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On the current stage



Of world revolution



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# GREECE



Helmeted riot police charging into demonstrators.

## NEW LINK IN CAPITALISM'S CRISIS IN S. EUROPE

by MANOS SIMONIDIS

On May 24 and 25 Greece experienced its first general strike since the fall of the military dictatorship and the reestablishment of parliamentary rule under the leadership of Constantine Caramanlis. The strike call had been issued to mobilize the working masses against a bill placed before the National Assembly by the Caramanlis government. The bill was aimed at a de facto suppression of the right to strike through the imposition of various restrictive measures, the most important of which require that ten days' warning be given before any strike, outlaw strike pickets, ban political strikes (it is the Ministry of Employment that will decide whether or not a strike is political), and grant the government the right to draft strikers.

Lascaris, the minister of labor, presented the bill, claiming that uncontrolled strikes were damaging democracy and that if democracy were to disappear, "a very long fascist night would descend on Greece." For his part, Minister of Economic Coordination Paligouras accused the opposition of "carrying legislative powers out onto the streets." The deputies of the two Communist parties walked out of the Assembly, leaving the representatives of the EDA (Democratic Left) and the Center party the task of voting against the government bill.\*

Called at the last minute for the day on which the draft law was to be discussed in the National Assembly prior to being voted on the following day, the strike was unable to prevent the vote. Nonetheless, the strike did mark an extremely important milestone in the development of the Greek workers movement, both in terms of the mobilization and above all in terms of the combativity it revealed.

\*The Communist party-exterior is the pro-Moscow CP. The designation "exterior" derives from the fact that the leadership was outside Greece during the period of the dictatorship. The Communist party-interior split from CP-exterior during the period of the dictatorship on the basis of positions close to those of the Italian Communist party. The denomination "interior" was adopted because the leadership opposed "orders" coming from the outside. Its base in the working class is much inferior to that of the CP-exterior; its internal regime is more liberal. The PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement) is a centrist organization of a Social Democratic type founded and led by Andreas Papandreu. The EDA (Hellenic Democratic Left) is a Social Democratic party that served as the cover for the Communist party (banned since the civil war) before the military coup of April 1967. The Center party, led by George Papandreu, was the major bourgeois party of limited reformist tendencies before the military coup. It is a minority today. Some of its major representatives have moved to the right and entered Caramanlis's New Democratic party; others have gone to PASOK.



This combativity was manifested very suddenly on May 25. On that day several thousand construction workers leaving a strike meeting disregarded their leadership's orders to disperse and marched to the Ministry of Employment and then toward the National Assembly. They were halted en route by a police barricade. Police, backed up by antiriot tanks, charged the workers, clubbing them and launching tear-gas grenades. Broken up into small groups, the construction workers were soon joined by other young workers and students. For twelve hours they confronted the police, erecting hasty barricades of their own, attacking tanks with paving stones, and sometimes fighting hand-to-hand against the police. They asserted their refusal to allow the forces of repression to take command of the streets, their refusal to bow their heads and flee in face of the deployment of state violence.

The official balance-sheet was this: one old woman killed by a police tank (a beggar, according to the radio!), more than 160 wounded, and more than 150 arrested, thirty-seven of whom were remanded to Athens city courts on charges of "refusing to obey the orders of the authorities and disrupting public peace." On June 4 twelve of the thirty-seven charged were sentenced to two years in prison. It is to be noted that some of them, members of the Communist parties or of Maoist groups, have yet to receive any support whatsoever from their organizations.

The explosion was not limited to Athens. The events that transpired on the island of Rhodes on May 26 give an even better idea of the mobilization in the country. For thirteen hours more than 2,000 demonstrators confronted the antiriot forces of the gendarmerie on the quays of the port, protesting against the anchoring of an American aircraft carrier and destroyer (6,000 men on the two ships). The government immediately declared that the two ships would lift anchor the following day and that the crews would not disembark. The demonstrators set fire to the basement of the building housing the leaders of the gendarmerie and overturned the car of the bishop of Rhodes, who had come to pay a visit to the commander of the aircraft carrier.

### **The reformist parties**

The Caramanlis government accused the reformist parties (that is, the CP-exterior, CP-interior, and the PASOK) of having instigated these events. On May 26 the pro-government daily Acropolis accused the opposition parties of having created "an atmosphere propitious to these bloody confrontations." An official government communiqué issued on May 25 stressed that "the responsibility lies with the political parties that called the strike against a bill which the government was duty bound to support." This communiqué concluded by announcing that the government had resolved to impose law and order. The government issued a warning to the PASOK and the CPs, which were allegedly "playing a double game, in parliament and in the streets."

Since it is well known that this is not at all the case, it is clear that the government's aim was to compel these parties to disavow the workers vanguard that manifested itself on May 25.

And the reformists did not disappoint the government. In their haste to prove their innocence, they went so far as to become informers. Rizospastis, the daily of the CP-exterior, reported on May 28 that a cadre of the party had called the police on May 25 to report that 150 demonstrators were outside the party headquarters and that, according to this cadre, they ought to be arrested. The article expressed indignation at the failure of the police to arrive. For the CP-exterior, this constituted the proof that the clashes of May 25 were the work of "extremists and police provocateurs." The front page of the May 26 Rizospastis carried headlines about "obscure forces of disorder," reducing the confrontations, which had a clear and obvious class character, to simple police manipulations.

How could such a situation have arisen after two years of a political situation under the control of a government whose chief, Caramanlis, had been greeted as a liberator, whose party had received 54 percent of the vote in the legislative elections?

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### **July 1974: fall of the junta**

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Ever since its establishment just after the fall of the dictatorship, the Caramanlis government has taken advantage of its image among the masses. Coming to power after the dictatorial junta, which had relied exclusively on police violence, the new government put itself forward as representing the reintroduction of democracy, and it was able to fully utilize the democratic trickery it set up. The massacre that had followed the uprising at the Polytechnic Institute in Athens in November 1973 had been one of the police masterpieces of the policy of the military junta. After that massacre, Caramanlis was able to take up the torch with great chance of success. He was facing an extremely disorganized working class. The vanguard that had expressed itself on the occasion of the uprising at the Polytechnic Institute had been either decimated by the blows of repression or absorbed by the reformist parties (a result of the political weakness of that vanguard). What remained of the vanguard was isolated, lacking organic links with the masses and without roots in the workers movement.

The political capital accumulated by the Greek bourgeoisie through the transition from the dictatorial regime to Caramanlis's democracy went hand in hand with an important tactical concession to the workers movement: recognition of its political existence through granting authorization to the workers political parties. This was a radical political change from the whole postwar period, and it was seen as such throughout the country. For the first time since the end of the civil war that had followed the second world war, the workers parties were granted the right to exist legally.

Taking account of the very weak level of political development of the workers movement, the bourgeoisie counted on being able to use the reformist parties for a rather long period as factors of stabilization, the aim being to curb any radicalization or rise of the working class. The CP-exterior, CP-interior, and PASOK acted in the manner hoped for by the leaders of the bourgeoisie. But their joint efforts were not sufficient to prevent the rise of a powerful movement for trade-union demands. The overtaking of these parties by the mobilization of the masses comes at a time when Caramanlis finds himself without reserves in face of the demands of the workers, given the very strong inflation that has racked the economy since 1973-74.

### End of the postdictatorship period

In order to prevent the development of the workers movement, Caramanlis used the tricks of the perfect apprentice Bonaparte: blackmail during the elections under the slogan "Caramanlis or the tanks"; appeal for national unity against the so-called Turkish danger; pandering to nationalist sentiment with his fraudulent "threats" to quit NATO.

The period of "national unity" — in other words, the temporary consensus assembled around Caramanlis — came to an end in 1975. During this period the prevailing conditions of legality had permitted the development



### July 1974: returning exiles

of some struggles, the circulation of ideas, the opening of discussion, and political propaganda by all the currents of the left and far left. When the effects of the international economic crisis hit Greece, the bourgeoisie undertook to make the working class bear the costs by reducing living standards with the aim of making Greek products more competitive on the world market; the perspective was to enter the Common Market.

To directly control the workers movement, the Caramanlis government established a state trade union system through a national union federation whose functioning was controlled and leaders appointed by the government. But this instrument of Greek capitalism proved ineffective precisely in the sort of situation it had been designed to prevent or curb. Placed before the reality of the growing rise of the workers movement, the government resorted to an escalation of repression in an attempt to cut the mobilization short and preserve the benefits that had been inherited from the dictatorship. This bourgeoisie, which had governed through the use of force virtually uninterruptedly since the war, rediscovered its old reflexes against the working class.

The most advanced mobilizations and exemplary strikes were systematically attacked by the regime in order to prevent them from spreading within the working class. Selective blows against the most advanced actions were combined with generalized repressive operations (on April 21 and July 23, 1975, and now on May 25, 1976). Blackmail, threats to return to dictatorship, became more concrete in the eyes of the masses, for whom yes-



terday's tanks have become today's antiriot tanks. The old torturers reemerged in the form of repressive forces identical to those bodies that have emerged throughout capitalist Europe in recent years. There is no longer any doubt that the policy of the Caramanlis government has failed.

The rise of the movement for trade-union demands continued. It was marked by very tough and prolonged struggles and also by its extension to all the exploited layers, from the steel workers to the teachers in the private schools, from the factory workers of the Pitsos and Isola appliance plants to the bank employees, from the Olympic Airways employees to the typesetters. The general strike of May 25-26 marks a qualitative turn in the workers movement.

Even though the slogan of a general strike had not been raised, even though this strike was not called on a centralized basis but rather through separately issued calls by individual unions, even though the reformists clearly acted to limit the scope of the strike by having the unions under their control vote for the principle of twenty-four-hour work stoppages on either May 24 or May 25, the very massive strike nevertheless offered the workers themselves a demonstration of their own strength and became the clearest experience in class unity. The strike also dealt a severe blow to state trade unionism, which was bypassed and contested from all sides by a movement whose cry was "State out of the unions!"



## Emergence of a vanguard

Incapable of containing the rise of the workers, the policy pursued by the Caramanlis government was also incapable of preventing the rebirth and development of the vanguard. This vanguard had received a rude blow

with the massacres at the Polytechnic in November 1973. That was when it had appeared for the first time. Its first independent mobilizations since those events occurred with the demonstration last May 4 called by the whole far left to protest against the death of Sideris Isidoropoulos, a 17-year-old high-school student and member of the group Militant Communist Organization, who was killed on the eve of May 1. Isidoropoulos had been chased by the police while pasting up May Day posters; he was run down by a car and killed. On May 4 some 30,000 people assembled in front of the Polytechnic Institute and decided to march on the National Assembly, in spite of a police ban. On two occasions police backed up by light tanks and fire hoses barred the route of march, and on both occasions they turned tail and withdrew in face of the determination and combativity of the demonstrators. Proof was given that the heritage of what happened at the Polytechnic in November 1973 had not been lost, that the vanguard existed and was fighting and advancing on the road opened up by the Greek November.

The demonstration was transformed from a protest against the murderous blows of the bourgeois state into an anti-government demonstration whose central slogan was "The Polytechnic was only a start, soon it will be Caramanlis's turn!" (after the colonels). Some may have believed or hoped that this reemergence of the vanguard was simply the product of exceptional circumstances: the emotion caused by the death of Sideris Isidoropoulos and the burial the following day of parliamentary deputy Panagoulis, who died under conditions that remain obscure. But such people were to be disappointed, for on May 24 this same vanguard, refusing to disperse after the meeting of strikers, violating the orders of the reformist leaderships, marched to the Ministry of Employment, victoriously imposing its will on a government that had trumpeted with all the media at its disposal that no demonstration would be tolerated after the strikers' meeting. And the next day, it was this same vanguard that answered the deployment of police violence with its own spontaneous self-defense. The population of Athens supported the demonstrators on May 25. The vanguard is not isolated from the masses. In the days that followed, all the newspapers, from those of the far right to those of the CPs, waged a hysterical campaign against "uncontrolled violence." But this lying campaign of denunciation of "provocations" did not receive the hoped for response among the working class.

Since the workers disregarded the so-called dangers threatening the nation and since the effects of the prolonged weakening of the working class under the dictatorship were clearly eroding at an accelerated pace, the bourgeoisie decided to deal a head-on blow to the workers movement. The ridiculously low increases of 10 percent for the lowest wage categories at a time when inflation is running at more than 20 percent a year and the passage of the antistrike law constitute open provocations to the workers. Since the reformist parties have proven incapable of containing the rise of struggles, the bourgeoisie is establishing the legal framework through which to assemble the means for a direct confrontation with the workers movement.





Riot police prepare to attack a construction workers' demonstration in Athens.

For the working class, May 24 and 25 were days of a rapid and sharp accumulation of experiences. The workers are reconstituting their political forces and anticapitalist consciousness on a mass scale. The true nature of the bourgeois-democratic state that succeeded the police state of the colonels is being fully revealed. The anti-working-class law against strikes will pose difficulties for the development of struggles and for the vanguard within the working class, but it will not break the ongoing rise of the workers, for future strikes now threaten to take on the character of clashes with the repressive organs of the state. The restriction of legality imposed on the working class by this new law will have the effect of compelling some or even all of the workers to go beyond Caramanlis's legality in order to wage their struggles. The necessity of the workers' developing their own structures of self-organization and self-defense to wage and protect their struggles is thus posed sharply and squarely.

The aim of the government is not to return to the past but to create an atmosphere of insecurity and permanent fear among the workers in order to paralyze their actions without necessarily reestablishing the atmosphere of terror that prevailed in the past.

## The far left

In the new political context thus created, the impact of the events of May 24-25 goes well beyond the present political capacities of the vanguard. What was involved was a violent confrontation between the working class and the Caramanlis government, but things will not remain at that level. The shock continued for several days, thus testifying to the strength of the mobilization. The workers vanguard being born in these struggles has not been broken. It has emerged out of the concentration of workers in the new industries established during the dictatorship. It lacks traditions and is not subject to the bureaucracy of the unions controlled by the state nor is it dominated by the bureaucracy of the unions controlled by the Communist parties.

Surprised or unable to understand what was going on, some political groups went so far as to disavow the struggles of May 25. This was the case with the Maoist organization EKKE (Greek Revolutionary Communist Movement). Others considered these confrontations a political error, considering them justified only because of the police repression and not because of their anticapitalist logic. Others were incapable of continuing the struggle during the days that followed May 25.


Revolutionary Marxist militants were alone in waging a campaign against the arrests and against the police terror of the government. For instance, the only meeting responding to government repression, denouncing the trials of the indicted militants, and denouncing the campaign of the two Communist parties and PASOK (the campaign aimed at claiming that provocateurs were responsible for May 25) was held on May 31, sponsored by some far left organizations which explained the meaning of the confrontations. These organizations were the Organization of Internationalist Communists of Greece (section of the Fourth International), the Revolutionary Communist Front, and the Internationalist Communist Union, three Trotskyist organizations that have been formed during the past two years. Their public meeting, which drew a great number of left and far left worker militants (several hundred altogether) was held in spite of the presence of police concentrations in the area.

For the past two weeks the bourgeois press has been waging a hysterical campaign against the Trotskyist comrades. The June 3 issue of *Vradini*, the newspaper of Caramanlis's New Democratic party, gave front-page coverage to a statement by the minister of public order announcing that investigations would be continued and extended to discover the instigators of the events and that the necessary means would be brought to bear. It was said that the three Trotskyist organizations that had held the May 31 meeting bore responsibility for the confrontations with the police. To round out the picture, the newspaper also denounced urban guerrillas. Further down on this same front page, the Trotskyists were attacked for "sowing disorder against the new trade-union law and for forgetting that Trotsky had favored the integration of the trade unions into the state in the USSR in 1921." This is an indication of the government's fear of the sudden irruption of workers combativity and of the inability of its "trade-union" system to keep the working class in check.

But it remains the case that this lack of elementary organization of the working class in face of the consequences of the world economic crisis, due to the delays accumulated under the dictatorship while the industrial proletariat was becoming concentrated and thereby transformed, must be overcome as quickly as possible. The social and political specific weight of this working class must find its own class expression both economically and politically. That is the most immediate task of revolutionaries in Greece.

June 4, 1976





Paris Commune

**ON THE  
CURRENT STAGE  
OF  
WORLD REVOLUTION**

by Ernest Mandel



The time has come to try to assemble into a coherent framework the Fourth International's analysis of the important changes that have occurred in the world situation during the past eight years. The present theses represent an attempt in this direction. We have deliberately left aside all tactical and organizational problems and even all economic analysis in order to concentrate on what is essential in the process of world revolution at this stage.

There have been several previous attempts at such a global analysis on the part of the Fourth International. At the Third World Congress in 1951 important steps forward were made in understanding the specific forms taken by the colonial revolution under the impact of the combination of the crisis of imperialism and the crisis of Stalinism. At the same time, the analysis of the Third World Congress was marred by the incorrect projection of the "war-revolution" concept on a world scale. (This concept has turned out to have only limited application, in some exceptional cases of victorious revolutions in semicolonial countries.)

The theses on the "Dynamics of World Revolution Today," adopted by the Reunification Congress of the Fourth International in 1963, integrated what remained valid in the 1951 analysis with a more balanced view of the interrelationships among the socialist revolution in the imperialist countries, the colonial revolution, and the political revolution in the bureaucratized workers states. However, while this resolution correctly predicted the coming upsurge of the Western proletariat, it could not anticipate all the striking features of the rising socialist revolution in capitalist Europe that have asserted themselves since May 1968 in France, the "creeping May" in Italy in 1969, and the upsurge of the Portuguese and Spanish revolutions since then.

An initial attempt at a new synthesis was made by the theses of the Ninth World Congress in 1969, "The New Rise of World Revolution," and by this author's report to the congress on the theses. (See *Quatrième Internationale*, May 1969, for the text of the theses and report.) The present theses represent an extension of this initial attempt. In them, we have tried to incorporate the lessons of the latest developments in the semicolonial countries and the bureaucratized workers states.

① The basic feature of the world socialist revolution is its proletarian and conscious character, the first characteristic being the objective precondition of the second, the second being the subjective expression of the first. The socialist revolution and the building of socialism constitute the first phase of world history that cannot be reached purely by the action of objective forces but instead requires a conscious effort by the toiling masses. The proletariat is the only social class that, through its social conditions, is capable of creating a planned economy and emancipated society, a "society of associated producers," as Marx put it. No socialist, that is classless, society will emerge without the proletariat's conscious participation in and leadership of the process leading to it. While the uneven development of proletarian

class consciousness is the foundation stone of the Leninist theory of the party, the necessity of a rising level of class consciousness on the part of the entire class in order to achieve a victorious proletarian revolution and the building of a socialist society is the foundation stone of the Marxist-Leninist theory of soviet power, soviet democracy, and the construction of socialism. Trotskyism, contemporary revolutionary Marxism, unites both theories into an indissoluble unity.

② The fact that the objective conditions for world socialism have existed at least since 1914, if not since 1905, does not lead to an automatic or inevitable victory of world socialism, essentially because of the central role played by the subjective factor in the achievement of socialist revolution. Although it has proven possible in some colonial and semicolonial countries to overthrow capitalism despite a "left centrist" leadership and a still insufficient level of consciousness and conscious activity on the part of the proletariat (weak in any case), this possibility must be ruled out in the industrially developed countries. "The crisis of humanity is the crisis of revolutionary leadership (and of class consciousness) of the proletariat." If this crisis is not resolved through the construction of a mass revolutionary International, the decline of capitalism could result not in the emergence of world socialism but instead in barbarism: a massive destruction of productive forces, human beings, and civilization through nuclear war, fascist-type regimes, destruction of the ecological system, and so on.

③ Materially, the highest achievement of capitalism was the worldwide objective socialization and division of labor, albeit on a sharply unequal basis. This internationalization of the productive forces creates the material basis for the globalization of the economy, politics, the class struggle, and war in the epoch of imperialism. World revolution and world socialism begin from this material basis, even though their growth reflects uneven and combined development, which is the form taken by this process of globalization under capitalism. In its totality, the theory of permanent revolution, cornerstone of Trotskyism, is nothing but the conscious expression of this process.

④ It follows from this that what occurred after the 1917-23 upsurge of the world revolution can be seen only as a historic defeat of world revolution. The initial goal of the Bolsheviks had not been, nor could it have been, the building of an isolated socialist society in backward Russia, nor was it the creation of a permanent "power base" for world revolution in that single country, isolated and backward into the bargain. Their goal was to trigger the process of world revolution. But they failed to complete this project. In the final analysis, the temporary restabilization of capitalism after 1923, the victory of Stalinism in Russia, the emergence of fascism in Europe (and semifascism in Japan at the end of the 1930s), the long decline in the level of working-class consciousness, and the outcome of the second world war with all its horrors (from Auschwitz to Hiroshima)



are the results of the long series of defeats for the international revolution that occurred between 1923 and 1943 (although this series of defeats was of course interrupted by partial, geographically limited upsurges).

⑤ The downturn of world revolution between 1923 and 1943, although the dominant world trend, did not lead to complete defeat. True, it was universal — the victory of Stalinism in Soviet Russia and the consolidation of the bureaucratic dictatorship in that country, as well as the crushing defeat of the second Chinese revolution in the cities being among the expressions of a great retreat of the proletariat. But it was not complete in that capitalism was not restored in the Soviet Union and the toiling masses in China maintained their active and massive resistance to the onslaught of Japanese imperialism, especially in the countryside. This created a favorable objective starting point for the next wave of the rise of world revolution following the successful resistance of both the Soviet state and masses on the one hand and of the Chinese masses on the other hand, which greatly weakened imperialism in continental Europe and Asia and opened the way for the overthrow of capitalism in East Europe, North Korea, and China after 1945. The general weakening of capitalism and imperialism as a result of the second interimperialist war (in spite of the tremendous economic and military power of U.S. imperialism) and the rise of mass revolt and revolution against the unbearable living conditions this war imposed on the toiling masses of many countries combined with the above-mentioned Soviet and Chinese resistance to determine a new upsurge of world revolution, the starting point of which may be placed in 1943, when the fascist dictatorship in Italy was brought down. This new upsurge was expressed in a limited revolutionary wave in Europe and a long and formidable one in the colonial and semi-colonial countries.

⑥ However, although the defeat of world revolution during the period 1923-43 was not complete objectively in the Soviet Union and China, subjectively the effects of the victory of Stalinism in Russia and in the Communist International became a major obstacle to the victory of the world revolution, an obstacle that remained long after the retreat of the world revolution had ended. The Stalinist parties strangled and betrayed the Spanish revolution of 1936 and the revolutionary developments in Greece, Italy, and France from 1944 to 1948. Moreover, the abhorrent aspects of the Stalinist dictatorship in the USSR and East Europe became an important subjective obstacle to the development of revolutionary class consciousness in the two numerically strongest sectors of the world proletariat, the American proletariat and the Soviet one. Since a number of important problems of world revolution — that is, of world politics and economics considered from the class standpoint of the proletariat — cannot be resolved without the conscious revolutionary activity of the 150 million or so workers of these two countries, world history since 1945 can be correctly interpreted only through a correct method of

grasping the dialectic of the objective and subjective factors. The concept of "world dual power," like the concept of "war-revolution" on a world scale, both of which seriously underestimate the importance of the subjective factor, are unable to do this. Likewise, it is at best incomplete, if not downright incorrect, to assert that the reconstruction of capitalism in West Europe after the second world war was imposed on U.S. imperialism by the strength of the Soviet Union. It must be added that this reconstruction was made possible by the Stalinist and Social Democratic parties' betrayal of the 1943-48 revolutionary upsurge in West Europe, which prevented a victorious breakthrough of socialist revolution in that region.

⑦ It follows that the post-second-world-war period has features fundamentally different from those of the post-world-war-one period. These must be grasped as basically contradictory. On the one hand, capitalism has been further weakened and as a world system it is in a greater state of decay than it was in 1917. This is expressed particularly in the downfall of the capitalist system in China, East Europe, North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam. On the other hand, the postwar revolutionary wave in the imperialist countries was again quickly defeated. It is true that between 1949 and 1968 this wave by and large continued in colonial and semicolonial countries (Korea, Vietnam, Algeria, Cuba, Bolivia, Indonesia, Iraq, Palestine, the Portuguese colonies in Africa, Chile, etc.), with varied results — some striking victories, some crushing defeats. But the overall impact of this wave was not sufficient to prevent the relative stabilization of imperialist power in the imperialist metropolises themselves. Hence, while it is correct to state that the overall relationship of forces evolved to the advantage of the anticapitalist forces, this evolution did not at all imply an intrinsic weakening of the economic or military power of imperialism. On the contrary, as of May 1968 that power was greater than it had been in 1938 or 1948, not only in absolute terms, but even in terms of international centralization. (True, interimperialist competition had increased at the expense of U.S. imperialism, which lost its absolute hegemony of the 1945-50 period, but it was nowhere as violent as it had been before World War I or World War II.) At the same time, it must be added that this greater economic and military strength was undermined by a deeper social crisis, which began to break out during the late 1960s.

Again, the apparent paradox can be explained only by the dialectic of the objective and subjective factors. The defeats of the world revolution in 1923-43 and in West Europe in 1943-48 and the downturn of workers struggles in the United States after 1947 caused by the cold war and McCarthyism created not only the subjective but also some of the objective conditions for a new development of the productive forces under capitalism. The sharp upward shift in the rate of exploitation of the working class determined an increase in the average rate of profit, which triggered a long-term acceleration of capital accumulation under conditions of technological



revolution, aided by permanent rearmament and permanent "mild" inflation. This enabled imperialism to grant some reforms and concessions both to the working class in the imperialist countries and to the bourgeoisie in the semicolonial countries (which made the transition from colonial to semicolonial status), which helped to relatively stabilize the system for two decades.

Neither the economic and political effects of the colonial revolution nor the external pressure of the bureaucratized workers states has been able to seriously upset that stability, which could be challenged decisively only from the inside, by the proletariat of the imperialist countries themselves. In this sense, the course of world history has confirmed the correctness of the basic orientation of the Fourth International since the late 1950s and early 1960s. Both the Fanon-Lin Piao "third worldist" concept that a generalized victory of the colonial revolution was a necessary and probable prerequisite to a new upsurge of the proletariat in the imperialist countries and the Khrushchev "two world camps" variant of the theory of "socialism in one country," with its emphasis on the "socialist" countries' overtaking the standard of living of the imperialist countries before any possible new rise of the working class in the imperialist countries have been proven false.



YALTA IN FEBRUARY 1945

But for a basic challenge to the capitalist order to occur in the imperialist countries themselves something decisive had to change in the class consciousness of the proletariat and its vanguard. During the 1940s and 1950s this consciousness was profoundly marked by the long-term effects of past defeats. Class consciousness after the second world war was qualitatively lower than it had been after the first world war. This is the basic reason why Trotsky's prediction that the Fourth International would grow rapidly after the second world war turned out to be erroneous. While Stalinism and reformism constituted the main form in which this low level of class consciousness was expressed, the long duration of Stalinism's hold over the proletariat in key countries is likewise a result of this low level of class consciousness.

It was only in the 1960s that a new generation of proletarian revolutionaries emerged in these countries as the nucleus of a new vanguard. The emergence of this vanguard was the combined result of key social processes in the imperialist countries (growth of the productive forces, which included an increase in the number, skills, and cultural level of the proletariat; deepening crisis of capitalist relations of production; growing awareness of that crisis on the part of the proletariat and its mounting instinctive and semiconscious attempts to integrate the seizure of the means of production into ongoing working-class struggles), the subjective by-products of the Cuban and Vietnamese revolutions, and the growing international crisis of Stalinism. Operating in a context of increasing working-class militancy and class consciousness, this new generation was finally able to begin to build new Leninist organizations with growing success, essential nuclei of tomorrow's mass revolutionary parties that will lead the Western proletariat to the conquest of power.

⑧ The opportunist concept that capitalism can be overthrown gradually, first on one-sixth, then one-third, then two-fifths, one-half, three-fifths of the world's surface and so on until a final military test of strength results in the downfall of "Fortress America" through a combined external onslaught by the "socialist world" is nothing other than an updated extension of the Stalinist concept of "socialism in one country" to the "two world camps" theory. It is fundamentally wrong from an analytical standpoint and it leads to political conclusions that could be disastrous for world revolution and for the very survival of humanity. Its main errors are as follows:

a. It sees relationships of forces in purely quantitative and relative terms, overlooking the fact that the absolute strength of imperialism and the absolute level of productive forces and of material civilization, as well as such quantitative and relative relationships, are of decisive importance in a victorious breakthrough to socialism. Because of the amplitude of destruction and loss of life, a nuclear war in which the "socialist camp" was "victorious" would make the building of a classless society impossible for centuries and would thus be a defeat and not a victory for world socialism.

b. It overlooks or underestimates the organic unity of the world economy and ignores the fact that because of the increasing interdependence of the world economy, even the economically developed and growing workers states that have been established in some countries may find their social evolution toward socialism blocked, as has obviously been the case with the Soviet Union and East Europe for the past twenty-five years.

c. It fails to see that the disarmament of the major imperialist powers, the United States in the first place, can be accomplished only from within these countries through the revolutionary conquest of power by the proletariat; this is the only way in which the catastrophe of world nuclear war can be avoided.



d. It implies, whether consciously or not, the pacifist illusion that the military power of imperialism can somehow be "neutralized" and its ruling class "pressured" into permanent passivity, demoralization, or capitulation by the growth of the military power of the workers states. Nothing in history justifies such an assumption. Even if it becomes only "half as strong" as the "socialist camp," U.S. imperialism will still fight — and to the death — to retain its power. And this implies nuclear war, so long as it is materially possible (just as, for example, Hitler would have used the atomic bomb if he had had one, even in 1945, on the eve of imminent defeat), provided the political and social relationship of forces inside the United States allows it. In that sense, the decisive battle for the survival of humanity will indeed be fought in the United States. U.S. imperialism cannot be disarmed from the outside. Its relative weakening does not lead to its disarmament, but could even lead to greater aggressiveness.

This analysis does not imply any tendency toward "capitulation to nuclear blackmail by U.S. imperialism." Rather, it implies that all changes on a world scale must be gauged also from the standpoint of their effects on the class struggle in the United States. The history of the Vietnam war provides striking confirmation of this. U.S. imperialism was not militarily defeated by the Vietnamese revolution. In fact, U.S. imperialism is probably militarily stronger today than it was in 1965. It was compelled to withdraw from Vietnam because it was politically paralyzed through a shift in the relationship of political forces within the United States (the unbreakable resistance of the Vietnamese masses, the demoralization of the expeditionary corps in Indochina, and the mass antiwar movement played the decisive roles here). But this political paralysis is neither permanent nor definitive, nor is it even tendentially growing. It could be sharply reversed by defeats or a decline of awareness of the U.S. masses. Any event that aids developments in that direction (Mao's counterrevolutionary policies toward Nixon, for example) objectively contributes toward unleashing a world nuclear war. Only developments that aid the U.S. proletariat in finding the road to mass political action and socialist class consciousness will lead toward a disarmament of U.S. imperialism, through its overthrow. But socialist revolution in the United States is neither assured nor automatic. "Socialism or fascism in the United States" will be tomorrow's concrete expression of the alternative "socialism or barbarism" on a world scale.

9 The roots of the new upsurge of the European proletariat—which has been ripening since 1968, is now fully unfolding in the Iberian peninsula, and will spread at least to Italy and France—lie essentially in the advance of the power and consciousness of the proletariat as the combined result of the growth in the productive forces during the past twenty-five years, the growing internal contradictions of bourgeois society (above all the growing crisis of capitalist relations of production), and the growing understanding by broad vanguard layers of the proletariat of the fundamental bankruptcy of



**France, May 1968**

"classical" Social Democracy and Stalinism. The combination of all these factors, fertilized by the growth of the revolutionary vanguard, has given workers struggles a growing anticapitalist and antibureaucratic impetus, the material source of which is the proletariat's objective need and capacity for democratically centralized (that is, planned) self-management in the economy and society. For this basic reason, the next wave of socialist revolution will unfold on a qualitatively higher level of proletarian strength and class consciousness than did the 1917-23 wave, not to mention the post-second-world-war wave. The collective memory and intelligence of this working class is finally beginning to draw all the lessons of the historic victories and defeats of the world proletariat. In this sense, the European socialist revolution will fulfill the predictions made by Trotsky about the end of the second world war — with thirty years' delay.

10 The historic function of the European revolution — and the historic breakthrough of the Fourth International alongside the unfolding of that revolution — will be to decisively modify the subjective situation of the two largest sectors of the world proletariat, the working classes of the United States and the Soviet Union, and, subsequently, of the entire world proletariat. Under the present social (and international) relationship of forces, the conquest of power in West Europe is possible only if it grows out of a clear revolutionary-socialist decision by the majority of the toiling masses, which means the majority of the population. This in turn is possible only on the basis of experience with forms of self-organization and mass activity higher than those possible under bourgeois democracy, forms which herald a higher form of state power from the standpoint of the democratic rights and decision-making power of the broad masses compared with those partially enjoyed in a bourgeois-democratic state: a workers state based on organizations of workers councils, workers power, and workers council democracy.



Once again, however, under the present social (and international) relationship of forces in Europe, such a state would from the outset represent such a leap forward in the emancipation of the workers, both individually and collectively, that its impact on the world proletariat would be enormous. The attractive power of such emancipation on the American and Soviet working classes would contribute decisively to overcoming the basically apolitical attitude of both. The former would leap over anticommunism and lack of class consciousness to active sympathy with workers councils, socialism, and democracy. The latter would be able to break out of the impasse "bureaucratic dictatorship or capitalism." Socialist revolution in the United States and political revolution in the USSR would become concrete perspectives.

11 The basic subjective difficulty in achieving a victorious socialist revolution in West Europe, a difficulty resulting from the whole past history of the labor movement, lies in the deep reformist and semireformist illusions of broad toiling masses, in other words, the widespread identification of their own democratic freedoms with the institutions of the bourgeois-democratic state. So long as this identification is not broken, bourgeois attempts to overcome the qualitative weakening of the repressive state apparatus, which is a feature of the beginning of every revolutionary crisis, through a campaign to restore the integrity of the institutions of the bourgeois state disguised as "popular will" and "respect for the universal franchise" will meet with success among the majority of the workers. And one of the essential elements in breaking that identification is that the workers themselves experience higher forms of democratic freedoms on a broad scale.

For this reason, the generalization and centralization of soviet-type bodies of self-organization of the toiling masses (workers councils, soldiers committees, peasant leagues or councils, neighborhood committees, popular committees, etc.) is the key problem of revolutionary strategy from the very beginning of the revolutionary crisis in Europe.

Only if such a situation of generalized dual power emerges can the majority of the masses come to understand through their own experience that the direct democracy of workers councils allows them greater freedom than indirect bourgeois democracy and that the smashing of the bourgeois state apparatus is a precondition for the free and unfettered development of mass initiative and activity and does not represent the beginning of a gradual withering away of the democratic rights and freedoms of the working class. This in turn is a precondition for winning the majority of the working class away from reformism, without which the conquest of power in imperialist countries is impossible under the present national and international relationship of forces.

In this sense, it is wrong to present the democracy of workers councils simply as an extension or "completion" of bourgeois democracy. A basic defense of private prop-

erty and capitalist exploitation is inherent in bourgeois democracy, and this implies a fundamental reduction of the role of the toiling masses to that of passive observers and voters, the basic intent being to prevent them from becoming key actors in the political process on a permanent basis. What the democracy of workers councils does indeed extend and "complete" are those "nuclei of proletarian democracy within bourgeois democracy" within which the working class counterposes its own organizations and activities to those of the bourgeois-democratic state organs. These nuclei can become generalized and universal only through the destruction of the bourgeois-democratic state organs. Moreover, proletarian democracy, with its integration of the economic liberation and decision-making power of the toilers, has a quality and content that differs from bourgeois democracy, as well as basically different forms.

Likewise, the generalization and centralization of organs of mass power are indispensable in achieving an increasingly generalized mobilization and unification of the broadest masses, for neither the existing trade unions nor mass parties, with their bureaucratic structures and leaderships, can by themselves really unite the organized and unorganized workers, technicians, intellectual toilers, students, high-school students, apprentices, housewives, poor peasants, soldiers, and so on. Again and again, experience since May 1968 has confirmed that all these layers can and should be united in the process of socialist revolution, at least in their majority.

12 Under the given circumstances in the imperialist countries of historically developed ideological differentiation and organizational division of the working class and the workers movement, genuine generalization and centralization of organs of the worker-council type are impossible without thorough respect for proletarian democracy, in other words, respect for the existence within these organs of different parties, factions, groups, etc., and respect for the right to speak, write, print, and debate both inside and outside these organs. Any attempt to question, restrict, or suppress these basic democratic



Russian factory workers (shown voting on resolution)



freedoms of the masses — among other ways by claiming that this or that party or current is "bourgeois" — can only call into question and weaken the legitimacy of soviet democracy as opposed to bourgeois democracy in the eyes of the masses and thus help the bourgeoisie and its reformist agents to restore stable bourgeois institutions. Similarly, any such attempt will necessarily deeply divide the working class and break the upsurge of the mass movement toward overthrowing capitalism.

13 The solutions to the two aspects of the "crisis of the subjective factor" — weakness of proletarian class consciousness and inadequacy of revolutionary leadership (weakness of the revolutionary party) — are closely interconnected. In their majority, masses who are still dominated by reformist or semireformist ideology cannot be led toward the conquest of power by a revolutionary party. Likewise, a party unable to alter the reformist consciousness and practice of the majority of the proletariat is not yet an adequate revolutionary party. Only through the experience of a situation of generalized dual power will the majority of the proletariat in the imperialist countries be able to break with reformist ideology decisively. This implies that most probably it is only under conditions of generalized dual power that the revolutionary party will be able to win the majority of the working class to its political project.

14 Of course, this will not be a spontaneous development. It will depend on the revolutionary party's applying a correct strategy and tactics. Nor will the actual conquest of power (destruction of the bourgeois state machine, transfer of power to the congress of workers councils) be the result of an automatic addition of spontaneous or semispontaneous mass actions. A centralized plan and willingness and capacity to act at the decisive moment are indispensable in this. All of which implies the leading role of the revolutionary party.

But this leading role can be successfully played out, averting adventures, only if the party is supported by the majority of the proletariat. In the imperialist countries today, this implies a generalized structure of workers councils and a conquest of political predominance within them by the revolutionary party (possibly in alliance with some left-centrist forces, but on the basis of the plan and projects of the revolutionary Marxists). Thus, the emergence of a structure of generalized dual power, the conquest of the majority of the proletariat, the fusion of the broad proletarian vanguard with the revolutionary Marxist program and cadres, and the building of a mass revolutionary party contesting for hegemony within the entire class are all closely linked and intertwined processes in today's proletarian revolution.

15 Dictatorship of the proletariat means exactly what the words say: the dictatorship of a class (which in the imperialist countries today represents between 75 and 90 percent of the working population) and not

the dictatorship of a party or party leadership. It means the destruction of the bourgeois state apparatus and the creation of a state of a new type in which the proletariat can exercise state and economic power directly and can protect that state against attempts by the former ruling class and its political forces to overthrow it. It does not mean a one-party system, nor does it mean rule by the revolutionary party, restriction of democratic rights and freedoms, or institutionalized terror. Arising in imperialist countries from a revolutionary period and a conquest of power in which the decisive role is played by workers councils (the bodies of self-organization of the masses), the dictatorship of the proletariat can only mean the rule of soviets (workers councils and so on). The revolutionary party attempts to guide the soviets through persuasion, through winning political hegemony, and through conquest of the majority and not through administrative or repressive measures. It accepts the majority rule of the soviets, without which the multi-party system and soviet democracy are impossible.



There are two fundamental reasons for adhering to this concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. First, any alternative (any variant of a one-party system, even the "mildest" one, such as that which prevailed in the Soviet Union between 1921 and 1923) inevitably fuels the growing passivity of the masses and the growing restriction of workers democracy (including within the revolutionary party itself), which causes a growing resort to administrative rule and command, in other words, the growth of bureaucracy and of the power of the bureaucracy. (This is not to say that the one-party system in the USSR during the 1921-23 period was the basic cause of the passivity of the workers. This passivity resulted primarily from the enormous sacrifices and efforts made by the proletariat during the civil war. But it was accentuated and prolonged by the failure to return to soviet democracy after 1921.) The price to be paid for such a departure from the road to socialism, such a bureaucratic process, is immeasurably greater than the potential price of any "excessive democracy." An effective struggle against bourgeois democracy also requires an atmosphere of free political debate and cultural-ideological pluralism. Otherwise, the transformation of Marxism into a "state religion" threatens to stifle Marxist creativity and the genuine commitment of youth to socialist convictions. Paradoxically, as the example of the Soviet Union has strikingly confirmed, this will fuel a much more powerful re-emergence of reactionary ide-



ologies than would be the case under conditions of free ideological struggle.

In any event, from its inception the socialist revolution in the West will combine a powerful antibureaucratic impetus with its basic anticapitalist thrust, a result of the whole past and present of working class experience. The resistance of the masses to any attempt to impose a one-party system will be powerful and long standing. It would have to be crushed by terror essentially directed against the proletariat itself. The consequent split and demoralization of the working class would be fatal to the attempt to consciously build a classless society. In fact, however, there is no reason to believe that such an attempt will actually be undertaken. The relationship of forces between the bureaucratic and democratic currents within a victorious proletariat and within post-capitalist society as a whole in the presently advanced capitalist countries will be decisively in favor of proletarian democracy.

Second, the objective needs of rule, power, and management by the masses themselves arise from the very richness and complexity of the economies and societies of the imperialist countries. There are no pre-established recipes for the innumerable problems posed by the building of socialism in these countries. Only the freedom of action of the working class as a class — that is, freedom of debate, dissent, and experimentation, freedom to make mistakes and to correct them rapidly, in other words, a free and unfettered process of self-education of the proletariat in power — can gradually resolve these complex problems in the successful construction of a classless society and a classless world. If this is already increasingly felt to be the case in countries like the USSR or Czechoslovakia, it is a hundred times more the case in West Europe, North America, and Japan. Any attempt to replace workers self-management in the economy and society with central rule by one party inevitably leads to the twin evils of bureaucratic centralization and/or "market socialism," which in turn leads to maximum waste, inefficiency, disorder, and the survival of habits and motivations of bourgeois origin. Only planned self-management, that is, rule by soviets, can ensure both optimal growth and the Leninist project of the dictatorship of the proletariat as "a state which begins to wither away from its very inception."



16 The international extension of the European socialist revolution will most likely be determined by the dynamic of the international class struggle and by the effects of international capital's attempt to crush the first workers state or states in West Europe. Given the present relationship of forces, it is likely that this attempt will take the form of an economic blockade rather than immediate military intervention. It follows that the slogan of the Socialist United States of Europe has an immediate transitional function against these attempts: to mobilize the proletariat of the capitalist European countries to block these counterrevolutionary moves and join the revolutionary process. Any proposal that would place additional political or ideological obstacles on the road to the immediate international extension of the revolution (for example, a proposal for immediate linkup with the Soviet Union) would be counterproductive and should be avoided.

In the course of this process of international consolidation of workers power in one or several countries of West Europe, the question of aiding the development of the political revolution in the USSR will surely arise. Demands that can be advanced to aid the rise of the political revolution could include proposals for joint economic planning with the countries of East Europe. But such slogans should take on central importance only if the political revolution has become an immediate perspective. In all other circumstances, such propaganda should be subordinated to the immediate and burning practical tasks of protecting and consolidating the first European workers state or states by mobilizing the masses in other capitalist countries and helping them on the road to the conquest of power.

Yugoslavia, however, presents a special case. Because of the special relationship of the Yugoslav working class with that of several West European countries, because of the sympathy evoked among the West European proletariat and organized labor movement for the hybrid, imperfect, but nonetheless basically more progressive Yugoslav system of "self-management," and because of the serious threats the international and "national" forces of the bureaucracy (as well as procapitalist forces) could represent for the most advanced conquests of the Yugoslav working class in the near future, an immediate offer of federation and of pooling of economic resources made by a victorious socialist revolution in southern Europe to the Yugoslav working class could constitute an important stimulus for a successful self-defense by the Yugoslav proletariat against such threats and could thereby constitute an important stimulus for the political revolution in Yugoslavia and elsewhere in East Europe.

17 In the fifteen years since the victory of the Cuban revolution, the colonial revolution has suffered many defeats, some crushing (Brazil, Indonesia, Iraq, Chile), some grave (Algeria, Bolivia, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Sudan); in addition, there has been a disastrous retreat in the most important semicolonial country, India. On the positive side of this bleak balance-sheet there is



only the long struggle and final victory of the Indochinese revolution, with its positive repercussions throughout Southeast Asia. But these repercussions will bloom into full-fledged revolutionary opportunities only slowly and in the long run.

The basic reason for this long wave of defeats lies neither in the greater flexibility of world imperialism nor in its more vicious response to revolutionary mass movements (large-scale or covert military intervention, terror, assassinations, counterinsurgency, blockade, economic sabotage, etc.). Clearly, all these factors are operative today; but they were likewise operative — for long years and on a broad scale — in countries in which the revolution was finally victorious, like China, Cuba, and Vietnam.

The basic reason for the long chain of defeats of the colonial revolution lies in the adherence of its leadership to the conception of two-stage revolution, whether for primarily social reasons (where the leadership is mainly bourgeois or petty bourgeois), or for mainly ideological reasons (where it is predominantly Stalinist, whether of the pro-Moscow or pro-Peking variety). What has been negatively confirmed by these defeats (and positively confirmed by the Chinese, Cuban, and Vietnamese victories) is the correct fundamental assumptions of the theory of permanent revolution, namely that under the pressure of the mass revolutionary upsurge of the workers and peasants in the colonial and semicolonial countries, the bourgeoisie in these countries is compelled to massively go over to the camp of counterrevolution, along with its state apparatus and army. Any tying of the proletariat to the "national" bourgeoisie, its political leadership, bourgeois state apparatus, and army necessarily disarms the proletariat in face of the counterrevolutionary onslaught.

18 The long delay of victorious socialist revolution in the semicolonial countries and the temporary consolidation of bourgeois states in many of them, however, has not resulted in total stagnation or retrogression in these countries. We have seen a new manifestation of the law of combined and uneven development: Although significant portions of the toiling masses of the semicolonial countries have experienced an absolute decline in living standards and democratic rights (in striking contrast to the rise in the standard of living of the workers and the power of the organized labor movement in West Europe and Japan throughout the twenty-five years that preceded the recession of 1974-75), this decline was combined with a significant movement toward industrialization, urbanization, and numerical growth of the wage-earners (the proletariat and semiproletariat), especially in countries like Brazil, Mexico, Iran, Colombia, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, Peru, Hong Kong, and Singapore, but also in countries in which there had already been a numerically strong working class, like Argentina, India, and South Africa.

Although the peasantry remains the largest class numerically in the semicolonial world as a whole, and even



in such key countries as India, Indonesia, Brazil, Egypt, and Iran, and although the conquest of the political leadership of the peasant movement by the proletariat and its revolutionary party through a correct fight for the national-democratic slogans (agrarian revolution, national independence from imperialism, constituent assembly, etc.) remains absolutely vital, nevertheless, in the long run this numerical and social growth of the proletariat in the colonial and semicolonial countries





creates much more favorable conditions both for the building of revolutionary parties (sections of the Fourth International in these countries) and for the political defeat of all bourgeois, petty bourgeois, and Stalinist leaderships that hitch the growing working-class movement to the wagon of the "national" bourgeoisie.

The struggle against "populist" interclass political ideologies and programs and for the political and organiza-

tional independence of the rural and urban proletariat in the colonial and semicolonial countries constitutes the key political struggle that must be waged in these countries in coming years. It is through this struggle that the Fourth International will be built in these countries.

This struggle should in no way be counterposed to the needs of the anti-imperialist struggle. Rather, it must be seen as the expression of the lessons of the past sixty years of history, namely that no consistent and completely victorious anti-imperialist struggle is possible under the leadership of or in political alliance with the "national" bourgeoisie, its parties, armies, and states.

19 Historically, the balance-sheet that may now be drawn of the emergence of the powerful Fidelista current in the Latin American revolutionary movement is that it was the expression of an initial and only partial break with populism. In the early 1960s the rising Fidelista current did break with the Stalino-populist "two-stage" theory of the Latin American revolution and stood, correctly, for an intertwining of the democratic and socialist tasks of the Latin American revolution; this was particularly expressed in the Second Declaration of Havana and the writings of Che Guevara. In doing this the Fidelista current dealt a powerful, though not decisive, blow to the Stalino-populist concept of historical "blocs" with the "national" bourgeoisie against the oligarchy and imperialism.

But inasmuch as the Fidelista current increasingly and essentially focused on armed struggle and gave the form of the struggle greater and greater priority over the problems of the class composition and class content of the revolutionary forces, it allowed in through the window what it had thrown out the door: the possibility of essentially populist organizations (people's armies and people's parties) divorced from the specific needs and concerns of the proletariat and therefore susceptible to being periodically coopted by the strategy of alliance with the "progressive sectors" of the bourgeoisie, including the bourgeois army.

The ultimate reabsorption of the Fidelista current by the Latin American Communist parties should not be exaggerated. What has occurred is more a result of the Cuban workers state's dependence on military and economic aid from the Kremlin, a product of the isolation of that state because of the successive defeats of the Latin American revolution. The ideological and political ferment introduced into the revolutionary and working class movement in Latin America by the victory of the Cuban revolution will prove to have lasting effects. Even in Cuba itself, the autonomy of the Fidelista current and of the best Guevarista traditions may reassert itself if there is a new upturn in the Latin American revolution. But in Latin America more than anywhere else, the struggle against populist illusions and deviations and for the political independence of the working class remains the key problem for this future upturn.





Castro with former Chilean president Allende

Whether that upturn is imminent or will yet be some years in coming depends to a large extent on the outcome of the military coup in Argentina and on the degree to which the Argentine working class is able to reorganize its forces and build an alternative leadership in spite of the coup. To put it another way: It will depend on the degree to which the Argentine bourgeoisie proves capable of using the coup to inflict a defeat on the Argentine workers as crushing as the defeat inflicted upon the Brazilian, Chilean, and Uruguayan proletariats.

② It is increasingly likely that the victory of the proletarian revolution in West Europe will precede the victory of the political revolution in the Soviet Union and China. Barring unforeseen turns in the world situation, this is the variant on which we must base ourselves. The reason for this lies not in any objective "need" for or "function" of the bureaucracies in the bureaucratized workers states, nor in any broad mass base among the toiling population allegedly being acquired by these bureaucracies. On the contrary, all evidence confirms that revulsion against and opposition to waste, oppression, disregard for the workers' desire to administer production, and wanton strangulation of the elementary democratic rights of the masses are more widespread than ever.

The greatest obstacles on the road to political revolution are essentially subjective and political and not objective and social. They are:

a. The widespread conviction in the East European countries and among the oppressed nationalities of the USSR that any direct and open challenge to the Kremlin's rule in these areas that does not coincide with or quickly lead to a similar challenge in the Russian heartland itself will be quickly crushed as in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968.

b. The lack of political perspectives and consciousness among the Soviet proletariat in the absence of a realistic and credible alternative to both capitalism and the rule of the bureaucracy (the depth of the historical disappointment of the Russian proletariat).

c. The destruction of any continuity in the organization and cadres of a revolutionary Marxist working-class opposition, a result of Stalin's terror and the subsequent "milder" repression under Khrushchev and, especially, Brezhnev.

d. The long-term, slow but steady increase in the standard of living of the workers in the USSR during the past twenty-five years (briefly interrupted in the early 1960s), which, given the lack of political perspective, creates a material basis for "consumerism" and for posing only "reformist" demands on the government. It is true that any recurrent interruption in this rise of the standard of living (for example as a result of a new crisis in the food supply or in distribution) as well as any renewed tension among the oppressed nationalities could give rise to explosive mass struggles, but of too scattered and unconnected a character to directly challenge the rule of the bureaucracy.

The inability of the "new" opposition to go beyond the aspirations of the intelligentsia and to develop a political and organizational project of linking up with the working class and the rebellious youth has undoubtedly contributed to this same trend.

The key role of the rise and victory of the socialist revolution in West Europe in overcoming these obstacles has already been stressed. Embryonically, it has been confirmed by the limited experience of the Prague Spring and the panic this provoked among the bureaucrats, who feared that the "Czechoslovak experience" would trig-



"Lenin, wake up—they've all gone mad!" Prague students during 1968 Soviet invasion.



ger a universal movement in favor of socialist democracy and self-management in East Europe and the Soviet Union. The effects of a much more advanced example in West Europe, where military intervention by the Kremlin is excluded, would be much deeper, if less rapid, than those of the Prague Spring.

21 While the most likely variant today is that the political revolution in the USSR and East Europe will occur after the victory of the socialist revolution in several key countries of West Europe, this in no way reduces the tremendous contribution this political revolution will make to the process of world revolution as a whole. The workers of the bureaucratized workers states will bring to the world revolution not only an acute sensitivity to the necessity of nipping bureaucratic deformations in the bud (a sensitivity born of their terrible experiences with Stalinism), but will also bring a technical skill and cultural level immeasurably higher than that of the Russian proletariat in 1917. They will bring the positive results of a tradition of living outside bourgeois society, results which are extensive and important in such fields as a less frantic work pace, greater weight of cultural needs, and deeper feelings of group solidarity, in spite of all the terrible consequences of bureaucratic dictatorship in all fields of social life.

Once the shackles of that dictatorship have been broken, it is likely that the Soviet, Czechoslovak, East German, Yugoslav, Polish, Hungarian proletariats will rise to great heights of political and social consciousness. On the basis of their rich political experiences, they will contribute powerfully to the general struggle for a socialist world.

22 The escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict to the state level has strongly underlined the reactionary role played in world politics today by the identification of the interests of the workers states with the interests of a privileged bureaucracy. Although one may indeed demonstrate that the ideological roots of the petty-bourgeois reactionary nationalism that dominates the dynamics of this conflict in both Moscow and Peking lie in the theory of "socialism in one country," it is nonetheless the case that the relative autonomy that has been taken on by this conflict at the state level, its reactionary impact on the international class struggle and the colonial revolution, and the way in which imperialism has been able to make use of it go well beyond its originally ideological aspect.

During the first stage of the conflict, essentially during the 1960s, the Kremlin undoubtedly played the more reactionary role. It allied with bourgeois India against the Chinese workers state, supported reactionary bourgeois governments in several semicolonial countries against local CPs, and refused essential military and economic aid to the People's Republic of China during a serious crisis for that country. More generally, Moscow introduced into the ranks of the CPs, particularly but



not exclusively the CPs of the bureaucratized workers states themselves, such utterly reactionary prejudices as the "need to defend Western civilization against the Yellow peril" as well as chauvinistic contempt for "backward peasants who want to build communism on a bowl of rice." It is no wonder that during this period the Maoist and semi-Maoist currents were able to win broad support among oppressed and rebellious layers in semi-colonial and even imperialist countries against such fundamentally conservative and counterrevolutionary ideologies.

In a second stage, however, essentially since the very end of the 1960s or the beginning of the 1970s, the scales have tipped in the opposite direction. Today the Maoist bureaucracy upholds policies and ideologies far more reactionary than those of the Kremlin or the "official" Communist parties. Beginning with the concept of the "two super powers" regarded as equally obnoxious (an ideological rationalization of Peking's diplomatic maneuvers between Washington and Moscow, based on the theory that capitalism had been restored in the USSR and in most of the East European countries), Mao has gradually shifted toward the concept of "Soviet imperialism" as the main danger. This had led to approval of NATO and of nuclear rearmament of European imperialism, to defense of the capitalist "fatherland" in West Europe against the "military threat from Moscow," to openly counterrevolutionary interventions in the Portuguese and Angolan revolutions, and to alliances with blatantly procapitalist forces, not only against the CPs, but even against the independent mass movements of the proletariat.

This tragic evolution once again highlights the importance of systematic internationalist education of the proletariat and of fighting against the divisive effects chauvinism and nationalism have within the proletariat and the working-class movement itself. The evolution of Chinese policy has led to the self-liquidation of a whole layer of dedicated revolutionaries. The importance of



building an international organization alongside and simultaneous with national revolutionary parties, a fundamental distinctive feature of revolutionary Marxism, of Leninism, of Trotskyism, embodied by the Fourth International today, becomes all the more significant in light of the disastrous ideological and political results of petty-bourgeois nationalism run rampant in the organized labor movement, a phenomenon of which the latest degeneration of Maoism is a new, but by no means the only, confirmation.

23 On the other hand, one must not deduce wrong conclusions about the internal dynamics of Chinese society from the overwhelmingly reactionary role played by Maoist diplomacy and "orthodox" Maoist sects in world politics today. Recent events have once again confirmed that in China, contrary to Stalinist Russia, the masses are neither atomized nor politically passive. The cycle of political differentiation and confrontation in the People's Republic of China occurs in a context basically and historically different from that which prevailed in Russia in 1927-53. Again and again, the maneuvers of the Maoist faction of the bureaucracy have been limited by the independent dynamics of the mass movement, initially among the youth and now, it appears, increasingly among the proletariat as well. Thus, to reduce the phenomenon of the cultural revolution, its aftermath, and the current political struggle in China to simple intrabureaucratic conflicts would mean to seriously underestimate the potential revolutionary consciousness and militancy of significant sectors of Chinese society.

The crisis of Maoism now unfolding in the People's Republic of China is a crisis in which the masses are intervening more directly and autonomously than was the case during the crisis of Stalinism in the USSR. From a Marxist point of view, this must be the starting point of any analysis of political developments in China. This is the basis for the optimism of the Fourth International about the possibilities for a rebirth of Leninism and Trotskyism in China itself.

24 From a programmatic standpoint, the slogan of the Socialist United States of Europe has now been superseded by the need to fight for the Socialist United States of the World. The key problems of world economics and politics — underdevelopment, hunger, averting nuclear destruction, prevention of depletion of natural resources, etc. — can be resolved only through a world planned economy. The increase in the number of workers states and the need to overcome any relations of nationalist egoism among them leads to the same conclusion. Any notion that from a programmatic point of view we lend priority to common planning with the "rich" workers states of the USSR and East Europe as against the "poor" ones of Asia would be monstrous. Any world strategy for socialism that does not take account of the special problems and sensitivity of the underdeveloped countries will lead to disaster. As the world party of socialist rev-

olution, the Fourth International must consciously express the need for this world planning and must build a world leadership with that goal in mind. Continental or regional priorities must be subordinated to this strategic priority.

Solidarity with the struggle of the key sectors of the colonial and semicolonial world, to which imperialism will cling to the bitter end for obvious reasons (South Africa, Palestine, the oil-producing centers of the Middle East, probably the Panama Canal zone and the surrounding areas of Central and northern South America) will play an important role in developing among the liberating ranks of the proletariat of Europe the consciousness needed to begin solving the key tasks of the liberation of humanity.



25 World revolution and world socialism are indissolubly linked to a consciously planned worldwide use of human and material resources to realize a certain number of priority objectives that can be achieved only on a global scale:

- a. Elimination of want and avoidable illness for all human beings.
- b. Radical closing of the gap in material and cultural development between the northern and southern hemispheres, which implies a massive transfer of resources to the superexploited peoples of the southern hemisphere.
- c. Conservation or restoration of the ecological balance and of scarce resources for future generations.
- d. Radical revolution in technology, which must be subordinated to the human needs of the producers and to the diversified possibilities in various geographic milieus.

All these revolutionary changes cannot be achieved under conditions of soviet democracy unless they are accompanied by an end to any form of domination, paternalism, or authoritarianism on the part of the white "race" as against other races and on the part of men as against women. Social equality among all people and races can become a reality only if it is based on equality of material resources and power. To achieve this without any decline in the material well-being of the proletariat and without any form of coercion on key sectors of the working class remains the most audacious and ambitious goal of communism, for which the Fourth International is the only consistent fighter today. □



# Portugal

## LCI WITHDRAWS SUPPORT TO ARLETE DA SILVA

On May 27 the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI—Internationalist Communist League), sympathizing organization of the Fourth International, issued the following communiqué announcing the withdrawal of its support for the candidacy of Arlete Vieira da Silva in the presidential elections. Originally, this candidate had been jointly presented by the comrades of the LCI and the Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (PRT—Revolutionary Workers party). The candidate was subsequently withdrawn. The next issue of INPRECOR will provide further information on the presidential elections in Portugal.

The Central Committee of the LCI adopted the orientation of struggling for a united workers candidate who would respond to the offensive of the bourgeoisie aimed at imposing a military president of its choice, who would respond to the will of the workers to break with the bourgeoisie, its politicians, and generals and to advance the struggles of the working masses to defend their conquests and win their demands.

The LCI was prepared to support a candidate that represented this will of the workers. In order to keep this possibility open until the last moment the LCI reached an agreement with the PRT to present a candidate who represented both the program and the political fight that we propose to the workers.

The LCI reaffirms its intransigent defense of a workers candidate who would support and adopt the basic demands of the struggles being waged by the workers for workers control and centralization of the workers commissions, for the agrarian reform, for a democratic congress of all the trade unions to establish a program of struggle, for an SP-CP government responsible to the workers, their trade unions and workers commissions.

In establishing a political agreement with the PRT the leadership of the LCI had decided to support the candidacy of a militant whose past, positions, and political coherence permitted this program of struggle to be synthesized.

The two organizations examined several possible candidates. In light of the assurances given us, we abandoned the other candidates in favor of Arlete Vieira da Silva, who was presented to us by the comrades of the PRT as a militant whose whole life had been dedicated to struggle against capitalist exploitation and the oppression of the dictatorship of Salazar and Caetano.

However, our responsibilities to the workers led the LCI to initiate a check on the past of the proposed candidate. Although these inquiries were concluded belatedly, with a delay relative to the responsibilities incumbent upon us, they permitted us to draw the conclusion that Arlete Vieira da Silva neither possesses the past nor meets the minimum conditions that would permit her to be the intransigent defender of a program of unity and independence of the workers movement, of the program that we insist on defending in the presidential campaign.

For this reason, the LCI withdraws its support to the candidacy of Arlete Vieira da Silva, hoping that our comrades of the PRT will take the same position.

Since we have not completely clarified the causes and motives that determined the behavior of Arlete da Silva, the LCI will continue to carefully study all the political implications of this situation.

In assuming the only serious revolutionary attitude before all the workers and all the comrades who supported us in the process of presenting the candidate, the LCI is conscious of the slanderous use the bourgeoisie and the reactionary forces will attempt to make of these events. We reaffirm that the full truth will be told to the workers and that we will not permit the bourgeoisie to make use of this fact to attack the workers forces, divide the toilers, and isolate the revolutionaries.

Finally, the LCI calls the attention of all the workers to the danger of the election of Ramalho Eanes, the president that the bourgeoisie wants to impose on the workers movement, proclaiming his victory even before the vote has taken place. A victory for Ramalho Eanes could result only from the division and lack of decision of the workers parties. We call upon all the workers organizations to assume their responsibilities in the battle to defeat the bourgeois candidates, a battle that we have already begun and will continue. □





# "TURN KISSINGER AWAY!"

by B. Åsman

On May 23 Henry Kissinger arrived in Stockholm for talks with the Swedish Social Democratic government. Some hours before his arrival, 13,000 people demonstrated in the streets of the city demanding "Turn Kissinger away!" This mass demonstration was the result of a three-week campaign by an action committee composed of more than forty organizations.

Kissinger is the highest American official ever to visit Sweden. His visit must thus be seen as a turn in diplomatic relations between the American and Swedish governments. Tension between the two has been high since 1968 because of the Swedish government's position on the Vietnam war, a tension that was indicated by the withdrawal of the American ambassador from Stockholm on several occasions.

But these problems were not at all in evidence during the meeting between Kissinger and Prime Minister Olof Palme. Instead, Kissinger declared that relations between the two countries are now good and on the right keel. Since the foreign policy of the Swedish government has not changed, this represents a change in the attitude of the American government.

What is the reason for this visit and for Kissinger's indication of a changed relationship to the Swedish Social Democracy on the part of U.S. imperialism? With the mounting social contradictions in Europe and the ripening of prerevolutionary and revolutionary situations in southern Europe, American imperialism is seeking new means by which to intervene politically, since for the time being Washington finds itself deprived of the possibility of using military force against a revolution in any West European country. It is within this counterrevolutionary optic that Kissinger considers it useful to establish closer and friendlier relations with Olof Palme. The important role Palme played last year in rallying the support of European Social Democracy to the Portuguese Socialist party, which gave increased credibility to Soares's counterrevolutionary policy, is an indication of this.

Second, the Swedish government can act as an information and contact link between the U.S. government and the governments of some semicolonial countries and workers states. This was clearly stated by Kissinger: "We agree on many fields. On other fields we can exchange important information thanks to the Swedish policy of neutrality, which allows Sweden to talk with many countries with which we cannot." This was even demonstrated during the visit itself, as Palme delivered a message from Fidel Castro that the Cuban troops would be withdrawn from Angola in the near future.

The leaders of the Social Democracy are more than willing to play this role. But it causes some problems with the left of the party, as was ironically indicated by Kissinger himself, who commented, "I hope, Mr. Prime Minister, that I don't get you in trouble if I say that we have had a very friendly discussion." Before Kissinger's arrival the Social Democratic leaders tried to play down the importance of the visit. *Aftonbladet*, the largest Social Democratic newspaper, for example, asked, "Who is afraid of Kissinger any longer?" saying that he is on his way out and that his visit was completely unimportant.

The 13,000 people who demonstrated against the Nobel Peace Prize winning war criminal and demanded that the government turn him away showed that they did not accept these Social Democratic arguments. In fact, the visit gave rise to the broadest united action ever held by the left in Sweden, involving nearly all the organizations and solidarity committees left of the Social Democracy. It was important, for example, that the 5,000-member Swedish Harbor Union, which has been boycotting all ships from Chile since March 1, 1976, condemned the government for receiving Kissinger and urged support to the demonstration. The only groups that refused to participate in the united action were the Maoist Swedish Communist party and some smaller groups around it. They preferred instead to organize a separate contingent "against the super powers"; only 1,000 people participated. □



# ISRAEL TOWARD MORE BRUTAL REPRESSION

by MICHEL WARSHAWSKY

One of the most important elements on which the Israeli government had based its policy in the territories occupied since 1967 was the apparent passivity of the inhabitants of this territory, especially the Palestinians of the West Bank. The weakness of mass struggles in the West Bank between 1969 and 1974 and in the Gaza Strip after 1971 enabled the Zionist regime to make big speeches about the "liberal" character of its occupation and the alleged acceptance of that occupation by the Palestinians. At first glance, it often could have seemed that the population in the occupied territories did not support the resistance movement and that this movement could neither speak nor act in their name.

It must be noted, in the first place, that the low level of struggles in the West Bank was not at all the result of any allegedly liberal occupation, but on the contrary

of the effective repression imposed immediately after the occupation began in June 1967 and above all of the demoralization brought on by the defeat of the Arab regimes in the 1967 war. It was precisely the later political successes of these Arab states against the Zionist state that were to induce a deep change within the occupied Palestinian population. These successes were to enable the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to make some not negligible diplomatic breakthroughs, which in turn served to catalyze new mobilizations in the territories occupied since 1967. Thus, it is no accident that each wave of mass mobilization in the West Bank during the past two years has been linked to the PLO's diplomatic offensive (Arafat at the United Nations, Security Council discussion on Palestine, etc.).

## Failure of Israeli policy

The racist sentiment of superiority that has characterized the whole of Israeli policy since June 1967 was also felt in the manner in which the Zionist authorities dealt with the occupation. It was considered "normal" that the Arabs should passively submit to Israeli domination; it was "natural" that sooner or later they would accept the occupation. It was for this reason that the occupation forces were not at all prepared to confront the uprising in the West Bank, just as the Zionist army was not prepared to confront the Arab military offensives when the October War broke out three years ago. This is what explains the Israeli failures in the occupied territories, both politically (the latest municipal elections, for example) and from the standpoint of pure repression.

It is clear that Israeli policy has failed on all fields. The elections, which according to Prime Minister Robin and Minister of Defense Peres were supposed to permit an accelerated integration of the West Bank through the regime's project of "self-administration," became transformed into a plebiscite against the Zionist occupation itself. Notorious collaborators like Sheikh Khalil did not even make any gestures to respond to the voters and



Far-right Zionist demonstration in occupied West Bank.



in most of the large towns of the West Bank — Nablus, Hebron, Ramallah, el-Bireh — the slates of the National Front were elected. In reality, these slates were coalitions that more or less openly claimed allegiance to the PLO. It is obvious that after such electoral results the plan for self-administration has to be scrapped. But it has also turned out that the repressive measures have lost much of their effectiveness. The wave of strikes and demonstrations that mobilized the whole of the West Bank has now lasted for more than three months. Even the most optimistic forces had not expected this.

The occupation forces spared no effort in trying to put an end to this mass movement: hundreds of preventive arrests, days and days of curfews, requisition of shops on strike, and, above all, unprecedented violence in dispersing demonstrators. In the space of two months, the occupation forces murdered twelve people. But neither the curfew nor the murders broke the combativity of the inhabitants of the West Bank. On the contrary, each new murder, each new repressive measure (for example, the transformation of the Casbah of Nablus into a ghetto closed by iron gates) provoked new demonstrations more or less in solidarity with the resistance movement (as well as the systematic appearance of Palestinian flags and increasingly radical slogans).

It is thus not surprising that in face of the failure of the present policy in the occupied territories, a debate has broken out among Israeli leading circles over what new repressive measures to take. For the most part, the various alternatives turn around techniques of repression, whether to use lead bullets or rubber ones, clubs or tear gas, systematic curfews or attempts to institute a so-called normalization in the cities of the West Bank. The argument of the "liberals" is typical: "Deadly bullets damage Israel's already tarnished image and are ineffective." A whole liberal program. As against this "Zionist left," the right demands an accentuation of repression, that blood flow whenever necessary. And the right adds a new element to its strategy, an element that was rarely expressed openly until recently: massive expulsion of the Palestinians, and in some cases, even a massive transfer of population beyond the borders of Palestine. For the moment the government has opted for attempts at normalization. It has withdrawn most of its military forces from Nablus and Ramallah and has dismantled the iron gates of the Casbah. The curfew has been suspended in exchange for the agreement of the municipal councils to try to put an end to the mobilization. But this retreat on the part of the occupation forces is seen by the population as a victory and will certainly entail new mobilizations.

### Limits of the mobilization

As significant and militant as the latest mobilizations in the West Bank have been, their perspectives remain limited and are narrowly dependent on the development of the Palestinian resistance outside the borders of the Zionist state. The lack of independent perspectives for the struggles of the Palestinian population under Zionist occupation on the other side of the "green line" (the

pre-1967 state borders) is the direct consequence of the specific forms taken by the Zionist colonization in Palestine: destruction of Palestinian society through the expulsion of the majority of the indigenous population and their dispersion throughout various Arab countries. Since 1967 the center of the Palestinian national liberation movement has been located in the refugee camps in which the various organizations of the resistance arose and in which most of the fighters have been recruited. It is these armed organizations of the resistance that have waged the struggle against the Israeli occupier, thus permitting the weakness of the struggle of the masses in the occupied territories to be ameliorated somewhat.

But the resistance movement itself has been unable to develop independent perspectives, because of the specific conditions in which it has had to wage its struggle and, above all, because of its dependence on the various Arab regimes. The petty-bourgeois leadership of the resistance has chosen not to base itself on the mobilization of the toiling masses of the Arab countries and not to link its struggle to that of the workers against their own bourgeoisie. On the contrary, this leadership has chosen political and financial support from the Arab regimes in exchange for the "noninterference" of the resistance in the internal affairs of the various Arab countries.

The events of Black September in Jordan in 1970 and of the current civil war in Lebanon have clearly demonstrated that the policy of noninterference was not only erroneous but even absurd. The very existence of the resistance in the various Arab countries represented interference in the internal affairs of these states and a permanent threat to the existing regimes. In order to preserve its very existence the resistance was compelled to struggle against the bourgeois regimes, for whom the dismantling of the resistance, or at least a serious limitation on its freedom of action, was a necessity; the only alternative was to increasingly accept the Diktats of these regimes.

Thus, in an apparently paradoxical fashion, the future of the mobilization of the Palestinian population in the West Bank is being played out in Lebanon; that future is tied to the outcome of the civil war in Lebanon. Inasmuch as everything suggests that the majority of the







PLO leadership will opt for a new compromise with the bourgeois Arab states (new rapprochement with Egypt, discussions between Arafat and Assad), it seems that the outcome of the recent mobilizations will be found in . . . Geneva. But the resistance will come to the negotiating table in Geneva weakened by the civil war in Lebanon and further weakened by the accords that will finally end that war. The PLO will probably attend under the auspices of one or several of the Arab regimes and will probably find itself facing the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank under conditions much worse than those the revolutionary Marxists and the Palestinian organizations of the Rejection Front predicted nearly three years ago.

## The Israeli "peace plan"

Although the integration of the PLO into the American peace plan does not seem to pose too many problems, the same is not true of the integration of the Zionist state. The Israeli regime continues to refuse to consider withdrawal from the West Bank or negotiations with the PLO. Nevertheless, as all observers have noted, new American pressure will be exerted on the leaders of the Jewish state after the American presidential elections.

The probability of a new U.S. diplomatic offensive, the confrontation with a mass civilian resistance in the occupied territories, and the divisions provoked by the wildcat "unauthorized" colonizations organized in the West Bank by the Zionist far right have combined to permit a certain clarification of the Zionist government's plans for the West Bank. The overall project provides the framework of the "compromise" the Zionist leaders are prepared to accept in regard to the future of the West Bank. This Israeli "peace plan" is in fact not new. In effect it amounts to the old Allon Plan, bitterly debated more than six years ago. The Allon Plan was never officially adopted by the government, but the map of the Zionist colonies established in the West Bank since

1967 is clearer than any official communiqué. There is a line of colonies along the Jordan River, a cluster of colonies in the areas around Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, and a corridor of new colonies that is to link Jerusalem to the pre-1967 Israeli territories in the Jordan Valley.

What will be the results of such a plan for the Zionist leaders? The complete occupation of Palestine with the exception of two Arab enclaves, one in Judea, the other in Samaria, themselves linked to Jordan through the Jericho corridor. What is involved here is clearly a project for the South Africanization of Palestine, with the creation of a state (an "Arabistan") enjoying a strictly relative autonomy, politically dependent on both Jordan and the Zionist state. Such is the plan for a "Palestinian state" that the Zionist leaders are prepared to accept. It is not in contradiction with the process of Zionist colonization; on the contrary, it is fully integrated into the process of this colonization.

This plan also indicates what are the limits of the concessions the Jewish state is prepared to make in the context of a peace treaty. The only element that has not been taken into consideration is whether the Arab regimes and the Palestinian leadership will accept this plan or not. Inasmuch as all signs are that they will not, the Israeli "peace plan" loses its reason for existence and the key to the present "peaceful solution" must once again be sought in Washington. For the Israeli gendarmes of imperialism in the Arab East, there has always been a contradiction between their own expansionist projects and the overall objectives of their imperialist patron. And in the final analysis, it is the pressure brought to bear by the latter that will determine the fate of the occupied West Bank.

In the meantime, the Zionist bastion is hardening its attitude. In spite of certain temporary retreats, what must now be expected is a hardening of repression both in the occupied territories and within the pre-1967 borders. There will be not only an intensification of official repression, but also a strengthening of tendencies and groups of fascist ideology which will often assume certain repressive tasks that the government is not yet prepared to undertake. For the moment, the authorities have no interest in seeing a proliferation of partisan initiatives against the Arab population and the forces of the left, but it would be utopian to believe that the policy of systematic murders by the repressive forces in the West Bank and in Galilee faces big dissent among the Israeli-Jewish population. It is thus that one must understand the violence of the latest demonstration of right-wing students at the University of Jerusalem, who for the first time used arms (brass knuckles and clubs) to disperse a demonstration of the Union of Arab Students against repression in the West Bank. When cold blooded murder goes on in Nablus and Ramallah, there is no longer any hesitation about killing elsewhere. And it will not be long before shots are fired at the University of Jerusalem or Tel Aviv. Such is the criminal logic of colonial repression and such is the road down which the Zionist state is heading today.





# questions on the Cambodian revolution

●by **PIERRE ROUSSET**●

For some months now the situation in Cambodia has been the object of an intense anticommunist slander campaign in several countries. According to the American weekly *Time*, a regime of pure terror has been established since the victory of the "Khmers Rouges": "entire villages massacred, victims tied together and buried alive by bulldozers, . . . rivers of blood in the irrigation canals." For François Ponchaud(1), writing in *Le Monde*, *Time*'s estimate of the number of deaths one year after the liberation of Phnom Penh (500,000) is apparently too modest, for he puts forward the figure of 800,000. In a dossier prepared for press distribution, Ponchaud tried to "shed light" on the "Realpolitik" of the Cambodian leadership by quoting a Khmer Rouge who is said to have declared that "if only 20,000 youth are left in Cambodia, then we will reconstruct the new Cambodia with those 20,000 youth!" The escalation of casualty figures was continued by the *New York Times*, which announced one million dead, and by *Newsweek*, which blithely upped the ante to a million and a half. One year of the new regime is said to have cost the Cambodian population as much as five years of the American war and the massive bombing. The Western press has no fear of figures.

The almost total silence of the Cambodian leadership and the closing of the country's borders facilitate the fueling of this broad campaign of slander. But this does not mean that the slander does not exist or that it does not take crude forms. Here are some examples taken from the French press.

The weekly *Paris-Match* published a series of photographs entitled "Terror in Cambodia," which were later reproduced on television. These photographs, it was said, "had been taken by a refugee." But in fact they had already been published in *Thai Rath*, a Bangkok daily, which indicated that they had been taken from the Thai side of the border with a telescopic lense. One of these photographs showed a small gathering. *Thai Rath* claimed it was a "scene of political indoctrination" (cited by the *Paris daily Libération*, April 22, 1976). In *Paris-Match* it became a "collective marriage" in which young girls were being "given" to meritorious fighters. The *May 26 Figaro*, a Paris daily, published a photograph of a woman lying on the ground, "taken clandestinely in April 1975 by an inhabitant of Phnom Penh." With a wealth of detail, *Figaro* explained how this woman had been killed by a soldier of the liberation army. But



a check of this photograph (Libération, May 28) indicated that in fact it had been taken in 1974 by an Agence France-Presse photographer in a different place. And the woman was not dead, but lying on the ground crying; a second photograph showed her standing again. Neither Figaro nor AFP offered any explanation.

The slander campaign is based essentially on the testimony of refugees, most of whom have gone to Thailand. Here again, their testimony, while sometimes interesting, must be regarded with more prudence than seems to be the usual practice. On April 18 *Le Monde*, a newspaper with a reputation for seriousness and objectivity, published the dramatic testimony of Ien Souvannari, a refugee. This same refugee had been interviewed by the Bangkok correspondent of *Le Monde* upon his arrival in Thailand (see *Le Monde*, November 8, 1975), and had offered a considerably less bloody version than the one he wrote several months later. This is not the first time that Bangkok has utilized "disinformation" to such ends. The refugee camps, in which atrocity stories are peddled from mouth to mouth and become inflated in the process, and in which the Thai, American, and French secret services are extremely active, offer an extremely favorable milieu for the manipulation of information. The slander campaign clearly exists.

How can truth be sorted from lies given the slander campaign on the one hand and the silence of the Cambodian leadership on the other? It is impossible to draw up a real balance-sheet on the choices made by the Khmer Rouge leadership since the victory of the revolution on April 17, 1975. One can merely advance hypotheses and attempt to raise some problems, using as the basis of analysis the orientation of the Khmers Rouges as it is expressed in the rare official documents and the collective information assembled through monitoring Radio Phnom Penh and reading the accounts of refugees published by F. Ponchaud, whom it is difficult to accuse of excessive tenderness toward the new regime.<sup>(2)</sup> We may thus relocate the present problems in the history of the Cambodian revolution and of the Cambodian Communist leadership.

## The option for autarky

The evacuation of the population of Phnom Penh by the FUNK shortly after the city's liberation was partially explained by conjunctural reasons. There was famine. The channels of transportation, which had been destroyed, did not allow for rapid resupply, and in any event the previously liberated zones were not capable of providing sufficient food for this mass of population (at least 30 percent of the total population of the country), who had previously been fed by the American aerial bridge. The rainy season was on its way, and everybody had to produce.

But these conjunctural reasons did not in themselves explain either the scope of the displacement of the population or the forms it took. The distrust of cadres and soldiers emerging from the peasantry for Phnom Penh, a parasitic and corrupt city if ever there was one, came

through in the attitude of the FUNK fighters upon their entry into the Cambodian capital. In the words of a "political commissar" recorded by F. Ponchaud on April 18, 1975: "The people have to learn about the grain of rice. It is in sweating to clean it, sow it, plant it, and harvest it that man learns the real value of things. . . . The city is bad, not the people; because the people can be reformed, but not the city. It is in the city that you find money and corruption." Beyond the anecdote, what we see here is also the problem of the choices and development priorities of the Khmer Rouge leadership, posed in crude terms by the forced exodus of the urban population.

The watchword of the orientation of the Cambodian Communists today is "independence and sovereignty." Their project for the economic restructuring of the country is an attempt to realize this independence immediately. "Our people, workers and peasants," declared Vice-Prime Minister Ieng Sary, ". . . are wedded to their position of being independent and sovereign, of counting on their own strength, of being master of the country and of their own destiny." (Speech of April 17, 1976, translation by the GRUNK mission in Paris.) To be sure, it is necessary to get the factories running again, but in order to reduce the need for foreign aid the accent has to be placed on the search for self-sufficiency in food and the creation of an exportable rice surplus assuring the future reentry of currency and permitting an upturn of foreign trade. The essential part of the work force must consequently leave for the countryside and participate in hydraulic development. "If we have dikes," declared Radio Phnom Penh on February 21, 1976, "we will have water. If we have water, we will have rice. If we have rice, we will be able to have everything."

To this project of economic development — search for self-sufficiency in food by relying on the country's own forces, creation of an exportable surplus and reentry of currency, controlled priming of foreign trade — there corresponds a political orientation that is fiercely nationalistic. In official speeches, of course, the very general assertion of the need for international solidarity remains. "The revolution of Kampuchea (Cambodia) cannot be divorced from the revolutionary movements of the world," declared Ieng Sary in his speech. But the present leitmotiv is quite different, to judge by the speeches of the president of the FUNK in France during the commemoration of the first anniversary of the victory. He declared: "Our people and our revolutionary army are determined . . . to defend the territorial integrity of the country at all costs, its waterways and land, its maritime borders, its islands, its air space, against any aggressor, large or small, coming from near or far." And he drew the balance-sheet of the anti-imperialist struggle without once mentioning the common fight of the Vietnamese and Laotian peoples! There is now a border dispute between Cambodia and Vietnam, and everything suggests that Vietnam is in fact the "near country" referred to here.



The effort at production the FUNK has imposed on the population was in part made necessary by the state of ruin in which the United States had left the country. The 1973 bombing, when Washington concentrated the whole of its Indochina air force on Cambodia, was terribly devastating. The figures on the destruction of the economic infrastructure now advanced by the GRUNK are extremely high. But this excessively intense effort was also made necessary by the Khmer Rouge leadership's choice of autarkic development. A different choice was possible, one that would have permitted much more progressive measures of reconstruction to be taken and would have avoided the organization of the population in the form of an army in the countryside. That choice was to have relied on Indochinese development, thus fostering trade with and aid from the bureaucratized workers states. In addition, certain judicious options of trade with the capitalist countries could even have been envisaged.

### The nationalist retreat

the orientation of the Cambodian Angkar (the "organization") in fact sanctions the breakup of the Indochinese revolutionary front that had been formed during the war. This nationalist retreat is one of the central problems with which the Indochinese revolutions are now confronted. It has taken particularly sharp forms in Cambodia. To understand this, it is necessary to go back to the history of these leaderships.

The first Khmer Communists were members of the Indochinese Communist party, within which they, along with the Laotians, were a small minority compared with the Vietnamese. During the 1930s, the program of this party called for a strongly integrated Indochinese revolution leading to the "Union of Soviet Republics of Indochina," as it was put in the draft resolution on work among ethnic minorities submitted to the 1935 congress of the French Communist party. The right of the Laotian, Khmer, and Montagnard minorities to determine their own future, up to and including state separation, was recognized at that time. But the full measure of the national aspect of the liberation struggle had apparently not yet been completely grasped. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were united by French domination and later by the American intervention. But they remained profoundly different in socioeconomic structure, self-consciousness, culture (Sino-Confucian in one case, Indo-Buddhist in the others), and civilization. Now, the reaffirmation — or affirmation — of a national identity against imperialism was to be one of the essential motor forces of the revolutionary upsurge. The revolutions had to be Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian before they could be Indochinese. The turn of the Communist movement on this question began in 1941 with the creation of the Vietminh (which was Vietnamese) and led in 1951 to the formation of three different Communist parties: the Workers party of Vietnam, the People's Revolutionary party of Laos, and the Khmer Communist party. Nevertheless, the leading nucleus of each of these three parties had come out of the Indochinese Communist party.

The historical links among them were close. A twofold break, political and generational, was later to occur in the case of Cambodia.

The bulk of the present leaders of the Khmer Rouge did not experience the first anti-French resistance. In 1954 the Cambodian Communists, overshadowed by Sihanouk, were the first to be sacrificed by the Geneva Accords and the machinations of the great powers. While the Laotian revolutionaries were able to withdraw to two provinces in the northeast and while the Vietnamese won the formation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Khmers had to go underground or seek exile in North Vietnam. Son Ngoc Minh and the bulk of the Cambodian Communist cadres seem to have gone to the DRV. The lesser known militants probably remained in Cambodia and some cadres, among them the representatives of the left of the Khmer Issarak resistance to the Geneva Accords, founded the Pracheachon (Party of the People). The militants who remained in Cambodia assured the permanence of the inactive guerrilla base (and probably still do), while the second layer of cadres now occupy posts of secondary responsibility. Sien An, for example, became ambassador to Hanoi and Keo Meas ambassador to Peking.

Most of the members of the present government whose political histories are known became Communists during the 1950s in France, where they were pursuing their studies. This is notably the case for Hou Youn (former planning minister of the GRUNK, who seems to have been killed in the fighting in 1975), Son Sen (vice-minister of defense), Ieng Sary (vice-prime minister and minister of foreign affairs), Mai Mann (who led the resistance inside Phnom Penh), Khieu Samphan (president of the presidium), and Saloth Sar (one of the major leaders of the party). These people joined the French Communist party and became leaders of the Khmer Students Association. It was during this period that Hou Youn wrote his university thesis on the Khmer peasantry and Khieu Samphan his thesis on the industrialization of Cambodia.



Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan.



Upon returning to Phnom Penh, sometimes by way of Hanoi, these militants integrated themselves into the political life of the capital, along with other militants such as Hu Nim (now minister of information). In 1962 the Pracheachon was hit by repression. Nong Suon, its secretary general, and thirteen other militants were arrested and sentenced to death. During the following year a large number of intellectuals and militants disappeared from Phnom Penh to aid in the reorganization of guerrilla centers. These included Ieng Sary, Son Sen, Saloth Sar, Ieng Thirith (minister of social affairs and wife of Ieng Sary), and many others. In 1967 in the province of Battambang, where the Communist tradition is strong and the concentration of land ownership more advanced than elsewhere in the country, a peasant uprising broke out. Sihanouk launched an anticommunist campaign and three deputies, Hou Youn, Hu Nim, and Khieu Samphan, in turn joined the guerrillas. From that point on, the "Khmer Rouge" guerrilla movement was to experience important advances, up to the time of the Lon Nol coup of March 18, 1970.

Thus, it is a rather homogeneous team that took the leadership of the internal resistance and rapidly won hegemony within the FUNK against the Sihanoukists. By the time the victory came, Sihanouk held no longer but a shadow of power. (3) In December 1975 the "National Congress of Representatives of the People" met. On January 5, 1976, a new constitution was promulgated, the monarchy was officially abolished, and the birth of "Democratic Kampuchea" was proclaimed. Elections to the National Assembly were held on March 20; on April 2 Sihanouk "retired," and on April 6 the government of Penn Nouth, Sihanouk's prime minister, resigned. Power was in the hands of the Angkar-Khmer Rouge.

Most probably, the abandonment of the 1935 program and the nationalist retreat of Cambodian Communism are explained by a combination of several elements: the awakening of Khmer nationalism in the course of the liberation struggle; the political trauma of Geneva in 1954 and the abandoning of the struggle by the Stalinist bureaucracy; the much more pronounced turnover in generations than in Laos or Vietnam (in spite of the maintenance of a certain continuity). In the absence of a revolutionary development in Thailand, the largest country of Southeast Asia, a close alliance with Vietnam presented certain objective dangers: 7 or 8 million Cambodians compared with 50 million Vietnamese, greater socioeconomic backwardness of Cambodia. But these dangers were less serious than those entailed for the Cambodian revolution by the forced course and autarkic retreat decided on by the leadership of the Angkar. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of the economic development of Cambodia outside the regional framework at least. The harnessing of the Mekong River, for example, can be accomplished only on the basis of an Indochinese policy tightly linked to Vietnam, Laos, and in the future, if the Thai revolution is successful, Thailand. Only such regional cooperation can permit international trade with any balance at all and can prevent the social costs of development from rising too high.



Ieng Sary (right)

### "Radical" measures

The measures taken just after the victory were radical. "The state of Kampuchea is a state of the workers, peasants, and other toilers of Kampuchea," declares Article I of the constitution. Article II states: "All the important means of production are the collective property of the people's state and the collective property of the people in common." The immediate nationalization of all the land was perhaps not the sharpest measure. Traditionally, the land had been the property of the king, who leased it on a usufruct basis for cultivation. The privatization of the land introduced by colonization was imposed only relatively. But money was abolished and the requisition of goods was carried out administratively, through distribution, and sometimes, it appears, through barter among enterprises.

The main feature of the orientation of the Khmer Rouge leadership appears in this administrative and bureaucratic organization of society. The population is organized in military fashion in the countryside in order to assure the relaunching of production. The asserted objective is the quantity of food production, "to build the most dikes possible as rapidly as possible before the rainy season. . . . Next year we will add to and fortify these dikes." (Radio Phnom Penh, January 10, 1976.) It is necessary "to cover all Kampuchea with a network of dikes and canals cutting the country at right angles so as to fill the country with a checkerboard of rice paddies." (Radio broadcast of February 21.) We must "not choose grain like rich people who want good rice but like poor people who are trying to get a lot of rice." (Broadcast of January 15.) Everything for rapid and massive production.

The initial results of the effort engaged seem rather impressive. Cambodia is naturally suited to agriculture, but it was one of the countries in Southeast Asia with the lowest productivity of labor. And food shortages, bordering on famine, prevailed just after the victory. All observers today agree in recognizing that the harvest of the end of 1975 and beginning of 1976 will be exceptional in quantity. The per capita rice ration, according to Radio Phnom Penh, has been increased to 500 grams per day (slightly more than one pound). Photo-



graphs recently taken in several regions of Cambodia depict a genuine transformation of the countryside by hydraulic works. (See, for example, Wilfred Burchett's article in the May 3-16 issue of *Afrique-Asie*.) Self-sufficiency in food seems to have been achieved and this result is far from negligible in view of the conditions into which the country had been plunged by the war. A small transformation industry has been reconstituted: various textiles, tires, bicycles, batteries, paints, glass, soap, paper, food products, cigarettes, wood cutting, cement, and small ovens are the enterprises Radio Phnom Penh has mentioned.

This productive effort implies a turnabout in mentality for a population to whom this work pace had been foreign. The change in mores also affects the family. Children go to school, often far from their villages; young boys and girls are organized into groups; marriage requests are no longer handled by parents, who no longer have anything to say about them, but by the head of the young women's group. Likewise, the former place of women in society is tending to be shaken up by the challenging of the traditional family and the reorganization of labor. Women have the right to ask men to marry them and the state radio hails equality of labor: "What men can do women can do as well." (Broadcast of February 11.)

On the administrative and social level, new structures have been established. Each level of organization seems to be directed by a triumvirate: the president, vice-president, and secretary. Ten to fifteen families form a "group" (*krom*), several groups a village (*phum*), then a canton (*khum*), the president of which holds authority on questions of repression (according to F. Ponchaud), then an arrondissement (*srock*), district (*damlan*), and finally region (*phumpheak*), of which there are eight. Cooperatives are also being set up. Their function and organization is little known. In any case, there are distribution cooperatives and labor is organized collectively. In fact, the uniform term "cooperative" seems to be replacing the old "solidarity production groups," "solidarity groups for dike construction and canal digging," and "mutual aid teams." In fact, it seems that the "group" of ten families is nominally becoming the cooperative and that the "group of cooperatives" is tending to replace the "village."

### **The omnipotence of the Angkar**

But these radical measures seem to have been taken through authoritarian displacement of population, excepting, perhaps, the population of the previously liberated zones. The bulk of the urban population has been sent to clear new land or to work sites. In the villages, the population has been organized into "three forces": The "first force" is composed of young unmarried people more than fourteen years old who can be sent away from their villages in "mobile groups"; the "second force," composed of "middle aged" couples, is assigned to work in the fields; the "third force," aged persons, takes care of the children and small-scale projects. Many

"work sites" have been set up around canal digging and dike construction. Those mentioned by the state radio include anywhere from 400-500 workers to 25,000. The intensity of the work required and the pace of successive jobs in the fields or work sites appear to be quite high.

In this context, the role of the mass organizations seems very small, if not nonexistent, and the power of the Angkar apparatus total. The elections to the National Assembly, which designated 150 peasant representatives, 50 workers and other toilers, and 50 representatives of the army, obviously had nothing to do with the reality of power. The political structure of Kampuchea is substantially different from that of Vietnam, where the mass organizations of the population have a different weight and the Communist party a different tradition. But while there has been authoritarian organization and bureaucratic constraint of the masses, there has not been, contrary to the allegations of the Western press, massive physical liquidation.

To judge notably from the "dossiers" of F. Ponchaud, "it does not seem that there were many summary executions during the first days." The group executions that were reported to have taken place, according to witnesses, were essentially directed against noncommissioned officers of the puppet army, and this in an uneven fashion according to region. The repression is said to have been most severe in the regions of Battambang-Siemreap. In other cases, the NCOs of the puppet army are said to have been arrested and grouped into prison camps. The degree of arbitrariness seems largely dependent on the quality of the local organization. One social category, that of officers and functionaries of the puppet regime and the urban elite, was hit very hard, although it is difficult today to draw a serious balance-sheet of the repression that followed the victory. But the bulk of the refugees did not flee out of terror, but because of food shortages and the intensity of labor required.

"Fear of being eliminated," François Ponchaud has written, "seems to have motivated the departure of the officers and functionaries of the old regime, but the motive most often mentioned by the other exiles is not only the extreme rigor of living and working conditions, but above all hunger and the small hope of seeing the basic situation improve in the short run." (Dossier of January 1976, p. 11.)

The famine is not the work of the Khmer Rouge. It was born in Phnom Penh under American domination. American documents estimate that 250 people were dying each day in the Cambodian capital on the eve of liberation. Washington estimated that the rupture of the aerial bridge would result in the death of tens of thousands of people during subsequent weeks. (Patrick Ruel in *Libération*, April 18, 1976.) Those responsible for the crushing bombing of Cambodia are the ones who are now waging the anticommunist campaign in the name of human values.





**CAMBODIAN VILLAGE** destroyed by U.S. bombing.

It remains true that a serious social and political gap probably opened up just after the liberation between the Khmer Rouge leadership and a part of the population. While April 17, 1975, probably meant greater well-being for the population of the previously liberated zones, it also meant exodus and deportation under very difficult conditions for the population of the newly liberated zones. Sickness and undernourishment, it seems, caused the death of many aged citizens. Under these difficult conditions of the post-victory period, the democratic organization of the population would have been indispensable in preventing a political rupture from occurring and prolonging social tensions.

The democratic organization of the masses does not exist and the Angkar seems to have developed the theory of the "guiding party" more than any other Indochinese movement. Omnipotent, the "revolutionary organization" is also elusive. Its organizational boundaries, political program, and relationships to other bodies are not clearly defined as, for example, in Vietnam. One may, it seems, assimilate the Angkar to the politico-administrative apparatus of power. There is certainly no cult of the personality and the constitution preaches the "collective principle in the method of leadership and work." But the anonymity of "the organization" does not guarantee its democratic character. And the affirmation of its guiding power goes beyond the substitutionist relations between the party and the masses that prevail in the other Indochinese countries. This was grossly expressed during the elections to the National Assembly, when the radio was able to announce: "To thank the Angkar for the honor of being allowed to elect deputies, all have resolved to press forward and develop production." (Broadcast of February 7.) "All the victories," declared Ieng Sary on April 17, 1976, "are due essentially to the far-seeing and correct leadership of our revolutionary organization." (Document of the GRUNK mission in Paris.)

Once again, in the absence of substantial and sure information, one is reduced to making hypotheses. The results obtained in one year, the existence of a movement of return to the country, illustrated by the recent declaration of 127 Cambodians, a number of them former refugees, and the qualities manifested during the liberation struggle rule out making hasty and definitive

judgments. But the very fact that the leadership of the Angkar feels neither the need to respond more amply to the ongoing campaign of denigration, nor even to more clearly define its program, orientation, and projects, provides a heavy dose of questions. It is to be feared that the anonymity with which "the organization" cloaks itself serves as a cover for the bureaucratic power of local potentates and that the tests to which a part of the population were subjected just after the liberation may lastingly remove them from the revolution. From the strict point of view of economic development, which seems to be the priority defined by the Khmer Rouge leadership, the choice of maximum production will tend to rapidly lower the growth rate, especially in view of the authoritarian organization of labor. Indeed, it requires a too considerable effort on the part of the population to be accepted for long. An optimum growth rate must take account of the real capacities of the masses for mobilization. Even the struggle against famine did not necessarily require the brutality of "setting the urban masses to production." An urgent request for aid and an international campaign of solidarity would have permitted the food crisis to have been eased in a different manner. The example of the Russian revolution and the more recent example of the Laotian revolution (after the closing of the Thai border) confirm this.

In spite of that, the Cambodian anticommunist action movements seem extremely weak and absolutely dependent on Thailand. Divided, each including several hundred members at most, they act essentially from the Thai side of the border. What could have been the only anticommunist guerrilla center of any degree of consistency, in the Cardoman chain, seems to have been extinguished. The border areas are frequently porous and sparsely populated, which allows certain journalists to write reports about "anticommunist liberated zones." But these seem to be more gathering spots for smugglers than popular centers of resistance to the new regime.

June 4, 1976

#### FOOTNOTES:

1. François Ponchaud, who lived in Cambodia for a long time, now works for "Echanges France-Asie" in the framework of "foreign missions of Paris" (Catholic). This body publishes a series of dossiers on China, Vietnam, Cambodia, etc.
2. Dossier "Echanges France-Asie," of January-May 1976 (26 rue de Babylone, 75007 Paris). The quotations from Radio Phnom Penh without specific indication of source come from this dossier. Translations of Radio Phnom Penh broadcasts, an essential source of information, can also be found in the BBC bulletin "Summary of World Broadcast."
3. On the reasons for Sihanouk's influence and the evolution of the relationship of forces within the FUNK, see "La révolution cambodgienne et le sihanoukisme," in Quatrième Internationale, May/August 1973, and INPRECOR, No. 14, November 28, 1974.





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