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THE "WAR" REACHES THE PACIFIC

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Artificial Division of the History of the Soviet Union

"Full Political Freedom to all Pro-Soviet Parties"

(A Slogan and Its Meaning)

The Trotsky School of Falsification

Two Pictures of Piatakov
Trotsky and Radek's Line on China

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THE "WAR" REACHES THE PACIFIC

THERE is hardly a worker in the world today who does not burn with the just desire to destroy Hitlerism root and branch. For many years now, different sections of the working class have pinned their hopes upon various forces which profess to fight the horrible monster of Fascism. Invariably with every new page of history the illusory hopes turned into disappointment, anguish and fearfulness.

The declaration of war in September 1939 marked, in the eyes of the advanced workers, the beginning of the "Second World Imperialist War." Such was the evaluation of the new turn of history given them by their leaders, the Stalinists, Trotskyists and Left Socialists. To the average worker, this new situation represented a war of the "Democracies Against Hitlerism." Regardless of the interpretation, both the advanced and the average workers believed there were two fighting camps bent upon defeating each other.

One thing, however, became obvious from the start. The behavior of the participants in this "Second World Imperialist War" or "War of the Democracies Versus Hitlerism" was strikingly illogical. People openly referred to the situation as the "Phoney War." This illogicalness was "explained" in a thousand different ways. The influential capitalist newspaper, The New York Times, not only admitted that "Logic is not the guide to this war," but even set the minds of its readers to expect the unreasonable to continue:

"Logic is not the guide to this war. Some completely irrational and implausible incident — an in-

tervention of nature, an accident, an unexpected human reaction — may upset the sequences of reason and change the course of events. Logic does not rule, and we shall continue to be plagued and baffled by the unreasonable and irrelevant behavior of premises and conclusions." (Editorial, New York Times, January 9, 1941.)

No sooner had a state of war been declared between the capitalist-democratic United States and fascist Japan, than that illogicalness, so evident in the relations between the European capitalist-democracies and the fascist powers became plainly visible in the Pacific.

THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

FOR years the relative strength of the United States and Japan was presented in figures and documents. It was common knowledge that in virtually every respect Japan was inferior, and in some respects hopelessly behind the United States. There was no change whatever in this view even on the very eve of the declaration of war. In The New York Times of Nov. 30, 1941, there is an article by Arthur Krook entitled "Power Backs Diplomacy in Far Eastern Talks." The author's theme was that the Administration in Washington was pursuing a strong foreign policy against Japan. It was because of the force behind it the author asserted, that a strong policy was shown:

"Foreign policy is no stronger than the force required to maintain it an axiom in diplomacy, state-

craft and war-making. During the discussion in Washington, therefore, the President and Secretary Hull were able to enunciate a strong foreign policy because of the force behind it, in part outlined above." (My emphasis - G.M.)

Krock pointed to strong air, naval and military forces of the United States and of the British Empire in the Far East. The Philippines, Krock wrote, had become a fortress menacing the Japanese domain:

"For in the Far Pacific are strong naval units and bases - air, naval and military - of the combined power of the United States and the British Empire. The Philippine archipelago - though its people are exposed to bombing, as President Quezon has said - has become a fortress menacing the top curve of the horseshoe, which is the realm of Japan."

And he further stated what was known, namely, that the air power of the United States in the East was in certain elements superior to any other:

"But these things are known: the United States has air power in the East which is superior in certain elements to any other."

British and American sea power, Krock asserted, was concentrated to form a wall between the Japanese naval force and the basic raw materials sorely needed by Japan, materials without which modern war cannot be carried out:

"Also, British and American sea power in great strength has been concentrated in the space of the horseshoe, forming a wall between the Japanese Navy and the treasure of raw materials to the southward."

A multiplicity of articles in the capitalist press spoke of the greatly weakened condition of Japan's industry due to the disturbed world situation. The National Industrial Conference Board in an analysis entitled "The Effects of Allied Economic Blockade on

Japan" made some definite statements regarding the serious condition of Japanese economy. Reporting on this analysis, The New York Times of December 2, 1941 wrote:

"In describing the economic problems now confronting Japan, the board pointed out that even in peace time that country was barely self-sustaining in foodstuffs and was heavily dependent upon sources now under control of the blockade group for materials to keep her industrial machines working."

In plain words, Japan, to keep her industry from collapse, depended upon the "blockade group" - that is, primarily upon British and American sources of supply. The economic crisis in Japan was depicted as being so severe that many industries had to shut down:

"At present, the report continued, every available scrap of material is being salvaged, including such things as iron fences, sunken ships, name plates, manhole covers and kitchen utensils. Even fishing boats are denied use of gasoline. Despite these measures, it was said, lack of material has forced many industries to shut down, and operations in the cotton textile industry have been curtailed almost 50 per cent."

The publication, Contemporary China, a digest of the China News Service, wrote on December 1, 1941 that Japan was on the verge of collapse due to the strain of her military adventure in China; also, that the operation of Japanese industries was cut to between 30 and 40 per cent of their full capacity.

We have not come across a single article or statement written prior to December 7-9, which would attempt, even in a remote way, to suggest that Japan was a match for the United States in naval and air strength. Every student of international affairs knew that Japan some time ago had accepted the 5-5-3 ratio of naval forces, the 5-5 representing Britain and the United

States, the 3 representing Japan. After that ratio was abandoned, Japan strained herself to enlarge her fleet. But she was never able to come up to the British or American navy, for these navies grew enormously and uninterruptedly, leaving Japan relatively at the same point at which the naval race commenced.

The illogical spots in the picture began to appear with the events at Pearl Harbor. The New York Times of December 9th printed a brief news item under the heading "Japanese Navy Held 'Very Formidable'" with a subhead "British Military Expert Here Fears It Has a Surprise'." This "expert" asserted that on October 30th he had received a private report giving the figure of Japanese aircraft carriers as almost double the former estimates. The alleged "private report" placed the "number of Japan's aircraft carriers at thirteen, with two more launched but not yet completed." But in the same issue of The New York Times there appeared a table of comparative naval strength of the United States and Japan. This table completely disregarded the alleged "private report" and stated that Japan had 7 to 9 aircraft carriers as compared with 7 of the United States. The New York Sun of December 8, 1941 gave Japan 8 aircraft carriers. However, the number of vessels does not convey an accurate picture of their strength. The prominent Wall Street organ, The New York Sun, happened to make a revealing remark on this matter:

"What seems to be a numerical advantage for the Japanese actually is a disadvantage, since American aircraft carriers have a complement of about 100 planes each or a total of 700 for the water-borne air arm and the biggest Japanese carriers hold fifty planes during wartime and the smaller units can handle only thirty or forty shipboard fighters and dive bombers." (Dec. 26, 1941)

In the November 1941 issue of the American Mercury there is an article of absorbing interest written by James R. Young.* Speaking of the situation among the Japanese upper circles, Young said that,

"... the powerful Admirals — well-educated and widely traveled men who know that their navy would have to bear the brunt of a struggle and that it is no match for the U.S. Navy. They know that our battleships, with vastly superior ordnance and fire control, shoot with accuracy and speed which theirs cannot approach. Industrial leaders and realistic Palace Statesmen also see inevitable disaster if the country goes to war." (The Reader's Digest, November 1941, p. 29.)

The New York Sun cites the opinion of those who have knowledge of the shortcomings of Japanese air power:

"Japan is in no position to battle successfully with United States air power and once this country's flying units get moving Nipponese aggression will be halted, in the opinion of experts who know the shortcomings of the Japanese air force and its personnel." (Dec. 8, 1941.)

Concerning plane production in the United States, an article "Our Staggering War Output" in The New York Post for January 10, 1942, says:

"The U.S. now is rapidly becoming the world's main source of military aircraft. Present produc-

* The Reader's Digest, which reprints the article in condensed form, described the author as follows:

"James R. Young has an intimate understanding of the problems facing the Japanese, having lived and worked in Japan for 13 years. He was Tokyo correspondent for International News Service and business manager of the Japan Advertiser (American)."

tion figures are secret, but before the war this country was producing well over 2,000 planes a month." (My emphasis - G.M.)

James R. Young states that the entire airplane industry of Japan has a quota of 250 machines a month. But even this quota is not met.

"The whole airplane industry, now employing about 10,000 men and women - 3,000 less than work in the Glenn Martin plant at Baltimore - is producing only 150 of its quota of 250 units a month.

"Most of Japan's 6,000 planes are obsolete or obsolescent. Her pilots are fair, their accident rate the highest in the world. German officers who train them say they can be taught to use a slow bomber but lack the individual initiative to fly a high-speed plane in combat." (Reader's Digest, November 1941, p. 31.)

Young further states that due to the fact that industry was run by Japanese technicians on the basis of mass output of inferior quality goods, they could not help Japan in the problem of producing precision machinery.

The New York Sun declares that the entire Japanese air force would be no match for the American naval air arm alone! It reports that the American navy has over 4,000 planes, with the number increasing every day. In numbers, Japan probably has more planes than the American navy, but strength is not measured by numbers only:

"The entire air force of Japan would be no match for the United States Navy air arm alone, let alone the navy combined with the army air force. The expanded fleet includes twelve aircraft carriers, and the navy alone has more than 4,000 planes in service with the number increasing every day. Two new long range dive-bombers now are beginning to flow to the navy, the Brewster SB A-1 and the Curtiss SB2C-1, both of which carry their bomb loads inside the fuselage." (Dec. 8, 1941. My emphasis - G. M.)

Discussing the relative air weakness of Japan, Charles A. Michie, in the December 8, 1941 issue of P M, stated:

"Japan is not an air power. At best she rates sixth among the major powers, far behind Britain, Germany, Russia and the U.S.A., weaker even than Italy. And Italy's first-line warplanes were blasted out of the Mediterranean sky by obsolete British squadrons, unfit to take part in the Battle of Britain.

"In spite of the recent reorganization of Japan's army and navy air forces under Gen. Kenji Doihara, Japan's present air power cannot compete on any basis with the equipment the U.S.A. will fight with."

The comparative weakness of Japan in the air was further illustrated in the number of pilots. The probable number of Japanese pilots for both navy and army was about 4500. According to the United States Navy's announcement, the American Navy alone, at the end of 1941 counted 6000 pilots (P M, Dec. 8, 1941.)

Since the events at Pearl Harbor however, the long-established picture is being repainted to make it look as if Japan is the superior naval and air power.

An Associated Press dispatch, printed in The New York World-Telegram, Dec. 17, 1941, quoted Rear Admiral Yates Stirling Jr., retired former Chief of Staff of the U.S. fleet, as saying: "As it is now, Japan has real superiority. She has 5000 airplanes, a superior fleet and the initiative."

Many well-informed people who prior to December 7 had never depicted Japan as superior in any respect to the United States have suddenly taken to singing the new tune. An eminent journalist, Anne O'Hare McCormick, said the day after the events in Pearl Harbor: "We can no longer talk and ask why the British and French were not prepared. We were not prepared." (The New York Post, December 9, 1941.)

The new tune did not immediately become the predominant one. There still appeared writings showing that the United States is superior to Japan. In a feature article "War Finds This Nation Far From Unprepared" published in The New York Times exactly a week after the events at Pearl Harbor and five days after McCormick's statement, we find an indication of this. The article shows that the American Navy is supported by 5000 planes, and there are orders to build up this air force to the strength of 15,000. In naval might, except for cruisers, the article says, the United States is superior to Japan:

"On every count except numbers of cruisers on hand the United States is far superior to Japan."

Concerning the cruisers we may point out that though the United States has 37 to Japan's 46, in tonnage the cruisers are equal - 330,000 tons ("Comparative Naval Power," The New York Times, Dec. 9, 1941). It is clear that the United States cruisers, though fewer in number, are larger and more powerful, unit for unit, than Japan's. Nor is this all. Japan's building program is far smaller in every form of naval craft. Moreover, Japan's rate of building and repairing is incomparably slower than that of the United States.

In addition to the vast naval and air power superiority of the United States, it must be remembered that in the Far East there is a considerable British air force. The Australian Navy and air force must not be lost sight of. Last but not least, there is a small Netherlands fleet and a considerable air force. According to P.A. Kerstens, Netherlands' Minister of Shipping and Industry who arrived in London from Batavia, the Netherlands air force is really of huge proportions:

"Mr. Kerstens said the first-line air strength of the Netherlands was about 2,000 planes..."
(New York Times, January 8, 1942.)

Most of these planes are of American manufacture, among the finest

machines in the world.

THE ILLOGICALITIES IN THE EVENTS
AT PEARL HARBOR

(ONE of the greatest naval fortresses in the world, perhaps the greatest, serving as the defense key to the entire Northeastern Pacific from Alaska to the Panama Canal, is Pearl Harbor. It is the "Gibraltar of the Pacific." The nearest Japanese bases for land planes are on the islands of Wotje and Jaluit, in the mid-Pacific over 2,000 miles from Pearl Harbor. The "Gibraltar of the Pacific" has been fortified with an eye to the possibility of an attack precisely from Japan:

"To many Americans Hawaii is the land of ukeleles, hula hula dancers and Waikiki Beach, but to the War and Navy Departments it is America's Gibraltar of the Pacific, bristling with airfields, barracks, dry-docks, warships, artillery, search lights and anti-aircraft guns and all the other weapons of war, installed for one purpose - to guard against attack from the one possible aggressor, Japan." (New York Herald Tribune, Dec. 8, 1941.)

On Sunday December 7, 1941 a flock of Japanese planes swarmed over this mighty fortress, and some midget Japanese submarines, obviously brought very close to Hawaii by a carrier or carriers, entered its harbor. That a Japanese attack was impending was known and expected well in advance. There is considerable evidence to this effect. Reporting from: Washington, Charles T. Lucey of the Scripps-Howard Staff wrote:

"High Navy Department officials have informed certain Congressmen that ALL United States naval commanders were advised on November 26 or November 27 - 10 days before the Pearl Harbor attack - that an enemy assault might come at any moment." (World Telegram, Dec. 24, 1941. My emphasis - G.M.)

Was Lucey the only one who indicated that knowledge existed regarding an impending action by Japan? Arthur Krock, the Washington Correspondent of The New York Times, reported that Secretary of State Hull had told both the Army and Navy departments "to prepare for the worst":

"It was learned today that as early as Nov. 27, immediately after the special Japanese envoys in Washington had received this government's final proposals for settlement of the Far Eastern situation, the Secretary of State issued a warning to all departments concerned to prepare for the worst. Among those concerned were, of course, the Army and the Navy." (December 17, 1941.)

Afterward, Secretary Hull was approached for comment on Krock's statement that the Army and Navy had been notified of the probability of an attack by Japanese forces. His reply verified Krock's report:

"HULL STANDS ON RECORD
ON WARNING OF ATTACK

"Secretary of State Cordell Hull said he was entirely content with the record of the State Department when he was asked to comment on the report published in THE NEW YORK TIMES today that he had warned the armed services well in advance of the probability of a sudden Japanese attack." (Dec. 18, 1941.)

Leland Stowe reporting from Chungking, China, stated the following:

"How the Japanese were able to bomb the Army's big airfields at Oahu without large numbers of American fighters getting into the air promptly remains incomprehensible.

"This is especially true since United States representatives in Chungking were warned by Washington of the seriousness of the situation as early as last Friday when a code message stated that relations with Japan might be ruptured over the week end." (New

York Post, December 10, 1941. My emphasis -- G.M.)

A United States naval officer spoke strange and significant words to Stowe which indicate that the naval commanders knew what was coming and when:

"On Sunday evening, at least an hour before the Japanese blitz in Hawaii, an officer of the United States gunboat Tutuila warned your correspondent: 'It's going to happen tonight.'

"He and another officer were both convinced that Japan would discard its mask before I could use my Hong Kong plane reservation on Tuesday. Their attitude obviously was based on advice from Washington received ahead of the Tutuila." (Ibid. My emphasis - G.M.)

If the officers on a gunboat in China knew, it is hard to see how the commanding staffs in Pearl Harbor could have been in the dark, a point not lost on Leland Stowe:

"If the Tutuila staff was so clearly warned, it is difficult to understand how the commanders of the American forces at Hawaii were less posted." (Ibid.)

As a matter of fact, according to a United Press dispatch from Honolulu, it was revealed that the armed forces there knew of the impending attack a whole week in advance!

"It is now possible to reveal that the United States forces here [Honolulu] had known for a week that the attack was coming and they were not caught unprepared." (The New York Times, Dec. 8, 1941.)

Thus, that action by Japan was impending was reportedly known to high Navy Department officials, to certain Congressmen, to the commanding staff of an American gunboat in China, and to the authorities in Honolulu.

The situation at Pearl Harbor, however, was most remarkable. Despite all the advance knowledge of the impending attack, the enormous Pacific

fortress seemed to have been virtually completely off guard. The Japanese planes and midget submarines, transported by carriers from a great distance, required a travelling time estimated at from one to three weeks to get to Hawaii. Even under ordinary circumstances, a foreign force could not get within hundreds of miles of Pearl Harbor without being sighted far in advance by the naval forces. But in the tense situation which, it seemed, existed for many days, the bulk of the U.S. Pacific fleet was inactive at anchor in Pearl Harbor. This peculiar circumstance could not but evoke questions:

"The fact that a large part of the fleet — an unusually large part considering the routine that the fleet had been following prior to hostilities — happened to be in Pearl Harbor on the fatal Sunday, Dec. 7, may also require some explanation, because it is apparent that if international tension is serious, the place for the fleet is at sea." (Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times; Dec. 9, 1941.)

When the Japanese force had penetrated the Pearl Harbor defenses and unloaded their bombs in a way that would hardly be possible ordinarily, a powerful wave of amazement swept over the world. Explanations had to be given. The first story forthcoming was from unofficial sources, chiefly newspaper writers, stating that the Japanese attack was a surprise. This, an obvious cock-and-bull story of the capitalist newspaper writers, completely contradicted the known facts that the impending attack was well anticipated. And, if these newspapermen knew before that all the naval commands had been forewarned, then they were deliberately lying when they called it a surprise.

The official explanation, as stated by reports, fell in line with the above initial story. According to The New York World-Telegram, Secretary of the Navy Knox, after his investigation, declared that the navy had not been forewarned.

"The reports in Congress of the navy's warning to its commanders appear to conflict with a statement made by Secretary of the Navy Knox on his return from Pearl Harbor. Asked then to comment on reports that the navy had been forewarned, he replied that it had not been." (World-Telegram, December 24, 1941.)

This completely contradicted the statements in the above-cited reports to the effect that high Navy Department officials, as well as Secretary Hull, declared that the navy had been forewarned!

LACK OF LOGIC IN THE PHILIPPINES

[N a war between such powers as Japan and the United States, one would think that the policy of attack would not be confined to one side alone, least of all to the weaker side, Japan. The Japanese Empire is extremely vulnerable to an attack by such first-rate naval powers as Britain and the United States. The mandated possessions of the Mikado, — the Marianas, the Caroline and Marshall Islands, — are strewn in the Pacific, a great distance from Japan proper, flanked on three sides by the Philippines, Hawaii, the Netherlands Indies, British possessions, and the Samoan Islands belonging to the United States. A short distance north and northwest of the Philippines lie Formosa and Hainan, islands held by the Japanese imperialists. Japan's cities and industries are fairly open to attacks from air:

"All large industrial cities in Japan which contain factories are adjacent to the seacoast. Japan has no way of defending these cities from air attack." (New York Sun, December 8, 1941.)

Other writers agree with the above-expressed view. Burton Crane in The New York Times of December 14, 1941 wrote:

"Probably no country in the

world is more vulnerable to bombing attacks than Japan. This is due not so much to the materials of which Japanese houses are built — mud-covered wattles with thin board sheathing — as to the concentrated nature of the country's industrial plant. A few well placed bombs could cause more dislocation of Japanese production than a thousand times that number in this country."

James R. Young states that:

"Japan's cities are most vulnerable to aerial bombardment." (Reader's Digest, November 1941, p.30.)

Incendiary bombs could produce a tremendous catastrophe:

"It is not unusual to read in Tokyo newspapers that '2000 houses burned down last night.'" (Ibid.)

For transportation Japan depends to a great extent upon its limited railroad mileage which is but a fraction of the railroad mileage of the United States. James R. Young states:

"Military men estimate that planes from two American aircraft carriers could cripple the entire rail system for months. This is the more serious because Japan has neither roads nor trucks to switch to motor transport in any large degree. In fact, this nation of 73,000,000 has fewer motor vehicles than the State of Mississippi." (Ibid.)

We have cited material to the effect that the Philippine archipelago became a fortress menacing the Japanese realm, and that in the East, which can mean only the Philippines, the United States has air power which in certain elements is superior to any other air force. Some statements, we remember, went as far as to declare that the entire air force of Japan would be no match for the United States navy air arm alone. The Roosevelt Administration, to all appearances, was pursuing a strong policy toward the Japanese fascist imperialists. In its note on November 26, 1941 the

Washington Administration demanded no less than that "the Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and Indo-China" (New York Times, December 8, 1941). Such demand would be made only on the basis of sufficient power to enforce it, and would not have been made without the consciousness of great striking might — unless something was involved totally different from the surface features.

Judging from a policy reportedly based on the incomparably more powerful naval and air forces, one would expect, after the attack on Pearl Harbor and the official declaration of war, that the naval and air might of the United States would take the offensive. Indeed, a few days after war was declared, some writers in the capitalist press expressed this expectation. To illustrate:

"The Japanese got Pearl Harbor from aircraft carriers which crossed the Pacific. On the supposition that what a Jap can do a Yankee can do, it would scarcely be surprising to see Tokio or Osaka or some other enemy city bombed from airplane carriers almost any time now." (DeWitt Mackenzie, New York Sun December 18, 1941.)

This was a logical expectation. But, as the whole world knows, nothing of the sort took place. Quite the opposite.

A few more points. Japan was in an officially proclaimed state of war not only with the United States but also with Great Britain, the Dutch East Indies and last but not least, China. On the face of it this was an attempt to defeat the two greatest naval powers on this globe as well as their aides. Surely a tremendous undertaking!

The British have been increasing their defenses in Singapore for many years. In the Spring of 1941 neutral observers were astounded at the ability of Britain to spare increasing numbers of planes for the Singapore area:

"Neutral observers are amazed by Britain's ability to spare increasing numbers of fighting and bombing planes for this area, despite the great demands of the African campaign and home defense — a tribute to the growing productive power of British and American factories." (New York Post, April 22, 1941.)

The Dutch Indies were receiving a steady flow of planes and war supplies from the United States. As to the Philippines, huge bombers were sent there of such wide range as to be able to reach Japan. In The New York Times of November 30, 1941, one week prior to the affair at Pearl Harbor, the following was said regarding these things:

"The military aspect assumed steadily graver importance, for the British were openly strengthening their defenses at Singapore. The Dutch in their Indies were girding against possible attack, aided like the British and the Chinese by the increasing flow of American-made warplanes munitions and other material. The United States was also making stronger its position in the Philippines. Giant bombers were reported to have been flown there, bombers able to take off, bomb Japanese cities, fly on to Vladivostok, refuel and fly back to repeat the bombing process."

So it would seem logical that the Dutch, reportedly having around 2000 mostly American-made planes, the Chinese, who also possess an air force, the British and above all the United States, would strike at Japan — at least at some of her far-flung islands such as Yap, Peleu, Tobi, Hainan, Formosa, the Marianas, Carolinas and Marshalls.

Reviewing the strength only of the United States, the editorial in The New York Post of December 24, 1941 said "In short, we have the strength to strike at once." This was logical, but it was the illogical that continued to unfold.

Neither the United States bombers

nor the Navy attacked Japanese possessions. The opposite took place. Before the echo of the declaration of war with Japan had subsided, the United States island of Guam was occupied by the Japanese naval forces. Almost immediately followed the landing at Luzon.

How could there have taken place such an occurrence as the rapid landing of Japanese troops in the Philippines which are a fortress menacing the realm of Japan? The New York World-Telegram wrote: "Luzon is the best fortified unit of that island group." (Dec. 26, 1941.) Weren't the waters around Luzon mined? Didn't the naval and air patrols warn the United States army long in advance of the approaching Japanese transports? The command at Luzon certainly must have been on the alert after the experience at Pearl Harbor. Peculiar things began to happen in swift succession, bearing out the strange and baffling assertion of The New York Times editorial that "Logic is not the guide to this war" and "we shall continue to be plagued and baffled by the unreasonable and irrelevant behavior of premises and conclusions."

A few days following the events at Pearl Harbor, the newspapers presented two contradictory pictures of the situation. One picture looked as if the American forces had the upper hand. On the 12th of December, 1941, enormous headlines in American capitalist newspapers announced that in the first encounter with the United States Asiatic fleet the Japanese warships in the Far East fled. The headline "Jap Fleet on Run" in The New York World-Telegram is a sample. In a dispatch from Manila in this newspaper it was reported that a big Japanese battleship was sunk by an American aviator, and that—

"American submarines are ranging the narrow seas of the Philippines war zone and are expected to report major successes when they communicate with their home bases."

Almost three weeks later, on the eve of the occupation of Manila by the Jap-

anese, the press stated that there was a considerable American submarine force in the Philippines:

"We had at the outbreak of war a very considerable submarine strength in the Asiatic Fleet - many of them new submarines, with splendid equipment and well-trained crews." (Hanson W. Baldwin, The New York Times, December 31, 1941.)

For a brief moment it seemed that the Japanese forces were being prevented from making any real attempt to invade Luzon. The Japanese fleet was officially reported to have turned tail. American aviators were said to have scored some telling blows. But here enters the contradictory picture in the reports on the situation.

The initial landings on Luzon Island were made, it can be gathered from newspaper reports, at three places: Vigan, Legaspi and Aparri.

An outstanding communique issued on December 14th at the headquarters of General MacArthur stated that these landings of the Japanese troops, small in numbers, were UNOPPOSED!!!

"The enemy effected unopposed landings in limited numbers at Vigan, Legaspi and Aparri. There were only local activities in those areas." (The New York Times, Dec. 15, 1941.)

Thus, in the face of the apparently strong policy of the Roosevelt Administration, the United States forces not only refrained from invading, or even attacking, the widely scattered Japanese possessions, but did not even oppose the landing of the Japanese Fascist troops on United States territory!

With the American submarines scouring the waters of the Philippines, with the Japanese Navy on the run, as officially announced, and with some Japanese warships sunk, one would think the American troops would wipe out the landed parties and cripple Japanese efforts to send reinforcements. Yet

Japanese reinforcements, dispatches showed, in a steady stream were pouring into Luzon. They were brought, peculiarly enough, precisely by sea. Tremendous flotillas were used. For example:

"A flotilla of eighty enemy transports was sighted this morning off Lingayen Bay, north of here on the western coast of Luzon, and the Army, in announcing the hostile approach, said there was no doubt that this was the beginning of Japan's major drive on the Philippines." (The New York Times, Dec. 22, 1941.)

These ships, according to Washington, as reported in The New York Post for December 23, 1941, carried 80,000 to 100,000 Japanese troops!

"Washington says there were 80,000 to 100,000 Japanese aboard the 80 transports that came in for a landing in the Philippines."

The 80 transports, as The New York Times dispatch indicated, were landing Japanese troops north of Manila. Two days later, on December 24th, an A.P. dispatch flashed the news that another flotilla of 40 transports, landed troops southeast of the city. A communique issued by U.S. Army Headquarters in Manila stated:

"The enemy continues to land reinforcements." (The New York Post, December 24, 1941.)

By the 28th of December the Japanese were reported to have landed between 150,000 and 200,000 troops on Luzon. There was one interesting feature, apart from many others. It was said that the Southern force of the Japanese army landed without support of the Japanese navy:

"The Southern Japanese landing, it was said, did not appear to have been backed by naval support, possibly because the beaches where the Japanese came in were unfortified." (The New York Times, December 28, 1941.)

The beaches might not have been fortified; but it was certainly a simple matter to offer naval and aerial opposition to these unprotected transports. Was it that the Japanese Fascist command felt it was perfectly safe for them to send troop transports without naval protection?

Concerning the numerous Japanese transports anchored in Luzon waters, The New York Times contained the following:

"Certainly, long lines of Japanese transports anchored in Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay would seem to be snoring targets — no matter how well protected — on a dark night, not only for our submarines but also for a desperate destroyer or cruiser raid." (January 2, 1942.)

The troops the Japanese sent to Luzon were described by many newspapers as seasoned veterans, well-equipped with modern weapons of war. However, an Associated Press Correspondent "on the Lingayen Front" gave an altogether different idea of the quality of the Japanese army, at least of the army which landed from the 80 transports at Lingayen:

"The Japanese army pushing south toward Manila from the Lingayen Gulf area is an ill-uniformed, untrained mass of young boys between fifteen and eighteen years old, equipped with small-caliber guns and driven forward by desperate determination to advance or die." (The New York Herald Tribune, Dec. 26, 1941.)

The correspondent quoted an American officer who gave the following description of the Japanese troops:

"Some wore poor-quality khaki; others wore half uniforms and half civilian clothing. Some wore sweaters and some fatigue clothes." (Ibid.)

In another dispatch we read:

"In the opinion of a hard-bitten United States cavalry colonel whose

regiment has seen some sharp fighting in northern Luzon, the Japanese troops invading the Philippines are distinctly fourth-raters — and that, he says, is a charitable estimate." (The New York Post, Dec. 29, 1941. My emphasis — G.M.)

If the Associated Press' information about the Japanese Lingayen army corresponded to fact, then the invasion of Luzon was a fantastic event accomplished by an army of boys. The only practicable route of invasion on that Island, it seems, is precisely the Lingayen area:

"The Lingayen approach is the only route of invasion on Luzon — except the approach through fortified Manila Bay — that is not cut off from Manila by mountains or difficult terrain." (Hanson W. Baldwin, The New York Times, Dec. 27, 1941.)

We repeat. If the huge army of invasion which landed off 80 transports at Lingayen was "an ill-uniformed, untrained mass of young boys between fifteen and eighteen years old, equipped with small caliber guns," then the invasion of Luzon, apparently, is something of a fantastic affair. Indeed, if "the Japanese troops invading the Philippines are distinctly fourth-raters" then one must conclude that the Japanese Fascist command expected no serious resistance.

To be sure, reports of the inferiority of Japanese troops invading Luzon were denied in Washington. But then, a legitimate question arises: Is it plausible that a correspondent of a leading American press agency, on the scene, would invent a story to convey the impression that American forces are being driven back by fourth-rate troops?

There were suggestions that Manila would be declared an open city with the alleged purpose of sparing the population. On the night of December 25th in San Francisco there was heard a Japanese broadcast which commented on these suggestions, indicating that

Japan would not recognize Manila as an open city:

"JAPAN OPPOSES OPEN CITY VIEW

"SAN FRANCISCO, Dec. 25 (U.P.)—
—Commenting on suggestions that Manila might be declared an open city, a Japanese broadcast heard here tonight said:

"Quarters here said it is almost unthinkable to consider Manila as undefended. No one knows better than the American authorities in the Philippines how well Manila is defended. It is well known that Manila has long been considered a typical base in the event of an American attack against Japan. If Manila is designated an open city Singapore, Chungking and Hong Kong could also be considered as open cities."

(The New York Times, Dec. 26, 1941.)

Almost immediately the announcement was flashed that Manila had been declared an open city and stripped of its defenses:

"Manila's anti-aircraft batteries were dismantled; military stores that could not be removed were destroyed; the last soldier and sailor left the city." (The New York Times, Dec. 27, 1941.)

All this was done in line with the "Plan to spare the city from attacks" (The New York Times, Dec. 26, 1941).

No sooner was Manila denuded of troops and left without anti-aircraft defenses than it was subjected to a bombardment by the Japanese aviators. If by declaring Manila an open city it was meant to spare the population the horrors of aerial bombardments, the Japanese Radio announcement would seem to indicate quite clearly that such an aim could not be achieved. After the Japanese planes bombed Manila, the population of the city demanded that the United States armed forces return:

"Everywhere there were demands that the army and air force, which

left Manila when the capital was declared an open city, return to make a bitter-end fight. Anger against the Japanese mounted among all sections of the population." (Frank Hewlett, United Press Correspondent, World-Telegram, Dec. 27, 1941.)

But, according to reports, not only did the armed forces not return, but, in the face of the fact that the Japanese had showered bombs upon the undefended city, the population was told to discontinue the blackouts. Moreover, the radio station was permitted to resume broadcasts, although due to the broadcasting the Japanese planes could the more easily find their way:

"Despite this declaration, and a Tokio radio announcement that the Japanese had no intention of recognizing Manila as an open city, there was no hint that authorities planned to restore Manila's defenses.

"On the contrary, MacArthur's headquarters announced last evening that Manila no longer would be blacked out. The radio station was permitted to resume long wave broadcasts and police cars picked their way through bomb-scarred streets with loud-speakers blaring: "Turn on your lights - the blackout is ended." (The New York Post, December 29, 1941.)

This, indeed, was a peculiar method of carrying out the "Plan to spare the city from attacks."

WHAT'S THE NAVY DOING?

WRITING in The New York Times of December 31, 1941, Hanson W. Baldwin remarked that the question "What's the Navy Doing?" was "on many lips during the past weeks as the battle of Manila was joined."

Upon his return from Hawaii, Secretary Knox in his statement said the following:

"The entire balance of the Pacific Fleet, with its aircraft

carriers, its heavy cruisers, its light cruisers, its destroyers and submarines, are uninjured and are all at sea seeking contact with the enemy." (The New York Times, Dec. 16, 1941.)

And, in the light of a dispatch of the Associated Press (N.Y. Sun, Dec. 16, 1941), not only the Pacific but also the Asiatic fleet, a lesser force, was looking for the Japanese warships.

This seems to be the answer to the persistent question, "What's the Navy Doing?"

Now, where was the Japanese Navy? Was it very difficult to find it? Logic would say, in order to find the Japanese warships there was no need of scouring the vastness of the Pacific, for it was pretty clear where at least a part of the Japanese Navy was and what it was doing. It was convoying transports to Luzon. It was attacking Midway and Wake Islands, United States links between Hawaii and Luzon.

In connection with the question "What's the Navy Doing?" and "Where is the Navy?" very instructive, we think, is the case of Wake Island. Here was a very tiny garrison, fewer than 400 in number. It was not too well armed, its entire air force consisting of only 12 planes. In the first attack by the Japanese, eight planes which were grounded, were put out of commission.

"But with four other planes and the help of batteries and light weapons, the garrison shot down at least a dozen Japanese planes, destroyed one cruiser, one destroyer and a submarine and damaged two other destroyers." (Editorial, The New York Times, January 7, 1942.)

Later information stated that the garrison did even more damage to the Japanese fleet than what the first reports had indicated. The New York World-Telegram said the following on this point:

"It is now revealed that the Ja-

panese lost seven warships — one cruiser, four destroyers, a submarine and a gunboat — in the Wake Island action.

"If our Marines had had four more airplanes, they'd probably have sunk the whole Jap navy." (January 9, 1942.)

An editorial in The New York Post of December 26, 1941 obviously in response to the question "Where is the Navy?" said this among other things:

"But even in the middle Pacific the Navy did not relieve or rescue or even prolong the delaying action at Wake Island."

Everybody knew that Wake Island was being attacked by the Japanese navy, but, strangely enough, the American navy did not come to its aid.

A dispatch in The New York Times of December 24, 1941, recorded two mysteries with respect to the defense of Wake Island.

"There are two mysteries in connection with Wake Island that may be explained only after the war is over. One is the manner in which this tiny garrison has withstood a dozen bombardments by air, shelling by hostile ships and other attempts at landing. The other is the reason why no American naval units have been reported as going to the assistance of Wake Island." (My Emphasis - G.M.)

It is the second point, or "mystery," that really counts. The American naval units as we remember, according to official reports, were hunting for the Japanese fleet in the enormous stretches of the Pacific. But the Japanese fleet, evidently, carefully avoided being caught by the United States warships; it was very skilfully "concealing" its whereabouts by capturing Guam, attacking Wake Island for two weeks and Midway Island, by convoying almost daily dozens of transports to Luzon, Mindanao and other U. S. territories.

Most people who read press re-

ports superficially have a hazy idea of the relative strength of the United States Atlantic and Pacific fleet, dividing them in their minds into two equal parts. But it seems that the Pacific fleet is larger, indeed is considered, as a naval unit, to be the strongest fleet in the world:

"One third the size of Long Island, Oahu contains Pearl Harbor, the rock-walled home of the Navy's largest battle fleet - said to be the mightiest single fleet operating as a unit in the world." (New York Herald Tribune, Dec. 8, 1941.)

And so while this powerful fleet, probably supported by a correspondingly powerful complement of planes of the navy whose air arm alone is said to be stronger than the entire air force of Japan (The New York Sun, Dec. 8, 1941), reportedly ranged the desolate wastes of the Pacific, Fascist Japan, with hardly any interference, moved about the ocean at will. The New York World Telegram of January 2, 1942 discussing the future possible moves of Japan, stated:

"Perhaps Japan cannot do all this overnight. But she is now showing ability to strike about the Pacific at will. Japan moves large fleets of transports and lands armored units with comparatively little interference. Already Japan has captured rich tin centers and rubber country in Malaya. With a little more effort Japan will have access to many of the raw materials so desperately needed."

There are mysteries about the situation in the Pacific, and there are paradoxes. From the paradoxes, Anne O'Hare McCormick selects a very striking one, as follows:

"Among the paradoxes of the Pacific battle, not the least is that the greatest damage has been inflicted on the enemy by the smallest power in that area. Most of the Japanese ships sunk have been sent to the bottom by the Dutch. All the help received by the hard-

pressed American forces in the Philippines has come from the Dutch. Incredible as it is that the world's greatest producer of machines has to fight on the ground while a third-rate air power commands the Pacific skies, it is almost as strange that the American planes that actually are harrying the Japanese are manned by Dutch pilots." (The New York Times, Dec. 29, 1941.)

A day before Manila was occupied the city was all agog with rumors that aid was arriving, because from Washington came the report that the navy was not idle:

"Manila had been seething with rumors that help was coming. The rumors were believed based largely, however, on the Washington announcement that the United States Navy is not idle, and on wishful thinking. It was not confirmed in any official quarters that aerial reinforcements had arrived." (The New York Times, Dec. 31, 1941.)

Why was there no real aid sent to the Philippines and to Wake Island? The atmosphere becomes even more mysterious in the light of the report showing that the sea route between the United States and the Far East is open:

"The war in the Pacific has not cut off shipments from the Netherlands Indies to this country." (The New York Times, January 10, 1942.)

E. C. Zimmerman, the Netherlands Indies Commissioner in the United States, according to The New York Times, said "I don't anticipate that there will be any cessation of business...." (Ibid.)

Sea lanes are open also from Australia and South Africa to Singapore. A dispatch from that British fortress says:

"Ample stocks of essential materials are available and new

shipments are coming in from Australia and South Africa, indicating that the sea lanes are open." (The New York Times, January 9, 1942.)

Not only is the power of the United States Navy in the Pacific great enough to convoy reinforcements but, according to The New York Times, the Pacific naval forces are even capable of carrying "the battle" to Japan itself!

"For the present the deeply reassuring, all-important fact is that we still have a Navy in the Pacific capable of carrying the battle to Japan." (Dec. 16, 1941.)

Yet, apparently, neither Manila nor Wake Island received the support of the powerful United States Pacific fleet. The New York Post of December 26, 1941 remarked:

"Whether the subject considered is the retarding of Japanese troop landings on the Philippines, infliction of losses on enemy warships or air attacks on Japanese bases, the one question is, Where is the Navy?"

Considering the naval powers involved in the situation, one must come to the conclusion that despite the resistance to the Japanese navy on the part of Netherlands Indies, of Wake Island's defenders, and the record of a few isolated sinkings of Japanese warships and transports, the Japanese sea power was virtually unopposed in the Far East in so far as landing in American and British territories is concerned. Indeed, a review by the British Admiralty, cited by The New York Times, remarked upon what a sea power can do when unopposed:

"In the Far East we see with sadness every day what unopposed sea power can accomplish, and the only way to obtain control of the sea routes in that area is by destroying or neutralizing Japanese naval forces." (January 1, 1942. My emphasis - G.M.)

We saw in 1940 what an unopposed Nazi land power did in France. Countless workers, peasants, Jews, refugees from Fascist tyranny were tortured to death. Those who remained alive were put into chains of Fascist military slavery.

PRESENT-DAY FASCISM AS INTERNATIONAL KORNILOVISM

KORNILOV was a Tzarist Cossack general. During 1917 he attempted to overthrow the capitalist-democratic government headed by Kerensky, to massacre the workers of Petrograd and establish a military Fascist dictatorship in Russia. The Russian workers and soldiers led by Lenin thwarted Kornilov's attempt. It became known later that what seemed to have been a war of destruction between Kornilov and Kerensky was really a screen covering secret collaboration of the "democratic" and Fascist elements to place Kornilovism in power.

Kornilovism was tried in Spain, with Franco playing the role of Kornilov and Azana that of Kerensky. We have no definite proof of secret collaboration between the two, although from historical experience, and from the policies of the Stalinist-Loyalist government we have a definite idea that there was such collaboration. Kornilovism was successful in Spain, only because the workers and peasants followed the policy of "Democracy Versus Fascism" and trusted the Stalinist-Loyalist Government of Azana and those tendencies, like the POUM and Trotsky's, which gave the Stalinist-Loyalist traitors "critical" support.

For the first time in history Kornilovism was tried on a major international scale in France, with the Nazis in the role of Kornilov, while Reynaud, Daladier, Darlan, Petain, Gamelin, Weygand and other participants in the capitalist-democratic government performed the part of Kerensky. International Kornilovism was success-

ful in France. The French capitalist politicians, admirals, generals and magnates of finance who wore "democratic" masks to hide their Fascist features opened the gates to Hitler while pretending to fight him. Fascism was established because the French and other workers guilelessly accepted the line of Stalinists, Trotskyites and Left Socialists that the French financial oligarchy was really fighting the German Fascist imperialists. This "Second Imperialist War" story was a trap, a deadly illusion preventing the French workers from realizing what was happening.

We believe that thinking people will understand that unless Fascism is really stopped it will aid the international imperialists to round out the Fascist system over the whole globe. The American workers are in a terrible danger. For if Hitlerism or Japanese Fascism reaches the United States, the American workers, and in particular the national minori-

ties which are used as scapegoats, such as Jews and the Negroes, will share the appalling fate of the French and all the other toiling masses who are ground into the blackest military slavery under the blood-bespattered boot of the Fascist capitalist rule.

The American workers must be awakened to the danger of Fascism which is moving upon them along a path that they do not even suspect. The key section of the working class is the class-conscious vanguard, now in the clutches of various pseudo-Marxists. If Fascism is to be prevented from engulfing also the United States, this advanced section must break with its misleaders, the Cannons, Shachtmans and all those who spread the paralyzing illusion that the "democratic" financial magnates are engaged in a real war against the Fascist powers.

George Marlen
January 15, 1942

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ARTIFICIAL DIVISION OF THE HISTORY
OF THE SOVIET UNION

FOR working purposes, it is perfectly legitimate to divide history into periods. This division, however, must be based on factual and not fictitious landmarks.

International News, a publication of the "Provisional International Contact Commission" of the Revolutionary Workers League, divides the history of the Soviet Union into two periods. The "first period," ending 1924, is pictured as a revolutionary one, with the Soviet Union standing upon the position of extending the proletarian revolution to other countries. The second period starting in 1924 has had as its basis, according to International News, the "theory" of Socialism in one country, which theory determined the foreign policy of Stalin. We quote International News to give this division in its own words:

"In the first period, under Lenin and Trotsky, the foreign policy flowed from the fundamental proposition of the EXTENSION OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION.

"But from 1924 onward the foreign policy more and more took a line of capitulation to one or another group of imperialists. The axis which determined the foreign policy under Stalinism was based upon the THEORY OF SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY, just the opposite of the former period." (International News, November 1941, p. 1.)

Continuing in this vein International News conveys the impression that up to the introduction of the

"theory" of Socialism in one country, which occurred in the Autumn of 1924, "the Soviets," that is the leadership of the Soviet Union, pursued a foreign policy in the class interests of the workers:

"Whereas under Lenin, the Soviets admitted their weakness from internal civil war and imperialist intervention, they were, nevertheless, firm and independent in relation to their class policy." (Ibid.)

Is it true that the year 1924, marking the introduction of the "theory" of Socialism in one country, also marks the dividing line between the period of Leninist and the period of Stalinist foreign policy of the Soviet Union? Or is it that this dividing line manifested itself considerably before 1924 and had nothing to do with "Socialism in one country"? Let us examine the historical facts.

Let us take the year 1923. According to International News, this year falls into the period of foreign policy based "upon the proposition of extending the October Revolution to other countries." An examination of the historical facts, however, reveals that the exact opposite was the case. We have given material proof of this before, but the matter is of such great historical and political importance, especially in view of the distortions persistently spread, that we are compelled to cite the documentary evidence once more.

By 1923 Lenin's prolonged ill-

ness prevented him from participating in the political guidance of the State to such an extent that the actual direction of the Soviet policies was in the hands of Stalin and his colleagues, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin and others. Just as in its internal affairs, this bureaucratic clique carried on reactionary machinations on the international scene. We shall cite a few examples.

I N January 1923, Adolf Joffe, a representative of the Soviet Government and an important member of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was sent to China to negotiate with the bourgeois leaders. Joffe met Sun Yat-Sen, the head of the bourgeois Kuomintang Party. Joffe and Sun Yat-Sen issued a joint communique (Joffe-Sun Yat-Sen Communique of January 26, 1923). In it they declared:

"During his stay in Shanghai, Mr. Joffe has had several conversations with Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, which have revealed the identity of their views on matters relating to Chinese-Russian relations, more especially on the following points:

(1). Dr. Sun Yat-Sen holds that the Communistic order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence, and regarding this great task, he has assured Dr. Sun Yat-Sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people, and can count on the support of Russia." (The China Year Book, 1924, p. 863. My emphasis - G.M.)

This declaration, on Joffe's part, who, of course, was only an agent of the bureaucratic leadership of the Soviet Union, was a complete rupture with the Bolshevik policy of extending the Soviet revolution internationally.

It was a violation of the decisions of the Second Congress of the Communist International which advocated the policy of building Soviets in such countries as China. In brief it was the policy of Stalinist counter-revolution. Joffe's adherence to this declaration was an advance promise that the Stalin leadership would divert the workers from fighting for Soviets in China. The Joffe-Sun Yat-Sen Communique served as the official basis of the Stalinist-Kuomintang collaboration. Yet during this 1923 period, the theoretical flag of the Stalin clique displayed not a hint of "Socialism in one country," and moreover, as late as the Spring of 1924, Stalin himself explicitly and officially declared that Socialism in one country cannot be built.

So much for the reactionary policy of Stalin and Company in 1923 with respect to a backward bourgeoisie like the Chinese. If one might imagine that Stalin in 1923 was induced to pursue a reactionary policy in China by the backward colonial status of that country, we shall cite his equally reactionary policy toward Germany, a highly advanced country.

THE situation in Germany at the turn of the year 1923 was critical for the bourgeois government. The French imperialist army invaded the Ruhr throwing Europe into a crisis of great intensity. The Soviet Government directed by Stalin made a great pretense of being for a proletarian revolution in Germany. In this severe crisis of 1923, the Stalin gang, however, was giving the imperialist government of Germany advice on how to strengthen its position. This advice was put forth under the slogan of "closer relations" with the Soviet Union. Pravda openly declared that:

"....only a closer economic and political contact with Russia will strengthen the position of the the present German Government." (January 11, 1923.)

It goes without saying that Lenin's policy never sought to strengthen

the position of any imperialist government. Quite the opposite Lenin's policy was to weaken and destroy all imperialist governments. Again it should be pointed out that the reactionary policy of the bureaucratic Soviet leadership in January 1923 preceded the noise about "Socialism in one country" by almost two years.

FRENCH imperialism at that time intensified its repressive measures, and some of the leaders of the C.P. of that country felt the nip of bourgeois oppression. This evoked from the Russian leaders an appeal to the bourgeois government of France. The political line of that appeal can be gleaned from this item published in Pravda:

"The letter of Comrades Bukharin and Zinoviev to the Minister of Justice of France:

"Mr. Joceline, Paris

"We do not in the least doubt that the judiciary of democratic France known for its impartiality and love for objective truth will grant our appeal." (Pravda, Feb. 16, 1923. My emphasis - G.M.)

Thus, while the Stalinist leaders were advising the German government how to strengthen its position, they were casting a halo of "impartiality" and "love for objective truth" on the rotten judiciary apparatus of the "democratic" French government. This reactionary fakery also appeared long before the dividing line (1924) set by the Revolutionary Workers League.

WHEREIN does the falsity of the division of the history of the Soviet Union as spread by International News lie? The fact is that Stalinism had developed long before the introduction of the "theory" of Socialism in one country. In the latter part of 1921 and especially in 1922 and 1923 Lenin, severely ill, was not in close touch with the affairs of State, and the fate of the Soviet

Union was already in the hands of a clique of bureaucrats headed by Stalin. Trotsky testifies that already in 1922 there was a conspiratory Trio composed of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev who carried out bureaucratic policies. Some years afterward Zinoviev disclosed the secret that the XII Congress of the Russian Party in April 1923 tacitly agreed that this Trio continue leading the Party (Stenographic Report of the XIV Congress of the C.P.S.U., p. 454).

Long before Stalin introduced the "theory" of Socialism in one country, the Soviet Government under him introduced secret diplomacy, violating the principle of open policy in foreign affairs established by the October Revolution. As a matter of record, while Stalin in the Spring of 1924 wrote that Socialism could not be built in one country, his agents carried on negotiations with different sections of the world bourgeoisie in great secrecy. Chicherin at that time revealed this incautiously in the case of China:

"Even now the agreement between Comrade Karachan and the Chinese Foreign Minister Wellington Ku had to be prepared with the greatest secrecy." (International Press Correspondence, No. 35, June 19, 1924, p. 350.)

There were secret negotiations with the McDonald Government of British imperialism, and with Mussolini and Kemal Pasna. And all this time Stalin and the Soviet Government stood on an explicit rejection of the "theory" of Socialism in one country.

In our publication we have cited a considerable amount of substantiating documentary evidence to show that the Stalinist reaction in the Soviet State began and developed some years prior to the introduction of the "theory" of Socialism in one country. This degeneration had absolutely nothing to do with this "theory." The "theory" was introduced afterwards merely as an ideological cloak to conceal the bureaucratic machinations for power, and to deceive the masses into

believing that the Stalin gang was leading them into a Socialist paradise. The Stalin clique never took this "theoretical" invention seriously.

International News has been peddling a deception. The origin of this deception can be easily traced. When one makes even a cursory examination of the Trotskyist literature, one inevitably comes upon the proposition that reaction in the Soviet Union stemmed from Stalin's "theory." In Ten Years by Max Shachtman, published by the Trotskyists in 1933, we read the following in the Chapter "The Theory of Socialism in One Country":

"This pernicious theory, which was finally written into the fundamental program of the Communist International in 1928, has brought the greatest harm to the revolutionary movement inside of the Soviet Union and out. From it flowed that unbroken chain of blunders, defeats, catastrophes and setbacks which the Communist movement has suffered since 1924." (Max Shachtman, Ten Years, p. 35.)

This, of course, is not the position only of Shachtman or of the Revolutionary Workers League. It is a fundamental Trotskyist invention. Only recently, in an article "The Stalinist

Theory of 'Socialism in One Country,'"
The Militant wrote:

"Soviet disasters, defeats of revolutions are fruits of this theory." (November 22, 1941.)

Thus the Trotskyites — and with them the Left-Trotskyites (RWL) have been obscuring the truth, and for a reason. Unearthed material establishes beyond peradventure of a doubt that Trotsky collaborated with Stalin as early as 1922, during Lenin's illness. Trotsky himself testifies that Lenin bed ridden and worried over bureaucratism, proposed to him a bloc to fight Stalin and Stalinist policies. The battleground was to be the XII Congress of the Party, convoked in April of 1923. (See Leon Trotsky, My Life, pp. 479, 480.) The Stenographic Report of the XII Congress, as well as Pravda and other Soviet publications, show that instead of fighting Stalin and his reactionary policies, Trotsky gave unstinted support to Stalin. This is an indelible fact. To conceal this fact and many other equally damning facts the Trotskyites date the Stalinist degeneration from the Fall of 1924. By this maneuver, they seek to close the view of the workers to the preceding period of 1922-23 when Stalinism was already rampant and Trotsky as documentary evidence establishes conclusively, was in a direct bloc with the Stalin clique.

OF WHAT POLITICAL SPECIES IS THE R.W.L.

I N the same issue of International News we came upon the expression "Cannon Trotskyites" and "Shachtman Trotskyites." As we see, the fact that Trotsky sharply dissociated himself from Shachtman and upheld Cannon did not deter International News from classifying Shachtman as a Trotskyite. And this is correct, because the political foundation upon which Shachtman rests is Trotskyist. In 1940, Shachtman set out to form his own group. This meant organizational separation from Trotsky. Hence Shachtman dates Trotsky's departure from Marxism as of 1940. The whole previous period of Trotsky's reactionary policies — and

of Shachtman's, who was then with Trotsky — is thus palmed off as Marxist. Organizational separation did not alter Shachtman's fundamental politics — Trotskyist politics.

But Oehler, in his own way, plays the same game as Shachtman. In 1934, Oehler set out to form his own group. This, too meant organizational separation from Trotsky. Hence, Oehler dates Trotsky's departure from Marxism as of 1934. Again, the entire preceding period of Trotsky's opportunism — and of Oehler's, who was with Trotsky for a few years — is palmed off as Marxist. By such a maneuver,

Oehler, like Shachtman, maintains the pretense that he was and is a Marxist. But as in the case of Shachtman, the organizational separation of Oehler from Trotsky did not fundamentally change Oehler's politics. He remains

basically Trotskyist, spreading Trotsky's deceptions in historical and political spheres.

George Marlen
December 2, 1941

THE PAGES OF HISTORY contain numerous subtle political frauds. There is none more subtle, however, than the Trotskyist pretense of leading a Leninist struggle against the Stalinist reaction. The true history of Trotsky's role in the rise of Stalinism, hidden and covered up for many years, now stands exposed in the issues of THE BULLETIN. Read this publication to find a weapon against the pseudo-Bolshevik opportunists whose line has brought the workers to disaster. Many articles with documentary material, concrete facts and historical evidence are to be found in THE BULLETIN.

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"FULL POLITICAL FREEDOM TO ALL PRO-SOVIET PARTIES"

(A Slogan and Its Meaning)

[N the program which the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party puts out in connection with the defense of the Soviet Union, there appears as an outstanding point the slogan, Full Political Freedom to All Pro-Soviet Parties. This slogan is not new or incidental in the Trotskyists' politics, but has existed for many years and constitutes a basic feature in their political system. Here is this slogan in the words of the Trotskyists themselves:-

"Restore the democratic institutions of the working class, including the Soviets and the trade-unions, and give full political freedom to all pro-Soviet parties." (The Militant, August 30, 1941, p. 6.)

The Trotskyists throw out a general slogan of "full political freedom to all pro-Soviet parties" without indicating specifically what parties they have in mind. History, however, has shown that there are all sorts of "pro-Soviet parties." With the exception of the Bolshevik Party under Lenin's leadership, all the "pro-Soviet parties" during and after the period of the Russian Revolution were counter-revolutionary to the core,

Among those professing to be pro-Soviet could be found the tendencies not only of the Mensheviks and S.R.'s, but of Miliukov, of some White Guards, and of certain of the international imperialists. Lenin indicated this

clearly in his speeches after the Kronstadt uprising in the Spring of 1921. The Communist press at that time devoted a great amount of attention to the repercussions in the capitalist press produced by the Kronstadt events. It culled citations from various counter-revolutionary newspapers to establish the fundamental solidarity among all anti-Bolshevik forces. Lenin said:

"Of course, you all noticed that extracts from the White Guard newspapers published abroad were given side by side with extracts from English and French newspapers. They represent a single chorus, a single orchestra. It is true that these orchestras are not conducted by one man conducting a piece according to music. International capital conducts them by means less conspicuous than a conductor's baton, but that it is a single orchestra should be clear from any one of these extracts. They have admitted that if the slogan becomes 'Soviet power without the Bolsheviks' they all agree. And Milyukov explains this with particular clarity. He has studied history very closely and has refurbished all his knowledge by experiencing Russian history on his own hide, as it were. He has supplemented his twenty years' professorial study with twenty months of personal experience. He declares that if the slogan becomes 'Soviet power without the Bolsheviks' he is in favour of it. Abroad, in Paris,

he cannot see whether this shift will be a little towards the Right or a little towards the Left, towards the anarchists. He cannot see what is going on in Kronstadt, but he says: 'Messieurs monarchists, don't hurry, don't spoil the thing by shouting about it.' He says that if the shift is towards the Left he is prepared to be in favor of Soviet power against the Bolsheviks." (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. IX, p. 143-144.)

Thus, already by 1921, the imperialists had learned something in their struggle against the Marxists. They understood that what was necessary was to dislodge the Bolshevik Party from the monopoly of power, realizing that they themselves could use the Soviets for their own reactionary purposes. The reactionary tendencies, Lenin pointed out, were all "pro-Soviet." But to give them legal status and political freedom would be to provide an opening wedge for the bourgeoisie to reestablish itself in power.

The Trotskyists' issuing of a general slogan of "full political freedom to all pro-Soviet parties" is in itself opportunist. It is a cover for the fact that aside from a genuine Bolshevik Party, all the so-called "pro-Soviet parties" are counter-revolutionary. By putting the slogan in general form without specifically naming the parties, the Trotskyists attempt to conceal the fact that they are in reality calling for freedom for counter-revolutionary parties which may demagogically parade as "pro-Soviet."

It goes without saying that in the event of the overthrow of the Stalin clique by the proletariat, thousands of Stalinist bureaucrats, covered with infamy and crime, fearing the rise to power of true Leninists who would mercilessly punish all traitors to the toiling masses, would be among the first to support the Mensheviks, S.R.'s., and everybody who proposed "freedom for pro-Soviet parties." Should the political arena be thrown open to all opportunist

parties and to all the "revolutionary" swindlers that conceal their treacherous nature under a "pro-Soviet" cloak, the return of bourgeois rule would be enormously facilitated.

It must be emphasized that though the Trotskyites do not even name the "pro-Soviet parties," they unequivocally demand complete freedom for these unnamed parties — for all of them!—

"These Soviets must be revived and all pro-Soviet political parties must be given legal status and complete freedom." (The Militant, October 4, 1941, p. 1. My emphasis — G. M.)

This opportunist poison is what the Trotskyist leaders palm off as the process of restoring workers democracy in the Soviet Union!

Those who are really fighting for Bolshevik politics will fight for Soviets along the lines laid down by Lenin. They will ruthlessly expose all those who participated in the Stalinization of the first workers State, will fight for workers' democracy within the State institutions, for maximum freedom of discussion and criticism within the new Bolshevik Party, for unadulterated inner-Party democracy. And above all, they will reject the idea of freedom for counter-revolutionary parties and organizations disguised as "pro-Soviet."

In conclusion we cite Lenin's warning to the revolutionary workers against s u b t l e enemies of the proletariat:

"Perhaps the most striking example of how the enemies of the proletariat take advantage of every deviation from the strictly consistent Communist line was that of the Kronstadt mutiny, when the bourgeois counter-revolution and White Guards in all countries of the world immediately expressed their readiness to accept even the slogans of the Soviet system if only they could secure the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia; when the

Socialist-Revolutionaries and the bourgeois counter-revolution in general in Kronstadt utilized the slogans of insurrection ostensibly in the name of Soviet power against the Soviet government of Russia. These facts fully prove that the White Guards try to disguise and succeed in disguising themselves as Communists and even as the most Left Communists, for the purpose of weakening and overthrowing the bulwark of the proletarian revolution in Russia." (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Volume IX, pp. 131-132.)

At this moment the dictatorship of the proletariat, crippled from within by the Stalinist bureaucratic malady, is being destroyed by the military arm of world imperialism. Politically the imperialists are aided less by those who openly support the capitalist system than by those who profess to be Communists, but who in reality are the betrayers of Communism.

The most powerful of these are Stalin and his crew, who abolished the Leninist concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat under the Bolshevik Party, who introduced the vicious prostration before the personal dictatorship of the General Secretary. The Trotskyites reject Lenin's concept of the dictatorship of the Marxist party and lay down a line that would open the path for the return of capitalist rule in Russia should the workers attempt to overthrow the renegade Stalin.

The new Bolshevik Party, which will finally arise out of the present chaos, defeats and wreckage, will have to fight not only Menshevism, Anarchism and ultra-Leftism, but in the first instance will have to clear out pseudo-Bolshevism, the subtlest branch of which is the Trotskyist political system.

George Marlen
November 8, 1941

A CLARIFICATION

In our article, THE INVASION OF IRAN, (THE BULLETIN, Nov. 1941, p.9), there is an expression which may convey a wrong meaning. In commenting on a statement by Albert Goldman to the effect that the invasion of Poland, Finland and the Baltics was condemned by the Trotskyites because it made the Soviet Union appear in the same category as Nazi Germany, we stated:-

"Does not the invasion of Iran in conjunction with the British forces put the Soviet Union in the same category as British imperialism? Obviously it does."

By this statement we intended only to show the logical implications of Goldman's position. We did not in any way intend to convey the impression that we consider the Soviet Union in the same category as British imperialism. As readers of THE BULLETIN know, we regard the Soviet Union as a bureaucratically degenerated workers state.

TROTSKY AND RADEK'S LINE ON CHINA

ONE of the better known political figures that passed across the screen of the history of the Soviet Union and of the Comintern was Karl Radek. For a few years, under Lenin's leadership, Radek generally held to Marxist positions. But with the bureaucratic degeneration of the Bolshevik Party, Radek departed from Marxism and sank into the feid Stalinist morass. When Trotsky had been exiled to Turkey, he gave the following illuminating facts regarding Radek's politics:

"Up till 1926 Radek held that it would be impossible to carry through any economic policy other than that of Stalin-Bukharin. Up till 1927 Radek was under the illusion that it would be possible to work together with Brandler and his group. Radek was against the Chinese Communist Party leaving the Kuo Min Tang. After the general strike in England, Radek was against the dissolution of the Anglo-Russian Committee. After the Right and Left Kuo Min Tang had betrayed the revolution, Radek was against the slogan of the proletarian dictatorship and for that of the 'democratic' dictatorship interpreting that the same way Stalin, Bukharin and Martinov did." (L. D. Trotsky, The Militant, August 1, 1929.)

"Radek defended a mistaken line in the question of China...." (Leon Trotsky, "Letter to Souvarin," Bulletin of the Opposition, July 1929.)

We see in the above crystal-clear statements by Trotsky that on the most

vital questions confronting the workers Radek presented pro-Stalinist positions. Radek's line on China was not Marxist but definitely opportunist. Naturally long before Trotsky made the above statements in 1929, he knew of Radek's pro-Stalinist line of keeping the Chinese Communist workers in the Kuomintang and of Radek's rejection of the Marxist line of proletarian dictatorship for China. Trotsky was too closely associated with Radek in the Soviet Union not to have known of Radek's opportunist line on China. But ransack Trotsky's works written during the Chinese revolution of 1925-1927 as thoroughly as you can, you will not find a single word exposing the true nature of Radek's line on China. Not until his exile did Trotsky reveal the fact that Radek's line was crassly anti-Marxist.

Radek, however, during the Chinese Revolution of 1925-1927 was one of the leaders of the "Opposition." He had to appear before the Trotskyist rank and file as an opponent of the Stalin-Bukharin policy of subordinating the Chinese Communist workers to the Kuomintang. He, therefore, trimmed his line which Trotsky showed afterward to have been essentially the same as that of Stalin-Bukharin, with opposition-in-tone, but perfectly loyal, inoffensive questions, suggestions and advice. But Stalin, in his drive for absolute personal dictatorship would tolerate no "oppositional" tone no matter how soft and how distant from a real attack upon him. Radek's "oppositional" trimmings were suppressed.

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Trotsky, of course, knew that both the official line of Stalin-Bukharin and the sham "oppositional" line of Radek were a betrayal of the Chinese revolution. Yet, at that time he created the impression that of these two reactionary lines, which were essentially the same, Stalin had a false line and Radek a correct one:

"Radek cannot say anything openly in the press about his line, for otherwise the party would learn that Radek's line is being C O N F I R M E D by the whole course of events." (Leon Trotsky, Problems of the Chinese Revolution, p. 81. My emphasis - G.M.)

Trotsky said this on May 17, 1927 after the betrayal of the Right Kuomintang and while the betrayal by the

Left Kuomintang was in the making. Need we add anything to show the true political character of Trotsky's defense of Radek's line which he knew all along was not Marxist, but reactionary and actually pro-Stalinist?

Thus, when Radek was a close adherent of Trotsky's group Trotsky presented Radek's line on China as "being confirmed by the whole course of events." But when Radek broke with Trotsky in a rabid fashion, Trotsky revealed suddenly that "Radek defended a mistaken line in the questions of China." Trotsky's utter opportunism and his sheerly factional approach to questions vital to the proletariat are obvious.

G.M.

October 21, 1941

TWO PICTURES OF PYATAKOV

AMONG those who entered the revolutionary movement and later became corrupt Stalinist bureaucrats spending their years in deceiving and betraying the workers, was Pyatakov. Trotsky in his autobiography gives a striking description of this carrerist:

"The military oppositionists included, for example, Pyatakov, the present director of the State Bank. He usually joined every opposition, only to wind up as government official. Three or four years ago, when Pyatakov belonged to the same group as I did, I prophesied in jest that in the event of a Bonapartist coup d'etat, Pyatakov would go to the office the next day with his brief-case. Now I can add more earnestly that if this fails to come about, it will be only through lack of a Bonapartist coup d'etat, and not through any fault of Pyatakov's." (L. Trotsky, My Life p. 439.)

Although playing at opposition Pyatakov politically worked for Stalin. After Lenin's death Pyatakov participated with Stalin's lieutenants in installing close supporters of Stalin into the War Department of which Trotsky was head. Trotsky reports this act of Pyatakov's as follows:

"A delegation of the Central Committee composed of Tomsky, Frunze, Pyatakov, and Gusev came to me at Sukhum to coordinate with me in making changes in the personnel of the war department. This was sheer farce. The renewal of the personnel in the war department had for some time been going on at full speed behind my back, and now it was simply a matter of observing the proprieties." (Ibid., p. 511.)

Pyatakov was one of the first to crawl publicly before Stalin who rewarded this careerist with the fat job

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er director of the State Bank. Writing almost ten years later, Trotsky declared that from that time on Pyatakov became a loyal functionary of Stalin.

"We have no need here to characterize Pyatakov who left the Opposition in December 1927 and who since then became Stalin's functionary loyal, destitute of ideas." (L. Trotsky, Bulletin of the Opposition, #54-55, p. 38.

Pyatakov, like thousands of other renegades and traitors to the masses, worked loyally and assiduously for Stalin, selling out the Russian and international proletariat.

Suddenly there came the stupendous crisis in the internal life of the Stalinist bureaucracy. To tighten his personal despotism, Stalin engineered a whole series of frame-ups, netting in his dragnet not only former "oppositionists" but thousands of the most loyal Stalinists, the big and small Yagodas and Tukachevskys. Among those slated for elimination was Pyatakov. He figured as a defendant in the "Moscow Trials" in which he made monstrous confessions to acts he never committed.

Marxists, of course, view the social processes with a political eye. A man may be in power, as Stalin today, he may be in a dungeon or may be shot as will probably happen to Stalin tomorrow, but irrespective of Stalin's political fate he is and will forever remain one of the blackest traitors and betrayers of the masses. As for Stalin's bureaucratic palladines, the Pyatakovs and Radeks, who carried out his treacherous policies, they shared in his crimes. It was only the process of centralization of Stalin's personal power that finally brought his loyal functionary Pyatakov to the firing squad. Pyatakov must be presented to the workers as he actually

was, so that workers should hold in contempt the memory of their betrayers, and above all, should beware of similar betrayers still living. But Trotsky in 1938, referring to the "Moscow Trials," painted a Pyatakov entirely different from the real one, the renegade and turncoat who fell victim both to his own rottenness and to Stalin's passion for greater personal power. Here is the retouched picture of Pyatakov painted by Trotsky:

"No matter what one's attitude towards the defendants at the Moscow trials, no matter how one judges their conduct in the clutches of the G.P.U., all of them, Zinoviev, Kamenev, S m i r n o v, PYATAKOV, Radek, Rykov, Bukharin, and many others — have by THE WHOLE COURSE OF THEIR LIVES proved their disinterested devotion to the Russian people and their struggle for liberation." (Leon Trotsky, Socialist Appeal, March 26, 1938. My emphasis and capitals - G.M.)

And only about a year before, Trotsky had plainly showed that for almost a decade Pyatakov was a renegade serving the interests of the Stalinist counter-revolution.

It is obvious that Trotsky in later praising Stalin's flunkey, Pyatakov, deceived the workers, beclouding their minds and softening their hearts towards corrupt careerists, the enemies of the proletarian cause.

Blind, purely emotional attachment to former revolutionists, no matter how great a service they performed for the masses, is detrimental to the cause of the masses. While remembering a person's contribution to the interests of the workers, a clear-minded Marxist will never close his eyes to the character of the degenerated revolutionist whose former positive work serves him as a protective cloak for his present negative role.

G. M.

Nov. 19, 1941