
September 1943

Fourth International

THE ITALIAN REVOLUTION

1. The Anglo-U.S. Policy of Counter-Revolution

2. The Anti-Fascist Movements in Italy

by Felix Morrow

Stalin and His "Allies" *an Editorial*

Post-War "Planning" *by C. Charles*

A Report on the Comintern *by Leon Trotsky*

The Stalinist Youth Movement *by David Jeffries*

Twenty Cents

Manager's Column

What in previous years has been known as the "summer slump" has become a period of increased activity for us this year. Literature sales generally have increased and those branches which are conducting sales campaigns are meeting with phenomenal success. As the literature agent of Central Branch, Local New York, reported, "Literature sales are on the uptrend."

* * *

Chicago's subscription campaign is drawing to a close. To date they've turned in \$62.50 worth of subs and the latest information from the literature agent is that the drive has been extended two weeks. The additional time will undoubtedly bring the campaign to a rousing finish.

Further word is received from Chicago: "Our literature sales have been good, considering the time of year. The F.I. now takes care of itself, I am glad to report. We used to have to sell it to ourselves and distribute it, but we now have steady customers for 100 copies. It should be 10,000, if more people knew what is worth reading."

"Yours for better business towards a better world."

* * *

Akron also informed us in a letter that the "F.I. pays for itself."

Boston writes: "We have been having very good luck with selling the F.I. by newsstand lately. For the last couple of months the woman in charge has sold seven each month, which is quite good, we think."

Detroit requests an increase of 10 in the FOURTH INTERNATIONAL bundle, up from 50 to 60.

* * *

Seattle has added another activity to an already busy schedule:

"In order not to confuse our newly organized Civil Rights Defense Committee teams, we are having to stage a sub campaign based on individuals. I don't think we'll get the results that we would if we could have teams competing, but we'll be able to handle these later."

Portland's excellent idea for obtaining subscriptions should be tried by all the branches:

"We got a list of 20 names from a Negro contact and delivered four copies of the paper to them. Then we called on them.

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Enclosed subs are the first results and we will get more. The names were not selected—just a cross-section of Negro shipyard workers. We'll summarize results when we've covered them all."

* * *

A friend in Cleveland asks: "Can you send me the article by Leon Trotsky on the Manifesto—Introduction to the African edition. ("90 Years of the 'Communist Manifesto'" which appears in the February 1938 NEW INTERNATIONAL) I

need it for a class. If you have an F. I. of that issue, please send it . . . can the bound volume be obtained? . . . I would like to see an article in the F. I. on Post-War Economy." (Prompt service: See article in this issue by C. Charles.)

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A friend in Los Angeles sends suggestions for future articles: "The more I think of it, the more I'm convinced that a good increasing section of the F. I. should be devoted to reprints of articles which are difficult for us to get in book form. Would you please accept this as a suggestion for the F. I.—you once ran a poll to find out what type of articles were desired and as a dialectician I don't think you hold any 'absolute' ideas on the subject."

A friend in Alabama writes: "It has been an instructive experience, living in the homes of southern families, and before I leave Alabama I hope to write something of a report, dealing specifically with the position of the Negro in the south. The most obvious and encouraging fact is that the spirit of militancy now being shown by the Negro masses at home exists down here too and the white people are all very much conscious of it."

* * *

The following letter from Scotland was gratefully received and we look forward to receipt of the material mentioned with keen anticipation.

"Any spare moment I get I am compiling material to go into an article, which will be an attempt to give you a composite picture with statistics of the life and conditions of women in Engineering and Shipbuilding, Land Army, Regular Army, and the Home."

A friend somewhere in the British army writes:

"I recently received, via England, copies of FOURTH INTERNATIONAL dated April and May, 1942. Although a year old, they made excellent reading and I offer my congratulations to you and your associates.

"Until conscripted, I never missed an issue before the war. Someone over there may remember sending me a bound volume of the NEW INTERNATIONAL in 1939 as a donation. However, I am not 'scrounging' this time: I want to buy two subscriptions to your magazine for 1943. If possible will you please send me the back issues for this year so that I can start reading at January. The second subscription is for a friend in the Indian Command.

"I hope to be able to take out subscriptions later on for 1944. In the meantime I offer you my very best wishes."

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

VOLUME IV

SEPTEMBER 1943

NUMBER 9

The Month in Review

Stalin and his "Allies"

THE LATEST STAGE OF A FUNDAMENTAL CONFLICT

Those who have followed in these pages our analysis of Soviet-U.S.-English relations since they became "allies," were scarcely surprised at the latest outbreak of signs of conflict between the USSR and the "democracies." Before we discuss the present stage of this conflict, permit us to recall briefly our previous analysis. We do so particularly for new readers who are members or sympathizers of the Communist Party and who, lulled into a false sense of security during the past two years by the Stalinist picture of idyllic relations between the "allies," are now being awakened by the force of events.

That we are the firmest defenders of the Soviet Union we proved by warning the workers of the dangers of the alliance from the first. On June 23, 1941, the day after the Nazi invasion of the USSR began, the Socialist Workers Party wrote in its manifesto, "Defend the Soviet Union":

"The Soviet Union is now compelled by sad necessity to seek these alliances. That is necessitated by the isolation and weakness of the Soviet Union. What, however, shall be the attitude of the working class toward the Soviet Union's capitalist allies? . . .

"We warn the workers: the 'democratic' ally is just as hostile to the nationalized property of the Soviet Union as is the fascist enemy. Roosevelt and Churchill will seek two things at the same time: the defeat of their German imperialist rival and also to prevent the Soviet Union from strengthening itself through victory. Even at the cost of weakening their fight against their imperialist rival, Roosevelt and Churchill will try to hold down the world working class, including the Soviet Union . . .

"The fundamental antagonism remains and will come to the fore precisely if the 'democracies' begin to win . . .

"On guard against the capitalist allies of the Soviet Union! That is the only possible position of the real defenders of the Soviet Union: irreconcilable opposition to all the imperialist powers, whether 'allies' or enemies." (*Fourth International*, July, 1941.)

Precisely at the first faint signs of victory over the Nazis, the fundamental conflict between the "democratic" capitalists and the first workers' state came out into the open—last winter and early spring, when the Anglo-U.S. forces successfully invaded North Africa and the Red Army began to drive the Nazis back. At that time we analyzed the disputes as follows:

1. *Territorial differences*: "The 'democratic' bourgeoisie pretends that the issue is one of safeguarding the national 'independence' of Finland, Poland, Rumania and the Baltic states . . . What appears superficially as disputes over frontiers between the Soviet Union and its small neighbors are in reality the steps being taken by the Anglo-U.S. bloc to prepare for the future new super-Wrangels against the Soviet Union . . . Are there politically literate people who really believe that Roosevelt and Churchill are interested in preserving the national independence of small nations?"

2. *The Second Front*: "Why do the 'democracies' insist on operations in the Mediterranean, with a view to invading the

Balkans, rather than invading Western Europe? . . . They remember what happened when the Red Army was advancing in Eastern Poland in 1939, and similarly in Bessarabia . . . If the Red Army continues to advance, the revolutionary example set by the workers and peasants of Eastern Poland and Bessarabia is likely to be followed by great masses in the Balkans and Central Europe. This thought is a nightmare in Washington and London and inevitably they must seek ways and means of preventing its realization . . . That is the class meaning of the preoccupation of the 'democracies' with the idea of a Balkan front which would cut the Red Army off from Europe."

3. *The fundamental question*: "The present disputes over frontiers may be resolved. The temporary relation of forces may dictate to Churchill and Roosevelt a settlement recognizing as Soviet some or perhaps even all the territories now in dispute . . . If the 'democrats' thus have to surrender outposts in Eastern Poland, Finland and Rumania, then they will find new ones in Central Poland, Bulgaria, the Scandinavian peninsula, etc. This incontestable fact demonstrates the basic fallacy of Stalin's bureaucratic and nationalistic method of defending the USSR. Vain is his search for 'strategic' frontiers in the epoch of the bomber, parachutist and tank . . . Just as vain is his search for a 'good' Anglo-American second front. At best Stalin's false policy can succeed in leaving the 'democracies' holding relatively poorer outposts on the Soviet borders. We repeat: the Soviet Union will remain in mortal danger so long as capitalism remains the stronger power on a world scale, i.e., so long as there does not exist the Socialist United States of Europe." ("The Class Meaning of the Soviet Victories," by Felix Morrow, *Fourth International*, March 1943.)

THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE GROWING CONFLICT

Everything that has happened since March further illumines the fundamental correctness of our previous analysis. We were still alone then in writing that "The almost untouched armies of the United States and Britain have stood by while the Red Army has been bled white." Now it is becoming such a commonplace that the columnist Drew Pearson has charged that the State Department "wants to see Russia bled white." (That he struck home was indicated by the viciousness of Roosevelt's attack upon him.) Yet the present stage of the dispute is still characterized by fantastic attempts of the Stalinists to picture Roosevelt as the innocent victim of reactionary forces who prevent him from doing the right thing. Lest we appear to be burlesquing the Stalinist line, we provide a typical quotation from a Stalinist editorial: "We have no second front because defeatism, anti-Sovietism and profascism have been able to block it by blurring and diverting the correct war orientation of the Commander-in-Chief and many of the forces which support him." (*Daily Worker*, August 24.)

To maintain this idyllic picture of Roosevelt requires more and more gymnastic ingenuity from the Stalinist trapeze artists. The Kremlin-sponsored "Union of Polish Patriots" issues a particularly devastating attack against the Polish government-in-exile; Roosevelt simultaneously sends warm greetings to the head of that government. The Stalinist press brands the Greek and Yugoslav governments as participating in a plot for a

cordon sanitaire against the USSR, and the Kremlin backs a Partisan central government in Yugoslavia; Churchill, in his August 31 speech—obviously in agreement with Roosevelt—goes out of his way to endorse the Kings of Yugoslavia and Greece. After months of silence, the Soviet press feels compelled to brand AMGOT as “anti-democratic”; Roosevelt fiercely defends AMGOT in his press conferences. Finland remains one of the sorest differences: it is still a Nazi ally and a deadly base of submarine operations against Soviet shipping; but Roosevelt firmly continues to bar a declaration of war against “little Finland.” Soviet claims to Bessarabia, western Ukraine, western Byelorussia and the Baltic states continue to be firmly repulsed by Roosevelt. Moscow must release the information that a Soviet emissary had been prevented by American authorities from contacting the French Committee of National Liberation, and that the British authorities were preventing President Benes of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile from going to Moscow where he is scheduled to conclude a pact with the USSR. But all this, according to the Stalinist myth, is not supposed to have anything to do with Roosevelt. Finally—not to mention other contradictions of the same kind—Browder’s September 2 speech has to warn that Soviet-American relations are bound “to deteriorate sharply” if the situation continues, and he even imputes “bad faith” toward the Soviet Union; yet his formula requires him to leave Roosevelt and even Hull without blemish. Who is fooled by this combination of all-out attack on Roosevelt’s foreign policy and all-out support of Roosevelt and his war policies? Certainly not Washington. Only the workers, the loyal friends of the Soviet Union, are fooled, confused, disoriented—and that means to deal terrible blows against the Soviet Union, for only if they are clear-sighted and prepared can the class-conscious workers defend it well.

ONCE AGAIN ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE As Nazi power begins to crack, the question of the future organization of Europe becomes more and more an immediate problem. Every class-conscious worker, every real friend of the Soviet Union, wants a Europe which can never again be a battering-ram against the Soviet Union—and that means a socialist Europe.

But the Kremlin in all its actions indicates its hostility to the European socialist revolution. Let us note here only the two latest indications.

Quite correctly, the Soviet press condemns the various plans for European or regional federations as being designed to serve as a *cordon sanitaire* against the Soviet Union. The universal conviction of the masses everywhere that Europe must be unified if a third world war is to be prevented is undoubtedly being manipulated to secure popular support for federations which would inevitably be pitted against the Soviet Union. But what alternative is offered to the masses by the Kremlin? Here is a typical example of its attacks on capitalist proposals for European “unity”—and a typical example of its failure to propose a progressive alternative. The article appeared in the Soviet organ, *War and the Working Class*:

“Every logically thinking person understands that to the Soviet Union—the biggest power on the continent which in the course of the war has revealed its state and military strength—will belong one of the leading roles in the organization of the post-war reconstruction of Europe and of the whole world. Nevertheless, anti-democratic and semi-fascist elements are trying to prevent the participation of the USSR in the organization of the post-war world and are building the most fantastic plans in this direction, clearly hostile to the Soviet Union.” (*Sunday Worker*, July 25.)

In this Stalinist conception of “one of the leading roles” for the USSR in organizing Europe there is not the faintest hint of a socialist solution. Its collaborators would be the great imperialist powers. What kind of Europe would they organize together? Obviously it would remain capitalist in structure. In truth, even this proposal is not meant seriously by the Kremlin. *It has no real proposals for the unification of Europe.* On the one hand the Soviet bureaucracy does not want a socialist Europe, for the revolutionary wave in Europe would inspire the Soviet masses to put an end to the privileges and power of the bureaucracy and revive the Soviet and party democracy of the early years. On the other hand, the Soviet bureaucracy knows that, even with its participation, a unified capitalist Europe would be a dagger at the heart of the workers’ state. Hence the course followed by the Kremlin simply comes down to keeping Europe disunited.

The formation of the “Free Germany Committee” likewise indicates the Kremlin’s perspective of a capitalist but disunited Europe. The launching of this committee undoubtedly is, as Alexander Werth, Moscow correspondent, was permitted to cable, “part of a ‘Russian insurance policy’ against various ‘political surprises’ which, it is widely felt, may be hatched through various elements in the Allied countries.” (*New York Times*, July 25.) That is to say, it is aimed to win Germany to collaboration with the Soviet Union as against the Allies and their European satellites. To this end, the committee is conducting a vigorous campaign by leaflets and radio from Moscow, assuring the German bourgeoisie and Junkers that, if they accept Stalin’s terms, capitalism will be retained in Germany, its army preserved, and the country saved from dismemberment. In short, Stalin is competing with his “allies” in offering the German capitalist class terms for making peace. Stalin’s basic reasoning is quite clear and superficially plausible: Germany after its defeat will not be a threat again to the USSR for a decade or two; meanwhile its industrial resources can serve to rebuild the Soviet Union. At bottom, however, this kind of calculation is no better than that of the despot who said: “After me the deluge.” No matter how close the relations of a capitalist Germany and the Soviet Union would be in the first years, the inevitable outcome would be a new imperialist attempt to utilize the resources of all Europe in a new invasion of the Soviet Union. Let us recall that, as the outcasts of Europe, Germany and the USSR were joined together even in the most secretive military collaboration until Hitler came to power! In twenty years there would be a new Hitler, if capitalism is permitted to survive in central Europe. Yet that is all that Stalin offers the European and Soviet proletariat.

CHURCHILL WONDERS: WILL STALIN SURVIVE THE WAR? In his August 31 speech, Churchill appeared to pay Stalin an extraordinary compliment: no other regime, he said, could have survived the defeats and sufferings visited upon the Soviet peoples. But was Churchill aiming to pay a graceful tribute to Stalin’s regime? Or was he—his speech was in large part an attempt to justify the continued state of disagreement with the Kremlin—attempting to turn the minds of his class to the thought that the continuation of the Stalin regime, or a similarly bureaucratic successor, could not be safely counted upon?

Reactionaries like Rickenbacker, thinking in terms of the perpetuation of the Kremlin’s bureaucratic regime for a long time to come, are ready to go half-way in finding a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet state. More far-seeing, Churchill cannot but wonder whether concessions made to Stalin will not turn out to be useless in the end. Churchill is a life-long student of revolutions; as he explained in his first speech after Badoglio

assumed office, he knows that revolutions undergo various phases and mutations. He knows that the Kremlin bureaucracy is but a phase, product of the isolation, exhaustion and economic backwardness of the Soviet Union after the civil war. He knows that revolutions are certain to come in Europe and that before long they may find a response in the Soviet masses which will topple the bureaucracy. What value, then, of any agreement with Stalin?

Better to concede nothing, seize every possible bastion against the European revolution and the Soviet Union. If this conception is not firmly fixed in the minds of Churchill and Roosevelt as yet, the first phases of revolution in Europe will drive them towards it.

Rickenbacker's Report on the USSR

WHAT RICKENBACKER LIKED IN THE USSR Captain Edward V. Rickenbacker is a bourgeois with a keen sense of what is useful to his class. He showed that six months ago when, rescued in the southern Pacific, he promptly began to wave the bloody shirt against absenteeism, high wages, a \$25,000 limitation on Big Business salaries, etc. He is showing that again now, on his return from a War Department mission to the Soviet Union. In his press interviews and radio broadcasts he is skillfully coupling admiration of the heroism of the Red Army with warm praise of Stalin's reactionary foreign and domestic policies—policies which, Rickenbacker understands very well, are serving not the Soviet Union and the world working class but the world bourgeoisie.

Rickenbacker saw many things in the Soviet Union which serve his class, and he gleefully points them out. "Russia has been moving to the right," he says, "away from Bolshevism in the direction of capitalism." He is pleased by the compulsions employed against the Soviet workers: "They have no labor difficulties," i.e., the workers have no way to object. "They have no absenteeism problem," thanks to reprimands for lateness backed up by wage-cuts, cuts in the offending worker's rations and, in "flagrant" cases, dismissal and "the bread line." He likes also the "incentive pay" system which leads further and further away from equality of wages, for he knows how that tends to divide the workers. Similarly he praises the "compulsory overtime" system which forces everyone to work an 11-hour day six days a week.

Above all he is pleased with the fact that the "iron discipline" does not come from below but from the top; he understands that repression of the masses' initiative serves his class: "Bolshevism in Russia is not what we have been led to believe by communistic enthusiasts in this country. The Russians have been constantly turning to the right. Nowhere in the world have I seen so much respect for rank in the Army as I witnessed in Russia from the bottom to the top, which is in the direction of capitalism and democracy. Officers' uniforms have in great measure been copied from the old Czaristic designs, and the press is selling pre-revolutionary heroes to the people."

The August 18 *Daily Worker* reported the press interview in which Rickenbacker made these statements under the headline: "Rickenbacker Pays Tribute to Soviets." Its story deleted the foregoing details, except for the following generalization: "Leaving his technical specialty, Rickenbacker offered the novel opinion that 'Russia has been turning to the right' . . ." Not wrong, but "novel"! The capitalist newspapers of course happily devoted many columns to Rickenbacker's detailed statements.

THE DAILY WORKER'S ALIBI FOR STALIN The contrast between the other stories and that of the *Daily Worker* was too glaring, and the next day it felt compelled to publish an editorial entitled "The Wily Captain." It evades all the points made by Rickenbacker. It says nothing about the compulsions employed against the Soviet workers or the return to Czarist ranks and methods in the Red Army. It says nothing about Rickenbacker's warmest praise of Stalin, that "anyone who knows his history knows that Stalin has been opposed to world revolution." Instead the *Daily Worker* erects a straw man to knock down: "Rickenbacker has 'discovered' that the Soviet workers receive incentive pay. . . . According to him this is 'capitalism.' [He] fails to explain that no one in the Soviet Union receives millions in profits, that there is no exploitation of one class by another—the basic facts of Soviet socialism which explain the high degree of national unity he found there."

But Rickenbacker did not say that incentive pay and the other phenomena he observed constituted capitalism; he stated, very precisely, that it was "in the *direction* of capitalism." To this unfortunately all too scientific observation, the (how rare!) reference of the *Daily Worker* to the nationalized property is no answer. All it proves is that Stalin's policies have not yet resulted in destroying the nationalized economy of the Soviet Union. Thanks to the class understanding of the Soviet workers and soldiers that at all costs the economic achievements of the October revolution must be defended, the nationalized property has been saved so far. But within the Soviet Union the initiative and solidarity of the masses is repressed and undermined by Stalin's repressive measures; and abroad Stalin's counter-revolutionary policies serve to prevent the extension of the October revolution, the only permanent assurance of the survival of the Soviet Union. Thus Stalin undermines the conquests of the October revolution and aids world capitalism. Rickenbacker understands this very well and praises Stalin for it; the *Daily Worker*, even in pretending to rebuke Rickenbacker, cannot refute the indubitable facts he produces.

In attempting to answer Rickenbacker, the *Daily Worker* resorted to the rare and desperate expedient of reminding its readers of the socialist foundations of the Soviet Union. It concludes, however, by attempting to erase the class significance of nationalized property: Rickenbacker's crime of crimes is that "he fights every [Roosevelt] Administration move towards strengthening economic controls and planning—the very things on a very much higher level which make the great Soviet war effort possible. . . ." Thus the difference between capitalist "planning" (which includes Roosevelt's latest grant of powers to the WLB to punish unions) and Soviet planning becomes a difference of "level" which Roosevelt presumably could equal if the workers supported him enough. Here we see the completely reactionary role of Stalinism: to conceal from the workers the most important truth which they must learn to understand—that the real road to planning is through proletarian revolution on a world scale. Here we see the role of Stalinism in the service of Rickenbacker's class.

Canadian Labor's Election Victories

AN EXAMPLE FOR U. S. TRADE UNIONS TO FOLLOW Every supporter of an Independent Labor Party based on the trade unions should acquaint himself with the inspiring facts of the labor victories in the recent elections in Canada. These facts should be told in every union hall; they show the trend of the workers and dirt farmers of this continent away from the capitalist parties; they are an annihilating answer to the pretense of the

CIO and AFL leadership that the workers are not yet ready for independent political action.

The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, based on trade unions, farmers' groups and constituency clubs—a Farmer-Labor Party—was founded ten years ago, a product of the economic crisis. Until recently it had strength primarily in British Columbia and the far western districts of Canada—the traditional stronghold of radicalism in the Dominion. During the last years it emerged as the second party in British Columbia, polling 150,000 votes out of a total population of about three-quarters of a million. On a national scale it showed comparatively little strength in the 1940 elections, winning eight out of the 245 seats in the House of Commons.

But in the three years since then, the workers and dirt farmers have been moving away from the capitalist parties. The first opportunity to record the extent of this development came in the August 4 elections to the legislature of Ontario province of eastern Canada. This province contains one-third of the Dominion's population and more than half the country's industries; previously the CCF had no seats in the Ontario legislature.

The CCF emerged from the election with 34 out of the 90 seats; two other seats were won by Communist Party candidates (under "Labor-Progressive" labels—the Communist Party was still illegal). The CCF won all its seats away from the two capitalist parties—29 from the Liberals (representing the present Dominion government) and five from the Progressive Conservatives, the opposition capitalist party which came out first with 38 seats, leaving the present administration with a drop from 63 to 14. No party won a majority, so a coalition must govern Ontario; but the CCF has promised that it will not collaborate with the capitalist parties.

Every industrial seat in Ontario (its capital, Toronto, is Canada's second city) went to CCF candidates (and the two CP candidates). Many of the 34 elected are trade unionists, mainly of CIO unions.

Of equal significance with the Ontario election were four by-elections on August 9 for the Dominion House of Commons; they showed the same trend. All the seats had been held by the Liberal Party which now rules Canada. The two western farm seats were won by CCF candidates. Of the two in the French-Canadian province of Quebec, one was won by the Communist Party (in Montreal, Canada's principal city), and the other by the newly-formed Bloc Populaire, an anti-war but reactionary French-Canadian party.

THEY VOTED AGAINST THE CAPITALIST CLASS

The main trend is indisputably clear: the hitherto dominant Liberal Party is being emptied, the workers and dirt farmers going to the left, while a section of the middle class is going to the right. Under the impact of the war and its economic consequences, class lines are being drawn sharply. In addition to its victories in labor constituencies, the CCF showed notable strength among young people and lower-income-bracket elements of the urban middle class—a clear indication that these elements are looking to labor for leadership.

The Stalinists supported the CCF only because the whole labor movement was doing so, and are trying to drag the CCF into "national unity" with the Liberal government. Fearful of the effect of the CCF example on U. S. trade unionists, the Stalinists are attempting to minimize the class significance of the CCF gains. Thus a dispatch to the August 15 *Worker* says the elections showed "a lack of confidence not so much on the basis of the Government's war record—Canada's achievements

in the war effort have been considerable—as its domestic policies." In reality, however, the government's conduct constitutes an inseparable whole against which the workers and farmers voted. In Canada as in the U. S., the government's foreign and domestic policies are inextricably bound together.

That does not mean that the CCF has opposed the war or that the workers now brand it as an imperialist war. The CCF has supported the war, but with reserves and criticisms; it has protested the inevitably anti-labor methods of conducting the war. Its left wing (called "Trotskyist" by the Stalinists) claims to advocate a socialist solution to war and fascism, and has considerable strength. The CCF leadership has also increasingly emphasized the demand for "public ownership of natural resources and industries." During the 1942 vote on conscription, the CCF advocated the "conscription of wealth" as well as men; just what that meant its advocates never made clear, but it appealed to the masses as anti-capitalist. In the Ontario election the CCF leader, E. B. Jolliffe, vaguely posed the issue as reaction or socialism: "Every democratic country is moving toward more collectivist organization. . . . Shall it be collectivism of the authoritarian brand, or democratic collectivism?" We need scarcely enlarge on our estimate of the reformist weakness of the CCF program. What is all-important, however, is that the votes of the masses indicated their resistance to the effects of the war and their desire for a break with capitalism and its parties.

Nor do the votes for the rabidly pro-war Stalinists indicate otherwise. They won their prestige among the workers in their "anti-war" period preceding Hitler's attack on the USSR, a period in which they led strikes and demonstrations which the masses have not forgotten. Jailed during that period, Stalinist leaders were not released, in many cases, until long after they turned pro-war. To this day the government has not rescinded its outlawry of the Communist Party. The workers look upon it as the representative of the Soviet Union. These factors, and not its chauvinism, explain the Communist Party votes.

THE WORKERS DISTRUST THE CAPITALIST FUTURE

The relatively small working class of agrarian Canada has shown the way to the giant proletariat of the industrial U. S. This example on the northern part of our continent must be shoved into the faces of the CIO and AFL leadership until they can no longer pretend not to have seen it. The U. S. workers have no faith in the capitalist future; their next great step on the road to socialism will be to break away as a class from the capitalist parties.

Even the trade union bureaucrats admit in their own queasy way that the working class has no faith in the future of capitalism. Thus AFL president William Green on August 17 declares: "We have made up our minds that organized workers of all nations, and particularly the AFL, shall be fully represented at the peace conference to prevent any such debacle [as territorial grabbing]." Green here reflects the workers' distrust of a capitalist peace; but he and his bureaucratic caste propose no way whereby the workers may be "fully represented." That could be done only by a Workers' Government, while the Greens are resisting to the bitter end all steps toward formation of Labor's own party. The fantastic gap between Green's grandiloquent aim—nothing less than a labor-guided peace—and his servile capitalist-party politics is not accidental: it demonstrates the increasing gap between the workers' needs and the inadequate machinery of simon-pure trade unionism. The gap can and must be filled by an Independent Labor Party. The day of its achievement can be speeded by broadcasting far and wide in the trade unions the example of the Canadian workers.

A Split in the Glasgow C. P.

In a previous issue we were able to report the first news of a split in one of the most important centers of the British Communist Party. Further information is contained in the following letter from the British Trotskyists:

Dear Comrades:

After persistent activity by our Glasgow local, consisting mainly of young and inexperienced people, we have managed to drive a wedge into the Stalinist organization throughout the Clydeside, and particularly in the factory which they have considered their key factory for years. A dozen militants have broken away including all the leading shop stewards in the plant.

The dissolution of the Comintern has had profound effects here where the mass of the workers have an international consciousness, and a statement of these 12 rebels should be the last straw for many militants who hang onto the party out of loyalty and in the hope of an early change. In every important shipyard and plant on the Clyde, the CP fraction is split. The workers know it, and are watching the struggle with a keen interest.

The effect of the Stalinist sell-out has also resulted in a new turn toward syndicalism. In the last war this tendency was progressive, one moving towards politics, to-day it is moving away from politics. We have published another 1,000 copies

of Trotsky's "Communism or Syndicalism" (all we have the funds for) as a weapon in the struggle to combat this trend.

With fraternal greetings and high hopes.

J. H.

The Next Darlan-in Hungary?

Count Michael Karolyi, President of the short-lived Hungarian Republic after the last war, writes (in the August 13 *British Tribune*) an urgent warning that a Darlan deal is in the making with the Hungarian white guards. The Darlan is Count Stephan Bethlen, who in 1919 called in the Rumanians to crush the Hungarian Red Army. Karolyi writes:

"Like M. Thiers in 1871, like General Franco in 1936, and Marshall Petain in 1940, Bethlen sought the help of the enemy against his own people..."

"... They will come crawling, as they did in 1918. Then overnight everybody was ready to swear allegiance to the Republic. Archduke Joseph of Habsburg, the Bishops, the Counts and even Horthy, wrote a humble letter. Archduke Joseph went so far as to ask me to allow him to change his name in order to prove how wholeheartedly he supported the Republic."

One could not improve on this incisive characterization of the role of the Republic—a shield behind which all the reactionaries tried to hide during the flood-tide of revolution. Needless to say, Karolyi's understanding of this will not prevent him from trying to repeat it.

The Italian Revolution

By FELIX MORROW

1. The Anglo - U. S. Policy of Counter-Revolution

The future of Italy cannot be considered apart from that of Europe as a whole: the survival of its peoples, not to speak of progress, requires the Socialist United States of Europe. Two world wars have demonstrated that national sovereignty under private property means mass suicide. Between the two wars the industrialized nations—Germany, France, England, Belgium—could not find markets for their goods and their peoples hungered. The agrarian countries—Italy, eastern Europe and the Balkans—had food and fibers, yet could not buy industrial goods or feed either their own or other peoples, nor could they expand their own industries in the face of the superior industrial countries. Everything that has happened in Europe points to the Socialist United States of Europe as the task toward which the burning life-needs of the peoples must drive them during this war and its immediate aftermath.

Hence the class character of the Italian revolution, as of all the others which will come in capitalist Europe, cannot be other than proletarian. As regimes collapse in military defeat or are overthrown by mass revolt, the workers and peasants can move only in one direction: toward decisive inroads on capitalist property. Whatever illusions the masses may have about the reformist parties, the masses themselves will move against capitalist property: the peasants will try to seize the landlords' land, the workers will contend with the capitalists for actual control of industry. If in the course of their struggle the masses fail to create a sufficiently strong and firm revolutionary party which will lead them to the conquest of state power and the defense of it against counter-revolution, then the strivings of the masses will be crushed and capitalism will emerge the

victor. The form of the bourgeois victory may be, for an unstable period, the "democratic" republic, as in the case of the Weimar Republic. But whether finally successful or not, the masses will be driven by their elementary needs into basic conflict with private property. So it was in the revolutionary wave of 1917-23; so it will be again on a far broader scale.

What we are saying is of course the ABC of Marxism. Yet it is defended today only by the Fourth International. All the other avowedly "Marxist" and "socialist" parties—the emigre parties of Europe, the Stalinists, the Social Democrats here, the British Labor Party, etc.—deny that the proletarian revolution is on the order of the day in Europe. Their contentions are enunciated in various shadings, but all hold in common the proposition that the task in Europe is the creation of democratic republics, i.e., bourgeois states. The "lefts" add that "of course" one must then go on to socialism, by which some of them mean a new state order succeeding the democratic republic and others mean socialization within the structure of the bourgeois-democratic state—the latter proposition is cheerfully agreed to by all the rightist socialists as well.

If the great historic task now facing the European peoples is the democratic republic, it should follow that revolutions once unloosed should stay within those bounds. If bourgeois democracy has the capacity to solve the main problems of the peoples, then the masses would not struggle for more. Thus the free play of class forces presumably should produce stable democratic states in Europe, once fascism is defeated. Certainly, then, the rulers of the great "democracies," the United States

and England, should have no fear of revolutions. If the Stalinists and Social Democrats have rightly read the course of history, they should certainly be able to convince their "allies," Washington and London.

Yet the record shows that from the first day of the war the "democracies" have been deaf to the unsolicited advice of these democrats. The pro-Ally Italian anti-fascists explained that "this war can best be won by arming and supporting the European Revolution."* But the only arms they got were as individual soldiers in the British and American armies. Washington refused to accept the offer of Randolfo Pacciardi, leader of the Garibaldi brigade in Loyalist Spain, who sought the formation of a force of Italian anti-fascists to be landed in Italy on such an occasion as was provided by the fall of Mussolini. (In contrast, Washington did accept Otto of Habsburg's proposal for an Austrian battalion; it proved a fiasco because of widespread opposition.) All attempts of the Italian emigres to secure official or quasi-official support for a revolution proved in vain; when they broadcast to Italy they were forbidden to attack the monarchy or the army leaders. This took place during a period of years in which there could be no pretense that the policy was dictated by military expediency; there was no question then of an Allied entry into Italy.** Even where overtures for collaboration came from the side of the British who, it is known, at one time approached Lussu, head of the Action Party, the negotiations broke down when Lussu made a condition of collaboration the overthrow of the monarchy; the British insisted on saving it.

Anglo-American policy since the fall of Mussolini has merely been a continuation of the previous line. The ostensible pretext for the series of official statements made during the week following Badoglio's assumption of office was military expediency: maybe Badoglio and the King could be induced to surrender and thus save the lives of many of our boys. Presumably to facilitate this, bombings of Italy ceased for two weeks, during which—precisely because the Italian masses saw in the cessation of bombings a sign that Badoglio was moving in the direction of peace—Badoglio was able to weather the revolutionary wave, and reorganize the army at least to the extent of weeding out soldiers who were refusing to fire on demonstrations. It is well-nigh certain that at the time Churchill, Roosevelt and Eisenhower knew what since has become clear to lesser mortals: Badoglio would not and could not make peace at that time.

Class Loyalty Across the Battlefields

As a matter of fact, had their sole motivation been knocking Italy out of the war as soon as possible, the two-week cessation of bombing is incomprehensible. Military expediency dictated not only continuation of bombing, but other military actions, as the Italian liberal historian, Gaetano Salvemini has pointed out, in an article he wrote on August 5 (the day after the *New York Times* still reported that "the Allied broadcasts from North Africa commend the House of Savoy"). Salvemini wrote:

"... one would have expected Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt not to have stopped war operations after Mussolini's downfall, but to have carried them on as intensively as possible,

* Typical of the non-Stalinist anti-fascist parties of Italy is the program of the *Quaderni Italiani*—published by adherents of the Action Party and the Justice and Liberty group—which was described and analyzed in the February 1943 *Fourth International*.

**The vain attempts of the Italian emigres to secure U.S. backing are described in some detail in my article, "Washington's Plans for Italy," *Fourth International*, June, 1943.

smashing the Italian war machine quickly and completely, without paying any attention to what the King or Badoglio might do in Rome . . .

"Or at least, if a man like Randolfo Pacciardi had not been kept idle in the United States, but had been allowed to gather around himself a few hundred volunteers, and if he and his men had been available in Sicily on the day Mussolini's collapse was announced, they might have been sent immediately to Civitavecchia, and from Civitavecchia they might have marched on Rome, perhaps unresisted. Even had they failed and been captured and executed, Italian volunteers and not American or British soldiers would have lost their lives, and the impact of the attempt would have been immense all over Italy. The adventure would have been worth a trial. The wise men of our State Department did not allow Pacciardi to go where he could have been useful. But a few hundred parachutists, dropped on Rome the night following Mussolini's dismissal, might have wrought havoc in the most important nerve centers of Italian military administration, and thrown Rome into a terrible confusion." (*New Republic*, August 16.)

Instead, the nerve centers of Italian military administration were afforded a breathing spell, which they employed against the rising masses.

It is only as acts supporting Badoglio and the King against revolution, whether or not they made peace, that one can explain the Anglo-American declarations: Roosevelt's rebuke of the OWI broadcaster who had referred to the "moronic little King"; Eisenhower's commendation of the House of Savoy; Churchill's statement to the House of Commons that he did not wish "to break down the whole structure and expression of the Italian state" or to see Italy reduced "to a condition of chaos and anarchy" (July 27); Roosevelt's declaration that he was willing to have dealings with any element "that was not a member of the Fascist government" and that could "prevent the country from plunging into anarchy" (July 30); the *New York Times*' declaration that "It is likely that domestic political axes are being ground and that anti-Fascist elements are seeking their own advantages. There are evidences that Communists are heavily involved in many of the disorders. Disorder would interfere with the prosecution of the war against Hitler." (August 1.)

Milan-Rome: A Contrast in "Democracy"

After the two-week cessation of bombing, it began again on August 8, with a big British raid on Milan and other northern industrial cities. Then, three times in four days—August 12, 14, 15—Milan received British "saturation" bombings. The city emerged with not only factories but *the workers' quarters* reduced to rubble, the population fleeing to the open countryside and to the safety of Rome.

Why Milan? From the day Mussolini fell it had been the center of the strikes, demonstrations and clashes with the police and troops. There had occurred the most revolutionary acts: the successful storming of the Cellari prison and the release of political prisoners; demonstrations successfully facing down orders to disperse; troops disobeying orders to fire at the workers; seizure of former fascist offices by anti-fascist organizations; there the workers first drove out the fascist "union" officials and transformed the organizations into their own unions; there originated the strikes for peace which spread throughout northern Italy. Milan was the beacon of the revolution. Every Berne dispatch up to August 12 indicated Milan as the center of the rising workers' movement. That is why that experienced student of revolutions, Churchill, had its workers' quarters razed to the ground.

Had the "democracies" looked upon the anti-fascist movement as an ally, the example of Rome shows how Milan would

have been bombed, if at all. In the two raids on Rome, American precision bombers were used, which effectively pin-point bombed railroad yards and military installations. How the commanding officers boasted that only a single church was at all damaged despite the devastation wrought! Think of that, and then think of the saturation bombing of the homes of the Milan proletariat. Mussolini's collaborator for 21 years, the Pope and his property, are allies which must be protected at all costs; but not the Milan workers. The lesser damage done to the strike-paralyzed Milan war plants had they been pin-point bombed instead of saturating the city—weigh the difference in the scales against the destruction and disruption of the Milan workers' movement. Which would have been more valuable, were the real aim the struggle against fascism? The question answers itself.

Needless to say, the "anti-fascists" of the *Daily Worker*, the *New Leader*, etc. said not a word about the slaughter of the Milan proletariat. The day it was announced that Milan had been bombed three times in four days, the bloodthirsty Stalinist editors complained only because Rome also was not being bombed: "The 'Eternal City' cannot be taken out of the war by itself... Whether we are going to bomb Rome again is not a humanitarian question... It is a war question... We cannot afford for a moment to let up..." We, for our part, shall not fail to tell the Communist Party survivors of Milan how their American comrades showed their solidarity.

Why the hostility of Washington and London to what all the respectable world—the Stalinists, the Social-Democrats, all the anti-fascist parties of Italy, and in general bourgeois "public opinion," the press and radio in the "democracies"—says would be a democratic revolution, that is, leading to a bourgeois-democratic republic? The "socialist" and democratic critics of Anglo-American policy are unable to explain its motivation. Denying the proletarian character of the coming revolutions, they cannot explain the hostility of bourgeois-democrats to bourgeois-democratic revolutions.

The "New Leader" Offers an Alibi

Consider, as a prime example, the ludicrous reasons cited by the Social-Democratic *New Leader*, in an editorial August 21, to explain the Churchill-Roosevelt hostility to revolution. Every word of it stinks of philistine servility to the capitalist order. It begins:

"One senses, both here and in Britain, a deep fear of European revolutions. For this feeling there is some excuse in the experiences which followed the last war. Disorders increased military difficulties. And the most optimistic advocates of political and social change were disappointed in the results which were attained. From every point of view there is reason enough for making every attempt to maintain orderly ways of life during the days of rapid change just ahead.

"But there is grave danger that our preference for orderly change will bring us to a stop this side of democracy."

What a vile thing is the mind of Social Democracy! The February and October revolutions in Russia—the only revolutions which occurred *during* the last war—become "disorders" which "increased military difficulties" and therefore there "is some excuse" for the Roosevelt-Churchill hostility to revolution. The *New Leader* is silent about the fact that the October revolution "increased military difficulties" for the imperialist powers in both camps; perhaps this is an oversight and this vexation of both camps at "increased military difficulties" is the *New Leader's* explanation for the whole capitalist world joining together against the "disorders" in Russia! The formula of "disorders" as against "our" preference for "orderly change"

is deliberately designed to denude of all class content Washington and London's hostility to the revolution and thus to justify the *New Leader's* continued support of the "democratic" war. The truth, of course, is that the workers infinitely prefer an orderly change of society, make every effort to secure it, and resort to "disorder" only in defense of the proletariat against the "orderly ways" of the bestial counter-revolution. Under the transforming wand of these Social Democrats the plain enough words of Churchill and Roosevelt become merely the prejudice of tidy housekeepers against those who interfere with "orderly ways."

In addition to this occupational prejudice of neat housekeepers, the *New Leader* adds another explanation: the occupational prejudice of generals:

"For a general it is much more according to the rules to beat an army and receive the submission of a responsible government. Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery can certainly move on more smoothly and confidently if life in Italy, and later in France and Germany, goes on without political change until the troops are in firm possession."

What is a "responsible" government to the generals? The *New Leader* does not say. Before there were signs of revolution in Europe, the *New Leader* joined the Social Democratic and liberal chorus which called the war an "international civil war" which could be best won by "arming and supporting the European revolutions." Now, when the signs of revolution multiply, the *New Leader* tries to make everybody understand sympathetically that "for a general"—"our" generals—it is better not to have revolutions.

Even so, the *New Leader* feels it has said too much, and hastens to add that "There is nothing sinister about our attitude," the "our" including Roosevelt, Churchill, and the generals. We now come to the *piece de resistance*: it seems that it is for the sake of the future of democratic Italy that Roosevelt and Churchill insist on maintaining Badoglio! Here is the *New Leader* argument:

"There is nothing sinister about our attitude. A good argument can be made for leaving Badoglio or Petain or Hitler in his place until he suffers the disgrace of defeat. This would free the succession state of the obloquy of handing over the sword and suffering humiliation. It would have been better for the Weimar Republic if it had come into being only after the defeat and surrender of the Kaiser."

This argument tells us nothing about Roosevelt and Churchill's policy, for it does not offer nor is there the slightest evidence anywhere that this is the motivation of Anglo-American policy. But it tells us volumes about the *New Leader's* perspective. The history it retails is quite erroneous. The Weimar Republic came into being *after* the armistice. The approach to the Allies for an armistice was made before the fall of the Kaiser and at the urging of the Kaiser's generals, and negotiations were well-nigh completed when the revolution broke out. There was thus no basis in fact for Hitler's "stab in the back" agitation blaming the revolution for the defeat. For a decade neither this nor the rest of Hitler's agitation met with widespread response. Nor can one ascribe to this phase of Hitler's agitation a decisive role in bringing him to the Chancellorship. Fifteen years of hunger and misery, thanks to the support of capitalism by the *New Leader's* comrades, is the fundamental explanation for Hitler's rise to power. When the workers' parties did not lead the masses to a new social order, Hitler won millions to his "new" order. When the *New Leader* draws an analogy between a future Italian republic and the Weimar Republic, it means that Social Democracy proposes to repeat in Italy its fatal course in Germany.

And only people who think in capitalist terms and who have completely succumbed to nationalist demagoguery can offer as a

good argument against assumption of state power by the Italian revolution the danger of "the obloquy of handing over the sword and suffering humiliation." The Brest-Litovsk treaty was, as Lenin said, far worse than the Versailles treaty, yet Lenin and Trotsky accepted it precisely to save the revolution. There were those—the Social-Revolutionaries—who had the nationalist mentality that the "humiliation" could not be accepted and tried to overthrow the Bolsheviks. But the revolution survived the "obloquy" precisely because it destroyed the class forces which employ such nationalist demagoguery and which the Social Democrats did not destroy in the Weimar Republic.

If we follow out the logic of the *New Leader*, military defeat—one of the classic conditions of revolution—becomes precisely the time when the revolutionists should not take power, but let the old regime make peace. But the *New Leader* is silent as the grave about what would then happen: the old regime would be recognized by the Anglo-American leaders as the legitimate regime, and would be backed by it against revolutionary attempts.

The Long-Term Role of AMGOT

Is this not the plain meaning of AMGOT? Even the *New York Herald Tribune* of June 29 admitted that "it would be painfully easy for an occupying force, in the interest of 'order,' to freeze Italy's Fascist organization in authority. It is less likely that the Allies would permit the opposite to occur—namely, the riotous competition of anti-Fascist groups for power—during the critical period of occupation."

And what would be done during the "critical period of occupation" would determine, in so far as it lay in the power of the Anglo-American authorities, the future composition of the Italian government. This is indicated in rather cynical terms by the shrewd reporter, Herbert L. Matthews, describing AMGOT in Sicily:

"... What often happens in effect is that the fascist label is removed, but the same men carry on the same functions.

"It is curious to note that Marshal Badoglio has done the same thing on the peninsula. He has signed a paper abolishing fascism, but except for a few officials at the top he has to rely on the very same men who kept things going before...

"The Carabinieri have proved extraordinarily useful, and they were recently complimented by General Alexander...

"... Sooner or later some kind of government will have to be established, and the Italians, who will be consulted about it, will have been chosen by AMGOT in the course of its work. AMGOT will also have developed various trends that one must expect to be continued.

"... Theoretically the people of Italy will have their chances to choose their own form of government when the time comes, but it takes only a little cogitation to realize that AMGOT's activities between now and then will profoundly affect the mechanism and the choice of leaders through which the new government will take form." (*New York Times Magazine*, August 22.)

Thus AMGOT serves not merely present "military expediency" but the long-term political aims of Washington and London. Such "democracy" as will be required to refurbish the Italian ruling class will be carefully dribbled out from the top, while every effort will be made to keep the masses firmly in check. The fundamental motivation of this policy is crystal-clear: if the masses are permitted to move, they will be certain to assault the citadels of private property, for all the driving forces of Europe are in the direction of proletarian revolution.

Because it must pretend to be blind to all this in order to support the war, the *New Leader* can only complain that the

Roosevelt-Churchill policy "leaves out of account the pulse beat of the national will [of Italy] . . . The slight inconvenience occasioned by disorders would be a small price to pay for such evidence of democratic spirit."

Infinitely more serious, Roosevelt and Churchill know that "the slight inconvenience" of a successful Italian revolution would be the spark to set off the European revolution, and that the "small price" would be the end of world capitalism.

An Agonized Testimonial by Salvemini

Those Italian anti-fascists here like Salvemini and Pacciardi who still protest (many of the others are now serving in Poletti's "political" battalion; others, as the Justice and Liberty group announces in the case of Alberto Tarchiani, Bruno Zevi and Alberto Cianca, have been permitted to go abroad by Washington, no doubt on the basis of an "understanding") provide us often with valuable information but they, like the Stalinists and the Social Democrats, are unable to explain the motivation of Anglo-American policy. They make it appear as insane willfulness which is damaging to the real interests of Washington and London. Throughout the war Salvemini has been warning Roosevelt and Churchill that their support of the monarchy and the church hierarchy creates the danger of social revolution. In his latest article he writes:

"They [Roosevelt and Churchill] can manage to embark such a revolution so as to have a democratic rather than a communist revolution. Unfortunately, they are endeavoring to patch up a by-product of the Fascist regime. As a consequence, whoever is prevented from fighting for democracy and feels forced to choose between communism and a revised edition of fascism, becomes disgusted and exasperated, and chooses communism, cursing those who force upon him such a tragic choice." (*New Republic*, August 16.)

There is a very significant development of Salvemini's ideas recorded in this paragraph. He still believes that it would be possible to "embank" the revolution into the channels of bourgeois democracy, and cannot explain why Roosevelt and Churchill will not do so. Salvemini has been offering them quite detailed prescriptions for doing so, since the war began, and one can be sure that his eminent standing as a scholar and authority on Italy has led their brain trusts, if not Roosevelt and Churchill themselves, to study carefully what he has written. Nevertheless, Allied policy continues as before. Up to now, despite the continuation of this policy, Salvemini has retained hope that it would change, and his advice on "embanking" the revolution into democratic channels included the suggestion that "the armies of occupation should prevent an irresponsible extremist clique from seizing power . . . (*Nazioni Unite*, February 4, 1943.)

Now, however, Salvemini appears to have lost all hope of a change in Anglo-American policy and sees as the real alternatives communism or the Allied-supported "revised edition of fascism." The soul of the petty-bourgeois professor "curses those who force upon him such a tragic choice." That is quite characteristic! Nevertheless, if the revolution sweeps on firmly, the petty bourgeois goes along in its wake. "Disgusted and exasperated," he "chooses communism." More than the further unfolding of the Anglo-American policy has driven Salvemini to write these significant words, for in truth he showed his grasp of that policy long ago. Salvemini's words reflect in their own way the depth of the Italian—and the European—revolution. Whatever he personally may do, he knows that not only the masses but also all those who remain true to art and culture, faced with the real alternatives, are going to fight on the side of the proletarian revolution against its "democratic" oppressors.

2. The Anti-Fascist Movements in Italy

The Sources of Our Information

It is important for the advanced American workers, hungering for the facts about what is now happening in Italy, to realize that all present sources of information are extremely meager and unreliable. This fact in itself has political implications and it is instructive to examine these sources of information.

Of the dispatches in the bourgeois press here, the only intelligent ones were those from or based on the writings of the neutral Swedish correspondents residing in Italy; but the Badoglio censorship put an end to that after the first week. The dispatches since then from the Swiss border are obviously written by men ignorant of the political composition of the anti-fascist movement. For example, they refer to *Giustizia e Libertà*, the Justice and Liberty group (now in the Action Party) as the "left wing coalition of all the parties"; designate right-wing trade unionists like Buoizzi and Amadeo as "anarchists" and "liberal socialists" (in reality the "liberal socialist revolutionary movement" is the name adopted in the recent period by left-wing Justice and Liberty groups); speak of the Stalinists as "extremists" when actually they are on the right wing of the movement; and apparently do not consider it important to transmit the texts of such party documents as do come into their hands—the important Manifesto of the Socialist Party was published in *Libera Stampa* of Lugano (Switzerland) but appears never to have been sent to the press here.

To the crimes of omission and commission of the reporters in Berne, one should add the policy of their editors and of the OWI here. There is much interesting material transmitted here by the OWI and released for publication but which is not printed. Examples: a letter from Benedetto Croce, the liberal philosopher, published August 10 in *Giornale d'Italia* and released here August 17, obviously indicating his belief that the workers want an end to capitalism and his fear that civil war is coming; almost daily reports of freeing of well-known workers' leaders; the rather astonishing text of the August 16 decree, which goes so far in a demagogic attempt to conciliate the masses as to confiscate (on paper) "the real and personal property belonging to persons who, having filled public office and exercised political activities during the period from October 28, 1922 to July 24, 1943, achieved a rapid and large increase in their estate for which justification is not rendered"; the official Stefani news agency's frank and almost daily admissions of big strikes and their effectiveness. Do these omissions of material available to them indicate that the bourgeois newspapers are going even further than the OWI in concealing the depth of the revolutionary ferment? In addition, OWI itself does not make public certain material which it gathers, particularly statements and documents of the workers' parties in Italy which indicate fear of the reactionary consequences of an Anglo-U.S.-dictated peace. So much for the limitations of bourgeois sources of information.

The Stalinist press is the only other one which receives telegraph and wireless dispatches from abroad. At first glance these Berne and Moscow dispatches seem very useful; they purport to give the statements and activities of the five principal anti-fascist parties, said to be functioning in a close coalition; however, as we shall soon see, we can take them only as expressing the Stalinist line, and not even as indicative of what the Communist Party workers and sympathizers are actually doing.

The dishonesty of the Stalinist press reports are matched

by the conspiracy of silence of the Social-Democratic press: the *Jewish Daily Forward*, and its child, the *New Leader*. They have access to OWI material from which we are shut off, and undoubtedly have also received certain material from the Socialist Party of Italy. But they do not publish the fact that the Italian party does not take their line of 100 per cent support of the "democracies," nor the undoubted fact of collaboration between the Socialist and Communist parties—the latter fact does not comport with backing the Antonini-Generoso Pope bloc.* *Nazioni Unite*, organ of the republican Mazzini Society, has perhaps even better sources of information than the Social Democrats (some of its principal figures went "abroad" some time ago, it is announced, which means with Washington's collaboration), but is often silent about matters embarrassing to Washington. The Social-Democratic Italian-language weekly, *La Parola*, does not go along with its brothers in supporting Generoso Pope; but like them is an apologist for Washington. The Italian-language anarchist papers, relics of a dead movement, have no avenues of information.

Such are the extreme limits of our present sources of information. One might, of course, take the little authentic information and, in the manner of the scientist reconstructing a prehistoric animal from a few bones, attempt to provide a complete reproduction of the present situation in Italy. Unfortunately the analogy with the anatomical sciences is only a metaphor. In 1931 during the first months of the Spanish revolution, there was neither war nor censorship and letters came with some regularity, yet Trotsky was constrained, in writing from Prinkipo about the events, to say it was like playing chess blindfolded. At this moment we are in the position of not knowing the value or the disposition of many of the men on the Italian chessboard. It is within these limits that we must attempt to analyze the events in Italy.

The Elemental Movement of the Masses

Spokesmen of the various political tendencies are claiming credit for the revolutionary strikes and demonstrations but, with all due consideration of the activities of the underground groups, the stormy movement of the masses bears the marks of an elemental movement from below.

What was the actual state of organization of the anti-fascist parties on the eve of the fall of Mussolini? A pamphlet dated

* Indicative of what the Social Democrats consider fit to print is this incident. The day following Mussolini's fall, the *New Leader* wired several persons for statements, among them Margaret De Silver, the widow of Carlo Tresca. Her statement sought faithfully to interpret what Tresca would have said at this moment; he would not be "unaware of what the Allies would be up to in the matter of suppressing any real revolution. And he would have fought against the enemies of the revolution. Maybe that is why he is not here. For the fact is that the ex-fascists who are scrambling on to the New Deal handwagon are the most serious threat at the moment, including such people here as Generoso Pope and straddlers like LaGuardia. . . . Maybe the people of Italy, if they succeed in their terrible struggle, will be the ones to do the job of avenging Carlo's memory, the job which people in America seem incapable of accomplishing, to our disgrace." Despite its request for her statement, the *New Leader* refused to publish it, for "reasons of the welfare of our entire movement." Margaret De Silver's answer was: "I should have known that a paper willing to push aside any implied criticism of the New Deal's prosecution of the war, and a paper that takes Generoso Pope seriously, would not print my interpretation of what Carlo Tresca would now be thinking of the Italian situation."

September 1942, written by spokesmen of one of the principal tendencies, the Action Party and the Justice and Liberty groups, spoke of "widespread propaganda," an underground press "on an unparalleled scale," the holding of political meetings, "combat groups formed in nearly every town and village," and "a strict coordination of all these units." (In justice to the Action Party in Italy, one should note that these claims were made by emigres here and not in its underground press.) Similar assertions were made by the Stalinists.

If these claims were true, then it was a new phenomenon in history. All other revolutions which have broken out under conditions of illegality of workers' organizations have been elemental movements of the great masses without benefit of organization. Czarist repression was not totalitarian: between 1912 and 1914 the Bolsheviks had a legal press under a thin disguise, and even during the war there were legal workers' fraternal (insurance) societies; yet we know how small were the underground parties of Russia on the eve of February 1917, and how little influence even the Bolsheviks had on the revolutionary strikes and the insurrection which toppled the Czar. Likewise in Germany in 1918, where the Spartacists were illegal but many close to them were in the legal Independent Socialist Party and the revolutionists had at their disposal part of the apparatus of the legal trade unions, the November revolution was essentially an explosion of the masses undirected by the parties. It is unlikely that, under the conditions of totalitarian repression in Italy, the underground parties had achieved by July 1943 more organizations than the workers' parties in February 1917 and November 1918.

The years of underground propaganda and activity are, of course, not only the indispensable means of training cadres for the future mass parties, but are also a leaven among the masses as a whole. But it is significant that the Action Party's underground press, sole source of information about a great strike in March of this year of 50,000 Turin workers, makes no claim that the party led it. We have certain rueful admissions of the class enemy, as in the Pope's speech of June 13, when he complained that revolutionary handbills were being distributed and "propaganda is circulating . . . especially among the working classes, that the Pope wished the war." But these facts do not mean that the underground parties led the mass movement in the great strikes of July 26-28. All underground experience hitherto indicates that the party cadres which are actually organized are too small, when the revolutionary situation develops, to assume leadership of the mass actions. Among the leaders whom the workers throw up for the first strikes and demonstrations are individual party members, but neither the situation nor previous preparation enables the latter to act as part of their organization. If that was true of the best organized revolutionary party in history in February 1917, it was undoubtedly far more true of the reformist and centrist parties of Italy.

After the initial explosions create broad areas in which the parties are enabled to come above ground and operate semi-legally under the protection of the mass movement, the masses come more and more under the control of the parties. The small cadres emerging from the underground are clothed with mass recruits. We can well believe the report from Berne in the very first days after the fall of Mussolini that thousands are joining the Socialist Party daily; it is undoubtedly true as well of the other parties. But speedily though the parties grow in a revolutionary situation, much of the mass movement, strikes, demonstrations, clashes with police and troops, etc., still occur undirected from above. Workers in a given city achieve results which, perhaps, not even a revolutionary Marxist party, thinking in terms of a national and international

perspective, would advocate attempting. A typical example of this appears to have occurred in the Italian city of Como, according to a dispatch from Zurich:

" . . . municipal authorities of Como had announced their city wanted nothing to do with the war and 'henceforward will be a hospital town,' open only for charity.

"All factories in the city working for the Italian Army have been forced to cease production, and all troops, including Army staffs, have been removed from the town." (*New York Times*, August 27.)

The audacity of it—one city deciding to quit the war and putting the army out! Bloody reprisals by Badoglio would be certain—if the city remained isolated.

As the masses strike, demonstrate and clash with the police and military, learning the extent of their strength by action, the masses in one city notifying, as it were, the masses in other cities of their readiness to join together to destroy their common oppressors, they also learn the limitations of their elemental movements. Despite all they have done, the war still goes on. The masses become increasingly aware of the need for something more: really coordinated action on a national scale, and a definite plan to fight for peace and freedom; the need, that is, for a general staff of the masses, a party. More and more the further unfolding of the revolution will depend on the parties, their programs and their immediate slogans, and their relations with each other.

What the various parties are at present advocating is extremely difficult to ascertain from the meager reports available. However, we do know the programs which these parties advocated during the preceding years. Let us attempt an outline of the physiognomy of the principal parties. What follows is based not only on the relevant literature but on discussions with informed persons representing or adhering to the various parties.

The parties will make their way into the masses now primarily through the older workers and agricultural laborers who remained loyal to the socialist and communist tradition and experience of the pre-fascist period. No new parties are emerging as yet. The reason for this was explained by the Founding Conference of the Fourth International (1938): "It is extremely difficult for workers in fascist countries to make a choice of a new program. A program is verified by experience. And it is precisely experience in mass movements which is lacking in countries of totalitarian despotism." Nevertheless, the significant body of experience which the party cadres had with their parties during the fascist period is likely to speed the development of new parties. Perhaps the best basis for analyzing the parties is to sketch briefly the history of the movement since the last war.

The First Chance: September 1920

The Socialist Party emerged from the war as the sole party of the workers and agricultural laborers, thanks to the fact that, unlike most of its sister parties of the Second International, it did not turn chauvinist. During the Turko-Italian war in 1912, the party had expelled some chauvinists; others seceded in 1914; the party maintained a semi-pacifist anti-chauvinism, as a result emerging in 1919 with great prestige, growing from 50,000 members in 1914 to 216,000 in 1919 while the party-led trade unions grew from 320,000 to 2,250,000 (the figures are Zinoviev's at the time). In 1919 it voted adherence to the Third International and its delegation participated in the Second Congress (July-August 1920).

But within the party remained a reformist wing led by Filippo Turati, and opportunist trade union leaders; and the party leadership resisted expelling them despite the insistence

of the Comintern. Vacillation on this question proved to be fatal to the revolution.

In September 1920 came the great test. When the employers refused to grant the economic but far-reaching demands of the workers (including workers' control of production), they occupied the factories. In Turin and other places occupation was followed by the workers continuing production as if they were forever finished with the capitalist class; attempts to oust the workers failed; barricades were erected and the workers prepared for civil war. Serious observers of various political tendencies agree that the Socialist Party had sufficient authority among the workers and peasants to carry the strike forward into a political general strike and a successful insurrection. True, Italy had no coal and little bread, and would have had to face outside capitalist intervention at a moment when Soviet Russia was still fighting Pilsudski's armies and the German revolution was lagging. But revolutions must be made when the masses are ready, and cannot be postponed to await improvement of external conditions. There were risks; and defeat would come in the end if the Italian revolution did not create a response elsewhere in Europe. But the situation in all Europe was revolutionary. Above all, the alternative to making the Italian revolution was to let the masses down, to deprive them of the hope of a fundamental social change, to abandon them to passivity and demoralization. Subsequent history proved that those were the only alternatives.

The reformist leaders of course opposed the road of revolution. The outstanding leader of the party, Serrati, returned from the Second Congress in Moscow at the height of the revolutionary crisis. The pressure of the reformists plus his own vacillations turned the tide. The party permitted the trade union leaders to arrange a "compromise." As the workers retreated, the bourgeoisie regained self-confidence and the fascists whom it financed pressed forward. It was only after the evacuation of the factories that the fascists were able to recruit on a mass scale.

There is considerable evidence to prove that the revolutionary elements in the party, on the basis of patient and pedagogical criticism of the party leadership's conduct during the September struggle, could have won the great majority of the party. A few months later, however, at the Livorno Congress early in 1921, the left elements prematurely split away, under the leadership of the ultra-left anti-parliamentarian Bordiga, to form the Communist Party. After they left, the Livorno Congress adopted a resolution stating: "The Congress reaffirming its adherence to the Third International hereby refers the entire conflict to the coming Third (Comintern) Congress and pledges itself in advance to abide by and execute its resolution." The hasty split in the face of the party's continued affirmations of loyalty to the Comintern obscured the fundamental lessons of the period. The split shifted the relationship of forces in the party in favor of the reformists, and the Communist Party did not grow appreciably. This was the paralyzing situation during the critical period between spring 1921 and Mussolini's assumption of the premiership in October 1922.

That same month Serrati at last expelled the reformists at the party's Rome Congress; the reformists, now attempting to find a *modus vivendi* with Mussolini, were now quite willing to go, openly boasting that they had stayed in the party to prevent the revolution. Serrati now sincerely sought to bring the party back into the Comintern; on December 31, 1922 it accepted the decisions of the Fourth Comintern Congress for re-unification; and, indeed, for some years thereafter continued to proclaim its desire for a united party adhering to the Comintern. Actually, however, during those years the party kept

moving to the right in the demoralized atmosphere after the fascist victory. Serrati had no cadres to back him comparable to those outside in the Communist Party; in the leadership he stood well-nigh alone; his associates (Pietro Nenni, whom he had given control of the party organ, *Avanti*, Angelica Balabanoff, etc.) had hardened into a centrist current which successfully opposed him. They ousted Serrati from control and he returned alone to the Comintern (he died in 1925).

Meanwhile the infant Communist Party, while formally abandoning its anti-parliamentarianism and opposition to democratic and partial demands under Comintern pressure, in practice failed to follow the policy of united fronts against the fascists. The net result was that many workers, however critical of the Socialist Party, could not see the formalistic intransigence of the communists as a real alternative. This fact was recorded in the general elections of April 1924 when, as noted by the Comintern *Inprecorr* (it proved to be its last months of honest reporting), the Socialist Party proved it still had the support of hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants.

The Second Chance: the Matteotti Crisis

Then came the second great test of the Socialist Party, when the murder of Matteotti by the fascists precipitated a profound crisis lasting from mid-1924 into 1925. The fascist regime was isolated. Against it appeared arrayed well-nigh all Italy; a considerable part of the bourgeois press joined the socialists and communists in the outcry against the regime. The bourgeois-democratic parties, the Popular (Catholic) party, the Socialist Party and the rightist unitarian socialists (Turati and Matteotti's party) formed the Aventine coalition. But the anti-fascism of the coalition was limited to parliament and journalism; Mussolini skillfully let them exhaust the ferment and themselves in talk—then began systematic repressions again in 1925 and outlawed the opposition parties in 1926. Its failure to seize its second chance left the Socialist Party discredited in the eyes of millions of workers and peasants.

But where was the Communist Party during the crisis? It was still small, thanks to the premature split; but, according to the claim of *Inprecorr*; in the 1924 elections it had polled more votes in most of the industrial towns (except Milan) than the Socialist Party, electing 17 deputies. True, the communists correctly refused to enter the Aventine coalition, branding it as a purveyor of democratic illusions when fascism could be overthrown only by violence; true, the communists also by various formal proposals attempted to draw the socialists out of the coalition and into a proletarian united front for a general strike, etc. But upon closer examination it is clear that the Communist Party was already then being paralyzed by intervention from the rising Soviet bureaucracy in Moscow. One will search in vain in the Comintern documents of 1924-25 for a serious analysis of the Italian crisis and the tasks of the communists: it was the period when Zinoviev was leading the "struggle against Trotskyism" and "Bolshevization of the parties," i.e., among other things purging them of the revolutionists who would not submit to the Soviet bureaucracy. In the most crucial weeks of the Italian crisis, articles in *Inprecorr* condemn Bordiga for . . . "defense of Trotskyism." The last legal National Conference of the Communist Party of Italy, in January 1926, is occupied with the crushing of Bordiga; instead of a sober analysis of the lost opportunity of 1924-25, it produces boastful reports of party progress in *Inprecorr*. The party's previous reputation for impractical intransigence now merges with the stigma of narrow-minded intolerance of dissident but genuinely revolutionary, loyal and morally impeccable communists.

In emigration the leadership of the Socialist Party split in the late 'twenties, Nenni and others re-uniting with the unitarians (reformists) to call themselves the Socialist Party and return to the Second International. The others (Maximalists) lived on in exile after a fashion, publishing *Avanti* in Paris, and vanished as an organized tendency when the war broke out; their one remaining group today, in Argentina, is anti-war. The Socialist Party of course came out for the "democratic" war and its London delegation is indistinguishable from the most chauvinistic social-democratic exiles.

A minority under the leadership of Pietro Nenni, close collaborator of the Stalinists in the Spanish civil war, defended the Stalin-Hitler pact and took up an "anti-war" position; its Stalinist inspiration was indicated when it turned chauvinist after June 22, 1941. Nevertheless, its "anti-war" position until then appears to have been more akin to the revolutionary sentiments of the socialist workers in Italy and the Nenni group gained a certain prestige during that period. When the majority leadership was bottled up and prevented from functioning in Vichy France, Nenni claimed to speak for the party, consummating various "pacts" with the Stalinists. At some point the majority appears to have declared the expulsion of Nenni who now, however, emerging from a short stay in an Italian prison, is presented by the Stalinists as the official spokesman for the Socialist Party. This claim is central to the Stalinist picture of a five-party coalition whose line is indistinguishable from that of the Stalinists.

The Socialist Party Today

However, the actual line of the Socialist Party in Italy today appears to be somewhat different, not in basic principles, but sufficiently in formulation and direction to belie the Stalinist picture.

The Stalinist line is 100 per cent for unconditional surrender to the "democracies" and complete uncritical support of them as "liberators"; silence on the question of overthrow of the monarchy as an institution; "removal"—not overthrow—of Badoglio, and "abdication" of Victor Emmanuel, i.e., replacement by another king.

The Socialist Party, on the other hand, issued a Manifesto a week or so after Mussolini's fall, which speaks quite differently. The text we have is incomplete, but the cuts in it (and the translation) were made by a pro-Ally source, hence the differences with the Stalinists may be even more pronounced in the unavailable original. The translation states:

"1. A major factor in the political crisis which precipitated Mussolini's overthrow was the opposition of the large popular masses to both dictatorship and war. Fascist leadership had crumbled under the threat of popular insurrection. A majority of the members comprising the Fascist Grand Council became panic-stricken and opportunely shrank from the danger of any internal revolutionary upheavals as well as from the consequences of a military defeat by sacrificing an already discredited dictator, along with some of the symbols of fascism, and by turning their power over to the military caste. There was no dynastic hand in the foregoing movement: the fascist King merely obeyed the injunction of a fascist majority.

"2. The Badoglio government does not mean the liquidation of the fascist dictatorship. It merely represents the extreme attempt to save the monarchical state, the empire and the present social structure. Behind the facade of military dictatorship are gathered many elements vital to fascism; some of them have been strengthened. The Badoglio dictatorship is fascism minus Mussolini. . . .

"3. In all the fundamental problems underlying the Italian crisis there really exists the closest solidarity among top ranking military, the dynasty, the capitalist and fascist leaders. Badoglio cannot give the people anything else. Badoglio

served Mussolini loyally during twenty-one years of fascist tenure. . . .

"The attitude of the Socialist Party before the new government cannot therefore be doubted: we are as emphatically opposed to this new government as we were to fascism.

"4. Some ancient liberal and conservative elements to whom Badoglio has entrusted the management of all leading Italian dailies and other public offices in an effort to simulate a return to constitutional rules and regulations, were never part and parcel of any popular anti-fascist movement. . . . Dynamic liberalism in our country today is represented by those daring elements who are continuing in the tradition of Gobetti and Rosselli. With these elements the Italian Socialist Party is eager to collaborate both in the current struggle aimed at the liquidation of whatever is left of the fascist party, as well as tomorrow in the reconstruction of an Italy which is truly democratic in a modern sense.

"5. It behooves us to fix in the mind of international opinion the true character of the demonstrations and the strikes staged since the overthrow of Mussolini. For those movements were not the result of any despair or mutiny because of war horrors, but rather the clear-cut manifestations of sheer rejoicing on the part of a people who had finally emerged victorious over their internal enemy. . . . When it became apparent that Badoglio was committed to a continuation of the war, and in safeguarding as much of fascism as possible under the circumstances, then all popular demonstrations and accompanying strikes surged into a resumption of the fight until complete victory is won over the internal enemy.

"6. The Socialist Party is avowedly committed to the immediate cessation of the war. This, however, is not to be construed that the socialists will later accept just any kind of peace terms; nor does it mean that the socialists will accept any kind of abuse without protesting or reacting against it. Throughout this war we asserted most energetically the independence of our political struggle from that which certain nations have been waging against fascism. We shall not tire from vindicating the rights and vital interests of the Italian people, even if this should mean being at odds with the ruling circles of the United Nations. . . . We do not hesitate to state most frankly that the Italian fascist monarchy deserves a demand for unconditional surrender from its adversaries. . . . But we appeal to the democratic forces of British, American and Russian public opinion, with whom we feel morally allied, and urge upon them at the peace conference the representatives of democratic and republican Italy be summoned, and with them terms be discussed as based on the pledges contained in the Atlantic Charter.

"7. Recent events have once again proved the incapacity of the old Italian ruling class to establish any relations other than those of brutal force and terror between itself and the Italian people as a whole. The historic task confronting us all is the setting up of a democratic republic in Italy. . . .

"8. In order to unite all efforts in the prosecution of the struggle and give them maximum efficiency, the Socialist Party proposes that all other opposition groups begin immediately their work of propaganda and, in view of the general strike, prepare to achieve the following objectives: liberation of all prisoners and political internees; cessation of the war; suppression of the monarchy; freedom of the press; political organization along syndicate lines."

It is clear the document remains within the limits of bourgeois democracy and support of the "democratic" war. Nevertheless, it differs with the Stalinists in (1) calling for the overthrow of the monarchy—which is entirely unacceptable to the "democracies"; (2) suspecting the peace aims of "the ruling circles of the United Nations"; (3) making the distinction of "the independence of our political struggle from that which certain nations have been waging against fascism";* (4) seeking close collaboration only with those "in the tradition of Gobetti and Rosselli"—which means principally the Action Party and

the Justice and Liberty group—and only perfunctorily referring to uniting its efforts with other groups. Particularly significant is that it is lukewarm not only to collaboration with the Stalinists but also to the oppositional Catholic democratic groups; this indicates that the latter are not considered a serious force today, for the Socialist Party would be unlikely, with its perspective limited to a bourgeois-democratic republic, to have any principled reason for opposing collaboration with the Catholics. On the other hand the Stalinists, seeking to remain within the limits acceptable to Roosevelt and Churchill—including retention of the monarchy—make much of the Catholics and other rightist-democratic elements as part of the “national front,” in order, as in Loyalist Spain, to use them as a conservative counterweight against the workers’ organizations.

Thus, in certain ways, the reformist Socialist Party today appears to the left of the Stalinists.* Once again the policies of the Communist Party make possible the continued preservation and indeed growth of the Socialist Party which, in turn, is certain to play no less a reactionary role than Stalinism in the further development of the revolution.

Action Party and “Justice and Liberty”

The victory of Mussolini in 1925 starkly illumined the bankruptcy of the traditional socialist and democratic parties and the impotence of the Communist Party, and inevitably gave rise to a widespread yearning among intellectuals and students for something “new” in anti-fascism. As might be expected, the “new” turned out to be very old indeed. Individual terrorism, expression of the despair of the petty-bourgeois democrats, appeared: there were at least four attempts to assassinate Mussolini in 1926. “Combat organizations” of students sprang up. In Sardinia, Emilio Lussu founded the Action Movement, with no other ideology than armed violence against fascist armed violence. Carlo Rosselli, Gaetano Salvemini and others established illegal newspapers which preached “offensive and not defensive action,” in other words without a serious perspective. The nature of this tendency has just been summarized very well by Nicola Chiaromonte:

“For these men, irrespective of their political credo (and many of them, at the beginning, would have been embarrassed if asked to give a strict account of their ideas), the first and fundamental act was a mute oath, given to none but themselves and of which only their intimate friends were aware, never to give up, never to have anything in common with ‘them.’ The second act was, when they came to the question of ‘what to do,’ a full realization that no matter how many people regarded them with sympathy and respect, they were essentially isolated, ‘Einzelgaenger’ who didn’t even know where they were going, but only what they were going away from.”

Their desire to oppose fascism was expressed in various heroic but futile gestures and between 1926 and 1929 thousands of them joined the communist workers in the prisons. Especially dear to their hearts were the spectacular airplane flights of Bassanesi and Dolci over Milan in July 1930 and of Lauro de Bosis over Rome in 1931, dropping revolutionary leaflets;

* As we go to press, the September 1 *Nazioni Unite* publishes the complete Italian text of the Manifesto. There are two significant additions not in the English translation: the Allies are described as fighting the fascists “for other reasons” than those of the Italian anti-fascists; and a paragraph is devoted to explaining that the military defeat is so complete that it is impossible for a new government to fight on for a better peace. We can be sure this reflects widespread suspicion of the war and peace aims of the “democracies.”

and various new attempts against Mussolini’s life. But, as Chiaromonte adds, the efficiency of the repression began to make itself felt:

“Until then, the question had been ‘how to do it?’ Around 1930, for many people, the most distressing problem became ‘what to do?’ meaning by that, what to do that could make sense in a situation in which as the regime became stronger and stronger, the people felt increasingly helpless and frightened, and the ground for any kind of effective political opposition seemed completely to disappear.” (*New Republic*, August 30.)

Meanwhile, up to about 1928, the Communist Party had been correctly explaining to these people that “offensive action” under the given conditions was an absurdity. The necessary task was to train cadres in Marxism, firmly grounded groups of leaders, who would understand that patient and slow methods were required to gather the vanguard of the workers together, sink roots in the masses in the factories and on the land, and prepare for the inevitable financial or military catastrophe of the fascist regime, or a revolutionary explosion elsewhere in Europe, which would create the opportunity for overthrowing the regime. The Marxist perspective, as time passed, showed itself infinitely superior to the spectacular but pointless gestures of the petty-bourgeois rebels, and more and more of the youth turned toward the Communist Party.

Precisely at this juncture came the “third period” formulas from Moscow: no united fronts with other opposition groups; characterization of the socialists as “social-fascists,” anarchists as “anarcho-fascists,” etc.; and a perspective identical with that with which the petty-bourgeois rebels were tiring and turning away from: “offensive” action. Had Moscow deliberately sought to perpetuate the independent existence of the confused petty-bourgeois anti-fascist movement it could not have invented a more efficacious device than the “third period.”

This “left” turn explains the renewed vitality of the petty-bourgeois movement, which found its main organizational form for the next decade in *Giustizia e Libertà*, “Justice and Liberty,” founded by Carlo Rosselli and Emilio Lussu after their famous escape from the Lipari Island prison in August 1929. Its first manifesto condemned the “constitutional-moral” limits of the anti-fascism of the traditional parties, and declared itself to be “a revolutionary movement, not a party,” uniting “republicans, socialists and democrats,” to fight for “liberty, the republic, social justice.” As if finding it necessary to explain how a movement with such utter poverty of ideas could play a major role, the latest official history of *Giustizia e Libertà* writes: “Although the anti-fascist combativity of the Communist Party attracted many youth, its attacks of depreciation against the other oppositions and against that same culture (*civiltà*) the destruction of which was provoking a national insurrection of moral conscience and new revolutionary formations, prevented the Communist Party from assuming the function of complete successor of the oppositions.”*

This movement was sufficiently dangerous to the fascist regime to impel Mussolini to assassinate Carlo Rosselli near Paris in June 1937. Despite its confusionism, the movement had important insights. During the Ethiopian crisis, it was the only tendency other than the Trotskyists which insisted that anti-fascism should not support sanctions by the “democracies” against Italy but should base itself on internal struggle against the regime. Many of its best comrades fell in the civil war in Spain, where the Italian anti-fascists became legendary for their superiority in combat with Mussolini’s conscripts; in a

* “Movimento di Giustizia e Libertà,” June 1943 Manifesto of the North American Federation of G.L., 1133 Broadway, New York.

confused way but in the correct direction it protested against the conservative "defense of the Spanish republic" based on dependence on the "democracies," and called for independent "defense of the Spanish revolution." When the "left" line of the "third period" was followed by the Stalinist crimes of the Popular Frontist period, it hardened the determination of the elements around *Giustizia e Libertà* to steer clear of Stalinism, although politically they stood not far from the Stalinists then, and again when the Nazi invasion of the USSR swung the Stalinists back to the "democracies."

It is known that now the groups of *Giustizia e Libertà* have entered the Action Party founded by Lussu, himself a founder of the former organization. In 1931 Trotsky characterized this general tendency as left-democratic, with its nearest counterpart, perhaps, the Social Revolutionaries of Russia. During the last ten years it has taken on a little more socialist coloration, perhaps, but remains "classless," i.e. petty-bourgeois, with considerable overtones of old-fashioned national patriotism. Its principal immediate difference with the Stalinists is probably on the monarchy, which it continues to insist on overthrowing.

The Stalinist Line in Italy Today

As reported in the *Daily Worker* and the weekly *L'Unita del Popolo*, the Stalinist line is breath-taking in its crudity. It is reported in Moscow's "Intercontinent News" (ICN) dispatches from Berne as ostensibly the line of an illegal radio, "Milano Liberta," speaking for a five-party coalition (the others are Socialist, Action, Christian democratic and "liberal reconstruction"); and undoubtedly there is a certain amount of collaboration since all the parties limit themselves to the perspective of a bourgeois-democratic revolution; but we have no right or reason to take the Stalinists' word that the others share responsibility for the formulations attributed to the alleged coalition.

In the crucial eleven days between Mussolini's dismissal on July 25 and August 4, the Stalinists did not call for the ousting of Badoglio and the king. On the contrary, they praised them for dismissing Mussolini:

"We greet all those who, understanding the will of the nation, helped ban the tyrant by action from the top." (*Daily Worker*, July 28.)

Those who protested an Anglo-U.S. deal with Badoglio were answered as follows by the foreign expert, James S. Allen:

"Badoglio is a new phenomenon. He is not Petain. He is not Darlan.

"He is not only the Badoglio of the Ethiopian campaigns...

"He is the man who in this transitory but swift and decisive moment of national resurgence is confronted with the imperative national will for peace...

"Civil war can be avoided if Badoglio makes peace...

"Thus, to raise the slogan of 'No deals with Badoglio,' under any circumstances, even if this would mean knocking Italy out of the Axis immediately... is to befuddle the whole issue." (*Daily Worker*, July 31.)

The same Allen had to explain, five days later:

"When it became clear that Badoglio simply was playing for time... the approach towards the Badoglio government of both the Allied governments and the anti-fascist front in Italy changed. The five-party coalition first increased direct pressure upon the regime and when this failed to produce results called for its overthrow." (*Daily Worker*, August 5.)

The word "overthrow" was thus used for a few days, and there was even an ICN dispatch from Berne of a call to "arming the people." However, another ICN dispatch, this time much more authoritative because from Moscow, corrected the hot-headed Berne reporter and established the precise line as follows:

"The next day [August 4] the opposition launched the following slogan—'removal of Badoglio, the abdication of the King and the formation of a national government for peace.'" (*Daily Worker*, August 23.)

And this has been the Stalinist line since then: removal—not revolutionary overthrow—of Badoglio, and abdication of the king, i.e., not the end of the monarchy but replacement of Victor Emmanuel by Crown Prince Umberto and his nominating someone else for Badoglio's place.

The same Moscow dispatch explains why the Stalinists at first "did not project an immediate veto of the King and Badoglio," because:

"It would have been folly to place as their chief objective on the 26th the struggle to overthrow Badoglio and force the King to abdicate. Nobody would have understood such a slogan.

"In the eyes of the most enlightened people, the King and Badoglio seemed to have been Mussolini's grave-diggers."

As we have seen, "the most enlightened people" included the Stalinists, with their praise of Badoglio's "action from the top" and his role as "a new phenomenon."

The principal function of the "government for peace" would be unconditional surrender to the Anglo-U.S. forces, who are recommended by "Milano Liberta" as follows:

"The democratic countries demand nothing of the Italian people, nothing of the Italian nation... What they demand is the capitulation of fascism and its accomplices... Therefore, the democratic armies who are advancing with this program are our allies, our friends." (*Daily Worker*, July 30.)

It is hard to believe that these dispatches describe the line as it is actually purveyed to the bombed workers of Milan. In all probability, the formulations of the dispatches are for foreign consumption only, for whatever the Stalinist functionaries are, they are not so stupid as to repel the masses whom they seek to influence. Not that the line as actually carried out in Italy is less treacherous; but it is probably cleverer.

The Contradiction in Italian Stalinism

It must be recognized that Stalinism is not only attempting to betray the Italian revolution, but has a powerful capacity to do so. Undoubtedly the principal political cadres in the proletariat belong to the Communist Party. The party has the prestige of having borne the brunt of the underground struggle, as a bitter opponent of Stalinism has recently testified:

"But, for all the barrenness of what was going to be their various 'lines' in the following years, for all the absurdity of their tactics, for all the hatefulness of their discipline, nobody can deny to the men in Italy who called themselves Communists the honor of having been the most stubborn, unflinching and ruthlessly persecuted of those confraternities of stoics who guarded for twenty years the future of the Italian people." (Nicola Chiaromonte, *New Republic*, August 30.)

It could not fail to be so. Under fascism the Communist Party members and sympathizers could not learn the truth about the counter-revolutionary role of Stalinism elsewhere; nothing comparable took place in Italy where Stalinism always remained in opposition to the regime; and of course they would not believe what they read in the fascist press. To them the party remained the Leninist movement it had been in 1922. One should add the fact that the Comintern's party, always able to finance activity and literature, was far more attractive to underground activists than the Socialist Party which secured only occasional starvation rations from its sister parties outside.

But if, upon emerging from underground, the party has the best cadres of the proletariat at its disposal, that is not to be recorded as a source of strength for Stalinism for an indefinite period. Unlike the functionaries who in emigration became corrupted and willing tools of Stalinism, the party ranks who

remained to suffer in Italy are not Stalinists. Indicative of the moral caliber of the Italian communists is the fact that even as late as 1931, when the apparatus of all the other parties of the Comintern had been completely Stalinized, there could still be an important split in the Italian leadership on the question of Trotskyism. Three members of the Political Committee—Blasco, Feroci and Santini—became Trotskyists.

One could not expect their example to be followed by the ranks, for they had access to outside information and political literature which the average underground member could not have. Even more significant, therefore, is the fact that many communists, though failing to learn the true character of Stalinism, developed a strong distrust of the Comintern through their experiences with it. Orders from Moscow or Paris, issued by light-minded bureaucrats trying to "produce," often resulted in disastrous consequences. Typical enough of the 1930's is the appearance of a Comintern functionary in an industrial city with leaflets calling for a general strike. The small local cadres of the party, painfully built over a period of years, would protest that the leaflet distribution would mean nothing except the destruction of the party cells, but would carry out the order. Seized and imprisoned for long terms, they would compare experiences with other communists: the party cells in Mussolini's prisons, as in those of the Czar, were schools of Marxism. A discussion would lead to general agreement of a communist cell that the Comintern orders had been wrong in a given instance; that would in turn lead to deeper probing into the Comintern program for Italy. Thus the jails trained many communist dissidents. Those who had the moral courage to fight fascism would not knuckle down to what they believed wrong in the party. Some of these were expelled or left, but perhaps even more of them were still in the party when Mussolini fell.

Thus there is a deep contradiction within the Stalinist organization. On the one hand it is clothed with great moral prestige. On the other hand those who provided it with that moral credit are unlikely to go along with the Stalinist policy as it changes from the oppositionism of the past 21 years to support

of an Allied-sponsored regime. So long as the struggle in Italy remained underground, Stalinism could identify support of the "democracies" with the struggle for peace and freedom of the past decades. But it is a very different thing to paint the Anglo-U.S. forces as liberators when AMGOT is already operating in Sicily (not to speak of what will happen if it attempts to rule the advanced workers of northern Italy as it rules the Sicilian peasants!); and when Roosevelt and Churchill find their Darlan—perhaps Badoglio himself—and insist on retention of the monarchy.

There is a small percentage of members in countries like England and the U.S. who have stayed with the Communist Party throughout the course of its degeneration. One must remember, however, that they adapted themselves to Stalinism over a long period of time: Trotsky seemed mad to them when he predicted in 1928 that Stalinism would end in chauvinism. In Italy, however, in many cases it will be as if a communist of 1922 would be confronted with the Stalinist line of 1943. One can predict with confidence that the cadres of the new revolutionary Marxist party will come from among these communists and the youth they will train.

There should be no illusions: Stalinism will wreak great havoc before it is overcome. But in addition to the fundamental contradiction in the ranks of the party which we have noted, it is also important to realize that neither this party nor the other parties as yet control the mass movement. It remains in large part elemental and explosive. Before Stalinism succeeds in channelizing it, the movement will in all probability topple many things and create an arena of workers' democracy in which the revolutionists breaking with Stalinism can fight for the minds of the masses. After 21 years of totalitarianism, there will be widespread resistance among the workers to the Stalinist totalitarian methods. Difficult days lie ahead for the revolutionists; but also serious possibilities of success. Above all they and the revolutionists everywhere on the continent have on their side the terrible urgency of transforming the European shambles into the Socialist United States of Europe.

Postwar Planning: New Deal vs. Old Guard

By C. CHARLES

Seldom, if ever, has a class faced victory over a rival power on the field of battle with less confidence in the future than the rulers of the United States. Against the revolutions they know are coming abroad they place their hopes on an "international police force," plus the use of indigenous police agents such as Darlan, Giraud and Habsburg, and the application of a food policy "which will be a mighty weapon and a powerful persuader" against revolution. But what weapon can prevail not only abroad but here against the post-war economic crisis? The terrible thought runs through their minds: In case capitalism weathers the first shock will it be only to fall before later ones?

The gravity of the problem is undenied even by the least penetrating of the capitalists. On the basis of 1940 production levels (and the year 1940 was the most prosperous of the preceding decade) Department of Commerce statisticians calculate that the post-war period will find 19,500,000 unemployed. Here is how they reach this figure. There were over 9,000,000 unemployed in 1940. To these are added the increase by population

growth and the war-induced growth of the working class through the proletarianization of former small businessmen and marginal farmers. The unprecedented technical advances which took place during the war means that 1940 production levels will be attained with a far smaller working force: millions will face technological unemployment. In limiting its estimate to nearly 20,000,000 unemployed, the Department of Commerce calculates that 2,500,000 will be kept in the army for post-war functions.

The total of unemployed thus would be equal to more than one-third of the present working population. And even these figures are grossly optimistic. The year 1940 is taken as the base period. But by 1940 the artificially stimulating effects of the war upon industry had already begun to operate. If the average of the decade 1930-40 is taken instead of the single year 1940 as the starting point of the calculations, the estimate of the number of unemployed is greatly increased. And if the economic level were to sink to 1933 levels, the unemployed would approach 30,000,000 in number.

The quarter-century since 1918 has left its sobering impression even on the capitalists. The confident capitalist class of World War I did not consider it necessary to formulate plans such as preoccupy their successors. The end of the war would allow them to pick up the string of their existence as before, they thought. The present generation of the capitalist class has lost this happy innocence.

The Role of Monopoly

As a matter of fact, the problem that faces the capitalist class today is much more aggravated than faced them 25 years ago. The interim period between the wars was one of increasing monopolization of industry. The continued depression which threatened the profits of the monopolies and trusts as well as other capitalists was met by the monopolists by an ever greater scope of monopoly. The price of goods was artificially kept up by adjusting supply to demand—i.e., by curtailing production, which they were able to do thanks to the strengthened monopolies. Curtailment of production in turn meant acceleration of unemployment. Following the depression, the war has brought an even greater increase in monopoly. In spite of the "prosperity," small businesses are dying off like flies in a frost. The end of the war will mean that American industry will emerge more than ever dominated by powerful monopolies.

Capitalist and reformist economists greeted the early monopolies with the claim that monopolies would mean that there would no longer be crises. This illusory perspective was already refuted by Kautsky and Hilferding early in this century; they showed that monopoly means deeper crises, war and political reaction; their subsequent desertion of the revolutionary movement did not alter the accuracy of their earlier work. In 1916, Lenin, in his book *Imperialism* demonstrated that the monopoly stage of capitalism means ever more ravaging crises. The prolonged economic depressions of the period between the two wars, a period of ever more intensive monopolization of economy, proved that Lenin was right. Even the bourgeois economists who testified before the Temporary National Economic Committee in 1937-38 were forced to admit what Lenin held in 1916.

All schools of capitalist ideology pay lip-service to the slogan of fostering small competitive capitalist enterprises. But any attempt to transform this slogan to effective action will end in a fiasco. The futility of trust-busting is apparent after half a century of such efforts. Even new industries, which in previous decades were the reserve of the small entrepreneur, are now, from their inception in the industrial laboratory, dominated by large-scale capital.

Many bourgeois economists admit that the growth of monopoly was a major factor in the prolongation and intensification of the depression of 1929-40. In pre-monopoly capitalism, bankruptcies and falling prices paved the way to revive production at a profit for the remaining capital. Monopoly, however, with the aid of the state, stands above bankruptcy and maintains prices by curtailing production. This extension of monopoly was fostered by the "New Deal" through the NRA. Still greater was the growth of monopoly through the policies of the war administration. The huge accumulations of capital now bar the way to expansion of peace-time production.

The second factor that makes the post-war perspective darker than that after World War I is the monstrous national debt. It will act as a depressant on the forces making for recovery. If a large part of the debt will be paid by taxation of the workers—and this will be the earnest endeavor of the capitalist class—this means a decrease of buying power in the workers' hands, together with an increase of wealth in the hands of the bondholders, who will be primarily the wealthy. Thus, industry

will have to curtail production for lack of a market. To the degree that the wealthy are taxed, it means a lowering of the rate of profit, which is the driving force of capitalist production. And if resort is had to inflation to repay the debts contracted by the government to finance the war, the printing of money will mean that the workers will be paying the debt through their lowered standard of living, while the wealthy will be in a favored position as real wages sink, remaining small businesses will go bankrupt and be absorbed by the larger concerns. It must be recalled that all inflations are the prelude to economic crashes.

Can the masses be depended on to remain passive as they are shuttled from hunger in peace to rationing in war back to hunger in peace again? The shortness of the memory of the masses, which is the chief stock-in-trade of capitalist politicians, is not an immutable quality. It seems to be coming to an end now. In July 1942 *Fortune* conducted a poll which showed that 54 per cent of the people expected in the post-war period as much unemployment as before the war or more. Among high school youth (and this is highly significant as these are the young workers of the near future) a public survey of November 1942 proved that 59 per cent thought that their chances would be as bad or worse than those of their predecessors.

As frightened rulers used to call in their astrologers, the capitalists now call in their economists. These economists have built up in the last year a really copious literature. Bulk is its major attribute. Their task is to convince the workers at home and in the army that there will be no return to pre-war unemployment and hardship. The workers must be assured that the past is dead and the future will be an improvement. In the words of the letter of transmittal of the report of the National Resources Planning Board to the President: "We need to see more and more clearly the kind of world toward which we are headed in order to maintain the fighting spirit of our armed forces and the ardor of our industrial workers."

The word planning has had up to now a grating sound to the ears of capitalist economists. Criticism of the anarchy and wasteful planlessness of capitalist society has always been one of the most vulnerable spots in the ideological defense of capitalism. But the day when planning was a tabooed subject among the bourgeois economists is now over. Everyone has plans, blue prints and prescriptions to bring the desired results and everyone has exorcisms to banish the undesired results. It is estimated that there are 300 organizations in the U. S. dealing with the problems of the post-war world.

Of course, what goes under the name of planning is broad policy, rather than real economic planning such as inaugurated by the Soviet Union, and possible there *only* because of the nationalized economy. Often the plans are simply ludicrous puffed-up homilies, such as pay your debts, buy war bonds, save money—in other words live right and the Lord takes care of His own.

The Old Guard School of Planning

Amid the welter of proposals, two main lines can be discerned: one that can be called the Old Guard of capitalism, and is headed by the National Association of Manufacturers, which in March 1943 issued the pamphlet "Jobs-Freedom-Opportunity in the Post War Years, the Preliminary Observations of the Post War Committee of the NAM." In the field of more theoretical economics the pamphlet issued by the Brookings Institution in December 1942, "Collapse or Boom at the End of the War," written by Harold G. Moulton and Karl Schlotterbeck, holds the ramparts for the point of view of the Old Guard group.

The second group is centered about the New Deal. Its two basic documents were issued on March 10 by the governmental National Resources Planning Board (NRPB): "Report for 1943—Post-War Plan and Program," and "Security, Work and Relief Policies." The former deals with plans for the immediate transition from war to peace, and for the development of an "expanding economy," plans for services and security and suggested plans of immediate action by state and local governments and regions. "Security, Work and Relief Policies" discusses in great detail social security and relief.

Both groups place as first on the order of the day the preservation of the capitalist system. The NRPB documents were charged, even by such reputable journals as the *New York Times*, with plans that were socialistic; but of course the guiding line of the NRPB reports, no less than the NAM, is the preservation of capitalism.

The differences between the two, within the scope of their common aim to defend capitalism, are real and profound. They entail such questions as *how* to assure the continued existence and survival of capitalism, the degree to which it is necessary to make concessions to the masses, the role of the state, and other important disputes.

Both groups foresee an immediate crucial period between the end of hostilities and the placing into full swing of their respective plans. To bridge this crucial period both groups lay a great deal of emphasis on the "deferred demand." People will need houses, cars, clothes, refrigerators, which were not supplied during the war. Upon this backing of accumulated demands they place their hopes for an impulsion toward prosperity.

But their reasoning is false. When didn't the masses need the necessities, not to speak of the amenities of life? If need were sufficient to produce full-scale employment, there never would have been a depression. Even in the most prosperous periods a large part of the nation is under-fed, under-clothed and poorly housed. Need, of and by itself, cannot bring prosperity; it must be transformed into demand, that is, need made *effective* by money.

This is tacitly recognized by both groups when they emphasize the accumulated savings of the people as the starting point for a buying wave. The NAM estimates that at the end of 1943 there will be a total of \$24,000,000,000 of war bonds held by the public, besides other savings. Undoubtedly these savings will be a cushion after the war, but its importance is greatly exaggerated. First of all much of the bonds and even more of the bank savings will be increasingly concentrated in few hands. Secondly, with the price rises which mark the war economy and which will be accelerated with the development of the war, the actual purchasing power of the savings will be greatly diminished even as compared to the present. It must be recalled that the price rise was particularly precipitated after the end of World War I. The effective demand in the hands of the masses will be quickly absorbed, above all under the strain of supporting large numbers of returning soldiers and former war workers who will be unable to find work.

But it is not to this phase—the transition from war to peace economy—that we wish to devote this article. It is rather to the long-range "plans" proposed by both groups.

The Old Guard school has a candid approach to the problem of bringing about prosperity. Its fundamental tenet is that the capitalist class must be assured a favorable rate of profit, high enough to induce the capitalists to permit their industries to operate. Once the rate of profit is restored, they argue, the capitalists will invest their money with the hope of receiving profits. This will create jobs and buying power. Let us quote directly from the NAM document:

"Investment, thus, is the keystone of creating jobs. If one looks back over the development of our country he finds that there has been a direct and unfailing relationship between the volume of investment and the ability of our workmen to find jobs. In periods when the public for one reason or another was unwilling to risk its savings in buying machines and buildings to be used for the production of goods, there has been unemployment, with our workers unable to find jobs which would enable them to use their strength and their ability to turn out the commodities and perform the services which the public would like to have."

To insure profitable investment, the NAM holds that the government "should limit its activities on the economic front to maintaining a domestic and external environment that permits and encourages sound business operations."

The major attribute of such a domestic and external environment is first of all the open shop. As regards wages the NAM is very vague and devious. However, what the NAM lacks in concreteness as regards wages is more than made up by the frankness of its theorists, Harold G. Moulton and Karl Schlotterbeck. They say, comparing the situation at the end of World War I with that following World War II:

"The economic situation on the whole is somewhat less favorable than that of 1919"; "the less hopeful outlook for satisfactory earnings [profits] is attributable chiefly to the high level of wage and raw material [farm] costs resulting from wartime policies."

Thus to bring about a more "hopeful" outlook, wages must go down and profits up.

The Old Guard's International Plan

The NAM places great stress on the external requirements for prosperity. It lays down an international program for American capitalism. On the rehabilitation of the war-devastated countries (which will include practically all Europe) the line of the NAM is thus expressed: "It may become desirable for the stronger nations and their citizens to assist the weaker in the process of rehabilitation. Then, as nearly as possible, such assistance should be made on a sound economic basis consistent with the national welfare of the assisting country." Aid will thus be forthcoming only if the profits of the American capitalists are directly or indirectly guaranteed. It will mean the economic domination of the world by the U. S. in the interests of American foreign investors. This is clear in the following words of the NAM on repayment of debts:

"Lease-lend operations are being conducted on such a huge scale that payment of interest on the balances at the close of the war or repayment of the capital will probably be beyond the economic power of the beneficiary countries and probably could not be accomplished without disrupting their own economy. Therefore, arrangements should be contemplated looking to drastic scaling down of interest charges, together with repayment of interest over a long period of time. The principal should not be cancelled, however, since the United States may in the future be justified in asking for foreign credits or other considerations reciprocal to the present needs of those countries which are now obtaining lend-lease assistance from the United States."

In other words, use the debt as a means of coercion to obtain favorable terms abroad for American capitalism.

The NAM document also declares, with reference primarily to Latin America, that economic domination must be backed up by more than moral suasion:

"Rights of investors in many countries who are not nationals thereof have been frequently and seriously violated in recent years. Satisfactory international relations are impossible, and international movement of goods, services, and capital is restricted to the disadvantage of all concerned, so long as these conditions exist."

"Investors in countries in which they are not nationals cannot rely on economic benefits of their operations for protection, but must look, first, to the laws of the country in which they are investing, and, second, when justice is denied, look to their own governments for support. Specifically we believe that the proper departments of the United States government should take appropriate action to protect the property, rights, and interests of American citizens in foreign countries."

Speaking of the British and other rival although Allied imperialisms the NAM lays down the policy of the "Open Door" long favored by American capitalism: "In colonies and dependencies all nations should be treated on an equal basis in such matters as investments, trade, and travel." That means all other markets must be open to American imperialism while its own markets are barred to others.

Thus the political, economic and moral code of the Old Guard reduces itself to: at home, lower living standards for the masses by union smashing, wage cuts, revocation of social legislation; abroad, superexploitation and oppression of the masses of the world. In the international aspects of the post-war plans of the Old Guard are present potential aggressions, both economic and military, against colonial and semi-colonial peoples and against rival imperialisms. The ground work of World War III is being laid while World War II goes on.

This is the post-war plan of the more conservative section of American capitalism. By all indications, such as the recent action of Congress in refusing appropriations to the NRPB, it is the preferred policy of American capitalism.

The New Deal School of Planning

The New Dealers do not completely share the optimism of the Old Guard on the power of capitalism to maintain full production and absorb all the unemployed. They agree with the Old Guard that investment is the basis of jobs and prosperity, but argue that the capitalist no longer can find the opportunity for profitable investment. In former decades such outlets for capital investment were supplied by the growth of population, the opening of new territory, new industries, and the construction work all this involved. But, claim the New Dealers, these long-range factors have been exhausted: the rate of growth of population has declined, the frontier is closed, new industries no longer require many workers due to modern technique. The New Deal group foresees, therefore, a constant army of unemployed. To employ this large number who can find no room in private industry, a large-scale program of public works is necessary. In periods of prosperity the public works program will be slowed down as private industry absorbs many workers; in periods of depression, when private industry is curtailing production, the public works program will be accelerated until the forces of private industry recuperate and are able to re-employ the unemployed.

According to the New Dealers the government is thus destined to play an important and direct economic role in the future, to a much greater extent than previously. Only through cooperation of government and private capital will the possibility for the development of expanding economy be realized.

The NRPB document "Post-War Plan and Program" outlines in some detail such a public works program, while its companion publication proposes a program of large-scale intensive social and employment insurance. Some of the outstanding proposals follow:

Selection of certain war plants to be maintained in standby condition so that they will be in condition to turn out war goods if the occasion arises.

Continue war contracts in areas where special hardship would

result were war plants to close down. Government grants for plant rehabilitation wherever necessary.

Liquidation of other war contracts as speedily as consistent with economic and social welfare.

Aid to small business, partly through the extension of low-interest loans. Generally, aid to private enterprise and the taking of measures to prevent monopoly by:

- a. Development of new industries and processes by research in government departments and government-aided private concerns.
- b. Government partnership in certain industries, such as aluminum, magnesium, shipbuilding and aircraft. In these industries, considered crucial in war and peace, which private capital will not and cannot develop, the government would place large investments. (It was this proposal in particular which occasioned the accusation of socialistic plans against the report as a whole.)
- c. Government control of patents and properties seized from the enemy with the aim of having them used by the government or licensed to private industry.

Retention for some time, or at least slow relaxation of war-time controls such as allocation of scarce raw materials, the control of prices over certain goods, the rationing of certain consumer goods, especially durable consumer goods, as well as government control over the distribution of industrial and construction equipment.

An extensive program of public works including the development of a national transportation agency which would coordinate and consolidate the various railway systems into a number of regional systems; modernize the transportation media such as terminals, railroads, highways, air and pipe lines, river and harbor facilities.

A wide-scale public housing program; power development program, water pollution abatement and other comprehensive multi-purpose development and control of water resources; land conservation, clearance, irrigation and drainage.

Federal grants to implement the proposal of elementary and high school education to all children and youth and equal access to general and specialized higher training. A similarly extensive health program.

In these ways, according to the NRPB, the government will be able to accept and fulfill the responsibility of assuring jobs to all at decent pay.

Like the NAM, the NRPB report places considerable stress on the international aspects of the problem of insuring jobs. It foresees the large-scale development and growth of American capital goods industries to aid in the development of Europe, China, Latin America and other backward areas. The fallacy of this international aspect of the New Deal plan I have discussed in detail in another article.*

The Theory of Underconsumption

The job and insurance program will be financed by borrowing and taxation, but fiscal policy is also to become a means of avoiding both extreme boom conditions as well as conditions of depression. When a boom appears imminent, according to the scheme, borrowing and taxation will be resorted to with the aim of tapering off the boom by withdrawing purchasing power. Contrariwise, when a depression menaces, buying power will be transfused from the financial reserves in order to increase production. The buying power will be injected by repayment of loans, by public works, insurance payments, lowered taxation.

Essentially, the NRPB reports represent a variation of the

* "Wallace's Post-War Utopia—Why American Capitalism Can't Bring World Prosperity," *Fourth International*, February, 1943.

underconsumptionist theory of crises. According to this theory, crises are caused because people do not consume all that is produced. The capitalists, who have the bulk of the savings, refuse to consume when hard times threaten. At such times, the capitalists cut down on personal expenditures, as well as investment in industry. On the other hand, the workers do not consume primarily because they do not earn enough. Therefore, reasons this school of reformism, if the workers' income were raised during or just prior to depressions by job guarantees, social and job insurance, by public works and maintenance of wage rates, this would lead to an increase in the money in circulation, thus stimulating demand and production, with the resultant prosperity shared by the capitalists who would be assured of a market for their goods.

Undoubtedly, these proposals at first sight appear to have an element of plausibility. But history is the laboratory of the social sciences, including economics. For a scientific criticism of these plans, the lessons of history must first be closely examined.

The crash hit in the autumn of 1929. For nine years previously, the Old Guard was politically in power through the presidential terms of Harding and Coolidge, while Hoover was finishing the first year of his four year tenure. Unionism had reached in 1929 the lowest point in the last half century in numbers and militancy. The government frowned on all measures of social security. In truth, this was the Golden Age of the Old Guard. Then, if ever, their methods should have been shown as efficacious in avoiding the crash. Yet, the economic crisis hit with unparalleled ferocity. For over three years, from 1929 to 1933, the Old Guard, under Hoover, tried their measures of ending the crisis. The incantation of "prosperity is just around the corner," which by sheer repetition was to have restored public confidence and prosperity, proved to be impotent magic. History proves the Old Guard method met ignominious failure.

Roosevelt took the presidential chair at the head of a New Deal administration in 1933. A program of public works and relief was established. CWA, FERA, PWA, WPA, NYA, CCC, FSA, TVA, USHA, and other letter combinations denoting public work and relief administrations became American household words. While these programs were in operation, industrial production did slowly increase until it reached, in 1937, a level approximately that of 1929. But unemployment remained a major problem until the end of 1941, for throughout the decade productivity had been increased because of technical advance, and fewer workers were required to produce as much as had been produced in 1929. Moreover, the hesitant climb of industrial production came to an abrupt end in 1937. In a few months, the level of industrial production declined by 33 per cent from 1937 levels. This sharp decline, more precipitate than that of 1929-30, proves that the public works program had not induced a normal cyclical prosperity. Once the crutch was removed, the recovery collapsed. The final return to "normal" prosperity—as "normal" as we will ever know under capitalism—was due not to the public works program but to the war program. The entire experience of the public works program of the New Deal bears out the statement of one bourgeois economist: "The public investments must first be supported and later replaced by private investments, or the recovery will not develop into prosperity." Thus the history of the Roosevelt administration shows that the underconsumptionist panacea of the NRFB, which is simply the New Deal once again, is impotent against the forces of present day capitalism, and met the same failure as the Old Guard policies.

At the termination of the crisis of 1857, the bourgeoisie assured all that this was the last and final crisis; the disturb-

ances to the economy caused by the discovery of gold would never be repeated. After the crisis of 1873, it was as seriously avowed that the railroad development of the American West, which had brought the crisis, was over and that American industry was at last mature, and its growing pains over. The crisis of 1890, attributed to investment in South America, was declared the last one, as world economy was finally well developed and a reasonable, stable, crisis-less economy could be expected. The panic of 1907, which led to wide-scale bank failures, was the cause of the founding of the Federal Reserve Bank and the same assurances were made as had been made after each preceding crisis. Following the short but intense depression of 1921, came a six year period of prosperity. Loudly, the apologists for capitalism asserted that the dire predictions of Marx had been refuted. Melvin A. Traylor, president of the American Bankers Association, stated: "We need not fear a recurrence of conditions that will plunge the nation into the depths of the more violent financial panics such as has occurred in the past." Less than two years later came the crash of 1929. The present credos of the Old Guard and the New Deal will inevitably take their places in the lists of exploded panaceas and convocations for a capitalist economy without crisis.

For the Old Guard, the lessons of the past are a book which they can never hope to understand. What it proclaims now as the secret of permanent prosperity, could have been written fifty or a hundred years ago, and have had the virtue of being at least a comparatively fresh illusion.

Nor does the New Deal, bound to the capitalist system which it hopes to set in working order, really understand economic depressions. The lack of understanding of the underconsumptionists can be gauged by the fact that Keynes, the fountainhead of this New Deal wisdom, solemnly assures us that unemployment was avoided in ancient Egypt and medieval Europe because the slaves of the former and the serfs of the latter were kept busy at a type of public works in pyramid and cathedral building. In reality, unemployment was an impossibility in those two societies; it is unique to capitalism. In this connection, let us recall Engels' celebrated reply to the underconsumptionists of his day, that mankind has underconsumed since the days of the Pharaohs, but overproduction is a phenomenon that began in 1825.

The "Labor" Theory of Underconsumption

Undoubtedly the underconsumptionist New Deal school is still popular among the masses of American workers. Trade unionists feel that the theory of underconsumption gives them further arguments for demanding higher wages. It is tempting to blame economic crises on the short-sightedness of the capitalists, who simply will not grasp the fact that the masses of the workers are their best customers and that all they need do is to pay these workers higher wages in order to ensure the existence of unfailing purchasing power for their goods and thus avoid all danger of crises.

But it is a wholly fallacious argument, which Marx refutes in *Capital* (Volume 2) in the following words:

"It is sheer redundancy to say that crises are produced by the lack of paying consumption or paying consumers. The capitalist system recognizes only paying consumers, with the exception of those in receipt of poor law support or the 'rogues.' When commodities are unsalable, it means simply that there are no purchasers, or consumers, for them. When people attempt to give this redundancy an appearance of some deeper meaning by saying that the working class does not receive enough of its own product and that the evil would be dispelled immediately it received a greater share i.e., if its wages were increased, all one can say is

that crises are invariably preceded by periods in which wages in general rise and the working class receives a relatively greater share of the annual product intended for consumption. From the standpoint of these vallant upholders of 'plain common sense,' such periods should prevent the coming of crises. It would appear, therefore, that capitalist production includes conditions which are independent of good will or bad will and which permit such periods of relative prosperity for the working class only temporarily and always as the harbingers of the coming crises."

The popular but fallacious trade union argument deplores the short-sighted capitalist who will not bring prosperity by paying higher wages; equally fallacious is the New Deal argument which deplores the short-sighted capitalist who resists a public works program as the road to prosperity. The objections of the Old Guard to the New Deal program is neither short-sighted nor ill-willed, but is based on the obvious consequences of the New Deal program.

The Results of Public Works Plans

The program of public works undoubtedly would satisfy useful social and economic needs. But the question in dispute is: Will a program of important public works aid or hinder the recovery of private capitalism? The Old Guard is unquestionably correct in insisting that a program of public works will result in the placing of an obstacle in the process of the recovery of capitalism. The following considerations will make this clear:

1. A program of public works will increase taxation. If the incidence of the taxation falls on the workers, this means a lowering in their purchasing power, and a curtailment in production. If it falls on the capitalists, this means a lowering of the already low rate of profit and a further delay in recovery.

2. A program of public works runs into competition with private industry. A public housing program clashes with the private realty corporations, public power plants with private electric utilities. Thus the scope for profitable investment is further reduced by a public works program.

3. A public works program, with decent wages, tends to increase the workers' wages in all parts of the economy. From the point of view of the workers this is highly desirable; but in relation to capitalist recovery this is a major disaster. An important factor in the cyclical recovery of private industry from the depression is the lowering of workers' wages, a lowering which up to the 1929 crash has been a concomitant of depression. The workers' unions tend to collapse, as the competition from the remaining jobs among the workers assumes cut-throat proportions. Finally wages are driven to such a point that the capitalists feel it possible to operate once more and hope for profits. For, as the Brookings Institution pamphlet frankly and correctly took as the starting point of its argumentation, wages must be cut if profits are to rise.

If the capitalists try to drive wages below those paid in public works, the workers will leave private industry, being assured of a job on the public works program. Feeling a certain measure of security, the workers will be encouraged to organize and press demands for higher wages from the private employer. This will lower the rate of profit in private industry, bankrupt many capitalists, drive private capitalism further down into the crisis. The workers of the bankrupted shops will look for work on the public works, thus increasing its scope.

The economy will be cleft into two antagonistic sectors: public and private industry. Between these two sectors a struggle will develop. Far from bringing industrial recovery to the private capitalists, the public works by raising wages will drain the strength out of the profit system. It will become a matter of life or death for private industry to abolish the public works

program. Violent struggles will ensue, as the workers will strive to defend what they have gained. The program of reform, like all reform in the period of capitalism, is doomed to a brief and unhappy existence as the forerunner to either a reaction of a Kornilov, Mussolini or Hitler, or the social revolution of the workers.

The Real Barrier to Production

What the New Dealers refuse to understand is that, as Marx put it, "The real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself." It functions for the accumulation of further capital; capitalist production is production for capital. What is necessary is the transformation of this system into one in which production becomes an ever-expanding system of creating goods for the benefit of the society of producers. This transformation requires one pre-condition: the expropriation of the capitalists who, not out of ill will but as a functioning class, bar the way to production for use. Against that, however, New Dealer and Old Guard stand together.

The fundamental fallacy of the New Dealers is explicitly stated by the *New Republic*, which championed the NRPB reports in a supplement to its April 19 issue called "Charter for America." It says of the men who ideologically fathered the NRPB reports (Veblen, Hobson, Brandeis, Keynes, Hansen): "These men have taken an approach to the economic problem that has not been dogmatic in the sense of the rejection or espousal of any 'system,' but has been rather an engineering one. They have, by and large, asked what resources in men and material we have, and how those resources can best be organized to achieve the social goals that the sense of the whole community regards as desirable."

These reformists thus refuse to see the truth: that capitalist society does not function to achieve social goals the community as a whole regards as desirable, but rather operates to achieve the goals considered desirable by a small part of society, the ruling capitalist class, which places its profits as the paramount concern of society. Society does not exist to satisfy the requirements of the community but the profit needs of the capitalist class. The government, no matter whether conservative or liberal, remains a social organization whose purpose is to insure the rule of the capitalist class, and by its policies to assure the receipt of profits, which is considered the first claim on society. When the needs of the great majority of society come into conflict with the capitalist system and the capitalist class, the government's role is to ascertain that the latter triumphs. Capitalist class parties may differ and sometimes do differ deeply on how to achieve the purpose of the state, but despite these differences all capitalist parties represent poorly or well the capitalist class. This true role of the government cannot be seen by the petty-bourgeois *New Republic*, which assigns to the state a super-class social "engineering," rather than a class role. Upon this illusion the New Deal's leftish liberals build their economic castles in the air.

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The Stalinist Youth Movement Today

By DAVID JEFFRIES

EDITOR'S NOTE: The author of this article was until recently secretary of one of the largest Young Communist League branches and chairman of one of its principal university groups. He is now a member of the Socialist Workers Party.

The National Council of the Young Communist League announced this June that the YCL was to be reorganized and transformed into a "broader, non-Communist, anti-fascist youth organization" by special convention called for October. The name and program of the League are to be changed, untainted by any remaining hint of "communism."

This organizational recognition of an existing situation is an appropriate occasion to analyze the question: What is the current anatomy of the YCL, and how firmly are its members bound to Stalinism and its open, flagrant betrayal of the working class? Only on the basis of a correct analysis can we pursue a policy that will win over a section of its membership—now about 20,000—to the Trotskyist program.

It should be clearly understood that this is an analysis only of the YCL and not of the Communist Party. Although there will undoubtedly be similarities in any analysis of the two, there are certain important differences that make it impossible to equate the two organizations. The Communist Party, unlike the YCL, has its base in the labor movement, where it does a great deal of its work, and consequently its members are subject to direct pressure from the working class. Likewise, it is slightly stricter than the YCL in its organizational measures, such as requirements for membership, etc., and thus tends to have a larger percentage of active members. Finally, the great majority in the Communist Party has been in the movement longer than most YCLers, and this greater experience naturally carries with it many implications of differences between the ranks of the youth and those of the parent organization.

Like the Communist Party, the YCL is not a homogeneous group. The superficial cloak of unanimity covers deep differences in political development, orientation and opinion. The task of the Stalinist leaders is to marshal all these differences from right to left, behind the current Stalinist line, and in order to accomplish this it is necessary to give different sets of reasons for the line to the different political groupings. The result is an organization officially united upon the leading questions, but in which the individual members retain disagreements (some semi-conscious, and almost all unexpressed) with one aspect or another of the total Stalinist platform, past and present.

There is one great contradiction in the field of education during a right zig-zag period. If it fails to give its membership any semblance of an education in the principles of socialism, it runs the risk of losing almost all of these uneducated members in the event of a new "left" turn. The League membership dropped fifty per cent in the three months following the Stalin-Hitler pact, falling from 24,000 to 12,000. In addition, and perhaps even more important, loyalty and self-sacrifice come only from those members who have socialist ideals. On the other hand, if the League does give its membership an education in some of the basic principles of socialism, the contradiction between these principles and the present Stalinist line would be inescapably glaring and would doubtless lead to many questions and doubts about the correctness of the line. This contradiction is resolved as political necessity dictates today: basic education is largely ignored.

The result is what might be expected; about fifty per cent of its present membership is ignorant of any inkling of Marxist ideas. This percentage is increasing, since the only requirement for admission to the League for over a year has been a desire "to win the war." The scheduled change in name and program will only recognize and intensify this existing trend. It can surely be predicted that in the event of a new "left" turn the loss in members will be terrific, since there will be no preparation for this at all.

In studying the membership of the YCL it is necessary to divide it into three distinct groups: the completely uneducated members; the semi-educated youth; and politically advanced members. The groups, of course, are not actually so clearly defined as they will appear to be here, but by and large it can be said that the YCL member falls into one of these three categories.

1. The Uneducated "Members"

About fifty per cent of the present League is almost completely politically illiterate. This tremendous body of uneducated youth, about evenly divided between petty-bourgeois and working-class elements, has come in during the last two years, since the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. They have been marshalled into the League ninety-five per cent on the basis of simply supporting the war, and many of them have joined without even this political motivation. Writing in an issue of the *Weekly Review*, former YCL organ, during the past winter, the Buffalo organizer of the League recounted with considerable pride how some half-dozen youth had been cajoled into joining the League at a social affair on the basis of doing a favor for a YCL friend of theirs who was going into the army! Evidently some "sectarians" in Buffalo had objected to this procedure, for the organizer devoted the next couple of paragraphs to explaining why this was a perfectly correct procedure, in line with "everything to win the war."

These youth, recruited on a patriotic and social-life basis, remain largely unabsorbed into the League. The YCL affairs that get the largest turn-outs are always the dances, not the meetings.

Negro youth are attracted by its social life and Negro-white equality; at a big YCL dance in Philadelphia recently, 70 per cent of a crowd of 1500 were Negroes, far out of proportion to their membership. In contrast to this, the attendance of Negroes at branch meetings is very low, despite the speed with which those Negroes who do become active are pushed forward into leadership. Negroes are of course little attracted by the pro-war line; yet recruiting goes on among them on the basis of local discrimination issues.

The great bulk of the group of members we are discussing do not even attend the social affairs, and their faces are not seen at the branch headquarters from one end of a month to the other. They are inactive, disinterested, and make no response to the frequent letters and postcards they get announcing meetings, dances, etc. Dues payments seldom exceed fifty per cent, even in the best of branches, and in some branches they consistently run as low as ten and twenty per cent. After a certain time (usually the registration of membership at the end of the year) all back dues are cancelled. The branch membership lists are cluttered with the names and addresses of people

whom nobody knows or has heard of. The greatest task of all branch leaders is attempting to get these members into activity, but it is a well-nigh hopeless task, since in many branches the inactives outnumber the actives five and ten to one.

In other words, the great majority of this bottom stratum of the YCL is not only politically uneducated but organizationally inactive. These inactive "members" not only surely will drop out in the case of some new turn, but are continually leaving, if their previous organizational status justifies the term. When a "member" has not been heard of for months, when he cannot be located, or when he bluntly tells his pursuers that he does not wish to belong to the YCL (not that he wishes to resign—merely that he doesn't want to "belong")—when this occurs he is finally liable to be stricken from the branch lists at the next registration.

However, a small number of these politically uneducated elements do enter into a certain amount of political activity. These include those who come to dances, occasionally attend meetings, and a few who even take part in committee work. These members are usually enthusiastic about winning the war, but they have the least knowledge of the history of Stalinism, and since they have little or no knowledge of socialist, class-struggle principles, they are less prepared than the more developed members to justify the CP zig-zags. The main line of present-day Stalinist propaganda in literature and the press is directed at this element among the members and sympathizers. A "Marxist" analysis of the situation is given for the benefit of the revolutionary elements immediately following a new turn; they are then allowed to shift for themselves and all guns are concentrated upon influencing the more backward elements by means of anti-Marxist appeals to their conservative ideas and prejudices. The Stalinists seldom mention their policies of preceding periods, and when they do, patently false versions are presented. (In "Victory and After" Browder claims that the Communist Party was opposed to the United States entering the war before June 1941 because it couldn't possibly have won with the Soviet Union neutral!)

These members are the most easily disillusioned with Stalinist zig-zags and at the same time the least hostile to the Trotskyists, since they know the least about their supposed crimes ("Mission to Moscow" may have changed this a little). However, they present a difficult task to win over to the Marxist movement because of their political backwardness. They possess most of the disadvantages that a Stalinist has over the average youth (allegiance to Stalinism, devotion to winning the war, etc.) and only one of the advantages, political consciousness.

2. The Semi-Educated Members

The second stratum of the YCL, composing about forty per cent of the membership and most of the actives, is the group with a certain amount of education in socialism and an active interest in politics. This stratum is composed of two distinct strains: one consisting of new members who have been active enough to receive a certain amount of political education, and the other of older members who have been with the League through several years, but for one reason or another remain semi-active or inactive today.

It is worthwhile devoting considerable attention to the new members in this group, since they are rapidly becoming the base of the YCL. With the old leaders of the League going into the army or graduating into the CP, this group will soon dominate the branch leadership completely. It is being specifically groomed by the leadership for this purpose.

Those new members who show a willingness to become active

are pushed forward as fast as they are willing to go. Most of the new members are active to the extent of participating in committee work and attending meetings and classes. They pick up most of their education at these meetings and classes since the *Daily Worker* is read even less in the YCL than it is in the party.

The average YCL meeting agenda is usually built around an educational lecture of some political importance, but there is often so much folderol surrounding the speech that its effect is lost. Skits and "radio" programs, quiz contests and patriotic singing ("Over There," "The Caissons Keep Rolling," etc.) litter almost every agenda. It is in this atmosphere that the new member acquires his political education. The educational speech, usually delivered by a branch or district functionary, hews strictly to the line of current topics, shallowly and empirically interpreted. Such topics as the Anti-Poll Tax Bill, the Congressional "defeatists," the Second Front (a hardy perennial) and "Production for Victory" are the usual political meat. The speaker will usually go into a few more of the subtleties of a problem than do the normal *Daily Worker* stories, for he is directly facing an audience and he must draw a reasonably well-rounded picture for them. However, fundamentally the "analysis" produces the same result as the usual article: a totally false line-up of forces is impressed upon the listener. Roosevelt is equated to Stalin, Lewis is in the same camp as Coughlin, and that is that!

In addition to absorbing these educationals, the average YCLer in this group will probably read Browder's "Victory and After" (the present Bible of the movement, now printed in a ten-cent edition), he will read some current pamphlets sold at meetings (usually as shallow as the *Daily Worker*), and may attend a branch class. These classes, attended by from five to twenty people, take up only "problems of the war," but they are sometimes productive of a serious discussion. For example, the leader of a discussion on "The Nature of Fascism" will usually attempt to hash over only its superficial aspects (suppression of democratic liberties, etc.), but some enterprising student may venture into a discussion of its class character. Such questions are now being answered by the theory, unofficially promulgated, but supported by quotations from Browder, that fascism has turned against capitalism and that American and British capitalists are now opposed to fascism as such!

The nature of the Soviet Union is also discussed, but apart from perfunctory references to it as a socialist state, it is merely represented as having some social advantages that the "democracies" have not got as yet, but which they may acquire (it is not breathed how) at some future date. After this "tribute" to the October revolution, more important things about the Soviet Union take precedence: it is discovered that the Soviet Union's most important contributions to the world have been the policy of collective security and the making possible of a "United Nations" victory.

The more active new member, who shows the ability and the inclination for leadership, is usually given some sort of more advanced course. Here, for the first time, he will encounter what he is told is "Marxism-Leninism," but is merely the current Browderist-Stalinist line in theoretical clothing. Here he will learn in some detail of the "accomplishments" of "socialism in one country"; of Lenin's writings on future national wars in Europe (all ten lines of them); here he may get an introduction to Marxist economics, and here he will certainly learn to "understand the correctness" of Stalinist zig-zags during the past eight years (anything before that is too far back for the youth to remember, and hence need not be discussed). Even during this course, the most advanced given in the YCL, little

encouragement is given to read the basic works of Marx and Lenin.

What is the result of such an educational system? What sort of cadres does it turn out?

A YCLer who has gone through this mill comes out with three main political orientations: "friendship" for the Soviet Union; a vague desire for socialism at some distant future date, with no idea of how this is to be achieved; and the main orientation—conviction of the necessity for a "United Nations" victory at all costs as "the precondition for all future progress."

If this orientation can be said to have a class base, it is a petty-bourgeois one. No attempt is made by the Stalinist line to appeal to working-class instincts, and it is a matter of fact that most of this new crop of cadres are petty-bourgeois elements. No appeal is made to the working class as an independent force, and as a corollary there is no mention made in the YCL press or educational discussions of any specific trade union or working-class activity (speeding up production excluded).

Thus we find this typical new YCLer developing in a community branch, following a reactionary political line and completely divorced from working-class pressure in the organized labor movement (there are no union fractions in the YCL). He thinks entirely in terms of winning the war; all other aims, such as socialism, are completely tied up with and predicated upon this. Therefore, no sacrifice, in his mind, is too great if it helps "national unity," "United Nations unity," and consequently the winning of the war. The Stalinist slogan "Everything to win the war!" has a very literal meaning, and is applied with a vengeance.

This type of League member has been molded by the Stalinist leadership for the present period, and he fills the bill perfectly in all respects but one. The bureaucrats have been able to discover substitutes for many things, but they have not yet discovered a substitute for the political and organizational devotion of a proletarian revolutionist. If there is one thing characteristic of these new cadres, it is their undependability. This undependability of the "win-the-war cadres," together with the previously mentioned apathy of a great many "members" of the League, provide the organizational difficulties with which the League is constantly faced.

This member is the most difficult type to talk to. Unlike the inactives he is well-versed in all the Stalinist half-truths and falsehoods and, unlike the more advanced elements, has no theoretical background to appeal to. It is from this group that come most of the hysterical anti-Trotskyists, people who have read all the *Daily Worker* slanders and who have no considerations for working-class democracy if it disturbs the war effort. Their whole alphabet from A to Z is "Win the War!" and anybody who disagrees with this is a "Trotskyist Hitler agent," etc.

To sum up, this type is a new kind of YCL leader and activist. With an absolute minimum of Marxist knowledge, and schooled in opportunistic politics, he has only the most tenuous connection with radical thought. Though subsequent events may disillusion some of these elements with Stalinism, they will be far away from a revolutionary position.

We have now completed our analysis of the two principal types of new members, who have come in since the Nazi invasion of the USSR and who now constitute the bulk of the YCL. To be completely precise, one should add that there is a small percentage of new members who do manage to get a better political education than the others we have dealt with. An interesting illustration of this took place during the past year in an isolated YCL branch at the University of Missouri. With only the most tenuous connections with the state office at St.

Louis and no connection at all with the National Student Office, it was continuing to follow the strict educational and organizational procedure of the Stalin-Hitler pact period. A comparatively large amount of time was spent on organized study of the works of Marx and Lenin, and the requirements for admission were at least an understanding and agreement with the principles of socialism. When the National Student Secretary of the YCL discovered this state of affairs during a visit last winter, she horrifiedly set about putting an end to it. But such branches are isolated exceptions.

There is another group of members, comparatively small, in this stratum of the YCL, who have been in the movement for several years but have never become absorbed into the organization and remain politically inactive or semi-active. They know enough of radical theory and have a good enough memory for the previous Stalinist line to take with a grain of salt the more extreme right analyses of the leadership (Roosevelt as the American guardian angel, etc.) but in the main they have never grasped enough of the socialist ideal to shake them out of their petty-bourgeois apathy sufficiently either to rebel against the opportunistic Stalinist line or, on the other hand, to throw themselves into the YCL actively.

3. The Revolutionary Elements

Finally, and most important, there is the layer of the best and most loyal members. These are the comrades who have read Marx and Lenin, some of them to a considerable extent. Most of these YCLers are also members of the Communist Party. These are the socialist-conscious youth who can defend Stalinism with "theoretical" arguments and the inevitable out-of-context quotations.

These members are bound to the Communist Party because to them it represents the only Marxist movement, the only socialist movement, and the only movement that defends the victorious working-class revolution in the Soviet Union. It is important to remember that they are not held *only* by the defense of the Soviet Union, but also by their firm belief that the Communist Party is the only party that can achieve socialism in the United States. These convictions are the foundation-stones of their wholehearted adherence to the Stalinist movement.

The contradiction of their position is that because of their devotion to socialism represented to them by Stalinism, they are forced to accept a political line that trespasses on every principle of revolutionary socialism. What is the factor that keeps them from recognizing this contradiction and allows them to follow the Stalinist road while remaining fundamentally honest with themselves? To be sure, defense of the Soviet Union and devotion to socialism are the rocks to which they cling when everything else is thrown in doubt. But what is it that makes it possible for them to finally accept the Stalinist line as the real theoretical goods? What is it that above all characterizes these YCLers and distinguishes them from consistent revolutionary Marxists?

It is their failure to think in terms of class forces. To be sure, they are aware of the existence of the bourgeoisie and the general role it plays. They are aware of the social basis for fascism and bourgeois democracy, and know that it is the same. They are substantially aware of what must be done by the working class in order to achieve socialism. But all this in a sense is abstract awareness—it is never consciously applied to the world situation of 1943. In other words, these YCLers do their "theoretical" thinking on one plane and their "practical" thinking on another. This Marxist-conscious League member will read, agree with and absorb for future reference Lenin's characterization of the present epoch as one of imperialist wars and proletarian revolution, and five hours later he

will go forth from his room and his "theoretical" study to lecture his branch meeting on the necessity of "national unity" to defeat Hitler.

The crucial thing that makes the acceptance of all this Stalinist tripe possible is the failure of this Young Communist to base his political thinking upon the principle that the working class is the *only* progressive force in modern capitalist society, that the socialist revolution is the *only* progressive goal in this society, and that independent working-class action is the *only* method of achieving this goal. Ingrained in his mind as a principle of "progressive" politics is the idea that the bourgeoisie, or parts of it, are dependable and worthwhile allies for the working class in the achieving of some progressive measure, be it social security or the defeat of fascism. It is this idea that makes it possible for him to agree with such measures as the support of Roosevelt and Churchill, while accepting the patently false adulation of these "allies" with a grain of salt as necessary for "unity."

It is possible to enter into theoretical discussion with these YCLers, and this is the most fruitful method. Most of them, despite their necessarily vague idea of Trotskyists as "spies, saboteurs, and fascists," realize at heart that the rank and file of the Trotskyists must at least be honest, and are therefore usually willing to engage in some sort of discussion. They reason that the prohibition against association with Trotskyists is made to protect the politically inexperienced members against the "insidious line" of the Trotskyists, but that they, the politically advanced, are proof against it.

It is of the utmost importance to impress upon these YCLers that we are for unconditional defense of the Soviet Union, and by the only method that will assure its success. But in addition, and most important, it is necessary to engage these Stalinists in discussion upon their basic political line today. Theoretical blows must be dealt at the line of "national liberation war," at the dissolution of the Comintern, at Browder's thrusting into the future (a more distant future with every speech) of the struggle for socialism either here or in Europe. The basic theoretical questions of today must be the main line

of attack. *It is important to remember that many of these YCLers have inner doubts about these questions.*

In addition to their acquaintance with Marxism this third group has the advantage of being the most active and self-sacrificing political workers. They are the most dependable elements in the YCL.

Many of this group are now leaving the League, either being drafted into the army, going into Communist Party work or entering the party bureaucracy in the district offices. In the latter case they tend to become completely associated with the Stalinist machine as a pattern of life. As has been pointed out, no similar cadres are being turned out to take their places. It is necessary to realize that in the future the Stalinist youth movement will have a different physiognomy than in the past. The Stalinist youth movement is heading towards the right and into conflict with the basic needs of the working class. This tendency is reflected and will be reflected even more in the class composition, increasingly petty-bourgeois, and the political consciousness, decreasingly radical.

The Socialist Workers Party must salvage some of these Stalinist youth during the coming period—some of those who consider themselves revolutionary Marxists. As we have indicated, they still number at present about 10 per cent of the 20,000 members. One should add, however, that this category of revolutionary-minded youth is so large only if we count the many of them who are in the army. Only when, carried forward by the coming revolutionary wave, we have a mass organization capable of getting a steady stream of propaganda into the hands of the Stalinist rank and file, will we have the possibility, aided by the revolutionary developments themselves, of breaking off large sections of the membership as a whole. This is a task that history has set for the future.

However, in the present period, it is possible and necessary to convert the best and most politically advanced elements in the YCL to Trotskyism. Winning over these youth is a serious task for the revolutionary movement—a task that will lay the groundwork for the events ahead.

From the Arsenal of Marxism

Report on the Communist International

By LEON TROTSKY

EDITOR'S NOTE: This is the second and concluding section of a speech delivered in Moscow on December 28, 1922 to a session of the Communist fraction of the Tenth All-Union Congress of the Soviets, with non-party delegates participating. The speech was in response to an invitation to make a report on the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, which had just been held. In the first section, Trotsky frankly indicated the extent to which the European bourgeoisie had recovered from the post-war revolutionary wave, but counterposed to that the permanent crisis of European economy. Everything now depended on the correct policies of the Comintern. But the Comintern Congress on which he was reporting proved to be the last Leninist gathering.

Comrades, until recently we failed to differentiate adequately between Europe and America. And the slow development of communism in America might have inspired some pessimistic ideas to the effect that so far as revolution is concerned Europe must wait for America. Not at all!

Europe cannot wait. To put it differently, if the revolution in Europe is postponed for many decades, it would signify the elimination of Europe generally as a cultural force. As you all know, the philosophy now fashionable in Europe is that of Spengler: the decline of Europe. In its own way this is a correct class premonition on the part of the bourgeoisie. Disregarding the proletariat which will replace the bourgeoisie and wield power, they talk about Europe's decline. Of course, if it actually happened the inevitable result would be, if not a decline, then a prolonged economic and cultural decay of Europe and then, after a lapse of time, the American revolution would come and take Europe in tow. But there are no serious grounds for such a prognosis, pessimistic from the standpoint of time intervals. To be sure, speculations concerning time intervals are quite unreliable and not always serious but I want to say that there is no reason for thinking that between 1917—

the beginning of the new revolutionary epoch in Europe—and its major victories in western Europe, there must be a lapse of many more years than between our 1905 and our 1917. Twelve years elapsed in our country between the beginning of the revolution, the initial experience, and the victory. We do not of course know just how many years will pass between 1917 and the first major, stable victory in Europe. It is not excluded that less than twelve years may pass. In any case, the greatest advantage today lies in the existence of Soviet Russia and of the Communist International, the centralized organization of the revolutionary vanguard and, intimately linked with this, the systematic organizational strengthening of communist parties in various countries. This does not always signify their numerical growth. Naturally, in 1919-20, when the first hopes of the proletariat were still fresh, the ranks of the communist parties were flooded—as is always the case in time of high tide—and the communist organizations became filled with unstable elements. Some of these elements have now withdrawn, but there has been no cessation of the growth of the party in terms of its becoming tempered, in terms of the strengthening of ideological clarity, in terms of international centralization and ties.

This growth is indubitable and finds its expression both in the fact that the Fourth World Congress made a beginning in drafting an international program—for the first time in the history of the proletariat—as well as in the fact that the Fourth Congress in electing the Executive Committee created for the first time a centralist organ not on federative principles, not on the basis of delegated representatives from various parties, but as an organ elected by the Fourth Congress itself. And this Executive Committee has been entrusted with the destinies of the Communist International until the next Congress.

The Communist International is confronted after the Fourth Congress with two intimately connected tasks. The first task is to continue the struggle against centrist tendencies which express the repeated and persistent attempts of the bourgeoisie through the medium of its left wing to utilize the protracted character of the revolutionary development by sinking roots in the Communist International. The struggle against centrism within the Communist International and the further purging of the latter—this is the first task. The second is the struggle for influence over the overwhelming majority of the working class.

The Role of the Centrists

Both of these problems were posed very sharply at the Third Congress, especially in connection with our French party which came to the Congress represented by two factions—the center and the left. Following the events of 1920, our Italian party split. By the summer of 1921 the Italian center, the so-called Maximalists with Serrati at the head, were no longer present at our Congress (the Third) and they were declared expelled from the International. In the French party these same two tendencies were delineated on the eve of the Fourth Congress. The parallelism in many respects between the Italian and French movements has been previously remarked upon. And here is a fact of the greatest symptomatic significance: despite the triumph of the counter-revolution in Italy as well as Europe generally, which I have already referred to, we observe precisely in Italy, where communism has suffered its worst defeat, not disintegration, not a movement away from, but on the contrary, a new impulsion toward the Communist International. The Maximalists led by Serrati whom we had expelled (and correctly so, for conduct that was truly treacherous), these Maximalists, having split with the reformists during the September 1920 movement, began knocking at the gates of the

International on the eve of the Fourth Congress. What does this signify? It signifies a new revolutionary impulsion to the left on the part of a section of the proletarian vanguard.

There were many indications that the French centrists would repeat the course of the Italian Maximalists, that is, split away from us. We would of course have been reconciled even to such an outcome in the knowledge that the left wing would have in the end gained the upper hand. However, the French centrists, with Cachin and Frossard at the head, have learned something from the experience of Italian Maximalists who arrived in Moscow with heads bowed in repentance after having split with Moscow. You should all acquaint yourselves with the resolutions on the French party adopted by the Fourth Congress. These resolutions are in their own way quite drastic, especially if one takes into account the morals and customs of France and of its old Socialist Party. A demand for a complete break with all the institutions of the bourgeoisie is something that seems self-evident to us. But in France where hundreds upon hundreds of Communist Party members belong to Freemason lodges, bourgeois-democratic leagues for the defense of the rights of man, etc., etc.—there the demand for a complete break with the bourgeoisie, for the expulsion of all Freemasons and the like represents a complete overturn in the party's life.

At the Congress we passed a demand to the French party that nine-tenths of the candidates for all electoral posts, the parliament, the municipalities, the cantonal councils, etc., be selected from among workers and peasants directly from the workbench or the plough. Those who are acquainted with the existing conditions in the French party in a country where entire legions of intellectuals, lawyers, careerists flock to the gates of various parties whenever they sniff the scent of a mandate, and all the more so a prospect of power, etc., will understand that a demand for advancing workers and peasants directly from the workbench and the plough to nine-tenths of the electoral posts represents the greatest possible upheaval in the life of the French party. The left wing which is approximately as strong numerically as the center was in favor of this. The center vacillated a great deal.

We understood that this issue was the most acute and that our Moscow boots had stepped on a very sensitive corn and we awaited how Paris would react to the prodding of Moscow. The latest telegrams testify that a break with Moscow was attempted. Morizet is referred to as the initiator of this attempt. He paid us a visit in Moscow and then wrote a very sympathetic book. (It is one thing to write in Paris a sympathetic book about the Russian revolution; it is something else again to prepare the French revolution.) This Morizet together with Soutif—both members of the Central Committee—proposed to split and to proclaim the formation of an independent party without waiting for the return of the delegation from Moscow. But there was such great pressure from below, the readiness of the rank and file to accept the decisions of the Fourth Congress was so clear and manifest, that they were forced to beat a retreat. And while they abstained—only abstained—the incumbent Central Committee consisting entirely of centrists, with not a single left winger on it and perhaps without any general enthusiasm among all the members of the Central Committee, nevertheless voted to submit to the Moscow decisions.

I repeat, comrades, that this fact may seem to be a minor one from the standpoint of world perspectives. But if we had followed the life of the French working class and its communist vanguard from day to day—and we must learn to do this through our press—then all of us would say that only now, only after the Fourth Congress has French Communism turned the helm in such a way as will guarantee it a swift progress

in conquering the confidence of the broad working masses of France. This is all the more true because there is not another working class in this world that has been deceived so often, so shamelessly and vilely as the French working class. Since the end of the eighteenth century it has been duped by the bourgeoisie in all its colorations during all the revolutions. From among all the parties of the Second International, the French socialists of the pre-war and war epoch produced the most elaborate technique and virtuosity of treachery. And this is why the French working class with its superb revolutionary temperament inevitably reacted with the greatest mistrust even towards the new Communist Party. It had seen "socialists" under all sorts of labels; it had seen organizations, no matter how they changed their skins, remain passageways for careerists, deputies, journalists of all sorts, ministers, etc. Briand, Millerand, and all this, after all, stems from the old Socialist Party. No other proletariat in the world has passed through such an experience of deception, of political exploitation. Hence mistrust; hence political indifference; hence syndicalist influences and prejudices.

What we need is that the Communist Party come before the working class and demonstrate in action that it is not a party like other parties but the revolutionary organization of the working class; that there is no room in its ranks for careerists, Freemasons, democrats and grafters. For the first time this demand has been presented and accepted. Furthermore the date has been fixed: January 1, 1923 is the deadline. Not a single Freemason, not a single careerist—by January 1, 1923. They have only a few days left. Comrades, these are facts of utmost importance.

The Issue of the United Front

Another question likewise in connection with France was posed very sharply—the question of the united front. As you know, the slogan of the united front arises from two causes. In the first place, we Communists are still a minority in France, in Germany; in all countries of Europe with the exception of Bulgaria and perhaps Czechoslovakia we influence and have control over less than one-half of the proletariat. At the same time the revolutionary development has started to lag; the proletariat wants to live and to fight but finds itself split. It is under these conditions that the Communists must conquer the confidence of this working class. On what basis? On the basis of the struggle in its entire scope. On the basis of current day-to-day struggle, on the basis of every demand, at every strike, at every demonstration. The Communist must be in the forefront everywhere. The Communist must conquer the confidence of those who still do not trust him today. Hence the slogan of the united front; hence the internal fusion, the expulsion from our ranks of everything alien to us in spirit and a simultaneous struggle to win over those elements that still trust these careerists, opportunists, Freemasons and the like. This is a twofold but closely interconnected task. The French Communists, especially the centrists who had tolerated Freemasons in their ranks and rejected the tactic of the united front, have proposed to apply the tactic of the united front in connection with the demand for amnesty. I cite France because these questions found their sharpest expression in that country.

When Frossard, the secretary of the party, proposed in the name of the Communists to the Dissidents, i.e., socialists, patriots, reformists, that they engage in joint action in order to obtain amnesty for worker-revolutionists clapped in jail during the war or in the post-war period—as soon as this offer was made, the shrewdest leaders of the Dissidents immediately replied in a way that is typical and instructive in the highest degree. We have met and we shall meet this answer elsewhere.

The Dissidents said: "You Communists have turned to us and consequently you thereby acknowledge that we are not betrayers of the working class. But we want to think about your offer and whether or not you are hiding a brickbat in your sleeves; or are preparing to discredit us by chance." I judge from the papers that in The Hague comrade Radek wrote reportedly a very impolite article about Vandervelde and Scheidemann and at the same time offered the local Social Democrats and followers of Amsterdam a united front against militarism and the danger of war.

Knowing the irascible temper of comrade Radek I am ready to allow that the article was very impolite. But the reaction of Messrs. Amsterdamists was quite typical: "Look here," they said, "this means one of two things. Either you must admit that we are not traitors in view of your proposing a united front to us or we shall become firmly convinced that you are holding in your sleeves not only disrespectful articles, but brickbats, and something worse."

Comrades, this position of course constitutes the most sweeping admission of bankruptcy. Upon reading this I was reminded of the comments of certain Parisian wits in the period of our emigration on the occasion when the Social Democrats proposed to debate with Burtsev (the old S.-R.). They pointed out that Burtsev's reply amounted to saying: "I'm a wise old bird and you can't trap me. What you seek by a discussion is to expose my feeble mentality but I refuse to fall for this provocation."

The gentlemen of the Second International are shrewder than Burtsev but they fall into the self-same trap. For what is the content of the brickbat in our sleeves? It is this, that we say that these people are incapable of struggle, incapable of defending the interests of the proletariat. And we address ourselves to their army, that is, those workers who still follow and trust them and say to them: We are proposing to your leaders a certain way of fighting jointly with us for the eight-hour working day, for amnesty, and against wage cuts. What is our "brickbat"? Why this, that if you Amsterdamists and Social Democrats expose yourselves in this struggle as cowards and traitors, a section of your workers will come over to us. But if contrary to expectations you turn out to be revolutionary tigers and lions, then so much the better for you. Try it.

This is the content of our provocation. It is so simple, our trap is so simple. But at the same time it is unassailable. It is impossible to escape from it. It does not matter whether a Burtsev agrees to discuss and shows that he is no good or refuses to discuss for fear of revealing that he is no good. In either case he remains no good, and can't remedy the situation. In other words, the slogan of the united front which is already playing an enormous role in all European countries is educating the working masses about the Communists and posing before the workers who do not yet trust the Communists the following proposition:

"You do not believe in revolutionary methods and in the dictatorship. Very well. But we Communists propose to you and your organization that we fight side by side to gain those demands which you are advancing today."

This is an unassailable argument. It educates the masses about the Communists and shows them that the Communist organization is the best for partial struggles as well. I repeat that we have had major successes in this struggle. And alongside of the growing internal fusion of the Communist parties we observe the growth of their political influence and their increased ability to maneuver, really maneuver. This is something that they have especially lacked.

From the united front flows the slogan of a workers' government. The Fourth Congress submitted it to an all-sided discussion and once again confirmed it as the central political

slogan for the next period. What does the struggle for a workers' government signify? We of course know that a genuine workers' government in Europe will be established after the proletariat overthrows the bourgeoisie together with the latter's democratic machinery and installs its own dictatorship under the leadership of the Communist Party. But in order to bring this about it is necessary for the European proletariat in its majority to support the Communist Party.

But this does not obtain as yet and so our Communist parties say on every appropriate occasion:

"Socialist workers, syndicalist workers, anarchists or non-party workers! Wages are being slashed; less and less remains of the eight-hour working day; the cost of living is soaring. Such things would not be if all the workers despite their differences were able to unite and create their own workers' government."

And the slogan of a workers' government thus becomes a wedge driven in by the Communists between the working class and all other classes; and inasmuch as the summits of the social democracy, the reformists, are tied up with the bourgeoisie, this wedge will act more and more to tear away, and it is already beginning to tear the left wing of the social democratic workers away from their leaders. Under certain conditions the slogan of a workers' government can become a reality in Europe. That is to say, a moment may arrive when the Communists together with the left elements of the social democracy will create a workers' government in a way similar to ours in Russia when we created a workers' and peasants' government together with the left Social-Revolutionaries. Such a moment would constitute a transition to the proletarian dictatorship, the full and completed one. But right now the significance of the slogan of a workers' government lies not so much in the manner and conditions of its realization but rather in the fact that at the present time this slogan opposes the working class as a whole politically to all other classes, i.e., to all the groupings of the bourgeois political world.

At the Fourth Congress we were confronted concretely with the question of a workers' government with respect to Saxony. There the Social Democrats together with the Communists comprise a majority as against the bourgeoisie in the Saxon Landtag. I believe there are 40 Social Democratic deputies and 10 Communist deputies while the total bourgeois bloc is less than 50. And so the Social Democrats proposed to the Communists the joint formation of a workers' government in Saxony. There were some doubts and vacillations on this issue in our party. The question was reviewed here in Moscow and a decision was reached to reject the proposal. What do the German Social Democrats really want? What were they aiming at with this proposal? You all know that the German republic is headed by a Social Democrat, Ebert. Under Ebert is a bourgeois ministry, called to power by Ebert. But in Saxony, one of the most highly proletarianized sections of Germany, it is proposed to institute a coalition workers' ministry of Social Democrats and Communists. The result would be: a genuine bourgeois government in Germany, over the country as a whole, while in the Landtag of one of the sections of Germany there is, acting as a lightning rod, a coalition Social Democratic and Communist government.

We gave the following answer in the Comintern: If you our German Communist comrades are of the opinion that a revolution is possible in the next few months in Germany, then we would advise you to participate in Saxony in a coalition government and to utilize your ministerial posts in Saxony for the furthering of political and organizational tasks and for transforming Saxony in a certain sense into a communist drillground so as to have a revolutionary stronghold already reinforced in

the period of preparation and approach for the outbreak of the revolution.

But this would be possible only if the pressure of the revolution were already making itself felt, only if it were already at hand. In that case it would imply only the seizure of a single position in Germany which you are destined to capture as a whole. But at the present time you will of course play in Saxony the role of an appendage, an impotent appendage because the Saxon government itself is impotent before Berlin, and Berlin is—a bourgeois government. The Communist Party of Germany was in complete accord with this decision and the negotiations were broken off. The proposal of the Social Democrats to the Communists—much weaker than the Social Democrats and hounded by these same Social Democrats—to share power with them in Saxony is of course a trap. But in this trap was expressed the pressure of the working masses for unity. This pressure has been evoked by us; and this pressure, insofar as it operates to tear the working class away from the bourgeoisie, will in the last analysis work in our favor.*

The Lesson of Fascism

Comrades, I said that there is a tide of concentrated reaction now occurring in Europe in her governmental upper stories; the victory of the Tories in England; Poincaré's national bloc with a prospect of Tardieu in France; in Germany which is still called a Socialist Republic today (it was hastily labelled so in November 1918), there is a purely bourgeois government; and finally in Italy there is the assumption of power by Mussolini.

Mussolini is a lesson being given to Europe with regard to democracy, its principles and its methods. In some respects this lesson is analogous—from the opposite extreme of course—to the one which we gave Europe in the beginning of 1918 by dispersing the Constituent Assembly. Mussolini is a lesson to Europe that is instructive in the highest degree.

Italy is an old cultured country, with democratic traditions, with universal suffrage, etc., etc. When the proletariat frightened the bourgeoisie to death but proved unable to deal it the death blow, owing to the treachery of its own party, the bourgeoisie set in motion all its most active elements, headed by Mussolini, a renegade to socialism and the proletariat. A private party army was mobilized and it was equipped from one end of the country to the other with funds allegedly drawn from mysterious sources but which flow essentially from governmental resources, partly from the secret funds in Italy, and to a considerable measure from French subsidies through Mussolini. Under the aegis of democracy the storm-troop organization of the counter-revolution was organized, and in the course of two years it conducted assaults upon workers' districts and threw a ring of its troops around Rome. The bourgeoisie vacillated because it was not sure that Mussolini was capable of coping with the situation. But when Mussolini proved his capability, they all bowed before him.

The speech made by Mussolini in the Italian parliament ought to be posted and placarded in all the workers' institutions and houses in western Europe. This is what he virtually said:

"I could chase all of you out of here and turn this (Parliament) into a camp for my fascists. But I don't need to do it because you will lick my boots anyway." And they all answered, "Hear! hear!" And the Italian democrats thereupon

* The following summer, however, the Brandler leadership of the German party did enter a coalition government in Saxony and, while the party vacillated whether or not to prepare revolution nationally, the central government sent troops which drove the coalition out.—Ed.

requested to know: "Which boot is it your pleasure that we begin with—the right or the left?"

Comrades, this is a lesson of exceptional importance to the European working class which in its summits is corroded by its traditions, by bourgeois democracy, by the deliberate hypnosis of legality.

I have said that the centralized communist organization of the Comintern and the existence of the Soviet Republic constitute the greatest conquests of the European and world working class in this epoch of the death-bed triumphs of the European bourgeoisie, in this epoch of a break in the rising curve of the revolution. The gist of the matter is not that we, Russia, conduct an internationalist propaganda. It of course happens that Russian comrades like Radek and Lozovsky, for example, manage, to our surprise, to reach The Hague, and there write disrespectful articles, and arouse the ire of pacifists of both sexes, etc., etc. This, comrades, is of course very valuable and very gratifying, but it is still something of second-rate importance.

Nor is the gist of the matter in the fact that we in Moscow extend hospitality to the Congresses of the Comintern. It is of course a good thing, but our propaganda does not consist in welcoming our comrades from Italy, Germany and elsewhere and assigning them rooms in the Lux Hotel (poorly heated, of course, inasmuch as we have not yet learned to operate heating systems efficiently). The gist lies in the very existence of the Soviet Republic. We have become accustomed to this fact. The entire world working class appears, in a certain sense, to have become accustomed to it. On the other side, the bourgeoisie, too, makes a pretense to a certain extent of having grown accustomed. But in order to understand the significance of the existence of the Soviet Republic for the revolution, let us imagine for a moment that this Republic no longer exists. With Mussolini in Italy, Poincare in France, Bonar Law in England, a bourgeois government in Germany, the downfall of the Soviet Republic would signify the postponement of the European and world revolution for decades; it would signify the genuine decay of European culture. Socialism would then arise perhaps from America, from Japan, from Asia. But instead of speculating in terms of decades, what we are striving for is to bring this issue to its consummation in the next few years. (Applause.) For this there is the greatest and most ample opportunity.

What is the proletariat once it establishes a correct relationship with the peasantry, the proletariat of even so backward a country as ours? We have already seen it with our own eyes, and our All-Union Soviet Congress, now convening in Moscow, is demonstrating just what is signified by the power of the proletariat, encircled and blockaded by the whole world, but leading the peasantry behind it. The European and world working class draws its strength and energy from this source, from Soviet Russia. We hold the power. In our country the means of production are nationalized. This is a great trump in the hands of the toiling masses of Russia and at the same time this is a pledge of an accelerated development of the revolution in Europe.

America's Role . . . and Soviet Russia's

Should America lag behind we shall nevertheless gain the upper hand. During the imperialist war the American bourgeoisie warmed its hands at the European bonfire. But, comrades, once the revolutionary conflagration starts in Europe the American bourgeoisie will be unable to maintain itself long. It is nowhere written that the European proletariat must keep waiting until the American proletariat learns not to succumb to the lies of its triply depraved bourgeoisie. This is written nowhere. At the present time the American bourgeoisie is de-

liberately keeping Europe in a condition of decay. Glutted with European blood and gold the American bourgeoisie issues orders to the whole world, sends its plenipotentiaries to conferences without any previous commitments. These emissaries maintain silence and render their own decisions, and from time to time they place their American foot on the table and the diplomats of the European countries cannot fail to observe that this foot wears an excellent American shoe, and with this foot America dictates her laws to Europe. The European bourgeoisie, not only of Germany and France but also England, stands on its hind legs before the American bourgeoisie which drained Europe in wartime by its support, its loans, its gold, and which now keeps Europe in a condition of death-agony. The American bourgeoisie will be repaid by the European proletariat. And this vengeance will come all the sooner the firmer our Soviet successes are.

* * *

That same American billionaire with his first-class boots could buy up all of our Russia with his billions were our frontiers open to him. That is why the monopoly of foreign trade is just as much our inalienable revolutionary conquest as the nationalization of the means of production. That is why the working class and peasants of Russia will not permit any violation of the monopoly of foreign trade no matter how much pressure is exerted upon us from all the five continents of this globe still under the yoke of capitalism. These are our trumps. Only with a correct organization of production can we preserve them, multiply them and not waste them. From this standpoint, comrades, there must be no self-deception concerning the difficulties of our tasks. This is what we said at the Fourth Congress which had as a special point on its agenda our New Economic Policy (NEP) in connection with the world perspectives. We listed our big trumps: state power, transport, the primary means of production in industry, natural resources, nationalization of land, taxes in kind which flow from the latter, and the monopoly of foreign trade. These are first-class trumps. But if one does not know how to use them, it is possible to lose even with better trumps. Comrades, we must learn. At the Congress comrade Lenin in his brief speech laid particular stress that not only they but we, too, must learn. We must learn the correct organization of industry, for this correct organization still lies ahead and not behind us—it is tomorrow and not yesterday, nor even today.

We are making efforts to stabilize our currency. This was also taken up at the Fourth Congress. These efforts are indispensable and, naturally, the greater our relative successes in this field, all the easier will be our administrative labors in industry. But we all understand only too clearly that all efforts in the field of finances unaccompanied by genuine material successes in the field of industry must remain mere child's play with beads. The foundation is our industry; the Soviet state rests upon it, thrives with it and gets the assurance of the further victories of the working class.

The Danger of Party Degeneration

Finally, there is one more trump, one more apparatus, one other organization that is in our hands. We talked about it more than once at the Fourth Congress. It is our party. I am speaking here first of all before the Communist fraction of the Soviet Congress and it is necessary in closing to say a few words about it. From the general analysis it follows that we are living through, on the European scale, a period of decline in the direct revolutionary struggle, and simultaneously through a period of preparatory work and strengthening of the Communist Party. The development has assumed a retarded and

prolonged character. This means that we must wait for the assistance of the European and, later, of the world proletariat; this means that our party is destined for a long period ahead, perhaps for several years, to remain the vanguard of the world revolution.

This is a very great honor but it is also a great responsibility, a very great burden. We would prefer to have beside us Soviet republics in Germany, Poland and other countries. Our responsibility then would have been less and the difficulties of our position would not have been so great. Our party has old cadres with pre-revolutionary, underground tempering, but they are in the minority. We have in it hundreds of thousands who in terms of human class material are in no way inferior to the old timers. These hundreds of thousands who poured into our ranks after the revolution possess the advantage of youth but are handicapped by a lesser experience. Comrade Lenin told me (I did not read it myself) that some physician, either a Czech or a German, wrote that the Communist Party of Russia consists of a few thousand oldsters and the rest, youth. The conditions of the NEP will tend to reshape it, and if the old generations—a few thousands—depart from activity, the party will be imperceptibly transformed by the elements of the NEP, the elements of capitalism. Here, as you see, is a subtle political calculation. The calculation is of course false to the core, but at the same time it demands of our party that it give itself an accounting of the protracted character of the revolutionary development and of the difficulties of our position; and that it double and triple its efforts for the education of the new generations in our party, for attracting the youth and for raising the qualifications of the party mass. In the present conditions this is a life-and-death question for us.

Lenin's Illness

Comrades, I want to refer to still another episode—a very major episode for all of us—and that is the illness of Vladimir Ilyich. Most of you here have not had the opportunity of following the European press. There have been many wild campaigns concerning us and against us but I do not recall—not even in the days of Kerensky when we were hounded as German spies—such a concentrated campaign of malevolence, viciousness, and fiendish speculation as the campaign around the illness of comrade Lenin. Our enemies of course hoped for the worst outcome, the worst possible personal outcome. At the same time they said that the party is beheaded, split into warring groups, falling apart and that the opportunity is opening up for their laying their hands on Russia. The White Guard scum talked about it openly, of course. The diplomats, the capitalists of Europe, hinted about it, understood each other with half-phrases.

Comrades, in this way they, against their will and desire, showed on the one hand that they have been able in their own way to appraise the significance of comrade Lenin to our party and the revolution, and on the other hand that they neither know or understand—all the worse for them—the nature and character of our party. It is superfluous for me to talk before the Communist fraction of the Soviet Congress about the significance of comrade Lenin to the movement in our country and in the world. But there is, comrades, a kind of tie that is not only physical but spiritual, an internal, indissoluble tie between the party and the individual who expresses it best, most fully, and in the way that a genius does. And this found its expression in the fact that when comrade Lenin was torn by illness away from his work, the party (which knew some-

thing about the howling of the bourgeois jackals throughout the world) awaited with tense expectation news and bulletins of comrade Lenin's condition, but at the same time not a single muscle in our party trembled, there was not a single vacillation, not a hint of the possibility of internal struggle, and all the less so of split. When comrade Lenin withdrew from work on the orders of the physicians, the party understood that now a double and treble responsibility fell upon every rank and file member of the party; and the party waited in unanimity and with fused ranks for the leader's return.

Not so long ago I was engaged in conversation by a foreign bourgeois politician who said to me: "I get around a good deal in your party circles and in Soviet circles. Of course there are personal conflicts among you but one must give you your due. Whenever the external world, or external danger, or general tasks are involved, you always straighten out your front." The latter part of his declaration about our straightening out our front gratified me, but the first part, I admit, annoyed me somewhat. To the extent that in such a big party as ours, with such colossal tasks as ours, and under the greatest conceivable difficulties, and with the old timers unquestionably wearing out (it is in the nature of things)—to the extent that some internal dangers could arise in our party, there is not and cannot be any remedy against them other than the raising of the qualification of the entire party and the strengthening of its public opinion so that each member in every post feels the increased pressure of public opinion.

No Guarantees of Victory

These are the conclusions we draw from the general international situation. The hour of the European revolution will not perhaps strike tomorrow. Weeks and months will pass, perhaps several years and we shall still remain the only workers'-peasants' state in the world. In Italy Mussolini has triumphed. Are we guaranteed against the victory of German Mussolinis in Germany? No. And it is wholly possible that a much more reactionary ministry than Poincaré's will come to power in France. Before squatting down on its hind legs and pushing its Kerensky to the fore, the bourgeoisie is still quite capable of advancing its last Stolypins, Plehves, Sipyagins. This will be the prologue of the European revolution, provided we are able to maintain ourselves, provided the Soviet state remain standing, and, consequently, above all provided our party maintains itself to the end. We shall perhaps have to pass through more than one year of this preparatory economic, political and other kinds of work.

Therefore we must draw closer to our mass reserves. More youth around our party and within it! Raise its qualifications to the maximum! Given this condition of complete fusion and with the raising of the party's qualifications, with the transfer of experience from the old to the new generation, no matter what storms—these heralds of the final proletarian victory—may break over heads, we will stand firm in our knowledge that the Soviet frontier is the trench beyond which the counter-revolution cannot pass. This trench is held by us, the vanguard of Soviet Russia, the Communist Party, and we shall preserve this trench inviolate and impregnable until that day when the European revolution arrives, and over the whole of Europe shall wave the banner of the Soviet Republic of the United States of Europe, the threshold to the World Republic. (Long and stormy ovation.)

(Shouts: Long Live the Leader of the Red Army, Comrade Trotsky! Long Live Lenin!)

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