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Labor Action, 26 December 1949

 

Eugene Keller

World Politics

Discussion: Socialist Policy and the Rearmament
of the New Germany

 

From Labor Action, Vol. 13 No. 52, 26 December 1949, p. 3.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for ETOL.

 

During the past six weeks – that is, ever since the Paris conference of the foreign ministers of the Western powers and the subsequent accord reached by them with the Bonn government – there have been recurrent rumors and “unconfirmed” reports regarding the rearming of Germany.

Thus the N.Y. Times in a Paris dispatch dated November 28 reports an article by Pertinax in the newspaper France-Soir asserting that Americans in Germany had already taken measures toward rearming the Germans. The London Times was reported as saying that “the ultimate end of German disarmament had been implied in the admittance of Western Germany into the Western family of nations.”

The N.Y. Times of November 11 reports a French news agency which, it says, is officially subsidized and often officially informed, as stating that “the military aspect of the German problem had been discussed by the foreign ministers and that Mr. Acheson had said that Gen. O.N. Bradley’s plan was to base the Western defense on the Elbe river.”

Finally, the fact that Hugh McCloy, U.S. high commissioner in Germany, a week ago demanded of Adenauer, the German chancellor, that he refrain from discussing the touchy subject of rearmament and that there have been no denials (except spurious ones, ending in the escape clause “at this time”) of the rumored plans, is sufficient evidence that the subject is of intense concern to American foreign policy.
 

Rearming or Occupation?

The re-creation of a German army will understandably cause great consternation to many who chose to believe that a major objective of the Allies in World War II was the destruction of that army and with it the source of darkest reaction. That the German army should be revived seems monstrous to them; but they fail to see the monstrosity of their alternative proposal – that a strengthened Allied military force should remain on German soil another ten or more years.

Others have reacted with cynical resignation to the rumors and reports mentioned above, failing or not caring to see that such an attitude abets not only the present trend in U.S. foreign policy but the resurgence of the worst elements in German society as well. Still others, among them liberal groups, labor spokesmen and liberal Jewish organizations who sense the relationship between America’s policy in Germany and their own continued existence, confine themselves to protests, exerting “pressure” on the State Department, etc., but seem unable to make suitable counter-proposals nor to give concrete support to German socialists and liberals in their fight against the threatening revival of German militarism.

It is necessary to understand the causes which move the American government to consider German rearmament; it further is necessary to propose and fight for a sound democratic alternative to their plans. But the first necessity is the unconditional recognition of the right of the Germans as a nation to have their own armed forces.

The fact that these may be led by reactionaries is, to be sure, of justifiable concern to thinking people everywhere, but the case is the same with the leadership of the armed forces of any nation. Given the opportunity and a little aid from their foreign friends, the German masses are quite capable of dealing with the reactionaries in their midst.
 

Adenauer’s Line

The rearming of Germany must necessarily strengthen the German bourgeoisie. This is not a desire of the Americans; they could maintain stable conditions in Germany, i.e., conditions favorable to the social position of the German bourgeoisie, without giving it an army. (By the same token it is safe to say that a German army is not created merely to control social unrest.) The German government and industrialists are, of course aware of their bargaining position; they have already rejected any suggestion that a German army should be led by non-Germans. They might possibly compromise on this or other issues bearing on rearmament; they need the Americans as the Americans need them.

But it must always be kept in mind that their ultimate objective is an independent position in all world affairs and it is for this that they are bargaining. When Schumacher, the Social-Democratic leader, denounced the Adenauer government in the Bonn Parliament as an agent of the Western powers, he was oversimplifying a complex and potent situation. The Adenauer government does in a reactionary manner what a Schumacher government might, to some extent, do democratically.

The Americans cannot help but bear the possible consequences of the policies they have adopted on the basis of military, political and other necessities as they see them. The atomic bomb has rendered impossible the concentration of armies and navies such as were mustered on the coast of France in June 1944; a second conquest of Europh is out of the question unless Russia’s sources of military-economic strength are thoroughly devastated. Clearly, this would “nullify the policy for which war is an instrument,” as S. Pitt in a recent issue of LABOR ACTION has pointed out.

The present trend of U.S. foreign policy and of the debate on the nature of the coming war now going on among sections of the upper strata of American society indicate that the belief is held that a serious attempt must be made to hold Europe west of the Elbe river, that is, not to allow the Russians to penetrate the defenses of that river. That this is militarily feasible is analyzed by Vannevar Bush, wartime director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, in his recently published book Modern Arms and Free Men; and it is implicitly attested to by the plans to rearm Germany as well as in the Atlantic Pact.
 

What Will They Be Fighting For?

It need not be stressed that there are tremendous political obstacles to the fulfillment of this military policy. The European masses cannot possibly be depended on to fight another war for a very long time. But without being able to rely on a mass levy in case of war, how can the onslaught of Russian armies be stopped?

C.L. Sulzberger of the N.Y. Times writes in that paper’s December 1 issue: “Forming a qualitative North Atlantic army is a major task of the planners ... A qualitative army is more flexible and politically more feasible for the democracies because of the relatively smaller manpower commitments.” Such a “qualitative” army might hold a large area of Europe long enough for the Americans to land their dependable mass armies. (We cannot here go into what appears to us the rather chimerical character of a “qualitative” army.)

Considering this basic trend of military-political policy German manpower is obviously a factor which cannot be ignored. The new German army, however, no matter how “qualitative” it be, must have an ideology, it must at the least be able to feel that it is fighting for a country of its own, if nothing more sublime.

This ideology cannot be created on the day war is declared; it must be created even before an army is organized. That is one of the reasons McCloy prefers a “healthy, non-insidious” patriotism for the Germans. But he cannot have his cake and eat it too.
 

Proposing a Military Policy

The German Social-Democrats have not as yet, to our knowledge, taken any position on the military plans for Germany. It would seem to be their task not to oppose the rearming of the German people; to oppose it would be utterly unrealistic. But they must oppose the re-creation of the type of army that existed up to 1945; they must fight the vesting of control over a future German army in the government of Adenauer and his associates.

It would be plausible and practicable to propose and build a militia based on the existing mass organizations, such as the trade unions, peasant organizations, etc., with election and rotation of officers and a certain number of hours per week devoted to training in the many special skills needed in a modern army. Insofar as full-time officer personnel would have to be employed, means could easily be found to control their activities. There is certainly ample evidence in the history of the German workers’ movement to demonstrate their ability to organize their own military formations, hence this would be nothing new to at least the older ones among them.

It remains to be seen whether the Social-Democrats are capable of taking a sound position on the rearmament of their country. The initiative rests with them; but they must be assured of some degree of support especially from American groups whose own domestic position is endangered by reactionary U.S. foreign policy; who do not take seriously the idiotic and reactionary assertions of the Wallaceites, Ickes and others that the German people are militaristically predisposed; and who can pluck up what little courage it takes to defy the State Department on an exceedingly vital issue.

 
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