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THE  
DEAT  
SQUAD

Haiti

**US troops settle in**

International Appeal :

**World Bank, IMF : Enough !**

Denmark :

**Radical left breakground**

Feature :

**Brazil : Post-election debate opens**

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# World Bank, IMF: Enough!

THE campaign's objective is to establish an international network of citizens' groups, community organisations, trade unions, NGOs, church organisations, and so forth, through the establishment of activist committees in each country and city. We are asking for support in publicising, reproducing and distributing the international appeal as widely as possible.

Can you or your organisation sponsor the campaign, or collect signatures (individual and collective)?

Contact the campaign at:

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**T**HERE is little to celebrate as the international community commemorates the fiftieth anniversary of the Bretton Woods agreement, which led to the founding of the IMF, World Bank, and GATT. The "structural adjustment programmes" imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions has led to famine and the brutal impoverishment of the developing world while contributing to the "third-worldisation" of the countries of the former Eastern bloc.

While the World Bank's mandate consists in "combating poverty" and protecting the environment, its actions have contributed to the dismantling of health and education programmes. Its support for large scale hydro-electric and agro-industrial projects has speeded up the process of deforestation and destruction of the natural environment, leading to the forced displacement and eviction of several million people. In the South and East, hundreds of millions of under-nourished children are denied the fundamental right to primary education. In several regions of the world, the brutal suppression of public spending, combined with the collapse of purchasing power, has led to a resurgence of infectious diseases including tuberculosis, malaria and cholera.

The GATT agreement further violates people's fundamental rights, particularly in the areas of foreign investment, bio-diversity and intellectual property rights. Several clauses of the "structural adjustment programme" are now permanently entrenched in the articles of the new World Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO's mandate consists in regulating world trade to the benefit of the international banks and transnational corporations, as well as "supervising" (in close collaboration with the IMF and the World Bank) the enforcement of national trade policies.

In the developed countries of the North, similar socially oppressive economic policies are now being applied. The consequences are unemployment, low wages and the marginalisation of large sectors of the population. Social expenditure is curtailed and many of the achievements of the welfare states are being repealed. State policies have also encouraged the destruction of small and medium sized businesses.

## Feeding on poverty

In the South, the East and the North, a privileged social minority has accumulated vast amounts of wealth at the expense of the large majority of the population. This new international financial order feeds on human poverty and the destruction of the natural environment. It generates social apartheid, encourages racism and ethnic strife, undermines the rights of women and often precipitates countries into destructive confrontations between nationalities.

The time has come for humanity to respond forcefully and to establish an agenda for social change. We the undersigned — citizens, workers, teachers, writers, artists, civil servants, trade unionists, members of NGOs throughout the world — re-assert the fundamental right of people to national economic sovereignty, democratic development and social justice. We denounce the destructive "economic model" and re-assert our firm opposition to the interference of the Bretton Woods institutions and the new WTO in the internal affairs of sovereign states. ★

## First signatories:

Samir Amin (economist, director of the Dakar Third World Forum, Egypt), Jean-Marie Baise (Ecolo deputy, Belgium), Agnès Bertrand (ECORAPA, France), Madeleine Briselance (SOS, Tahiti, France), Janet Bruin (International League of Women for Peace and Liberty, Switzerland), Humberto Campadonico (professor of economics, San Marcos University, Peru), Felix Cardenas (Aymara de Bolivia, Movimienta "Pacha-Kuti", Bolivia), Carlos Camero Gonzalez (United Left European deputy, Spain), Michel Chossudovsky (Ottawa University, Canada), Didier Daeninckx (writer, France), Christine Daure Serfaty (France), Erik de Clerck (general secretary, frères des hommes, Belgium), Germain Dufour (Ecolo deputy, Belgium) Bruno Dujardin (Institute of Tropical Medicine, Belgium), François Gagnon (Regroupement-Action-Milieu, Canada), Pierre Galand (general secretary Oxfam, Belgium), Susan George (co-director Transnational Institute, member of the Greenpeace International Council), Edward Goldsmith (*The Ecologist*, Britain), François Houtart (director CETRI, Belgium), Albert Jacquard (geneticist, France), Bernard Lacaube (Latin America Association, France), Jacques Liesenborghs (Ecolo deputy, Belgium), Santiago Lorente (professor, University of Madrid, Spain), Ernest Mandel (Economist, Belgium), Gustave Massih (CEDETIM, France), "Sub-commandante Marcos" (Zapatista Army of National Liberation, Mexico), Leana Nuez (UNICARAGUA, FSLN, Nicaragua), Miguel Nuez (ACSUR, President de Las Segovias, Spain), Orlando Numez (sociologist, member of FSLN Assembly, Nicaragua), René Nuez Tellez (member of the FSLN national leadership, Nicaragua), Gilles Perrault (writer, France), James Petras (writer, USA), Luis A. Reveco (director of Third World First, Britain), Jean Ronveaux (general secretary of CNCI, Belgium), Lola Saiz (co-ordination des ONG de Madrid, Spain), Catherine Samary (economist, Université Paris X, France), Abraham Serfaty (militant, Morocco), Vandana Shiva (economist, India), Christine Sibilotte (comité justice sociale SA, Québec), Henri Simon (Ecolo deputy, Belgium), Lodewijk Steenwegen (Agalev deputy, Belgium), Ruth Stör-Mougel (Solidarity with the peoples of Central America and the Caribbean, France), Lise Thyry (virologist, United Left, Belgium), Gianni Togoni (general secretary of the Peoples Permanent Tribunal, Italy), Alain Tondeur (Socialist Workers Party, Belgium), Eric Toussaint (Committee for the Cancellation of the Third World Debt, Belgium), Francis Wurtz (Communist Party, France)

# 50 years — no more!

ONE HUNDRED solidarity movements, among them the French campaign "50 ans, ça suffit!" (50 years, that's enough!) and the Brussels-based Committee for the Cancellation of the Third World Debt (CADTM), organised a counter-summit to that of the IMF in Madrid in September. Coinciding with the fiftieth anniversary of the Bretton Woods accords the solidarity movement was ensuring that there was a voice for all those who are never heard in the official conference chamber. **ANKE HINTJENS** describes the highlights of the counter-summit.

**T**HROUGHOUT the world, people are organising to reject the policies of the international economic institutions and their blind faith in the free market system. On 29 September, during the festivities for the 50th anniversary of the Bretton Woods institutions, India was hit by a strike against the country's structural adjustment programme and the signing of the GATT accords. The protests, called by the National Platform of Mass Organisations, completely paralysed the banking, mining, metalworking, insurance and postal sectors. For three years now India has been obliged to apply a structural adjustment programme. The slogan behind the strike: "Three years is enough!"

One of the organisers of the Indian resistance to GATT and the IMF is Vandana Shiva, and she was present at the counter-summit in Madrid. "Free trade, which becomes a world system with the new GATT agreement, is not a new system. It is simply the prolongation of colonisation. The IMF, the World Bank and the GATT say they wish to liberalise the world market and free it from the interference of the public powers. But in reality they have established a system of planning without precedent in history, in favour of the most advantaged. The application of the structural adjustment programmes in India has brought no relief to the ordinary people, on the contrary. The modest agrarian reform applied after independence has been suppressed. The number of unemployed in the cities has increased by four million in two years. Out of an active rural population of 400 million, there are now 110 million unemployed. Traditional food production is being suppressed because it is not commercially viable, and that which cannot be transformed into money will not appear in the statistics and consequently cannot be taken into consideration in the 'development' projects. Land is being grabbed for agro-export. This leads to the contradiction

that whereas the number of calories produced in India has grown in the last few years, the number of calories consumed per head has diminished. The plague epidemic did not happen by chance. The restrictions in the refuse collection sector and the dismantling of the health sector have created the necessary conditions. What kind of catastrophe might have occurred if this epidemic had broken out some years later, when the health sector will be completely privatised? The IMF and the World Bank have imposed on us a 'model of development' by which entire communities are sacrificed in the name of progress. The nefarious consequences of this policy are blamed on our governments. But how can they be responsible? The IMF and the World Bank replace all the ministers. In India, the programme of structural adjustment is parachuted directly to the minister of finance and applied without the prime minister being aware of it!"

Vandana Shiva's testimony gives an idea of the atmosphere at the Madrid counter-summit. For a whole week, different workshops examined aspects of the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions. Every day some 1500 people were mobilised to participate in the work. Youth were numerous and they matched their words with actions. Delegates to the official meetings were welcomed by demonstrations of angry youth. One World Bank press conference was disrupted by a smartly-dressed militant who put the other side of the story, while other activists unfurled a banner for the attention of the photographers: "50 years is enough". Madrid's police had a difficult week.

During the week of debate, the CADTM organised a meeting on the role of the IMF in the explosion of the civil wars in Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda. Michel Chossudovsky, a professor from Ottawa university and an active member of CADTM, led the meeting.

In 1984, the United States wrote, in a "highly confidential" text, that it wished to see the free market restored in **Yugoslavia**. In 1989 a structural adjustment programme was applied. The recipe is a familiar one.

- Devaluation
- Privatisation of self-managed businesses, where the economic balance sheet was positive
- Destruction of social security
- Abolition of financial transfers from the central State to the republics

Consequently, many republics no longer saw any advantage in being part of the federal republic. From the first year of the application of the structural adjustment programme the standard of living diminished by 40%. The IMF measures therefore contributed to the atomisation and distress of the Yugoslav republic.

**Somalia** was also subjected to an absolutely devastating structural adjustment programme. The country lived to a great extent from the export of capital from the Gulf countries. It was self-sufficient in food on the basis of a fragile equilibrium between peasants and pastoral farmers. In 1981, the IMF obliged it to apply a restructuring of the economy. In addition to devaluation, Somalia had to make economies in veterinary services. The cattle farmers were no longer able to pay for services and cattle died because of untreated diseases. Moreover, the government was obliged to tax water. The sum of these measures led to poverty and famine.

For **Rwanda**, it is the same schema but more so, the country being obliged to apply restructuring in the midst of war. In November 1990, Rwanda had to devalue its currency by 50%. The country, which had had a fairly low inflation rate of 4.2%, saw it rise to 19.2%. The government was no longer authorised to pay a fixed price to coffee cultivators. Food production, linked to coffee production, went into free-fall. The opening of the frontiers for the import of cheap food (often called "humanitarian aid") destroyed the internal market for the peasants. The new loans that the country received as a present for applying the adjustment programme were used to buy weapons.

These economic "destructurings" do not, of course, explain the racism on which the genocides were based but they nonetheless created a fertile base for such disasters.

At the end of its labours, the counter-summit released a declaration in which it demanded the suppression of the international economic authorities and cancellation of the third world debt: "The

Madrid forum denounces this destructive economic model and demands the annulment of all the debts. It demands a halt to the interference of the Bretton Woods institutions in the internal affairs of the sovereign countries... It is time to end the existence of these type of institutions. The only thing to discuss is the timing and the [way in which we dismantle] the Bretton Woods institutions."

**"The only thing to discuss is the timing and the way in which we dismantle the Bretton Woods institutions."**

### **No dialogue possible**

THE week of activity culminated in a tumultuous demonstration of 15,000 people against the IMF and the World Bank. A discussion also took place between the solidarity movements and representatives of the IMF and World Bank. Pierre Galand and Vandana Shiva spoke in the name of the solidarity movements. Two thousand people followed the debate. The IMF representative recited the catechism of his organisation and the audience found it difficult to contain their indignation. The World Bank speaker was more subtle. He appealed to the NGOs not to see the World Bank as an enemy but to improve communications in the interests of the people. Vandana Shiva and Pierre Galand did not enter into this debate. Both said that the World Bank was only taking up themes like ecology and women's liberation to render its policy of adjustment a little more presentable. No dialogue was possible with institutions which habitually lied. Pierre Galand focussed his attention on the fact that programmes of adjustment were also being imposed on the European countries, and said that the vicious circle of austerity should be broken in the interests of the peoples of the North as well as the South. He appealed to the NGOs and the solidarity movements to engage more in politics. It was necessary to work harder for democracy from below and resist the tendency to globalisation which distanced people still more from political power. The room stood up to applaud our speakers. And the debate was closed: 50 years is enough! AH ☉

# Contemptible argument

THE IMF would like neo-liberalism to adopt a human face. **MAXIME DURAND** unmasks their current policies to reveal that nothing has changed.

**T**HE LEADERS of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have the habit of replying to their critics with the aid of a standard argument; that there are great difficulties in the countries of the Third World, and that without their intervention things would have been much worse. It is technically an unanswerable argument, since nobody is in a position to say what would have happened if these two organisations had not been in a position to impose their so-called structural adjustment policies.

This contemptible argument is the classic weapon of those who hold power; there is only one way of doing things — ours — and everything else is utopian and irresponsible.

In relation to this kind of position, the recent meeting of the IMF in Madrid introduced an important idea, which strengthens the impact of campaigns against the Third World debt and the Bretton Woods institutions, and clearly demonstrates the existence of very concrete choices, inside the IMF fortress itself. The meeting touched on the problem of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). SDRs are the credits issued by the IMF and they represent something akin to an international currency. The last allocations took place a long time ago (1970, 1978, and 1981) in a very different international monetary context, where they helped to inject a little liquidity in the world market.

## New instalment

The proposal this time was to issue a new instalment of \$36 billion, principally destined for the countries of the South and the East, many of them only recent adherents to the IMF. At least this was the plan of the director-general of the IMF — and not a particularly revolutionary one, given that \$36 billion represents less than 3% of the total debt of those countries. Yet it was still too much for the apostles of liberalism! The representatives of the IMF in Germany, the United States and Britain, joined by France ("out of realism", as the French minister

of finance put it) were opposed to the issuing of supplementary liquidities, because of the supposed risk of stoking inflationary pressures.

## Co-ordinated recovery

This says a lot about the real will of the governments of the imperialist countries to ensure the conditions for a co-ordinated recovery of the world economy, in which the so-called "countries on the road to development" can find a more satisfactory place. Yet this is only designed to distract public opinion and show humanitarian good faith, because when they find their backs to the wall, and when concrete decisions have to be made, the representatives of the bourgeoisie throw off the mask of solidarity and show themselves in their true light. In this case, it is not even a question of big spending, the sums in question being, as stated, minimal on a planetary scale. What we see here are the economic and ideological postulates of an inconceivable rigidity. All these thinkers who love so much to vaunt the merits of flexibility are themselves subject to inflexible dogmas; as if the problem today was the risk of inflation!

This myopia is revealing in relation to the hope or rather the ridiculous illusion that the great powers are able to implement a

**\$36 billion represents less than 3% of the total debt in the South and East.**

new "Marshall Plan" on a world scale. Not only are they incapable of it, but one could even say that their monetarist blindness leads them to conduct a policy which is counter to their own interests. When an expert such as Jeffrey Sachs, famous for his anti-social intransigence, demands that the IMF "cease preoccupying itself with the transition in Eastern Europe" and on to deplore the fact that there is "no global institution to assure control" of the international financial system, it is very much a signal that the policy of the IMF has skidded into a cynical and counter-productive defence of the domination of the large imperialist countries.


**Common front**

The positive result of this policy is that the countries of the South have formed an unexpected common front which has led to a situation of stalemate on the issue of the new SDRs. India, Brazil, Argentina and even Saudi Arabia have held firm, with the support of the rising powers of Asia, in arguing that the richest countries have no particular right to impose their point of view on the rest of the members of the IMF.

The very same day, we learnt that the us House of Representatives had postponed by two months the ratification of the accords signed at Marrakesh in the framework of GATT. It is the conservative opponents of GATT, led notably by the former presidential candidate Ross Perot, who have won what will undoubtedly be only a first skirmish. This throws into doubt not only the supposed benefits of free trade but also the durability of the future World Trade Organisation which is to be set up on 1 January 1995. The official liberal theory says that everybody gains from free trade, and in the context of GATT it evaluated at US\$250 billion the benefits accruing from the signature of the Uruguay Round between now and 2005. A new study has providentially arrived to double the stakes; now it will

be US\$500 billion. It goes without saying that these studies are pure and simple mystifications and that such figures, which can simply be doubled according to needs or circumstances, mean absolutely nothing. If the benefits of ultra-liberalism will indeed be so fabulous, it is hard to see why the IMF should make so much fuss over a few billion dollars!

The double non-ratification of Washington and Madrid symbolises eloquently the doubts hovering over the organisation of the international economy and, notably, over the destiny of the poorest countries in the world. ★



# US troops settle in

**GENERAL Shelton, who commands the US forces, says that: "We must not become the enemies in Haiti." Yet soldiers have been arresting paramilitaries only to hand them over to the Haitian police, who immediately release them. A very strange way of making friends with the Haitian masses. ARTHUR MAHON examines the real objectives behind the US occupation.**

**O**N THE night of Sunday 16 October a rumour spread throughout Haiti: General Duperval, who had a week earlier replaced Cédras as head of the army, had planned to assassinate President Aristide. American guards had discovered grenades in his car. During the night, some thousands of people gathered in front of the national palace in Port-au-Prince. Some carried machetés and clubs. Having enjoyed some days of liberty, they were determined that a new 30 September 1991 would not take place. A nightmare for the US officials. The next day a hundred US soldiers were stationed before the national palace, together with a number of security agents. All wore the same khaki shirts,

which scarcely concealed their bullet-proof vests. All through the night and morning, US officers with all kinds of special-vision binoculars kept scanning the multitudes. According to the UPI agency, "the work has begun to identify rabble-rousers".

The episode reveals the central role played by the US forces in Haiti. Having had access to the roof and balconies of the national palace to protect the president, they used this privileged position to build up files on those who came to defend him. In the name of the restoration of democracy, they are seeking to secure their control of Haitian society, using not only the national palace, but also its principal inhabitant.

## Edifying

The true objectives of the US intervention can best be assessed by examining the motives of those who planned it. This has been done by the American journalist Allan Nairn, who writes on US policy in Latin America and Asia.<sup>1</sup> The views he canvassed during the weeks preceding the invasion were edifying. According to one of his interviewees, the objective was to create a situation in which the Haitians "don't think that they can do as they want". Who was the invasion supposed to protect? In the words of one intelligence officer, it was

"the middle class, those who have an American style training, some sectors of the business community". Major Louis Kernizan, an American of Haitian origin, was a representative at the US embassy in Port-au-Prince from 1989 to 1991, and now works for the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). He is one of the principal strategists of the occupation and expresses himself frankly: "Who are we going back to save? You're going to end up dealing with the same folks as before, the five families that run the country, the military and the bourgeoisie. They're the same folks that are supposed to be the bad guys now, but the bottom line is you know that you're always going to end up dealing with them because they speak your language, they understand your system, they've been educated in your country. It's not going to be the slum guy from Cité Soleil." Kernizan is opposed to wage increases because "you have to use your advantages and in Haiti it's cheap labour". Another intelligence officer agrees with Kernizan on this subject. Speaking of Aristide, he told Allan Nairn that "that old reformist economic programme is now history, and he won't be allowed to revive it". Is there nothing to fear, then, from Aristide? Obviously, these gentlemen do not like him. Yet, according to a Pentagon man, "the sooner that we can bring Aristide back to

1. *The Nation*, 03.10.94 (New York).



**Aristide returns...**

**...after three long years in exile**



give his message of reconciliation, of law and order, the better it will be." "Others", according to Nairn, "are uncertain whether he will play the game but note that anyway he will not really lead. A psychological operations expert said that, under the occupation, the greatest part of the Haitian army and the administrative infrastructure will transfer its loyalty to the new 'gwo nèg' [he who makes the rules]. And the new strong man, he said, will be the United States."

While Kernizan was sceptical about the possibility of a popular uprising, not everybody shares his opinion. Nairn again: "A US psychological operations expert who specialises in Haiti predicts that if there is an invasion, the people will begin by applauding the departure of Cédras, but an anti-American sentiment — and thus attacks against the forces of the United States — could develop in the space of four weeks. That will be less probable if Aristide returns rapidly, but even in this case, he said, the danger of uprising remains if the popular expectations are not rapidly met." In any case, "according to documents and long conversations with the US military and intelligence strategists, whatever the manner in which Cédras goes — through an invasion, a coup, or an understanding — the US will contain the popular movement, by force if necessary." For this, the necessary equipment has been prepared: "A supplier who works for the State Department has said that the naval force now off Haiti has replaced its stocks of anti-tank weapons by instruments of crowd control, like shields, gas masks and batons." Yet some continue to say that the US forces will be withdrawn after several months. And afterwards? Nairn: "It is envisaged that a whole army of US soldiers, CIA advisers and civilians will remain behind to participate in Haitian affairs more deeply than they have for some years. For example, the International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), the US agency charged with reconstructing the Haitian police force, should, according to its chief strategist, remain for three years, with several hundred US trainers who will have the job of fashioning a Haitian force of 5,000 men." According to a Pentagon source, this police force will be there to prevent any attempt at revolt.

The United States will not rely solely on repression or espionage to control Haitian society. "Some US officials", writes Nairn, "say that, although they

## Clinton has recently granted \$5 million to the CIA to carry out "non-specified political actions"

are prepared to keep a tight rein on the popular movement, its capacity for resistance has been weakened by the unrestrained terror of the armed forces and of FRAPH [Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti]." Consequently, "low intensity war" can now give way to what the American researcher William Robinson calls "low intensity democracy".<sup>2</sup>

### Infiltrate

Under the dictatorship, as a complement to the repression, the United States, had already, in several ways, tried to infiltrate the popular movement and buy it off. They are now going to devote themselves to constructing an "organised civil society" in their own fashion. This is considered, according to Nairn, as the "key to any programme of control of the population". They will also, of course, act on the political plane. According to the weekly *Haiti Progrès* (Volume 12, no. 29), which quotes a memorandum from the US embassy, they intend to encourage and finance "the responsible elements inside the popular movement" and "the moderate Duvaliériste sectors". According to the *New York Times*, Clinton has recently granted \$5 million to the CIA to carry out "non-specified political actions".

The reasoning of the military officials interviewed by Allan Nairn before the invasion was based on over-formal schemas. What happened after the arrival of the US troops was not really foreseen in their programme, to the extent that US strategists have had to modify their plans from day to day. Moreover, the presence of US soldiers excited popular mobilisations rather than holding them back. In fact, at least in the big towns where US soldiers were numerous, increasingly large and audacious

Haitians used them as shields to regroup, demonstrate and defy the Haitian army. At Cap-Haïtien, the US soldiers had to halt their patrols one night because, from the moment when they appeared, the people came onto the street and followed them.

### Substitute

One of the objectives of the accord signed on 18 September by Jimmy Carter and the putschist leaders was to prevent the collapse of the Haitian army, through co-operation between the two armies. The US army did not wish to substitute itself for the Haitian army and assume the functions of a police force, on the one hand because, as one officer said, "to become the police is to become a target", on the other because the US officials wanted the Haitian state apparatus to continue functioning, without rupture. In several towns, this schema was able to function. In some, the US soldiers were too few in number to be used as "shields" by the people. In others, they strictly applied the orders following from the 18 September accord, at the risk of seeing their popularity founder.

At Cap-Haïtien and Cayes, it was different. The US soldiers rapidly found themselves in a vacuum; before the mounting of popular protest, the Haitian soldiers preferred to abandon their barracks. At Port-au-Prince, where the greatest part of Haitian soldiers are concentrated, it was another case. After the Haitian police had killed some demonstrators who had been emboldened by the US presence, the project of common patrols between the two armies was abandoned. And the US military police supervised the forces of Haitian repression. The latter showed themselves inca-

2. *Covert Action*, Spring 1994 (Washington).

# US troops settle in

pable of assuming certain missions which the US military commanders wished to assign to them (disarming the paramilitaries, protecting demonstrations). Finally, faced with increasingly audacious demonstrations, which went so far as the sacking of police stations, the soldiers deserted the streets of the capital.

**U**NTIL now, the US army had watched, intelligently, to preserve its popularity. Its attitude during the demonstration of 30 September, which was to render homage to the victims of the dictatorship, is however very revealing of the devious policy which it has adopted. The organisers of the demonstration had been promised that the US soldiers would protect them. Finally, after a consultation with the White House, a sharing of tasks was decided. The Haitian army would oversee the route of the demonstration. For their part, the US soldiers would keep their distance and block the crossroads leading to the bourgeois quarters and the official buildings. But the Haitian soldiers never appeared. And, although posted not far away, the US troops allowed the thugs of FRAPH to attack the demonstration. To conserve its credit, the US army organised a raid on some arms caches and arrested a few dozen people. By raiding the FRAPH local, the

US soldiers became heroes although they had not lifted a finger three days earlier when its occupants fired on the demonstrators.

## Responsibility

One can trace a parallel between this episode and what has happened since 1991; the United States bears an overwhelming responsibility for the coup d'état and the repression which followed, and yet they could finally emerge considered to be the "liberators of Haiti". Act I of the play must be forgotten — only Act II should remain in the memory. The US embassy had a large hand in the coup. The CIA now acknowledges that it knew in advance of the putsch. Emmanuel Constant, one of the chiefs of FRAPH, has revealed to Allan Naim<sup>3</sup> that CIA and DIA leaders were at the army GHQ at the time. The FRAPH is a paramilitary structure which sows terror throughout the country. The United States would like to make it the equivalent of the Salvadoran ARENA. According to Constant, it was a DIA agent, Colonel Patrick Collins, who has very recently returned to Haiti, who asked him to create FRAPH after the coup d'état. Constant already worked for the CIA and for its Haitian emanation, the SIN (Service d'intelligence nationale), a structure which has organised political repression since 1987.

Constant's links with the United States are so close that on the day after the raid against FRAPH the US embassy organised a press conference for him, providing a microphone, technicians and protection!

## Return

The return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, on 15 October, was greeted by explosions of joy in the popular neighbourhoods. But the crowd which gathered before the national palace was smaller than anticipated. The fear of repression remains great. Some days before, a truck filled with FRAPH members had fired on a demonstration in the south of the country, killing 24 people. In some rural areas, the section chiefs continue to make the law. What will happen in the months to come cannot be a replica of the first seven months of the Aristide presidency. A lot of things have changed. The coup d'état allowed the reconstitution of a network of auxiliaries of the army and strongly implanted paramilitaries. They dispose of considerable weapons supplies. Aristide wants the US army to disarm them. But there would be much to fear in a large scale operation of house searches. When, following denunciations by the people, the US soldiers seized some arms depots, they began by searching a house of Aristide supporters, acting on a tip-off from a

## US troops allowed the thugs of FRAPH to attack the demonstration

3. *The Nation*, 24.10.94.

pro-putschist leader in Cap-Haïtien. The problem of the paramilitaries can only be settled by a general mobilisation of the population. It must have the right to protect itself. Aristide himself, before taking office in February 1991, made reference to the vigilante brigades which had been formed several times during 1986. During the night of 16 and 17 October, when the rumours of a coup spread, one again saw the inhabitants of the popular neighbourhoods setting up roadblocks to control vehicles. Yet Aristide no longer seems disposed towards this kind of initiative, and the Minister of Information, Hervé Denis, has announced that anybody found taking part in looting or attacks on the houses of political opponents (in other words, the pro-putschists) will be arrested. This is the first time that one of Aristide's ministers has spoken the language of repression, and undoubtedly it will not be the last. The political course adopted by Aristide has its consequences. He has announced that he wishes to include representatives of Haiti's richest families in the government, which would mean there would be no question of allowing the crowds to besiege the parliament or barricade the doors of the tribunals where the corrupt judges sit, as happened in 1991. The economic policy to which Aristide is committed could lead him to give his approval to acts of repression. It will be one of the great problems in the period to come.

**Economic orientation**

In 1991, Aristide had not yet chosen a well defined economic orientation. However, the programme presented by his representatives to a meeting of financial backers held in Paris in August 1994 is very clear. It was notably drawn up by Leslie Delatour, who was finance minister in the first government which followed the fall of Duvalier. The neo-liberal economic policy which he has undertaken to carry out would have catastrophic consequences. The programme presented in August envisages in particular the suppression of half the jobs in the civil service, the privatisation of state industries, and the abolition of import duties (except, for the moment, on some agricultural products). A non-defined "social safety net" is proposed. Interviewed on the subject of this plan three weeks after its presentation, Chavannes Jean-Baptiste, founder of a peasant movement, replied that, although he was a member of Aristide's private cabinet and resident in Washington, he had

never been consulted and he had never been able to procure a copy of the text. After having read some extracts, he said: "This is the plan of the World Bank and the IMF. It's the same plan they've always offered for years, what they used to call the 'American Plan'."<sup>4</sup> In line with this plan, US officials have proposed that the funds for compensating victims of repression, envisaged by the ambiguous amnesty law voted at the beginning of October (which Aristide is to interpret in a decree) should take the form of shares in the privatised public enterprises!

This economic programme has a formidable logic. In order to attract foreign investment, it is necessary that the environment is "secure and stable", as they love to say in Washington. It follows that the poor must keep quiet and leave the Haitian (or rather Haitian-American) state to settle their affairs. It would be disastrous if the Haitian left were to follow President Aristide down this road. ★



**US soldiers arguing with a woman, accused by her neighbours of hiding an "attaché"**

4. *Multinational Monitor*, July/August 1994 (Washington).

# Radical left break ground

LAST month we briefly reported on an important breakthrough in Denmark for the European radical left, with the election of six parliamentary deputies from the "Enhedslisten" (Red-Green Alliance) list, and that one of the six, Sören Søndergaard, is a member of the Socialist Workers' Party, the Danish section of the Fourth International. Below, in a **DOCUMENT** by the Alliance's Committee on European Affairs the reasons for, and the significance of, this electoral success is explained.

**A**T THE 21 September general election, "Enhedslisten" — Red-Green Alliance — won six seats (3.1 percent of the national vote). This was the first time that the radical left had entered parliament, the Folketing, since the Left Socialists (VS) lost their seats in 1987.

[Our results] are to a large extent due to our opposition to the Maastricht Treaty and the European Union, as the Alliance was the only political force standing in the election on a clear anti-Maastricht ticket. Other small parties with a similar policy, like the Greens, had been prevented from standing, as the authorities have introduced increasingly restrictive rules to make it more difficult for new parties to stand in parliamentary elections. The Alliance probably even attracted voters who under other circumstances would never have voted for a radical socialist party.

But there were other issues which contributed to the result, such as unemployment, since many voters

feel that the government and the political establishment is not doing anything near sufficient on this problem. Moreover, the two Maastricht referendums in particular have meant that a section of the population has become disaffected with establishment politics in general.<sup>1</sup> There is no doubt that the Alliance attracted a number of the youngest voters, many of whom want change.

Another important factor was that over the last few years the Socialist People's Party (SF) has moved increasingly close to the Social Democrats, hoping to be included in a future government or to gain some influence over its policies — a tactical move which has not yet paid off. This move is reflected not only in their switch to a pro-Maastricht stand in the second referendum in 1993, but also in much of their political practice — for example, they no longer have a clear stand on disarmament. In fact, SF has become part of the political establishment. After the second referendum many voters felt betrayed by SF. Consequently, there has been a bigger space to their left, which the Alliance was able to fill.

The elections were a big victory for the right-wing liberal party, "Venstre". They took a further thirteen seats, increasing their representation to forty-two, although they have been unable to use their success to form a government. Before the election they had made what proved to be a very stupid alliance with the Conservatives and the extreme-right Progress Party, which contributed to undermining the voters' belief in their ability to form a government with socially responsible policies.

The Social Democrats have been able to form a new minority government with the two liberal centre parties, very similar in fact to the old government which was formed in January 1993 after ten years of bourgeois government. However, the new government is

considerably weaker, as the Social Democrats have fewer seats than before and the Christian Peoples' Party lost all their seats. The government will be forced to operate with shifting majorities.

Our line was to prevent a bourgeois government and we therefore supported the creation of a Social Democratic-led minority government, whilst maintaining a free hand on future parliamentary votes.

The new government's policies will probably be very much like those of the previous government, which have been right-wing social democratic policies. However, there is no doubt that the entry of the Red-Green Alliance in the Folketing will present some difficulties for the government with regard to the 1996 inter-governmental conference. It will make it more or less impossible for SF to move closer to the Social Democrats on further European integration, which is surely on the cards for the EU conference. The government will be seeking broad parliamentary support for their negotiations with the other EU member states. If they don't have that they run the risk of losing the next referendum on the new EU treaty, in 1996/97.

The Red-Green Alliance was presented during the election campaign as little more than an anti-Maastricht party or co-ordination between small left-wing parties. However, since the parliamentary elections in 1990, we have developed politically and organisationally, with detailed policies on a wide range of issues. In parliament, we hope to be able to form closer links with popular movements outside, first and foremost with the two movements which reject the Maastricht Treaty, and put forward their views alongside our own. ★

1. See Åge Skovrind, 'The carrot and the stick', *International Viewpoint*, no. 246, June 1993.

**FINN KJELLER** from the Socialist Workers' Party (SAP — Danish section of the Fourth International) adds:

**T**HE SOCIAL Democrats are determined to stay in power. They show no desire to explore the possibility of cooperation with those to their left. Its coalition with the two small bourgeois parties, both of which have been given important portfolios, means that the government will

depend for a majority on the Conservative Party rather than the left.

The political course of the government, led by Nyrup Rasmussen, will include tightening budget constraints further, even though the economic up-turn has failed to reduce unemployment so far. However, the police and military will not suffer from reductions in public spending. Despite widespread reluctance from the Social Democratic rank-and-file, Nyrup and his ministers intend to continue with previous policies, for

example, inviting tenders for city bus services and privatisation of the post office. This is an indication of the extent to which the government has committed itself to the European Single Market.

From the first day of the new parliamentary session, the Red-Green Alliance have been the government's sharpest critics. One of the first motions from the Alliance was a demand to veto any EU directive which erodes current environmental or other standards. ☛

## FREM TIDEN?



The future?  
It's not with Maastricht...

### *On the side of the workers' parties*

DECLARING itself a left opposition in parliament, the Red-Green Alliance placed itself on the side of the workers' parties against the right-wing bloc — on the side of working people against capitalist policies, including those implemented by the Social Democrats.

In order to prevent the right-wing from taking office, it gave support to the leader of the largest workers' party, Nyrup Rasmussen of the Social Democrats, to initiate and organise the negotiations to form a government. At the same time, the Alliance maintained its independence, refusing to give Nyrup government a "blank cheque". That is why no conditions, and no compromises were attached to this initial support. On every issue the Red-Green deputies will vote according to what serves the interests of workers, the environment, international solidarity, democratic rights and social equality — opposing all set-backs. At this stage it remains to be seen to what extent the different elements and strategies contained within the Alliance will give rise to different interpretations of specific issues and motions. ☛

# Meciar treads "Slovak path"

**UNLIKE their richer Czech neighbours, Slovakia's would-be entrepreneurs are finding the introduction of capitalism difficult. In elections on 30 September-1 October, voters rejected a neo-liberal government in favour of one which claims to favour social reform and greater interventionism. A similar result in the 1992 Czechoslovak elections split the federation. ADAM NOVAK explains why the new government will be hard pressed to find an external scapegoat.**

**A**LTHOUGH they have never won an election, Slovakia's neo-liberal and Christian Democratic parties have twice profited from a split in the country's largest party, the broad centre-left Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) of Vladimir Meciar, enabling them to form unpopular governments which pushed through market reform policies. Since forcing a vote of no confidence on 11 March, the "caretaker" government of neo-liberals, Christian Democrats, and the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL, former Communist Party) has tried to repeat the popular Czech privatisation by coupon. However, their reform crusade has been tarred by bureaucratic delays, and bogged down in accusations of corruption.

## Foreign aid

Nor did the foreign aid, which they said Meciar had frightened away, materialise. Since 1989 direct foreign investment has been only US\$1.1 billion (20% of the per capita level of foreign investment in the Czech Republic). Unemployment is 14.5% nationally, and up to 20% in some regions (the Czech average is 4%). Although the economy has now recovered from the partition of Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993, the economy is still weak, with Western advisers warning that the "inevitable" steps of restructuring are still ahead. The rightist government's decision to reduce

petrol, diesel, potato and meat prices, announced the day before the election, failed to convince the population that quick reforms would bring results.

The party of former Privatisation Minister Ivan Miklos even failed to clear the 5% hurdle to enter parliament. As a result, the right wing parties would have to ally with the former Communists and either the Hungarian or the Slovak nationalist parties in order to have a majority. However, this would not give them a mandate for the reforms they wished to pursue. Moreover, it would oblige them to take sides in relation to the increasing national tensions between Slovak chauvinists and the compact Hungarian minority living along the southern borders.

The populist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), led by former premier Vladimir Meciar, maintained the support of one third of voters. In government and in opposition, Meciar had skilfully argued the need for interventionist, state capitalist policies. Almost alone on the Slovak political scene, he opposed the neo-liberal policies forced on Slovakia by the main Czech parties which dominated the former federation.<sup>1</sup> Rightly, Meciar predicted that the uncontrolled market would be a disaster for Slovakia, industrialised only under the Stalinist regime, home to most of Czecho-Slovakia's heavy industry, and heavily oriented to Eastern customers. He was ostracised for his criticism of President Vaclav Havel's 1990 decision to abandon Czechoslovak arms production (2/3 of which was based in Slovakia).<sup>2</sup> HZDS's demands for a "Slovak path" in economic policy was particularly popular in small towns and villages,<sup>3</sup> and among workers and older people.

Meciar has built the image of a nationalist leader, suspicious of the market and foreign capital. In fact, his economic policies are broadly similar to those applied in neighbouring Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and, in the case of the latter, he has done all he can to maintain the agreed customs union. The Czech Republic still takes over 30% of Slovak exports, mainly raw and semi-finished materials for re-working and re-export to the West. And his decision to devalue the Slovak koruna

(Kcs) by 10% against the Czech, when the currency union fell apart in February 1993, is now accepted in business circles, who predict a Kcs15 billion surplus in trade with the Czech Republic this year, leaving the country with a manageable global trade deficit of only Kcs1 billion.<sup>4</sup> The devaluation is a continuation of the 45% devaluation in 1990, which placed Czecho-Slovak wages at 3/4 of Polish or Hungarian levels. Such destructive competition is not just a sign of weakness, but the logical conclusion for central European countries with similar industrial structures bidding against each other for limited Western orders on the basis of one cost advantage: a skilled and unorganised labour force.

Though social expectations will be higher under Meciar, his policies are essentially the same as those of his neo-liberal critics, presented in an authoritarian and paternalistic, rather than technocratic style.

## The left

The conflict between Meciar and the right had, until these elections, favoured the moderate Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), which has transformed itself from being the former ruling party into a broad democratic party, supported by former Communist party members and others who reject the current reforms.<sup>5</sup> Yet while the left as a whole increased

1. In 1991, Czechoslovakia had a population of 15.7 million: 10.3 million in the Czech Republic and the rest (including 530 thousand ethnic Hungarians) in Slovakia.

2. Arms sales represented about 12% of Czechoslovakia's hard currency earnings in the late 1980s. Had sales continued at the same rate, arms would now account for 20% of Slovak foreign currency earnings. While the highly-profitable Czech arms industry was re-launched after independence, Slovakia's tank factories are silent. Some have been stripped of their equipment, others are engaged on ill thought-out conversion programmes imposed on them by French, British and American NGOs, using funds provided by the very governments which have taken the place on the world arms market which Slovak products used to fill.

3. 3/4 of the population live in towns with under 50 thousand inhabitants.

4. Exports this year will exceed Kcs116 billion.

5. This transformation, based on re-registration, required members to make an active choice to remain in the party, combined with a purge of Stalinist leaders. However, there is tolerance for Stalinist members. The party's social democratic policy has been imposed by a young and articulate new leadership.

its vote in these elections, the SDL paid a high price for its participation in the anti-Meciar government, and the consequent reduction of its policies to support neo-liberal economic reforms in exchange for a slightly more generous social policy, and greater support for important businesses in financial difficulty. Having received only half of the votes they expected, ex-Stalinist deputies, such as Pavol Kanis, are considering reversing the social democratic policies of party leader Peter Weiss, and entering a coalition with the HZDS, which they consider to be less democratic, but more social minded than the outgoing rightist government of Jozef Moravcik.

### Fortunes

The fortunes of social democratic parties have been reversed before. What is worth noting in Slovakia is that the votes lost by the SDL went not only to the vague centre-coalition of Meciar, but also to the "Workers Association of Slovakia" (ZRS), formed only this spring, which took 7.4 % of the vote and 13 of the 150 seats. A spontaneously formed coalition of groups of frustrated older workers, the ZRS mixes workerist and populist demands, combining an absolute rejection of factory closures and price rises with reactionary demands — for example, a law "to outlaw unemployment, and punish the feckless", and measures to restrict the use of the Hungarian language in ethnically mixed southern districts.

This volatile formation is of crucial importance in the development of a democratic and socialist opposition to market reforms. On the one hand, the ZRS is so unstructured that, even if the leadership is absorbed into exclusively parliamentary activity, and becomes more moderate, each strike and social polarisation will throw up new radical leaders for the Association on a local level. But unless a group of leaders are able to articulate alternative policies, rather than short term defensive demands, the association could drift towards the "red-brown" realignment of nostalgic Stalinists and the extreme right, represented by the Slovak National Party (SNS). ★

PARTY	1992(%)	1994(%)	SEATS
Association of Workers (ZRS)		7.3	13
Common Choice (mainly SDL)	14.7	10.4	18
Mvmt. for a Dem. Slovakia (HZDS)	37.3	35.0	61
Christian Democrats (KDH)	8.9	10.1	17
Democratic Union (DU)		8.6	15
Slovak National Party (SNS)	7.9	5.4	9
Hungarian Coalition		10.2	17
Lists receiving less than 5%		13.1	—

Total participation in election: 76% of registered voters (voting is not compulsory).

### Nationalism

THERE are both Hungarian and Slovak nationalist parties in Slovakia. Their actual and potential role is quite different. Three nationalist and Catholic parties mobilise over 90% of the votes of the largely-rural ethnic Hungarian minority (12% of the population) in the south of the country. They seek to defend the extensive minority education and language rights introduced under the Stalinist regime, and now threatened by each successive government in Bratislava. As the climate of intolerance increases, minority leaders are more vocal in their demands for autonomy. Until these demands are met, there will be little possibility for organising Hungarians on anything other than a national basis.

The Slovak National Party is quite different. Their nostalgia for a mythical Slovak past, and fascination with the puppet fascist state of 1938-1944, means little to most urban Slovaks. Blaming Hungarians and Czechs for all the country's ills has won them a place on the margins of parliamentary life, but they are hardly the dominant force the foreign press says they are. The far right as a whole is less popular than in the neighbouring Czech Republic. ★

### Economic Situation

- Redistribution in the federal budget made up 7% of the Slovak budget in the late 1980s.
- In the twelve months to June 1994 GDP increased by 4 %, almost cancelling the decline following the national partition (4.5%).
- Industrial production has increased by 15%, but construction is 6% down.
- Inflation is currently at 13.5%.
- Budget deficit of Kcs10.6 billion. Servicing of the State debt will cost 12.6 billion this year, 42 billion in 1995. Foreign loans make up 40% of currency reserves.

US\$1 = Kcs34

# Originality of thought

1994 marks the hundredth anniversary of the birth of the great Latin American Marxist José Carlos Mariategui (1894-1930), a thinker comparable, in the strength and originality of his thought, to the great European Marxists.<sup>1</sup>

**MICHAEL LÖWY**

**O**NE OF the most important — and also controversial — aspects of Mariategui's work is his conception of the Peruvian and Latin American revolution, developed mostly in the course of his last years, often in polemic with Haya de la Torre and his party (APRA). It represents a strategic vision with striking analogies to permanent revolution. Mariategui was familiar with Trotsky's writings (he had published an article by Trotsky — on Lenin — in his review, *Amauta*); yet it would be a mistake to believe that he deduced his theory of the Latin American revolution starting from this source. Trotsky himself did not formulate his theory of permanent revolution, as a theory with a universal application, until 1929; the book was only published in 1930, after the death of Mariategui. In reality, the founder of Peruvian communism arrived by his own road, through an autonomous and original reflection, at conclusions close to or comparable with Trotsky's.

At the time when Stalin formulated the doctrine of "revolution by stages" and the "bloc of four classes", and applied it (or had it applied) in China — with consequences which are well known — Mariategui reacted in a contradictory fashion. On the one hand he seemed to accept, around 1927-1928, the Comintern's Chinese policy, but on the other he denied that it had any validity for Latin America: "The collaboration with the bourgeoisie, and even with the feudal elements, in the Chinese anti-imperialist struggle, is explained by reasons of race, of national civilization which do not exist among us. The Chinese noble or bourgeois feels himself to be profoundly Chinese, and so on. In Indian America the circumstances are not the same. The Creole aristocracy and bourgeoisie do not feel any solidarity with the people through the link of a common history and culture." Later, in 1929, he recognised his

error in relation to China: "The treason of the Chinese bourgeoisie, the rupture of the Kuomintang... have demonstrated how little confidence one can place, even in a country like China, in the revolutionary nationalist sentiment of the bourgeoisie."<sup>2</sup>

Whatever his views on the Orient, he was convinced that the local bourgeoisie could not play a revolutionary democratic role in Peru and in Latin America. He wrote, for example, in 1927-28 that, "A progressive bourgeoisie, with a national sensibility, does not exist, and has never existed, in Peru."<sup>3</sup> That is why he turned in an active fashion towards the workers and peasants as the motor force of the Peruvian revolution, and founded in 1928 the Socialist Party, affiliated to the Communist International, as well as, in 1929, the CGTP trade union federation.

## "Populist"

The writings of Mariategui on the indigenous peasantry of Peru and Indian America have earned him the epithet of "populist" from Soviet (Stalinist) spokespersons. According to V.M. Miroshchevski, the principal representative of this "orthodox" critique, Mariategui's principal heresy consists in believing in the possibility of a socialist revolution in Peru, denying the possibility of a prior stage, the "bourgeois democratic, anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution": "To provide a basis for his affirmation of the socialist character of the immediate revolution in Peru, he appealed to arguments which started from romantic nationalism, from idealisation of the Inca social regime, from the "populist" fetishisation of the peasant community."<sup>4</sup>

1. Several conferences on Mariategui have already taken place in Lima, Mexico, Havana and so on. An international conference will be held in Paris, at the Sorbonne, on 4 & 5 November 1994.

2. J.C. Mariategui, 'Punto de vista anti-imperialista', June 1929, in 'Obra Política', Mexico, Ed. Era, 1979, pp 273-274.

3. J. C. Mariategui, 'Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana', 1928, Ed. Universitaria, Santiago de Chile, 1955, p. 29.

4. V. M. Miroshchevski, "El populismo" en el Peru. Papel de Mariategui en la historia del pensamiento social latinoamericano, 1942, in J. Arico (ed), 'Mariategui y los orígenes del marxismo latinoamericano', Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente, Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1978, pp. 67-69.




It is true that Mariategui had, in several essays, advanced the heterodox idea that the pre-Columbian communitarian traditions of the indigenous Peruvians could constitute the point of departure for a socialist re-organisation of the countryside. If that was sufficient to characterise a theory as populist, Marx himself would have been a "populist" thinker. As is well known, he had, on several occasions — and notably in his preface to the 1882 Russian edition of the Communist Manifesto — defended exactly this idea, in relation to the traditional Russian peasant commune (the *obshchchina*).

In reality, Mariategui's ideas can in no way be assimilated to populism. On the one hand, because for him, (as for Trotsky), the emancipation of the peasants could only be realised by a proletarian revolution, at the same time socialist and democratic ("anti-feudal" to use the terminology of the period, which is fairly imprecise): "In our Spanish America, still semi-feudal, the bourgeoisie has neither known how to nor wished to accomplish the tasks of the liquidation of feudalism... This enterprise falls to socialism. The socialist doctrine is the only one which can give a modern, constructive sense to the indigenous cause which, situated on its real social and economic terrain... could go a long way towards the accomplishment of this task with the will and the discipline of a class which appears today in our historic process; the proletariat."

### Indigenous communities

On the other hand, because he in no way advocated a return to the past, his recognition of the role of the traditional indigenous communities did not at all mean a "romantic and anti-historic tendency of reconstruction or resurrection of Inca socialism which corresponded to completely outmoded historic conditions", rather, it took into consideration the habits of co-operation and socialism of the indigenous peasants as factors which could be utilised in a perfectly scientific technique of production.<sup>5</sup>

Mariategui's great merit and originality was to recognise precisely the immense revolutionary potential of the indigenous peasantry, the richness of its ancient culture, the vitality of its collectivist traditions, while simultaneously showing, with vigour and realism, that the socialist revolution was the sole authentic solution to its suffering, its poverty and its exploitation by the big estate owners (*latifundistas*).



After having characterised Mariategui as populist, the Stalinists would try, some years later, to "retake" him, re-interpreting his writings in the light of the Comintern doctrine of the revolution by stages. They tried to legitimise this distorted reading by referring to one or two paragraphs of his work, taken out of context. For example, they cite the following passage from the "Programme of the Socialist Party", drafted by Mariategui in October 1928: "Only proletarian action can first stimulate and then realise the tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution, which the bourgeois regime is incapable of developing and accomplishing... Its revolutionary-democratic stage accomplished, the revolution becomes by its objectives and its doctrine proletarian revolution."<sup>6</sup> In fact this text can be read and interpreted in a "permanentist" as well as in a "stageist" sense. Yet to decide which interpretation is the most adequate, there is an obvious solution: to compare the passage with the rest of the writings of Mariategui at this period. For example, in the editorial of the review *Amauta*, no. 17, September 1928, Mariategui stressed explicitly, radically and unequivocally the necessary fusion of the democratic and socialist tasks in the Latin American revolution: "The Latin American revolution will be nothing more and nothing less than a stage, a phase of the world revolution. It

will be purely and simply the socialist revolution. You can add to this word, according to the case, all the adjectives that you wish: "anti-imperialist", "agrarian", "revolutionary nationalist". Socialism implies them, precedes them, embraces them all. To imperialist, plutocratic, capitalist North America it is only possible to effectively oppose a socialist Latin America. The era of free competition in the capitalist economy is past in every domain and every aspect. We have entered the era of the monopolies, that is the empires. The destination of these countries, in the capitalist order, is that of simple colonies."<sup>7</sup>

One could consider some of these formulations to be excessive or a little schematic: "semi-colonies" (or dependent countries) would be more precise than "simple colonies" and the definition of the revolution as "purely and

5. See Mariategui, "Prefacio a 'El amaute Atusparia', 1930, et principios programáticos del Partido socialista", 1928, "Obra Política", pp. 231 and 270-271. The concept of "Inca socialism" is very debatable; on this subject also see Robert Paris, "José Carlos Mariategui y el modelo de 'comunismo' inca" in his book "La formación ideológica de José Carlos Mariategui", Cuardenos de Pasado y presente, Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1981.

6. Mariategui, "principios programáticos del Partido Socialista", "Obra Política", p. 271.

7. Mariategui, "Aniversario y balance", 1928, "Obra Política", pp. 266-267.

# Originality of thought

simply" socialist seems to underestimate the weight of the democratic tasks. But nobody, short of total falsification, could present the author of these lines as a partisan of the revolution by stages.

## Diverse forms

These ideas are taken up, in diverse forms and accents, in several other writings of Mariategui during the years from 1928 to 1930. We will mention only the most famous, the document "Anti-imperialist point of view" presented by Mariategui to the Latin American Communist Conference in Buenos Aires in June 1929: "Neither the bourgeoisie, nor the petty bourgeoisie can carry an anti-imperialist policy to power... without neglecting the use of any element of anti-imperialist agitation, nor any means of mobilisation of the social sectors which can eventually participate in this struggle, our mission is to explain and demonstrate to the masses that only the socialist revolution is capable of opposing a real and definitive barrier to the advance of imperialism."<sup>8</sup> Once again, one can consider that this formulation underestimates the anti-imperialist aspirations of the petty bourgeoisie (or at least its radicalised sectors) but it is impossible to portray its author as a partisan of the bloc of four classes with the national bourgeoisie against imperialism.

In any case, these theses were rejected by Vittorio Codovilla and the "orthodox" Communists during the Buenos Aires conference; as Ricardo Galindo observes in his remarkable book "The agony of Mariategui", whereas the International wished to struggle for a "bourgeois democratic" revolution Mariategui and his comrades refused to consider capitalism as progress and fixed as their objective socialist revolution.<sup>9</sup>

In other words: the idea of the socialist dynamic of the Peruvian and Latin American revolution is at the heart of the political thought of Mariategui between 1928 and 1930, something which was original and heretical in relation to the doctrine of both "official" communism and APRA. However, it would be wrong to simply identify his conception with that of the growing over of the

democratic into the socialist revolution (a more systematic conception), and the articulation between national, agrarian and socialist tasks which Trotsky was in the process of formulating at exactly this time and subsequently published as "Permanent Revolution" in 1930. Yet the similarity of the fundamental political aim, the analogy between the essential line of the two is undeniable.

It seems that in the course of the conference of Latin American parties of 1929, the accusation of "Trotskyism" was launched against Mariategui. It amounted of course to an inexact formulation, but it had its "rational kernel"; Mariategui's theses on the Latin American revolution were closer to those of the Left Opposition than those of the Stalinist Comintern leadership.<sup>10</sup> Later, in their stage of "retaking" Mariategui, certain Stalinist authors presented him as "anti-Trotskyist", under the pretext of his polemic against the "Trotskyist" Max Eastman in his book "Defence of Marxism" (1930). In fact, Max Eastman had little to do with Trotskyism, but also and above all, in this book Mariategui refers to Trotsky as an example, together with Marx, Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg of the unity between action and thought.<sup>11</sup>

## Internationalist

A convinced internationalist, Mariategui followed closely the debates inside the CPSU without taking any explicit position for one tendency or the other. In an article written in 1928, while considering the victory of Stalin as an inevitable stage of the Russian Revolution, and the result of a provisional national retreat, he saluted Trotsky as a leader who represented "the international sensibility of the socialist revolution. His notable writings on the transitory stabilisation of capitalism situate him among the most lucid and penetrating critics of the epoch. But this same international sensibility of the revolution, which gives him so much prestige on the world scene, reduces his strength, for the moment, in the practice of Russian politics."<sup>12</sup> It required a good deal of political courage and autonomy of thought for a partisan of the Communist International to make

an affirmation of this type at the very moment when Trotsky was being expelled from the Soviet party.

## Prophetic

One year later (February 1929) when Stalin expelled Trotsky from the USSR, Mariategui wrote an article where this prophetic formula appears: "The Russian revolution owes its international, ecumenical value, its character as a phenomenon prefiguring the rise of a new civilisation, to the thought to which Trotsky and his comrades adhere to with all their vigour and coherence. Without a vigilant critique, which is the best proof of the vitality of the Bolshevik party, the Soviet government probably runs the danger of falling into a mechanical, formalist bureaucratism."<sup>13</sup>

Neither "Trotskyist" nor "anti-Trotskyist", Mariategui was a consistent revolutionary Marxist, an authentic anti-imperialist and internationalist, and his thought belongs to all those who struggle, as he did, for the socialist revolution in Peru, Latin America and throughout the world. ★

8. Mariategui, "Punto de vista anti-imperialista", 1929, "Obra Política", p. 275.

9. Ricardo Flores Galindo, "La Agonía de Mariategui. La polémica con el Komintern", Lima, Desco, 1982, pp. 29-31.

10. See on this subject the interesting remarks of Rubén Jiménez Ricardez in his introduction to the Mexican edition of the political writings of Mariategui; "Mariategui utilised in his polemic with the Communist International the principal arguments that he had already advanced against the APRAists. The programme proposed by the Communist International to the revolutionaries of Latin America resembled, like two drops of water, the programme defended by Haya and his partisans. Mariategui had observed the incapacity of the Latin American bourgeoisies to resolve the bourgeois-democratic tasks. He argued, as a logical corollary, that only the working class was capable of resolving them, and in this process transform the continent in a socialist direction. He proposed thus the line of the uninterrupted revolution. In the Latin American Communist conference, Mariategui was harshly criticised by, among others, Codovilla... it seems that Mariategui was accused of being a Trotskyist". (R. J. Ricardez, "Introducción", in Mariategui, Obra Política, p. 42).

11. Mariategui, "Defensa del Marxismo", 1930, Lima, Ed. Amauta, 1964, pp. 39-40.

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# Post-election debate opens

THE FOLLOWING is a contribution from the national committee of the Socialist Democracy tendency (DS, which identifies with the positions of the Fourth International) of the Workers' Party (PT) to the debate which must be held in the light of the election results, and in particular that of the presidential election.

**A**FTER our defeat in the 1989 presidential election, the PT set to work within the perspective of a possible victory in 1994. We concluded that there had to be a "qualitative leap in the Brazilian popular democratic movement", without which it would be impossible to win the struggle for central government. Aware of what was at stake, the bourgeoisie achieved its own qualitative leap.

Yet we did not! During the past year, the PT did not prioritise the building of the party, fuel the political debate with its own alternative socialist projects, set up the necessary mechanisms with which to impose its hegemony upon the country, ensure that it had its own press, or develop the reinforcement and politicisation of the social movements. Indeed, it reduced its activity! Our trump card in the electoral battle was the prestige of Lula. The gravity of our defeat shows clearly that this was not enough.

The PT has shown that it was not ready for the level of confrontation required to win government on the basis of the transformation of society, a battle where conservative forces must suffer serious harm. We underestimated a dangerous enemy, while overestimating the strength both of our own forces and those of our allies.

We all share responsibility for the mistakes which were made. We must draw up a harsh balance-sheet, and learn

from it, so as not to commit them a third time. Other currents within the party have already given, in the national press, an analysis diametrically opposed to our own, which in our view can only increase our difficulties.

The following document is only a preliminary balance-sheet. The results from the second rounds of the elections in which we are taking part — for the governorships of the Federal District and the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Espirito Santo, Sergipe and Amapa — may yet further emphasise the depth of our defeat. Our main task up until 15 November (when the second rounds take place) is to battle for victory in these states.

## Results

On 3 October the left in general - and the PT in particular - suffered a crushing defeat in electoral terms, but an even worse one politically. The election results mark a qualitative change in the national political framework, and will mean changes to our present points of reference.

The main change in terms of national politics is the new role played by the Brazilian Social-democratic Party (PSDB).<sup>1</sup>

We were defeated not only because the battle was won in the first round by the coalition between the PSDB, the Liberal Front Party (PFL) and the Brazilian Workers' Party (PTB),<sup>2</sup> but also because the Brazilian Popular Front never had, even at the end, a clear political line.

1. Contrary to its name, the PDSB is not linked to the popular democratic movement, and is situated half-way between social-democracy and liberalism. From this party came Fernando Henrique Cardoso, soon to be President and inventor of the "Plan Real".

2. The PFL is strongly identified with the military dictatorship. Its candidate was Paulo Maluf (former Governor of the state of Sao Paulo) but he withdrew due to the level of united conservative support for Cardoso. The PTB is a right-wing party led by a rich banker.

## Important defeat

The Brazilian people, and the Brazilian left, have suffered an important defeat, the significance of which cannot be underestimated. Accordingly, it cannot be regarded simply as a closed chapter in Brazilian history.

The bourgeoisie are now better placed than before to advance their project of "development" for a third of the population (and increasing the exclusion of the other two thirds); they want to make Brazil part of the neo-liberal "normality" of present-day capitalism.

However, neo-liberal adjustment is a long and conflictual process (as can be seen in Argentina, Chile and Mexico). It will meet with widespread social resistance, and there must also be taken into account the experience of struggle and organisation within the popular sectors. The role of the PT in the organisation of this resistance will be crucial to preventing (or not, if we fail) Brazil becoming aligned with the dominant international economic, social and political bosses. Its success or otherwise will determine the political future of the country.

A new development on the national political scene is the formation of a bourgeois strategic centre around the alliance between the PSDB and the PFL, which is even closer to the imperialist decision-makers than the military dictatorship, and which testifies to the new degree of internationalisation of the dominant class. Not only have we returned to the beginning of the 1990s, and the classical, harsh neo-liberal programme of Fernando Collor de Melho, but further are witnessing a possible end to the crisis in the bourgeois leadership of the state and the fragmentation which has existed in the bourgeois camp since the end of the dictatorship. The popular sectors could lose a trump card which up until now has been critical to maintaining our political space.

Our defeat has been lightened a little by the fact that the votes for Fernando Henrique Cardoso were above all an expression of support for the "Real Plan"<sup>3</sup> — and, whatever the media might say, not for the neo-liberal project, as occurred in the Mexican presidential election. Moreover, abstention greatly increased (17.7%) and so did blank and void votes (11.4 and 11.8% respectively, or 23% of the votes cast, in the presidential election, and 42% of the total cast in the election for the Chamber of Deputies — where 12% were blank and 30%

# The bourgeoisie are now better placed than before to advance their project of "development"

void). This indicates that a large part of the population felt both alienated from the political process and mistrustful of politicians.

The defeat could also be lightened (although not annulled) by second round victories in Rio Grande do Sul, Brasilia and Espirito Santo. Up until now these electoral battles have taken place in a national electoral context dominated by our opponents. It might still be possible to win some important bridgeheads for political action and to increase our political presence.

The aggressive way in which the State apparatus was placed at the service of one candidate, electoral legislation made to the detriment of the PT, the media, opinion polls, and in particular the TV channel Globo used in favour of Cardoso, and the application of the "Plan Real" to direct electoral objectives, prove that the State was not playing by the rules. Contrary to what was said by the national press, there was no "affirmation of Brazilian Democracy".<sup>4</sup>

However, it has been difficult to challenge the illegitimacy of the electoral process. This is due not only to the skill with which it was managed by the ruling class but to the timidity of the PT itself in denouncing these frauds. If we do not do so then we risk our opponents consolidating their position and the "Mexicanisation" of Brazilian political life.

## Decisive test

These elections have been not just a great battle but a decisive test for us. We have ended them on the defensive, having committed many mistakes. The

PT turned out to be incapable of winning central government on the basis of Lula alone. It underestimated the degree of resistance which would be shown by the bourgeoisie. It also neglected aspects such as building the party, the ideological battle, co-ordination and encouragement of the social movements and the linking of our work in municipal apparatuses with the global political battle. Given the structure of Brazilian society and the existing conditions of class struggle, we will only win central government with a much more cohesive and better organised party, which has the support of a larger, more active and more politicised social movement. We cannot minimise the defeat by pointing to how many deputies were elected or the number of second rounds in which we were involved. This is because not only was the increase in both cases much less than expected,<sup>5</sup> but also because the potential for intervention in the political battle which they represent can only be achieved by a strengthening of the party and the social movements.

3. The introduction of a new currency, the Real — effectively devaluation of the existing Brazilian currency.

4. O Estado de São Paulo, 8 October 1994.

5. The number of federal PT deputies increased from 35 elected in 1990 to 49 in 1994 and the number of state deputies from 79 to 92 over the same period.

# Post-election debate opens

## Central role of the PDSB

**T**HE KEY factor in our defeat was the PDSB. With the aim of preventing a Lula victory, it built a solid conservative alliance, even larger than those of the last two decades - including the Democratic Alliance, which in 1984 put Tancredo Neves and José Sarney into power. The 1994 front included not only the closely linked PFL and PTB, but also parties such as the Progressive Party (PP)<sup>6</sup> and the Liberal Party (PL), as well as wellknown personalities such as Antonio Brito from the Movement for Brazilian Democracy (PMDB)<sup>7</sup> and Jaime Lerner of the Democratic Workers' Party (PDT).<sup>8</sup>

A resolution passed by the 8th national meeting of the PT defined the PDSB as a party where neo-liberal ideology predominated, but which also included some progressive sectors. The latter have turned out to be marginal in importance. The party has undergone a qualitative change, moving from the centre to the right to strengthen the leadership of the Brazilian bourgeoisie, committing itself to the application of neo-liberal policy and building solid links with the dominant oligarchies.

Contrary to the view of many in the PT, the PDSB is not the hostage of the PFL. The sectors closest to international capital and its strategies are organised in the PDSB around Cardoso. Today the PDSB represents the modern, dynamic and pro-active right, with the most coherent antipopular project and the ability to take the initiative. It is working to re-establish the solid hegemony by the bourgeoisie over Brazilian society. The PDSB has become our main and most dangerous enemy — for it is more difficult to unmask than the traditional right even though it puts forward the same project — a society based upon exclusion.

Efficient application in Brazil of the neo-liberal project would not alter its harmfulness to the majority of the popu-

lation which is excluded from the formal job market. There would be small islands of prosperity linked into the global market, but no social progress in the rest of the country. The majority of the population would be reduced — at best — to dependence on social security. This would mean even greater social fragmentation and inequality. Accordingly, keen not to provoke social resistance, so as to prove its ability to govern, the PDSB is likely to place a greater emphasis upon social questions in its neo-liberal programme. It will also seek to attract sectors of the left by reference to welfare benefits and "solidarity programmes".

The PT must stand in clear opposition to the new government, if we are to gain support for our programme. It will be an even more dangerous adversary than the previous government, due to its more organic links with the bourgeoisie and its greater legitimacy in the eyes of a party which is larger and more influential than that of Collor. We must clarify the position of the party on the PDSB when deciding on the support which we will give candidates from other parties in the second round of the state governorship elections. It must be made clear that the PDSB is no longer to be considered our ally, and that from now on it is to be regarded as a right-wing current even more dangerous than the traditional right.

## Reasons for defeat

We must examine both the advances made by the bourgeoisie and our own weaknesses, and evaluate the part played by both conjunctural and structural factors in these elections. We must recognise that many fundamental structural factors — accumulating over the last five years — contributed to our defeat. Yet, if we had not also made the mistakes which we did, Lula would have gone through to the second round. And if there had been a second round, the result might have been different.

The bourgeoisie knew, much better than us, how to learn from their experience in 1989.

● It built around the Cardoso candidacy a united conservative force not seen before in this country (which was even able to achieve the withdrawal of Paulo Maluf, the PFL candidate).

● It learnt to use the media skilfully and to its full potential.

● It used the State machinery to the advantage of Cardoso.

● It had international contacts from which it learned how other parties confront the left at elections. It had direct assistance from the World Bank and the IMF, as well as from those who ran the Clinton campaign in the United States.

● It gave these elections the character of a plebiscite.

● It developed a powerful ideological offensive in support of neo-liberalism and against any challenge to this.

The building of a united conservative force, media manipulation, and the utilisation of state resources were not solely responsible for the Cardoso victory. If the most united bourgeois camp in the last few decades was the main reason for the Cardoso victory, the "Plan Real" was the electoral instrument by which it took place.

The matter was skilfully handled. The bourgeois camp needed an extremely important issue around which there was widespread public concern (this applied to stabilisation of prices) where the government (the Finance Minister and the Central Bank) could produce short-term results. The problem was that numerous anti-inflationary measures had already been applied in Brazil, all without success. While another anti-

6. The PP is a right-wing party. To this party belongs Luis Antonio Medeiros, President of Fuerza Sindical, the organisation most openly opposed to CUT (the main Brazilian trade union federation).

7. The PMDB is a centre/centre-right party. Its president is Orestes Quercia, former governor of the state of São Paulo.

8. The PDT is centre-left populist party, affiliated to the Socialist International.

inflationary measure might increase distrust and lead to accusations of an electoralist operation, at least it allowed the team behind the "Plan Real", which had been half-considering other plans, to be able to rely upon experience. Further, it was an issue where it was possible to look to examples in other countries and to international ideas, especially those of the World Bank.

The decline in social struggles since 1989 was equally important. The recession unleashed by the application of neo-liberal adjustments under the Collor government, which meant not only the worst social crisis in the history of Brazilian capitalism but the incapacity of the popular movement to combat this offensive, led to a huge decrease in the level of activity in the mass movement in comparison to 1988-9. While there was some remobilisation during the government of Itamar Franco, this was extremely weak.

## **Mistakes made by PT**

Some structural limitations which were not dealt with at the 8th and 9th national meetings contributed to the disarming of the PT in the electoral battle.

It should be said that most of those who attended the meeting of the national leadership (DN) of the PT on 12 and 13 August have already stated certain of the problems which have been raised here, and believe in the need for a change of course. However, as there was no quorum, it could neither debate or vote upon any resolutions.

Throughout May and June the PT believed that the political situation was more than favourable, when this was not the case. At the time a political void had been created by the withdrawal of Sarney and Maluf from the presidential election and the bourgeoisie were completely occupied in forming an alliance around the PDSB, the PFL and the PTB. It was then that there began to be a triumphalist atmosphere, which, as speeches predicted a first-round victory, increased the pressure for our campaign to be stretched to the maximum at the earliest possible moment. Much energy was wasted in preparing for a future Lula government.

The campaign carried out by most of the party was not within the framework of the resolutions made at the 8th and 9th national meetings — which were centred around structural reforms, the

confrontation between the different projects for society and the proposal of a democratic revolution in Brazilian society. Our campaign wavered between the line agreed at the last two national meetings and a (vain) attempt to present the party as the party of the poor while also trying to engage the confidence (or at least the neutrality) of the rich. This wavering was decisive in demobilising militants.

Yet Cardoso also denounced the social situation, on television — even the calamitous state of public healthcare, which he himself helped to create.

It was argued that it was not necessary for the presidential campaign to attach itself so closely to the campaigns for the state governorships. This had some disastrous consequences, for example in São Paulo, where a greater identification of Lula with José Dirceu might have enabled him to go through to the second round — the situation in this instance being aggravated by the fact that some sections of the party were stating publicly throughout the campaign, that he should withdraw and that there should be an alliance with the PDSB. While Lula obtained 27% of votes cast in that state, Dirceu only obtained 17%, when 22% was needed for him to go through to the second round.

From December 1993, we saw the putting into place of the "Plan Real" (originally entitled "Plan FHC-2") by the government and the first attempts to use it in such a way that Cardoso would be elected President of the Republic. It became more and more clear, as the bourgeoisie gathered around him, that

the "Plan Real" would be the trump card of our main political adversary.

However, we were incapable of putting forward a Lula proposal for fighting inflation at the most favourable moment, when he was ahead in the opinion polls and the currency had not yet been changed. We did not recognise inflation as one of the most important issues in the campaign. There were differences between our party economists as to how stabilisation should be achieved, but more important was a general tendency, both by them and the campaign leadership, to underestimate the potential impact of the "Plan Real".

This underestimation was coupled with differences and errors of analysis concerning the short-term effect of the introduction of the new currency. The predominant vision was that put forward by, amongst others, Aloizio Mercadante (the main spokesperson for the party on economic issues and an extremely influential member of the Campaign Coordination Committee when it came to these). This foresaw a number of short-term problems for the Real, notably that it would lead to recession and the people to note a marked loss in purchasing power. Up until the end of July, and even into the beginning of August, it counted upon a change of opinion on the part of the population when it received its salary for July (the month when the Real was introduced).

The difficulties in the debate upon and analysis of the "Plan Real" in the campaign leadership resulted in the campaign having a very contradictory position on this. On the one hand, we

# **The campaign carried out by most of the party was not within the framework of the resolutions of the 8th and 9th national meetings**

# Post-election debate opens

began by denouncing the Plan as an electoralist operation, with recessive effects and a consequent loss of purchasing power, but on the other let it be understood that we would follow it. In consequence, Lula did not have clarity or firmness on this issue and so did not appear a reliable alternative on the principal theme of the campaign.

A campaign with such characteristics needed more than anything else a strong political leadership, capable of permanently re-evaluating the situation and of taking political initiatives.

The campaign leadership should have been the Campaign Co-ordination Committee. While this was basically elected by the DN of the PT, it also included several members directly nominated by Lula and, from July 1994, members from the leaderships of other organisations in the Brazilian Popular Front. However, it became progressively weaker. Some of its members never took on any real responsibility, as, for example, in the case of José Genoino, who was in principle responsible for relations with the parliamentary group, or the politologue Francisco Weffert, who in his articles in the national press waxed strangely lyrical on the Cardoso candidacy. Neither of these two attended any of the meetings.

Further, any serious discussion was almost impossible due to the continual bombardment by the national press, fed not only by the formal declarations of party leaders and parliamentary deputies who were opposed to the decisions which were taken, but also by the "unofficial" declarations of the leaders and officials who completely disowned the Committee. The contradiction between the debates within the Committee and the declarations in the press appeared with most acuteness during the replacement of Eduardo Bisol. Following this incident the Committee played no role whatsoever in effective political leadership.

## Alliances

This was the main point of conflict between the left and right wings of the party. It is completely untrue that, under

the leadership of the left, the PT would have had only a narrow policy on alliances! And in these elections all possible alliances were made. Where alliances were not made, this was because those with whom it was proposed that we should ally did not want an alliance with the PT, or alternatively would have imposed unacceptable conditions.

There was also discussion of the type of alliance where we would abandon our political project and place ourselves in the position of subordinate partner to bourgeois hegemonic currents. This was the case with the proposal of the withdrawal of our candidate in São Paulo in favour of Mario Covas, the PDSB candidate. Attempts to set up this type of alliance, an extreme option which would not have been viable without disowning the PT, weighed against us and placed serious strain upon our campaign.

The confusion in our relationship with the PDSB challenged the entire project of the PT. Yesterday's "ally" rapidly transforming itself into today's enemy was a decisive factor in disarming us. Cardoso was already the main proponent of PDSB entry into the Collor government and became Lula's chief adversary from the moment when he became Finance Minister. He gained in strength before our very eyes yet the PT did not combat this, continuing to treat him as a privileged partner.

Affirming the necessity to broaden our appeal amongst the middle class, by moderating our proposals, ignores the figures. We have lost because, once again, we have been incapable of addressing ourselves in a meaningful way to the majority of the electorate, the "shirtless ones", the unorganised popular mass which brought Collor to power in 1989. It was this majority of the excluded which, deceived by the Real, allowed Cardoso to be elected.

## Limits of the PT

These elections have been a test for the party, sharpening its contradictions and holding its limitations up to view. The result is worrying if one believes the PT to be an instrument for construction

of an alternative to the hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism and for the radical democratisation of Brazilian society. The electoral battle has revealed a dilution of the socialist perspective of the party. Equally it has shown that the party has only a fragmented and partial understanding of what is meant to be the centrepiece of our programme: universal citizenship for all. This was translated into abstract speeches, including certain proposals for workers to be incorporated in the marketplace and have access to social services, coupled with general rhetoric aimed at the majority of the nation, the excluded. The real majorities, women and black people, and important minorities, such as lesbians and gay men and youth, did not appear in the project which we put forward for society. Finally, the concessions made to conservative forces, such as the Catholic Church and the armed forces, revealed an ambiguous approach.

In the course of the electoral battle party structures were liquified, literally diluted in inclusive lists of candidates. The verdict from the ballot boxes reveals the extent of demobilisation of the militant layers, which for five years have been treated by the press and part of the parliamentary group as a "party bureaucracy". The non-existence of a party press has only worsened the political and ideological dispersion of the PT.

Both our social base and our militant layers have for information only the bourgeois press. This has seized every opportunity to undermine the unity and coherence of the party. Even our right to free television time during the electoral campaign was held up to ridicule.

The relationship between the party leadership and the deputies in the federal parliament is an old problem which has never been resolved. During the debate over revision of the Constitution, the leadership put forward the party line in the face of opposition from the parliamentary party. This cost us a great deal of effort and a long and devastating argument in the press. The impetuous declarations made in the media by front-ranking deputies had a negative effect upon our campaign at critical moments - such as during the discussion on Bisol or when they stated that from the second



round they would direct the campaign themselves.

The PT is in the process of re-organising its leadership: this was begun at the 8th national meeting in June 1993, with the intention of more firmly opposing the government of Itamar Franco and constitutional reform. However, most of the leadership was not sufficiently united politically or forceful enough to lead the Lula campaign, and it dissolved into the Campaign Co-ordination Committee. This was centred upon Lula, with the result that during the campaign power was concentrated in his hands. This can be seen in all the important campaign decisions taken since the 9th national meeting — such as the choice of Aloísio Mercadantes as the understudy for Lula, the general tone of the campaign, the content of speeches aimed at the media and even the different responses which we gave to the “Plan Real”.

### **Non-definitive balance-sheet**

Our intervention in the political arena will differ according to whether we win the second round of the elections for the governorships of Rio Grande do Sul, Brasilia and Espirito Santo. Rio Grande do Sul is one of the most important states in the country, where Lula won the first round of the presidential election this year, and where the party is better organised than anywhere else in Brazil. In this state, our administration of Porto Alegre has created a role model for public administration which serves the people, and constitutes a trump card in the electoral battle. A victory could give us a national “shop window”. Brasilia, as the capital, plays an important role on the national political scene. It is vital that we snatch victory in these two states on 15 November.

Our task, in the vast majority of the states, is to contribute to the defeat of the PDSB and the political bloc which it leads, given that it will be our main opponent in the years to come. This must be done while preserving our independence: in other words, where we transfer our votes to a non-PT candidate we must do so without making any commitment to any elected government or reaching any programmatic agreement.

In the case of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, the candidates opposing those of the PDSB are from the traditional right-wing, which makes it impossible to support them against the “modern” right-

wing candidates of the PDSB. This means that the PT will either have to explain that it does not support any candidate or alternatively emphasise that one does not have to vote. There is a strong tendency among wellknown party personalities advocating that the PT should support Covas in São Paulo and Azevedo in Minas Gerais, both PDSB candidates. This shows a deep misunderstanding of the new circumstances in which we find ourselves, where the PDSB is our principal enemy. We should not support or give legitimacy to candidates who, if victorious, will strengthen the neo-liberal camp in the most important states in Brazil.

SAO PAULO, 17 OCTOBER 1994. ★

## **Most of the leadership was not sufficiently united politically or forceful enough to lead the Lula campaign**

# Continuing the struggle

THE FOLLOWING article, abridged, has been taken from the most recent edition of *Brasil Agora*, no. 65.

ANTONIO MARTINS

**T**HE NEW PRESIDENT needs left-wing support if he is to carry out a programme similar to that of Fernando Collor.

Now that the elections are over, Fernando Henrique Cardoso — FHC — will try to ensure that no-one remembers what he has said in the past. Politicians will make speeches, and the conservative press will publish articles on a daily basis, exhorting the left either to join its efforts to those of the government or to exercise “moderate opposition”. Through circumstance, FHC needs the left if he is to carry out his programme. The conservatives believe that with more voices, more deputies and perhaps its first state governors — but without its own project for the country — the left will have to rally behind him.

## Five years...

Five years after the election of Collor, and two years after his impeachment, the Brazilian ruling class still cling to the deposed President's programme. Collor tried to apply it by force, and failed. FHC, around whom has regrouped a conservative coalition the like of which has rarely been seen this century, will try to apply it through consensus. This route is a long one. Its success cannot be guaranteed.

Elected thanks to the fleeting stability provided by the Real, the new President will try to avoid, at any cost, his plan letting in water in the first few months, dragging in its wake the popularity of the new government. His first priority is pursuit of the present economic policy. At the beginning of October, the Finance Minister, Ciro Gomes, attended the 49th annual meeting of the IMF in Madrid and personally

gave to its Director, Michel Camdessus, a “Memorandum on Economic Policy”, which sets out a balance-sheet for the first few months of the Real and the government's financial plans for 1995. Its content is clear. In order to control inflation, the Planalto Palace (the Brazilian seat of government) intends to maintain high interest rates, which will lead to the transfer next year of almost US\$10 billion dollars from the Treasury to its creditors — those who play in the “financial markets”. As in recent years, repayment to the large monopolies will be achieved at the cost of a sharp fall in State investment in Brazil's infrastructure and in healthcare and social security in particular.

This is still not enough for FHC. Ciro Gomes himself admitted at Madrid that the Real will not survive without “structural reforms” — and the first will affect pensions, taxes and financial relations between central government and the states and municipalities. All this will mean costly and complicated constitutional reforms.

## Dependent

FHC and the forces which have brought him to the Presidency are dependent upon there being a large influx of foreign capital, which will permit them to launch an ambitious programme of investment and modernisation. There are also other obstacles. The international financial markets have in fact been characterised for some years by a surplus of capital. However, to benefit, the country must alienate its patrimony (and, in a sense, waive its own sovereignty) and force workers to accept working conditions even worse than today.

Outside money will enter in large amounts only provided that it can

swallow up the most lucrative nationalised industries.

FHC is ready to deliver them to foreign capital. He openly supports "flexibilisation" (which is more advantageous for foreign investors than privatisation) of the State petrol and telecommunications monopolies. He is equally ready to remove from the Constitution those Articles which protect mineral resources, and to privatise the extremely lucrative mining operation in the state of Vale do Rio Doce. However nothing of this kind can be carried out without constitutional reform. The first two attempts to revise the Constitution in 1993-4 (the first led by Collor, the second by a coalition from the ruling class) failed in the face of the consequent mobilisation by unions whose workers were likely to be affected — particularly those representing petrol and telephone workers.

### Multinational


Foreign capital could also enter in the form of investment by multinational companies. From the neo-liberal point of view, however, Brazil is light years behind Asia and Europe and even other countries in South America where multinationals already operate. If they are to be attracted then workers' social rights must be swept away, by the removal of rights inscribed in the workers' code and in "flexibilising" the way in which work is organised. It is a route which was taken by Spain some years ago, where the most visible result is an unemployment rate of around 25% of the active population. We should remember that the true capitalist industrial revolution always leads to huge waves of redundancies and a massive increase in inequality. Are Brazilian workers ready to accept such "modernity"?

The difficulties for the forces which won the elections begin with the differences which exist within the dominant sectors. The right, the centre, the archaic and "modern" sectors of big business united to beat Lula in the second round of the presidential election

in 1989 and 1994. They have been incapable, however, of sustaining the "Collorido" programme, and it is far from certain that they will unite behind FHC. Will the big employers, which have drawn upon the post-war model of development, cede graciously to those who want to ride the neo-liberal wave? Are parties such as the PDMB (a centre-right party) and the PPR (a right-wing party, to which most politicians belonged during the dictatorship), which have a significant number of deputies, ready to share responsibility for unpopular governmental measures without sharing in the benefits of power? Committed by his own programme to inflicting serious defeats upon workers, and to complex negotiations with sectors of the ruling class, FHC needs the support of the PT and other left-wing parties, while not actually requiring their participation in government. If it proves possible to domesticate them, to push them into being merely a fragile and cosmetic opposition, and to convince them not to contest structural reforms, then it will be possible to give an air of legitimacy to unpopular government plans, and to force the support of the conservative parties which are not in the victorious coalition. ★

Even if we have encountered difficulties here and there due to the fact that we had different traditions to work, one could say that it was satisfactory overall. The necessity of jointly fighting the electoral campaign and the construction of a common party presented us with some difficult moments. But we thought from the beginning that these procedures should be rationally handled. If not, we would continue the same path as the preceding attempts at reorganisation; in other words, we would continue our work with making manual operations

The diverse components of the B... different attitudes to the K... But we have adopted a... more made from our first public o... ration... common framework... the unconditional recognition of the right of self-determination of peoples. This means the recognition of the right to found a separate state. Certainly... recognition of a right and the fashion in which this right is implemented are two distinct things... The... organises in Turkey... refrain from doing so in the K... provision. For us, it amounts to a question of principle on which we are intransigent. But we believe that the



# Convergence in new party

THE TURKISH revolutionary left, one of the most powerful in the region in the 1970s, was subsequently marginalised, both through the hammer blow of the military coup d'état of 1980 and its own internal weaknesses, characterised notably by extreme fragmentation and a sectarianism which went so far as bloody confrontations between rival groups. The process of left-wing recomposition remains very laborious and several attempts at regroupment have failed at the beginning of the 1990s. It is in this context that we consider the foundation of the United Socialist Party (BSP), which is to hold its first conference before the end of 1994. Yeni Yol (New Course), the Turkish section of the Fourth International, are participating fully in the process of convergence inside the BSP. ✪

**ERDAL KARA** is one of the five vice-presidents of the BSP, and also one of the principal leaders of Kurtulus, a group originating in the revolutionary student movement of the 1960s and 1970s which is today one of the main components of the BSP. **ERDAL TAN** spoke with him for *International Viewpoint* in Istanbul on 15 July 1994.

## HOW WOULD you define the United Socialist Party (BSP)?

From the beginning, the legal party that we wished to create was defined as an umbrella organisation for socialist groups. In other words, it amounts to a common framework where all the participating groups maintain their own organisation and their own propaganda. The principal lesson that we have drawn from the preceding attempts at unification of the socialist movement in Turkey around a communist programme, is that the process will take some time. Our consciousness of this reality has led us to develop other types of projects. The BSP is, then, the fruit of a conception which takes account of these lessons and bases itself on a very simple programme, which is, in my opinion, a programme of permanent action based on certain principles. It is clear that such a programme does not have a detailed perspective for the seizure of power and serves above all to assure a convergence of struggles. But it does not reject the possibility of going beyond the current stage. What is important is that discus-

sion of the elaboration of a more detailed programme will take place through winning other sectors of the left to the BSP.

The process that we have been through since November 1993, with the BSA (see *International Viewpoint*, no. 256, May 1994) and then the BSP, shows us that this approach has revived considerable interest inside the socialist movement. If we succeed in enlarging the BSP with the addition of other sectors, which is perfectly possible, the socialist left could rapidly move out of its current marginalisation and appear as a credible alternative to society. It is the most fundamental question to resolve and the development of the BSP until now shows us that we possess the means to do it.


### ***How do you characterise your partners inside the BSP?***

The BSP is currently composed of five groups: Kurtulus (Liberation), Emek (Labour), Sosyalist Birlik Partisi (Party of Socialist Unity, SBP), Yeni Yol (New Course), and Sosyalist Politisi (Socialist Party).

The SBP was founded by comrades originating from the former pro-Soviet parties (the Turkish Communist Party, the Workers' Party, the Socialist Workers' Party) and a pro-Chinese group (the Workers' and Peasants' Party). At the beginning, the SBP brought together all the comrades around a fairly rightist programme. But the elements originating from the Communist Party left the party, in opposition to the SBP defining itself as Marxist. Thus, with the departure of those who wished to transform this party into a social democratic party, the programmatic retreat was halted. But in our opinion, the approach of this party to the principal questions of socialism remains rightist.

So far as Emek is concerned, we can say that we in Kurtulus have many points in common with this group. However, we diverge on the conception of socialist democracy and women's liberation. Emek is certainly a revolutionary group, but it would not be false to say that it retains some conceptions from the (Stalinised) Third International. Sosyalist Politika is the group which remains the most attached to, and the most coherent representative of this conception, although both have evolved in a positive fashion in their approach to the current problems of socialism.

As to Yeni Yol, we consider this group to also be revolutionary group.



Trotskyism is not a mass or deeply rooted movement in Turkey. But several Trotskyist groups have developed from the milieu of the 1980s. One of the principal reasons for this development was that the socialist movement began at this time to question the heritage of the Third International and had a good deal of contempt for the stereotypes of this period. One could say that for a significant part of the socialist movement, the Trotskyists were no longer regarded as "traitors", even if there are still some groups which have not budged an inch on this question. In speaking of Yeni Yol, it would be useful to compare it to the other Trotskyist groups. In my opinion, Yeni Yol has one characteristic radically different to the other Trotskyist groups in Turkey: it seeks to find a solution to the problems which face us in everyday practice, whereas the others have an approach which one could qualify as theoretical sectarianism.

### ***What is your evaluation of the common work carried out during the electoral campaign?***

Even if we have encountered difficulties here and there due to the fact that we had different traditions of work, one could say that it was satisfying overall. The necessity of jointly fighting the electoral campaign and the construction of a common party presented us with some difficult moments. But we thought from the beginning that these two processes should be intimately linked. If not, we would commit the same error as the preceding attempts at regroupment; in other words, we would content ourselves with making mutual declarations

on our theoretical and programmatic divergences. Indeed, the platform of work realised in common during the electoral campaign has allowed us to genuinely found the party in action, in a very short time.

It is clear that one cannot expect that groups like ours, which have rooted traditions, will instantly abandon their identity. That will take time. But one could say that, in little time, we have learned to be sensitive to the problems of our partners and have tried to resolve them together. For example, the Emek group, which participates in the BSP, had decided to boycott the elections, whereas the BSP participated. But this did not block the process, because of our attitude to Emek, and the reasonable behaviour of this group.

### ***What is the point of view of the BSP on the Kurdish question? What are your relations with the Kurdish organisations?***

The diverse components of the BSP have different attitudes to the Kurdish question. But we have adopted a common attitude from our first public declaration. This common framework is the unconditional recognition of the right of self-determination of peoples. This means the recognition of the right to found a separate state. Certainly, the recognition of a right and the fashion in which this right is implemented are two distinct things.

The BSP organises in Turkey but refrains from doing so in the Kurdish provinces. For us, it amounts to a question of principle on which we are intransigent. But we believe that this

principle is also valid in an inverse sense for the Kurdish organizations. It is only thus that solidarity between the two peoples can be established in a healthy fashion. The Kurdish organisations, and in particular the PKK, represent the Kurdish people and we must oppose attempts to search for interlocutors inside the regime.

### **What is the approach of the BSP to international relations between socialist movements?**

The BSP considers itself as a component of the international socialist movement. But it is not enough to say this, it is necessary to act on it. Even if the conditions do not exist today to construct an International, this should not lead us to remain within purely national limits. One of the principal objectives of the BSP is to institute durable and regular relations with the international socialist movement. To the extent that the Kurdish question in particular is very important, as much for us as for neighbouring countries, we must devote ourselves to the task of building a durable and regular solidarity movement on a regional scale in the Middle East, to the construction of a regional organisation, which will itself be linked to the international socialist movement. ★

**MASIS KÜRKCÜGİL**, a member of Yeni Yol and one of the other five vice-presidents, adds:

**T**HERE are only two left-wing parties which are legally registered in Turkey today. The first is our BSP. The second is the Workers' Party (the successor to the Workers' and Peasants' Party, the Maoist TIKP), which has been legal for a long time now. But the numerical strength of the BSP has already exceeded it and there should be around 2,000 members by the time of the first congress. When the congress takes place a common programme and statutes will be adopted. The delay in holding the founding congress is necessary in that the BSP, as it exists today, cannot be considered a finished product. It is hoped that other currents and a whole range of independent militants will join us, and that they too will have the chance to participate in the debates on the programme and statutes. In particular the unitary dynamic will encourage young militants who do not identify with any of the currents which formed in the 1970s. It should not be forgotten that the socialist movement has been in crisis for 15 years, and the debates of yesterday do not hold a great deal of meaning for youth.

The numerical forces within the BSP are certainly unequal, yet from the start the party decided to function by consensus, even while it is recognised that this has some disadvantages. If

...ion of the elaboration of a more detailed programme will take place through winning the support of the... BSP... The process that we have been through since November 1993, with the BSA (see International Viewpoint no. 256, May 1994) and then the BSP, shows us that this approach has revived considerable interest inside the socialist movement. If we succeed in enlarging the BSP with the addition of other sectors, which is perfectly possible, the socialist left could rightly move out of its current marginalisation and appear as a credible alternative to society. It is the most fundamental question to resolve and the development of the BSP must now show us that we possess the means to do it.

How do you characterise your partners inside the BSP?

The BSP is currently composed of five... everybody is in agreement the organisation acts in unison, but in cases of disagreement there is paralysis. All the component groups are attempting to find remedies to these problems of functioning. These questions and challenges will be at the heart of the debates at the founding congress, in order to go beyond the old cleavages and programmatic disagreements.

So far as the position of Yen Yol in these debates is concerned, it must stressed that there is no question of an "entryist" approach; on the contrary, we take our full place in the construction of the BSP, even while we maintain (as far as it proves necessary) our freedom to constitute ourselves as a tendency and to diffuse our ideas. It is not a question of having one foot in and one foot out. Our partners respect our political and programmatic traditions. They know also of our international links, but have no objections to them. On the contrary, the different experiences (both happy and unhappy!) of construction, had by the sections of the Fourth International throughout the world, reverberate inside the BSP, and are considered a useful contribution to its own process of construction. ☉

# The future of the FMLN

**T**HE PEACE accords signed in Chapultepec in 1992 between the ARENA government and the FMLN have still not come fully into force. How is the process progressing?

It should be remembered that the Republican Nationalist Alliance (ARENA) government did not sign the accords of its own free will. Therefore it was clear from the beginning that it would do everything possible to put a spoke in the wheels of the process and to drag things out, so forcing modification of the timetable.

There are still problems around the civil national police (PNC).<sup>1</sup> While it is true that it has increased in number and that it is now deployed throughout the country, the government's central objective is to militarise it. ARENA continues to campaign for transfer into the organisation of contingents from the former national police. Joining the PNC is meant to be an individual process, following a training course at the new police academy, and tests to determine suitability. If the government succeeds in integrating repressive former contingents, then the PNC will not fulfil the role assigned to it by the accords: a police force which respects the people, which is not corrupt nor uses violence.

Without doubt, the most fundamental of the accords is that which deals with the transfer of land occupied during the conflict by those who made up the social base of the FMLN.<sup>2</sup> Land has begun to change hands in the last few months, but the delay has had serious effects. More than two and a half years after the signing of the peace accords, many peasants are still working land which does not legally belong to them,

and often without credit, as the banks will not lend to those who do not hold proper title deeds. This has led to some demoralisation amongst our peasant bases, who have gained the impression that the accords are worthless. The government was aiming for this effect. Thanks to unceasing pressure by the FMLN and by ONUSAL<sup>3</sup> on the government, the transfer of land programme is still continuing. But this struggle is using up all the energies of the cadres in the FMLN rural communities, and is preventing them from working on other tasks.

There is also the problem of the collection of private weapons. Many people have them in this country. The rich and large-scale land-owners have veritable arsenals, and, with the increase in delinquency, there is organised arms trafficking in working-class districts. There is no control worthy of the name and presently nothing is being done about this.

## *How should the social movement respond to the neo-liberal plans of the government?*

The neo-liberal programme is aimed at privatising everything, from the national telephone company to healthcare and education. The FMLN does not oppose all privatisation automatically. For example, during the recent privatisation of the sugar industry, FMLN deputies led and won a battle for it to be sold to workers organised in co-operatives, when the government initially wanted to sell it off to the private sector.

But, as a general rule, the privatisation campaign is aimed at protecting and increasing the interests of a minority and not at responding to the needs of the majority of the people.

**FOLLOWING** the split in the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) represents, both numerically and in terms of influence, the most important of the five forces which make up the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). To discover their analysis of the situation in El Salvador and the conflict within the Front, *International Viewpoint* spoke with **MERCEDES PENA**, co-ordinator of the FPL's international relations department.

1. Within the goal of demilitarising society, the PNC, made up of 20% former guerrillas, 20% former members of the army (entering on an individual basis) and 60% civilians, will replace the former repressive bodies such as the National Guard and the Rural Police.

2. The transfer affects nearly 18% of agricultural land. The former owners did not have it compulsorily purchased. They have been indemnified by a Land Bank set up by one of the accords. The peasants are buying the land through Land Bank loans of 30,000 colons per occupier (1 colon = £14.32/US\$8.82), repayable over thirty years.

3. The United Nations mission which has been observing the peace process since the summer of 1991 is due to leave the country this December.

***The FMLN has twenty-one deputies in the National Assembly; what role can it play there, despite the public split on 1st May?***

Despite the internal problems of the FMLN, the number of its representatives in the National Assembly is far from negligible: the fact that we have twenty-one deputies means that ARENA can't make decisions without taking into account the views of the FMLN and other opposition parties.

Further, the FMLN representatives have noted that the people are beginning to have confidence in them. They have realised that they are the true representatives of the Salvadorean people. We want to achieve a certain level of representativeness and respectability, and this can be seen in the proposals put forward by our group in connection with economic policy, changes to the electoral code and so on.<sup>4</sup> All this is still very recent: our participation in the National Assembly is a new experience for us, particularly given that the FMLN has never participated in any form of power before.

### **Control**

We have already had a number of successes. For example, ARENA, which obtained control of the executive after its victory in the presidential election, and a simple majority in the Assembly, wanted to continue to control the Supreme Court of Justice. The FMLN succeeded in reaching agreement with all the other opposition parties on a united and firm refusal to ARENA's hegemonic intentions. For a whole month we completely blocked Assembly business so that ARENA was unable to do anything. This had never happened to it before. As a result of our action the Supreme Court is now more balanced than those which preceded it, and, in contrast to those of the past, does not hinge exclusively upon decisions made by ARENA. ARENA's deputies now realise that they must debate with all the opposition. The same thing will happen with the appointment of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, because once again the opposition has reached a joint position.

As soon as our deputies are used to this new experience at the heart of power, we will become a force for putting forward proposals which reflect the most pressing needs of the people. There must be a direct link between the people and their representatives, and not a separation, as has happened in the past.<sup>5</sup>

***Following the elections, the FMLN has also taken a number of town halls. What type of municipal management has the Front put in place?***

Ten of the fifteen councils won by the FMLN were won by the FPL. Although we had hoped to win more this was still a good result. It is enough to begin to put into place a new framework for local power, where the interests of the people are truly represented. We have begun by giving specific training to our mayors. Most of them are former guerilla leaders, and while they have plenty of enthusiasm they greatly lack the training and experience needed to exercise their new responsibilities: carrying out weddings, notarising documents, carrying out a whole host of legal procedures and so on.

We have also organised "cabildos abiertos" (public meetings). These are provided for by the Civil Code, which states that once per month the demands and needs of the community must be put forward. In most of the Front-held town halls, during the first cabildo abierto a report has been presented on finances. This has been a surprise for the people because no town hall has ever done this before. Previously, the town halls were making their own decisions on municipal expenditure, and in a number of cases quite simply pocketing the money. Our town halls have informed the people of their own projects, those of the government and the possibility of foreign aid.

Working closely with the people, our municipal teams have begun to make lists of the needs of each community and will use this as a basis upon which to draw up their priorities. We are trying to obtain financial support from three sources: from central government, which is presently receiving much foreign economic aid (mainly from the US and the European Union), but which balks at benefiting municipalities won by the FMLN; from non-governmental organisations; and from solidarity groups, which finance more modest projects.

The greatest problem which we are facing is the ARENA policy of snuffing out the FMLN gains: in the absence of central government funding, how will the town halls find the money to carry out their projects of improving infrastructures and economic and social development (roads, electricity, drinking water, schools, health centres and so on)?

Where the town halls have been won by the FMLN, the people are waiting for them to carry out their demands, believing that they are the true representatives of the people. Moreover, other municipalities have their eyes fixed on those held by the FMLN to see if changes really will happen: it is therefore vital that our municipal administrations are a success. In 1997 we must again win the town halls which we hold today, and, with the 1999 presidential elections in mind, win other municipalities. If in 1997 we suffer disastrous results in the municipal and parliamentary elections, the 1999 presidential election will be extremely difficult for us.

***Can you tell us about the internal crisis in the FMLN?***

Each party, and no doubt each individual member, has their own view on this. Firstly, it should be borne in mind that the FMLN is a front rather than a single party, and that there have been differences between us since it was first founded. There has always been five separate organisations, with different interests. We did of course share an identical goal: the bringing about of change in our society. We were all fighting on behalf of the masses, and adopted a common mode of action: the politico-military struggle. This united the five organisations but each continued to analyse the situation in the country in its own way. During the war, there were numerous disputes within the FMLN, but which we succeeded in overcoming. There is nothing new about what is happening now. All that has changed is the context.

### **Logical**

The present split in the FMLN does not worry us: it is a logical development in the left-wing movement in this country. What must be asked now is whether the FMLN can still guarantee change in this country. Would it not be more sensible to replace it by a larger movement or a single party? Is the FMLN still right for the job?

4. The FMLN has demanded, amongst other things, that the procedure for electoral registration be simplified and that there are registration offices in each village, not just in the towns.

5. The FMLN deputies have tried to make as many links as possible with their community activists. Accordingly, in mid-August, when there was discussion of a law aimed at cancelling peasant debt of less than 500 colons, numerous delegates from land co-operatives attended the Assembly.



Then there is the question of internal democracy. This is a serious problem for the Front. The FPL has proposed that the election of delegates to the next FMLN convention be organised according to the number of members in each party, not by quota.<sup>6</sup> We believe that the democratisation of the Front should begin with votes by individuals, not by party blocs.

The FPL believes that it is time to form a single party, with the different organisations which make up the FMLN merging into a single structure. A single party which will defend the interests of the masses, which will make pacts and alliances with all the forces in this country which refuse to compromise on the fundamental issues for which thousands of Salvadoreans gave their lives; for while we are maintaining relations with all the political parties, this does not mean that at a given moment we will negotiate so as to obtain this or that position.

### **Paralysed**

We cannot remain paralysed. This has been the case since May and we have to act. We must respond to a number of political events and stop ARENA profiting from the internal divisions within the Front. It is urgent that solutions be found to the future of the FMLN, because there is just enough time to re-organise and to prepare properly for the municipal and parliamentary elections in 1997. If the Front does not form a single party it will become stuck in endless internal debate.

### **Would such a party accept the existence of tendencies?**


No. We want a single party with no tendencies, although there can be different personal opinions. In the FPL there are different opinions, but that does not mean that we have factions or that everyone does what suits them. We envisage a single party where there are different views but where decisions are respected once they are made. This is not the present case in the FMLN, where everyone is acting as they please.

### **Doesn't the proposal for a single party risk appearing, in the eyes of other parties in the FMLN, to be an attempt at hegemony by the FPL?**

Of course, there is that fear because the FPL is the most important organisation in the Front. But I believe that we

have to look at political reality. The FMLN as it exists now is no longer viable and we are presenting a disastrous image to the people. Many believe that the FMLN represents an alternative, but if the crisis continues, they may turn away from us.

Either the FMLN becomes an opposition bloc of different political parties in the Assembly, without internal discipline, or it becomes a single party. I believe that political reality demands a single party. ★



6. Up until now, all the organs of the FMLN leadership have been elected on the basis of one representative per party, irrespective of the numbers within it.

# Extreme right make gains

IN SEPTEMBER Vincent Scheltiens reported on the rise of the extreme right in both Flemish and French speaking areas of Belgium. In the recent local elections they made further gains and strengthened previous footholds. One of the only bright spots was the election of local councillors in Antwerp from the Movement for Socialist Renewal, BSV, which included a member of the Socialist Workers' Party (SAP/POS, Belgian section of the Fourth International). **ALAIN TONDEUR** sent us the following report.

phenomenon in the port city. In the legislative elections of 1991, "Black Sunday" as it has been known since, it took 25% of the vote, becoming the largest party in the city. It has now increased its lead, taking 28% of the vote, and its continuing success is at the expense of social democracy.

Since the last local elections in 1988 the SP vote in Antwerp has declined by 8.3%, down to 20.5% today. The party has been complicit in implementing austerity policies, vain attempts to manage the crisis, and aggravation of social inequality — killing any hope for change. Moreover, the local SP, which has been part of the city's municipal government since the end of the war, remained unaffected by the relatively successful renewal by Flemish social democracy as a whole in the course of the 1980s. The combination of the two factors no doubt has something to do with the fact that the neo-fascists did even better in Antwerp than elsewhere.

## Stronghold

Today, Antwerp is the capital of the Vlaams Blok. Starting from this stronghold, it is spreading out across the whole of Flanders and the stain gets bigger with each election. The Blok is above its Flemish average (10.9%) throughout the province of Antwerp but also in Gand, the second city of Flanders (13.3%). Until now it had not succeeded in breaking through at Limbourg, where anti-racist sentiment was well rooted in the community of mineworkers. Henceforth it can have high hopes, as the government has decided to close the pits and the Blok, like all similar parties, follows in the tracks of unemployment.

**B**ELGIUM'S local elections on 9 October confirmed and amplified the breakthrough of the extreme right, not only in Flanders and Brussels, but also in Wallonie. The Vlaams Blok, the Front National and AGIR had more than 300 representatives elected to the communal and provincial councils. The Vlaams Blok consolidated itself as the largest party in the Antwerp metropolis, whereas the FN was close on the heels of the traditional bourgeois parties in the industrial region in the south of the country.

The breakthrough for the Vlaams Blok in Antwerp is no surprise. In 1987 this fascist party emerged as a worrying

Antwerp is not a town like the others; it is the biggest urban concentration in Flanders, an important industrial centre and a port which serves a hinterland going well beyond Belgium.

The bourgeoisie has always preferred class collaboration in order to manage the city, and the chamber of commerce did not hide its hostility to the Vlaams Blok in the course of the campaign. Traditional parties swore to establish a "cordon sanitaire" around the Blok — without success.

The dominant class is not on the point of changing this policy but a coalition of three traditional "families" is hardly sufficient to stop the fascists from participating in the communal government. With the Greens (AGALEV) the majority would be more comfortable, but they are not seen as a viable partner by the ruling class. Moreover, three of the seven Green deputies are in fact "Red-Green" (see below).

## Questions

Many questions remain unanswered. The worst outcome for sure would be that the Blok succeeds in presenting itself as the sole opposition force in Antwerp in the coming years. If that happens, the fascists would not be slow in breaking through to new "heights".

The situation is no more comforting in Wallonie and Brussels. The 10 communes of Brussels elected 47 fascist municipal councillors. The FN received its highest score (16.6%) in Molenbeek, a working class area of the capital. However, the Front National and AGIR had confirmed their breakthrough in French-speaking Belgium at the European elections earlier this year. The vote for these two rival formations in June was no bout of fever, and nobody can now deny it. On the contrary, the red regions of Wallonie are little by little being covered by ugly stains, with the Front National and AGIR registering scores of

just over 10% (14.4% at La Louvière).

As in Flanders, it is clearly those disappointed by social democracy who are passing to the extreme right. The phenomenon is most evident in the localities where the PS has been the dominant party for a long time. At Charleroi, Seriang, La Louvière and a good deal of other workers' towns, the gains of the extreme right corresponded almost exactly to the losses of the social democrats. Moreover, a survey carried out after the election indicates that the PS electorate is more susceptible to racist crusades than the ecologist electorate — obviously — but also the Christian electorate; only 35% of SP voters think that foreigners born in Belgium should have the right to vote in local elections.

## Observer

Against this sombre background, the progressive observer will be somewhat cheered by the election of three members of the BSV, the Movement for Social Renewal, who were candidates on the list of the ecologist party at Antwerp. These were Patsy Sorensen, outgoing local councillor and SP dissident, founder of the BSV and a very well known personality because of her fight against the treatment of prostitutes, Nadine Peeters, a member of the SAP (Belgian section of the Fourth International) and leader of a high school students organisation (AJOKAR), which has organised several school strikes against fascism and racism; and Lou Weyns, a combative trade unionist who works in chemicals. Their presence on the green list with five other members of the BSV was the result of an appeal for BSV-Agalev unity launched by a number of progressive personalities.

The Francophone left, on the contrary, enjoyed hardly any success in these elections. The

"United Left" movement ran lists in nine localities. In six cases the score was below its result in the European elections. There was only one candidate elected, in a small provincial town. The threat of the far right created new pressure for a useful vote. There remains an electoral space for the left but to occupy it, it must, without losing its identity, be able to link up with wider currents and demonstrate that a vote for the left will not be a lost vote. ☛

**ONE RESULT** of the collapse of the Soviet Union has been the opening of Soviet archives and the publication of a series of memoirs by former KGB officials. But, asks **KEITH MANN**, what is the significance of a posthumous article from an otherwise little known member of the French Communist Party?

**I**N FRANCE, the French Communist Party (PCF) has abandoned its pretensions to be the sole authentic voice of the French working class. However, the limits of their openness and self-criticism have been underscored by the publication, without comment, in *l'Humanité*, the PCF daily, of a posthumous article by a French Stalinist functionary accused of helping arrange the assassination of Leon Trotsky.

The information which has recently been made public due to the opening of Soviet archives has gone a long way in setting the record straight on some of the most sordid crimes committed in the 1930s by the Stalinist apparatus against opponents in the labour movement. Charges — denied for decades by the CPs — that Stalinist agents assassinated anti-fascist fighters in the Spanish Civil War, and deliberately sabotaged that struggle as part of a foreign policy which gave assurances to imperialist powers and attempted to subordinate struggles around the world to the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy, have now been corroborated. The recently published memoirs of the former KGB general Sudoplatov have confirmed the accusations, made by Trotskyists and others, that the assassinations of left opposition leaders such as Rudolf Klement and Ignace Reiss, as well as Trotsky himself, were indeed ordered by Stalin.

In France, the PCF no longer considers Trotskyists as "counter-revolutionaries". In fact, the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR, French section of the Fourth International) has for several years had a bookstall at its annual festival, the "Fete de *l'Humanité*", and last December was invited for the first time to send observers to the party's 28th Congress. Historians close to the PCF have recently gone out of their way to invite Trotskyist historians to collaborate on research projects.

But those hoping that these developments signalled a generalised policy of openness would have been disappointed

by the said article which appeared in 29 August 1994 edition of *l'Humanité*. The author, Georges Fournial, had requested that the article be published only after his death. The article denied the accusations that Fournial had helped to arrange the assassination of Trotsky (although, curiously, he never *explicitly* denies the charge).

Who exactly was Georges Fournial? A leading member of the teachers' union, his role in the PCF was that of an important behind-the-scenes cadre. Although in charge of relations with Latin America, as a member of the PCF's commission on foreign relations, Fournial never spoke at PCF congresses or was a member of its Central Committee.

## Congress

According to his account, Fournial came to Mexico City in early 1938 on behalf of the International Teachers' Union, to prepare a congress of Latin American teachers. He then left Mexico in June or July of the same year. He later attended the congress, which was held in Havana, Cuba, in September 1939. Taken captive in Germany after France's defeat in June 1940, he remained in prison until March 1945. He claims to have learnt of Trotsky's death only after he returned to France, and that the first he heard of his supposed role in Trotsky's death was by way of an article in the French publication *La Révolution Proletarienne*.

Fournial's arrival in Mexico in 1938 immediately aroused attention amongst Trotsky's entourage. From Paris, French Trotskyist Gerald Rosenthal wrote to Trotsky's secretary in Mexico, Jan van Heijinoort, that the Teachers' Union militant was "young, energetic, and must be considered as an agent of the GPU" (the forerunner of the KGB), an opinion echoed by another prominent French Trotskyist, Pierre Naville. The French Trotskyist publication *La Lutte Ouvrière* and the US newspaper *Socialist Appeal* asked publicly: "What is Georges Fournial doing in Mexico?" Trotsky's friends had good reason to be suspicious of the arrival of any functionary of the Stalinist apparatus in Mexico (where he had been granted political asylum by the bourgeois nationalist regime of Lazar Cárdenas in January 1937). Ramón Mercader, who eventually killed Trotsky in August 1940, was only one of a whole network set up by the GPU to carry out the assassination. For example, the Mexican painter and fervent Stalinist David Siqueros organised an unsuccessful attempt on Trotsky's life in May 1940.

While no hard evidence has yet surfaced definitively linking Fournial with Trotsky's murder, the tone of the article calls his alleged innocence into question. He ends the article by calling on those interested in the affair to conserve a "scientific doubt". The question immediately arises as to why, if he had nothing to hide, Fournial waited to publish his denial until after his death when nobody could question him. Earlier in the article, he states: "...if Stalin wanted the violent death of Trotsky ...would he need the services of a little teacher ...for a 'contract' of this nature?" At the time of Trotsky's assassination, the Stalinist press circulated the lie that Trotsky was murdered by a "disillusioned follower". Yet even before Mercader received the Order of Lenin following his release from prison in 1960, the GPU's responsibility for the crime was public knowledge, and recent revelations have only confirmed this. For Fournial to state that Stalin might not have been involved, and then immediately deny his own involvement, makes his denial highly suspect.

## Prestige

Unrepentant Stalinists, nostalgic for the days when the CPs and Stalin himself enjoyed tremendous prestige in the working class, still remain in the PCF, as in similar parties. It would be unrealistic to expect the PCF to proclaim that Trotsky and the left opposition were right after all. However, given the role played by the PCF in the international campaign of lies, slanders and distortions against Trotsky, and its proclaimed openness and abhorrence of the methods of the past, *L'humanité* could have published the article with a statement of regret at their participation in the campaign. Alternatively, it could simply not have published the article. By publishing such an evasive article, which raises more questions than it answers, the PCF has shown that it has a long way to go in confronting its own past.

At a time when the entire socialist project has been discredited in the eyes of millions around the world, a situation to which the Communist parties have contributed, those claiming to stand for a socialist alternative to today's savage liberalism cannot afford the slightest association with the undemocratic practices which have so badly weakened the international labour movement in the past. This means confronting the truth. In this regard *l'Humanité's* treatment of the Fournial affair fails. ★