

Fourth International

A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MARXISM PUBLISHED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL



20th AUGUST 1965 — 25th anniversary of the assassination of

LEON TROTSKY

Resolution of the International Committee

Rebuilding the Fourth International

Marxism and the Cuban Revolution

Trotsky and American Marxism

AUGUST 1965

VOLUME 2 NUMBER 2

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*Published by the International Committee
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Note

In the article, 'Cuba: Marxism and the Revolution', reference is made to the imprisonment of five members of the Cuban P.O.R. (pp. 68-9). This is a group which supports J. Posadas, who split from the Pabloite International Secretariat some years ago. On going to press we learn that they have now been released—Editors.

Rebuilding the Fourth International

Resolution of the International Committee in preparation for the international conference in 1966

Early in 1966, the International Committee of the Fourth International is calling a conference of its sections, together with observers and consultative delegates from several countries. The purpose of the conference is to lay the political basis for the reconstruction of the Fourth International, founded by Leon Trotsky and his followers in 1938.

Readers of Fourth International are aware of the struggle carried out since 1953 against revisionism. The resolution published below has been circulated to all organisations connected with the International Committee. Its publication here, for international circulation, is intended to open a public discussion, and Fourth International invites written contributions from all countries, to be published in our forthcoming issues.

I The class struggle is international. World capitalism has long since played out its historical role of laying down the objective bases for socialism; the struggles of the workers of all countries have meaning only in terms of the world socialist revolution which began in October 1917 in Russia, as part of the world proletarian revolution. The Third (Communist) International was set up to answer the needs of the working class in this epoch of wars and revolutions. Following the betrayals of Social Democracy after 1918, the degeneration of the CPSU and the Comintern led eventually to the defeats in Britain and China in 1926/27 and the victory of fascism in Italy, Germany and Spain. Between 1933 and 1938 Trotsky and the Bolshevik opposition prepared to establish a Fourth International in response to the needs of the working class in a period of defeats, when Stalinism passed definitively to the side of counter-revolution.

The history of the class struggle since 1938 has proved correct the basic starting-point of Trotsky and the founders of the Fourth International: the working class remains oppressed by capitalism because of the betrayals of the working-class leadership, particularly

by the Stalinist bureaucracy in the USSR; *our epoch is the epoch of crisis of working-class leadership*. All the economic and political developments since then have shown the correctness of insisting that the development of imperialism constantly deepens the contradiction between the productive forces and capitalist social relations. But at every critical stage in the development of this contradiction, the traitorous social-democratic and Stalinist leaderships and the Soviet bureaucracy have misled the workers; these petty-bourgeois formations have divided the workers along national and sectional lines and held back the development of a revolutionary consciousness. The post-war economic and political crisis in the advanced countries, the breakdown of capitalist rule in Eastern Europe, the victorious revolution in China, the mass struggles in the colonial countries—all of these international capitalism has survived because of the treachery of these misleaders who disarmed the working class.

Only an international revolutionary Marxist leadership could have enabled these class struggles to be used for the overthrow of capitalism in the main centres, the advanced countries. Only the Fourth

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International and its parties, intervening in the class struggle in these countries, giving them international significance, could have given leadership to the independent organs of working-class power, and could have led the peasant masses beyond the leadership of the petty-bourgeois nationalists in the colonial countries.

The absence of the International and its parties enabled imperialism at each stage of the struggle to establish a new relative equilibrium. In this the collaboration of international Stalinism and of other petty-bourgeois tendencies was the essential component.

Such collaboration, fully developed in the bureaucracy's strategy of peaceful co-existence and peaceful competition between the two world systems since the death of Stalin and particularly since 1956, now takes on an added significance for the rebuilding of the Fourth International. This new and more advanced phase of the counter-revolutionary role of Stalinism is the response of the bureaucracy not only to the increased pressure of imperialism but also to the upsurge of the political revolution in Eastern Europe after 1953. At the same time, movements like the General Strike of August 1953 in France showed that the policies of the Stalinist and Social Democratic bureaucracies in the advanced capitalist countries were coming into contradiction with the mass movement. The containment of the working class in those capitalist countries where the Stalinists had mass influence became more difficult and fraught with danger. Every partial mobilisation of the strength of the class threatened to rapidly develop into a general class confrontation, putting in question the whole capitalist system. The Stalinist bureaucratic leaderships of the working-class movement found themselves faced with the necessity of making themselves open agents of the maintenance of bourgeois order like the Social Democrats before them. In a different form, the historic defeat of French imperialism at Dien-Bien-phu forced the international Stalinist apparatus into direct collaboration with imperialism for the purpose of preventing the extension of the revolution in the colonial countries.

The Hungarian Revolution represents the principal manifestation up to the present of the insoluble contradiction between Stalinism and the extension of the socialist revolution. At the same time as it was the first political revolution against the Stalinist bureaucracy, and was for a time victorious, it was also an expression of the international class struggle taking its specific form in the countries of Eastern Europe. It posed the problem of workers' power through workers' councils not only in Hungary but throughout the USSR and Eastern Europe. Its actual development raised the question of the social revolution in

the countries of Western Europe. Thus the increasingly international character of the proletarian revolution threatens the existence of both the Kremlin bureaucracy and imperialism. The Sino-Soviet conflict is another major external manifestation of the insoluble contradiction between Stalinism and the international revolutionary struggle. This struggle must be led by a Marxist leadership if capitalist counter-revolution is to be prevented in China, the USSR and Eastern Europe, and if imperialism is to be defeated throughout the rest of the world.

Another major principle of the founders of the Fourth International is thus more than confirmed. Stalinism is not a new social system but a regime of crisis in a degenerated workers' state, a regime which will fall to the political revolution of the working class; the political revolution can succeed only under the leadership of parties of the Fourth International. This is the lesson of the recurrent crises in the USSR since 1953, the East German and Polish uprisings, the Hungarian revolution and the Sino-Soviet split: the establishment of degenerated or deformed workers' states in Eastern Europe and China, far from ending the isolation of the USSR and softening its contradictions, has accelerated and deepened them. The more the planned economy develops under the control of the Soviet bureaucracy, the sharper become the social contradictions, thus giving more and more concreteness to the alternative posed in the founding programme of the Fourth International.

'The political prognosis has an alternative character: either the bureaucracy, becoming ever more the organ of the world bourgeoisie in the workers' state, will overthrow the new forms of property and plunge the country back to capitalism; or the working class will crush the bureaucracy and open the way to socialism.'

In neither event can there be any peaceful conclusion. The actual outcome will be the product of the world class struggle, primarily in the developed capitalist countries and in the USSR, Eastern Europe and China. The unity of the workers' struggle in Eastern Europe with the workers' movement in Western Europe now urgently requires conscious and concrete expression. This can only be done by the rebuilding of the Fourth International of Marxist parties in every one of these countries. The Socialist United States of Europe is a living slogan: in Eastern Europe the bureaucracy clumsily attempts economic co-operation between the different workers' states (Comecon); in Western Europe, the capitalists try to discipline the working class and resolve their contradictions in the framework of the European Common Market, itself a reflection of sharpening inter-imperialist contradictions; between the imperialists and the bureaucracy an uneasy series of compromises

is negotiated, and the economy of Eastern Europe and Russia is penetrated more and more by the prevailing relationships and prices in the imperialist world market. Thus, along with its political rapprochement with imperialism since 1953, the bureaucracy is made more sensitive and responsive to the contradictory economic development of international capitalism. It is the task of the Fourth International to create working-class parties which consciously respond in struggle to these objective contradictions and potentialities. The historic division between the workers of Russia and Eastern Europe on the one hand, and those of Western Europe and America on the other, the result of Stalinism, can only be overcome through the conscious experience of the unity of their struggles; this conscious experience takes concrete form in the rebuilding of the Fourth International, rooted in the working class of the advanced countries as well as of the planned economies. There will be no spontaneous formation of such parties. In Hungary in 1956, despite a high level of political development and the formation of workers' councils, such a party was not built, and any conscious intervention by the Fourth International was sabotaged by the Pabliste revisionists. The workers' struggle continues in these countries since 1956, and it is the responsibility of the Fourth International to provide conscious leadership which can build on the lessons of 1956.

In the same way, the International and its parties are the key to the problems of the class struggle in the colonial countries. The petty-bourgeois nationalist leaders and their Stalinist collaborators restrict the struggle to the level of national liberation, or, at best, to a version of 'socialism in one country', sustained by subordination to the co-existence policies of the Soviet bureaucracy. In this way, all the gains of the struggle of the workers and peasants, not only in the Arab world, India, South East Asia, etc., but also in China and Cuba, are confined within the limits of imperialist domination, or exposed to counter-revolution and imperialist intervention (the line-up against China, the Cuban missiles crisis, the Vietnam war, etc.). In each country, the organic link between the colonial workers and the struggle of the workers in the advanced countries and in the workers' states can be understood and given concrete expression only under the leadership of parties of the Fourth International.

The period 1953-56 marks a turning point in the world situation. At the end of the second world war, the changed relation of class forces on a world scale broke the old capitalist equilibrium. However, to the extent that the Stalinist and reformist bureaucracies were able to contain or manipulate the strength of the working class in the advanced countries, the most decisive consequences of this changed situation were

not immediately apparent in all their significance.

There was a growing together of the social and economic contradictions of the advanced capitalist countries and of the planned economies. In the long term, imperialism cannot survive except by bringing the workers' states back into the orbit of capitalist exploitation. At the same time, the harmonious development of the planned economies of Russia and Eastern Europe demands that the most advanced productive forces in the world be included in socialist planning. But the economy cannot be considered in and of itself. Its contradictions must be translated into class terms.

The Kremlin bureaucracy and all its satellite bureaucracies, precisely because they have the character of parasitic social groups, are no less attached to a purely national framework, to national states, than the bourgeoisie of the various capitalist nations. These national states constitute the basis of their exploitation of the working class in their own country. The idea that it is possible to achieve 'socialism in one country' is not only a false theory; it is at the same time the ideological expression of the conditions of growth and survival of the parasitic bureaucracy and its material interests.

A mechanical idea of working-class internationalism leads to a misunderstanding of the national factor in the struggle for emancipation of the working classes subjected to imperialism and the Kremlin bureaucracy. But it is no less dangerous to ignore the internationalist content of the workers' struggles in these countries. The workers must liberate themselves from the oppression and exploitation both of imperialism and of the Kremlin bureaucracy, a task which goes beyond a struggle within national frameworks. Except in this context, national independence is meaningless.

The struggle of the working class in Eastern Europe can only be understood as a struggle against regimes produced by a revolutionary movement which has been doubly distorted:—

(1) It is part of a revolutionary upsurge which threatened the very existence of capitalism in the whole of Europe, a threat which was dispelled by the complementary actions of American imperialism, the Soviet bureaucracy and its agencies, and European Social-Democracy;

(2) The Kremlin bureaucracy used its power to decapitate the revolutionary action of the workers of these countries, using for this purpose the old apparatus of the capitalist state.

The movements of August 1953 and of the summer of 1955 in France, together with the rising revolutionary wave in Eastern Europe, must be considered

in their historical continuity, at the same time as marking a turning point in the world class struggle. From one point of view, they carried forward the revolutionary struggles in Europe of the years 1943-45; from another, they inaugurated a new period in the international struggle of the working class.

Independently of their level of consciousness of the question, the working classes of Eastern Europe and of France in particular fought struggles which tended towards the dictatorship of the proletariat; only through this dictatorship is it possible to achieve the planned use of the productive forces of the world, based on common property in the means of production and the breaking down of national boundaries. In this sense the struggles of this period were the response of the working class to the contradictions both of the capitalist system and of the planned economies. In these struggles, they came into direct conflict with the Soviet bureaucracy, with its international Stalinist agents, and with the reformist bureaucracies, as well as with the bourgeois state machines.

The linked crisis of imperialism and of the Soviet bureaucracy does not arise solely from the contradiction between capitalist economy as a whole and the planned economies. It consists also of contradictions between the imperialist powers themselves, which constantly nourish the class struggle and give it sharper forms in the advanced countries, and of the inability of imperialism to arrest the development of the revolution in the backward countries; the crisis is also fed by the fact that the Kremlin and satellite

bureaucracies cannot resolve the problems posed by the development of the planned economy, whose harmonious development demands not only the extension of social ownership and planning to the means of production in the advanced countries, but also the participation of the working class in the management and control of industry; this is only possible if they exercise political power, which is impossible without the overthrow of the bureaucracy. This linked crisis creates the conditions for intensification of the world class struggle, and it is in that struggle that the crisis will find its solution. For this reason, the struggles engaged in by the workers of the advanced countries during the years between 1953 and 1956, and the changed relationship which these struggles expressed between the workers and the bureaucratic apparatus of the labour movement, were decisive factors. This fact was partially obscured by the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution, which was basically a victory for imperialism, encouraging pro-capitalist tendencies in the USSR and Eastern Europe and reformist trends in the Communist Parties. Nonetheless, this defeat was temporary and not fundamental, since in not a single advanced country has the working class been subjected to a defeat like those of the 1920s.

It is the perspective of combined revolutionary struggles, threatening at the same time the existence of imperialism and of the Kremlin bureaucracy, bringing the proletariat into conflict with the bureaucratic apparatuses which control the workers' movement, which demands and makes possible the rebuilding of the Fourth International.

2 No starting point for revolutionary practice in the present international political situation can be found simply from contemplation of the 'objective forces' at work. The degeneration of the international movement founded by Trotsky must be understood in its relation to the international class struggle. Petty-bourgeois opportunism, in the shape of a hardened revisionist tendency penetrating all sections of the Trotskyist movement, has destroyed the Fourth International as an organisation founded on the Transitional Programme and now necessitates a complete break from the theoretical, political and organisational methods of the revisionists. This revisionist tendency developed into a centre for liquidation of the revolutionary party and the International, now gathered together in the self-styled 'Unified Secretariat', which is the product of fusion between the International Secretariat of Pablo and the revisionist groups previously associated with the International Committee and the SWP of the USA. Revisionism

became liquidationism when the French section was expelled from the International because of its defence of Trotskyism, of the Transitional Programme, and of its own very existence. The break-up of the Fourth International was finally consummated in the split of 1953. The liquidationist centre has become a major obstacle to the rebuilding of the Fourth International.

Revisionism and liquidationism in the Fourth International, with its primary political expression subordination to the bureaucratic instruments of imperialist penetration of the workers' and national-liberation movements, must be seen not only as a result but also as an objective contributory factor to the success of these bureaucracies in containing the struggles of the international working class. The Fourth International cannot be rebuilt without a struggle against these 'Trotskyist' revisionists. In this period, when the counter-revolutionary actions of the Stalinist bureaucracy are an indispensable support to imperialism, revisionism and liquidationism take

particular forms of capitulation to this bureaucracy. Centrist tendencies within the Stalinist movement, in Eastern Europe, USSR and China, as well as in the various Communist Parties, base themselves on the perspective of a reform of the Stalinist bureaucracy. Pabloite revisionism and liquidationism is the expression of this revisionism of our epoch within the revolutionary movement itself. The first steps of a fight against Stalinism in the countries ruled by the bureaucracy go through forms which tend to accept this revisionist framework. In this way, the dominance of Pabloite revisionism in the Fourth International objectively hindered the development of the political revolution in 1953-1956. Thus Pabloite revisionism and liquidationism has not been a purely 'internal' or 'subjective' experience of the Fourth International.

The split in the International of 1951-53 was linked with the development of revisionism into liquidationism. The abandonment of the programme of the Fourth International which had been contained in the earlier theses of Pablo developed into actual support for the Stalinist bureaucracy against the revolutionary workers of East Germany. This constituted proof that the revolutionary organisation founded by Trotsky no longer existed. In 1953, the revisionism contained in Pablo's earlier theses was most sharply expressed in his retreat from the programme of political revolution in Eastern Europe at the time of the East German workers' uprising. The theories of 'centuries of degenerated workers' states', 'mass pressure on the bureaucracy', and the resultant tactic of 'entry *sui generis*', were the revisionist background of this betrayal and later of the Pabloites' similar attitude towards the Hungarian revolution of 1956, and to the whole phenomenon of 'de-Stalinisation'. The fundamental perspective of the founding programme of the Fourth International, the construction of revolutionary parties to fight for the political independence of the working class in the struggle for power, was abandoned. The Pabloite conception of an international centre whose role consists of influencing through abstract 'theoretical and political support' the 'leftward-moving' sections of the bureaucracy, as the latter supposedly respond to the pressure of the masses and of 'irreversible' objective trends, is the negation of the basic task defined by the Transitional Programme: '... the crisis of the proletarian leadership, having become the crisis in mankind's culture, can be resolved only by the Fourth International'. The fundamental perspective of the founding programme of the Fourth International rests on the following appreciation: 'The orientation of the masses is determined first by the objective conditions of decaying capitalism, and second, by the treacherous politics of the old workers'

organisations. Of these factors, the first of course is the decisive one: the laws of history are stronger than the bureaucratic apparatus.' The question is to fight in the course of the class struggle itself for the destruction of the bureaucratic apparatus and the building of the International and its parties.

Instead of the struggle to build the International, to construct in the course of this struggle an international leadership selected in and through the struggle, the Pabloites substituted their false idea of an international centre, and this resulted in the negation of the construction of revolutionary parties to fight for the political independence of the proletariat in the struggle for power. The active construction of revolutionary parties in Eastern Europe and the USSR was abandoned, and this assisted in the isolation of the workers in these countries from the working class of the capitalist world. (This liquidationism is the essence of Pabloism in all sectors of the international class struggle.) In the capitalist countries themselves, the counter-revolutionary role of the Stalinist parties and of the policies of the Soviet bureaucracy is covered up by the Pabloite revisionists, who speculate on the 'irreversible' progressive tendencies within the bureaucracies. Pablo's theory that the Stalinist party would be forced to the left and even to take power disarmed the vanguard of the French working class at the time of the 1953 General Strike, just as surely as it disarmed the Fourth International in relation to the political revolution in Eastern Europe. Clearly then, every national section of the Fourth International must carry out a determined struggle against Pabloite revisionism if it is to build a revolutionary party with a real perspective of international working-class unity.

The bankruptcy of this revisionism became particularly clear in the Pabloite evaluations of the split between the Russian and Chinese Communist parties. Instead of an objective analysis of the causes and consequences of this division as a way of strengthening the Fourth International in its struggle to defeat the bureaucracy, the Pabloites discussed at length the false problem of which line, the Chinese or the Russian, best expressed the needs of international socialism. The fact is that, although the Chinese make formally correct criticisms of the revisionist formulations of the CPSU, these are only a theoretical dressing for an empirical rejection of the consequences of the Soviet bureaucracy's attempted agreement with the American imperialists at the expense of China. Correct formal criticisms of the role of the national bourgeoisie and of the Soviet attitude towards them in the colonial countries has not prevented the Chinese leaders from sabotaging the struggle of the workers, for example in Indonesia and in North Africa, in accordance with needs of Chinese diplomacy. Chinese

criticism of the theory of peaceful co-existence is again narrow and purely empirical because it does not go to the point of posing an alternative strategy of international mobilisation of the working class against imperialism. This emerges clearly from the oft-repeated distinction between the colonial 'storm centre' and the advanced countries. The problem of unifying these struggles through the construction of revolutionary parties and above all of uniting these with the linked struggles in the workers' states against the bureaucracies, cannot be solved by the Chinese bureaucrats. Their attitude to Stalin and towards Trotskyism is entirely consistent with this limitation. It is objectively impossible for them to state clearly that proletarian revolution is the only escape from barbarism; they can present no overall strategy based on the nature of the epoch, because such a strategy puts in question their own existence.

In the advanced countries, the revisionists who usurp the name of the Fourth International are prostrate before the Social Democracy as well as before Stalinism. Here, too, the building of independent working-class parties is abandoned. Everything is concentrated on 'deep entry' and the encouragement of 'mass centrist' tendencies in the social democratic parties. In this way, the cadres of these sections are trained in opportunist adaptation to professional centrists and play their part in bolstering up the social-democratic bureaucracy. In Belgium the General Strike of 1960-61 found the revisionists around Germain, because of their failure to prepare the way for the establishment of an alternative leadership, tailing behind centrist demagogues who opposed turning the movement into a struggle for power. They put forward the demand for 'structural reforms' derived from the minimum programme of the Belgian Socialist Party. Empirically they adapted themselves to the separatist moods produced by the lack of leadership during the strike and gave whole-hearted support to the petty-bourgeois movement for Walloon federalism. From this time they were on the defensive, moving from one opportunist position to another until they found themselves helpless in the face of the bureaucracy's attacks on their freedom of expression in the Belgian Socialist Party in 1964. After years of 'deep entry' they now indulged in the sectarian adventure of proclaiming a new workers' party along with a handful of non-Marxists and demagogic elements. Their policy of 'structural reforms' is no different from that of the left Social Democrats and Stalinists of Italy and other parts of Western Europe. Germain and his collaborators provide the ideological cover for the Social-Democracy in those countries where Social-Democracy is the main reflection of capitalism in the working-class movement, just as they play the same role on behalf of

the Stalinists in Eastern Europe or in those capitalist countries where the Stalinists are strong. In Britain a tiny group of supporters of the Pabloites has concentrated its efforts on attacking the more and more successful construction of a Marxist alternative to the Social Democrats and the Stalinists, particularly in the Labour youth movement. To this end they have collaborated with renegades and anti-communists in service to the social-democratic bureaucracy.

The general swing to the right of all the social-democratic and Stalinist parties since 1956 is their response to the renewed upsurge of the international workers' struggle. The increasing subordination of the revisionists to the bureaucracies even during this right turn indicates clearly the international class nature of this tendency in international Trotskyism. Their theory that mass pressure forces opportunist bureaucracies to the left is a treacherous and reactionary theory. These bureaucracies serve imperialism, and any adaptations they make to mass struggles are for the purpose of betraying these struggles to the imperialists. Only a struggle against the Pabloite 'objectivist' revisions of dialectical materialism can prepare for the building of real revolutionary parties based on Marxist theory. Without this fight, there can be no working out of the detailed strategy and tactics necessary in the international class struggle in response to every development in the linked crises of capitalism and the Stalinist bureaucracy.

As we have seen, this dialectical connection between imperialism, bureaucracy, revisionism and the fight to reconstruct the International holds just as true for the colonial and semi-colonial countries. The Algerian national-liberation struggle against French imperialism culminated in the establishment of the Ben Bella Government and the Evian Agreement with de Gaulle, leaving French imperialism's North African interests protected. Instead of working for an independent working-class party in Algeria, and for a revolutionary working-class party in France which would forge the real international link between the French and Algerian workers against their common enemy, the Pabloites subordinated their sections in Western Europe to the FLN apparatus and collaborated in the new regime's repressions against the working class, at the same time excusing Ben Bella's deal with the imperialists at Evian. Even the building of independent working-class parties against bourgeois regimes in countries like Egypt and Syria is condemned as sectarian, and some spokesmen of the Pabloites characterise not only Algeria but these countries too as workers' states.

Castro's regime in Cuba has been uncritically praised as a 'healthy workers' state' and all independent working-class struggle, including the building of a party, renounced. Even Castro's repressions of the

Trotskyist party there (part of the Posadas group which split from the Pabloites in 1962) has been justified by the revisionists. The building of an independent workers' party and the establishment of workers' councils in Cuba as part of a proletarian internationalist orientation, with the extension of the revolution to Latin America and a revolutionary alliance with the workers of the USA and the rest of the world, is completely abandoned. The 'aid' of the Soviet bureaucracy is not seen in the context of the international class struggle, with the bureaucracy striving to trade the Cuban revolution for its own purposes, but as a 'progressive' assistance to Cuba. The theories about petty-bourgeois revolutionists being 'unconscious Marxists', about 'Jacobin leaderships *sui generis*', about 'revolutionary parties being built in the course of the revolution itself', about 'special conditions' in the backward countries which outdate the theory of crisis of leadership, all of these have served in practice to assist the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois nationalist leaders who, assisted by Stalinism, have managed to contain the mass revolutionary struggles in the colonial countries within the framework of continued world domination of imperialism.

3 These crucial examples demonstrate that the revisionist degeneration in the Fourth International is an international class phenomenon responding to the needs of imperialism in its latest phase of extreme contradictions and dependence upon the Stalinist bureaucracy, Social Democracy, and the nationalist leaders. The abandonment of Marxist theory within the Fourth International, not only the abandonment of the programme but even of the fundamentals of dialectical materialism, was the mechanism by which the cadres were prepared for this capitulation. The objective situation—physical liquidation of many sections in the late 1930s and the Second World War, the apparent strength of Stalinism in the workers' movement from 1942 to 1953, the divisions and pressure of the cold war period, the McCarthy repressions in the USA, all provided the circumstances for the decline, particularly by physically separating the class struggle in Eastern Europe and Russia from that of the capitalist world. But the emphasis placed on revolutionary consciousness by the Transitional Programme must be our guide. The death of Trotsky weakened the Fourth International immeasurably. There had not yet been time to train a cadre which had absorbed the living theoretical heritage of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky, particularly the lesson learned by Trotsky in the October Revolution of the

The most striking confirmation of the definitively opportunist role of Pabloite revisionism has been provided by the political evolution of the LSSP in Ceylon. Adhering to the Pabloite centre, the leaders of the majority of this party responded to the call of Mrs. Bandaranaike and her bourgeois SLFP party to enter a coalition government. Here we had expressed concretely the fact that the theory about middle-class leaders being pushed to the left, a substitute for the building of independent working-class parties, is the cover for capitalist politics. Imperialism's survival in Ceylon depended upon the workers' resistance being divided and broken, above all upon their leadership being beheaded. The 'unification' of the revisionists in 1963, explicitly carried through without discussion of such questions as the opportunism of N. M. Perera and company, was an essential part of the preparation of the betrayal of the LSSP in Ceylon in 1964. In this way, the spurious internationalism of the Pabloite revisionists ends by actively assisting imperialism. Under the cover of international 'unification', the politics of the national sections are left to adapt themselves to serving the direct agents of imperialism in their own countries.

need for a centralised Bolshevik party, founded solidly on Marxist theory, responding to every need of leadership by the working class in accordance with an internationalist perspective. This theoretical and political weakness, reflected in a dogmatic attitude towards theory and programme, not *developing* Marxist theory against hostile ideologies but attempting to 'preserve' it, was the reason for the inability of the Fourth International to develop the programme and build parties in the post-war period.

Instead the cadres of the International adapted easily to the petty-bourgeois trends dominant at that stage of political development, particularly to the Stalinists. A false and artificial 'international centre' was set up, relying on a propagandist contemplation and commentary upon 'objective' developments in the class struggle. Such a centre did not discuss the living experiences of the sections in the course of developing Marxist theory and programme but instead either left the sections without guidance or intervened bureaucratically (upon the basis of the most 'Bolshevik' of organisational statutes) to impose an abstract international line against the sections. Such an international centre, isolated from real struggle, adapting programmatic formulae to the surface atmosphere of politics and certain circles of the 'left' intelligentsia, dominated as it was by the

petty-bourgeois elements who inhabit the Labour bureaucracies, was inevitably exposed to the pressures of the cold war, of international Stalinism and imperialism. Its theory and programme developed not in active connection with living struggle but in the rarefied atmosphere of 'international secretariats'.

The theoretical backwardness of the SWP leaders, who paid no heed to Trotsky's warnings of the need to do battle against pragmatism, the dominant American philosophy, made it easy for them to adapt to the Pabloite revisions and to end in the position of pragmatists themselves. Such adaptation amounted in fact to a narrow nationalism in party matters, an abdication of internationalism and of responsibility to the International. This explains why the rejection of Pablo's revisionism by the SWP stopped short of a real theoretical analysis. Cannon and the SWP leaders reacted empirically to Pablo's gross capitulation to Stalinism and to his organisational abuses in organising factions within the national sections, especially in the USA, but they did not probe to the theoretical roots of the revisions and therefore themselves fell victim to revisionism; their abandonment of the programme of political revolution and the building of revolutionary parties in Eastern Europe, their increasing support for petty-bourgeois leaders in Algeria and Cuba, as well as in the Negro struggles in the USA itself, have all prepared a situation where the SWP is now in immediate danger of liquidation.

The assassination of President Kennedy provoked from the SWP leaders a reaction which revealed the depths of their capitulation. They addressed their 'condolences' to the widow, and published a statement denouncing the methods of terrorism. This action was only part of their liquidationism under the direct pressure, not of any Stalinist or Social-Democratic bureaucracy, but of US imperialism itself. Cannon's break with Pablo in 1953 only concealed this process of degeneration. It was perfectly possible, in the USA, to reject a tendency which took the *form* of a capitulation to the Stalinist bureaucracy, and at the same time to fall victim to the pressure of imperialism itself. That this was in fact the nature of the process was confirmed by the SWP's turn to the Pabloites after the crisis of Stalinism reached its peak in 1956.

The 're-unification' of the Pabloite revisionists in 1963 was preceded by the defection of Posadas and a number of Latin American Pabloite sections. The unification was followed almost immediately by Pablo's own break with the Unified Secretariat and by the debacle in Ceylon. This decomposition is not accidental. The revisionist theories of the Pabloites adapted them to the Labour and Stalinist bureaucracies and to the petty-bourgeois nationalists who in turn are the agents of imperialism. Consistent with the politics of this adaptation they revised out of

existence the role of revolutionary consciousness and Marxist parties. Blinded by the apparent strength of the bureaucracy and the nationalists at the end of a period of working-class defeats and world war, they were taken unawares by the revival of revolutionary working-class struggles in Eastern Europe and later in the imperialist world. They had capitulated to the dominant bureaucracies. The betrayals of the bureaucracy and the opportunists strengthen imperialism, but only *temporarily*. In the very act of perpetuating a system racked by contradictions and conflicts, the counter-revolutionary Social Democrats and Stalinists in fact lay the basis for more violent and all-embracing class struggles, which demand ever more insistently an international proletarian leadership. Just at the point where the linked crisis of imperialism and the bureaucracy provokes the sharpest struggles, so do the revisionists support more faithfully the petty-bourgeois nationalists and bureaucracy. This is clearly seen in Ceylon, in Belgium, in Britain and in relation to the Sino-Soviet dispute. The SWP plays a similar role in relation to the Negro movement and its leadership in the USA. There is nothing spontaneous about the growth of a successful revolutionary movement to end the rule of the imperialists. The reconstruction of the Fourth International is a real task which must be consciously carried forward in every country.

In every country the sections of the Fourth International will be built by insisting above all on training a political leadership which starts not from tendencies within the bureaucracies but from the movement of the working class which brings it into conflict with the bureaucracy, learning in struggle the treacherous nature of the official leadership and of their theoretical apologists, the revisionists. The policy of the working-class United Front has nothing to do with the policy of capitulation before the apparatus. It is necessary because it opposes the working class as a whole to the capitalist class, to the capitalist state and to the capitalist government. Consequently it implies the exposure of the bureaucracies' politics of class-collaboration, either with a section of the capitalist class or with the bourgeoisie as a whole. The United Front rests upon the correct aspiration of the working class, including those workers who are members of reformist and Stalinist organisations, for unity in action against the united forces of the capitalists, an aspiration which necessarily conflicts with the politics of the bureaucracy. It is not excluded that the bureaucrats in the traditional leaderships may be forced to take steps along the road of the United Front under pressure from the working class and their own members. In such cases, we support and participate in all actions which can be organised in that direction.

In any event, the policy of United Front must be taken in the context of the construction of independent revolutionary parties. Not even the semblance of a United Front can arise from spontaneous developments. It demands political struggle by independent organisations carrying the Transitional Programme into practice. It must serve as the springboard for the development of these organisations. In sum, the policy of the United Front can only really exist through the building of the organisations of the Fourth International. At certain stages, entry into mass organisations will be the best way of effecting

this tactic, but in no case is such entry to be regarded as a permanent or semi-permanent feature. It is always a tactic, subordinated to the general strategy of the struggle for power, of which the construction of an independent revolutionary party is the general prerequisite.

The decomposition of Pabloism, with its politics emerging clearly as a necessary part of opportunism, is thus a consequence of the crisis of capitalism and its agencies, to which the Pabloites subordinated themselves through their abandonment of the Transitional Programme and of dialectical materialism.

4 It follows that the most serious theoretical preparation in struggle against revisionism is necessary for the rebuilding of the Fourth International. The deepening crisis of capitalist society and the connected crisis of the Stalinist bureaucracy are dissolving the old political relationships and creating favourable conditions for the construction of revolutionary parties. The changes in the internal relations of the international workers' movement at present taking place, and the need to exploit the linked crises of imperialism and the Stalinist bureaucracy, demand that our national tasks must be placed correctly in their international context as part of the construction of the Fourth International; only in this way will the international class struggle be resolved in favour of the working class. But these parties will nowhere develop spontaneously; they depend in every case on the intervention of Marxists who base their programme on the international perspective of Trotskyism. In particular, these national sections must grasp in theory and in practice the revolutionary role of working-class youth in the USA, Europe, Russia and Eastern Europe, and in all the colonial and semi-colonial countries. It is these proletarian youth who are now drawn into struggle against the capitalists and the bureaucracy. In the building of parties of the Fourth International, youth play a special role as one of the most exploited sections of the proletariat. But the construction of sections of the International requires the mobilisation behind the programme and organisation of the Fourth International of all the principal fighting forces of the proletariat. It is in this perspective, and not in isolation from it, or as substitute for it, that work among the youth takes on its real importance. The Negro struggle in the USA, intensified especially by the impact of automation under capitalism, the heroic struggle of workers and students in Spain, the political opposition to the bureaucracy in the workers' states, the fight against the Social Democrats and Stalinists in Britain, France and all Western

Europe, as the youth strive to join battle with capitalism, the workers' battles in Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Latin America and Africa, all of these bring a new generation of workers to the fore. As all the old working-class political tendencies swing sharply to the right, a heavy responsibility falls upon the International Committee and the sections grouped around it. They have the responsibility, beginning from scientific analysis, of providing the motive force for the rebuilding of the Fourth International on the foundations of this revolutionary potential. It is not a question of a 'youth movement' as such, but of a generation of the working class radicalised by new international revolutionary opportunities, resulting from the crisis of imperialism. The cadres of the Fourth International are on trial: in these struggles we must develop Marxism, defeat revisionism and demonstrate in practice in each national section the capacity for leadership of the Trotskyist parties as the only answer to the capitalist class and its bureaucratic servants.

In each country, therefore, the starting-point must be the construction of revolutionary Trotskyist parties based on a Marxist analysis of the present international class struggle. The national tasks of the sections can only be carried out as part of the construction of the Fourth International. In this way they will contribute to the enrichment of Marxist theory and the strength of the International.

(a) Imperialism is in a deepening crisis. The development of the productive forces during and since World War Two, particularly the production of nuclear weapons and the introduction of automation, strains to breaking point the conflict between the productive forces and capitalist property relations. The struggles produced by this contradiction radicalise the working-class youth. The parties of the Fourth International will be built through these struggles.

(b) The realisation by the imperialists of the

threat to their world position, and their determination to uphold their domination no matter what the cost in human life, have been shown time and time again. The latest moves by the US government in Vietnam and Latin America, with the full support of the British Labour Government, underline still more the danger which imperialism represents for mankind. In Vietnam the US imperialists are developing a new strategy for dealing with the colonial revolution and with the USSR and China. It is no longer a question of 'peaceful co-existence', but of a Pax Americana maintained with destructive weapons which can blast out every living creature from large areas. These are not nuclear weapons—which are now only in the background. They are weapons for use they are bound up with the military requirements of imperialism at the present stage, in which it can only maintain itself by violence and terror. 'War is the continuation of politics by other means'—the politics of imperialism have no appeal to the masses but have to be imposed, not on states so much as on peoples.

The US imperialists are not concerned about their unpopularity. They know that every bomb dropped in Vietnam makes it more difficult for the agents in the colonial countries to defend their policies, but they obviously do not care about this. They show contempt for the national bourgeoisie and intend to keep them in line by demonstrating that they possess overwhelming military force.

It is not a case in Vietnam of defending US investments, or even only of defending imperialism in South-East Asia. It is rather the need for a testing-ground and demonstration of US striking power to impress Africa and Latin America and the bureaucracies of Russia, Eastern Europe and China as well. The US is concerned principally with the strategy of counter-revolution adapted to the needs of the present stage. The Russian adherence to 'peaceful co-existence' has contributed to its success. The overthrow of imperialism cannot be the result of a number of struggles in the less developed countries: it is necessary to carry out the struggle internationally, with the task of building parties in the advanced countries and in the countries of planned economy as a prime necessity.

(c) Imperialism is not only an epoch of wars and revolutions. More concretely, its life has been preserved through these wars and revolutions because the working class has not resolved its crisis of leadership. Since 1953, the Stalinist bureaucracy, severely shaken by the working-class upsurge in its own camp, has entered into closer collaboration with imperialism. But this reflects above all the deepening of their own crisis. The construction of revolutionary parties of the Fourth International in Eastern Europe, Russia

and China, with the programme of political revolution as the basic requirement of the workers in these countries, is a primary task of the Fourth International. Whereas in the late 1930's defence of the Soviet Union implied primary emphasis on support for its military defence against imperialism, it is now necessary to stress the necessity of building revolutionary parties in these countries as the only answer to the capitulationist policies of the bureaucracy, which now directly endanger the basic conquests of October as well as holding back the struggle of the international working class, upon which the future of these conquests depends.

(d) Revisionism, which separates into distinct sectors the revolution in the advanced countries, the 'colonial revolution', and the political revolution in the workers' states, is a most important cover for capitalist domination of the workers' movement and for obstructing the construction of revolutionary parties. This revisionism is expressed particularly in the theory and practice of the self-styled Unified Secretariat of the Fourth International, which was formed without discussion of theoretical and political questions. The next phase in the building of the Fourth International must on the contrary be accompanied by a most serious theoretical discussion in all sections of the policies and theory of the movement, past and present.

Many workers all over the world, particularly the youth, are in battle against the bureaucratic leaderships who want to confine them to narrow and sectional struggles. The Fourth International and its sections must be able to lead these struggles, explaining the class role of the bureaucratic leaderships and bringing forward the essence of these struggles—the perspective of world socialist revolution.

The intervention in the class struggle is not separate from the theoretical discussion upon which we have insisted. There is no development of Marxist theory except insofar as revolutionary parties fight in practice to penetrate living reality with that theory, enriching it in the course of the struggle, to negate the revisionism which has destroyed the International originally founded by Trotsky. It is not enough to make formal theoretical corrections on the one hand and to carry out intensive activity in the class struggle on the other. Such a procedure might give the appearance of limited success, but only when Marxists see themselves and their consciousness as part of the living class struggle, developing with it and transforming its quantitative ebbs and flows into an enriched theory from which to develop the programme of the International, is the unity of theory and practice actually realised. Only in this way will the cadres of the sections of the International be trained. Their internationalism will be worthy of


the struggles of the international working class, because it develops as a living part, the conscious and most vital component, of these struggles. The International Committee declares that the Fourth International founded by Leon Trotsky no longer exists. The International Committee has been built in the course of the struggle against Pabloite revisionism, and as such is the continuator of the Fourth International, without any implication that the IC is thereby 'the new leadership of the Fourth International'. It is not a new international which must be built, but the Fourth International which must be rebuilt, for during the last 27 years its founding programme has expressed correctly the strategy of the international

socialist revolution. It has no less importance for the struggle for the proletarian revolution than had the Communist Manifesto for the Marxist method and the fundamental aims of communists. In its appeal for the reconstruction of the Fourth International, the IC must show clearly the indissoluble link between this reconstruction and the building of revolutionary parties in every country, as the path to the victory of the socialist revolution.

The International Committee sets itself the objective of holding a conference of its constituent sections with the aim of defining for the next period the tasks of rebuilding the Fourth International.

June, 1965.

THE AGE OF PERMANENT REVOLUTION



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Edited with an introduction by Isaac Deutscher (with the assistance of George Novak). Published by Dell Publishing Co. Inc. Distributed in Britain by New Park Publications Ltd. Price 9s. 6d.

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
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CUBA

Marxism and the Revolution

By John Castle

SINCE 1961 the recurrent theme of the Socialist Workers Party leadership has been that 'Cuba is the acid test'. They claim that the Socialist Labour League and its allies in the International Committee have failed that test miserably while the Pabloites have come through with flying colours. Like the Pablo group in the International Secretariat of the Fourth International, the SWP leaders characterised Cuba as a workers' state, and gave uncritical support to Castro. This, said the SWP, justified reunification of the Fourth International.

The latest contribution along this line is an article in the Winter 1965 *International Socialist Review* by Joseph Hansen, 'The Test of the Cuban Revolution'. Hansen concentrates his attack on an article by Ed Stilwell which appeared in the July 18, 1964 issue of the *Newsletter*, weekly organ of the Central Committee of the Socialist Labour League. The Stilwell article dealt at length with the whole development of the Cuban Revolution from its origins and the great dangers which currently face Cuba because the revolution continues to be led by the same petty-bourgeois stratum which initiated it; this has meant that the revolution has failed to go over, under working-class leadership, to the creation of a workers' state.

Castro and Conciliation

Hansen's first major point deals with the quotations in Stilwell's article from Richard Eder's interview with Castro, published in the *New York Times* of July 6, 1964. While the Eder interview dealt with a number of questions related to Cuban developments, Hansen concentrates on Eder's attributing to Castro a willingness to withhold aid to revolutionaries in Latin America if only the U.S. would stop its hostilities towards Cuba. It seems that Castro repudiated this section of the interview shortly after it appeared in the *New York Times*.

The importance of the Eder interview is that it expressed extremely clearly an aspect of Cuban policy which has been evident for a long time and which has repeatedly found expression in interviews with Castro and in other ways. Essentially this policy is

one of probing the possibility of coming to terms with American imperialism, even if it means a retreat on Cuba's part from its support to anti-imperialist struggles in other countries.

Let us see if this is really an aspect of the Cuban leadership's policy, or simply a figment of the imagination of a *New York Times* correspondent. In the first place the sequence of events surrounding the Eder interview is not without significance. At the time of the interview the U.S. was planning to intensify its blockade of Cuba and thus to isolate Cuba as effectively as possible from the rest of the hemisphere. Castro was seeking through this interview to hold open to the U.S. another course—that of coming to terms with Cuba. Immediately after the interview, the U.S. State Department reacted with the greatest haste to turn down Castro's overtures precisely because it recognised that they were real, and were not merely the product of the *New York Times* writing staff; and also because it was not yet ready, for reasons we will shortly outline, to handle the Cuban revolution as Castro suggested. After this rebuff, Castro *ten days later* claimed he did not make the reported offer to withdraw aid to revolutionaries. He did not, however, repudiate related statements about coming to terms with the U.S., which included offers to pay indemnifications for seizures of American property and to free most of the political prisoners held on the island.

More recently Castro had an extensive interview with C. L. Sulzberger, one of the key policy makers of the *New York Times*, and a person who plays no small role in the process of formulating the international line of American imperialism. During this interview Sulzberger referred to this Eder interview, which he felt expressed a much more conciliatory line towards the U.S. than the line Castro was putting forward in his current interview. Sulzberger reports, 'Castro admits the contrast, arguing "then there had been an improvement in relations between Washington and Moscow. We set forth a position against that background. The suggestions I then made still stand. We are prepared to analyze our problems with the USA as a step toward reducing tensions—but only within a world framework"'. This statement was printed in the November 4 *New York Times* and so far neither the *New York Times* nor Fidel Castro nor Hansen has printed a statement retracting it.

The logic of this position should be clear for all to see. The stand taken by Castro in his interview with Eder was partially changed only because the international climate was not conducive to the kind of deal Castro had in mind. It logically follows, and Castro says as much to Sulzberger, that should the international climate change, the deal will be brought forward once again.

Hansen, of course, makes much of the fact that the United States has not sought to come to terms with Cuba. He assumes that this is because Cuba is a workers' state, and that, therefore, the only recourse for Washington is to crush it quickly before it spreads into other areas at present under U.S. imperialist domination. There is no doubt that U.S. imperialism is determined to roll back the conquests of the Cuban revolution as soon as possible, because the social and political crises which are recurrent in Latin America, as well as in the USA itself, make the Cuban

revolution a highly dangerous ferment. Until a definite relation has been re-established between U.S. imperialism and the Cuban state the possibility is there that a new proletarian leadership will emerge in Cuba and take the revolution to the next, socialist, stage of development. An important factor in preventing this transition wherever this stage is reached in the national liberation struggle is the role of the Stalinist bureaucracy, including the Soviet state and its military resources. The U.S. imperialists recognise this full well, and they refuse to make any steps towards a reconciliation with Castro because they take this general relationship of forces into account, and it is this consideration to which Castro refers in the Eder interview: the U.S. imperialists view Cuba in the context of their relations with the Stalinists on an international scale. Lacking a leadership with a truly internationalist line,* Cuba is left in a position where the withdrawal of Soviet sugar purchases and other economic assistance would mean inevitable collapse. The Soviet Union offers this aid to Cuba precisely as a method of keeping up direct pressure on the U.S. on the latter's own doorstep and thus increasing Soviet bargaining power. The U.S. understands this and realises that 'handling' Cuba must be part of coming to terms with the USSR. Thus Stilwell's emphasis on this interview in July was fully justified, for it showed that the Cuban revolution faces great dangers from its present petty-bourgeois leadership once an international climate conducive to real horse-trading between the U.S. and the USSR is established.

This leads us to another of Hansen's major points. He claims that Stilwell is mistaken in seeing the possibility that Johnson, following the election, may seek to make some deals with the USSR at the expense of revolution everywhere and possibly Cuba

* Besides Castro's and Guevara's inclination to 'leave out' from their calls to revolutionary struggle those countries with governments not unfriendly to Cuba, it is important to note the recent visit of Guevara to Algiers early this year. Addressing the Economic Seminar on Afro-Asian Solidarity he called for the sending of 'messages of solidarity to the heroic peoples of Vietnam, of Laos, of so-called Portuguese Guinea, South Africa, Palestine (!), and all the exploited countries which are struggling for their emancipation. We must forward our friendly greetings to our brother peoples of Venezuela, Guatemala and Colombia, who today, arms in hand, are definitely saying no to the imperialist enemy.' Speaking predominantly to Arab nationalists, Guevara has not a word to say about the repressions of the bourgeois governments of any part of the Arab world, carefully selecting the people of Palestine for his message of solidarity! This is reminiscent of the fine anti-imperialist exposures of the Stalinists in 1939-40: these were all very good, but were exclusively concentrated on the evils of British and French imperialism, since German imperialism somehow took on rosier hues because of the Nazi-Soviet pact. The consequences of this variety of internationalism are well known!

in particular. Hansen ignores this possibility altogether and sees from American imperialism only the danger of frontal military attack.

Castro, however, does not share this view with Hansen. Sulzberger reports in the same November 4 article—and neither Hansen nor Castro contradicts—that Castro was rooting for Johnson to win the American elections. Castro tells Sulzberger: 'If Johnson reassumes the Presidency with greater authority than any recent U.S. President he will be enabled to pursue a policy of moderation. Your government would be in a position to face serious problems: the stupid Vietnam war which is obviously lost; a nuclear China; and Cuba. Only a government coming to power with great popular support, seeking peace, can solve these problems.' Again we express our concern for the way in which such 'problems' as Cuba may be 'solved'.

This perspective of some serious deals between the USSR and the U.S. is not a matter of speculation. Already Johnson has made clear through his State of the Union Address that special attention is to be paid to this in the coming year. An exchange visit with Brezhnev is already in preliminary planning stages and in one form or another at least preliminary talks between Johnson and Brezhnev will be held before this year is over. The policies of the Soviet leaders in this direction are well known.

A Distorted Analogy

The importance to us of any interest in reconciliation between Cuba and the U.S. is directly related to our basic class analysis of Cuba itself. It is precisely through understanding what Cuba is in class terms that we deepen our own understanding of the dangers facing Cuba and thus are better equipped to defend the Cuban Revolution against the imperialists. First of all, we must understand the essential nature of the Cuban economy as it has been historically determined, and the failure to date of the Cuban leadership to alter this. Cuba has to this day a subordinate colonial economy. That is, it produces a raw material, sugar, which it then sells to the industrialised countries to get its foreign exchange and thence its resources for economic development. In this respect, it is in much the same boat as Bolivia, which depends on tin production. Ghana with its cocoa. Brazil with its coffee, etc. Thus its very economic backwardness, reliance on one main crop, makes it subordinate to the monopolies and banks which dominate the world market.

Cuba's ability to develop its own economy and supply the wants of its people remains dependent on the world price of sugar. Even today, when it exports most of its sugar to the Soviet Bloc countries, the price these countries pay—with slight variations—is essentially related to the world price of sugar. If these countries pay over the world market price, then this is but another way of subsidising Cuba. Should these countries not wish to, or not be able to, continue subsidies, Cuba is then thrown back upon the vicissitudes of the international capitalist market. In this fundamental economic sense Cuba is extremely differ-

ent from the early Soviet Russia, or even China. In Russia, economic backwardness brought severe problems to the Soviet state, but for Cuba any kind of autarchic economic development is excluded.

In Eastern Europe voices have already been raised to question the continuation of any form of subsidisation of Cuba. A permanent official of Comecon, the organisation for economic co-operation between countries of the Soviet bloc, reported to a meeting of that body early in February 1965 that Cuba was becoming a heavy liability without bringing any return, economical or political. The following figures were given of Cuba's debts to member countries: Soviet Union 250m. dollars, East Germany 77m. dollars, Czechoslovakia 63m. dollars, Hungary 21m. dollars, Rumania 19m. dollars, Bulgaria 8m. dollars—a total debt of 443m. dollars. The official is reported to have commented: 'All Cuba has produced in the past few years is a bigger and bigger police force, and a bigger and bigger army.' When the question was first raised in Czechoslovakia some months earlier of the drain on Eastern European economies of aid to Cuba, the Communist Party's organ in Prague suggested that the dependence of the Cuban economy upon sugar necessitated a normalisation of Cuba's relations with the economy of the United States.

There is not the slightest doubt that this Cuban dependence on Soviet purchases of raw materials poses even before the Cuban leaders the dangers of 'peaceful co-existence' and the impossibility of a solution of the economic problems of backward countries within the rotten framework of 'Socialism in several countries'. 'Che' Guevara, in the speech we have already quoted, had this to say:

'How can it be considered of mutual benefit to sell at the world market price raw materials which have cost such sweat and suffering to the masses of the backward countries and to buy at the world market price, the machine products of the big automated plants of today? . . .

'It is the duty of socialist countries to end their tacit complicity with the exploiting countries of the West.*'

Proceeding from this relation of Cuba to the world economy, ignored by Hansen, Stilwell made an analogy between the Cuban economy, the great majority of which is nationalized, and the nationalized coal industry in England. To the extent that Cuba re-integrates into the world capitalist market, to that extent it plays the same role within the world capitalist structure as does the coal industry within the capitalist structure of England—the supplier of a cheap raw material needed by industry. Thus Cuba can be completely re-absorbed into the capitalist market without so much as the de-nationalization of a single industry.

* As we go to press, it is reported that Guevara has not made any public appearance since the Algerian visit during which he made these remarks, and that his work in the government has been taken over by another Minister.

There is no sense in pursuing Hansen's invitation to 'extend the analogy' by asking what would happen if a workers' revolution took over all of British industry. Would not the British economy, he asks, then stand in the same relation to world economy as does the nationalized coal industry to British capitalism, and would we, therefore, be unable to say that a workers' state existed in Britain? Here one might answer that the economic development of Britain would make easier an independent construction of socialism without awaiting the international completion of the revolution. (As Lenin said, 'In England the revolution will be harder to get, but easier to keep.') But, of course, even Britain's socialist development would not be assured and cannot be considered outside of the whole process of international Socialist revolution. The enormous relative weakness of the Cuban economy assures that a workers' dictatorship in Cuba would have a much more precarious existence in the interim between its own conquest of the national state and the completion of the world revolution.

But Hansen's case actually begs all these questions, since he asks us to assume a 'workers' revolution' in Britain, and what remains to be proved in Cuba is precisely that a workers' revolution has taken place! Having carefully avoided this question, Hansen easily asserts that for Stilwell the class character of states appears to be determined by their international trade relations. This is not the point. In Cuba, it would be possible for the imperialists to reintegrate production of sugar into the world market mechanism without a counter-revolutionary overturn, i.e., through the existing bureaucratic state, against the workers and peasants. Hansen and the 'Fidelistas' in the Unified Secretariat welcomed the recent sacking of Rodriguez, old-line Stalinist, from the central economic planning apparatus, as a sign of Castro's independence from Moscow, seeing this in line with his speeches to the effect that Cuba abhorred the Sino-Soviet split and would be 'a satellite of nobody'. Like Guevara's statements on world market prices, these represent an empirical response to the consequences of dependence on the Stalinist bureaucracy, but outside of a world proletarian revolutionary perspective, they in fact pave the way for a renewed approach to relations with U.S. imperialism as the only way out.

Is Cuba then just another 'bourgeois' colonial country, and is Castro identified with Nkrumah, Ben Bella and Nasser? The answer is yes and no. There is a very real identity between Cuba and such countries as Algeria and Egypt and between Castro and the leaderships of these countries. But there are also differences. In the Stilwell article and elsewhere both the identity and the differences have been made crystal clear. Cuba represents the most radical of a whole series of petty-bourgeois-led national rebellions in the underdeveloped countries. Underlying these rebellions are similar factors—basically the inability of the imperialists or the domestic capitalists to supply the capital for the necessary economic development in the country and the related inability of the capitalists to

destroy the primitive exploitative land relations which oppress the masses and hold back the internal development of these countries. Because of this situation in all these countries petty-bourgeois elements come to the fore, seeking somehow to overcome their economic stagnation through heavy reliance on state nationalization measures. Even the Syrian government recently has announced extensive nationalizations, while in the same breath attacking Nasser's nationalizations as 'state capitalist'.

Cuba essentially differs from these countries in only one respect—the degree to which she has replaced direct dependence on the capitalist world market with dependence on the Soviet bloc. We do not view this as a difference which alters the nature of the state. Equally important, we do not see that this Cuban 'solution' is really open to countries like Algeria and Egypt. It requires first of all the willingness of the Soviet bloc countries to foot the bill, at least in part, for the economic development in the country, whether through direct subsidisation or by paying a price higher than the world market price for the products of the country.

The Soviet bloc countries are increasingly confronted by their own economic problems. These in turn derive from the isolation of the workers' states from the advanced countries, centres of the most important productive forces. This isolation is perpetuated by the counter-revolutionary policies of the Stalinist bureaucracy. The bureaucracy is more interested in coming to terms with the imperialists for its own advantage than in subsidising even revolution of the Cuban type. There is every danger that Cuba's withdrawal from direct imperialist domination and her modest economic development plans will be scuttled as the price the USSR would be more than willing to pay for some more direct agreement with the imperialists. A constantly recurring trend among the revisionists is the insistence that the Soviet bureaucracy 'can no longer betray'.

As the Stilwell article pointed out, the Castro regime is more and more viewing itself as part of the 'non-aligned camp' rather than really as part of the Soviet camp. Recently when Sulzberger asked Castro why he didn't take the course of such 'non-aligned' countries as Egypt and Algeria, he responded: 'I respect anyone else's position and I feel that Nasser is an intelligent capable man. But it is not fair to say that he is non-aligned. He is aligned against imperialism and colonialism and in that sense we, too, are aligned. The so-called non-aligned countries have similar positions on a whole series of international problems.' (November 8, 1964, *New York Times*). But when asked about any plan of Cuba's to join with Comecon, the Soviet bloc countries' basic economic integrating body, he stated: 'The Comecon organisation corresponds to the needs of its participating members. Cuba's case is somewhat different. We try to co-operate with the countries in Comecon and to trade with them, but there is no formal link to the organisation.' We add once again that these statements have yet to be repudiated by Castro or Hansen.

Cuba and Revolution

It is not our contention that Castro is opposed to revolution. On the contrary it seems that he strives in his own way to develop and support revolution. But we must have an understanding of the *kind* of revolution he stands for and the *limits* he places upon his support. Castro is, in our opinion, a genuine advocate of petty-bourgeois-led peasant rebellion against the backward latifundist regimes in Latin America and elsewhere. He is thus an advocate of the *bourgeois* revolution which has been incomplete in so many of the underdeveloped countries of the world. It is his distinguishing thesis that the bourgeois revolution can be completed and economic development spurred ahead through an essentially peasant struggle which storms the cities from the outside.

Castro is not now, nor has he ever been, an advocate of *proletarian revolution*. It is not the proletariat his supporters seek to organise in Latin America. A recent example of the outlook of the Castro leadership on this question can be found in an interview with 'Che' Guevara printed in the January 12 issue of *Challenge*, the weekly organ of the pro-Maoist Progressive Labour Movement in the United States. Asked his assessment of the reasons for the failure of the FALN in Venezuela, he states: 'There is too much stress on fighting in the cities. You lose too many cadres and there is not enough gain.' Thus he felt that the struggles failed in Venezuela because the revolutionaries paid *too much* attention to the urban centres where the proletariat resides. Such is the real orientation of Castro and his movement.

Moreover, Castro does place certain limits on his support to even non-proletarian revolutions. It is those regimes with policies hostile to Cuba which Castro seeks to overturn through internal revolution. He is not interested in overthrowing the regime in countries like Mexico. This was pointed out in the Stilwell article, but Hansen has totally failed to come to grips with this, and gives us not a single example of where Castro has given assistance in the movement against bourgeois regimes in Latin America which are favourable to dealing with Cuba.

The Need for a Working-Class Party

Hansen is especially offended by the assertion that in order to establish a workers' state there must be formed a revolutionary party based on a Marxist theoretical understanding. This concept is dismissed as the result of an extreme 'ultra-left binge' on the part of the Socialist Labour League. No, Joseph Hansen is to big a man to waste his precious time on so mundane a task as creating a working-class party with a theoretical understanding. He will by-pass that task by grabbing hold of the ear of some petty-bourgeois leader in power somewhere who is being forced by 'objective circumstances' to create a workers' state.

So far, unfortunately, the efforts of Hansen and his friends have not been too encouraging. Despite the extensive mimeographed commentary which the United Secretariat pours out in English from Paris it has

experienced nothing but splits and defeats since Hansen arrived on the European continent. The problem seems to be that United Secretariat supporters have had such success at getting the ear of people in power that the latter have had little need for the United Secretariat itself or for the expert guidance of Hansen. N. M. Perera, leader of the Ceylon section affiliated to the United Secretariat, not only got the ear of Mrs. Bandaranaike, but got a cabinet post to boot—so out he went. Michel Pablo didn't do as well as his Ceylonese friend, but a government job in Algeria is better than nothing. Pablo is now under disciplinary suspension by the United Secretariat.

The disintegration of the international Pabloite movement is directly related to their totally false and revisionist theory of the Cuban Revolution. This theory, rather than helping to build the Pabloite forces, has demoralised them and led to their further shrinkage.

But how could it be otherwise? How can a Marxist revolutionary movement be built on the basis of a theory that the working class and its conscious leadership, the Marxist movement, are no longer needed in the process of creating workers' states? The logical end is voluntary liquidation.

Hansen's complete political bankruptcy is shown when he challenges us to state what we would do if revolutionaries with our political outlook were to become the leadership of the Cuban revolution: 'If Healy succeeds in overthrowing the Castro government, what economic and social programme will he put in effect?' And later: 'It would be well for him to inform the Cuban proletariat—and peasants, too—more specifically about how he proposes to accomplish what has already been accomplished before he sets out from the London docks in a British *Granma*.' The implications of these statements are enormous. If Hansen challenges Healy to make clear what he would do differently from Castro if he were in power in Cuba, it logically follows that if Hansen were in power he would do just as Castro has done. Let us look briefly at what Castro has done, and in this way we will perhaps get an insight into what Hansen advocates be done not only in Cuba but elsewhere.

A useful addition to our knowledge of current Cuban internal developments is the article by Adolfo Gilly, 'Inside the Cuban Revolution', published in the October 1964 issue of 'Monthly Review', a U.S. publication which is extremely pro-Castro. Gilly holds that Cuba is a workers' state. However, he at least takes a certain critical stance in relationship to the Cuban leadership, and thus is capable of painting a more accurate picture of Cuba than the panegyrics of a Hansen.

First let us look at the real relations of the working class to the trade unions and the state. Gilly comments:

'You have only to live for a time in Cuba, participate in the Revolution's activities, and be in daily contact with the Cuban people to learn of one leader who enjoys the unanimous opposition of the

Cuban workers; he is today as much a part of the Cuban leadership as Escalante was just the other day, and he is no other than the general secretary of the Central de Trabajadores de Cuba Revolucionaria (CTCR), Lazaro Pena.'

Gilly describes the role of unions in Cuba as follows:

'The unions, then, serve to transmit to the rank and file the leaders' point of view and to convince the workers that they should not raise such and such problems. A long stretch separates Lenin's concept in which the union acts in the name of the workers, and this later one in which union represents the administration to the workers.'

Exactly how this process works out in the daily lives of the working class is illustrated by Gilly:

'Last September, Lazaro Pena personally went to a general meeting of construction workers in the heavy equipment sector (tractors, derricks, pneumatic drills, bulldozers, etc.). He went to ask the meeting to approve the following: when equipment which a worker operates breaks down, the workers will agree to work at a lesser job and accept the wage for that category instead of the wage he had been receiving. This had already been proposed by Fidel Castro, but the workers were not in agreement: what with the deterioration of equipment and the lack of replacement parts, the breakdown of a machine could mean a considerable loss of income. The union leaders in this sector were not eager to face the rank and file directly with these demands. The secretary general of the CTCR therefore had to go himself, and a scandal broke out at the meeting. A worker told him that when he gave up his automobile and went to work with them, they would accept his proposition. Another reminded him of his old collaboration with Batista. Others accused him of enjoying privileges. The meeting was suspended in great confusion. The press denounced the incident, first as the work of "confusionists". In subsequent meetings, better prepared by the leaders but much less well attended by the workers, the proposition brought by Lazaro Pena was carried.'

Such is the actual relationship of the working class to the trade unions and the state. But Hansen can see no need to criticise, much less replace, the present leadership. We can only conclude that if Hansen were in charge of Cuba, he, too, would do as Castro and Pena do today in relation to the working class.

Now let us look at another aspect of life in Cuba. Gilly comments:

'The Cuban press is a national calamity. It is not just an information medium: it is a defensive wall against the pressure from below, a uniform medium which allows discussions of art criticism or films but never dissent or criticisms of proposals for change when it comes to a decision of the government.'

Directly related to this is the position of the POR, a small group of supporters of J. Posadas who split from the Pabloites a few years ago and who still

follow many of their centrist policies. The POR, for all of its confusion, still has made limited criticisms of the Castro regime. As a result five members of that group have been tried in secret and sentenced to prison terms of up to nine years. Their sole 'crime' was the distribution of their publication in mimeographed form. Earlier the state had stepped in to prevent them from printing the paper. Needless to say Hansen makes no mention of all this. We can only gather that should Hansen today be in the leadership of the Cuban government he, too, would suppress all discussion of political questions in the press and imprison independent working-class critics of his regime.

We have noted the role of trade unions in Cuba and the role of the press, and the suppression of working-class critics. Perhaps despite all this there is some other way the working class exerts its control over this supposed workers' state. This is how Gilly sums up the situation:

'The masses not only lack political institutions through which to express their opinions and decide on the proportions and the structure of the economic plan; they also have no means for correcting the plan while it is being applied, or for pointing out errors which have come to light, or disproportions in time.'

He notes that not even the limited councils that exist in Yugoslavia and in the countryside in Algeria exist in Cuba. We can only conclude that this is how Hansen, too, would have it were he the leadership of Cuba today.

We, however, do have an alternative policy to that of Castro and we will be more than happy to spell it out. First and foremost we propose to bring the *working class itself* to power in Cuba. No more rule from on top by bureaucrats. Direct rule by the working class itself over every aspect of life in Cuba! For this the existing bureaucratic state inherited from the Batista regime must be *smashed*.

Secondly, we would base the whole international line of the Cuban Revolution on the struggle for power of the *working class* everywhere in the world. We would not rely on such perfidious 'allies' as the so-called 'non-aligned' countries nor would we trust the Soviet bureaucrats who have demonstrated over and over again that they put the preservation of their own privileges through peace with the imperialists above the interests of the working class. We would view the Cuban Revolution as the advanced spearhead of revolution which must spread over Latin America and above all to the advanced capitalist countries if it is not to be destroyed. In other words, we would regard the work of revolutionaries in Cuba as a base for the spread of a world-wide working-class revolution, much as Lenin and Trotsky regarded the conquests of the Russian Revolution in the early days.

There is no solution purely *within Cuba* to the problems confronting the Cuban Revolution. Cuba's real problem is the existence of the United States and the other advanced capitalist countries. Capitalism

must be overthrown in these countries or there is no hope in the long run for the working class and peasantry in the colonial countries. It will only be successfully overthrown when the Fourth International of workers' revolutionary parties has been rebuilt. Hansen and his international collaborators, by working against this rebuilding of the International, in fact thus work against the fundamental interests of the Cuban Revolution.

Cuba and Marxist Method

The objective conquests of the Cuban Revolution are obvious: mass struggles to overthrow landlordism and imperialist domination were strong enough to change the government; the new government of revolutionary nationalist leaders, in order to retain any control over the movement, has had to go farther in smashing landlordism and expropriating businesses, domestic and foreign, than they would have done on the basis of their own programme. But the future of all such revolutionary struggles in backward countries can only be understood and fought for in the context of the theory of permanent revolution. The bourgeoisie in such countries cannot have an independent economic development. Everything depends on the working class leading the peasant masses, being able to establish its dictatorship, hold the power and use it, not only for the control of the economy and as the instrument for expropriation of the old rulers, but also as the base for a revolutionary International, since only the world socialist revolution can assure the future of a workers' regime in such a country.

In the USSR after 1917, the isolation of the workers' state eventually provided conditions where a bureaucratic caste took control of the party, the state machine and the Comintern. By the 1930s 'Socialism in One Country' had become the cloak for a degeneration of the workers' state and the definitive going over of Stalinism to counter-revolution. But the basic social conquests of October remained intact, and defence of the USSR against imperialism remained, and is still, a primary duty of all Marxists.

After the Second World War, the extension of this deformed type of workers' power into Eastern Europe and China, with the process controlled from above by Stalinist parties, even where this was accompanied by revolutionary civil wars (China, Yugoslavia, Vietnam), was interpreted by revisionists as indicating a qualitatively changed objective world situation. It was claimed, most explicitly by Michel Pablo, that Stalinism was now forced to renounce its counter-revolutionary character and lead the workers to power. It followed that the task of Trotskyists, of Marxists, was not to build independent leaderships against the bureaucracy, but to integrate themselves with the 'progressive left sections' of the bureaucracy who were affected by 'mass pressure' and 'irreversible' processes. By extension, the same attitude was extended to the Social-Democracy, and above all to the petty-bourgeois revolutionary nationalists in Algeria. Cuba and other colonial countries.

It is this approach which lies behind the differences

over Cuba. Hansen and his friends have rejected dialectical materialism, with its insistence on the role of revolutionary consciousness, and become advocates of objectivism and pragmatism. They are now making the mistake which the opponents of defence of the USSR, such as Burnham, made in the 1930s; although the form taken is apparently opposite. Trotsky drew attention to the wrong *method* of Burnham, Schachtman and the petty-bourgeois opposition in the Socialist Workers Party in 1939-40. They looked at the degenerated social and political forms in the USSR, and concluded that here was a new stage in socio-historical development—managerialism, bureaucratic collectivism, state capitalism, or what you will. Trotsky pointed out that they had dissolved the concrete into the abstract. The USSR was a *particular* sector at a particular stage in a world revolution in the epoch of imperialist decay. Its political and social deformations were not the expression of a new stage in mankind's development, but expressed the particular refraction of these laws in the special circumstances of a backward, isolated workers' state under particular international conditions (see Trotsky 'The Revolution Betrayed' and 'In Defence of Marxism').

When the modern Pabloite revisionists and Hansen look at the post-war events in Eastern Europe, China, and now at Cuba, Algeria, etc., they make the same mistake, even if this time it results in adaptation to the Soviet bureaucracy, rather than anti-Communism of Burnham's type. In any case, subservience to the bureaucracy is only another, more insidious, form of response to imperialist pressure; defence of the USSR means defence against the counter-revolutionary bureaucracy, and not only against direct imperialist attack.

When Burnham and his co-thinkers added together their impressions of the Soviet state and abstracted them from world conditions and from historical stages of development, they were able to present the image of a new social system, a new 'objective' reality. Many of the 'Trotskyists' who recognised the extension of the October conquests to Eastern Europe and China in the shape of deformed workers' states now made a similar error. The particular conditions under which this happened, the particular stage of development of world imperialism, of the Soviet system, of the relations between bureaucracy and imperialism, were abstracted from the products of the post-war struggles, and the absence of Marxist leadership in these conditions was raised to the level of a general historical law. Unable to oppose revolutionary consciousness and the dialectical analysis of contradictions to the apparently enormous strength of the Stalinist bureaucracy in 1945-53, the revisionists developed the theory that new inevitable and irreversible forces in the objective situation would force the bureaucrats to extend the proletarian revolution. The exceptional, one-sided product of the world revolution in special conditions was abstracted and raised to the level of a new universal stage of political development, to be applied in an unrelated and mechanical way to every situation.

This method of thinking cut very deep into the international Trotskyist movement, and made necessary a stubborn fight for dialectical materialism and for the construction of a real revolutionary International, a fight which came into the open in 1952-53, against Pablo's revisionism, and another stage of which is now in progress against the opportunist and anti-Marxist positions of Hansen and the SWP. This revisionist mode of thought gradually cast aside all dialectical conceptions of contradictory development and the class determination of political processes. History has become a broad sweep of favourable objective conditions, and these conditions imperiously choose their representatives—Khrushchev, Kosygin, Ferhat Abbas, Ben Bella, Castro, and others yet to be selected. The Fourth International is reduced to the role of commentator and adviser, better equipped than anyone else for this role by its knowledge of quotations from Trotsky.

When we differ with Hansen over the evolution of Cuban state, it is a question of all these differences in method, and not at all, as Hansen tries to make out, a question of the 'criteria' for appending the label 'workers' state'. When Hansen insists that we discuss Cuba in line with the previous Trotskyist discussions on the nature of workers' states (he refers to the 1939-40 discussion with Burnham-Schachtman and the 1949-52 discussion on Eastern Europe and China), he really takes us to the root of his own wrong method. He sees these discussions as efforts to establish fixed and formal definition-criteria (nationalization), these criteria then to be applied in any circumstances. Some in the Pabloite camp have taken this to its 'logical' conclusion; they consider not only Cuba and Algeria, but also Syria, Egypt, Burma and Zanzibar to be workers' states of a certain type, since large-scale nationalizations have taken place there. The relation of these nationalized industries to the world economy, the nature of the state apparatus, and the role of the working class, are completely ignored in this approach. 'Socialism', it appears, is asserting its historical destiny over the heads of and even against the working class! Hansen argued in one of the earlier discussions that 'consistent empiricism' was equivalent to dialectical materialism. We see that, on the contrary, it has led the revisionists to a repetition of the historical theories of absolute idealism!

In the documents published in the last issue of FOURTH INTERNATIONAL we have dealt thoroughly with the nature of the state in Cuba, pointing out that unless the bourgeois state is smashed, workers' power established, and a Cuban revolutionary leadership built as part of the Fourth International, spreading the revolutionary struggle to the rest of America, then counter-revolution will triumph in Cuba, through the mechanism of the state itself, and with the help of the Stalinist betrayals, no matter what Castro wills or Hansen advises.

Since these documents were written it has become even clearer that Russian support for sugar production, plus general guarantees of military and diplomatic support, are disastrously dangerous bases for the future

of the Cuban revolution. The weakness and vulnerability of the Cuban economy, together with the counter-revolutionary role of the Stalinist bureaucracy and its relations with U.S. imperialism, make the building of a working-class party in Cuba absolutely imperative.

Rejecting this task, Hansen and his associates are in fact expressing that confidence in the Soviet bureaucracy and in non-working-class forces which Pabloism has always displayed. Hansen chooses to resolutely ignore the centralised, bureaucratic character of the Cuban state and of the one 'political party', the official 'IRO', and to characterise Cuba as a workers' state. The duty of Trotskyists, and of all working-class internationalists, is to defend the Cuban Revolution against imperialism, and also to defend it against the treacherous diplomatic and military sell-outs of Stalinism. This defence cannot be carried out by subservience to Castro and the petty-bourgeois leaders of the July 26th movement. The SWP and the Pabloites, in giving uncritical support to Castro, even baptising his leadership as that of 'unconscious Marxism', have connived at the repression of Cuban Marxists and the suppression of trade union rights. Their 'objectivism' turns into open support for counter-revolutionary measures. Their reaction to the missiles crisis of 1962 was exactly similar. Instead of condemning the adventurist phase of Stalinist opportunism which led to such grave dangers, Cannon pronounced that Khrushchev's withdrawal of missiles was a great act for peace—'what else could he have done under the circumstances?' That is precisely the point! Our revisionists take 'the circumstances' as unalterable 'objective' facts, instead of as products of class struggle and political movements, of which the revolutionary party is part. Thus they are responsible to no one because their own pronouncements play no part in the struggle, only entering it *after* each stage as a commentary which then plays the role of justifying the class enemy's agents who dominate the working class. Thus Castro now says that 'everybody knows' he was against Khrushchev's withdrawal of missiles. But yet Cannon thought nothing else could be done—nevertheless Castro's pronouncements are welcomed as the last word in 'revolutionism' and independence from Stalinism! When Hansen chooses to discuss on the basis of Cuba as 'the acid test' he seems to think he is on the strongest possible ground. On the contrary, it is on this question that the politics of the SWP come out most clearly as incapable of any consistency, determined as they are, not by a firm grasp of the objective laws of economic and class development, but by the actions and speeches of bureaucratic and petty-bourgeois leaders.

We consider that these differences on Marxist method are the real points at issue in our dispute with Hansen, Germain, Pablo and the 'Unified Secretariat'. Differences over Cuba are only one manifestation of this fundamental difference. The political essence of the difference is the role of revolutionary consciousness: the revisionists abandon the construction of

the revolutionary party, and now turn their attacks bitterly against those in the International Committee who insist on building the Party against the opportunists. Hansen and his friends have invented all manner of non-Marxist formulations to justify this abandonment of the founding principles of the communist movement and of the Fourth International. Where Pablo talked about revolutionary leaderships with no determinate class basis ('Jacobin leaderships *sui generis*!') Hansen and the SWP invented independently the notion that revolutionary parties need not necessarily be built in order for a workers' revolution to take place; they could be constructed 'in the course of the revolution itself'. Of course, they unconditionally accept the leadership of Castro and do not advocate even now construction of a proletarian party of the Fourth International. Trotsky long ago said: 'The dictatorship of the proletariat imperiously demands a single and united proletarian party as the leader of the working masses and the poor peasantry. Such unity, unweakened by factional strife, is unconditionally necessary to the proletariat in the fulfilment of its historic mission. This can be realised only upon the basis of the teachings of Marx and Lenin, undiluted with personal interpretations and undistorted by revisionism' (*The Platform of the Left Opposition* (1927)). Hansen has never said just how, when and why this basic paragraph became outdated.

The Permanent Revolution 'Confirmed'

One of the ways in which the revisionists of the SWP have attempted to dress up the Cuban revolution's petty-bourgeois leaders in Marxist clothes is by talking about the 'confirmation' of the theory of Permanent Revolution in Cuba. The implication is that the existing state form and leadership of the Cuban revolution must receive the support of Trotskyists; and that anyone who refuses to see this is unable to recognise the reality through which the theory is confirmed, clinging instead to dogmatic versions of the theory, insisting on the construction of independent parties when the existing leaders are themselves carrying out the necessary historical tasks. This notion of the theory of permanent revolution being confirmed in the shape of the leadership given by the Castro government has the appearance of showing the ability of Hansen and his friends to take into account the actual development of events, rather than using theory to insist that the facts should be different. In reality, the exact opposite is the case.

We have already seen that the SWP and Pabloite revisionists make the basic revision of substituting 'objectivism' for the outlook of dialectical materialism. For us Marxists, theory develops through the struggle to change the world; in politics, this unity of theory and practice is embodied in the revolutionary party, its strategy and tactics, its struggle against hostile tendencies and theoretical revisions. As against this, the revisionists take theory to be an abstract commentary, which is checked against the 'facts', to be confirmed or cast aside; as in the case of all non-

Marxist philosophies, the 'facts' remain external and quite separate from the active intervention of the subject, the observer. This is what has happened to the theory of the permanent revolution in the outlook of Hansen. Properly understood, this theory is an instrument in the hands of the international workers' movement. Except on the basis of this theory, there can be no victory for the international revolution; the parties of the Fourth International which start from this theory have the responsibility to develop it in practice, according to the concrete conditions of the struggle in each country and at each particular stage of imperialist development.

The theory of permanent revolution indicates that the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution—break-up of the holdings of the old landlord class, national liberation and unification, laying down of the political and legal conditions for the development of capitalist private property and social relations—cannot in our epoch be carried out by the bourgeoisie or its petty-bourgeois political representatives. In the revolutionary struggle, resolute leadership for the peasant masses will be formed only in the party of the proletariat. But the proletariat will not remain at the level of solving the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution; it will go forward to assert its own specific class demands, and the bourgeois revolution will grow over into the socialist revolution through the dictatorship of the proletariat. Further, the backward countries to which this theory applies cannot complete any of these socialist tasks except in the framework of the international revolution of the working class; this constitutes the second aspect in which the revolution is 'permanent' or 'uninterrupted'. What has happened then in Cuba? The objective factors which motivate the theory of permanent revolution asserted themselves with great force. The ruling circles of the Cuban bourgeoisie were so tied to U.S. capital that they were unable to command any support whatsoever against the peasant war led by the Castro guerrillas. The latter force, starting from the traditional programme of the democratic revolution—land for the peasants, a democratic constitution, and national independence—conquered power. The defeat of the Batista regime and the expulsion of the U.S. imperialists from Cuba immediately posed the question of going beyond these tasks. The struggle against U.S. interests brought the Cuban leaders up sharply against the world counter-revolutionary strategy of U.S. imperialism. The U.S. leaders were determined to regain Cuba for the direct economic domination of imperialism but also as a guarantee of their own military security, fearing that Cuba might become a base for Soviet military and political pressure. This, together with the example of revolution shown to the rest of America, was a major threat to imperialist control of the whole hemisphere. This enormous pressure from imperialism forced very rapidly a split among the petty-bourgeois leaders of the Castro movement. The very exigencies of national defence against the military and economic sanctions of Wall Street necessitated a thoroughgoing purge of the

Right in the July 26th movement and in government personnel, and all foreign holdings were expropriated. In this the Castro leadership called for and received the support of the Cuban masses. Soon the Castro group turned to the Stalinists, with whom their relations until then had been very bad, in order to strengthen the administrative apparatus of state, and also as part of the turn to Soviet assistance necessitated by the American blockade. It should be pointed out, however, that the democratic aims of the bourgeois revolution were never carried through in any way in Cuba. This is impossible in modern conditions. There is a continuous struggle up to the workers' dictatorship.

Thus the pressure of imperialism has created a very dangerous situation for the Cuban revolution, posing very sharply all the tasks of the permanent revolution. The necessary next steps—establishment of workers' power, construction of a leading proletarian party in Cuba within a revolutionary international—require a leap in consciousness, an ability to take hold of the specific class relations in Cuba and in the world, starting from correct evaluations of the present crisis of imperialism and of the counter-revolutionary Stalinist bureaucracy. Without this leap in consciousness, expressed in the strategy and tactics of a Marxist party, the next steps in the revolution cannot be taken and the existing gains cannot be preserved. To consecrate the existing, transitory, dangerous stage, to justify the existing petty-bourgeois leadership, with the formulae, 'this confirms the theory of the permanent revolution', 'Castro is a natural Marxist', etc., is a capitulation, an abdication from revolutionary leadership. Such 'theorising' helps the enemies of the revolution by exposing it to the dangers of internal degeneration through class differentiation and bureaucratisation, as well as to isolation from the workers' movement throughout the world, including the USA. Only those who fight to construct the Fourth International, in Cuba as well as in every other country, are consciously defending the future of the Cuban revolution. Those who oppose this construction, and for this purpose hide behind the formula, 'Cuba is a workers' state, and this shall be the dividing line', are precisely those who threaten the future of the revolution by holding back the most crucial factor of all (as the theory of permanent revolution makes clear)—the conscious intervention of the revolutionary party. Every development of objective reality poses new and specific tasks to the revolutionary party of Marxism; theory is a guide to action in fighting for the interests of the working class at every stage. In Cuba, those 'Marxists' who subordinate the working class to the existing petty-bourgeois and bureaucratic leadership—a leadership and a state apparatus which stand between the working class and its victory—are using 'Trotskyist' formulae for the purpose of liquidating the independent class interests of the proletariat, and behave in practice only as the left wing of the petty-bourgeois revolutionists. We thus have in the SWP attitude to Castro only one variety of the Pabloite adaptation to the bureaucratic and

petty-bourgeois servants of imperialism in all sectors of the international class struggle.

A Marxist analysis of revisionist theories must consider not only their relation to the history of Marxist theory, but also demonstrate the class interests which are served by the revisions. In general, it is clear that a revision of Marxism which destroys the concept of a necessary revolutionary party in every country serves the most decisive needs of modern imperialism: the crisis of working-class leadership continues unresolved, and so the main prop of imperialism remains in existence. But it is necessary to be more specific, with reference to the theory of Permanent Revolution and the role of national-liberation movements in the international proletarian revolution.

In writing about the 'centrist' socialists of the period of the First World War, Lenin differentiated them from the outright opportunist leaders of the Second International. The latter he considered to have passed to the side of capitalist counter-revolution; the centrists remained in the middle of the road, immobilised and paralysed by their rigid adherence to legal forms of work, organisational fetishism and doctrinal dogma. The theoretical ossification of almost the entire Trotskyist movement since 1940, the restriction of the activity of most of its sections to narrow propaganda circles unable to establish an independent programme and leadership in the working-class movement, long ago prepared the way for 'Trotskyism' of the variety peddled by Hansen and the Pabloite Secretariat becoming a 'theoretical' service to the agents of imperialism.

The reality behind the theory that petty-bourgeois nationalist leaders can lead the proletarian revolution in the backward countries is a reality of dictatorship established *against* the proletariat of these countries, a reality where these bourgeois nationalist governments retain their relations with imperialism. In these countries, the language of 'Socialism' is used to conceal the only possible capitalist path of development—state control of large sectors of the economy, state management of loans from international finance capital, either from private sources or from international monetary organisations, and state control of trade unions and political life through the monopoly of a single political party. Fine words about 'non-capitalist' paths of development which make 'unnecessary' the existence of democratic liberties, about 'workers' management' which make necessary the 'integration' of trade unions with the state, about the 'socialist' and 'revolutionary' character of heads of government, making it necessary to imprison independent working-class oppositionists—all these are rationalisations of the imposition of *bourgeois* rule over the working class and the peasantry.

Stalinism has developed its own blundering, empiricist, 'theoretical' adaptation to this state of affairs, hailing the existence of a whole number of 'independent' powers standing on the side of 'peace and progress' and skipping over the orthodox stages of capitalist development. 'African' paths to Socialism,

'Arab' socialism, 'Islamic' socialism, all of them disguises for consolidating the power of the national bourgeoisie and disciplining the working class, are hailed by the Stalinist bureaucracy as forces helping in the struggle against imperialism. The 1960 Moscow Declaration of the 81 Communist Parties, in which the Chinese were included, christened these countries as 'independent states of national democracy'. There is supposed to be a pattern of 'neutrality', 'non-alignment' and 'non-capitalist' paths of development. In a whole number of cases (India, Egypt, Syria, Iraq) the Soviet bureaucracy's concern to keep these elements 'non-aligned' has involved effective collaboration with the national bourgeois governments to the point of police repression, and in the case of Iraq the eventual consequence was physical liquidation of a whole Stalinist cadre.

It is not difficult to understand the logical connection between Soviet attitudes on these questions and the whole strategy of the bureaucracy as it seeks 'peaceful co-existence' and 'peaceful competition between the two systems'. The more sophisticated 'theorists' in the Soviet Union have arrived at formulations remarkably akin to those of the Pabloites, in that their firm purpose is to wipe out the factor of conscious revolutionary leadership. The method too is the same: the world struggle for socialism is seen as an addition of various national parts, each to be separately developed and then compared, rather than seeing the world revolution as an organic whole. Thus G. Mirski, a Soviet 'expert' on the United Arab Republic, writing in *New Times* (No. 18, 1964), concluded:

'the socialist world system is performing the the function of proletarian vanguard in relation to the imperialist-oppressed nations'.

The Soviet journal *Mirovaia Ekonomika* called a conference in the Spring of 1964, and reported that a number of participants saw the possibility of 'petty-bourgeois and even bourgeois leaders of the national liberation movement going over to the positions of the working class'. A certain R. Avakov spoke of 'a definite transition from the ideology of nationalism to the ideology of socialism of the national type'. When Khrushchev visited the United Arab Republic in May 1964 he said in one speech: 'We have welcomed with satisfaction your decision to develop . . . through a socialist reconstruction of society'. This sort of thing has predominated in the USSR, even while some Arab Communists have expressed doubts about the consequences of characterising Nasser's path as a 'socialist' one.*

It must be said that the 'Trotskyists' of the Pablo and Hansen school are nothing but more sophisticated apologists of this temporary stabilisation of capitalist rule in the backward countries. Their knowledge of the texts written about the theory of the Permanent Revolution enables them to perform this task with

* See quotations in 'Moscow and the "Third World"' by Uri Ra'anani, *Problems of Communism* Jan./Feb. 1965, from which the above citations are taken.

more agility than the rigid scribes of Stalinism, but it does not make them any the less guilty. This whole atmosphere of degeneration of theory provokes one explosion and split after another, as various groups take the 'theory' to its logical conclusion and adapt themselves completely to the national bourgeoisie in their own sphere of activity. Ceylon was the most disastrous example. The LSSP led by Perera marched into a bourgeois coalition with Mrs. Bandaranaike, providing an indispensable service to imperialism. Mrs. Bandaranaike had explicitly stated her desire to recruit a 'socialist' party to her government in order to discipline the working class. Eventually, in classic style, the coalition fell to a more right-wing combination. In the course of their stay in the government, the LSSP traitors distinguished themselves by attacking strikers and by supporting legislation to suppress freedom of the press, as well as collaborating in reactionary attacks on national minorities. Far from 'the theory of permanent revolution being confirmed', these 'Trotskyists' worked hard to *disprove* it by collaborating in the bourgeoisie's attempt to *prevent* even the democratic revolution advancing, let alone fighting for workers' power!

Pablo, after faithfully serving Ben Bella during the establishment of one-party bourgeois rule in Algeria, has recently turned his attention to Ceylon, and found even in Mrs. Bandaranaike a future leader of the socialist revolution! Reporting a recent rally in Colombo, his journal writes:

'Bandaranaike spoke to the masses at that demonstration in a way that was particularly significant of her leftwards political evolution, and was answered by the frantic applause of the demonstrators who ended by singing the Internationale.'

The article goes on:

'To continue in these circumstances to speak of the Coalition as a reactionary bourgeois alliance and of the government as a simple bourgeois or petty-bourgeois reactionary one, would of course be an unpardonably gross error.'

Pablo only takes to the logical extreme the position of Hansen and the SWP leaders. Their 'Unified Secretariat of the Fourth International' will continue to splinter so long as Trotskyist theory is used as a rationalisation for the leadership of petty-bourgeois reformists or nationalists. Only a movement developing Marxist theory as the instrument of the working class will find a soil for growth in the international class struggle today.

In April 1917, Lenin had to wage a bitter struggle against almost the entire leadership of the Bolshevik Party. These leaders adapted to the forms taken by the bourgeois revolution in the first weeks after the March uprising. They looked at the Provisional Government, with its ministers nominated by the parties of the Soviets, they accepted the future promise of a representative assembly, and they saw

the possibility of the government's taking steps towards ending the war. To justify conditional support for this government, they argued that the traditional Bolshevik programme of 'a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry' had now become a slogan with living actuality. Lenin waged a bitter struggle against this use of 'theory', so reminiscent of the theoretical pretensions of Hansen on the permanent revolution. He pointed out that as the class forces lined up in the actual struggles of 1917 there was revealed the *contradictory* nature of the class forces entering into the 'democratic dictatorship'. What actually occurred was a situation of 'dual power' in which the tendency of the peasantry was to hand over the political power to the bourgeoisie. Lenin proposed on the contrary the slogan of 'All power to the Soviets' with a struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat. 'He who *now* speaks of "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" only is behind the times, is therefore in practice on the side of the petty-bourgeoisie and against the proletarian class struggle; such a one should be placed in the archive of "Bolshevik" pre-revolutionary antiques (it may be called the archive of "old Bolsheviks").'

Lenin was able to correct the course of the Bolsheviks and prepare for the October insurrection, though not without further severe struggles and dangerous waverings in the Party leadership. In modern revisionism of the SWP variety we are not confronted with a temporary lapse which can be corrected in a short struggle within the same movement. History has already consigned to the museum of 'old Trotskyists' this international tendency which long since went over in practice to the side of the petty-bourgeoisie and thence to direct service for the imperialists (Ceylon), by abandoning the prime task of our time, the construction of independent revolutionary parties to lead the working class to its own power. Yes, the permanent revolution is being confirmed in Cuba, but in what direction this 'confirmation' takes the working class depends above all on conscious intervention and the *development* of Marxist theory through the revolutionary party. It is suitable to end with two quotations from Trotsky's *The Permanent Revolution*, with which we think Hansen was once acquainted:

'... to lead the masses of the people to victory over the bloc of the imperialists, the feudalists and the national bourgeoisie—this can be done only under the revolutionary hegemony of the proletariat, which transforms itself after the seizure of power into the dictatorship of the proletariat.'


and further:

'No matter what the first episodic stages of the revolution may be in the individual countries, the realisation of the revolutionary alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry is conceivable only under the political leadership of the proletarian vanguard, organised in the Communist Party.'

The struggle for Marxism in the United States

III. American Trotskyism with Trotsky

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Illustration overleaf: Detail from a mural by Diego Rivera. Trotsky supported by Marx and Engels points the way for the adherents of the Fourth International. Seated, second from left is Cannon. To the right of Trotsky is Dunne and between the lens and the banner is Shachtman.

A. THE DIVISION OF LABOUR EMERGES

THE FIRST FIVE YEARS of the American Trotskyist movement was a very difficult period, especially for the kind of people who made up the leadership and leading cadre of the movement. Cannon was a trained mass worker who was also very adept at organisational building work. Many of Cannon's followers and collaborators were like him in training. But the first period of the movement was not a period where much mass work could be done and it was not even a period where much of an organisation could be built. It was a period which required intensive study of theory and a *propagandistic* struggle for programme in and around the Communist Party.

Cannon's two major collaborators, Max Shachtman and Martin Abern, were a little better equipped for this kind of work. Shachtman's abilities lay in the literary field. He could do a presentable job of putting forth even complex theoretical and political questions in a journalistic fashion—a very useful thing in a propagandistic period. Abern was an administrator like Cannon, but lacking Cannon's background in mass work. He was always a small-time administrator, particularly adept at working in the small circle-type existence forced upon the early movement.

While Shachtman and Abern, both quite young men at the time, fared quite well under these adverse circumstances, it was all very demoralising for Cannon. He was very much like a fish out of water, and this feeling comes through very clearly in his *History of American Trotskyism*.¹ What a tremendous relief it must have been for him when a new kind of activity began to open up for the movement in 1933! In 1929 and 1930, however, Cannon played less and less of a role in the movement. In fact he simply disappeared from the organisation for close to a year during this time. Shachtman and Abern began to fashion their own regime without Cannon.

But Cannon soon revived in spirits and came back into the organisation actively. This led to a big factional battle between Cannon, supported by the Minneapolis comrades and others, against Shachtman and Abern, who were not inclined to hand the regime back to Cannon voluntarily. It was necessary for Trotsky to intervene in this early dispute—which lacked completely any political or theoretical basis—in order to achieve a new working relationship between Cannon,

Shachtman and Abern. Shachtman and Cannon in particular were able to arrive at a working relationship which was to dominate the central leadership of the party until 1939 and which contributed a good deal to the stability and growth of the party. Abern on the other hand soon retreated into his oppositional clique politics, forming unprincipled blocs with every major opposition group for the next eight years or so.

Trotsky's role in this early but important factional struggle is of some interest. He adamantly refused to support any organisational struggle against Cannon based simply upon complaints about his 'regime'. Shachtman himself testifies to this lack of support.² This is not to say that Trotsky was uncritical of Cannon in those days nor that his goal was to defend Cannon against every adversary. Rather he sought to bring about as much as possible a collective leadership fusing the various forces which made up the early American Trotskyist movement.

In particular Trotsky was critical of Cannon's tendency to utilise organisational methods in dealing with political problems. Trotsky felt Cannon tended to respond too quickly in a factional way to oppositional formations rather than in a patient political way, seeking to educate the cadres. In a letter to Farrell Dobbs in 1940 he refers back to this old difference with Cannon and others in the movement: '... our own sections inherited some Comintern venom in the sense that many comrades are inclined to the abuse of such measures as expulsion, splits or threat of expulsions and splits. In the case of Molinier and in the case of some American comrades (Field, Weisbord and some others) I was for a more patient attitude.'³

Trotsky was also well aware of Cannon's weaknesses in the field of theoretical development. Shachtman reports in the following manner on Trotsky's assessment of Cannon in this regard:

'As he indicated to some of the critics, it was necessary to understand that Cannon was a product of the American labour and revolutionary movements as they have developed in their own social and historical environment; that if he had some of the shortcomings of these movements he also

1. Cannon, James P. *The History of American Trotskyism* (Pioneer Publishers, New York, 1944).

2. Shachtman, Max. 'Twenty-Five Years of American Trotskyism' *The New International* (Vol. XX, No. 1, January-February 1954), p. 22.

3. Trotsky, Leon. *In Defence of Marxism* (Pioneer Publishers, New York, 1942), p. 97.

had their virtues; and that he would be superseded by a superior leadership not as a result of a factional fight in which opponents would win a numerical majority, but only when the class struggle in the United States would lift the proletariat to a higher level and lift out of itself leaders who in turn stood on a higher level. These views, carefully reflected in some of his writings on the factional struggles in the American movement, were rather objective but somewhat philosophical.⁴

Shachtman is, of course, anything but an unbiased observer as far as Cannon is concerned. That Trotsky took a critical approach toward Cannon in this period, especially on his organisational operations, is generally known throughout the SWP today and no one denies this. Furthermore, as we shall see, this assessment of Cannon in the early period is completely consistent with the kind of approach Trotsky was to take towards Cannon in later years. Above all it was a *correct* assessment of Cannon and not at all the kind of approach Shachtman was to take towards Cannon at a later period.

By 1932 a clear national and international division of labour had been worked out by the American Trotskyists. This division of labour was to have a deep impact on the whole future evolution of the movement and shows very clearly the approach of the American Trotskyists to theory and method. First and foremost was the division of labour between the American party and Trotsky. *Trotsky supplied the basic theoretical and strategic outlook for the organisation.* It was Trotsky who assessed the developments within the USSR and within the Communist International. It was Trotsky who analysed the German events and other important international developments in the period. It was Trotsky who initiated the turn away from the Communist International and towards the formation of a Fourth International in 1933. But, even more striking, it was Trotsky who initiated the major tactical turns *within* the United States—such as a merger with the American Workers Party and the entry into the Socialist Party.

The 1928-1933 period was a period where political and theoretical training was most important. No matter how hard the comrades may have tried to break out of isolation they could not have succeeded. But they could and should have developed themselves theoretically so as to prepare for future openings. In a sense they did do this. That is, they went to school with Trotsky and learned from Trotsky many things that were

useful to them in the next period. In this sense this international division of labour was extremely useful to the American Trotskyists. They learned from Trotsky much as the early American Communists had learned from the Comintern and the Russians.

But the relationship never went beyond a *teacher-pupil* form. While the American Trotskyists learned from Trotsky they did not participate in the international theoretical development of the Trotskyist movement as *contributors* in their own right. But without this kind of relationship there is a very severe limit upon how much one can learn. This is because the inability to contribute to the teaching process itself is a sign that one has not really absorbed the *method* of Marxism itself—one has not internalised this method.

Within the American organisation there was another division of labour paralleling in miniature the international division of labour. Cannon himself describes it this way:

'Shachtman and Burnham were by no means mere ornaments in the Political Committee. They were the editors of the magazine and of the paper, and they did practically all of the literary work. There was a division of labour between them and me, whereby I took care of the organizational and trade union direction, administration and finances—and all the rest of the chores that intellectuals don't like to bother with as a rule—and they did the writing, most of it. And when they were on the right line they wrote very well, as you know.'⁵

Cannon contributed nothing to the development of theory in this whole long period of essentially theoretical and propagandistic work, and in fact he contributed very little to putting theory forward in a propagandistic way. Just as in the Communist Party he left theory to others. In the late 20s it was Bittleman who wrote the basic political programmatic statements of the opposition bloc; in the early thirties it was Shachtman and those close to him who wrote them for the American Trotskyists.

As far as writing was concerned Cannon viewed himself as an 'agitator'. In the field of popularising socialist ideas in a way that they are readily understandable to workers Cannon had no equal. His book *Notebook of an Agitator*⁶ is a testimony to this ability and deserves to be studied as a guide in this kind of writing, always needed in a move-

5. Cannon, James P. 'Factional Struggle and Party Leadership' *Fourth International* (November-December 1953), p. 116.

6. Cannon, James P. *Notebook of an Agitator* (Pioneer Publishers, New York, 1958).

4 Shachtman, Max. *op. cit.*, p. 22.

ment which really seeks to reach workers. But there is almost nothing in this book, which covers the whole span of Cannon's career from the CP until recent times, of a deeper, even propagandistic nature. Also absent from the book are *any* writings at all for this 1928-1933 period. This was not a period conducive to agitational writing and activity and therefore Cannon had little or nothing to say.

But Shachtman and other intellectuals in the party did not develop beyond Cannon theoretically. While they utilised their literary gifts to popularise Trotsky's ideas in the United States, they too, simply took their ideas from Trotsky. They were never able to go beyond this task and eventually abandoned Marxism. Furthermore, they lacked Cannon's deep working-class orientation and perspective, based on his many years of experience and struggle in the American working class.

It was this strength of Cannon's which lay behind his actual break from Stalinism and the very birth of the Trotskyist movement in the United States. It was because of this strength that the working-class cadres of the movement always supported him. The history of the American Trotskyist movement was to be a test of whether this conviction in the revolutionary potentialities of the American working class by

itself was enough.

The early American Trotskyist movement was thus a *composite* of Trotsky, the creator of its theoretical and political outlook; Cannon, the continuator of American revolutionary traditions and the administrator; and Shachtman, the skilled propagandist of Trotsky's ideas. It was not simply Cannon's party—it was also Trotsky's party and to some extent Shachtman's party. Most important of all there was no real *fusion* of these separate forces. Trotsky did his best to bring about such a fusion. He collaborated extensively with all the leaders of the party and learned much from them about American conditions. He intervened to bring about a collaboration between the two sections of the organisation represented by Cannon and Shachtman. But Cannon was content to take his basic political line as something given to him from abroad, and devoted his energies to building an organisation around that political line. Shachtman translated Trotsky from the Russian and propagated his ideas. Within the party Cannon left literary tasks to Shachtman, and Shachtman was content with this, involving himself little in the work of the party in the class and learning little from this work. Collaboration is one thing and fusion is another. The early American party was essentially *a series of blocs internally and externally*.

B. THE GREAT OPPORTUNITY—1933-1938

While the first five years of the Trotskyist movement were extremely difficult ones, with severe limits set by the objective situation, the next seven years were to be marked by continual and growing opportunities for the growth and development of the movement. Thus the objective conditions for the solution of the very deep problems of the movement were certainly present. It is one thing to struggle for Marxist clarity under conditions of deep isolation from the masses and quite another to struggle for Marxist clarity under conditions of serious involvement in the mass movement.

The openings for the organisation began with the debacle of the Comintern's policies in Germany in 1933 and with the rise of Hitler to power. Soon after this negative vindication of Trotsky's line came a number of openings to our comrades in the mass movement. Combined with the growing involvement of the party in the mass movement were the serious leftward-moving trends in centrist circles in the United States. Thus the

party had the opportunity to simultaneously deepen its work in the class and win over already radicalised forces. The winning over of these radical forces would both strengthen its trade union work and add new intellectual forces to the party.

The most important development of all in the class struggle was the leadership given by Trotskyists to the great Minneapolis teamsters' strike in 1934. This important class action played an important role in preparing the American working class for its next great step—the organisation of the industrial working class in the United States in the CIO. Just as importantly, it showed in the concrete the kind of leadership revolutionaries could give to the class struggle and raised the prestige of the Trotskyist movement in the eyes of the American workers and radicals. The ability of the American organisation to carry out this great action can be attributed to its heritage of American radicalism *and* what it learned from Trotsky in the preceding five years. It was a

tribute to all that was healthy in American Trotskyism and in the Cannon section of the party in particular.

The fusion with the Muste-ites (the American Workers Party) was of no less importance in the development of the organisation. The Muste-ites had led that other great class action in the period just prior to the birth of the CIO—the Toledo Autolite strike. This fusion brought additional working-class cadres into the organisation. It also brought intellectuals into the party, not the least talented being James Burnham. Thus in the case of the Muste-ite fusion a political move towards another radical organisation strengthened rather than detracted from the work of the party in the mass movement. In this case 'regroupment' was not a substitute for mass work but rather a way to deepen it.

At the same time the work of the party among the youth was also developing. The youth organisation, called the Spartacist Youth League, had begun on a modest scale in 1932 and by 1934 was showing real signs of growth. In the beginning its orientation was almost totally towards the members of the Young Communist League. By 1934 it was devoting more attention to student work and to centrist and social-democratic youth.

Flushed with the success of the merger with the Muste-ites, and urged on by Trotsky, the American Trotskyists prepared their entry into the Socialist Party. However, in certain important respects the SP entry was carried out in a more confused way than the Muste-ite merger. In the first place little time had elapsed in order to assimilate the forces which had just entered the organisation through the Muste-ite fusion. Thus a section of these forces joined with Oehler in opposing the entry and finally broke with the movement over this question. Others who stayed with the organisation undoubtedly had a rather vague concept of exactly what revolutionary politics were.

There is no doubt that this struggle against the Oehlerites assisted the development of the cadres, however, both those coming from the Trotskyist and those from the Muste-ite organisation. Essentially the Oehlerite struggle was a rebellion of the *propaganda circle* 'revolutionaries' against the whole new dynamic politics of the Trotskyist movement. While it reflected itself in a sectarian opposition to entry it was in reality a fight against the turn of the Trotskyists towards real political intervention and growth in the class itself. But it was not a clean sweep—many 'propagandists' remained in the party. Most

notable were the Abernites, who first supported Oehler and then backed away as the split was carried through. But there were many others and there can be no doubt of the rather diffuse and immature nature of the Trotskyist forces at the time of the SP entry.

In the second place, while the Muste-ite unity took place almost simultaneously with important work in the class and greatly strengthened that work, the SP entry became such a dominant aspect of the organisation's work that the most important development in the American working class was virtually ignored by the American party. This is how Cannon himself later assessed it: 'Except in a few localities, we let the great movement of the CIO pass over our heads.'⁷ This was no minor error, for the CIO was the most fundamental step taken by the American working class in its modern history. It is true that the Trotskyist movement was later to develop considerable influence inside CIO unions. True, many workers were recruited out of the SP, which facilitated this. But there is still no getting around the fact that failure to be in on the ground floor of the creation of the CIO seriously hindered our work for many, many years to come and greatly facilitated the Stalinists' gaining their stranglehold over such a large part of the CIO. The CIO, this not unimportant aspect of the *American* question, was simply not fully understood by the American Trotskyists at the time.

In the third place, the entry was carried on in a manner which greatly facilitated adaptation to centrist currents within the SP. So much emphasis was put on reaching centrists within the SP that during the initial period of entry no factional organisation of Trotskyists was maintained at all. After a while many comrades began to settle down to a more or less permanent existence as an oppositional current within the SP. Trotsky documents this in his important article 'From a Scratch to the Danger of Gangrene' in *In Defence of Marxism*. On May 25, 1937, he wrote: 'I must cite two recent documents: (a) the private letter of "Max" about the convention, and (b) Shachtman's article, "Towards a Revolutionary Socialist Party"'. The title of this article alone characterises a false perspective. It seems to me established by the developments, including the last convention, that the party is evolving, not into a "revolutionary" party, but into a kind of ILP, that is, a miserable centrist political abortion

⁷. Cannon, James P. *The Struggle For a Proletarian Party* (Pioneer Publishers, New York, 1943), p. 59.

without any perspective.⁸

While this attack is directed specifically against Shachtman, there is no evidence that Cannon objected to Shachtman's political position at the time. Cannon himself admits this in his *History* when he states: 'There is no doubt at all that the leaders of our movement adapted themselves a little too much to the centrist officialdom of the Socialist Party.'⁹ In fact there is every indication that it was Trotsky's initiative which hardened up the faction inside the SP to the point where it was able to resist disintegration and to split from the SP in one piece. Cannon reports that Trotsky rejected their suggestions that they bow before the right wing to gain time so as not to jeopardise the Dewey Commission work. He goes on to state: 'Trotsky encouraged us and even incited us to go forward to meet their challenge and not permit them to push us any further for fear it might lead to disintegration of our own ranks, demoralisation of the people whom we had led that far along the road.'¹⁰ Without this kind of intervention by Trotsky it is doubtful just how much of the American Trotskyist forces would have survived this entry tactic. The need for such intervention was a sign that the *development* of the American Trotskyist movement was far, far from complete in this period, that a tremendous educational task lay ahead of it.

The American Trotskyist movement, when it emerged from the SP as the Socialist Workers Party, was in appearance a very impressive organisation. It had gained a sizeable trade union cadre and had important fractions in major unions. It had a number of qualified intellectuals and a very large intellectual periphery, particularly around the publication *Partisan Review*. It had a sizeable youth organisation, in fact the majority of the former Socialist Party youth. It had all the human elements needed for the creation of a real Marxist movement in the United States for the first time in history.

Yet in less than two years from its emergence from the Socialist Party it was to enter into a deep crisis, a crisis which almost destroyed the organisation. While there is no doubt that the objective situation contributed to this crisis it is completely wrong to blame the objective situation for the depth of the crisis. The Socialist Workers Party of 1938 could not have been all it seemed.

In actual fact there had been little qualitative development in the period since 1933. Each

component of the party had expanded *quantitatively*, but no component had developed qualitatively, and they still bore the same relationship to each other and to Trotsky. Cannon was joined by hundreds of working-class cadres, and his faith in the potential of the American workers was reinforced by constant day-to-day contact with the class. Shachtman was joined by intellectuals of the calibre of Burnham, people like Dwight McDonald, and many, many lesser-known younger intellectuals. The youth organisation had expanded tremendously and was now an important factor in the party, though it remained largely a student youth.

However, a qualitative fusion was far from occurring. The workers lacked any real theoretical development and, further, their native American hostility to theory was strengthened by the anti-intellectual prejudices which had long been deeply ingrained in the Cannon section of the party. They were all fine, class-conscious trade union militants, but they were far from being real Bolsheviks. The intellectuals in the party kept their distance from the workers and by and large travelled in their own circles. They felt themselves a part of the general intellectual stratum—the most radical part thereof—rather than an integral part of a working-class party. The youth were largely young intellectuals recruited from the campuses or out of the SP, which in turn had recruited them from the campuses. These young people, no doubt very sincere in their revolutionary convictions, had a political life separate from the workers in the party and made no real attempt to integrate themselves in a working-class party.

As the party continued to be made up a series of blocs internally, so externally the basic bloc with Trotsky was maintained by all the constituents. The intellectuals promulgated his ideas in a literary fashion and Cannon built an organisation around them. But independent theoretical development was as absent in this period as it had been in the previous period. No one can point to a *single* theoretical contribution made by any member of the SWP in this period.

There was also one important difference. Trotsky was now in Mexico. He was able to meet with a good cross-section of the party's leading cadre and to devote a good deal of thought to the development of the party. From 1937 on Trotsky was to watch the party much, much more closely and to develop a critical attitude towards *all* sections of it. This struggle on Trotsky's part to educate the SWP, to prepare it for serious *qualitative* development, was to continue right up to the time of his death.

.8. Trotsky, Leon. *op. cit.*, p. 107.

.9. Cannon, James P. *History*, p. 238.

.10. *Ibid.*, p. 249.

C. THE GREAT CRISIS—1938-1940

The 1940 struggle with the Shachtman-Burnham-Abern minority was the most important internal struggle in which Trotsky participated in his battle to create the Fourth International. At stake was the very survival of the SWP. Considering the SWP's prominent place in the Fourth International at that time, its survival was closely linked to the survival of the Fourth International itself.

The 1940 struggle had been prepared by the previous twelve-year history of the American Trotskyist movement. *The old internal blocs broke down and the groups turned on each other.* Trotsky had to bloc with the healthiest force in the party and struggle against a bloc which could, and almost did, destroy the movement itself. The failures of the past 12 years created conditions in which such a crisis could occur. The strengths of the movement over the past 12 years allowed for the beginnings of a progressive solution to that crisis. It is important that we evaluate both the strengths and the failures.

In late 1939 the Shachtman-Cannon bloc broke down. Shachtman was impressionistically caught up in a petty-bourgeois reaction to the Soviet invasion of Finland. Abandoning all pretence of Marxist method he united in a faction with Burnham and Abern. This faction rallied the bulk of the petty-bourgeois elements in the party and was in fact a reaction to the panic of the petty-bourgeoisie as a whole as the war approached. This was no small force in the party. As the convention approached, Cannon was not at all sure if he could carry the majority. As it was he carried only 60 per cent of the organisation, and if one counts the non-party youth the organisation was split right down the middle. *The Shachtman-Burnham-Abern faction was the result of the failure of the party as a whole to absorb its petty-bourgeois elements organically into the party.*

In opposition to Shachtman-Burnham-Abern, Cannon mobilised the overwhelming bulk of the party's working-class cadres. But these cadres by themselves were incapable of waging an effective battle against the petty-bourgeois opposition. It was necessary for that other critical factor of the bloc that formed the SWP to *intervene*—Trotsky. This time Trotsky intervened as he had never intervened in an internal dispute before. The entire polemic on the majority side was waged by Trotsky himself. It was Trotsky who worked out the analysis of the Finnish and Polish events. It was Trotsky who analysed the very nature of

the opposition and showed its class roots. And above all it was Trotsky who turned the discussion around the most fundamental of all axes—the question of *method*.

Cannon delivered a speech on the Russian question but this was no more than a restatement of Trotsky's position. Cannon wrote a lengthy piece on the organisation question but this did not add anything new that could not be found in Trotsky's own comments on that question during the polemics.¹¹ No, the political, theoretical and methodological struggle was conducted by Trotsky and by Trotsky alone. Cannon and his supporters simply advocated the positions initiated by Trotsky.

Many have pictured the struggle in 1940 as essentially a struggle over the Russian question. Certainly the Shachtmanites always liked to look at it that way. Many in the Trotskyist movement also see it in that light. However, even a cursory reading of *In Defence of Marxism* puts a different light on it. The struggle went far, far deeper than the Russian question. It was essentially a struggle in defence of the *Marxist method* itself. The defence of the Marxist method fell on the shoulders of Trotsky and Trotsky alone. No one else in the party saw this as the critical question in the beginning and no one else was in the least prepared to defend Marxist method.

Viewed within this framework the real significance of the 1940 struggle can be seen. Essentially the 1940 struggle was produced by *the failure of the SWP as a whole to develop Marxist theory through an understanding of the Marxist method itself.* This failure in method reflected itself in different ways through the different constituents which made up the party. One section of the party developed this failure of method into a *factional programme* pitted against the programme of the Fourth International. That was the petty-bourgeois section. Another section, the working-class section of the party, was instinctively repelled by the political course of the petty-bourgeois faction but was incapable itself of countering this course theoretically or really understanding it methodologically. This task fell to Trotsky.

Trotsky made clear this distinction between the weaknesses and errors of the majority and the systematic revisionism of the minority. He wrote

11. Cannon, James P. *Struggle for a Proletarian Party*.
12. Trotsky, Leon. *op. cit.*, p. 159.

in a letter to Hansen: 'In my article I admitted that on different questions the Majority comrades could have shared the errors of Shachtman but they never made a system of them, they never transformed them into a factional platform. And that is the whole question.'¹²

Trotsky's deep shock at the *extent* of the basic educational work he had to carry out on the ABC of Marxism comes through in much of his writings of this period. He wrote in 'From a Scratch to the Danger of Gangrene', explaining his raising of the question of method:

'The character of the differences which have risen to the surface has only confirmed my former fears both in regard to the social composition of the party and in regard to the theoretical education of the cadres. There was nothing that required a change of mind or "artificial" introduction. This is how matters stand in actuality. Let me also add that I feel somewhat abashed over the fact that it is almost necessary to justify coming out in defence of Marxism within one of the sections of the Fourth International.'¹³

In a letter to Cannon, the leader of the majority, he goes even further:

'Yesterday I sent the Russian text of my new article written in the form of a letter to Burnham. Not all comrades possibly are content with the fact that I give such a prominent place in the discussion to the matter of dialectics. But I am sure it is now the only way to begin the theoretical education of the party, especially of the youth, and to inject a reversion (sic) to empiricism and eclectics.'¹⁴

.13. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

Note that Trotsky *anticipates* resistance to a discussion on dialectics from the *majority* comrades (this is a private letter to the majority leader) and also note that he speaks of *beginning* the theoretical education of the party—*after 12 years of existence as a movement Trotsky must speak of beginning its theoretical education.*

In order to understand exactly how the SWP reached such a point as this we must go back and trace the relationship of the various constituents of the SWP with Trotsky during that critical period of Trotsky's close collaboration with the SWP, starting with his coming to Mexico in 1937. We will try to learn both how Trotsky assessed these constituents and what he proposed should have been done to prevent the kind of situation which evolved in 1940. Trotsky's analysis of his relationship with the petty-bourgeois section of the party is well documented in his article "From a Scratch to the Danger of Gangrene", and we will therefore only sketch this briefly here. Trotsky's relationship with the Cannon group in the party is not as well known or as clearly put forward, and to this aspect we therefore devote more space.

It will become clear that while one section of the party had developed 'gangrene' the rest of the party was far from unscratched. The sickness which necessitated the 1940 amputation was a sickness of the party's body as a whole. However, it had developed by 1940 to a point in one part of the party where surgery was necessary so that one could continue to struggle to cure the body as a whole.

(1) TROTSKY AND THE INTELLECTUALS

The great crisis of 1940 was prepared by the previous history of the party—was the natural outgrowth of its weaknesses. Trotsky's assessment of the petty-bourgeois elements in the party comes out clearly in *In Defence of Marxism*. Trotsky details his patient efforts over a span of three years to properly orient the intellectual elements in the party.

This process began appropriately enough with his arrival in Mexico in 1937. He reports: 'It would not be amiss, therefore, to refer to the fact that my first serious conversation with Comrades Shachtman and Warde, in the train immediately after my arrival in Mexico in January 1937, was devoted to the necessity of persistently

propagating dialectical materialism.'¹⁵ Seventeen years earlier Lenin had raised the same question with another revolutionary intellectual, Louis C. Fraina, with unfortunately similar results. Following this discussion there is no sign that either Warde, who ended up supporting Cannon, or Shachtman, did anything to educate the party on questions of method.

In the 1937 and 1938 period Trotsky wrote to Shachtman repeatedly concerning the growing attention given by the SWP to petty-bourgeois intellectuals who were obviously not serious revolutionists. He urged the SWP to develop

15. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

some kind of working-class defence work in connection with the Dewey Commission investigation of the Moscow trials but this was not done. He warned against devoting so much space in the *New Internationalist* to people like Eastman, Hook, and Lyons, and the friendly tone taken towards such people in the magazine. In 1939 he wrote his famous letter to Shachtman protesting against the Shachtman-Burnham article 'Intellectuals in Retreat', in which Burnham declared his opposition to dialectics and Shachtman declared his indifference to Burnham's opposition.

On all these points Trotsky was hitting at the essential weakness of the intellectual section of the SWP. This section saw itself as a part of the American intellectual community rather than as an integrated part of the proletarian revolutionary party. The indifference or actual opposition to dialectics was part of the dues these intellectuals needed to pay in order to be part of this community. As long as they used the same basic method as the Hooks, Eastmans and Lyons, then they spoke the same language, were part of the same community. The development of the SWP as a Marxist party required the *breaking* of these intellectuals *methodologically* from the basic empiricist method of the American intelligentsia.

It also required a more personal, subjective kind of break. The intellectuals needed to break from the petty-bourgeois circles and life and to integrate themselves personally in a working-class party. They needed to learn how to talk to workers, how to recruit workers, how to be an integral part of a working-class party. Trotsky wrote Cannon especially on this question time and time again in the period from 1937 to 1940 but to no avail. Trotsky's appreciation of Cannon's *Struggle for a Proletarian Party* was undoubtedly based in large part on Cannon's strong emphasis on this point.¹⁶

Over the years there has developed a simplified *myth* of Trotsky's attitude towards the role of intellectuals in the party. Trotsky is seen as taking a totally negative attitude toward intellectuals because of their petty-bourgeois background and conversely taking a totally uncritical attitude towards party members of proletarian origins. A close reading of Trotsky's writing shows nothing could be further from the truth. He valued the intellectual elements in the SWP most highly and made great efforts to facilitate their development.

He notes:

'After our American section split from the Socialist Party I insisted most strongly on the earliest

possible publication of a theoretical organ, having again in mind the need to educate the party, first and foremost its new members, in the spirit of dialectic materialism. In the United States, I wrote at the time, where the bourgeoisie systematically instils vulgar empiricism in the workers, more than anywhere else is it necessary to speed the elevation of the movement to a proper theoretical level.¹⁷

He viewed it as the task of the intellectuals to facilitate the general theoretical development of the proletarian section of the party. The proletarian section of the party, though prepared for rapid theoretical development by its actual position in capitalist society, would not develop theoretically if simply left alone. Thus he stated: 'It is precisely the party's penetration into the trade unions, and into the workers' milieu in general that demands heightening the theoretical qualification of our cadres. I do not mean by cadres the "apparatus" but the party as a whole.'¹⁸ And further: 'If the proletarian section of our American party is "politically backward", then the first task of those who are "advanced" should have consisted in raising the workers to a higher level. But why has the present opposition failed to find its way to these workers?'¹⁹

So concerned was he about the role which this section of the movement *could* play in the development of the party that in the middle of the discussion itself he wrote Shachtman: 'I believe that you are on the wrong side of the barricades, my dear friend. . . . If I had the possibility I would immediately take an airplane to New York City in order to discuss with you for 48 or 72 hours uninterruptedly.'²⁰

Thus Trotsky's approach towards the intellectuals in the party was clear. He sought to *integrate* them into the party by breaking them from the method of the petty-bourgeoisie and fusing them in the concrete with the proletarian section of the party. Such a fusion would have facilitated with great rapidity the theoretical development of the party as a whole. Instead these intellectuals deepened their split both with the method of Marxism and with the proletarian section of the party. Trotsky had no other course but to deepen his break with them and to hope that the struggle would lead to a development of the healthy section of the party which was willing to combat this desertion of Marxism.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

(2) TROTSKY AND THE YOUTH

Material on Trotsky's approach to the youth movement is not as easily documented as his relations with the older intellectual strata in the party. However, its general outlines are clear. Throughout this 1937-1940 period Trotsky actively sought to counter what he saw as an unserious, dilettante spirit in the Trotskyist youth organisation. He wished to instil in these young people the *seriousness* of the revolutionary struggle and the need to integrate themselves into a proletarian movement. He sought to break these students and young petty-bourgeois from their milieu and transform them from radical students into proletarian revolutionaries.

A turning point in this whole process was the resolution on the youth question at the Founding Convention of the Fourth International in 1938.²¹ This resolution, which was in the tradition of the early days of the Young Communist International,²² sought to orientate Trotskyist youth towards the problems of the young workers and the unemployed workers in particular. Following this convention the YPSL Fourth (as the Trotskyist youth was known in that period) devoted considerably more attention in its publication

21. 'Resolution on the Youth' *The Founding Conference of the Fourth International* (Socialist Workers Party, New York, 1938), p. 121.

22. *Resolutions and Theses Adopted by the Third Congress of the YCL* (Berlin 1923).

Challenge of Youth to the problems of young workers.²³ However, this attention was clearly of an artificial journalistic nature, and very little concrete work was done by the young Trotskyists among working-class youth. Thus this whole vital, dynamic section of the American proletariat went largely untouched in this period. *This itself had a serious negative effect on the SWP.*

Following this Trotsky urged several measures on the YPSL Fourth: the point of these was obviously to break down the intellectual dilettantism of these youth. It was Trotsky who insisted that the YPSL Fourth get themselves a uniform, red flags and other paraphernalia and learn to march in proper style. No pacifist was Trotsky.

Again Trotsky's approach towards petty-bourgeois youth was not a hostile one. Such young people, he felt, could play a very vital role in the building of the party. But this would happen only if they really broke from their petty-bourgeois background and integrated themselves fully into the revolutionary movement. This did not happen. It is difficult to see how it *could* have happened in the SWP of the 1930s with its bloc rather than fusion of constituents, and with its almost total lack of theoretical development.

23. *Challenge of Youth* (Young Peoples Socialist League—Fourth International, New York), July 1938 issue and following.

(3) TROTSKY AND THE WORKERS

Trotsky always understood the critical importance of the working-class cadres of the party. The workers in the party were always his first concern. All his efforts and urgings on the intelligentsia were aimed at getting this intelligentsia also to recognise the critical importance of this section of the party and to assist him in aiding the proletarian comrades' development. He understood that critical in the long run were both the growth and the development of the proletarian section of the party.

Trotsky's approach towards Cannon flowed from this assessment of the working-class cadres of the party. Trotsky was not an uncritical defender of Cannon the man, nor of Cannon's regime. He had made his position clear in 1932 on many of the organisational weaknesses of Cannon. He could not help but be aware of his theoretical short-

comings. However, he had a high regard for Cannon's role in developing a proletarian orientation for the American party. It was precisely the solid organisational base of the American party and its constant work in the mass movement which distinguished it from all other Trotskyist parties, which made it the most important Trotskyist formation of the period. Cannon had contributed in no small way to this development.

Precisely because Trotsky valued so highly the proletarian cadres of the party, he did not take an uncritical attitude either towards those cadres or towards the Cannon group within the party which had the confidence of those cadres. Workers in the trade unions are no more born 'natural' Bolsheviks than are intellectuals or students. While they are generally free from the kind of petty-bourgeois pressures which bear upon these

other sections of the party, they have their own specific weaknesses and are under other pressures within the trade union movement. Their strength is that these weaknesses are the weaknesses of the class itself, and to the extent that a revolutionary party comes to grips with them it is involved in its most fundamental work of all—the education of the vanguard of the working class.

It is *especially* in a period when the party is expanding its working-class cadres that the most conscious attention must be paid to the theoretical development of these cadres. This is no automatic process and it requires the greatest of efforts and internal struggle on the part of a conscious leadership. As Trotsky summed it up in the previously quoted statement, which deserves restatement here: 'It is precisely the party's penetration into the trade unions, and into the workers' milieu in general that demands the heightening of the theoretical qualification of our cadres.'

Just as with the intellectuals and students, Trotsky's concern about this section of the party dates back at least to his arrival in Mexico in 1937—that is, to the beginning of the period in which Trotsky was able to observe the American Trotskyist movement from close at hand. Trotsky's essential concern was that the party was adapting to the 'progressive' anti-Stalinist elements inside the trade union movement and that this adaptation was paralysing the party as far as: (1) a concrete political struggle against Roosevelt whom these progressives supported and (2) an orientation towards the healthy forces within the Stalinist movement. This adaptation also meant that the trade union cadres of the SWP, while functioning as class-conscious trade union militants, were not being developed into *revolutionary communists*.

In particular Trotsky was highly critical of the party-dominated teamster paper, put out under the supervision of Farrell Dobbs, the *North-west Organiser*, which he felt was a-political and which made no attempt to implement the line of favouring independent class political action worked out in connection with the Transitional Programme. In fact Trotsky pressed the party hard on this score precisely during the discussions around the Transitional Programme in early 1938. In 1939, as is testified in *In Defence of Marxism*, Trotsky urged a special orientation towards the Stalinist rank and file. He urged this on both Cannon and Shachtman but nothing was done about it. In 1940, when the question came up again for discussion with Trotsky *after* the split with Shacht-

man, Hansen summarised the past period as follows:

'Yesterday Comrade Trotsky made some remarks about our adaptation to the so-called progressives in the trade union, he mentioned the line of the *North-west Organiser* and also our attitude in connection with the elections and the Stalinists. I wish to point out that this is not something completely new on Comrade Trotsky's part. More than two years ago during the discussions over the Transitional Programme, he discussed exactly these same points and had exactly the same position, with due regard for the difference in time and that then it was not the elections but the farmer-labour party that was to the fore. Comrade Trotsky also has written some letters regarding the Stalinists and the need for a more positive line toward them.'²⁴

In April of 1939, just a few months before the outbreak of the factional struggle, Trotsky held a series of very important discussions with Johnson and other Negro comrades on the party's Negro work. It is important that it was Trotsky who forced upon the SWP the importance of the American Negro, a question almost totally neglected in the past period. In fact in 1933, Arne Swabeck, in discussions with Trotsky on the same question, was not even aware as to whether American Negroes in the South spoke a different language!²⁵ In the course of this discussion Trotsky was deeply concerned as to why the SWP so far had neglected work in this field. As he sought to discover the reasons for this it was precisely the *proletarian* section of the party and its leadership that came under his criticism:

I believe that the first question is the attitude of the Socialist Workers Party toward the Negroes. It is very disquieting to find that until now the party has done almost nothing in this field. It has not published a book, a pamphlet, leaflets, nor even any articles in the *New International*. Two comrades who compiled a book on the question, a serious work, remained isolated. That book is not published, nor are even quotations from it published. It is not a good sign. It is a bad sign. The characteristic thing about American workers' parties, trade union organisations, and so on, was their aristocratic character. It is the basis of opportunism. The skilled workers who feel set in the capitalist society help the bourgeois class to hold the Negroes and unskilled workers down to a very low scale. Our party is not safe from degeneration if it remains a place for intellectuals, semi-intellectuals, skilled workers and Jewish workers who build a

24. See appendix.

25. 'Documents on the Negro Struggle', *Bulletin of Marxist Studies*, No. 4 (Pioneer Publishers, New York, 1963), p. 12.

very close milieu which is almost isolated from the genuine masses. Under this condition our party cannot develop—it will degenerate.

'We must have this great danger before our eyes. Many times I have said that every member of the party, especially the intellectuals and the semi-intellectuals, who, during a period of say six months, cannot each win a worker-member for the party, should be demoted to the position of sympathiser. We can say the same on the Negro question. The old organisations, beginning with the AFL, are the organisations of the workers' aristocracy. Our party is a part of the same milieu, not of the basic most exploited masses of whom the Negroes are the most exploited. The fact that our party until now has not turned to the Negro question is a very disquieting symptom. If the workers' aristocracy is the basis of opportunism, one of the sources of adaptation to capitalist society, then the most oppressed and discriminated are the most dynamic milieu of the working class.'²⁶

Over half a century earlier Engels used almost the same language to characterise the native born workers of that period! The problem was still with the Marxist movement.

Once again during the actual factional struggle with Shachtman Trotsky was to raise this issue. This is particularly important because it meant criticising that section of the party which supported him and thus running the risk of aiding his opponents. But he felt it was important enough to risk that, so important in fact that he put the critical section in italics in his 'From a Scratch to the Danger of Gangrene':

'It would be asinine to think that the workers' section of the party is perfect. The workers are only gradually reaching clear class consciousness. The trade unions always create a culture medium for opportunist deviations. Inevitably we will run up against this question in one of the next stages. More than once the party will have to remind its own trade unionists that a *pedagogical adaptation to the more backward layers of the proletariat must not become transformed into a political adaptation to the conservative bureaucracy of the trade unions*. Every new stage of development, every increase in the party ranks and the complication of the methods of work open up not only new possibilities but new dangers. Workers in the trade unions, even those trained in the most revolutionary school, often display a tendency to free themselves from party control. At the present time, however, this is not the question.'²⁷

While this was not the pressing question at the

time of this fundamental struggle Trotsky makes it clear that this could be a pressing question in the future *unless* the cadre was educated now. This idea guided to a great extent his whole approach to the discussion with Shachtman and Co. It was aimed, not only at reaching those who could be reached in the Shachtman camp but educating his own supporters. He went into detail on the ABC of dialectics in such a way that the average worker in the party could understand it.

Trotsky intervened in particular to prevent a premature split and to prolong the discussion as long as possible. It is clear from even the published exchange between Cannon and Trotsky on this point that Cannon as early as October 1939 was impatient with the struggle and wanted to bring it to an organisational conclusion while Trotsky sought to extend it as long as possible. Trotsky wrote a very sharp and clear letter to Cannon on October 28, 1939²⁸ in response to a letter of Cannon's of October 24, 1939.²⁹ Trotsky's letter was 'inadvertently' left out of *In Defence of Marxism* but was published in a footnote in *The Struggle for a Proletarian Party*. He warns, after reading Cannon's letter:

'It would be extremely prejudicial if not fatal to connect this ideological fight with the perspective of a split, of a purge, or expulsions, and so on and so forth. You have many new members and uneducated youth. They need a serious educational discussion in the light of great events. If their thoughts at the beginning are obsessed by the perspective of personal *degradation*, i.e., demotions, loss of prestige, disqualifications, eliminations from Central Committee, etc., and so on, the whole discussion would become envenomed and the authority of the leadership would be compromised. If the leadership on the contrary opens a ruthless fight against petty-bourgeois idealistic conceptions and organisational prejudices but at the same time assures all the necessary guarantees for the discussion itself and for the minority, the result would be not only an ideological victory but an important growth in the authority of the leadership.'

Trotsky continued to press this point over and over again throughout the discussion right to the very eve of the split with the minority.³⁰ In fact every peaceful gesture aimed at extending the discussion and preventing a split came from Trotsky, not Cannon. Trotsky was especially disconcerted over the tendency of the rank-and-file

28. Cannon, James P. *Struggle*, p. 89-90.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 98-99.

30. Trotsky, Leon. *op. cit.*, pp. 63, 70, 101, 151-152, 161-163.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

27. Trotsky, Leon. *op. cit.*, p. 146.

majority supporters to grow impatient with the political struggle and to wish to get on with their concrete work unimpeded by such a struggle. In response to letters from Cannon expressing the impatience of many of the trade unionists in the party with the length of the discussion, Trotsky writes back, 'I understand the impatience of many Majority comrades (I suppose that this impatience is not infrequently connected with theoretical indifference).'³¹ This educational need was also the reason for his proposal in a letter to Warde that he, Wright, and Gerland form 'the first nucleus' of a theoretical association within the party to promote dialectical materialism.³²

Fundamental to an understanding of this question was a discussion held with the leaders of this section, Cannon, Dobbs, and other, in June, 1940, after the split with Shachtman and less than two months before Trotsky's death. Luckily the stenogram of this discussion was published at the insistence of George Clarke in 1953—otherwise it would have never seen the light of day. We append it to this article in its entirety so that the reader can see the actual give-and-take between Trotsky and the leadership of the SWP—to judge Trotsky's assessment of this leadership and his approach to it.

While the concrete issue in discussion was a proposal for a tactical orientation towards the Stalinists, in reality the discussion centred around

31. Trotsky, Leon. *op. cit.*, p. 158.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

the *adaptation* of the basic trade union cadres of the SWP to the progressives within the trade union movement and the SWP leadership's *failure* to do anything about this situation. Most important of all then is the documentation of the *fear* of the SWP leadership of being forced to break with its collaborators in the trade union movement in order to reach out to the Stalinist workers, then in crisis.

Hansen asks Trotsky point blank:

'I am wondering if Comrade Trotsky considers that our party is displaying a conservative tendency in the sense that we are adapting ourselves politically to the trade union bureaucracy.'³³

Trotsky answers frankly:

'To a certain degree I believe it is so. . . . In observing the *North-west Organiser* I have observed not the slightest change during a whole period. It remains a-political. This is a dangerous symptom. The complete neglect of work in relation to the Stalinist party is another dangerous symptom. . . . It seems to me that a kind of passive adaptation to our trade union work can be recognised. There is not an immediate danger, but a serious warning indicating a change in direction is necessary. Many comrades are more interested in trade union work than in party work. More party cohesion is needed, more sharp manoeuvring, a more serious systematic theoretical training; otherwise the trade unions can absorb our comrades.'³⁴

33. See appendix.

34. See appendix.

(4) TROTSKY'S ASSESSMENT OF CANNON

We see a consistent thread in Trotsky's assessment of the Cannon section of the party. It was the most proletarian, and thus the most healthy section of the party. Its existence is what gave the SWP of the 1930s its importance and was a credit to all that was positive and good in the American Trotskyist movement—and in the American radical tradition. The alliance of Trotsky with Cannon against the petty-bourgeois opposition was natural and necessary. It was an alliance of the party's strengths against its weaknesses.

However, it was not an uncritical alliance. Trotsky was fully aware that the Cannon section of the party, more than any other section, reflected the empiricism and syndicalism of the trade union rank and file in the United States. It had a disdain for theory and was itself aristocratic and

quite distant from the most exploited layers of the proletariat in the United States—especially considering the party's failures in reaching young workers and Negroes. Lacking theoretical training and having an aristocratic position within the class *it could not help but degenerate unless it was educated theoretically*. Trotsky devoted his efforts in the last days of his life seeking to impress upon the Cannon leadership the necessity of such theoretical development. The key to this theoretical development was, in Trotsky's view, a deeper understanding of the Marxist method itself. It was this, he hoped, that intellectuals like Warde and Wright would impart to the party.

Trotsky was fully aware of Cannon's weaknesses as well as of his strengths. He knew as well as anyone that Cannon had contributed to the crisis of 1940 as much as Shachtman because Cannon

was incapable of giving *theoretical* leadership in the party and in this way bringing about a fusion of the best elements in the intellectual and student sections of the party and raising the theoretical level of the proletarian section of the party. To blame Cannon for this is only to compliment him—it is to say that he was the real leader of the party and thus, more than the literary figure Shachtman, was responsible for the party's condition.

Trotsky summarises well his assessment of Cannon at the time of the Shachtman fight and thus explains why he supported Cannon so solidly against Shachtman. 'Cannon represents the proletarian party in *process of formation*. The historical right in this struggle—independent of what errors and mistakes might have been made—rests solely on the side of Cannon.' (emphasis ours)³⁵ He did not view Cannon as a finished Marxist leader nor his tendency, which emerged as the unchallenged leadership of the SWP which was to reign for the next 24 years, as a finished Marxist tendency. He saw it rather as a *revolutionary party in the process of formation*—as a force out of which *could* emerge a Marxist movement in the United States. His remarks of June 1940 just before his death make it completely clear that the emergence of this tendency as a Marxist party would not be an automatic process nor was it guaranteed success. The danger of its *degeneration* was clearly seen *even at this time*.

In his oft-quoted letter on Cannon's *Struggle for a Proletarian Party*, Trotsky refers to Cannon as a 'genuine workers' leader'.³⁶ This was a correct assessment of Cannon. Cannon showed his ability

35. Trotsky, Leon, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

as a workers' leader in the days of the IWW. He reasserted it once more in his long battle in the Communist Party for a proletarian orientation. Once again, he rose to the occasion in the American Trotskyist movement to battle to orientate the movement towards the class. Yes, Cannon was a genuine workers' leader. The challenge that Cannon has faced since his entrance into the CP was the need to be *more* than a genuine workers' leader. He needed to go beyond the simply empirical class struggle outlook of a Big Bill Haywood, a Vincent St. John, and the many other fine workers' leaders in United States history. He needed to become a *genuine revolutionary communist*.

To become a revolutionary communist Cannon needed to master Marxist theory. In the 1920s Cannon sought to get over this by taking his theory as given from the Russians. But the Stalinization of the Comintern caused the Russians to turn on him. Emerging on his own in 1928 he looked to Trotsky to develop theory and Shachtman and his friends to present it propagandistically in this country. This division of labour broke down in the debacle of 1940. Shachtman turned on Cannon and Trotsky had to *supplant* Cannon for the duration of the battle in order to save the Fourth International itself.

But Trotsky soon was killed. Even if he was able to continue to play the role of leadership for the SWP, Stalin's axe prevented it. Cannon was now for the first time in his life really on his own. The next 24 years was to tell what Cannon had actually learned in the past period. In 1940, after 20 years of American communism, the challenge before the SWP was whether or not it was to *become* a revolutionary communist formation.

Appendix

*The following is a rough stenographic draft—uncorrected by the participants—of discussions with Trotsky on the Stalinists held on June 12-15, 1940.**

Cannon: . . . The general perspective is quite optimistic. The Stalinists are the problem. By their change in line they dealt a heavy blow. We were forging ahead when they made the switch, paralyzing our work. The workers are unable to distinguish the real difference between us, especially with the faction fight compelling us to give undue emphasis to our defence of the Soviet Union. We need a line of agitation to distinguish ourselves from them. The

Stalinist party still has a powerful cadre of militants. It has a strong trade union machine which draws the workers. The pact seemed to disintegrate them, but it was losing just the democrats. The old militants are more devoted than ever. They believe that the party now has the 'real revolutionary' line. We need a more effective counter-attack against the Stalinists.

Trotsky: We don't participate in the presidential elections?

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Cannon: There are very rigorous election laws

which prevent small parties from getting on the ballot.

Trotsky: And the CP?

Cannon: The CP buys its way on to the ballot. For example in upper New York where it is extremely reactionary, the CP simply buys signatures from those who make a business of dealing in signatures. For us there is no way to get on the ballot.

Trotsky: Your attitude toward the other parties?

Cannon: We are running local campaigns in some places for minor offices.

Trotsky: What do we tell the workers when they ask which president they should vote for?

Cannon: They shouldn't ask such embarrassing questions. We tried write-in campaigns in previous elections, but it is not serious. Nor can we support either the Stalinists or Thomas.

Trotsky: I see there is no campaign in the *Socialist Appeal* for a workers' candidate. Why haven't you proposed a congress of trade unions, a convention, to nominate a candidate for the presidency. If he were independent we would support him. We cannot remain completely indifferent. We can very well insist in unions where we have influence that Roosevelt is not our candidate and the workers must have their own candidate. We should demand a nation-wide congress connected with the independent Labour Party.

Dobbs: For a while some people thought Lewis would run. But Lewis never seriously intended to run. He attempted to bargain with the Roosevelt administration. Now it appears certain that Roosevelt will run.

Trotsky: With the centrists the situation is clear. For a long time in the United States, the socialist movement was not necessary. Now with changed times when it is necessary, it can't have a reformist nature. That possibility is exhausted. At one time the United States was rich in reformist tendencies, but the New Deal was the last flare-up. Now with the war it is clear that the New Deal exhausted all the reformist and democratic possibilities and created incomparably more favourable possibilities for revolution.

I talked with E. a few weeks ago. For Roosevelt, but absolutely helpless about further possibilities of democracy. When I questioned him he was absolutely incapable of answering, and I thought he was going to break down in tears like a little boy.

The entrance into the war is the end of the last remnants of the New Deal and Good Neighbour policy. The Roosevelt of the third term will be completely different from the Roosevelt of the first two terms.

Dobbs: In the CIO and the AFL the leaders have been affected by Roosevelt's war drive, becoming

more and more outspoken for unity. Tobin has become more expressive, more deeply involved. Behind the scenes he moves in co-ordination with the war moves. Dubinsky, one of the original CIO leaders, voted to reaffiliate with the AFL thus weakening Lewis. Hillman, a CIO leader, negotiated a jurisdiction agreement with Dubinsky and is cool toward Lewis. There is grave danger of capitulation on the part of the bureaucrats, weakening the industrial workers. Lewis may have to reach unity at the expense of industrial unionism. All these leaders are jumping as Roosevelt cracks the whip.

Trotsky: The Stalinists are clearly the most important for us. E. says they lost 15 per cent but that the workers remain true to the party. It is a question of attitude. Their dependence on the Kremlin was of great value to the national leaders. Their line was changed from patriotism to anti-war. In the next period their dependence on the Kremlin will create great difficulties for them.

They are anti-war and anti-imperialist, but so are we in general. Do we have a nucleus among them?

Cannon: We have a small nucleus in New York and in one or two other places.

Trotsky: Sent in?

Dobbs: No. They came to us and we advised them to stay and work within.

Cannon: We got some with our campaign against the fascists.

Trotsky: Theoretically it is possible to support the Stalinist candidate. It is a way of approaching the Stalinist workers. We can say, yes we know this candidate. But we will give critical support. We can repeat on a small scale what we would do if Lewis were nominated.

Theoretically it is not impossible. It would be very difficult, it is true—but then it is only an analysis. They, of course, would say, we don't want your support. We would answer, we don't support you, but the workers who support you. We warn them but go through the experience with them. These leaders will betray you. It is necessary to find an approach to the Stalinist party. Theoretically it is not impossible to support their candidates with very sharp warnings. It would guide them. What? How?

Kay: But in Boston the Stalinists wouldn't even permit us to enter their hall. They even threw our comrade outside.

Trotsky: I know. They have even shot at us. But some tens of thousands of workers are with them. I don't know exactly how many. It is very difficult to determine. Of course, we would suffer the indignation of Burnham. Shachtman would say, 'See, I predicted it—capitulation to Stalinism.' There would even be considerable aversion in our ranks. But the question is the Stalinist workers. The working class is decisive. With guarantees, warnings, why not

consider it? Is Browder a worse rascal than Lewis? I doubt it. Both are rascals.

Cannon: The Stalinist movement is peculiar. In France we could approach the Socialists and join them. The Stalinists are large compared to us but small compared with the CIO. The Stalinists are hated by the militants. It is not the psychological attitude of our members but the broad anti-Stalinist movement. If we started to play this kind of politics we would run into this indignation of these militants. For example, the food workers in New York. Our comrades succeeded in creating a strong progressive faction. They may possibly be elected to posts. We built our strength on opposition to Stalinist control of the union. Such a line would disrupt our work. The same is true in the maritime unions and in the auto union. The Stalinists are the main obstacle. A policy of manoeuvre would be disastrous. What we gained from the Stalinists we would lose otherwise.

Trotsky: Before entrance into the Socialist Party we tried to analyse the situation in the same way. Before entrance into the Socialist Party we had the perspective of exhausting all the possibilities. We were not closer to Thomas than we are to Browder. Those advocating entry predicted that we would finish with the SP and then turn to the CP. Imagine the CP without holding a specific hatred toward it. Could we enter it as we did the SP? I see no reason why not—theoretically. Physically it would be impossible but not in principle. After entrance into the SP there is nothing that would prevent our entrance into the CP. But that is excluded. We can't enter. They won't let us.

Can we make this manoeuvre from the outside? The progressive elements oppose the Stalinists but we don't win many progressive elements. Everywhere we meet Stalinists. How to break the Stalinist party? The support of the progressives is not stable. It is found at the top of the union rather than as a rank-and-file current. Now with the war we will have these progressives against us. We need a stronger base in the ranks. There are small Tobins on whom we depend. They depend on the big Tobins. They on Roosevelt. This phase is inevitable. It opened the door for us in the trade unions. But it can become dangerous. We can't depend on these elements or their sentiments. We will lose them and isolate ourselves from the Stalinist workers. Now we have no attitude toward them. Burnham and Shachtman opposed an active attitude toward the Stalinists. They represent a whole period from 1917 up to date. We can't move without them. The coincidence between their slogans and ours is transitory, but it can give us a bridge to these workers. The question must be examined. If persecutions should begin tomorrow, it would be first against them, second against us. The honest, hard members will remain true. The progressives are a type in the leadership. The rank and file are disquieted, unconsciously revolutionary.

Dobbs: It is not quite correct to say that the 'progressives' include only the tops of the unions. The progressives include the rank and file, especially is this true in the big unions.

Cannon: They are not cohesive, but in revolt against the Stalinists. Where the Stalinists control the union that is where a real anti-Stalinist movement is strongest. The Stalinists control the maritime unions by and large and we have a powerful experience in development of a progressive revolt against them.

Harold: The trade union movement grew by the millions. A new bureaucracy was formed, there was a new stream of union conscious members. In this there were two currents, the Stalinists and the anti-Stalinists. Both streams included both rank and filers and bureaucrats.

Trotsky: But why the difference?

Harold: The differences began in 1934 when the Stalinists emerged from the red unions and were taken as a revolutionary movement. Many were corrupted. Many thought the New Deal swing a manoeuvre. The Stalinists made a deal with the CIO tops. They led many unions. They had a reputation of militancy. No one policy it is true, but they recruited as revolutionists. Now they are not considered revolutionists. Many of the best have dropped out. Those remaining are bureaucrats or confused.

Cannon: The problem is to get the CP out of the road. There is not a large percentage of revolutionary material in its ranks. They have discounted workers who saw no other force. They attract through the sheer inertia of a big apparatus and a big party. They use corruption where they do not already control the machinery. They use economic terrorism. They do everything the old-time bureaucrats did but on a conveyor system. Unquestionably there are good workers among them, but only a small percentage. It is a terrible danger to risk the condemnation of non-Stalinist workers for the sake of a manoeuvre that would win little. The progressive movement is composed of anti-Stalinists and legitimate rank-and-file forces organised by us. The Stalinists even buy old-time fakers. They provide a legitimate movement of protest which is our main source of recruitment and which comes during the struggle against the CP. In the Los Angeles auto movement, for example, some ex-CPers organised a counter-movement from which we recruited. The Stalinists have built up a terrible hatred against themselves. Seventy-five per cent is genuine workers' grievances and consists of many former Stalinists animated by a terrible bitterness. A complicated manoeuvre giving the possibility of identifying us with the Stalinists would be wrong. Our main line must be towards the non-Stalinist workers. We must handle the Stalinist question within this framework.

Jeb: I am against the manoeuvre. Perhaps I am not entirely rational about this. Perhaps it is mostly from inertia. Cannon wrote about the Stalinists that they are an alien movement in the workers' movement, irresponsible. Our influence in the progressive groups is a top movement, not a rank-and-file movement, especially in New York. Our position is very precarious. Not something that we can look forward to as a big recruiting ground. The Stalinists' influence in the ranks is quite solid. They make deals with the old-time fakers, but also have a rank-and-file following. In the painters' union they made a deal with the gangsters but also were supported by the anti-gangster following. We built up a movement, kicked out the Stalinists but couldn't consolidate or recruit. Stalinists operate with corruption but different degrees of corruption. A worker in the TWU who quit the CP in 1938 told us that they are disillusioned with the CP but not enough to join us. They use corruption by degrees—the best jobs are given to the Stalinists, lesser jobs to the group surrounding them, lesser jobs to sympathisers. The militants don't regard themselves as corrupt—just members of the CP. 'If we don't get the jobs, the reactionaries will.' That seems to be their attitude.

But we don't have contact with the Stalinist rank and file. Before we could take such a manoeuvre we need to organise a nucleus in the Stalinists.

Trotsky: If the results of our conversation were nothing more than more precise investigation in relation to the Stalinists it would be very fruitful.

Our party is not bound to the Stalinist manoeuvre any more than it was to the SP manoeuvre. Nevertheless we undertook such a manoeuvre. We must add up the pluses and minuses. The Stalinists gained their influence during the past ten years. There was the depression and then the tremendous trade union movement culminating in the CIO. Only the craft unionists could remain indifferent. The Stalinists tried to exploit this movement, to build up their own bureaucracy. The progressives are afraid of this. The politics of these so-called progressives is determined by their need to meet the needs of the workers in this movement, on the other hand it comes from fear of the Stalinists. They can't have the same policy as Green because otherwise the Stalinists would occupy their posts. Their existence is a reflex of this new movement, but it is not a direct reflection of the rank and file. It is an adaptation of the conservative bureaucrats to this situation. There are two competitors, the progressive bureaucrats and the Stalinists. We are a third competitor trying to capture this sentiment. These progressive bureaucrats can lean on us for advisors in the fight against the Stalinists. But the role of an advisor to a progressive bureaucrat doesn't promise much in the long run. Our real role is that of third competitor. Then the question of our attitude toward these bureaucrats—do we have an absolutely clear position toward these competitors? These bureaucrats are Rooseveltians, militarists. We tried to penetrate the trade unions with their help.

This was a correct manoeuvre, I believe. We can say that the question of the Stalinists would be resolved in passing insofar as we succeed in our main manoeuvre. But before the presidential campaign and the war question we have time for a small manoeuvre. We can say, your leaders betray you, but we support you without any confidence in your leaders in order to show that we can go with you and to show that your leaders will betray you. It is a short manoeuvre, not hinging on the main question of the war. But it is necessary to know incomparably better the Stalinists and their place in the trade unions, their reaction to our party. It would be fatal to pay too much attention to the impression that we can make on the pacifists and on our 'progressive' bureaucrat friends. In this case we become the squeezed lemon of the bureaucrats. They use us against the Stalinists but as the war nears call us unpatriotic and expel us. These Stalinist workers can become revolutionary, especially if Moscow changes its line and becomes patriotic. At the time of Finland, Moscow made a difficult turn, a new turn is still more painful. But we must have contact and information. I don't insist on *this* plan, understand, but we must have a plan. What plan do you propose? The progressive bureaucrats and dishonest centrists of the trade union movement reflect important changes in the base, but the question is how to approach the base? We encounter between us and the base, the Stalinists.

Kay: To support the Stalinists in the presidential campaign would kill us. They shift their line—

Trotsky: Nothing can kill us, Comrade Kay.

Kay: Our sympathisers would be driven away. The Stalinists cannot even talk with us. They are expelled for talking with us.

Trotsky: That is a blow against the party. They say that we are agents of this and that power. We say, if your leaders are serious against the war then we are with you, but your leaders will betray you. It is the politics of critical support. Tobin, for example, is a faker combined with a reactionary stupid petty-bourgeois, but would we vote for him if he were running on an independent ticket for president? Yes.

Kay: But Tobin or Lewis wouldn't kill us.

Trotsky: I am not so sure. Lewis would kill us very efficiently if he were elected and war came. It is not a sentimental question. It is how to break this hypnosis. They say the Trotskyites are agents—but we say if you are seriously against the war we are with you. Even the problem of making them listen to us—we meet that by explaining. It is a very daring undertaking. But the cohesion of our party is such that we could succeed. But if we reject this plan, then we must find another policy. I repeat then we must find another policy. What is it?

Carl: We must keep aware of the main task, to

present ourselves to the American workers. I think that we would be swallowed up in this manoeuvre because of the size of the party. Now we are becoming able to separate ourselves from them—but this manoeuvre would swallow us up. We must be careful to make an independent stand, not as an opposition movement to the Stalinists.

Trotsky: It is not a question of entry. And such a manoeuvre would be very short and very critical. The manoeuvre itself presupposes that we are an independent party. The manoeuvre is a measure of our independence. The workers of the Stalinist party are in a closed milieu, hypnotised by lies for a long time. Now the persecution from the war begins. Our criticisms seem part of the persecution and suddenly we appear to support them—because of the bourgeois persecution. I don't say even that we will actually vote for them—by November the situation can change. The leaders can carry out their betrayal.

Hansen: The manoeuvre seems to me to bear some resemblance to our united front proposal to the CP at the time of the anti-fascist demonstrations. At the first demonstration, we made no such proposals. Many of the rank and file of our party criticised us. At the second demonstration we made such a proposal. It brought immediate response from the Stalinists. The rank and file were favourably impressed and questioned their leaders. The leaders were forced to launch a new campaign against us. We gained some members as a result.

Trotsky: The analogy holds except that then we had the initiative. Now they have the initiative. Good, we support this initiative. An investigation is needed, a small conference. I don't wish to exaggerate this manoeuvre. It is not our strategic line, but a tactical question. It is one possibility.

* * *

June 14, 1940

Trotsky: Toledano's speech, reported today in the press, is important for our policy in America. The Mexican people, says Toledano, 'love' the United States and will fight the Nazis arms in hand. Toledano indicates complete fraternisation with the democracies. This is the first announcement of a new turn by Moscow. I have a concrete suggestion, that we publish a letter to the Stalinist workers: during five years your leaders were protagonists of the democracies, then they changed and were against all the imperialisms. If you make a firm decision not to permit a change in line then we are ready to convoke a convention to support your presidential candidate. You must give a pledge. It would be a letter of propaganda and agitation to the Stalinist workers. We will see. It is probable that the line will change in some weeks. This letter would give you free possibilities without having to vote for their candidate.

Dobbs: It seems to me you are considering two aspects of the question. One, you are weighing the question as to whether more is to be gained in numbers and quality than would be lost among the anti-Stalinists. Two, the manoeuvre is possible only while they have an anti-war attitude.

Trotsky: Yes. The Stalinist machine makes different turns and manoeuvres in obedience to Moscow. Now they make a turn corresponding to the most intimate feelings of the rank and file. Now we can approach them or remain indifferent. We can give support to them against their leaders or remain aside.

There is a presidential campaign besides this. If you are an independent party you must have politics, a line in relation to this campaign. I have tried to combine the two in a not decisive but important period. It combines the honest feelings of the Stalinist rank and file and also touches the masses at election time. If you had an independent candidate I would be for him, but where is he? It is either complete abstention from the campaign because of technical reasons, or you must choose between Browder and Norman Thomas. We can accept abstention. The bourgeois state deprived us of the possibility of running our candidate. We can proclaim that everyone is a faker. That is one thing, but events confirming our proclamation is another. Shall we follow negative or dynamic politics? I must say that during the conversation I have become still more convinced that we must follow the dynamic course. However, I propose only a serious investigation, a discussion, and then a conference. We must have our own politics. Imagine the effect on the Stalinist rank and file. It would be very good. They expect from such a terrible enemy as us that we will throw very cold water on them. We will surprise them with some terribly hot water.

Cannon: They will probably make a change before we return.

Trotsky: Yes it is quite likely.

Cannon: We must exercise great caution in dealing with the Stalinists in order not to compromise ourselves. Yesterday's discussion took a one-sided channel regarding our relations in the unions, that we act only as attorneys for the progressive labour fakers. This is very false. Our objective is to create our own forces. The problem is how to begin. All sectarians are independent forces—in their own imagination. Your impression that the anti-Stalinists are rival labour fakers is not quite correct. It has that aspect, but it has other aspects too. Without opposition to the Stalinists we have no reason for existing in the unions. We start as oppositionists and become irreconcilable. Where small groups break their necks is that they

scorn manoeuvres and combinations and never consolidate anything. At the opposite extreme is the Lovestone group.

In one union we began without any members, the way we usually begin. Up to the time of the war it was hard to find a more fruitful ground than the anti-Stalinist elements. We began with this idea, that it is impossible to play a role in the unions unless you have people in the unions. With a small party, the possibility to enter is the first essential. In this union we made a combination with syndicalist elements. It was an exceptional situation, a small weak bureaucracy, most of whose policies were correct and which was against the Stalinists. It was incomprehensible that we could play any role except as an opposition to the Stalinists who were the most treacherous elements in the situation. We formed a tacit bloc with the one possibility to enter the union freely. We were weak numerically, strong politically. The progressives grew, defeated the Stalinists. We grew too. We have 50 members and may possess soon 50 more. We followed a very careful policy—not to have sharp clashes which were not necessary anyway so far, so as not to bring about a premature split—not to let the main fight against the Stalinists be obscured. The maritime unions are an important section in the field. Our first enemy there is the Stalinists. They are the big problem. In new unions such as the maritime—which in reality surged forward in 1934, shattering the old bureaucracy, the Stalinists came to the fore. The old-fashioned craft unionists cannot prevail against the Stalinists. The struggle for control is between us and the Stalinists. We have to be careful not to compromise this fight. We must be the classical intransigent force. The Stalinists gained powerful positions in these unions, especially in the auto union. The Lovestoneites followed the policy outlined by Trotsky yesterday—attorneys for the labour fakers, especially in auto. They disappeared from the scene. We followed a more careful policy. We tried to exploit the differences between the Martin gang and the Stalinists. For a while we were the left wing of the Martin outfit, but we extricated ourselves in the proper time. Auto is ostensibly CIO but in reality the Stalinists are in control. Now we are coming forward as the leading and inspiring circle in the rank and file that has no top leaders, that is anti-Stalinist, anti-patriotic, anti-Lewis. We have every chance for success. We must not overlook the possibility that these chances developed from experiments in the past period to exploit differences between union tops. If we had taken a sectarian attitude we would still be there.

In the food unions there was an inchoate opposition to the Stalinists. There were office seekers, progressives, former CPers. We have only a few people. We must link ourselves with one or the other to come forward. Later we will be able to come forward. Two things can compromise us. One, confusion with the Stalinists. Two, a purist attitude. If we imagine ourselves a power, ignoring the differences between

the reactionary wings, we will remain sterile.

Dobbs: The general situation leads me to believe that we would lose more than we would gain from giving the impression that we are locking arms with the Stalinists. We have made connections with reactionary people but at the same time we have gained some very good trade union elements, bringing them closer to true Bolshevism. We have gained additional footholds. In one basic union we have 22 comrades in the rank-and-file movement. Some playing a very important role. At the last convention one comrade especially got the biggest ovation at the convention when he made his speech. Prior to the convention we had only a small nucleus. Since then we have grown among the rank and file.

Trotsky: Can we get them to go against Roosevelt?

Dobbs: Yes.

Trotsky: For whom will they vote?

Dobbs: I don't know. Maybe Roosevelt. For us to turn to the Stalinists will sow real confusion in their minds. It should not be rushed in any case.

Trotsky: I believe we have the critical point very clear. We are in a bloc with so-called progressives—not only fakers but honest rank and file. Yes they are honest and progressives but from time to time they vote for Roosevelt—once in four years. This is decisive. You propose a trade union policy not a Bolshevik policy. Bolshevik policies begin outside the trade unions. The worker is an honest trade unionist but far from Bolshevik politics. The honest militant can develop but it is not identical with being a Bolshevik. You are afraid to become compromised in the eyes of the Rooseveltian trade-unionists. They on the other hand are not worried in the slightest about being compromised by voting for Roosevelt against you. We are afraid of being compromised. If you are afraid, you lose your independence and become half-Rooseveltian. In peace time this is not catastrophic. In war time it will compromise us. They can smash us. Our policy is too much for pro-Rooseveltian trade unionists. I notice that in the *Northwest Organiser* this is true. We discussed it before, but not a word was changed; not a single word. The danger—a terrible danger—is adaptation to the pro-Rooseveltian trade unionists. You don't give any answer to the elections, not even the beginning of an answer. But we must have a policy.

It is not necessary now to vote for Browder. We are against Roosevelt. As for Norman Thomas he is just a political misunderstanding. Browder however is a tremendous handicap because he has a revolutionary attitude toward the imperialist war, etc. I understand that the situation is difficult.

What I propose is a manifesto to the Stalinist workers, to say that for five years you were for Roosevelt, then you changed. This turn is in the right direction. Will you develop and continue this

policy or not? Will you let the leaders change it or not. Will you continue and develop it or not? If you are firm we will support you. In this manifesto we can say that if you fix a sharp programme for your candidate, then we will vote for him. I see no reason why we can't say this with these ifs. Does this signify that we have changed our trade union policy? Not at all. We continue to oppose them as before. We say, if you seriously consider your attitude to Roosevelt you would have such and such policy in the trade unions. But you don't have such a policy there. We can't go along with you in the trade unions.

I would be very glad to hear even one single word from you on policy in regard to the presidential election.

Cannon: It is not entirely correct to pose the problem in that way. We are not with the pro-Roosevelt militants. We developed when the Stalinists were pro-Rooseveltian. Their present attitude is conjunctural. It is not correct that we lean towards Roosevelt. Comrade Trotsky's polemic is a polemic for an independent candidate. If we were opposed to that then his account would be correct. For technical reasons we can't have an independent candidate. The real answer is independent politics.

It is a false issue: Roosevelt versus the Stalinists. It is not a bonafide class opposition to Roosevelt. Possibly we could support Browder against Roosevelt, but Browder would not only repudiate our votes, but would withdraw in favour of Roosevelt.

Trotsky: That would be the very best occurrence for us. After laying down our conditions for support, this capitulation would win us a section of the Stalinists. It is not a strategic policy but a policy for the presidential campaign only.

The fact is that they have developed this anti-war propaganda. We must consider this important fact in the life of the American workers. We begin with nothing being done about the Stalinists.

The 'progressive' rank and file are a kind of semi-fabrication. They have class struggle tendencies but they vote for Roosevelt. They are not formed politically. The rank-and-file Stalinists are not worse. They are caught in a machine. They are disciplined, political. Our aim is to oppose the Stalinist worker to the machine. How accomplish this? By leaving them alone? We will never do it. By postponing? That is not a policy.

We are for an independent labour ticket. But we don't even have this expressed in our press. Why? Because our party is embarrassed. It has no line on the elections.

Last January we discussed a campaign in the unions to have our own trade union presidential candidate. We were to propose to him that we would vote for him if he were nominated. Even Lewis. We were to begin the campaigning for a labour president. But not a thing was done. Nothing appeared. Nothing in the Northwest Organiser.

Dobbs: Perhaps it was my fault—

Trotsky: No. That is the bad Hitler theory of history—

I can't explain it by negligence. Nor just because it is a trade union paper with just a trade union policy. The members of the party could write letters to the editor. What do their trade union leaders believe? Why can't our comrades write to the *Northwest Organiser*? We discussed in detail the technical details. But nothing was done. Why? It signifies an immediate clash with the Rooseveltians—not the rank and file—but a clash with our allies, the machine, the conscious Rooseveltians, who would immediately attack, a clash with our own class enemies such as Tobin.

Cannon: It is necessary to counterpose trade union candidates in the field. That would retain our following. But what I can't accept is Browder as a symbol of the class struggle.

Trotsky: That is a bit of false polemics. In January I didn't propose Browder. But you are reduced to Browder or Roosevelt. Why this lack of initiative? Why were these six months not utilised? Why? It is not reduced to an individual fight, it has general reasons. I discussed with O'Shea two years ago on this same problem and this same necessity. With Jones too. But the *Northwest Organiser* remains unchanged. It is a photograph of our adaptation to the Rooseveltians.

Understand, I don't believe that it would be advisable for important comrades to start such a campaign. But even totally unknown comrades could write such letters. He could write the Executive Board of the union, asking them what will be the fate of the workers. What kind of a president do we need? At least five months were not utilised. Completely lost. So we should lose two or three months more?

And Browder suddenly becomes an ideal political figure for me! A little false polemics.

How reach a compromise? I ask two or three hundred Stalinist workers. That is the minimum requirement. We can get them by holding their leaders to a class struggle policy. Are you ready to impose this class struggle line on your leader, we ask. Then we will find common ground.

It is not just to write a manifesto, but to turn our political face to the Stalinist workers. What is bad about that? We begin an action against the Stalinists; what is wrong with that?

I propose a compromise. I will evaluate Browder 50 per cent lower than I estimate him now in return for 50 per cent more interest from you in the Stalinist party.

Cannon: It has many complications.

Jeb: On the question of adaptation to Roosevelt's programme by our trade union comrades. Is it true? If so it was necessary for our trade union work. The trade unionists are for Roosevelt. If we want to

make headway we have to adapt—by not unfolding our full programme—in order to get a foothold for the next stage. We are still at the beginning despite all the work done. That is one thing, but to make it a permanent policy is another thing. We are against that. What is the right time to make the break. Have we exhausted the period of adaptation?

Cannon: The failure of the campaign to develop an independent ticket is due to inertia at the centre, the faction fight, the tendency to wait in place of energetic application of policies, a feeling of smallness of the party—psychological faults rather than conscious or unconscious adaptation to the Rooseveltians. The bloc in the trade unions is not a political bloc but a bloc over trade union policy. It is possible to have an active policy in opposition. In 1936 we supported the Socialist Party, not Roosevelt, despite the trade unionists giving open support to Roosevelt. The ideal situation would be for Comrade Trotsky to use his influence with the government to change the laws.

Trotsky: That is the job of the SWP.

Cannon: We should have started a campaign six months ago. During the faction fight there was a congressional campaign. Browder was running. Our policy was that it would be best to have our own candidate. We proposed this, but it was sabotaged by Abern.

But to go out and campaign for Browder, just at the time of war, when we are trying to explain our policy—

Trotsky: It is precisely one of the elements of explaining that theirs is a false policy.

Cannon: Support for a labour candidate can be justified, but the CP is entirely different. The CP is not a genuine workers' party.

Dobbs: We are caught short. The criticisms are very pertinent. They will be productive of better results you may be certain. But we feel that this

policy would be completely disastrous. We would prefer to sacrifice the manoeuvre for Jimmy Higgins work and put our own candidate on the ballot. It is not a question of Roosevelt. We will do anything short of supporting the Stalinists in order to go against Roosevelt.

Trotsky: Good. But why not write a manifesto, addressing them? Give them arguments understandable to them?

But we don't have a candidate. It is now too late to have a candidate. What is your policy?

Good—we will abandon voting for Browder. We will abandon a manifesto. We will make a leaflet. You would agree with a leaflet on the above lines? We can state our differences with the CP: your party accepts the class struggle only on accidental grounds.

... And if the Stalinist worker comes up to you and asks, will you vote for our candidate? We are a serious party, where do you stand? We must give him a serious answer. We must say, yes we will vote for him.

No party is homogeneous, not even the Stalinist party. We cannot change the party but only introduce a wedge to start some of them moving toward us.

Cannon: In 1920 in the first year of the CP in this country, we had a situation similar to this. We were in illegality. A few months before the election and impossible to run our own candidate. We openly boycotted the elections. It was completely ineffective.

Lenin wrote us a letter. He held that we should have voted for Debs. But at that time there was a strong psychological separation from the SP. Lenin's statement produced quite a shock. And Debs was in prison—not a Browder.

Trotsky: Yes. Although Browder is condemned to prison.

Cannon: There has not been a direct attack or approach to the Stalinists for some years. Could it be possible?

June 15, 1940

Hansen: Yesterday Comrade Trotsky made some remarks about our adaptation to the so-called progressives in the trade unions, he mentioned the line of the Northwest Organiser and also our attitude in connection with the elections and the Stalinists. I wish to point out that this is not something completely new on Comrade Trotsky's part. More than two years ago during the discussion over the Transitional Programme, he discussed exactly these same points and had exactly the same position, with due regard for the difference in time and that then it was not the elections but the farmer-labour party that was to the fore. Comrade Trotsky has also written some letters regarding the Stalinists and the need for a more positive line toward them. In the past faction fight

too, Comrade Trotsky mentioned in his polemic 'From a Scratch to the Danger of Gangrene' the following point, which he underlined: 'More than once the party will have to remind its own trade unionists that a pedagogical adaptation to the more backward layers of the proletariat must not become transformed into a political adaptation to the conservative bureaucracy of the trade unions.' I am wondering if Comrade Trotsky considers that our party is displaying a conservative tendency in the sense that we are adapting ourselves politically to the trade union bureaucracy.

Trotsky: To a certain degree I believe it is so. I cannot observe closely enough to be completely

certain. This phase is not reflected in the *Socialist Appeal* well enough. There is no internal bulletin for the trade unionists. It would be very good to have such a bulletin and to publish controversial articles on our trade union work. In observing the *North-west Organizer* I have observed not the slightest change during a whole period. It remains a-political. This is a dangerous symptom. The complete neglect of work in relation to the Stalinist party is another dangerous symptom.

Turning to the Stalinists does not mean that we should turn away from the progressives. It means only that we should tell the truth to the Stalinists, that we should catch the Stalinists beforehand in their new turn.

It seems to me that a kind of passive adaptation to our trade union work can be recognised. There is not an immediate danger, but a serious warning indicating a change in direction is necessary. Many comrades are more interested in trade union work than in party work. More party cohesion is needed, more sharp manoeuvring, a more serious systematic theoretical training; otherwise the trade unions can absorb our comrades.

It is a historic law that the trade union functionaries form the right wing of the party. There is no exception to this. It was true of the Social Democracy; it was true of the Bolsheviks too. Tomsky was with the right wing you know. This is absolutely natural. They deal with the class, the backward elements; they are the party vanguard in the working class. The necessary field of adaptation is among the trade unions. That is why the pressure of the backward elements is always reflected through the trade union comrades. It is a healthy pressure; but it can also break them from the historic class interests—they can become opportunists. The party has made serious gains. These gains were possibly only through a certain degree of adaption; but on the other hand we must take measures to circumvent dangers that are inevitable. I have noticed only some serious symptoms which indicate the need for more cohesion, more emphasis on the party. Our comrades must be in the first line party members, and only in the second line trade union members. This is especially true for trade union functionaries and editors. . . .

Before we go on—I have just received the latest number of *Labor Action*. Shachtman is calling for a new slogan, 'Let's have a programme for peace not war.' But it is war not peace. This is a pacifist tendency. It is no programme for war which is inevitable.

Canon: Can the Stalinists be regarded in any important sense as different from any other labour party or grouping? Are tactics applicable to the socialists, etc., also applicable to them? There is a strong tendency to regard the Stalinists as different. Not as a labour tendency. The crassest expression of this tendency is exhibited in the American Labour Party in New York. They regard the Stalinists not

as a working class party but as an agency of a foreign power. This was the position of Lovestone and Hook on the Browder passport case. It was Burnham's position in the CC. We held for critical defence. If O'Neal, for example, were arrested we would defend him similarly. There is no fundamental difference between O'Neal of the Second International and Browder as representative of the Stalinist bureaucracy. Both are treacherous in the labour movement. Burnham held that the Stalinists are not a labour movement at all. That they are like German Nazis. We should defend neither. This point is important in elaborating our general political tactics. So long as the social democrats represents a force we must not only have direct opposition but a policy of manoeuvre. Can any fundamental distinction be made between them and Lewis, Green, etc.? In my opinion we at least subjectively have made a distinction. We have not had a policy of manoeuvre since 1934, neither nationally nor internationally. In general should we not re-examine this again? Your proposal raises this drastically.

Trotsky: Of course, the Stalinists are a legitimate part of the workers' movement. That it is abused by its leaders for specific GPU ends is one thing, for Kremlin ends another. It is not at all different from other opposition labour bureaucracies. The powerful interests of Moscow influence the Third International, but it is not different in principle. Of course, we consider the terror of the GPU control differently; we fight with all means, even bourgeois police. But the political current of Stalinism is a current in the workers' movement. If it differs, it differs advantageously. In France the Stalinists show courage against the government. They are still inspired by October. They are a selection of revolutionary elements, abused by Moscow, but honest. If they are persecuted in the United States and remain anti-patriotic because Moscow delays its new turn, this would give them considerable political authority. Our revulsion from the Kremlin will not destroy this political authority. We must consider them objectively. We must consider them from the objective Marxist viewpoint. They are a very contradictory phenomenon. They have great courage. We can't let the antipathies of our moral feelings sway us. Even the assailants on Trotsky's house had great courage. I think that we can hope to win these workers who began as a crystallisation of October. We see them negatively: how to break through this obstacle. We must set the base against the top. The Moscow gang we consider gangsters, but the rank-and-file don't feel themselves to be gangsters, but revolutionaries. They have been terribly poisoned. If we show that we understand, that we have a common language, we can turn them against their leaders. If we win 5 per cent, the party will be doomed. They can then lead only a conservative existence. Disintegration will set in, because this 5 per cent connects them with new sources from the masses.

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


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
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