

International VIEWPOINT

Issue 171

October 16, 1989

£0.85; \$2; C\$2.75; 12FF

Rebirth of Ukrainian national movement



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International VIEWPOINT

A fortnightly review of news and analysis published under the auspices of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, in conjunction with the French language *Inprecor*, which appears on alternate fortnights.

All editorial and subscription correspondence should be mailed to: International Viewpoint, 2 rue Richard Lenoir, 93108 Montreuil, France. Fax: 43 79 21 06.

Published by Presse-Edition-Communication (PEC). Directeur de publication: Christian Lamotte. Commission paritaire: 64324. ISSN: 0294-2925. Imprimé par Rotographie.

International Viewpoint is catalogued by the US Alternative Press Index.

● News closing date:
October 9, 1989

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Solidarnosc government continues bureaucracy's economic program

"IF THE PRICE RISES continue, it is very likely that we will not be able to calm the workers down," Lech Walesa said on the announcement of the first steps taken by the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Calling on the new premier to speed up the reforms and on the workers to "roll up your sleeves," the Solidarnosc leader did not hide his anxiety about the possibility of a "civil war" situation developing in response to too long dragged-out austerity measures.

The program of the new government is going to run up headlong against the aspirations of the workers, who see it as a hope for a rapid improvement in their circumstances.

CYRIL SMUGA

THE BROAD COALITION government that was formed September 12 under the leadership of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, editor of Solidarnosc's weekly paper, and with a majority of ministers coming from Solidarnosc circles,¹ has aroused tremendous hope among the great majority of the Polish population. It symbolizes the crisis of the universally-hated regime rooted in Stalinism. And, in the eyes of the masses, it is the concrete confirmation of the failure of General Jaruzelski's attempt, under cover of the state of war², to "normalize" the plants.

Advance of popular self-organization

In this respect, it has reinforced the workers' confidence in their own strength, an effect that will not fail to have an impact on enrollment in Solidarnosc and the advance of popular self-organization.

A series of democratization measures announced by Mazowiecki flow from this situation. These involve, in particular, bringing the penal code and judicial procedure into line with the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights; reforming the courts; systematizing the law on assembly; eliminating the need for the press to get official permission to publish; creating the legal bases for forming political parties; and bringing forward the local and regional elections. The police are also to be put under court and social supervision, and military service is to be humanized.

In the absence of details, it is hard to say to what extent these measures correspond to the democratic aspirations expressed by Solidarnosc. One thing, however, is clear — preventive censorship will be limited, if not eliminated. The role and personnel of the political police (SB) are also to be changed, although there is no question of abolishing it. It seems, therefore, that in the area of democracy, Mazowiecki does not envisage going beyond the Round Table Accords³, unless he is forced to by mass mobilization.

The way in which the government was constituted, its makeup — in particular leaving the main levers of political power in the hands of the Communist Party (the army, police, transport and communications and the national bank) — and finally the program it announced to the parliament are in flagrant conflict with the aspirations of the people demonstrated in the June 4 elections⁴, as well as with the program of Solidarnosc's first (and only) congress.

Wave of strikes across country

This is an attempt by the only institution enjoying popular legitimacy (the bureaucratized leadership of Solidarnosc) to hold back an intense popular mobilization, marked in particular by a wave of strikes across the country in June, July and August.

The task assigned to the new govern-

ment by General-President Jaruzelski, and which it has accepted, is to pursue the policy of submitting the Polish economy to the demands of the capitalist financial institutions, first of all to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Presenting his government to parliament, which elected it by 402 votes against 13 abstentions, Mazowiecki formulated the credo of his policy in particular in the economic and social areas. It has to be noted that the differences with the practice of his predecessor, Mieczyslaw Rakowski are minimal. (See box.)

Mazowiecki is for "eliminating administrative control of prices save in absolutely exceptional cases, increasing discipline in paying taxes" for the enterprises and "continuing the reduction of subsidies" to them, as well as "limiting investments financed by the central budget" and "restricting credit facilities." What is more, "we will be forced to strictly impose tax penalties on enterprises that spend in contradiction to the rules."⁵

Severe sanctions imposed on enterprises

These tax penalties were introduced under cover of the state of war. They impose very severe sanctions on enterprises that increase their payrolls over an arbitrarily set ceiling. This tax brought virtual bankruptcy for all the enterprises whose average wage level in 1982 was lower than that of the neighboring plants, since their workers migrated en masse to the plants where the wage level was higher. It has the special feature, moreover, that it applies only to state industry, thereby

1. Of 23 ministers, 12 are close to the Civic Parliamentary Group (OKP, the Solidarnosc parliamentary fraction). Four are members of the United Peasant Party (ZSL, formed as a result of the war waged by Stalinist cadres for control of the peasantry), three are from the Democratic Party (SD, formed as a result of the war waged by Stalinist cadres for control of the urban petty bourgeoisie), four are from the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP, the Communist Party). In addition, the director of the National Bank, a member of the PUWP, is an ex officio member of the Council of Ministers.

2. See *International Viewpoint*, No. 169, September 18, 1989.

3. On the round table, see the articles in *IV*, Nos. 159 and 163, March 20, 1989; May 15, 1989.

4. See *IV*, No. 166, June 26, 1989.

5. This quotation and the following are taken from the Polish government daily, *Rzeczpospolita*, September 13, 1989.

allowing private companies to enjoy considerable tax privileges.

Until recently, not only Solidarnosc but almost all the self-management councils fought against this iniquitous tax, which has also been criticized by most Polish economists. The announcement that it will be maintained is thus a token of continuity.

The sum of these measures can only lead to bankruptcy for many enterprises, regardless of their potential for recovery. Mazowiecki is well aware of this, and thus warned about "the failure of some enterprises

and the unemployment that will flow from this." He even went further: "This can lead to a temporary drop in production and, consequently, to a new decline in the standard of living of the society."

With regard to social protection measures, he upset the idyllic image of the life of the unemployed that some of the Solidarnosc leadership's

ideologues have helped create: "We will also introduce various elements of social protection for those who lose their jobs. People should be aware, however, that all this depends on the budget, and cannot therefore exceed the limitations set with the fundamental aim of fighting inflation. This aid will, therefore, be limited."


Transition to modern market economy

As far as structural changes in the economy go, the new premier has announced that "the government will take measures to start the transition to a modern market economy of the type existing in the developed countries...The fundamental principle will be public and open sale to all citizens and institutions interested in economic efficiency. There will also be a place for all other sorts of economically efficient ownership....The legal foundation will have to be established for a stock market....It is likewise necessary to remove the obstacles to creating new private banks."

Incomes policy will be subordinated to this option. The new individual income tax will be progressive "but its progres-

siveness will not be in conflict with the main goal of awakening the immense potential of human initiative and the spirit of enterprise that is lying dormant in our society."

The peasants, who mobilized en masse in the preceding months against the policy of low wholesale prices and high retail prices for agricultural produce, will not be spared. Mazowiecki stressed "the need for developing nonagricultural industries in the countryside so as to create conditions for providing jobs and decent lives for persons who have been working up



until now on uneconomically small farms." This is hardly a small matter when you consider that this category includes a third of the Polish peasantry.

In order to carry through this program, Mazowiecki, like his predecessors, hopes to get foreign aid. And he set the terms for this: "We are not asking for disinterested aid but for investments of capital and technology profitable for everyone." He also stressed: "We are aware that getting such aid is conditional on carrying through the present implacable program" presented in his speech to the parliament. He indicated that it was inspired by the IMF, the US State Department, the Summit of the Seven Industrialized Nations, and the like.

In the statements of the Solidarnosc leaders and the new ministers, we hear a refrain that the reforms cannot be carried through without the assent of the society. But Tadeusz Mazowiecki has maintained a prudent silence about how such consent is to be verified. Basing himself on the undeniable hope that his government has aroused and on the sympathy he enjoys among the workers, he has preferred to stress that "the conditions exist today for overcoming the traditional conflict

between the good of the nation and the interest of the state." This was immediately echoed by Lech Walesa: "For the first time in a half a century, Poland has a government that millions of people can consider their own."⁶

However, this sort of rhetoric cannot cover up the innumerable pitfalls along the road of implementing this program. With regard to democratic reforms, the new government will have to take account of the resistance of the state apparatus, which it does not contemplate changing.

This situation was quite well summed up by *Polityka* (the weekly paper of the Communist Party's liberal wing) in bold type on its front page: "Your premier, our apparatus." The author of the article under this headline revealed, moreover, that the *nomenklatura* reached its peak in the mid-1980s. It included 270,000 posts to which appointment had to be approved in principle by the Communist Party or the three parties of the official coalition and in practice

by the officer caste! It was only in the fall of 1988, when a firm grip was regained on the apparatus after the crisis of 1980-1981, that the list of such appointments was reduced by four fifths.⁷

What *Polityka* did not say is that, in the meantime, other mechanisms for control by, and protection of, the apparatus have been put in place not directly linked to the crumbling superstructure of the Communist Party. The recent setting up a virtual shadow government around President Jaruzelski, among other things, should make it possible to maintain control.

Economic situation disastrous

In the economy, the situation is disastrous. "For the first time since 1982, we are seeing a rapid fall of production...In August, prices increased by 50%, and the economists predict a 40% rise for September. If this lasts a year, we will have an inflation rate of more than 4,000 per cent.

6. Statement published in *Rzeczpospolita*, September 13, 1989.

7. *Polityka*, No. 35, September 2, 1989.

8. Mazowiecki's speech to parliament, *op. cit.*

Rakowski explains economic policies

In early July, the outgoing government of Mieczyslaw Rakowski responded to criticism of its price rises by opposition spokesman Jacek Kuron by summing up the economic reform measures it had taken. This statement illustrates the continuity between the economic policy of Rakowski and the new government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

"Total freedom to undertake and conduct economic activity. Equality of the different sectors as regards employment, taxes and access to bank credits and the means of production. This model leads to freedom of prices and wages.

"Unification of the conditions for all forms of enterprises, including foreign ones.

Freedom to transfer profits into foreign currencies; the possibility for foreigners to head companies; freedom to buy and sell products at the market prices.

"The possibility to create a currency market; freedom of circulation of foreign currencies; a guarantee of holdings of foreign currency; the

possibility for individuals to buy and sell foreign currency.

"The possibility to create new banks, based on the principle of competition on the market.

"The division of the assets of enterprises between a treasury share that will form the basic capital and a fund of the self-financed enterprises, which will favor the gradual development of a capital market.

"A fund for developing the market that will promote competition in trade.

"A free market in fuel and a part of the means of transport (elimination of coupons for buying gasoline and automobiles).

"The possibility of renting or using state assets by private companies and persons engaged in economic activity based on the principles of the market.

"Freedom in ordering, buying and transforming agricultural products, preparing the way for free sale of all foodstuffs."

Rzeczpospolita, July 7, 1989.

That would mean that a roll would cost not 40 zlotys but 1,600."⁸

When Tadeusz Mazowiecki said this to the parliament, not only did rolls already cost more than 100 zlotys (and not 40) but the estimates for inflation in September had already been exceeded. Far from taking a jump and then stabilizing at a point of equilibrium between supply and effective demand, as both the Solidarnosc and Communist experts claimed they would, the prices freed by the outgoing government of Mieczyslaw Rakowski on August 1 have continued their frantic rise.

Dollar becomes hedge against inflation

Western currencies, whose inflated free-market exchange rates have up until now been based on the existence of heavily patronized dollar-stores, have become hedges against inflation. The dollar rate has gone up to one per 14,000 zlotys, and according to Mazowiecki, unless something changes, it will reach 44,000 zlotys in a year from now. But it is symbolic of the country's economic disorder that even the upward course of the dollar is far from stable. All that needs to happen is for a shipment of scarce goods (or those that can be stocked as a standard of value) to arrive, and the level of the dollar can plummet overnight. For example, on September 11, the dollar fell to 9,000 zlotys after a limited company issued several thousand shares of stock quoted in zlotys. The National Bank was not able to provide

the currency.

The inflation is also complicating trading relationships between the country and the cities. In a year, the price of piglets has multiplied by 20, which has upset all the calculations of the pig raisers. A Polish journalist quoted a farmer on this... "Two days ago, I sold a 120-kilo pig for 200,000 zlotys, and I wanted to buy two piglets. It seems that they will cost me 250,000 zlotys, but then I would have no more money for fodder to raise them." The immediate result is a dangerous drop in the number of young pigs being raised, and the shortage of pork will be still graver in the winter.

"The farmers lack circulating capital. Inflation is gobbling up everything."⁹ As regards the rest of agricultural production, there is already talk of hoarding by farmers. They are selling off their products very slowly, or else rushing to put their income in dollars, which is the only way to preserve its value.

Strikes are resuming at a fast clip. At the moment, these are not large-scale mobilizations or spectacular strikes hitting big plants, where the wage increases won in July and August have not yet been wiped out by inflation (but this will only be a matter of weeks). Elsewhere, the hope that the new government will use its power to bring a rapid halt to runaway prices is widespread.¹⁰

In these conditions, implementation of the measures announced by Mazowiecki will run into resistance from the workers. The Solidarnosc leaders are aware of this,

and now reject the idea of a "moratorium on strikes" (an idea that Lech Walesa launched at the end of August, before being disavowed by several regional leaders in his team). They limit themselves to hoping, like Lech Walesa, that the new government "will effectively transform our country, that it will win the social support essential for its work, that it will prove to be a government that measures up to our common aspirations and which can take advantage of the opportunities opening up for Poland."

This statement came after Walesa said that he would "undertake every possible action to help the government to accomplish its difficult task," while stressing that the union he leads "is concerned about living standards today and tomorrow."¹¹

This does not at all mean that the Solidarnosc leadership is prepared, even partially, to oppose the measures announced by Tadeusz Mazowiecki. They have been part of the union's program since 1985, and in this respect, they consciously broke with the program adopted at the union's first congress in August 1981. However, they will be sensitive to pressure from the ranks, especially as the new congress scheduled for the beginning of next year approaches.

In fact, unlike General Jaruzelski's team and its trade-union appendages (the OPZZ), the Walesa leadership of Solidarnosc draws its strength from the organization of the working people. It can hold back or divert mobilization, but it cannot break it without sawing off the branch that it is sitting on.

Given the de facto wage freeze and high cost of living, workers' mobilizations may occur in the coming months and cause differences and fractures inside Solidarnosc. Over recent years, the political evolution of the union leadership has been one of an apparatus largely independent of a base reduced to silence by state repression. The bureaucratization process has thus been able to advance without provoking a major crisis. But rebuilding a legal union is changing this situation.

The crisis that appeared within the group of historic leaders of the union a year ago, with the formation of the Working Group of members of the National Commission, which opposed the team around Lech Walesa head on, got a limited response in the country because this was largely a battle of chiefs without Indians. Today, it may re-erupt, although in a different form, in response to the threat that Tadeusz Mazowiecki's projects represent to the workers' dignity and standard of living. ★

9. Jozef Kusmierik in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, No. 92, September 14, 1989.

10. On this subject, see the discussion with Solidarnosc leaders at the POLAR plant in Wroclaw, p. 20.

11. *Rzeczpospolita*, September 13, 1989.

Union activists discuss Mazowiecki government

WHAT IS the attitude of Solidarnosc's rank-and-file union activists to the new government? What do they expect from Tadeusz Mazowiecki? What immediate steps do they propose?

On September 13, in the wake of the formation of the new government, *International Viewpoint* put these questions to members of the Presiding Committee of the Solidarnosc local in the POLAR enterprise in Wroclaw — Malgorzata Calinska, Zygmunt Klatka and Ryszard Chaszczewicz, union full-timers in the enterprise.

CYRIL SMUGA

“SOME PEOPLE criticize the Walesa group. But who else was able to take advantage of the social pressure to arrive at a situation where everyone, including the critics, can express themselves freely? Who has opened the way for the legal rebirth of Solidarnosc? Who has enabled us to get the power that we have today? It is Lech Walesa. On the other hand, those who criticize him fostered distrust and thereby undermined the relationship of forces favoring us. You can't change everything at one stroke, by decree, it takes time,” they said.

With 8,000 employees, of whom 4,900 are concentrated in Wroclaw, POLAR, Poland's main producer of refrigerators, freezers and washing machines, is one of the country's major enterprises. Some 40% of its workforce belongs to Solidarnosc, and 8% to the official union confederation, the OPZZ. The Self-Management Council, dominated by Solidarnosc activists, has just appointed a new director, who is not a member of the Communist Party, to replace the old one, who was forced out after he tried unsuccessfully to use his position to gain the chairmanship of a limited company that was to be based on the enterprise.

Like many other Polish enterprises, POLAR is in bad shape. Some 60% of its machinery is obsolete and worn out. The structure of its workforce is typical of bureaucratic management. Out of the 4,900 wage earners in Wroclaw, 3,150 are workers (of whom 1,700 are directly involved in production and paid on a piece-work system). About 900 perform various supervisory functions, and 930 work in the offices. The average wage in

August was 173,000 zlotys, to which you have to add 50,000 zlotys in bonuses and 15,000 to 17,000 zlotys compensation for inflation.

With around 240,000 zlotys at the beginning of September, the average worker at POLAR had little chance of feeding her or his family up until the end of the month. According to the calculations published in *Tygodnik Solidarnosc* (No. 15, September 8, 1989), based on August 20 prices, the minimum cost of food alone for a month for a family of four was 281,120 zlotys. Since then, prices have continued to climb. So, there was nothing surprising in the statement by Zygmunt Klatka, a member of the presiding committee of Solidarnosc in the enter-



prise, that “between May 1 and August 1 this year, the enterprise lost 600 workers, who left to look for better paying jobs.”

Along with those at the Hutmen and Hydral factories, the Solidarnosc local in POLAR is one of the union's strongest and most dynamic branches in Wroclaw. The level of trade-union membership there far exceeds the regional average. Malgorzata Calinska, chair of POLAR Solidarnosc, saw this as the result of “the effective work of the underground union after 1981, of a continuity never broken by the repression,” and also of “the work of the Self-Management Council — one of the most active in Poland — most of whose members have come from the underground Solidarnosc.”

“Better service to the rank and file”

The Solidarnosc leaders in the enterprise have been concerned primarily about strengthening the union: “Here we are strong and they have to reckon with us. But in the small enterprises there have even been cases where the management has formed a union with its own people. The union will be strong when it exists everywhere. For that reason, a few days ago, we issued a statement calling the regional and national organizations to order, demanding that they respond more rapidly to the workers' day-to-day problems and that they use their press better to inform union members of their rights. For example, we learned [from the government press] of the existence of a decree that permits every union local, once it has 150 members, to have a full-timer only a month after it was adopted. This testifies to the weakness of the coordinating structures, which should offer better service to the rank and file.”

This critical attitude originated in response to the positions taken by the opposition elites after the June elections: “We protested to the deputies of the Civic Parliament Group [OKP] after Kiszczak's election as premier. Already the election of Jaruzelski as president did not go down well, and we felt obliged to speak out against these compromises that went too far. We had to remind them who elected them. That was a universal demand from the workers. The workers' reactions were clear. They went after us, not the deputies, because we were the ones who called on them to vote for those deputies. Some Solidarnosc members even handed in their cards, although fortunately this was not the general attitude.”

The galloping inflation is the workers' biggest concern. The unionists in the enterprises do not understand their leadership's timid attitude toward this. Zygmunt Klatka said: “The regional and national leaderships should react to the price rises, or at least explain in their press what the situation is. Since the Round Table, Lech Walesa has not taken any position on this.

Crisis reaches Police forces

IN 1980-81, the Polish police did not manage, despite attempts in May-June 1981, to form an independent union. And those who tried it were very quickly fired, without any reaction from Solidarnosc. Now they are determined not to miss the chance offered by the liberalization.

In Piekary Slaskie, in Upper Silesia, on September 7, in an open letter to the new premier, 54 policemen demanded that the police be separated from the Security Service (SB, political police), that the political department and nomenclatura system be abolished in the police force, that the posts transferred since 1975 to the SB be restored to the police force, and that the riot police detachments (ZOMO) be reorganized.

Declaring that they "want to be a state and not a party police force," they announced that they have left the Communist Party. Finally, they raised the following demands:

- Total depoliticization of the police force, enabling persons of various opinions and religions to work in the profession.

- Setting up of a system of judicial protection for police-

men and formation of an independent police union.

- A possibility for rehiring policemen fired because of their opinions.

- The possibility of getting a passport valid for travel to all countries in the world.

On September 15, *Gazeta*, the Solidarnosc daily, published a second open letter addressed this time to the minister of the interior and deputy premier, Czeslaw Kiszczak (a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party), in which 70 policemen in Piekary Slaskie announced that their decision to leave the Communist Party was inspired by his declared intention to "depoliticize the Ministry of the Interior."

However ambiguous some of the policemen's demands may be, their demand to be able to form their own union testifies to the onset of a crisis in the repressive apparatus, a crisis whose first symptoms appeared already at the June legislative elections, in which the Solidarnosc candidates got a not insignificant number of votes in the polling stations reserved for the army and the police. This demand deserves support from Solidarnosc. ★

On the other hand, every day the TV news interviews Martyniuk of the OPZZ, who has no qualms about demanding a cost-of-living bonus of 40,000 zlotys instead of the 15,000 granted now. This does not fail to make an impact."

Malgorzata Calinska said: "Now, food prices are being marked up twice a week, by dozens of percent. So, the 15,000 zlotys don't solve anything."

"Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government is our government," Zygmunt Klatka said. The Solidarnosc leaders at POLAR consider that it is a "transitional government," and that its composition should reflect that. "People are not worried about who takes what ministerial portfolio. What is important is that Mazowiecki heads it. I know people who cried with joy when they learned of that. Mazowiecki has become the focus of immense hope, even if everyone knows that he has inherited a very difficult situation.

Demand for automatic cost-of-living bonus

"People are expecting first of all that he will make quick decisions about the soaring prices and the daily increases in the cost of food. In the resolution we addressed to the regional and national leaderships of Solidarnosc, we demanded that the government offer honest and serious compensation for rising prices by an automatic cost-of-living bonus — not 17,000 zlotys, when the OPZZ is demanding 40,000, and when in fact it may turn out tomorrow that the proper sum will be 70,000 or even 120,000 zlotys.

"If this government decides that the cost-of-living bonus should be so much, and that the sum will vary according to the evolution of prices, then the pressure for higher wages would stop by itself. Moreover, the government needs to do something to stop these rising prices, for example, by cutting out the middlemen. If this is not done, people are going to get the idea that our government has some-

thing to gain from these frenetic price rises, so that it can stop them later when they are already very high and thereby score an easy success. Already some people are beginning to suggest such things."

Eliminating bureaucratic red tape

While they hope that the new government will manage quickly to stop rising prices and compensate for them by a general cost-of-living bonus, the POLAR unionists are nonetheless aware that the real key to improving the economic situation lies in reorganizing production, so that it can be increased and costs reduced:

"In the first place, the tax problem has to be straightened out throughout the country, so that the enterprises can function. The union organizations and self-management councils have to organize a transfer of wage-earners to production. This has to be accompanied by wage increases for those who leave the offices for the production lines, so that they will immediately see the gain from such reorganization. This means eliminating red tape.

"For example, in production all the workers get work cards for every task. So, before starting my job I have to wait for an inspector to decide how much time I should spend for each task. Then the technician prepares a card for the worker to fill in. Then, I have to take the card to the foreman, who then transmits it to his chief, who gives it to the accountants. Sometimes I can have up to 50 cards like this in a workday, and at the end of the month it takes an army of clerks to calculate my wages.

"If this elaborate inspection were done away with, every worker would gain time for production, and at least a hundred people occupied with doing these useless checks could be transferred to the production lines [where there is a shortage of personnel]. This is only one example. Any number could be cited. Throughout

the country, by changing the organization of work, immense labor forces could be freed up through getting rid of this bureaucracy. On a nationwide basis, there are too many departments, too many useless rungs, too much apparatus. In this area, the territorial self-management bodies will have their work cut out for them."

The shortage of some daily consumption items — especially cigarettes — cannot be explained, the POLAR leaders said, by the disorganization of production. They echoed suspicions often heard in the store lines: "We are afraid that a lot of goods have been hidden in the stores, like in 1981, and that the Rakowski government, which continued to run the country two months after it resigned, deliberately had goods put into storage in order to aggravate the situation."

"Today, we need to re-unify Solidarnosc"

When I asked them about the possibilities for developing trade-union and social monitoring of distribution, which had started in 1981, they remained skeptical. Zygmunt Klatka said: "Today, we are in another stage of changes. Today, such monitoring should be done by our government, by our deputies and senators. The level of consciousness is higher today. People know that they have given a mandate to someone to do all that. On the other hand, at the rank-and-file level, our main task is to rebuild the trade-union structures, so that they can include at least 50% to 60% of the working people.

"In this work, we need unity in the union and to put an end to the quarrels between the radicals and the moderates, between the old and new leaders, because these divisions are maintaining distrust of the union as a whole and keeping people from joining.

"Today, we need to re-unify Solidarnosc and the upcoming congress of the union, which should be held soon, will certainly do so." ★

Declaration of the Wroclaw Regional Workers' Committee of the Polish Socialist Party-Democratic Revolution

THE NOMINATION of Tadeusz Mazowiecki for the post of prime minister of the Polish People's Republic is an expression of the deepening crisis of the nomenklatura's system of domination. This result of social emancipation has its origins in the birth of Solidarnosc — a workers' movement independent of the bureaucracy — in August 1980. Eight years of attempts by General Jaruzelski's regime to try and crush the self-organized society have ended in failure.

The establishment of Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government, however, does not mean that the society has taken power. This government is based on "35% democracy" and on a guarantee that the foundations of the system will not be questioned, in spite of the fact that the electorate came out clearly on June 4, 1989 for the liquidation of the nomenklatura. The main ruling structures — the office of the president of the republic, the ministries of the interior and of defence and the national bank — not only escape any control by the society, but even by the prime minister. By accepting such conditions the leading opposition groups, represented by the new prime minister, have not made the most of the pressure of the strikes and the bankruptcy of the PUWP. Nevertheless, the establishment of this government opens up the possibility of realizing social aspirations:

I. Getting rid of all the vestiges of the totalitarian regimes

● *Abolishing the mechanisms of the state's domination over the society*, and primarily the dissolution of the SB (political police), the ZOMO (anti-riot police) and the ORMO (auxiliary police), as well as revising the penal code with the objective of guaranteeing democratic freedoms. This also implies suppressing the privileged status of the PUWP and of all the groups linked to it, such as SD (Democratic Party), ZSL (United People's Party), ZSMP (Union of Polish Socialist Youth), ZSP (Union of Polish Students) and so on, and guaranteeing that everyone fulfilling leadership functions in both the

administration and in the economy should be elected. Finally, the subjection of territorial administration to the structures of self-management elected in free, equal, secret, proportional and direct elections.

● *Guaranteeing freedom of political and social activity*; that is the unlimited right to strike and to set up unions, likewise in the police and the army (including among conscripts).

This is in accord with the second and seventh of the 21 demands put forward by the Gdansk inter-enterprise strike committee in 1980, for "a guarantee of the security of strikers and those who support them" and for "all strikers to be paid for strike days in relation to the rates for paid leave". The activity of political parties, who constitute the basis of modern democracy and the condition for the society to be the subject of history, cannot be limited by law.

● *Guaranteeing total freedom of the press and of information* by abolishing censorship and ending the material and judicial guarantees of the monopolies in these areas, and in particular sharing out the material means disposed of by RSW "Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch" among all the political, social and cultural groups. Putting radio and television under the control of representative bodies at the corresponding levels, and guaranteeing access to them by all political and social groups.

II. Submitting the economy to social needs

The aim of economic policy on the eve of the 21st century must be to guarantee decent living conditions, that is, at least the right to healthy and sufficient food, to decent housing, to health care, to social services accessible to everyone (creches and nurseries, for example), as well as to education and culture to all members of the society.

Putting the economy under the direct

control of the producers is the indispensable condition for realizing these goals. Only such a model of social life can guarantee to each human being the possibility of realizing their aspirations and constitute the basis for the

emancipation of the society.

Up until the last moment, Mieczyslaw Rakowski's government — following the path of its predecessors and acting in the optic of *faits accomplis* — has resolutely oriented the Polish economy in the opposite direction. It widened the possibilities for private appropriation by the nomenklatura and for the development of speculative-corrupt capital, and created conditions for the sale of the national means of production to foreign capital. In addition, it allowed an unlimited rise in prices for consumer goods by introducing market mechanisms in a situation of grave food shortage. Having done this, it continued the process of linking the whole of the bureaucratic economy with market mechanisms, thus worsening the material situation of the majority of the society.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government has to break radically with its predecessor's policy.

III. Link up the plan, self-management and the market

It is necessary to understand that the fate of the economy rests in the first instance in the collective hands of the workers themselves. Only self-organization and workers' initiative can break the resistance of the old party-state apparatus and lead to a situation in which the new government could make economic changes beneficial to the majority.

As stipulated in the first point of Solidarnosc's programme, adopted at its first national congress in 1981: "We demand the introduction of a self-management and democratic reform at all levels of management, of a new social-economic order that will link up the plan, self-management and the market... The basis of the economy must be the social enterprise, managed by the workers' collective represented by their Council and led from day-to-day by a director, appointed after a competition

by the Council and recallable by it....The reform must socialize planning."

The realization of such a reform demands the setting up of social control over production exercised by self-managing councils of workers, agricultural workers and artisans organized in self-managing chambers regionally and nationally. Conditions for such control are the following:

- Guaranteeing the same possibilities for action to self-management councils, to unions and to other workers' agents in all the sectors of ownership, and the unification of the legal system in relation to production, jobs, trade and wages and working conditions.

- Transforming work relations in the workplace, in the sense of liberating work, in particular by radically limiting the number of supervisors and administrators and ensuring that these posts are elective.

- Opening the books. Workers' control over the means and goals of production is an indispensable step on the road towards the society taking total responsibility for economic management. The verification of production and cooperative links by self-management councils and the self-management chambers (reports on the state of the enterprises and on the economy as a whole) would permit a democratic national discussion on the principles of centralizing the allocation of the economic surplus in a way that could increasingly guarantee the satisfaction of the needs expressed by the society. Although the use of market mechanisms in distribution cannot be abolished, insofar as economic development cannot ensure the total satisfaction of needs for different products, in conditions of serious shortage the decision to use market mechanisms must be subject to the choices of a society conscious of its needs.

IV. Workers' self-defence in the face of the effects of the crisis

The gravity of the economic crisis means that the workers' collectives should immediately undertake acts of self-defence.

Workers' control of prices

The regional structures of Solidarnosc, notably in cooperation with the union commissions in trade and the service sector, should ensure that rises in the cost of living are calculated and published every week. On this basis, a weekly cost-of-living bonus should be established. The government must take measures to block price rises.

Social control over food distribution

Following on from Point 7 in the Solidarnosc programme adopted by its first national congress in 1981, in conditions of serious food shortages the rank-and-file structures of Solidarnosc must take the initiative in creating workers' commissions on the market and food supplies, coordinated nationally and cooperating with Solidarnosc' links with individual farmers. Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government should give such commissions the absolute right of control over all the shops selling consumer goods, including those shops under the control of the ministries of the interior and of defence.

Revalorizing labour

Previous governments have undertaken the process of aligning prices in the internal market to the level of the world market. Labour costs have been drastically reduced as a proportion of total production costs. Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government, in agreement with Solidarnosc, must undertake a radical reform of the wage system, and above all increase wages in relation to total costs up to the average world level.

Guaranteeing the right to work

As Point 9 of Solidarnosc's programme adopted by the first delegate congress in 1981 puts it: "We declare ourselves for the general right to work and against unemployment....In workplaces where reductions are foreseen, the union commissions must envisage the possibility of changing job descriptions or reducing working hours without loss of wages." Like the unions in Western Europe, we demand a 35-hour working week.

Denouncing the debt

As the new prime minister correctly remarked in his speech before the Diet [Polish parliament]: "the economy has been strangled by the foreign debt". Since 1971, \$49 billion in loans have been taken on. \$44bn have been repaid, but a debt of \$39bn remains even so.

The society cannot be responsible for debts contracted either by the nomenklatura or because of the waste caused by its rule.

Regaining economic and political sovereignty

1. Rejecting the IMF's conditions, the implementation of which would certainly lead to a drastic reduction in living standards and to the submission of Polish economic policy to foreign capital.

2. Revising the military and economic accords which, for Poland, derive from its membership of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon.

V. The self-managed republic


In line with Solidarnosc's programme adopted at its first congress in 1981, "we want real socialization of the system of management and of the economy. This is why we are working towards a self-managed Poland".

Free elections to a Constituent Assembly

The basic law must be the expression of a conscious and free choice by the society. The new government must organize free, equal, proportional, direct and secret elections to the Constituent [Assembly], in particular ensuring that all the candidates have the same material conditions for their electoral campaigns.

The question of power

The road towards the self-managed republic implies the total abolition of the nomenklatura's power. This task can only be fulfilled by the self-organized workers' movement, enriched by its experience under martial law and clandestine activity, struggling for workplace, regional and state power. ★



The meaning of the Tela accords

THE AGREEMENT reached in the Honduran Caribbean port of Tela, contains the following points:

1 — Effective implementation of the Esquipulas accords, which forbid a government to have troops on its territory intended to destabilize a neighbouring government — obviously applicable to Honduras.

2 — Reassertion of the need to implement the plan to demobilize the Contras. This plan was adopted in February 1989, and was to be carried out in 90 days, but it was torpedoed by the US Congress in March 1989.

3 — calls on the United Nations to create an international peace-keeping force to assist in the demobilization of the Contras and guard the frontier between Nicaragua and Honduras to prevent any new infiltration.

International legal case suspended

The Nicaraguan president made some limited concessions to obtain these decisions:

- The conditional and provisional suspension of the case brought by Nicaragua against Honduras at the International Court of Justice in The Hague for non-implementation of the Esquipulas accords. The case was certain to end with a judgement against Honduras. The Sandinistas are keeping their case in reserve to use as a bargaining counter without dropping it altogether.

- An appeal by the Nicaraguan, Honduran, Costa Rican and Guatemalan presidents addressed to the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Salvadoran government. The appeal calls on the FMLN to "engage in a constructive dialogue in order to obtain a just and durable peace." Symmetrically, the presidents "urge the Salvadoran government to engage in a dialogue to re-integrate the members of the FMLN in peaceful life."

The concession made here is limited; since the coming into office of the Alliance for National Renewal (ARENA) government the FMLN itself has demanded the opening of a "constructive dialogue." On August 7, 1989 the commanding general of the FMLN greeted the Tela accords in the following terms: "They constitute a victory for the revolutionary, progressive, independentist and democratic forces of the region, and we applaud them for this reason....Despite the fact that the government and armed forces put forward the thesis of a symme-

THE FIVE Central American presidents assembled once again on August 5-7, 1989 to try to escape from the impasse of their previous accords, Esquipulas I and II and Costa del Sol (see article by G. Buster in IV 167).

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try [between the Contras and the FMLN], their arguments were not taken into account....

"The FMLN reaffirms its desire to continue to contribute, along with the political parties, the Archbishop of San Salvador and other social forces to the realization of a dialogue and negotiations with the government....[according to the accords] it is clear that the FMLN is an indigenous force with good reasons for waging war and with whom it is necessary to negotiate peace. Nobody can demobilize the FMLN, because it exists inside the country and is a national force..."

In order to assess these accords, it is necessary to recall what Bush was expecting from the four presidents opposed to Nicaragua. They were meant to declare that Nicaragua had not implemented the Esquipulas and Costa del Sol accords, and had thus shown itself to be an authoritarian dictatorship.

This would have justified both the continuation of US aid to the Contras until the Nicaraguan elections of February 1990 and the failure of Honduras to apply the February 1989 accord. Furthermore, the United States expected the governments of Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica to join with Salvador's Cristiani and put the FMLN in the same bracket as the Contra.

Bush administration's failure recognized

The Bush administration has failed miserably to get its way on these questions, and this has been recognized by various American commentators. Thus, the *New York Times* wrote on August 8, 1989: "The importance of this accord is that, for the first time, it sets a date for the departure of the so-called Contra rebels, with the unanimous agreement of the region's leaders. Among the signato-

ries of the accord is Honduras' Azcona, whose country is the base for 6,000 to 10,000 Contras.

"The accord, reached in the face of stiff US opposition calls on the Contras to lay down their weapons voluntarily....The five presidents rejected a proposal by President Cristiani of Salvador that the dismantling of the Contras should be tied to a similar commitment to the disarmament of the leftist guerillas in Salvador....Many people see this accord as an important diplomatic victory for the Nicaraguans."

Throughout the negotiations, Bush put constant pressure on the four presidents opposed to the Sandinistas. The special correspondent of the Mexican daily, *Excelsior*, wrote on August 7, 1989: "The pressure reached its height during the final night....there was a danger that the summit would come to nothing and changes were made to the final texts of the resolutions."

US Congress blocks aid to Honduras

The five presidents had originally agreed to a limit of 45 days for the disbanding of the Contras, but this was eliminated from the final version [and replaced by a limit of 90 days]"

The failure of the Bush administration is clearly not final. US imperialism retains important means of pressure for torpedoing the accord and will certainly use them. Thus, on August 16, Bush froze half of the aid voted by Congress to Honduras (\$90m were blocked). A few days previously, Honduras had deployed its troops around the Contras' camps....

The regimes in power in Costa Rica and Guatemala are essentially allies of the United States, but this does not mean that they are inclined to do whatever Washington tells them. In recent years, they have adopted an attitude of "active neutrality", as the Guatemalan president put it.

He refused to enter into the binding alliance with Honduras and Salvador urged by the US after 1984. Costa Rica, meanwhile, expelled the Contras' armed forces from its territory in 1986 and 1987. Both these countries, whose bourgeoisies are the strongest in the region, aspire to play a leading role in Central America, which leads them to adopt a certain autonomy vis-à-vis Washington.

The presidents of Costa Rica and Guatemala, Arias and Cerezo, are virulently anti-Sandinista, but they do not want to support an attempt to crush Nicaragua

militarily, since this would increase US control in the region and the internal tensions stimulated by a prolonged resistance by the Nicaraguan people.

This resistance would sharpen the internal social contradictions in Guatemala and Costa Rica at a time when the Guatemalan guerilla movement is regaining strength and the popular movements in the two countries have undergone a significant revival.

A few days before the signing of the accords, Arias was faced with a general strike, while in July, Cerezo had to deal with a massive teachers' and civil servants' strike. It is developments such as these throughout the region, combined with the social entrenchment of the Sandinista regime, that makes Arias and Cerezo take their distance from the United States.

The defeat of Salvador's Cristiani at Tela was clear-cut. The FMLN has been undertaking a high level of military activity for over a year and shows no signs of slackening. Its ability to operate in the cities seems to be on the increase. However, there are no signs of an insurrectional situation.

The relationship of forces has not changed decisively in

favour of the revolution, and the Soviet Union has used this to try to convince the FMLN to reach a negotiated settlement.

However, the latter has shown considerable independence from Moscow. The dialogue between the FMLN and the government which began on September 12 in Mexico, can by no means be considered as a sign of softening by the FMLN. This dialogue is a sign above all of the weakness of the Cristiani government.

The Sandinistas made very careful preparations for the Tela summit. They wanted to avoid giving the four neighbouring presidents any excuse for questioning the legitimacy of the electoral process underway. Any such questioning would strengthen the international campaign being undertaken under US auspices to present the elections as a "chronicle of a fraud foretold."

This would be a new obstacle to the application of the plan to demobilize the Contras. Ortega had one trump card in his hand when he arrived: a few days previously the Sandinistas had arrived at an agreement on the electoral laws with almost all the opposition parties.

The Tela accords are a victory for the Sandinistas, since, even if the Contras are not totally disarmed by the set date

(December 1989), they will still have lost all their legitimacy in the region and at the international level.

This will be an important argument in the elections. To obtain this, the Sandinistas have had to make concessions to the right-wing opposition, to the Church and to the employers in spite of the fact that concessions had been made during previous negotiations. Most of the concessions took place in two stages.

The first, in September 1987, involved the reopening of the daily paper *La Prensa* and the Catholic Radio, and the adoption of the reactionary Archbishop Obado y Bravo as a mediator. The second stage was in February 1989, when the calling of the February 1990 elections was

Western European countries after Ortega's European tour in April.

To win the elections, the Sandinistas have decided that their candidates will appeal directly to the masses. There are several thousand candidates, since presidential, legislative and municipal elections are taking place at the same time. The selection process is very open. Each Sandinista organization discusses extensively the candidates that they are putting forward, as well as those put forward by other Sandinista organizations. Every candidate then has to get the go ahead at the local level.

Furthermore, over recent months, the Sandinista government has begun to reorientate its economic policies. It is its own social base that has so far borne the brunt of the austerity measures initiated in 1988.

Nonetheless, the risks of an electoral victory for the right should not be overlooked.

The danger is all the greater in that the United States has managed to convince the majority of the opposition parties to put forward common candidates.

Violeta Chamorro for the presidency and Virgilio Godoy for the vice-

presidency are the best possible candidates that the right could put forward. On the other hand, its ability to mobilize seems very limited — the recent meeting in Managua to support these candidates drew 5,000 people, according to the Spanish daily *El Pais*.²

The Sandinistas are right to insist that the elections have to be won not only in Managua, but also in Washington and the West European capitals.

They have therefore invited a large number of international observers for the duration of the election process and are calling for international solidarity to win their election battle. ★



News item: 15% of adult Americans cannot locate the United States on a map.

announced at the Costa del Sol summit in the framework of a so-called "democratization" of Nicaragua. Discussions with the employers also began at this time.

At Tela, rather than making new concessions on the domestic front, the Sandinistas tasted the fruits of their previous diplomacy and of the consolidation of the revolution. So far, the policy of concessions to the right-wing opposition has not posed real problems for the revolutionary regime. The freedom of expression and activity allowed to the whole opposition has stimulated the activity of the Sandinista movement itself, while confirming their commitment to pluralism.¹

Election challenge for Sandinistas

The February 1990 elections represent an enormous challenge for the Sandinistas. They are trying to get a new massive show of support to the revolution in the ballot boxes, despite an extremely grave deterioration of the economy and foreign interference in the electoral campaign. The US' financial aid to the right-wing opposition is already greater than the total aid granted to Nicaragua by the

1. Tomas Borge put it quite clearly five years ago: "The existence of critical people, oppositionists, dissidents, malcontents and reactionaries gives life and vigour to the revolution. Confrontation and polemics develop the ideological and political muscles of the people. It is a permanent exercise programme, an antidote to sclerosis and passivity." (*Granma* August 7, 1984)

2. Violeta Chamorro is the owner of the opposition daily *La Prensa*. She was a minister in the first coalition government immediately after the revolution. Her husband, Pedro Chamorro, was the leader of the anti-Somozist bourgeoisie and was assassinated by the dictatorship before the revolution.

After the elections — new coalition, same policies?

THE elections became necessary when the government fell in early May, a year before new elections were scheduled. The immediate reason for the break-down of the coalition was a disagreement between the government parties about tax-proposals for the financing of a plan against pollution. The international press wrote that this was the first time ever that a government fell over an ecological issue. That is however only part of the truth behind the collapse of the government.

An additional factor was the persistent leadership crisis in the VVD. This led to a decline in the influence of this party in the coalition, which was more and more dominated by Lubbers and his Christian democrats. Frustration grew in the VVD, and its leaders hoped a hard stand on the tax proposal would be an opportunity to raise its profile. But many of their voters didn't understand why the VVD had broken up a government they themselves called very successful, and which they were going to recreate after the elections as if nothing had happened.

Another element that led to the break-down of the right-wing coalition was the limited but important rise of combativity of sections of the workers movement and the growing political awareness of parts of the trade union movement. Seven years of CDA-VVD government have led to a drastic redistribution of income. Huge amounts of money have been transferred from the majority of workers to the benefit of profits and high incomes. People on social security have been particularly hard hit. In seven years profits have tripled and reached a level where some employers are beginning to fear a "backlash against business".

Contract with employers' organization

In 1982, when the present leader of the social democratic party was still the chairman of the main trade union federation he signed a contract with the chairman of the employers organization. The trade union leadership agreed to limit wage increases to allow profits to rise again, in exchange for promises that these higher profits would be used to create more jobs. These jobs of course never materialized, and over the years the results of the sell out have become clear to growing numbers of workers. As a consequence workers and

PRIME MINISTER Ruud Lubbers had an easy victory and his party, the Christian democratic party (CDA) kept its 54 seats in parliament. This was despite the fact that discontent has been growing during the seven years of the coalition government between the CDA and the right-wing liberals (VVD). The VVD lost five seats.

The social democratic party (PvdA) did not succeed in its campaign to become bigger than the Christian democrats, losing votes and three seats. The new Green-Left coalition (Groen Links) won three seats, which is less than what was expected after opinion polls predicted a gain of five seats or more. The three small right-wing Christian parties gained one seat, the "left" liberals (D66) three and the racist Centruumpartij re-enters parliament with one seat.

ROBERT WENT

trade union leaders are less and less inclined to limit wage demands, now that everyone can see how much profits have risen. In the last twelve months nurses and other groups have launched struggles for a higher income, more jobs and against excessive workloads. Many of these struggles have achieved partial success. Today employers fear what they call a "wage wave", which may threaten their "profit wave".

The possibility of a change of coalition after the elections scheduled for 1990, was therefore already being discussed among employers and in leading circles of the Christian Democratic Party before the disagreements that led to the fall of the government appeared. It is a not very well kept secret that prime minister Lubbers, employer and one of the more than 27,000 millionaires in the country, is himself in favour of a coalition with the social democrats, to avoid wage demands and to make it easier to get workers to pay for investments that are necessary to do something about the destruction of the environment. Lubbers says the PvdA has changed a lot and has become more "reasonable". He is not afraid that there will be a repetition of their so-called "big spender" policies of the seventies.

The right-wing liberals have lost fourteen seats in two successive elections, both after a period in which they were in government. Nine of those seats have gone to the Christian democrats. The CDA grew unexpectedly in 1986 and this

year it was able to maintain its number of seats and remain the biggest party. The Christian democrats are overwhelmingly the dominant force on the right. They have managed to build a strong and stable electoral base.

Support for the CDA is today much less based on Christian ideology than before, although that still is a reason to vote for Lubbers for most CDA voters. But the CDA also gets support from those with middle and high incomes, who are certain that the fact that they are doing well is a direct result of Lubbers' economic policies.

Non-believers vote for Lubbers

The number of non-believers voting for the Christian democrats has been growing since the beginning of the eighties. Only one percent of the membership of the CDA are non-believer. But in the last elections fourteen percent of non-believers — 450,000 persons, worth almost 8 seats — voted for Lubbers. That was again an increase in comparison with 1986.

The social democrats launched a big but empty campaign. Its main slogan was "It's high time for another policy". But it was not at all clear what concretely this meant. There were only marginal differences between the election programs of CDA, VVD, PvdA and D66. This was a deliberate choice by the PvdA leadership. From the beginning they campaigned for a

RESULT OF ELECTIONS

| | 1989 | | | 1986 | | |
|--------------|-----------|------------|-------|-------|------------|-----------|
| | votes | percentage | seats | seats | percentage | votes |
| CDA | 3.141.157 | 35,3 | 54 | 54 | 34,6 | 3.051.918 |
| PvdA | 2.833.266 | 31,9 | 49 | 52 | 33,3 | 3.051.678 |
| VVD | 1.296.049 | 14,6 | 22 | 27 | 17,4 | 1.596.991 |
| D66 | 700.863 | 7,9 | 12 | 9 | 6,1 | 562.466 |
| Groen Links | 361.274 | 4,1 | 6 | 3 | 3,3 | 305.230 |
| Christ.right | 361.457 | 4,1 | 6 | 5 | 3,6 | 331.703 |
| Centrumpart. | 81.215 | 0,9 | 1 | 0 | 0,1 | 12.277 |
| Total | | | 150 | 150 | | |

coalition with the Christian democrats.

After seven years of opposition the social democrats are willing to pay almost anything to be allowed in government again. So to avoid complicated negotiations with Lubbers after the elections they made the necessary concessions in advance. Their opposition in parliament was already very weak and outside parliament the social democrats have been absent from the struggles waged by nurses and others.

In parliament and in his election campaign PvdA leader Wim Kok failed to explain where the money would come from for the new policies. Middle income workers were therefore open to the argument that they would be better off with Lubbers. Since no satisfactory answers were given to such accusations the social democrats failed to win votes among middle layers.

More votes for racist Centrumpartij

Kok also failed to get the main victims of Lubbers out to vote. The social democrats lost a lot in the old working class districts of the cities, where many people didn't bother to vote, in a clear rejection of the policies of the social democrats. That same feeling resulted in more votes for the racist Centrumpartij. That all this will not change automatically is moreover shown by the fact that the PvdA's results among youth, where traditional party loyalties count less, were very bad: less than one out of four new voters voted PvdA, while almost one out of three voted for Lubbers.

After years of discussion and unsuccessful initiatives, the fall of the government and the early election finally impelled four parties to the left of social democracy decided to form a common slate. The crisis of these parties has resulted over the years in a big decline in membership, support and activities. The election result

shows that their problems were not solved by their decision to cooperate more. The green-left slate only got 55,000 votes — that is, less than one seat more than the individual parties together in 1986, when they had their worst result and lost 5 seats. Even so, it is necessary to build a political alternative to the right and to social-democracy, and that will take time, initiatives and discussion. The limited but real growth of support for the green-left slate among youth, women, migrants and trade-unionists shows that there is a basis to begin to build it.

Green-Left results disappointing

But it is also true that the green-left result is disappointing, and that more was possible. There were many political weaknesses in the campaign, not only due to the fact that the coalition was only recently formed. Groen Links built its profile mainly on the fact that it was "new" and "fresh" (which impressed nobody after the first weeks) and on its ecological proposals. This, apart from the fact that some of these proposals were bad, was too one-sided. Socio-economic issues only played a secondary role in the campaign of Groen Links. The necessity of a shorter work-week without loss of pay, of a wage increase for workers in the private and public sector and for people on the dole, of more money for health-care, housing and education...such issues were kept away from the centre of the campaign.

Finally Groen Links created much confusion about the differences with the PvdA. The social democrats campaigned to become the biggest party. They explained that the formation of a new government containing the PvdA depended on the relationship of forces with the right. "If you want the PvdA in government", Wim Kok said again and

again, "you have to vote for us. The government parties have to lose their majority, and the PvdA has to become the biggest, so that we can take the initiative in negotiations with Lubbers". Ria Beckers, the main candidate of Groen Links, had no answer to this powertalk, because Groen Links is also in favour of a PvdA-CDA coalition.

But it is obvious that there will only be minor differences between the policies of a CDA-PvdA coalition led by Lubbers and a CDA-VVD coalition led by Lubbers. Groen Links should therefore call on the social democrats to build a real alternative to the policies of the right in the unions, movements and struggles. But because of their parliamentarist approach and because — as they say — "the new green-left approach must be realistic", they were trapped in the traditional lesser evil outlook of the PvdA.

One seat majority for Christian democrats

The two government parties kept their majority, but a change of coalition is very likely. A majority of only one seat is not very comfortable, and there are, as explained before, political reasons for the Christian democrats to change partners. Lubbers has already begun negotiating and has announced that he wants to finish the talks on forming a new government in less than two months.

Whether he will succeed is not yet clear, but there is every chance that he will. That doesn't mean however that the situation will be stable and without risks for the employers. Relations between the PvdA and the trade union leadership have diminished over the years. And the direct influence of the PvdA on the rank-and-file of the unions has decreased a lot in comparison with the sixties and seventies.

It is therefore doubtful that the PvdA will be able to force the unions into a new period of cuts and moderation when it comes to wages, social security and a shorter work-week to reduce unemployment. And the social democrats will have many problems in a coalition government if — as is by no means ruled out — there follows a new recession.

These are all reasons for activists and currents to the left of social democracy not to have any illusions in a CDA-PvdA coalition. Expectations about reasonableness and illusions about changes that will certainly not come, will only disorient the left and those who come into struggle.

In the next period it is necessary, just as before, to strengthen and develop actions, campaigns, struggles and the self-organization of workers, youth, women and migrants. It is necessary to fight the right, win some gains and build a socialist political alternative. ★

SAP campaign: "Give the bill to the rich"

THE Dutch Socialist Workers' Party (SAP — Socialistiese Arbeiderspartij, Dutch section of the Fourth International) was excluded from the negotiations about a common left slate, that led to the formation of Groen Links.

When Groen Links published its program it became clear why the CPN and PPR refused to invite the SAP to the talks. The very detailed program is not socialist, does not challenge the power and possessions of the ruling class, and has many other weaknesses. The SAP could not sign the program without important improvements.

Women and youth candidates

The SAP therefore participated with its own candidates in the elections. The SAP slate of thirty candidates included eight persons younger than 30 years, which made it the youngest slate. Half of the candidates were women. To stress the key role of struggles all SAP candidates were activists from movements, unions and campaigns. There were dockworkers, activists who were involved in the recent strike in the health-sector, industrial workers, activists from the peace movement and ecological movements and comrades involved in women's liberation activities.

Friend and enemy agreed that the main slogan of the SAP contrasted sharply with those of the other parties and was at least very clear. "Give the bill to the rich" summarized in a provocative way that there is money enough for wages, dole, social security and to stop and cure the destruction of the environment.

The SAP campaigned with a platform of thirteen concrete demands and proposals, including:

- a shorter work-week without loss of pay;
- free child-care on demand;
- stop military spending, the Netherlands out of NATO and NATO out of the Netherlands;
- an increase in wages, dole, retirement pensions and social security;
- stop racism, end limitations on the

right to immigrate;

- right to vote for everyone of 16 years and older, and also for immigrants.

In its campaign the SAP proposed that a choice be made to take money from the rich and from profits and to cut the military budget drastically. The SAP explained that the main factories and plants have to be brought under control of the whole of society, in order to stop the destruction of the environment and to create the means and structures to satisfy the demands of the workers, youth, women and migrants.

"Give the bill to the rich" was the title of the SAP's election program and was printed on its wall-posters and on the more than 250,000 pieces of campaign-material (papers, leaflets, a youth paper, a paper to distribute among workers) that were distributed during the campaign.

The SAP had the right to broadcast two TV-commercials of two minutes, and

three "programs" of five minutes each because it put up candidates in all districts. Hundreds of persons reacted to these transmissions and asked for campaign material, wall-posters and the party's election program.

Campaign wins new members

The SAP obtained 4300 votes which is 700 more than in 1986. That is more than most comrades expected (or feared). It was estimated that the formation of Groen Links would have some attraction on persons in the periphery of the party too. That proved to be the case, but new people were also interested in and attracted by the proposals of the SAP.

That response is more important than the exact number of votes. Compared with the 1986 campaign, twice as many persons phoned or wrote for material.

The familiarity with the party grew, due to the party's TV programs, several interviews and articles in dailies and some appearances on (local and national) radio and — on the evening of the elections itself — TV.

The party won new subscribers, new supporters, new members and possibly one or two new branches. The party leadership was therefore unanimously very positive when it evaluated the campaign.★

Social gains under the knife

THE Danish Trotskyist paper *Klassekampen* spoke to the SAP's Wim Baltussen about the record of the Lubber's government.

"When the bourgeois Lubbers government took over in 1982, we got a real right-wing regime that modeled itself on Thatcher. But it wanted to carry out its program at a slower pace.

Big cutbacks were set in motion in education, social welfare and health, for example. In every new budget, the belt was tightened more. This continued through the 1980s, so that in many respects we have a different society today than we did at the beginning of the decade.

User payment have been introduced. Today, you have to pay for services that were free, because they were paid for all at once through taxes.

It costs 19 guilders a year, if we want to borrow books from libraries. It started at 7.50 guilders, but went up rapidly.

It costs 2.50 guilders for every visit to a reading room, although there is a yearly maximum.

It costs 27 guilders to go to a

specialist. Here also there is a maximum.

Its costs a families with two children around 1,000 guilders a year to keep them in school.

We have to pay a minimum of 1,500 guilders to register at a university. The government plan is that henceforward some forms of education should be more expensive than others. At the same time, sections of the public sector have been privatized.

The government has been skillful in splitting the population and making it harder to mount a united fightback against this attack. A typical example is the so-called decentralization of funds for municipal and county governments.

The budgets in the municipalities and counties are based on appropriations by the national government. This means that the national government has considerable control over how much money the counties and municipalities can spend. Many of them therefore have had to administer cutbacks. At the same time, tasks have been transferred to the local governments that they do not have the money to carry out".★

The "Social Europe" — demagoguery on a West European scale

AT THE last European elections, the socialist and social democratic parties had a chance to talk big about the "social dimension in building Europe today." All-round champions of the Single Act, the socialists responded to their voters' anxiety about the transformations underway in Western Europe, presenting themselves as unconditional defenders of a "social Europe." Moreover, François Mitterrand, now chair of the EEC for six months, is promising to advance implementation of the social aspects of the Single Act. But what does the "social Europe" actually involve?

CLAUDE GABRIEL

Taking advantage of the divisions and hesitations that European integration has provoked in many right-wing parties, the Socialists are arguing for a united Europe able both to meet the capitalist demands of the "big market" and to defend social gains. So, they are offering themselves as candidates for setting up the Europe of the bosses and at the same time for defending the workers' interests. Aware of the difficulty of this enterprise, they keep claiming that they are assuming the "challenge."

Jacques Delors, president of the Brussels Commission, for example, has written: "And what if Europe became the place, if not the means today for realizing the social democratic idea?"

"And what if the European dimension prevailed over the external or internal changes that have led to this model losing its luster?...In fact, the social democratic project today faces two challenges that together and independently threaten its advance — the external challenge of the development of world-wide relations and the internal challenge posed by new aspirations and types of behavior."¹

Will the opening up of markets create jobs?

However, no sooner were the European elections over than moderation and realism re-entered such declarations. The point of departure for arguing the social democratic thesis is the "Cecchini Report," which concludes that the opening up of markets will represent a gain of 175 to 255 billion ECUS for the companies. From this, the report deduces that in the medium term 1.8 million new jobs can be created, and ultimately 5 million. It

would then be possible to rely on the economic rationalization implied by the Single Act to prevent the growth of inequalities and an erosion of gains and to launch an attack on the problem of unemployment.

Opinion polls carried out at the beginning of 1989 pointed up the rise of doubts and fears among wage earners about the consequences of European integration. Through practical experience, workers began to perceive the dangers implied by the Single Act. An example are the mergers and restructuring that the bosses have justified in the name of European challenges, and which inevitably lead to layoffs.

Proliferation of agreements between firms

The misty horizons of the Cecchini Report thus are not convincing those who are suffering the dramatic effects of the big market in the here and now. On the other hand, the "social challenge" demagogues do not seem to be upset by the proliferation of agreements between firms, takeovers and relocation of plants that are helping to undermine working-class resistance.

The social democratic parties, however, are not always insensitive to voters' apprehensions about the European project. The emphasis put on the social dimension during the electoral campaign was a response to this. But the Socialist leaderships now face another problem — pressures and criticisms from the union bureaucracies. The latter are undoubtedly worried about their own credibility with their memberships, who are being attacked in the name of Europe.

For example, Apolinar Rodríguez, leader of the General Workers' Union (UGT, the union confederation historically linked to the social democrats in the Spanish state) has said: "We are taking our distance more and more from a [social democratic] government that is applying a neo-free-enterprise policy in response to the concerns of employers confronted by the building of Europe."²

Jean Kaspar of the French Democratic Confederation of Labor (CFDT), for his part, has explained: "The problem is not what sort of Europe we want. The CFDT will not accept a Europe reduced to a mere economic framework for reconversions and takeovers."³ The same tack is now being taken by all the union leaderships. Some are old converts to the EEC, others of more recent vintage. Today all of them (and rightly so!) are worried about the future.

Worry about future of institutional role

However, if some union leaderships talk this way, it is not because they are interested in putting up a strong fight for the workers' demands. "Realism" and class collaboration have long prevailed over all other considerations in these circles. Their main worry is about the future of their institutional role in a Europe in which capital is becoming more centralized, and where the established relationships between the unions and the state apparatus are going to lose some of their force.

Conflicts then appear between desires and realities. The union leaderships may hope to re-create at the European level the cosy relations with governments that they have sometimes enjoyed within the national context. But their friends in the Socialist parties do not always see things the same way, especially when these parties are in government or even in the Brussels Commission itself.

In general, social democrats say different things depending on whether they are in or out of power. Laurent Fabius, for example, who headed the French SP slate in the European elections, is no stickler for

1. *Europe sans frontières, Les Socialistes et l'avenir de la CEE*, a collection of articles by Socialist leaders, EPO, Antwerp, 1989. In this work, the Dutch Wim Kok wrote: "The challenge facing social democrats today is to define a new system of labor relations making it possible for a special social model of Europe to survive and develop in a positive direction."

2. *Le Monde*, February 8, 1989.

3. *Le Monde*, June 8, 1989.

the old socialist traditions: "The development of the left in Europe in different directions will certainly lead to a questioning of old positions. At the same time, this can be productive for the left forces, because it forces us to look at some of our traditional ideas — the role of the public sector, the effectiveness of social redistribution policies, the forms of education and so on."⁴

The union bureaucracies, moreover, are not the only worried ones. At various levels and in various ways, depending on the country the fear is now appearing in the social democratic parties, that the dynamic of the Single Act may break down the old consensus too rapidly and thereby endanger social peace. Even if you are ready to believe in the Cecchini's report's optimistic extrapolations, no one can fail to recognize that now capitalist reconversion is leading to plant closures and workforce reductions.

Free circulation of goods, capital and labour

Already, the demands imposed by deregulation and the opening up of the public services to competition have provoked major reactions such as the nurses' strikes in a whole series of EEC countries. This is why even the British Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock, whose new-found belief in Europe is well known, has said that "if 1992 is centered exclusively on the free circulation of goods, capital and labor, what the Single Market will establish will be a free circulation of poverty, unemployment and depression."⁵

These warnings are not of course leading to any questioning of the EEC project. The social democrats generally are definitively committed to "the European enterprise," in accordance with the needs of capital. However, aware of the new contradictions that this has engendered, even in their own ranks, they aspire to rebuild at the European level the conditions for social compromise that they have previously advocated in a national framework.

In defending the perspective of social guarantees in the context of the Single Act, some Socialist leaders indeed explain that a strong "social aspect" will benefit industrial competitiveness against the US and Japan. They argue that the establishment of new "labor relations" through building Europe will be a "force for innovation and productivity"⁶. The Austrian Socialist leader Bruno Kreisky, has written: "What we need is not speculative capitalism but a 'moderated' capitalism....Consensus is a cumulative process."⁷


A section of the social democracy is trying, within the context of the EEC, to revitalize a neo-Keynesianism in crisis at the national level. It is arguing, without any great conviction, for a specific European development model. But for that, EEC economic integration would have to

be achievable in the short term. There is thus a strong temptation to propose a protected economic space. But this is not what the Single Act envisages, since it also responds to a growing internationalization of the world economy. The big market means "opening up the market" (until a possible return to protectionist restrictions). In order to manage the labor force, the bosses do not hesitate to employ the Japanese model (for example in auto) or even third-world models.

The error of the social democratic reasoning consists in thinking that the big market will provide for a homogeneous European industrial fabric against Japanese and American competitors. According to this argument, the European bosses may also find uses for a European specificity combining high productivity, strong buying power and a high-level of social protection.

This is to forget that the setting up of the big market is not simply a response to the challenge of American or Japanese competition. This aspect is overshadowed by the worldwide reorganization of capital. Thus, some big European firms have already made inter-European alliances in some of their activities, American or Japanese ones in others.⁸

The call for the Single Act and steps towards a unification of Europe does not at all mean that some sort of European employers' code is taking shape. It is therefore utopian to appeal to the bosses for a specifically European social project that could be a basis for new and stable arrangements. The bosses do not seem much worried — and for good reason from their point of view — about the growth of unsteady jobs, pressures for



Sunday working or for nightwork for women, attacks on health care and so on.

None of these realities, however, resembles the pious image of a "European" capitalism seeking efficiency and competitiveness in the social well-being of the wage earners.⁹

It is especially astonishing that this reformist aspiration is to depend on a rapid emergence from the crisis and strong economic growth. What will happen to all these fine words if overall economic growth in the EEC remains depressed below 4 per cent in the coming years?¹⁰

The social dangers the Single Act poses for the workers are of various sorts:

- Industrial reconversion and new forms of competition in the service sectors (public and private) are bringing layoffs, changes in the rules and conditions of work, and freezing of wages.

- The threat that the bosses may more and more take as their benchmark those areas of the EEC where the conditions are best for them, in each industry or even in countries as a whole, as for example in

4. *Ibidem*.

5. *Europe sans frontières*.

6. See in this regard, F. Chalameit and F. Murillo (co-authors of the report "For a social Europe") in the May-June 1989 issue of the magazine *Projet*, published in Paris.

7. *Pour en finir avec le chômage en Europe*, La Découverte, Paris, 1989, p.67.

8. For example, out of 212 European firms that made research agreements with other firms, more than 50% did so with a non-European firm. Out of 197 joint subsidiaries formed in the EEC from 1982 to 1985, 41% were with firms outside the EEC ("Les entreprises de haute technologie et l'Europe," Philippe de Woot, *Gestion économique*, Paris, 1988). From 1980 to 1984, 38% of foreign investments by European firms were in Europe and 61% in the US. (source: Eurostat). For

example, the French firm Michelin plans to buy the US firm Uniroyal for 4 billion francs

9. Another innovation (more recent in some than in others) by the Socialist parties is to link the social sphere and ecology in their warnings about too much of a free-enterprise foreign market. This would be praiseworthy, if only it were clear that this was more than electoralist demagoguery, at a time when the Green vote is showing a strong rise. The best way to do that would be for the governments controlled by these parties to take radical measures in this field, and apply the correct idea that there is a relationship between defending social gains and defending the environment.

10. See the fears expressed in the report of the European Commission on Employment chaired by Bruno Kreisky. *Pour en finir avec le chômage en Europe*, p.53.

The thirteen "fundamental rights"

proposed by the Brussels Commission for a European "Social Charter".

- 1) Free circulation of workers (in particular workers in border areas who are employed in member states other than those they inhabit).
- 2) Employment and payment (defined as including the payment of "fair wages" to temporary workers vis-a-vis full-time workers).
- 3) Amelioration of living conditions ("partnership in progress"). Includes restructuring and flexibility in working hours, as part of a definition of the maximum hours of work allowed per week, but also in relation to all atypical forms of employment; work of limited duration, seasonal work, part-time, temporary, week-end and night work, etc.).
- 4) Social protection (including the fixing of a minimum revenue for the unemployed in law).
- 5) Freedom of association and of collective bargaining (in particular at a European level "if the social partners wish it").
- 6) The right to vocational training.
- 7) Equality of treatment for men and women.
- 8) The right of workers to information, consultation and participation (the accent being put above all on consultation with the workers of transnational enterprises, for the introduction of new technology, and in cases where restructuring has an impact on employment).
- 9) Protection of health and security in the workplace.
- 10) Protection of children and adolescents.
- 11) A minimum guaranteed income for the elderly.
- 12) Protection of the handicapped.
- 13) Protection of the consumer.

southern Europe. There is a danger of "social dumping," with relocation of plants to areas where social production costs can be cut.¹¹

● The effects of growing regional inequalities in living and working conditions, between those that are undergoing cumulative growth and those on the downward slope..

● A growing tax burden on wage earners as some states try to compensate for loss of revenues brought about by a reduction in Value-Added Tax or prevent capital flight by cutting taxes on income from capital.

● The attempts made in some industries to use the European reorganization to speed up changes in work—flexibility, fixed-term contracts, subcontracting and so on.

● The fact that the "big market" opens the way for freely installing non-European enterprises. The influx of Japanese companies into countries such as Great Britain, the Spanish state and France foreshadows added pressure on working conditions.¹²

In addition to all this, there is the threat that, facing a growing "multinationalization" of big enterprises and policies decided by the Brussels Commission, the national workers' movements may have less capacity to react and defend themselves.

Overall, a sharpening of competition among European workers represents the big danger for social gains — including pressure on social protection systems, on the rules for representation of wage earners in the plants and pressure on wages and working conditions.¹³ Competition

among working classes within the EEC poses a challenge to national legal systems and legislation. This concerns not only relations between wage earners and their bosses but also has to do with the specific histories of the states and national institutions.

The Single Act seeks to accelerate economic integration by relying on competition to rationalize the economic apparatus. Why should management of the labor force be exempt from this creed of competition? Why should the bosses, in the absence of pressure from social struggles, accept the constraint of rules in this area, when the entire philosophy of the Single Act is to reject administrative directives?

As regards social policy, the Single Act calls for "dialogue...that can result in contractual relationships."¹⁴ The Brussels Commission initially concentrated on two "social questions." The first was free circulation of labor, which is preparing the ground for a vast European labor market.¹⁵ The second was the social dangers in order "to discern in time the consequences that creating the internal market may have on employment for specific categories of persons or given regions, in order to forestall these effects or at least take the necessary compensatory meas-

ures."¹⁶ This is a noble enterprise no doubt, but, when all is said and done, a very modest one.

The debate takes on quite different dimensions when it becomes necessary to respond to the question of possible European social legislation. What scope could real common social regulation for the EEC have, given the neo-free-enterprise motivations of the Single Act and the differences in each state?

In 1981, the French Socialist government mooted the idea of a European "social space." Since then, a lot of water has gone under the bridge, and in 1989, Jacques Delors acknowledged: "If I had proposed the social space, I would have provoked a religious war, and Europe would still be in the midst of stagnation."¹⁷ That's the name of the game. Delors is only following the orientations of the big European employers, who are adamantly opposed to EEC social legislation.

This leads to a rather peculiar terminological debate, with some talking about a declaration of principles, or even a "common foundation," while others call for a document with the force of law. In response to the unions who demanded formal guarantees, Delors replied: "I have never said that this would be a directive. A solemn declaration would have considerable moral value."¹⁸ Ernst Breit, president of the European Trade-Union Confederation (ETUC)¹⁹, offered his own view of this in May in *Le Monde*: "If Delors has declared himself in favor of a solemn declaration, that means that he has said exactly the opposite of what he said a year ago in Stockholm."²⁰

Report provides undigestible stew

In a report summing up the thinking in several seminars on the big market, you find the following undigestible stew: "If you accept that labor costs will be different over a long period owing to unevenness in the factors that make development possible, you have then to give up the idea of a "foundation," the idea of a highway that sets the general direction in which all the countries have to travel at varying speeds. A 'dynamic convergence' has to be imagined. It will take time. Moreover, the convergence has to be real."²¹

What meaning is there in this clutter of words? For the moment, we are due for a statement by heads of states and governments. In June 1990, and not before, the Commission may propose a series of

11. Among other examples, Volkswagen moving to Spain and the closing of the Peugeot factory in Belgium.

12. See, for example, the recent Peugeot affair in France.

13. For example, flexible weekend work in Volkswagen in Spain, while this has been rejected by the firm's German workers.

14. Article 118 B.

15. This includes free access to public jobs and the

right for the unemployed to continue to collect their compensation if they move to another country. Article 118 of the treaty stipulates that "member states pledge to seek to improve the work environment in order to protect workers' health and safety, and set themselves the objective of harmonizing in a progressive direction the conditions that exist in this area."

16. Report by Manuel Marin, president of the European Commission, September 7, 1988.

17. *Libération*, August 29, 1988.

measures and a "Charter." Today, it is proposing 13 fundamental rights (see box), the formulation of which remains ambiguous and general. Binding legislation is not projected, except for the right to health care and safety in the plants. The rest, whose legal character has not been established, requires unanimous agreement of the states, with everyone left at the mercy of a veto, or a compromise at the lowest common denominator.

A series of established rules are already being adopted. It is useful, however, to look at their limitations in some detail to get an idea of the present juridical vacuum. They apply above all to working conditions (health and on-the-job safety); and, in passing, make it possible to curb the dangers of unfair competition. These directives set minimum thresholds. They provide for no system of supervision. They apply only where "practice or legislation in force in the member states permit."

Then there comes the whole area of guarantees of social rights, as well as structures for involving and informing the workers. This precisely is the focus of the debate over whether a "charter," and "foundation", or a "statement" is indicated. It is also on these questions that the new French chair of the EEC is loudly proclaiming his ambitions.

Governments must be left the Initiative

But, as usual, after a lot of radical verbiage in the media, the French leaders are now saying that a "charter" can be adopted in the form of recommendations (!), and that governments must be left the initiative to integrate them into their national legal systems. "Instead of following a policy of all or nothing, it is better to aim for consensus among partners," the French minister of labour has added.

There is also the attempt to create a European statute governing limited companies for firms based in at least two countries which would enjoy special tax breaks. This statute is supposed to open the way in a yet-to-be-determined form for joint representation of the workers in various countries. But this scheme has been in the works now for 13 years!

More generally, the area of contractual relations projected by Article 118 B of the treaty (in the event that "the partners consider it desirable") remains barely outlined. For the moment things are still at the level of a desire for "dialogue among social partners," on the model of the Val Duchesse meetings between the European bosses and the ETUC.²²

The unions and all the workers have an interest in seeing this lead one day to inter-professional accords and industry-wide contracts at the level of the EEC as a whole.²³ But the European employers remain fiercely opposed to that, because it would rapidly compromise the hoped-for

effects of the Single Act regarding comparative advantages and weakening the labor movement.

The sum of such measures remains thus quite modest!²⁴ And no one has dared to predict big progress in the short term. There are indeed various sorts of constraints.

Thatcher rejects binding social measures

The social democrats (mainly) explain that the delays in setting up their "social Europe" are the result of the obstacle posed by the free-enterprise rightist governments, above all Thatcher's. It is true that the latter government has unrelentingly denounced schemes for binding social regulation. But the present impasse cannot be explained simply by the stubbornness of the "Iron Lady"! The British veto argument, for the moment, is being used to cover up the hypocrisy of social democrats, who are trying to reconcile the irreconcilable.

Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the social democracy is following and will continue to follow the options chosen by the employers for realizing their capital. This is what explains the increasing slippage of the French government on the "social charter" and the powder-puff war that Delors is waging against the free-enterprisers. What is involved here? In establishing European legislation, the question of national prerogatives and specificities will inevitably be posed. Where will national jurisdiction start and where European? How can such diverse situations be unified, and how can everyone be satisfied?

This brings us back to the contradiction the ruling class faces today. It is well advanced in European integration, but for the moment it is incapable of resolving the problem of a European state. It is in fact quite significant that "in the part devoted by the treaty [the Single Act] to the 'rights and interests of the workers,' there is no obligation to adopt binding statutes and, moreover, the addition of a restrictive clause rules out majority vote in this area."²⁵

Facing this dilemma, Delors sees the

future in the form of a division of "tasks": "The European way does not consist of emptying national governments of their substance but rather of recreating a margin of autonomy enabling them to assume their essential tasks....The European way would enable a re-situated state to resume its mission of coherence and orientation." This is supposed to make it possible to make a distinction between the community (macro-economic) level and the national level, using "the budgetary, tax and parafiscal incentives best suited for transforming the ponderous structures of the labor market", and, on the other hand, the regional level "where the fine adjustment of demand and supply of jobs takes place."

But there is a gulf between projecting this and actually carrying it out. If the objective is to free the European executive from the responsibility for all concrete measures affecting the "ponderous structures" and the "fine adjustment" of the labor market, how can they claim to want at the same time to provide the EEC with social legislation binding everywhere?

Specific histories of each workers' movement

However, the difficulty goes beyond the bourgeoisie's internal conflicts. National laws represent specific histories combining the special traditions and gains of each workers' movement. Thus with regard to the difficult project of a European statute on limited companies, the trade unions themselves are divided over the possible options for workers' representation, notably between the German (co-management), French and British "models."

The Socialist grand scheme of giving the Single Act a social angle looks more and more like a mere profession of faith. You cannot enthuse over the stimulus offered by the new forms of competition that the big market is creating and at the same time want to limit social competition among workers in accordance with the unevenness of their situations from one country to another and from region to region. The "virtuous" competition that the Single Act establishes obviously

18. *Le Monde*, June 8, 1989. In 1988, in the report entitled "The social dimension of the internal market," which was the Brussels administration's first general approach to the problem, it was already written that "there may be a middle, more nuanced road" between too binding legislation and laissez-faire. *Europe sociale*, special issue.

19. The European Trade Unions Confederation (ETUC) includes 35 confederations in 21 West European countries. It claims to bring together 44 million people, or 40% of the working people in West Europe. The French CGT and Spanish Workers' Commissions have been denied membership up until now. The ETUC was founded in 1973. Its activity is essentially limited to coordination.

20. This refers to the ETUC congress held in the Swedish capital in 1988, at which Jacques Delors declared himself in favor of a foundation "negotiated by the social partners and reflected subsequently in

EEC legislation." *Le Monde*, June 8, 1989.

21. *Europe Sociale*, Vol. 1, Supplement 7/88, Brussels.

22. Val Duchesse, a chateau in the Brussels region where an initial meeting of this type was held in November 1985.

23. The Dutch Vredeling's draft directives on the need for consulting wage earners belonging to the same European multinationals has been in mothballs for years.

24. In this article, I have deliberately left aside the question of the Social Fund and the Regional Fund, which in principle offer states the means to compensate for social setbacks or regional problems caused by the big market.

It will be noted, however, that these are partial and belated mechanisms, and their use in national frameworks has already shown to have only a very limited effect.

25. *Bulletin de l'IRES*, No. 20, Paris, 1989, p.86.



includes competition between working conditions, wages and systems of social protection.

While the European big employers are moving ahead to install the Single Act, ETUC and the workers movement in general are paralyzed and sunk in the deepest confusion. The ones primarily responsible for this are the social democrats — witness Delors' conjuring act in front of the British TUC in 1988, when he claimed that the social Europe would put pressure on the Thatcher government. The Labour leadership at the time pretended that playing that card would be enough to defend the workers' interests and get new gains.

There is no more dangerous illusion for the workers movement than the idea that all that is needed to stave off the threat to social gains, is to apply pressure within the European institutions.

Soporific speeches of "socialist comrades"

This would mean taking for good coin the soporific speeches offered by the "Socialist comrades," especially those most implicated in European administration, and thinking that you can negotiate with the bosses without putting the pressure of social struggles on them at a time when they are preparing to launch major attacks against the workers through various types of deregulation. They are aiming in the same way to challenge even certain fundamental gains.

The stakes are therefore considerable, because it is out of this transition that the future relationship of forces among the

classes will come. To think that the basic weapon the workers have is pressure within the European institutions, to say nothing of co-management of building the EEC, would be a suicidal illusion.

The formulation of new social gains at the all-Europe level will come out of struggles. Nothing will come from the bounty of the bosses, and not a lot more from social democrats in government. The workers will begin to oppose the consequences of European integration in their own countries, perhaps without immediately recognizing how much is determined at the European level. But they will realize little by little that the same problems are facing other wage earners in the same company or the same industry in the EEC.

New methods of struggle required

Solidarity, and then coordination of struggles will loom as an unavoidable necessity in order to defeat the schemes of the bosses and the governments. Getting industry-wide contracts or the possibility to bring together representatives of wage earners in various countries to negotiate with the bosses of a trust will require new methods of struggle and first of all the establishment of a relationship of forces.

Many commentators have explained in these last years that the union movement should change its objectives and forms of organization in line with the multiplication of subcontracting firms, service establishments and the growing segmentation of production. The reality is much

more contradictory, and we cannot accept the "small is beautiful" philosophy that overlaps with all the so-called theories about the disappearance of the industrial working class.

There is certainly a decline in the numbers of workers in big plants and an increase of those in small and medium-sized enterprises.²⁶ But the present course of centralization of capital clearly points in another direction. And it is from the latter process that the workers' movement should deduce its objectives.

The growing number of mergers

and buy-outs in Europe and elsewhere points up the urgency for a corresponding concentration of working-class and trade-union forces.

In taking control of Plessey, GEC and Siemens "bought" 26,000 workers. The recent merger of Daimler-Benz and MBB has created an industrial group employing 380,000 wage earners. This is not the time for atomizing the trade-union movement, country by country, region by region, plant by plant, but rather for making a special effort to break down prejudices and recreate the conditions for a new internationalism, for expanding links among workers.

Convergence of nurses' struggles

The union bureaucrats will never take this direction. For them, this would mean choosing the camp of struggles, of democracy and openness, of a definitive break with social democratic options. The dynamic of the struggles themselves, however, is objectively generating motion in that direction.

This happened with the convergence of nurses' struggles in six European countries. Today, British engineering workers are demanding a 35-hour week. Why not take advantage of this to bring about a coordinated joint struggle for this objective in the European engineering industry as a whole? ★

26. The problem of unionization of small and medium enterprises is a serious problem for the workers' movement.

Norwegian elections show deepening polarization

THE September 11 elections in Norway showed the increasing polarization of Norwegian politics. The ultra-right Progress Party (FrP) got 13% of the vote and 22 seats in the new Storting (Parliament).

The other big surprise was the 10% vote for the Left Socialist Party (SV), double its vote in 1985. The chief losers were the traditional big parties, the Right Party (Høyre) and the ruling social democratic Norwegian Labour Party (DNA) of Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland.

RUNE SOMA

THE FrP's result was expected after they hit 12% in the local elections two years ago. The party started in the early seventies as a parallel to the Danish party of the same name. Its main focus was to protest against taxation and government regulations. After years of bitter internal conflicts, Carl I. Hagen has emerged as the party's strong man. He has turned the FrP into a well-oiled US-style election machine with a right-wing populist ideology.

Under cover of opposing bureaucracy, the party puts forward a Thatcherite economic program of social spending cuts, reduced taxes and privatization of social services. At the same time they single out scapegoats for the country's economic and social problems — people on welfare, single mothers, the unemployed, immigrants and refugees. A small racist organization, the FMI, whose leader was recently sent to prison for a year for planning to bomb a refugee centre, campaigned openly for the FrP in the elections without any protest or comment from Carl I. Hagen.

A new bourgeois coalition promised

In fact the 13% result was a disappointment for the FrP. In the polls just before the election, the FrP was moving up towards the 20% mark — one poll even gave them more than Høyre!

In spite of their political differences, above all on the issue of Norway's relationship to the European Community, the three main bourgeois parties, Høyre, the KrF (Christian Social Party), and the SP

(Center Party) promised the voters a new bourgeois coalition after the elections. They also agreed that there would be no deals with the FrP. The election results gave new confidence to the smaller partners of the bloc, KrF and SP, since, for the first time in years, they stopped losing votes, or, in the case of KrF, actually gained. The big loss of votes for Høyre, on the other hand, weakens its position in relation to its partners. It will strengthen those tendencies in the party that want to pull the party closer to the FrP, and will make the negotiations for putting together a new government very difficult.

Heyday of Norwegian social democracy is passed

The elections were yet another confirmation that the heyday of Norwegian social democracy is passed. The result for the DNA was the worst since the Second World War. The main reason for the DNA's decline is the breakdown of the social democratic model of "class compromise" established after the war. With the DNA as the arbitrator, big capital and the trade unions traded rising living standards and social reform against industrial peace and modernization. The end of the long postwar boom removed the economic foundation of this policy. In Norway, the expansion of the high-profit oil industry concealed the changed situation for many years.

The massive inflow of revenue from the North Sea gave the government plenty of room for maneuver. Although successive governments have tried to implement anti-working class policies, the results have been less than in other European

countries. Until 1988 unemployment remained comparatively low. Even during the five years of the bourgeois government up until 1986, the trade unions fought and won a 37 and a half hour working week in the face of a long planned lockout by the bosses in that year.

This defeat for the bosses was the real reason behind Gro Harlem Brundtland's return to government later that year. She immediately started to demobilize the trade unions and carry through a program of transferring resources from the working class to the bosses, a program that the bourgeois coalition was unable to implement. Interest rates were raised to restrict private consumption, a wage freeze was imposed by law, new closures of state-owned companies in trouble were pushed through and social expenditure was further restricted. In 1989 unemployment reached 100,000, the highest figure since the thirties.

Factory closures triggered sharp protests

This openly capitalist policy led to conflicts with the trade unions and the party's working class base. The wage-freeze was met with protests going far beyond the traditional left opposition in the trade unions. Factory closures, carried through with the government's blessing, have triggered sharp protests, including from the DNA's own local branch leaderships.

The government's passive attitude towards the rising social problems in the cities and its direct responsibility for the unemployment, makes it difficult for the DNA to continue to portray itself as the party of the traditional working class values of solidarity and brotherhood. It also makes it very difficult for the DNA to effectively counter the FrP's ultra-right agitation. This is an important explanation for the substantial growth of the DNA's closest left competitor, the Socialist Left (SV).

Besides putting itself forward as the defender of all the traditional social democratic virtues, the SV scored high on the "green" questions. As in the rest of Europe, environmental questions are of rising importance, especially among young people. The SV has traditionally been strong in the environmental movement, both politically and through being present in the activities.

This position was strengthened during the election campaign, where the SV came out as the only party that took "green" issues seriously. Furthermore, the SV boldly took the FrP on over a variety of issues, such as racism and social security. In the general climate of polarization, this clear-cut policy produced results.

To the left of the SV, the traditional pro-Moscow communist party (NKP) and the ex-Maoist AKP(M-L) were the main forces behind the electoral alliance "Environment and Solidarity". The alliance's



Ukrainian movement faces historic tasks

IN THE largest non-Russian republic of the USSR, the second most populous in the country, the People's Front of Ukraine (RUKH) for restructuring was constituted on September 8-10, along lines similar to those of the people's fronts in the Baltic republics.

ZBIGNIEW KOWALEWSKI

THE Stalinist counter-revolution of the 1930s had a particularly terrible impact on the Ukrainian people. Millions of peasants died in the famine created by Stalin's policy. The national intelligentsia was totally exterminated, and the republic's Communist Party and state apparatus were destroyed by police terror on a vast scale. Stalin subjected the Ukrainian people to forced russification.

In 1939, on the basis of the Stalin-Hitler Pact, the USSR annexed western Ukraine, which had previously belonged to the Polish state. This annexation was confirmed at the end of the Second World War. But it was very difficult to consummate, because the installation of the Stalinist system in this area encountered powerful popular resistance. The very widespread rural guerrilla movement led by the radical nationalists of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was finally crushed only in the early 1950s. After the death of Stalin in 1953, the survivors of the Ukrainian national struggle led strikes in the concentration camps from Vorkuta and Norilsk north of the Arctic Circle to Kinguir in Kazakhstan.

On this basis, in the following decades a continuity of historical memory was forged between successive generations of Ukrainian dissidents, who made up a very high percentage of the political prisoners in the "Gulag Archipelago." But in the Gorbachev period, the transition from historic and battle-hardened dissidence to a

Norways 1989 election results

| Party | Votes | % | Seats | % change since '85 |
|------------------------------------|---------|------|-------|--------------------|
| DNA (Social Democrats) | 895,164 | 34.3 | 63 | -6.5 |
| Høyre (Conservative) | 579,036 | 22.2 | 37 | -8.2 |
| KrF (Christian Social) | 221,828 | 8.5 | 14 | +0.5 |
| SP (Center-farmers) | 170,137 | 6.5 | 11 | -0.3 |
| FrP (Ultra-right) | 339,260 | 13.0 | 22 | +9.3 |
| SV (Left Soc. Democrat) | 251,374 | 10.0 | 17 | +4.6 |
| V (Liberal) | 83,091 | 3.2 | 0 | -1.8 |
| FMS (Comm/Maoist) | 21,223 | 0.8 | 0 | +0.1 |
| Greens | 9,861 | 0.4 | 0 | |
| SI (openly racist) | 8,765 | 0.3 | 0 | |
| FAF (People's Action for Finnmark) | 8,773 | 0.3 | 1 | |

official goal was to give all the different protest movements and opposition tendencies an electoral expression. Its program was very unclear and not to the left of the SV (it was not even explicitly socialist!). In reality the goal of the AKP (M-L), the strongest party in the alliance was to get one of their members into Parliament in order to strengthen their national presence.

This project was a failure. The results were only slightly better than the results of the two parties combined in 1985 — and less than their results in the local elections of 1987.

This is bound to lead to discussion inside the AKP (M-L), which is going through a very interesting development, from a revolutionary Marxist point of view, at the moment (see IV 166).

The polarization in the electoral arena has led to problems in creating an effective government. The bourgeois parties have a slight majority in the new Storting (84 seats to 81), but the three-party coalition will be caught between Hagen's 22

representatives on the right and the "socialists" on the left. Whichever way the eventual government is going to lean, the biggest partner, Høyre, will risk losing even more votes.

A DNA government would also be in a difficult position if the bourgeois project breaks down. A confident SV putting pressure from the left, and on the other side the need to secure support from at least one of the bourgeois parties to secure a majority in the Storting.

The halting of the FrP's growth at 12-13% seems to suggest that the Hagen machine is running out of steam. If this is the case, the leftward swing represented by the SV's results is all the more positive. A trial election among school children between 16 and 18 years old gave a clear sign of an even bigger leftward swing among young people.

It seems likely that whatever government is eventually formed, it will confront broad mobilizations from the working class and popular movements in the four years ahead. ★

mass movement has proved very difficult. Two factors explain the relative delay in the formation of the Popular Movement in Ukraine.

This republic continued to be governed by one of the toughest nuclei of the conservative bureaucracy, that is, those most loyal to the Brezhnevite *ancien régime*. Here, political liberalization encountered ferocious resistance from the bureaucratic apparatus ruled with a firm hand by the Communist Party boss in Ukraine, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky.

Ideological, political and police counter-offensive

In Ukraine, freedoms already taken for granted in Moscow or Leningrad — to say nothing of the Baltic capitals of Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius — are requiring a hard and as yet unfinished struggle, in which there have been many confrontations with an unreconstructed police force.

When the idea of forming a people's front emerged in early 1989 in the Union of Ukrainian Writers, and *Lituraturna Ukraina* published a draft program, Shcherbytsky launched an aggressive ideological, political and police counter-offensive. But the force of a rising independent mass movement led to the founding congress of RUKH being held in Kiev.

The importance of this success becomes clear in particular if you consider that in Byelorussia, another bastion of the conservative bureaucracy, the founding congress of the people's front had to meet recently "in exile," in Vilnius, under the protection of the Lithuanian movement Sajudis. Moreover, a few days after the Kiev congress, Gorbachev eliminated Shcherbytsky from the central leadership of the CPSU, and the formerly all-powerful boss had also to give up his post as first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. It seems, though, that his protégés remain in power.

The second problem has been the very uneven level of national awakening and rate of development of the mass movement in Ukraine. Since the summer of 1988, the city of Lviv, the traditional center of western Ukraine, has become the scene of almost constant mass mobilizations raising more and more radical national-democratic slogans and breaking more and more openly with the bureaucratic regime. It was here that the militant Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHS) has been rebuilt and has rapidly won a mass influence.

On the other hand, in central and eastern Ukraine, the masses have mobilized more slowly around less nationalist demands for an "ecology of nature, language and culture" and under the leadership of intellectuals linked to the Gorbachev wing of the bureaucracy.

Then, in July 1989, the workers move-

ment irrupted on the scene. The miners in the Donbass, the big mining center in eastern Ukraine, followed the example of their comrades in the Kuzbass in Russia and went on strike. Their demands were exclusively social and economic. They seemed indifferent to the national demands although a large percentage of them are Ukrainian. But they have been subjected to strong russification, and traditionally excluded from any possibility of access to the Ukrainian language, culture and history. Unlike them, the striking miners in the Lviv mining region in western Europe not only began to combine social and national demands but also, under Polish influence, to demand the formation of "an independent, self-management union, Solidarity."

The second great success is the fact that in the founding congress of RUKH, there was a convergence of representatives of the three currents mentioned — the radical nationalists in Lviv, the moderate reformers in Kiev and the emerging workers' movement in the Donbass. Uniting these currents is difficult but essential for building a united democratic mass movement. The congress was an important step in that direction.

The third success is the fact that the congress was attended by representatives of all the national minorities living in Ukraine, including the Crimean Tatars. The latter are fighting to return to their native land, which is today a part of the republic of Ukraine. No less important was the presence of representatives of the People's Front of Moldavia. As in Estonia, in Moldavia the bureaucracy has managed to mobilize Ukrainian and Russian workers against the demands of the indigenous people of this republic, who are Romanians. Finally, the presence at this congress of a delegation of Solidarnosc trade-union and parliamentary leaders should be noted. They were received very warmly. The workers' delegates from Dniprodzerzhynsk greeted them by waving the banners of the Polish free union.

Tortuous history of Polish-Ukrainian relations

The history of Polish-Ukrainian relations is tortuous, because in the past Poland has been one of the states oppressing the Ukrainians. The Stalinist bureaucracy in Poland still devotes considerable resources to fomenting anti-Ukrainian chauvinism, in close collaboration with the Soviet bureaucracy, which in turn is fomenting anti-Polish chauvinism in Ukraine.

In the recent vote in Poland, Solidarnosc's Civic Committee assured the election to parliament for the first time of an outstanding spokesperson of the interests of the Ukrainian minority, Volodymyr Mokry. In his speech to the congress in Kiev, Adam Michnik, a leading figure in


Solidarnosc circles, stressed that only a consistent struggle against any sort of national chauvinism would make it possible to build ties of international solidarity: "If we are unable to build such ties, then we will condemn ourselves to balkanization, to inter-ethnic conflicts and a military dictatorship, either Communist or anti-Communist."

There is a lot of evidence that, as in several other republics, the more retrograde sections of the bureaucracy want to divert the development of the national movement in Ukraine toward inter-ethnic conflicts. They have so far failed to accomplish this, thanks to the energetic denunciations of such attempts by the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and other independent groups. But concern is beginning to be aroused by the recent mobilizations against the rise of RUKH by an "Internationalist Front" that is trying to build itself among the Russian population of the republic, on the model of similar organizations in the Baltic countries.

The case of the Czarist Black Hundreds

From the platform of the congress, Ivan Dzyuba, author of the famous dissident book of the 1960s, *Internationalism or Russification?*, recalled the case of the Czarist Black Hundreds: "This was a powerful movement of the lower strata of society, which was strongly patriotic and skillfully led by specialists in social and national demagoguery. Its task was to save the Czarist empire from revolution, by directing the people's anger away from the regime toward the 'false preachers of the truth,' that is, against the revolutionary intelligentsia, against 'Judeo-Freemasonry,' against the 'slogans that oppress the Russian people.' Are we not facing a revival of the mass Black Hundreds today? In any case, the three fundamental ideas of the Black Hundreds are again in the air."

This is a threat that can be effectively removed only by an alliance of the national movements of the oppressed peoples of the USSR with the independent, multinational movement of the Soviet working class. ★



"It's Stalin's work on the national question — I know I buried it somewhere round here!"


Mass national movement launched in Ukraine

THE FOUNDING CONGRESS of the People's Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring the, *Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy za Vidbudovu*, was finally held in Kiev September 8-10. Formal constitution of the movement had been long delayed by a more repressive atmosphere in Ukraine than in other Soviet republics. There, the Brezhnev era had lived on under the rule of Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, who was appointed first secretary in 1972 in the context of a purge of "nationalist deviationists" and the destruction of the Ukrainian cultural renaissance of the 1960s.

The holding of the congress thus clearly represented a defeat for the local party leadership. In fact, on its second day an open letter to Gorbachev signed by 18 Ukrainian members of the Congress of People's Deputies was read out calling for Shcherbytsky's removal. At the special plenum of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in late September, the Ukrainian first secretary was removed from the all-union party Politburo. Shortly thereafter, he was also removed from leadership of the Ukrainian party.

The general explanation of why Shcherbytsky survived the removal of other conservative party bosses was that Ukraine was too important to the Soviet rulers to risk the sort of experiments that have been seen above all in the Baltic republics. Now it seems that it is no longer possible to prevent liberalization there also. Although national consciousness is much more uneven in Ukraine than it is in the more compact nations of the USSR, the growth of a national mass movement in the second largest republic of the Union can bring a qualitative advance in the struggle for national democratic rights. The following is the program adopted by the People's Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring at its founding conference. We have translated it from No. 2489, September 21, of *Ukrainske Slovo*, a Ukrainian weekly published in Paris.

DOCUMENT



IN THESE LAST decades of the twentieth century, our society is going into a deep political, economic, social, ideological and moral crisis. This is the result of the pseudo-socialist totalitarian model forcibly imposed by Stalinism; the usurpation of soviet power by the bureaucracy; the alienation of the people from the means and results of production; the brutal and absurd dictates of the central authorities; the voiding of the republic's sovereignty and the conversion of local self-government into a fiction; deceit under the cover of "internationalist" phrases; the policy of denationalizing peoples, fusion and mechanically mixing ethnic groups and ignoring their vital interests.

All aspects of this crisis, which has an all-Union character, assume additional special features in each of the Union republics.

Proclamation of the Ukrainian People's Republic

The twentieth century brought the Ukrainian people both a great hope for a revival of their statehood and national-cultural life, as well as terrible national tragedies. After the breakup of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, Ukrainian statehood was revived by the proclama-

tion of the Ukrainian People's Republic and subsequently of the West Ukrainian People's Republic. In complex historical circumstances, the process of the formation of Ukrainian statehood led to the creation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, which in 1922 united with the Soviet Republics of Russia, Byelorussia and the

Caucasus into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics through the Treaty of Union.

In the initial phase of the life of the Soviet Ukraine normal conditions were created for the national-cultural development of the Ukrainian people and genuine assurance of its statehood. However, with the emergence

of the Stalinist-administrative-command system, the principles of building the soviet federation began to be brutally violated. The sovereignty of the Ukraine was trampled on. It, like other republics, was in fact transformed into a featureless administrative-territorial unit of an ultra-centralized state.

Those who implemented the Leninist national policy were removed from the leadership of the Ukrainian Communist Party and government. Terror and forced collectivization were unleashed against the peasantry under the false slogan of "dekulakization." A famine was artificially created in 1933 in which millions of people lost their lives.

Moreover, in the period of Stalinist repression the entire national intelligentsia was liquidated. Every manifestation of national consciousness was stamped out under the pretext of "fighting Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism." Human and national rights were grossly violated. The history of the nation and its culture were plundered, distorted and reviled. The historic monuments of the Ukrainian and other peoples were plundered. Migration policy was used consistently to reduce the absolute and relative numbers of Ukrainians in the population of Ukraine.

Hostile attitude to cultural development

The Ukrainian language was driven from all areas of social life in the republic. There was a hostile attitude to the cultural development of Ukrainians within the boundaries of their own homeland. Nature was irreparably destroyed in a series of regions of Ukraine. There was the Chernobyl tragedy.

But these are just a part of the crimes of the Stalinist and neo-Stalinist-Brezhnevite bosses against the Ukrainian people.

If we add to this the losses of the civil war, the 1921-22 famine, the savagery of the German fascist occupiers and the 1946-1947 famine, we get an idea of the losses of the Ukrainian people in the twentieth century.

It is impossible to avoid a general national catastrophe without uniting all forces with a sense of patriotism and of historic responsibility in Ukraine regardless of their place of residence, nationality or religion, party affiliation, social status, educational level, sex or age. *The form of this unity can and must be the People's Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring.*

Similar forms for rallying the forces in favor of restructuring have arisen or are arising in many republics and

regions of the USSR. This is only one sign of their vital needs, a manifestation both of the general dynamic of restructuring and specific national features. The People's Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring has arisen on the wave of social activity unleashed by the restructuring processes in the USSR that is seeking to overcome the crisis and assure a better future for the peoples of the USSR.

Building a democratic and humane society

Principles, aims, orientations and means of action of the People's Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring.

1. In its activity, the People's Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring (henceforth designated as "RUKH") is governed by the principles of humanism, democracy, openness, pluralism, social justice and internationalism reflecting the interests of all citizens of the republic, regardless of their nationality. RUKH unites their patriotic energy and expresses their aspiration for the political, economic and cultural renaissance of Ukraine. RUKH supports the principles of a radical renewal of the society expressed at the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the CPSU, the nineteenth All-Union Party Conference and the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

2. *The main aim of RUKH's activity is generally to create the conditions for a decent life for people through their creative participation in building a democratic and humane society in Ukraine, in which there will be genuine people's power, well-being for the people, a renaissance and rounded development of the Ukrainian nation, satisfaction of the national-cultural needs of all ethnic groups in the republic and the creation of a sovereign Ukrainian state, that builds its relations with the other republics of the USSR on the basis of a renewed Treaty of Union.*

3. RUKH assumes the following aims:

a) In every way to promote the restoration of human beings as morally responsible individuals.

b) To promote the construction of a national state aimed at transforming the Ukrainian SSR into a *democratic state of laws*, devoted to assuring the free development of the individual, the defense of the rights of human beings and of the nation, as well as the unfettered exercise of basic democratic rights.

c) To achieve a radical restructuring of the economy of the Ukrainian SSR on the basis of republican self-

financing and self-management, taking into consideration the regional and structural peculiarities of the economy of Ukraine and *the real economic independence* of all those exercising management, regardless of the property forms.

d) To wage an unflagging struggle against the policy of denationalization; to create the preconditions for the free development and self-preservation of the Ukrainian people on their historic territory; to promote a spiritual renaissance of the Ukrainian nation on the basis of state support for the Ukrainian language, rounded development of Ukrainian culture, promotion of its historic memory and the national consciousness of citizens and the preservation of a sense of national honor.

e) To promote the rounded development of the languages and cultures of the national minorities and ethnic groups that live on the republic's territory and to defend their vital rights and interests.

4. The basic principles guiding RUKH's activity are the following:

— To defend human rights and freedoms, the rights of the people and the moral renewal of individuals and the society.

— Democratization of the social and political life in the USSR.

— To give real content to the sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR through radical changes in the Soviet federation.

— Putting the economy of the Ukrainian SSR decisively in order.

— Social justice.

— To defend the society's ecology.

— To build up the national culture.

— Ethics and religion.

— Safeguarding health, and sport.

— Active participation in the fight for peace.

Outline of the RUKH's activity

5. RUKH will carry out its activity in the following ways:

a) It will collaborate with state institutions, republic and party organs and other social institutions in tackling the problems laid out by the Program and Statutes of RUKH.

b) It will participate in election campaigns, running its own candidates and supporting other candidates and pre-electoral programs that do not conflict with RUKH's aims. It will push demands for the recall of deputies who fail to justify the trust of those who elected them. It will take part in the exercise of social supervision of elections.

c) It will draw up and present proposals to state bodies arising from the tasks of RUKH's program. It will sub-

mit requests for resolution of various problems of local concern to the local soviets.

d) Through legislative initiatives, it will submit to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR proposals for new laws or for repealing or amending laws and rules.

e) It will organize studies of public opinion and publish the results. It will present proposals for referendums and demand that they be held.

f) It will put pressure on the state authorities and administration through every legal channel.

g) It will oversee the Ukrainian SSR's fulfillment of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act on European Security and Collaboration and other international agreements on defense of human rights.

h) It will participate in the exercise of social inspection.

i) It will draw attention to memorable national dates and holidays. It will promote the revival of national traditions and customs.

j) It will carry out its own economic work. It will organize various forms of social projects, and look after monuments of our historical-cultural and natural heritage.

Organizing discussions for an exchange of views

k) It will organize an exchange of views, debates, colloquiums and conferences on pressing questions; it will form commissions of experts, organize lectures, carry out discussions.

l) It will publish its own journals, bulletins, news sheets; distribute information through leaflets, posters, appeals, open letters and also through the mass media.

m) It will organize and conduct mass meetings, assemblies, demonstrations, marches, processions, picketing.

6. RUKH operates within the framework of the constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and the laws of the Ukrainian SSR in accordance with its Program and Statutes. ★

First congress of the Popular Movement for the Reconstruction of Ukraine

THE AUTHOR of the following article was one of three Westerners of Ukrainian origin who attended the congress of the People's Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring. His article was written before the fall of the Brezhnevite first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky.

JAROSLAV KOSHIW

ON September 8, 9 and 10, 1989, in the city of Kiev, capital of the Soviet Republic of Ukraine, the impossible happened. Over 1,000 political activists opposed to the rule of Moscow held a congress to build the Popular Movement for the Reconstruction of Ukraine. The delegates represented regional (oblast) organizations of the Movement (in Ukrainian "Rukh"). The hall of the Kiev Polytechnic Institute was festooned with the hitherto forbidden blue and yellow national flags and tridents. Delegates covered their chests with badges of these symbols of Ukrainian independence. Outside the hall, stood large crowds of supporters with blue and yellow flags listening to the proceedings broadcast through loudspeakers. The Kiev militia, with special riot troops at the ready, stood by. For the first time in Kiev, no one was arrested for displaying a Ukrainian flag or badge.

For direct and democratic elections

After three full days of explosive and chaotic debates, which at times threatened to destroy the Congress, the Movement adopted a statute, programme and resolutions, and elected leaders. When the idea of the movement was first mooted in January 1989, the founders proposed that it recognize the leading role of the Communist Party. However, by the time of the Movement's Congress, this didn't even appear in the proposed programme and was not even debated. The most immediate demand of the Congress was for direct and democratic elections to the presidency and the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.

Late Sunday evening, after the Con-

gress had ended, delegates and supporters marched with blue and yellow flags about a mile to the statue of the 19th century awakener of Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko. There they held an enthusiastic midnight rally addressed by Movement leaders and Adam Michnik and Volodymyr Mokry from Poland's Solidarnosc.

Call for the resignation of Ukraine party boss

The Congress witnessed a number of dramatic moments. The two appearances at the podium of Leonid Kravchuk, the chief of the Ukrainian Communist Party's Department of Ideology, astonished the delegates. His call for the movement to co-operate with the reformist elements of the party added a new and unexpected dimension to the proceedings. He warned the Movement that it was not unequal to the forces opposing it and called on it to scale down its demands.

The appearance of the more acceptable face of the party, Ivan Salyi, one of the Kiev party leaders, cheered the delegates. His call for the resignation of Ukraine's party boss, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, was met with thunderous applause.

The Congress was electrified by the appearance of a Soviet troop commander from Western Ukraine, Colonel Vilei Martirosian. He is also a USSR Supreme Soviet deputy representing the Ukrainian town of Rivno and a member of the Movement. He told the delegates that he and like-minded commanders had decided to take the side of the people if an attempt was made to impose a military solution on the political problems of Ukraine. If that wasn't enough, the head of the Kiev Militia, Shapochka, sent greetings to the Con-



gress and wished it success.

No less dramatic were the presentations of former political prisoners, most notably Levko Lukyanenko, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Ivan Hel and many others. Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk of the banned Ukrainian Catholic Church called from the rostrum for the full legalization of the Church and the return of all its property. A representative of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church also asked the delegates' help in the legalization of his Church. Since the revolution of 1917-20, Ukraine had never witnessed such a spectrum of opinions at a political meeting. It became clear to everyone present that the Congress was the beginning of a new political order in Ukraine.

There were three main groupings at the Congress. The most prominent one consisted of delegations from the regions of Western Ukraine: Lviv, Rivno, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk, symbolically represented in the leadership of the Movement by the former political prisoner Mykhailo Horyn. These delegations were the most numerous and vocal at the Congress. Their air of confidence and their determination to achieve an independent Ukraine is backed by massive popular support. Two weeks before the Congress, on the anniversary of the Stalin-Hitler pact when Western Ukraine was "liberated" by the Red Army, they led large demonstrations all over Western Ukraine. The cities of Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk witnessed demonstrations of over 100,000 people. Of the many young delegates from Western Ukraine who took part in the debates, Vasyl Chervony from Rivno stood out because of his gift of expressing himself, his political astuteness and combativeness.

Representatives of the miners' strike committees

From the other end of Ukraine, the Donbass, came delegations which essentially consisted of representatives of the coal miners' strike committees. They were led by the strike leader Petro Poberzhny from Donetsk. He, like the other miners' representatives, has none of the Ukrainian nationalist fervour of Western Ukrainians. They support the demand for Ukrainian to be the state language, but demand the right to carry out their affairs locally in Russian, something which is not palatable to many Western Ukrainian activists. However, they exhibited even more confidence than the Western Ukrainians because of their successful strike during the summer. They are for all practical purpose in political control of Donbass mining towns.

Some of the strike committees have quartered themselves in local party buildings from where they rule their districts. They successfully intervened at the Congress with a warning that if the Ukrainian nationalist symbols of the blue and yellow

flag were adopted, the Movement would be rejected by the Russian-speaking Donbass.

The Kiev delegates, headed by the flower of the Ukrainian literary and academic intelligentsia, and backed by numerous workplaces, had the largest impact at the conference. It was they who organized the conference, prepared the programme, led the disparate elements in a common direction, and were finally elected as its leaders. It became clear during the proceedings that the organizers, led by Volodymyr Iavorisky, Dmytro Pavlychko, and Ivan Drach, all members of the Communist Party, had conspired with other reformist elements in the party to steer the Congress away from confrontation to cooperation with a yet-to-be-reformed Communist Party of Ukraine.

Chernobyl resolutions not put to the vote

It fell upon Dmytro Pavlychko who chaired much of the proceedings to successfully manoeuvre the delegates to soften or reject confrontational resolutions. Resolutions which from the party point of view were extreme were either sidetracked or voting on them was delayed in order that an alternative resolution could be presented by prepared speakers. For example, the resolutions relating to the Chernobyl accident, including the holding of a public trial of Shcherbytsky and other Party leaders, were not put to the vote. The delegates were easily maneuvered to accept a poetic but empty resolution on ecology which didn't commit the Movement to any specific action.

Only on one issue did Pavlychko's ability to control the fate of resolutions fail him, the vote relating to the new election law for the Ukrainian republican resolutions. The Party's proposed election law is designed to give it the majority of delegates in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and with it the presidency. The Congress accepted an alternative election law in which all the delegates and the presidency would be voted in directly. The delegates' fervour reached a peak in the discussion over what to do if the Party enacts its proposed election law. Despite Pavlychko's efforts to delay the vote on this issue, the Congress voted to call a national strike in Ukraine, if the officially proposed election law is adopted.

Outside the three main regional groups, the delegates from the cities which separate the Kiev region from the Donbass, specifically the towns of Cherkassy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kremenchuk and Poltava, were a distinct group, though small. They draw their strength from their workplaces. While they have adopted the blue and yellow flag and the trident, they, like the Kiev delegates, are willing to scale down nationalist demands on the language question for the sake of close collaboration with the Donbass miners' strike com-

mittees.

Finally there are 35 USSR Supreme Soviet deputies who support the Movement. These deputies represent all major groups at the Congress. They and the yet-to-be elected deputies to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet are destined to play a leading role in the near future in what will certainly be a tumultuous period in the political history of Ukraine.

Reform wing of Communist Party

The reformist members of the Communist Party, led by Kravchuk and even more so by Salyi, will also play a pivotal role in the future development of the Movement and the political situation. It is certain that at least in the Kiev party apparatus there is open opposition to Shcherbytsky. But in the regions, especially in the cities of Kharkiv and Odessa, the resistance to change among the local party bosses is very strong. The Odessa Party sent a selected delegation to the Congress in opposition to one elected by the members of the Odessa Movement. When the mandates of the Party appointed delegates were rejected by the Movement's mandate committee, Ukrainian television used this to tell its audience that the Congress was undemocratic. For this and other disinformation, Ukrainian television was excluded by the delegates from the Congress. In Kharkiv, while the Congress was taking place, the Party bosses staged a demonstration against the "nationalist" gathering in Kiev. It is yet to be seen what kind of a popular opposition can be organized against the Movement by the retreating conservative Party leaders.

The Congress elected Ivan Drach as its leader for a two year term. Drach, though certainly a person of integrity, is no match for politically hardened regional leaders. This is also true of his assistant, Serhei Koniev, an articulate and well-liked radical and USSR Supreme Soviet deputy from Dniprodzerzhynsk, in the industrial heartland of Ukraine. The two most forceful political personalities are to be found in the elected Secretariat of ten people who will be employed full-time to administer the Movement. Mykhailo Horyn, who will chair the Secretariat, represents the toughest strain of the movement for an independent Ukrainian Republic, and is as combative a political personality as they come in the Soviet Union. On the same level of resoluteness, but not political astuteness, is Dmytro Poyezd, a young police detective, who organized the dozens of stewards with blue and yellow armbands who forcefully guarded all the doors of the Congress hall from the mobs which besieged them. From the podium, sounding like a future Minister of Internal Affairs, Poyezd called for the organizing of self-defence teams throughout Ukraine against repressions.

A survey of the delegates backgrounds

REPUBLICS OF THE SOVIET UNION



was carried out at the Congress by the organizers, and the results announced were:

1158 delegates were elected throughout the regions of Ukraine representing 280,000 active members. 1109 delegates attended the Congress. The largest delegations were from the cities of Kiev, Lviv, Rivno, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk; three of the 25 regions of Ukraine, Crimea, Voroshylovhrad and Transcarpathia, didn't hold regional Movement congresses to elect delegates.

Statistics of the Congress

By nationality, 944 were Ukrainians, 77 Russians, nine Jews, six Poles, six Byelorussians, two Armenians, and one Korean, Greek, Hungarian, Czech, and Crimean Tatar. The appearance of a Ukrainian speaking North Korean living in Ukraine was one of the many exotic moments of the Congress.

By profession the delegates were: engineers (329); teachers (130); academics (121); workers (109); cultural workers (104); doctors (48); journalists (42); lawyers (25); farmers (16); Party employees (6); self-employed (6); and less than six were students, priests, architects, shop employees, actors etc. Two of the delegates were unemployed.

There were 228 members of the Com-

munist Party and 24 Komsomol members. The allegiance of the delegates to the various unofficial groupings was not available. There were at least a few dozen members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, which is by far the best politically organized unofficial grouping in Ukraine. All its major leaders, like Lev Lukianenko and Vyacheslav Chornovil, were delegates and gave well received speeches.

Among the guests from outside the Soviet Union, there were representatives from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. From Poland, Adam Michnik and Volodymyr Mokry, member of the Polish Parliament and a Ukrainian, spoke on behalf of Solidarity. Surprisingly there was only one guest each from the United States, Canada and Great Britain: Professor Taras Hunczak from the United States, Khrystyna Krylyn from Canada, and Jaroslav Koshiw from Great Britain.

"Enemies of the Soviet state"

It is not clear why visas were refused to many others from North America who wanted to come. The Shcherbytsky controlled newspaper, *Pravda Ukrainy*, published a slanderous article during the Congress accusing Hunczak and Krylyn of being enemies of the Soviet state. This manoeuvre backfired as the Congress invited the accused to the podium and

enthusiastically greeted them.

Among the many slogans loudly chanted by the delegates, the one which in the end prevailed, almost to the exclusion of all others, was **unity**. The delegates sensed that the potential for fragmentation was very high on the language question, the independence symbols, and the relationship to the Communist Party.

Freedom of speech becoming the norm

Freedom of speech is becoming the norm in Ukraine, whether it be in the Congress, or on the streets. Yet to come is the freedom of the press, the broadcasting media, and the right to organize political parties. But the first steps in this direction are being taken. The Congress voted to publish its own newspaper, to be called *Narodna Hazeta*, and elected its first editor Anatoly Shevchenko. The newspaper is to be published by the printing house in Kiev which prints all the major newspapers available in Ukraine, and where the print workers are supporters of the Movement. This, and the possibility of the Movement having its own building in Kiev, was the carrot that caused even some of the toughest nationalists to agree to a softening of the Congress resolutions. Political realism decided the final outcome of the Congress. The Popular Movement of Ukraine has been born. ★

British "Security forces" hand in glove with Loyalist killers



THE ARREST of 28 members of the Ulster Defense Regiment October 7 for involvement in passing information on suspected militant nationalists to Loyalist death squads is an indication of the extent of the scandal touched off by revelations of collusion between the official security forces in Northern Ireland and the reactionary murder organizations. The affair was unleashed by the Loyalists themselves, first in order to justify the August 24 murder of Loughlin Maginn, and then apparently to try to destabilize the Anglo-Irish Agreement. So far, it is they who have paid the price for it.

GERRY FOLEY

U NDERCOVER British soldiers just happened to be on the spot September 2 when Loyalist murderers shot down a politically uninvolved man in the nationalist Ardoyne district of Belfast. They chased the two assassins, killing one and wounding the other.

Attempt to restore credibility of Crown forces

The unusualness and timing of this incident suggested strongly that it was an attempt to restore the credibility of the Crown forces as impartial peacekeepers, after the revelations of the preceding week. The Catholic bourgeois party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), was quick to take up this incident to defend a greater involvement of the security forces in the ghettos to "defend the people."

The other side of the collusion between the British and pro-British forces and the reactionary murder organizations is that in differing degrees each is at the mercy of the other. The British are always prepared to sacrifice the Unionists for the sake of political maneuvers with the Catholic moderates and the Dublin government, but only partially, because if they cast them off altogether they would destroy the basis of their rule. So, the occasional slaps delivered to the Loyalist mad dogs only make them more rabid.

As the symbol and summit of British maneuvering with the Catholic bourgeoisie North and South, the Anglo-Irish agreement is particularly obnoxious to all shades of Unionism and most of all to its

Loyalist hardliners. So, the revelations of security forces' collusion in communalist murder seem to have been intended to make it impossible for even bourgeois Catholics and the Southern government to collaborate with British "law and order." From the general standpoint of the interests of stabilizing British rule in Northern Ireland, this is an astounding example of "cutting off your nose to spite your face." It reveals the bloodthirsty nature of Loyalism.

The Loyalists' idea of the way to deal with the problem of sympathy in the South with the Northern Catholics is to wage war on the Southern Catholics as well. They have already shown that by the Dublin bombings of 1972, and other incidents and attempts. Their solution for the discontent in the Catholic communities in the North is a regime of communalist savagery.

A system of communalist oppression

The British forces involved in defending what is fundamentally a system of communalist oppression in the course of things come to share this outlook. In the wake of the disclosures, for example, BBC's Radio 4 interviewed a former army commander in Northern Ireland who argued that sympathy for "terrorism" was endemic in the South, like "support for the Mafia in Sicily."

The aim of the British political leadership on the other hand is to isolate the resistance in the North. That requires a pretence of "law and order" and an appearance of collaboration with "consti-

tutional nationalists," but the result is to give the communalist killers a free hand. When the resistance was isolated following Operation Motorman in August 1972, which ended the liberated areas in the nationalist ghettos, there was also a wave of communalist assassinations. In its September 7 issue, the republican weekly *An Phoblacht* noted that two former MI5 agents, Colin Wallace and Fred Holroyd, had stated publicly that the British secret service was implicated in 30 communalist assassinations in the mid-1970s.

This pattern is long-standing, and the SDLP and the Dublin government cannot be unaware of it. So, their claims now that they were shocked to find that data collected by the Irish political police on militant nationalists living in the South, and provided to the security forces in the North, were passed on to the Loyalist assassins are clearly hypocritical. In fact, they must have hoped that the growing isolation of the Northern resistance would mean that there would be no reaction in the South to such killings.

Need to mobilize public opinion

However great this scandal and however many Loyalist executioners are sacrificed (they are not likely to be too numerous), the communalist terror system in the North will not change unless Irish and international public opinion are mobilized. In the 20-year-old "troubles" in Northern Ireland, there have already been quite a few "investigations" and "reforms" that have changed nothing substantial.

Indeed the basic lesson of this affair is that any waning of international attention on the oppression of the nationalist population, any political isolation of their struggle means more murders of innocent people. There is a cost in blood for every delay, every failure in rebuilding a broad international movement in solidarity with the struggle of the oppressed population in Northern Ireland. ★