy, the revolutionary Marxists support the necessity to substantially increase investments in the agricultural sector and in the sector of consumers goods, even at the expense of investments in the sector of heavy industry. Such an orientation would assure a more balanced more harmonious economic development, and at the same time make possible an increase in the productivity of labour, of which the consequences will become manifest in all domains, including that of heavy industry.

The revolutionary Marxists also favour increasingly greater economic integration of the workers states to assure a more rational division of labour. Parallel with economic integration, it is necessary to develop closer and closer political and cultural relations, a free circulation of people among the workers states to facilitate the exchange of experiences and growth of homogeneity.

In China, the revolutionary Marxists emphasize that despite its positive role in the international conflicts of the Communist movement, the Chinese leadership remains a bureaucratic leadership at the head of a state marked by profound bureaucratic deformations. The struggle against the bureaucracy and its regime, for proletarian democracy, that is, for workers and peasants councils having real powers, for a genuine Soviet structure, for the right of free expression of tendencies and of parties that stand within the framework of the society that issued from the revolution, representing the interests of the workers and peasants, for the independence of the trade unions in relation to the state, for the freedom of all the scientific schools and all

the artistic currents, etc., holds also for the People's Republic of China. These conquests cannot be won except through an antibureaucratic struggle on a scale massive enough to bring about a qualitative change in the political form of government.

At the present stage, more especially, the revolutionary Marxists will struggle for:

(a) Real democratic management of the communes.

(b) The installation of workers control and eventually workers management in the plants.

(c) The right of criticism within the Communist party and for the application in China of the minority rights demanded by the leadership itself on the international level.

(d) The resumption and development of the orientation of 1956-57 on de-Stalinization, an orientation expressed in the speeches of Mao on "contradictions among the people" and in the so-called "one hundred flowers" campaign.

In the people's democracies of eastern Europe, the program of current struggle of the revolutionary Marxists must be elaborated on the basis of criteria analogous to those which are valid for the Soviet Union but starting from the very different conditions underlined above.

In Yugoslavia, the revolutionary Marxists will struggle against the centrifugal tendencies of the present economic structure, for a greater role and greater powers of the workers councils, for the extension of their powers on the political level, for an effective application of the most progressive new constitutional rules, for the right of tendencies in the party and the right of free expression, of criticism and of opposition, and for the right of plurality of parties of a soviet type. On the level of international policy they will struggle against the rightist and opportunist orientation of the leadership on the questions of war, "peaceful coexistence," relations with the national bourgeoisies, and the "road to socialism."

# THESES ON THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE TASKS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

I. In the last decade some fundamental changes have occurred in the world, creating by their over-all impact a *new international situation* which poses new problems and new tasks to the international Communist movement.

II. The main changes are as follows:

The prodigious increase of productive forces which is a consequence and cause of the technological and scientific revolution of our times; the relative decline of the economic, military, international power of the United States, in the world in general, and more particularly in the capitalist world; the appearance of a new capitalist power, that of the European Common Market, through the integration at the summit of the governments, of state capitalism and of monopoly capitalism aided by the state; the irresistible and accelerated advance taken in the field of the rate of economic expansion and of military strength by the workers states as a whole and the Soviet Union in particular over the capitalist world as a whole and the United States in particular; the reinforced reappearance of the contradictions inherent in capitalism and of the classical interimperialist antagonisms, following the reconstruction of capitalist economy, the progressive weakening of the stimulants created by the destruction and by other consequences of the last world war, and the shrinking of the market accessible to capitalism; the extraordinary development taken by the destructive power of nuclear arms, posing the question of a general atomic war in absolutely new terms; the magnitude and the dynamism taken by the process of de-Stalinization in the USSR, the end of bureaucratic monolithism in the workers states and in the Communist parties, the grave ideological crisis in which the official Communist movement finds itself, differentiates itself and regroups itself; the new forms taken by the progress of the world revolution in the colonial and semicolonial countries which enrich the practice and the theory of the socialist revolution of our times.

III. For a whole period the impetus to the productive forces unleashed during the second world war in relation to the capitalist world could develop itself and be contained within the framework of an expanded capitalist market through the needs and consequences created by the war; the accelerated renewal of fixed capital, a consequence and cause of the technological and scientific revolution in the field of energy, chemistry, and alloys; the accelerated industrialization, although in a discontinuous and uneven way, of underdeveloped regions and countries; through trade likewise increased with the workers states in full growth.

But the forms of capitalist production in spite of the new means for regularizing, "planning" of economic development employed by the state, or by the different forms of integration and co-operation among

the different national state capitalisms and sectors of monopolist capitalism, have progressively again been revealed as a major obstacle to a continuous, harmonious development on an international scale.

This fact is manifest: in the revived antagonisms among the different centers of capitalist power, the United States, England, Japan, Common Market; in the increased gap between the advanced industrial areas and the underdeveloped areas and countries; in the gigantic parasitic development of the war economy which unbalances and undermines in the long run the foundations of international economic development.

At the present time the rate of economic expansion is everywhere slowed down in the advanced capitalist countries, although in an uneven way; recessions follow one another at an accelerated rate; the menace itself of a real economic crisis is more clearly revealed, beginning with the more industrialized countries, the United States and England. The economies of these two countries when they do not decline openly during the recessions maintain themselves on a level of quasi stagnation.

The new fundamental fact in the field of capitalist economy in general is not the absence so far of an economic crisis, sharply and rapidly developing in a catastrophic way, as for example in 1929—1933, but its *quasi stagnation once it has been rebuilt, and its marked delay, irreversible in relation to the rate of expansion of the USSR and the workers states.*

IV. Ten years ago the United States still appeared to be at the apogee of its economic, military, international strength in relation to the whole of the world and to the capitalist countries in particular. Today this is not the case.

Its relative economic decline is shown: by the decrease in the rate of expansion as compared to that not only of the USSR but of the Common Market, too, and Japan; by the decrease of the share of production of the United States in world production and world trade; by the continuous weakening of its gold reserves and hence ultimately of its currency.

Along with the relative economic decline goes the weakening of United States militarily and internationally, evidenced, among other facts by the spectacular advance of the USSR in the field of intercontinental and outer space rockets, by the difficulties encountered, and the humiliations suffered within the capitalist coalition itself, in the relations between the United States and the Europe of the Six.

This relative decline is an irreversible fact, in relation to the new international dynamic which pushes forward the workers states, the colonial revolution, with continental Europe integrated at the level of government and the state capitalist or

monopolist sectors of its economy. It will not continue however without provoking contrary reactions from Yankee capitalism, which through its reinforced tendency to export capital will try to dominate the Common Market from within, to expand it and to transform it into an Atlantic Market. This will not fail to sharpen still more the inter-imperialist contradictions bringing them, especially in the case of a prolonged economic depression, to a paroxysm which only the existence of reinforced workers will prevent from generating into an open armed conflict.

V. The construction, the reinforcement, the viability of the Common Market, the new capitalist power, corresponds to the dynamic acquired by the restored European Capitalist economy, confronted by its capitalist competitors (the United States, England, Japan) and the problems of the narrowed world market now accessible to capitalism.

The military and political imperatives have reinforced the tendency towards economic integration among the national European sectors of state capitalism and of monopolist capitalism aided by the state, which have powerfully developed in the last decade, particularly in continental Europe.

From an economic point of view the Europe of the Six is an integration of an inter-European monopoly capitalist sector specialized in the production of means of production, of consumption, of new services, and which is developing in opposition to the attempted seizure of the European market and its colonial prolongation by other monopolist sectors, in which, along with European capital, American and partially British capital dominates.

From a political and military point of view the Europe of the Six is developing on the basis of an economic integration described as the will and consciousness of a policy capable of defending this base in a largely independent way in relation to the United States as well as to the workers states, while subordinating itself to the Atlantic Alliance in case of a threat of war with the workers states.

Moved by the dynamic of its acquired structures as well as by the necessity of facing the tireless attempts of Yankee and British capitalism to transform the Common Market from within into an Atlantic Market dominated by the United States, the Common Market is compelled to develop itself more and more into the most modernized sector of the capitalist economy, equipped with its own military power, and naturally atomic power first of all.

In this march which overturns from top to bottom the old structures in the field of industrial, agricultural, trade union organization, it is necessary to exploit politically the resistences of the affected social sectors, of the protected archaic, Malthusianist industries, of small trade, backward agriculture, of the workers in enterprises and areas becoming un-economic, against big monopolist capital which dominates the Common Market. This however must be done within the framework of a revolutionary policy that opens the perspective of a more rapid economic development and especially balanced and

profitable to the workers, a policy oriented towards socialist power in each country and towards the Socialist United States of Europe.

VI. As compared with a capitalist economy which is evolving more and more by fits and starts, from recession to recession, lacking wind, particularly in the most industrialized countries, the economies of the workers states first of all that of the USSR, are developing on the basis of a continuous very high rate of expansion, which from now on guarantees the inevitability in the near future of overtaking the overall production of the advanced capitalist countries as a whole.

The USSR by itself will overtake in a few years to come the level of total production of the United States, and soon after its per capita production.

These economic victories of the workers states, greatly facilitated by the process of de-Stalinization in the USSR, by the planning begun over almost all of the workers states, although this planning is bureaucratic and mainly to the advantage of the USSR, and also by the increased trade with the rest of the world market, although they cannot by themselves ensure the victory over capitalism, will have more and more noticeable repercussions on the process of de-Stalinization inside the workers states, on the economic aid to be given to countries engaging in Socialist development, thus facilitating this commitment, on the workers movement of the advanced capitalist countries, thus stimulating its revolutionary awakening and its commitment to the fight for socialism.

VII. The revival of the contradictions inherent in the nature of capitalism and of classical inter-imperialist antagonisms that aim ultimately at repartition of the market which is still accessible to capitalism, acquires a new importance, that will continue to increase without end, for the solidity of the counter-revolutionary front of imperialism. This front no longer has the same quasi automatic cohesion that it had in the past and the contradictions and antagonisms pitting them in struggle for the "allied" capitalist markets allow a relatively easier progression of the revolution, as well as a noticeable weakening of the tendency of the imperialist coalition towards war against the workers states.

The sharpness taken by the inter-imperialist antagonisms is at present such, and charged with such dynamism in so far as the struggle for markets becomes inevitably more acute, that the perspective of a war by the imperialist coalition as a whole against the workers states is seriously compromised by the profound internal dissension within the coalition which threatens it with being shattered practically.

VIII. The new and growing sharpness taken by the inter-imperialist antagonisms combined with the fantastic destructive power acquired by atomic arms poses the question of the atomic war in a new perspective.

On the side of imperialism it is always the United States which represents by far the principal force interested in the war, owing to its requirements, tendencies, and structure itself of its economy as well as its international position.

However on the other hand the power acquired in atomic armaments by the USSR, and more particularly by its superiority attained in the field of intercontinental and cosmic projectiles, places the menace of certain death on the United States in case of attack, including one by surprise.

In the present state of affairs and for a long time to come the perspective of an atomic war launched by the United States would mean practically its own certain obliteration, without the rest of the world necessarily being likewise completely destroyed. On the other hand the United States must from now on combine the prosecution of its war preparations against the vast coalition of the workers states from the USSR to China, with a struggle to domesticate the Atlantic coalition within which the disintegrative and even openly antagonistic element formed by the Common Market acts with an increased virulence.

In these conditions the tendency inherent in Yankee imperialism towards counter-revolutionary war must be adapted to a certain extent with these new elements. This does not prevent the threat of a general atomic war from being posed each time some of the vital interests of imperialism are menaced by the progression of the World Revolution.

Hence the necessity to always envisage the possibility of a general atomic war, launched by means of present arms having an apocalyptic destructive power, as an historical defeat of mankind, eliminating totally or in very large part the material and cultural preconditions historically acquired for the victory and construction of world socialism.

These considerations therefore involve a revolutionary strategy capable both of avoiding the outbreak of general atomic war and of weakening imperialism to the maximum until it is rendered incapable practically visualizing the outbreak of the war.

This strategy must be carried out by all the sectors of the World Revolution, the Workers States, the Colonial Revolution, the revolutionary movement of the advanced capitalist countries, according to the means and conditions peculiar to each sector.

In respect to the considerations, abstractly correct but defeatist in practice, according to which the possibility of avoiding an atomic war depends on the preliminary victory of the revolution in the United States, it is necessary to first state forcefully that this possibility is practically created by the progress of the Colonial Revolution and the continuous reinforcement of the Workers States. This is the combined process which can historically create and is actually creating such a strategic, economic and psychological encirclement of imperialism.—of Yankee imperialism in particular—that any attempt at atomic war likely to be made becomes an operation of unilateral suicide.

Without relying on the sure stimulating effect for the workers revolutionary movement that this process will exercise and is already exercising in a number of advanced capitalist countries, outside of the United States, especially in the context of an economic conjuncture which is evolving unfavorably.

The question is not one of knowing under what theoretically ideal conditions the atomic war would cease to menace the fate of all mankind, but how the menace could be practically combatted, starting from the present concrete conditions of the present real progress of the World Revolution.

IX. Ten years after the death of Stalin the process of de-Stalinization in the USSR in particular has taken such scope that it has become not only irreversible but it has already laid down the bases for the revolutionary renewal of the international Communist movement as a whole.

It is the new economic and cultural conditions particular to the USSR in interaction with the new revolutionary conditions in the world which are acting more and more powerfully so that the Soviet masses and their new vanguard which is being formed will re-enter the world revolutionary scene as one of the main factors which in the coming years will contribute to the radical renewal of the international Communist movement.

The USSR is not taking the road towards a more "reformist" era while being left behind on the plane of revolutionary leadership by no matter what other workers state; but on the contrary is moving towards a firmer, more determined and clear role in support of the world Revolution.

"Khrushchevism"—itself, continuously evolving since its appearance—on the average—more to the left, is destined to be further propelled in this direction under the growing revolutionary pressure in the USSR and in the world.

The progressive internal aspects of de-Stalinization in the USSR are the determinants for adjusting the foreign policy included in the revolutionary character of the internal evolution of the country.

The case is the same with Yugoslavia, for example, which is increasing its practical aid to the Colonial Revolution.

The internal de-Stalinization to the extent that it signifies among other things a more ample and free participation of the working masses in the management of the country in full development, a retreat of the intimidating power of the bureaucracy, a clearer consciousness of the growing strength of the USSR, of the Workers States, of the World Revolution, has as an ineluctable consequence the maturing by leaps and bounds of a new revolutionary situation in the USSR, which also influences the present dominant wing of the bureaucracy, the one most sensitive to this pressure, the Khrushchevist wing.

It is necessary to grasp completely the profundity already acquired by the irreversible process of the internal de-Stalinization of the USSR, as well as its ineluctable revolutionary consequences on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The most significant expression of these developments which have begun is the support given to the Cuban Revolution, a support which continues and the importance of which has been and remains decisive for the consolidation of the victory of this Revolution.

The de-Stalinization in the USSR is likewise decisive in regard to the end of the ideological monolithism of the Communist parties, for the irreversible process which has begun of ideological differentiation and regroupment, hence for the renovation that has begun of the international Communist movement.

The Sino-Soviet conflict which is placed in this framework accelerates enormously and positively the development in this direction.

It is this aspect of the conflict; the open end of monolithism, the dispute centred on the fundamental problems of the international Communist movement which is by far the positive aspect of the conflict.

As to the attempt to present the positions of the Chinese bureaucracy, taken as a whole, as the more decisive for influencing the revolutionary renewal of the international Communist movement, it is necessary to reject firmly these conclusions which are confusionist, drawn superficially, and which can only throw discredit on the Fourth International.

The negative, even hostile, attitude taken by the Chinese bureaucracy against the decisive process of de-Stalinization in the USSR, its alliance with the bloody Albanian regime, as well as with the case-hardened Stalinists of the USSR and elsewhere; the criticisms and the slanders, all of them Stalinist, which it formulates against the Yugoslav conceptions which have been enriching Marxism concerning workers management, the withering away of the state and the general way of tackling the problems of the construction of socialism in the framework of one country, especially an underdeveloped one; the maintenance of its absurd and extremely dangerous position on general atomic war which according to them will destroy only imperialism, etc; its theoretical and practical opportunism towards the "national bourgeoisie" and more particularly towards its "allies" of the type of Soekarno, and the Communist parties which support it (like the Indonesian Communist party which possesses sufficient forces to reopen the chapter of the Revolution not only in Indonesia but throughout all Asia), the very strict bureaucratic rule imposed on the whole economic, political and cultural life of the country, etc.; all these fundamental aspects of the policies of the Chinese bureaucracy must be taken into consideration when it is a matter of making an over-all judgement on the way in which this bureaucracy is actually contributing to the renovation of the international Communist movement now underway.

Certainly there is no question of minimizing the very positive aspects of the criticisms which the Chinese wing of the bureaucracy has been led to formulate against the Khrushchev wing in the struggle underway to establish their reciprocal leadership in the international Communist movement, starting from their own positions and interests.

It is extremely useful and necessary to utilize the conflict in itself, the debate which it is provoking, the themes on which the discussion unfolds, as well as all the valid arguments put forward by the Chinese in their "left" criticism of those who criticize them, in order to maintain, deepen and clarify the discussion on all the problems, and help the vanguard elements to discover anew the integral Marxist revolutionary position, cleansed of its bureaucratic limitations, deformations and falsifications.

X. It is the experience and the specific development of the Cuban Revolution, and now likewise the Algerian Revolution, which will prove themselves by far to be the most propitious for enriching the theory and practice of the Revolution in a large number of colonial and semicolonial countries, and of the Socialist Revolution in general.

It is with the authentic revolutionary currents engendered by these revolutions, that the Fourth International must seek to fuse in the near future in a number of countries, while incorporating in its

theoretical arsenal the most valid of the new lessons of these revolutionary experiences.

The Cuban and Algerian experience has definitively sealed the extreme revolutionary importance of the landless peasantry engaging in guerrilla actions, with a leadership other than that of a Marxist party claiming to be Marxist, and capable of launching and of advancing for quite a time in a number of semicolonial and colonial countries a genuine revolutionary process, impregnated with a dynamism which in the last analysis belongs to a proletarian and socialist revolution.

That is the most striking demonstration of the power and influence gained in our days by the Workers States and the World Socialist Revolution.

What opens new revolutionary perspectives in the domain of the Colonial Revolution and allows us to perceive from now on a cascade of victories in the coming years in Latin America as well as in Africa and Asia, especially favourable areas for the immediate expansion for the world revolution.

On the other hand each new victory achieved in any country, how ever modest its former specific weight in the international arena may have been, has international reverberations out of all proportion, and becomes a dynamic center catalyzing the revolutionary energy in infinitely larger regions.

This is the case with the Cuban Revolution which has upset the revolutionary field in all of Latin America, without counting its repercussions in the world as a whole.

This will likewise be the case with the Algerian Socialist Revolution now underway, which will profoundly overturn the whole chessboard of Africa, the Middle East, and even part of Europe.

The major importance of the sector of the Colonial Revolution at the present stage of the World Revolution is thus again confirmed, implying the duty of the Fourth International to implant itself more seriously than in the past in these regions where its immediate and future development incontestably lie.

XI. It is only to the extent that the Fourth International familiarizes itself more, theoretically and practically with the problems of the Colonial Revolution and the present development of the Workers States that it can survive and progress, fusing with the mounting revolutionary forces in these sectors of the World Revolution.

This implies, among other things, that the renewed center of the international install itself somewhere in these regions; that the activity of its section in the advanced capitalist countries where the euphoric economic conjuncture, surely provisional, of capitalism still weighs, finds anew its revolutionary dynamism in an activity combining entryist work everywhere in the traditional mass organizations, conducted on a principled line, not deliberately opportunistic, with independent work by means, among others, of regular organs one hundred per cent revolutionary Marxist and which address themselves more specially to the young generations in order to organize among others their struggle against atomic arms and atomic war, for unilateral disarmament, for the defense of the Colonial Revolution, for propaganda for the European and American Socialist Revolution.

# FOR EARLY REUNIFICATION OF THE WORLD TROTSKYIST MOVEMENT

*(Statement of the Political Bureau of the SWP)*

THE world Trotskyist movement has been split since 1954. Various efforts in the past to heal the rupture proved unsuccessful. On both sides, however, it has been felt for some time that a new and more vigorous effort for reunification should be made in view of the encouraging opportunities that now exist to further the growth and influence of the Fourth International, the World Party of Socialist Revolution.

The Socialist Workers party has stressed that a principled basis exists for uniting the main currents of the world Trotskyist movement. During the past year, the International Secretariat took the initiative in urging the necessity and practicality of ending the split. For its side, the International Committee proposed that a Parity Committee be set up. Although some of the comrades in the IC viewed this as involving no more than a practical step to facilitate common discussion and united work in areas of mutual interest, the majority, it appears clear welcomed the formation of the committee as an important step toward early reunification.

While substantial differences still remain, especially over the causes of the 1954 split, the area of disagreement appears of secondary importance in view of the common basic program and common analysis of major current events in world developments which unite the two sides. With good will it should be possible to contain the recognized remaining differences within a united organization, subject to further discussion and clarification, thus making possible the great advantages that would come through combining the forces, skills and resources of all those now adhering to one side or the other.

The main fact is that the majority on both sides are now in solid agreement on the fundamental positions of the world Trotskyist movement. As briefly as possible, we will indicate the points of common outlook:

(1) The present agonizing world crisis reflects at bottom a prolonged crisis in revolutionary leadership. The development of the productive forces on a global scale has made the world overripe for socialism. Only a socialist planned world economy can rapidly overcome the economic under-development of the colonial and semicolonial countries, deliver mankind from the threat of nuclear extinction and assure a world society of enduring peace, of boundless plenty, the unlimited expansion of culture and the achievement of full freedom for all. Without the international victory of socialism, decaying capitalism will continue to waste enormous resources, to hold two-thirds of the earth's population in abject poverty, to maintain social and racial inequality and to support dictatorial regimes. To complete this grim perspective of hunger, insecurity, inequality and oppressive rule, capitalism offers the permanent threat of nuclear destruction.

(2) The delay of the world socialist revolution beyond the expectations of all the great Marxists before our time is due basically to the lack of capacity of the traditional leaderships of the working-class movement and to their cynical service as labor lieutenants of the capitalist class or the Kremlin bureaucracy. They are responsible for preventing the main revolutionary postwar crisis of 1918—23 and of 1943—47, as well as the lesser crisis of 1932—37, from ending as they should have ended with the proletariat coming to power in the advanced capitalist countries.

(3) Only by building new revolutionary Marxist mass parties capable of leading the working class and working farmers to power can the world crisis be met successfully and a third world war prevented. To build such parties is the aim and purpose of the world Trotskyist movement. A program of transitional slogans and measures plays a key role in party-building work in as much as the principal problem in overcoming the crisis of leadership is to bridge the gap between the present consciousness of the masses—which is centered around immediate problems and preoccupations—and the level of consciousness required to meet the objective necessity of overthrowing capitalism and building workers states based upon democratically elected and democratically functioning councils of the working people. Leninist methods must be used to construct revolutionary-socialist parties. These include patient, persistent recruitment of workers to the nuclei of revolutionary socialist parties already established; but also, where necessity or opportunity dictates, flexible advances toward various tendencies in mass organizations which may eventually be brought to the program of revolutionary Marxism. Individual recruitment and tactical moves of wide scope are complementary ways of party construction, but each carries its own problems and special dangers. In the one instance a tendency toward sectarianism can arise out of converting enforced isolation into a virtue; in the other, adaptation to a reformist environment can lead to rightist opportunism. In the tactic known as "entryism", where unusually difficult and complicated situations can occur, it should be the norm for those engaging in it to maintain a sector of open public work, including their own Trotskyist publication. Departure from this norm must be weighed with full consciousness of the heavy risks involved.

(4) The Fourth International as an international organization, and its sections as national parties, must adhere to the principles of democratic centralism. Both theory and historic experience have demonstrated the correctness of these principles. Democratic centralism corresponds to the need for quick, disciplined action in meeting revolutionary tasks while at the same time assuring the freedom of discussion and the right to form tendencies without which genuine political life is denied to the ranks. In its adherence to internal democracy, the world Trot-

skyst movement stands at the opposite pole from the stifling regimes imposed on working-class organizations controlled by bureaucrats trained in the schools of Stalinism, the Social-Democracy or reformist unionism.

(5) The bureaucratic reformist and Stalinist machines do not use the organized strength of the working class to overthrow capitalism where this is possible. They are primarily interested in their own privileges and power instead of the long range interests of the working class. Because of inertia, an anti-socialist outlook, or recognition that an upsurge can sweep over their heads, they undertake struggles in the interests of the proletariat only with great reluctance and under great pressure. While condemning and opposing the twin evils of reformism and Stalinism, Trotskyists refuse to identify the genuinely socialist or Communist workers of these mass organizations with their treacherous leaderships. The Trotskyist movement recognizes that the main task is not simply to wage literary war on reformism and Stalinism, but to actually win these socialist and Communist-minded workers to the program and organization of revolutionary Marxism. Under the pressure of long years of prosperity in the advanced capitalist countries and in reaction to the crimes of Stalinism, petty-bourgeois intellectuals have opened a wide assault on the fundamentals of Marxism. It is necessary to wage a firm ideological struggle against this revisionist current.

(6) The Soviet Union is still a workers state despite the usurpation of power by a privileged bureaucracy. The mode of production is noncapitalist, having emerged from the destruction of capitalism by the socialist October Revolution: and, whatever its deficiencies, lapses and even evils, it is progressive compared to capitalism. The tremendous expansion of Soviet productive forces through a colossal industrial and cultural revolution transformed a backward peasant country into the second industrial power of the world, actually challenging imperialism's lead in many fields of technology. This great new fact of world history bear witness to the mighty force inherent in planned economy and demonstrates the correctness of the Trotskyist position of unconditional defense of the degenerated workers state against imperialism.

(7) In the wake of World War II, the Soviet bureaucracy was able to extend its power and its parasitism into the so-called "people's democracies" of Eastern Europe and North Korea. But to maintain its position of special privilege, it has to destroy capitalism in these countries, doing so by bureaucratic-military means. That such means could succeed was due to the abnormal circumstances of temporary collapse of the local capitalist-landlord rule coupled with extreme weakness of the working class following the carnage of war and occupation. In this way deformed workers states came into existence. These are defended by the Trotskyist movement against imperialist attempts to reintroduce capitalism.

(8) In the workers states where proletarian democracy was smashed by Stalinism, or where it never came into existence because of Stalinist influence it is necessary to struggle for its restoration or construction, for democratic administration of the state

and of the planned economy by the toiling masses. Through a political counter-revolution, Stalin destroyed the proletarian democracy of the time of Lenin and Trotsky. The Leninist forces are therefore faced with the need to organize revolutionary Marxist parties to provide leadership for the working class in exercising its right to overthrow the dictatorial rule of the bureaucratic caste and to replace it with forms of proletarian democracy. This signifies a political revolution. With the rebirth of proletarian democracy on a higher level the workers states—the Soviet Union above all—will regain the attractive power enjoyed before the days of Stalin and this will give fresh impetus to the struggle for socialism in the advanced capitalist countries.

(9) The appearance of a workers state in Cuba—the exact form of which is yet to be settled—is of special interest since the revolution there was carried out under a leadership completely independent from the school of Stalinism. In its evolution toward revolutionary Marxism, the July 26 Movement set a pattern that now stands as an example for a number of other countries.

(10) As a result of the new upsurge of the world revolution, above all the tremendous victory in China which changed the relationship of class forces on an international scale, the Soviet proletariat—already strengthened and made self-confident through the victory over German imperialism in World War II and the great economic, technological and cultural progress of the Soviet Union—has exerted increasing strong pressure on the bureaucratic dictatorship, especially since Stalin's death. In hope of easing this pressure, the ruling caste has granted concessions of considerable scope abolishing the extreme forms of police dictatorship (dissolution of the forced labor camps and modification of Stalin's brutal labor code, destroying the cult of Stalin, rehabilitating many victims of Stalin's purges, granting a significant rise in the standard of living of the people, even easing the strictures against freedom of thought and discussion in various fields. The Khrushchev regime has no intention of dismantling the bureaucratic dictatorship a piece at a time its aim is not "self reform" but maintenance of the rule of the caste in face of mounting popular pressures. But the masses accept the concessions as partial payment on what is due and seek to convert the gains into new points of support in pressing for the ultimate objective of restoring democratic proletarian controls over the economy and the state. This slow but solid strengthening of the position of the proletariat in the European workers states is one of the basic causes of the world crisis of Stalinism.

(11) The differences which finally shattered the monolithic structure of Stalinism began in a spectacular way with ideological and political conflict between the Yugoslav and Soviet Communist party leaderships. This conflict was widened by the attempted political revolution undertaken by the Hungarian workers. The Cuban Revolution deepened the crisis still further. With the Chinese-Soviet rift it has become one of the most important questions of world politics. While expressing in an immediate sense the conflict of interests among the various national bureaucratic groups, and between the Soviet bureaucracy and the working classes of



countries under its influence, the crisis reflects fundamentally the incompatibility of Stalinism with living victorious revolutions in which the militant vanguard seeks a return to the doctrines of Lenin. The crisis is thus highly progressive in character, marking an important stage in the rebuilding of a revolutionary Marxist world mass movement.

(12) In conjunction with the world crisis of Stalinism, the colonial revolution is now playing a key role in the world revolutionary process. Within little more than a decade, it has forced imperialism to abolish direct colonial rule almost completely and to turn to indirect rule as a substitute; i.e., form a new "partnership" with the colonial bourgeoisie, even though this bourgeoisie in some places may be only embryonic. But this attempt to prevent the countries awakened by the colonial revolution from breaking out of the world capitalist system runs into an insuperable obstacle. It is impossible in these countries to solve the historic problems of social economic, and cultural liberation and development without overthrowing capitalism as well as breaking the grip of imperialism. The colonial revolution therefore tends to flow into the channel of permanent revolution, beginning with a radical agrarian reform and heading toward the expropriation of imperialist holdings and "national" capitalist property, the establishment of a workers state and a planned economy.

(13) Along the road of a revolution beginning with simple democratic demands and ending in the rupture of capitalist property relations, guerilla warfare conducted by landless peasant and semi-proletarian forces, under a leadership that becomes committed to carrying the revolution through to a conclusion, can play a decisive role in undermining and precipitating the downfall of a colonial or semi-colonial power. This is one of the main lessons to be drawn from experience since the second world war. It must be consciously incorporated into the strategy of building revolutionary Marxist parties in colonial countries.

(14) Capitalism succeeded in winning temporary stability again in Western Europe after the second world war. This setback for the working class was due primarily to the treacherous role played by the Stalinist and Social-Democratic leaderships, which prevented the masses from taking the road of socialist revolution during the big postwar revolutionary crisis. However, this temporary stabilization of capitalism and the subsequent upsurge of productive forces gave rise to more extensive, and ultimately more explosive, contradictions. These involve the other imperialist powers, above all the USA and Japan. They include sharpening competition in a geographically contracting world market; increasing incompatibility between the need to fight inflation and the need to transform potential major economic crisis into more limited recessions; mounting conflict between the desirability of maintaining "social peace" and the necessity to attack the workers' standard of living, job conditions and employment opportunities in order to strengthen competitive efficiency. These contradictions point to increasingly fierce class battles which could become lifted from the economic to the political level in acute form and, under favourable conditions of leadership, arouse the labor movement

to a new upsurge in the imperialist countries, challenging capitalism in its last citadels.

(15) Socialist victory in the advanced capitalist countries constitutes the only certain guarantee of enduring peace. Since the close of World War II, imperialism has methodically prepared for another conflict, one in which the capitalist world as a whole would be mobilized against the workers states, with the Soviet Union as the main target. Rearmament has become the principal permanent prop of capitalist economy today, an economic necessity that dovetails with the political aims of the American capitalist class at the head of the world alliance of capitalism. American imperialism has stationed counter-revolutionary forces in a vast perimeter around China and the Soviet Union. Its first reaction to new liberating struggles is to seek to drown them in blood. Its armed interventions have become increasingly dangerous. In the crisis over Cuba's efforts to strengthen its military defense, the billionaire capitalist families who rule America demonstrated that they were prepared to launch a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union and even risk the very existence of civilization and of mankind. This unimaginable destructive power can be torn from the madmen of Wall Street only by the American working class. The European socialist revolution will play a decisive role in helping to bring the American proletariat up to the level of the great historic task which it faces—responsibility for the final and decisive victory of world socialism.

(16) While participating wholeheartedly in all popular mass movements for unilateral nuclear disarmament, while fighting for an immediate end to all nuclear tests, the world Trotskyist movement everywhere clearly emphasizes the fundamental dilemma facing humanity: world socialism or nuclear annihilation. A clear understanding of this dilemma does not demoralize the masses. On the contrary, it constitutes the strongest incentive to end capitalism and build socialism. It is a suicidal illusion to believe that peace can be assured through "peaceful coexistence" without ending capitalism. Above all in America. The best way to fight against the threat of nuclear war is to fight for socialism through class-struggle means.

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In view of agreement on these basic positions the world Trotskyist movement is duty bound to press for reunification. It is unprincipled to seek to maintain the split. Reunification has also become an urgent practical question. On all sides, opportunities for growth are opening up for the revolutionary movement. The Cuban Revolution dealt a blow to the class-collaborationist policy of Stalinism in Latin America and other colonial countries. New currents, developing under the influence of the victory in Cuba, are groping their way to revolutionary socialism and seeking to apply the main lessons of the colonial revolution to their own situation. The Algerian Revolution has had a similar effect on the vanguard of the African revolutionary nationalist movement. To meet these leftward-moving currents, to work with them, even to combine with them without giving up any principles, has become an imperious necessity. Re-

unification will greatly facilitate success in this task by strengthening our own forces and bringing the attractiveness of Trotskyism into sharp organizational focus. The immediate corollaries will be increased effectiveness of our defence of the colonial revolutions within the imperialist countries and the added weight which the principled program of Trotskyism will gain among all serious revolutionists who seek the fundamental economic, social and political transformation of their countries. On the other hand, it is self-evident that the continued division of the world Trotskyist movement in factions wrangling over obscure issues will vitiate its capacity to attract these new forces on a considerable scale.

Similarly, the crisis of Stalinism which has led to the great differentiation visible in the Chinese-Soviet rift, has unlocked tremendous forces within the Communist parties throughout the world. Attracted by our Leninist program and traditions by the vindication of our decades of struggle against Stalinism, and by our insistence on internal democracy, many militants are puzzled and repelled by our lack of unity, by our seeming incapacity to mobilize our forces into a single cohesive organization. The reunification of the world Trotskyist movement would contribute powerfully towards re-educating Communist militants in the genuine spirit of Leninism, its real tradition of international solidarity and proletarian democracy. Obviously a united world Trotskyist movement would prove much more attractive to all those forces within the world Communist movement who are increasingly critical of Stalinism and its offshoots, and who are ready to examine the views of a movement which appears serious not only in its theory but in its organizational capacity.

Finally, we should consider with utmost attentiveness the problem of appealing to the youth, both workers and students, who are playing an increasingly decisive role in demonstrations, uprisings, and the leadership of revolutionary upheavals. The Cuban Revolution was essentially fought by the youth. Similar young people overthrew the corrupt dictatorial regimes of Menderes in Turkey and Syngman Rhee in South Korea. In the struggle for Negro equality in the USA, for solidarity with the

Algerian Revolution in France, against rearmament in Japan and Western Germany and against unemployment in Britain, the shock forces are provided by the youth. Youth stand in the forefront of the fight to deepen and extend de-Stalinization in the USSR and the East European workers states. Throughout the world they are the banner bearers of the struggles for unilateral nuclear disarmament. We can attract the best layers of this new generation of rebels by our bold program, our fighting spirit and militant activity, we can only repel them by refusing to close ranks because of differences over past disputes of little interest to young revolutionists of action, who are primarily concerned about the great political issues and burning problems of today.

Early reunification, in short, has become a necessity for the world Trotskyist movement. Naturally, difficult problems will remain in various countries where the faction fight has been long and bitter. But these problems, too, can best be worked out under the conditions of general international reunification, so that it is possible for the outstanding leaders of both sides to begin the job of establishing a new comradely atmosphere and of removing fears which have no real basis in the situation in the world Trotskyist movement today. After a period of common fraternal activity in an increasing number of areas, we are convinced that what may appear at the outset to be insuperable local problems will be solved by the comrades themselves through democratic means.

We think that it should also be possible for a reunified organization to bring in recommendations for subsequent consideration and adoption which, without breaching the centralist side of democratic centralism, would remove any doubts that might still remain as to the guarantee of democratic rights contained in the statutes.

Our movement is faced with a responsibility as great and as grave as the one it faced at the founding of the Fourth International in 1938. We ask both sides to decide at their international gatherings in the next months that the time has come to reunify the world Trotskyist movement, and that they will do this at a World Congress of Reunification to be held as rapidly as possible after these gatherings.

March 1, 1963,

# THE NEW PHASE OF THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

*(Resolution adopted by the International Secretariat of the Fourth International)*

**T**HE decisions adopted by the Ben Bella Government during the last few weeks, mark a decisive turn in the Social phase of the Algerian Revolution. These measures, corresponding to the most profound needs and aspirations of the masses, particularly those of the poor peasants, represent a major step forward of the Revolution, a severe blow to colonialist and neo-colonialist interests, an open attack against the strata of the Algerian national bourgeoisie itself, an enormous stimulus to the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses and growing consciousness of the active partisans of the process of socialist reconstruction of the country. Also, the most advanced wing of the Algerian leadership has succeeded in carrying through the most daring and revolutionary solutions against the resistance of right-wing elements, subjected to pro-bourgeois and neo-colonialist pressures.

(2) The decisions of March are above all important because they lay bare clearly a series of problems hitherto only partially revealed. They consolidate substantially the socialised sector vital to the development of the Algerian Revolution, securing thereby the preconditions for the subsequent widening of this sector beyond even the remarkable progress already achieved (notably through the decisive confiscations experienced by Algerians—as well as Europeans), limiting the possibilities for the growth of privileges and scope for manouver of colonialists, both old and new, together with their “national” agents.

The fact that the Algerian government has already struck at the Algerian landowners and capitalists, and has proved its intention to advance along the path of radical agrarian reform by expropriating estates over a certain limit without consideration for the nationality of the landowners, is a significant confirmation of the scope, not only of the anti-imperialist but also the anti-capitalist orientation of the Algerian leadership.

From an economic point of view the Ben Bella decrees ratify the eclipse of the ascendancy of the large landowners and big bourgeoisie over a sector which already represents an important area of cultivated lands, in fact the most productive part, an area capable of playing a decisive pilot role.

The control of the State and the workers over these estates provides the guarantee that a considerable part of the effective, as well as the potential, economic surplus will be utilised for the development of production and in the interests of collectivisation. This signifies that the preconditions have been specifically laid down to achieve a real solution to one of the crucial problems facing an underdeveloped country, a solution absolutely impossible not only under the regime of imperialism but also under the management of the national bourgeoisie as the experience of several other countries have shown. It is necessary at the same time to underline the important fact that the collectives also dispose of control of certain sectors, for the time being limited, of industry and the marketing of agricultural products.

On the other hand the confiscations of cinemas and hotels in the major Algerian towns, the political and social significance of which is absolutely clear, proves itself to be a very valuable measure, above all in the sense that it stifles in embryo the potential germs of an indigenous bourgeoisie which would have been able to crystallise itself at first in areas such as these and then extend its power to other sectors, economically more decisive.

(3) The decrees on the abandoned properties, the new expropriations, confiscation of cinemas and hotels as well as the measures seeking to emancipate certain groups and categories among the most disinherited (for example those connected with the shoeshine boys) by their very nature stimulated a vast mobilisation of the masses. The mobilisation was realised on a scale the Algerian Revolution had never known before, especially because of this, that the Ben Bellist leadership had shown itself willing to stake everything on the initiative and the conscious participation of the masses by adopting the major decree on the self-management of industrial enterprises and the farming of abandoned agricultural properties. The Algerian Revolution has also linked itself to the best traditions of worker and peasant democracy and will play a vanguard role in those matters which concern the elaboration of and experimentation with advanced forms of revolutionary and democratic management during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. Revolutionary Marxists do not ignore the difficulties inherent in such experiences. (low level of development of the productive forces, insufficient cultural level of the masses), they do not ignore that the Algerian form of self-management depends for its fulfillment on its effective functioning and in the last analysis on its economic success, but the adoption of the decrees and the mobilisation of the masses which has been realised constitute a fundamental point of departure, a certain guarantee of further developments. The next convocation of the National Congress of Committees of Management will mark a powerful thrust of a new, enlargement and a deepening of the social phase begun on the 29th March last.

(4) On the ideological plane, also, the most advanced wing of the Algerian leadership, of which Ben Bella, Bonmedienne and their supporters appear as the most representative elements, has shown new progress. It has expressed more and more clearly its socialist orientation and its understanding of the process of revolutionary development, the motive forces of this development, the means of struggle which it imposes and their dialectical interactions. It has stated precisely its position by an explicit and direct appeal to other anti-capitalist and revolutionary experiences particularly by its reference to the Cuban Revolution and its international significance. It has shown that it is animated by a profound international spirit by refusing squarely to impose on a whole people or race the responsibility for the crimes of colonialism, in making constant appeals for the help of Europeans including the French for the building of the new Algeria and in demanding of its

masses, although savagely treated by a blind repression, to avoid all measures of retaliation or vengeance. It has confirmed its understanding of the role and duties of the Algerian Revolution in connection with the African Revolution by striving to aid those who are struggling against the last strongholds of traditional colonialism and the most brutal racism (Angola, South Africa).

(5) Following these last measures which have been adopted and are in the process of being applied, Algeria has entered an eminently transitional stage from the point of view of its economic and social structure, from which will emerge the setting up of a Workers' State.

In fact two sectors subsist: in the agricultural sector, the Revolution has established its positions of strength by already opening up a process of revolutionary structural changes. Whilst in the industrial, banking and commercial sector the ascendancy of colonial and bourgeois forces remains predominant. It follows from this, further, that the integration of Algeria in the 'Franc Zone' and its financial monetary and commercial dependence in relation to France constitutes a very great handicap.

In most of the problems which will be posed by the enlargement of agrarian reform the decisive battles there ought to express themselves for the control of the key industrial sectors and for commercial and financial emancipation. But it is very important that the Revolution prepares from now an essential lever in order that it should gain positions of strength in an economic sector, which in the following years will play, in every way, a primary role. On the other hand it is no less important that, by all its recent attitudes, the Ben Bella wing has clearly confirmed its decision to act as the expression of the large masses of the population, the poor peasant and worker masses, and to strengthen itself by a large mobilisation of the masses.

This means that, in the transitional period in which it finds itself, in the period of harsh struggles which present themselves, faced with the blows that the reactionaries of all types will inevitably strive to inflict, the Revolution prepares itself with forces, instruments, political formulas and leaders who are prepared to confront the tasks facing them with realistic optimism.

(6) The Fourth International which linked itself from the start with the struggle of the Algerian revolutionaries, which has given immediately its critical support to the Ben Bella government, warmly salutes the measures adopted in March 1963 which imply in reality a fresh confirmation of revolutionary marxist conceptions and show incontestably the influence of revolutionary marxism on the development of the pilot revolution in Africa. It is convinced that the Algerian revolution will win crucial new battles which are preparing themselves and will go forward along the road of building a Workers' State and Socialism.

The Fourth International is conscious of the enormous international repercussions the development of the Algerian Revolution will have throughout Africa, the Middle East and even Europe. The Fourth International is, from another angle, conscious that this development, following on the specific development of the Cuban Revolution, a development in many ways analogous to the Algerian Revolution, will endow the international communist movement with a rich new experience in a number of areas of the theory and practice of the Socialist Revolution, in our time.

It estimates that amongst the tasks falling due shortly the following are the most important.

(a) to assure the effective and democratic application of the decrees on confiscations and self-management, to enlarge the area of enterprises and agricultural lands confiscated and submitted to the self-management of workers, to hold regional congresses and the National Congress of committees of management, which can become the essential elements of a revolutionary democratic structure for the new Algerian Society.

(b) to enlarge the zone of control on the part of the State and the workers in the industrial, financial and commercial spheres in order to prepare as rapidly as possible the nationalisation of key sectors and to introduce workers control in the industrial, banking and commercial enterprises.

(c) to ensure the control of the State over the trade in essential agricultural products and to introduce state monopoly of external trade.

(d) to organise effectively within a democratic structure, through the revolutionary process which has commenced and on the basis of the concrete tasks which that raises, the F.L.N. until it crystallises itself politically and organisationally as the vanguard expression and the instrument of the struggle of the workers, the peasants and revolutionary intellectuals.

(e) to enlarge, particularly in the country in the organisation of "Syndicates" which have an important role to play in the effective application of the decrees on self management and in the real functioning of these organisations, more than their natural role of defence of the immediate material interests of the workers and poor peasants.

(f) to elaborate the general lines of a plan of economic development and industrialisation.

The Fourth International supports all the revolutionary forces in Algeria in their March towards socialism. It calls upon all its sectors to enlist all possible forms of aid and mobilisations in favour of the new Algeria. It appeals to the international working class movement to enlarge this action of solidarity to all the forces of the world proletariat and of the world revolution.

# DECLARATION OF THE UNIFIED SECRETARIAT OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL ON MOSCOW TREATY

The signing of the Moscow Treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the United States and Great Britain has been welcomed by the very big majority of international public opinion as a sign of decrease in international tension, of easing in the cold war, and as a step albeit relative in the direction of a cessation of the process of nuclear armament. In this is reflected the sentiments of the masses who, rightly fear a nuclear war, grip with hope every sign which appears to them of promising nature. The Unified Secretariat of the Fourth International however considers that a correct valuation of the Moscow treaty must necessarily be based on an analysis of the reasons which have impelled the signatory powers to conclude this treaty, and of the practical consequences that it implies, while avoiding the pitfalls of propaganda that aims to discredit from the commencement of those who dare to advance criticism and whom efforts are being made to present by a dishonest formula as "enemies of peace", and war mongers regardless of the danger of a nuclear holocaust.

The nuclear powers have been impelled to agree by a number of reasons which one can sum up as follows:—

(a) The situation of relative equilibrium which the nuclear arms race has reached due to the fact that even that power which finds itself at a disadvantage nevertheless has a sufficient stock pile to make the efficacious counter attack and completely destroy its adversary. "A certain rationalisation" particularly of nuclear arms is thus imposed as a necessity, and on this plane there existed a basis for compromise.

(b) Even for powers like the United States and the Soviet Union, the pursuit and ultimate acceleration of an irrational nuclear arms race means an increasingly heavy economic burden which neither of them could permit to increase indefinitely without grave consequences. The leadership, of the U.S.S.R. could not do this without damage

to the economic policy that it is following, while for the United States, the nuclear armaments race in its present form does not stimulate the economy in the same way as in the case of the classical type of armaments.

(c) Above all for the two principal nuclear powers (Great Britain and even more France are much behind) the need to stabilise the situation at the present level, stabilising the relationship of forces, avoiding if possible the entry of other powers into the "atomic club", and in the first place of China in order thus to strengthen their hegemony for their respective camps.

The leaders of the signatory powers considered besides that they could exploit the treaty by presenting it to the mass as a concession to their pressure, as a success albeit partial of, their struggle against war, hoping also in this way to consolidate their position within their respective countries.

As to the real meaning of the treaty, it is necessary above all to underline that its content is in itself very modest because (a) not only does the nuclear stock arms remain intact, but it will be constantly augmented without any violation of the treaty. (b) underground tests continue. (c) the ultimate distribution of nuclear arms is not banned; not only information but also arms can be transmitted to other powers. Indeed, immediately after the signing of the treaty, the United States has proceeded with new tests and supplied nuclear war heads to their Canadian allies, thus concretising sentiments expressed earlier before the American Congress by certain close collaborators of Kennedy. The preparations for a nuclear war have not stopped, tests are continuing, the two principal powers are trying further to consolidate their superiority. Facts of this nature counter balance very considerably the one result that would flow from strict application of the treaty, namely the elimination of the dangers of radio active fall out.

On the other hand if one considers the treaty more closely, it appears clearly to favour generally the two big nuclear powers to the detriment of others, it gives particularly greater advantages to the United States than to the Soviet Union, which has besides given up its earlier position in this matter. The continuation of underground tests is more advantageous for the United States because of their greater experience in this regard. But—and this is most important—if Kennedy has difficulties in his camp, he has not provoked any division and has not aggravated the situation that existed earlier, while the decision of the Soviet leaders has had as it's easily foreseeable consequence a breach in practice between the two most powerful worker states.

The accusations made against the Chinese by the supporters of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union and the world are absolutely unjustified. In the manifest intention—quite naturally of the imperialists, but also in that of Khrushchev, the treaty is clearly directed against China whom he wishes thus to relegate to a clear position of inferiority. On the other hand, the argument according to which the Soviet Union by refusing to aid China in the matter of atomic arms, by contributing to prevent the dissemination of nuclear bombs has served the cause of peace, is equally unacceptable. In the first place this dissemination existed earlier in the imperialist camp and the treaty nowhere prevents this happening further. In the second place one cannot place on the same level the nuclear arming of a worker state and that of a capitalist state. In fact, if the increase in the number of bourgeois states furnished with nuclear arms implies an increase in the danger of war, the contrary is true in the case of worker states, which, by their very nature, have no interest in either unleashing a war of aggression or of preventing war. On the contrary, the fact, that the worker states other than the U.S.S.R. possessed nuclear arms would only have constituted a supplementary obstacle to the war plans of the imperialists.

The statement made by the supporters of Khrushchev according to which the U.S.S.R. is the shield of the entire socialist world, that it must remain the sole nuclear shield,

that the Soviet leadership is the only leadership competent to make decisions in the matter of nuclear armament, far from being acceptable really constitutes an unmasking of themselves by themselves. These statements in practice clearly bring back the concept of "a guiding state" which had been proclaimed to have been given up for ever.

The vehement protests of the Chinese—whose steps and statements have been hidden and deformed before international working class opinion—are the well founded because, from 1959 the Soviet leaders have violated the agreement made with China in 1957 on the supply of "new technics", because on the occasion of the signing of the treaty they have violated certain clauses of the Warsaw Pact in relation to Albania which, despite the ultra bureaucratic regime of Hodja, remains a worker state which has never formally ceased to be a member of this Pact, and because at the time of the crisis between capitalist India and the Chinese worker state, they supplied arms to Nehru and after news of an ever worsening situation they have just concluded with Nehru even more serious commitments, including commitments concerning the supply of strategic arms.

The Fourth International, throwing light on the real meaning of the Moscow treaty and denouncing all the biased propagandist deformities, continues to fight against the threat of a nuclear war according to the line laid down by its recent unification congress by demanding the banning of all nuclear arms, the destruction of existing stocks, the suspension of all nuclear tests, and by supporting the mass movements against war, more particularly the fact which, in a series of capitalist countries, is continuing for unilateral nuclear disarmament and for the elimination of imperialist bases through out the world. It considers that the propositions made by the Government of the Peoples Republic of China on 31st July 1963 particularly concerning the cessation of all nuclear tests, the destruction of existing stocks, the abolition of foreign military bases, form a valid basis for all those who desire a real nuclear disarmament and not a pretence which aims to hide completely different aims and to sow dangerous illusions among the masses.