

LABOUR FOCUS ON EASTERN EUROPE

A Socialist Defence Bulletin on Eastern Europe and the USSR

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POLAND: *SOLIDARNOŚĆ* IN ACTION



Bus carrying Solidarity leaders to Warsaw Court to register the union.

Statement of Aims

A growing number of socialists and communists are taking a stand against the suppression of democratic rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The labour movement has international responsibilities in this field as well as in the field of solidarity action with those struggling against oppression in Chile or Southern Africa or Northern Ireland.

But up to now socialists have lacked a source of frequent and reliable information about events in Eastern Europe. Coverage in the papers of the Left remains scanty, while reports in the bourgeois press are selective and slanted. The first aim of **Labour Focus on Eastern Europe** is to help fill this gap by providing a more comprehensive and regular source of information about events in that part of the world.

The mass media give ample space to Tory politicians and to some from the Labour Party who seek to use protests against repression in Eastern Europe as a cover for their own support for social inequality in Britain and for witch-hunts against those who oppose it. At the same time campaigns run by socialists in the labour and trade union movement for many years concerning victims of repression in Eastern Europe are largely ignored by the media. The second aim of this bulletin therefore is to provide comprehensive information about the activities of socialists and labour movement organisations that are taking up this issue.

Labour Focus is a completely independent bulletin whose editorial collective includes various trends of socialist and Marxist opinion. It is not a bulletin for debate on the nature of the East European states, nor is its purpose to recommend a strategy for socialists in Eastern Europe: there are other journals on the Left that take up these questions. Our purpose is to provide a comprehensive coverage of these societies with a special emphasis on significant currents campaigning for working class, democratic and national rights.

Whenever possible we will quote the sources of our information. Unless otherwise stated, all the material in **Labour Focus** may be reproduced, with acknowledgement. Signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of the editorial collective.

In these ways we hope to strengthen campaigns to mobilise the considerable influence that the British labour movement can have in the struggles to end repression in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

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EDITORIAL

Poland: Why Socialist Support for Solidarity Can't Wait

Since last August, relentless pressure from the Soviet, East German and Czechoslovak Party leaderships has enabled reactionary elements in Poland's Communist Party to survive and drag the country to the brink of civil war. The Prague and East Berlin governments and at least a part of the Soviet leadership seem to prefer a Polish blood-bath, which would inevitably boost the Reagan-Thatcher Cold War drive, to any chance that the Polish example might encourage their own workers to struggle for political rights.

The 4-hour general strike on 27 March over the Bydgoszcz affair demonstrated where the rank-and-file of the Polish Communist Party stand. Defying the leadership's ban on their participation in the strike, the Party's base rallied to the side of Solidarity and the working class. More than a million members of the Party are in Solidarity, and since last August the rank-and-file have been demanding an extraordinary Party Congress to throw out the anti-working class elements on the Central Committee, elect a leadership that will respect the will of Solidarity, and democratise the Party statutes.

But thanks to external pressure, the Party Congress has not been held, Gierek's Central Committee remains in power, and the corrupt and reactionary elements inside the Party apparatus have been able to stage one provocation after another against the new working class movement. First, in November, the Narozniak Affair showed that the Public Prosecutor's Office was preparing a wave of arrests of Solidarity activists and supporters. Then, in December the Politburo set a course of trying to renege on the August Agreements by rejecting the right to a five-day week, by failing to reform the trade union law and censorship law, and by failing to give Solidarity access to the mass media. Then, after the great strikes over Free Saturdays, the Party leadership tried to prevent the removal of officials shown by government investigations to have been engaged in widespread corruption in Bielsko Biala and Jelenia Gora; and at the same time it refused to register Rural Solidarity and the Independent Student Association. Finally, after a breather for the Soviet Party Congress, the provocationist wing of the regime started legal harassment of KOR leaders Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik, then sent the political police to beat up and severely injure Solidarity leaders in Bydgoszcz. And meanwhile, the government has been without any economic policy whatsoever since last August: it has simply been letting the crisis deepen.

The great hope of socialists in the West after the government agreed to the workers' main demands last August was that the rhetoric from Party leaders about renewal, democratisation and co-operation with the new working class movement would be translated into practice, that Poland would evolve swiftly and relatively smoothly towards socialist democracy and genuine working class control over its own destiny. Such an outcome would be a gigantic gain for the entire international socialist movement. Poland would become a powerful example of the way in which economic crisis can be overcome in the interests of working people, (without the mass unemployment, militarism and repressive policies gaining momentum in the West). It would also demonstrate the enormous superiority of a nationalised economy combined with working class political power over the capitalist system in the West. And it would show a way forward out of political and social stagnation for the other countries of Eastern Europe. The trend towards Cold War in Europe could be reversed.

This is the promise of Solidarity, and it is what the Party rank-and-file is striving for. But every step towards its realisation has required mass mobilisation by Solidarity to wring the necessary concessions out of the Government. Only the disciplined militancy and unity of Solidarity has been able to guarantee the

continued development of the process of renewal. Time and again the confrontationist wing of the Party leadership has sought to split the movement or destroy its discipline as a prelude to a crackdown on the movement as a whole. But so far they have been thwarted.

In the process, however, it has been necessary for the entire population to rally around Solidarity and learn the methods of mass political struggle. In the difficult conditions of a country under constant threat of Soviet military intervention, there is an absolutely inevitable tendency for struggle to acquire an acutely political character and in conditions where general democratic liberties do not obtain any independent organisation, whether a church or a trade union inevitably becomes a vehicle for a vast range of social and political aspirations. When these conditions are added to the efforts of the confrontationist element in the Party to turn every dispute into an all or nothing struggle for power, the idea that Solidarity could remain a simple trade union is utopian. The workers have been pushed into a full-scale political battle and in the absence of political parties of their own, they have no option but to use Solidarity as their lever.

As we go to press, it seems that the confrontationist wing of the Party leadership has been temporarily checked. If the government carries out the March 30 Agreement on the Bydgoszcz Affair, Solidarity will have won a real victory. Furthermore, the ranks of the Party have swung more firmly to the side of Solidarity during the latest crisis.

But there is no reason to conclude from this that the confrontationists will change their spots. On the contrary, as the crisis of the government deepens, the tendency to provoke a showdown will increase. These elements will need a new upheaval if they are to prevent their own positions being jeopardised by the Party Congress now scheduled for July.

If this analysis is correct then Poland is approaching a new crossroads on the road from Gdansk. Increasingly, stark alternatives loom before the Polish people: either the emergence of a government that bases itself on respecting the will of Solidarity and guarantees to defend the movement against provocation and attack; or a slide from stale-mate to civil war and military confrontation.

If preparations for the Party Congress were to be managed in a democratic spirit, we could expect a genuine partnership between Solidarity and the Party leadership to emerge from it. But with Stefan Olszowski in charge of conference preparations that perspective seems excluded. The struggle for a pro-working class government will therefore be an immensely difficult one.

In these conditions the labour movement in Britain must urgently be alerted to the threat facing the Polish workers. All British socialists who appreciate the significance of the international struggle for socialism must bring Poland into the centre of labour movement concerns. Our task is to do all that we can to ensure that the Polish people are able to move as calmly and peacefully as possible towards democratic socialism and the restoration of the planned economy.

Two crucial tasks face us. First we must do all in our power to make the Soviet leadership aware of the strength of our support for Solidarity's battle for democratic and working class rights, and the depth of our opposition to Soviet interference in Polish affairs. Secondly, we should demand in present conditions where the Soviet army has not intervened that the British government immediately release Poland from its debts to British banks — the money used for missiles targeted on Warsaw should be spent on easing the debt burden which the Polish workers face through no responsibility of their own.

With this in mind the demonstration on 12 April to the Soviet Embassy could not be more timely.

What you can do to help

In this issue we have focussed on one task, to the exclusion of almost everything else: trying to give socialists here as detailed a picture as possible of the nature of Solidarity and of the thinking of some of its leaders in different parts of Poland. We very much regret not having had the space to cover many other extremely important problems and movements: above all the economic crisis facing the Polish people and such movements as Rural Solidarity, the Student Movement and the various trends of political thought within the intelligentsia.

But we made the choice for a reason: we hope that our readers will draw the conclusion from reading this issue that the new workers' movement Solidarity is one of the most profound and hopeful positive steps towards the strengthening of the labour and socialist movements in Europe.

From this conclusion must come socialist and trade union support for Solidarity.

The first and most direct task is to support the London Labour Movement demonstration on 12 April. This is the first broadly-based labour movement march in support of the Polish workers and it comes at a crucial time.

Secondly, material and moral support from national and local trade union bodies is extremely important. The TUC, after some considerable delay, has come out in full support of Solidarity and has promised £20,000 worth of aid to the organisation, especially in the form of printing equipment. It has also offered training facilities to tackle such issues as negotiating methods, drawing up claims, etc. These moves by the TUC should open the door to a flood of assistance for individual trade union bodies. In the field of material aid, Solidarity especially welcomes duplicating machines that can be used for producing factory bulletins and newsletters. Solidarity branches are able to receive these through the normal channels for shipping goods.

Another important form of action is to establish bi-lateral links between Solidarity members and British trade unionists in the same industries and types of factories. Invitations can be sent to Solidarity provincial organisations by trades councils to exchange visits.

You can receive advice and information on how to go about these tasks by contacting socialist organisations involved in defence work. There is a broad measure of unity in the 'Hands Off the Polish Workers Campaign' whose address is given on the leaflet. But you can also contact either the Eastern Europe Solidarity Campaign, with which Labour Focus is associated, or the Polish Solidarity Campaign which has been very active in seeking to gain support for Solidarity and was first in the field with a duplicator for shipment to Poland. The EESC is exclusively open to socialists, Labour and trade union organisations. The PSC is open to 'all democrats'.

On another page of this issue we give a fairly full list of the Telex numbers of Solidarity provincial organisations. You can use these numbers to telex any useful information direct to the regional Solidarity leaderships. If you don't know how telex works, dial 100 and find out!

Eastern Europe Solidarity Campaign,
c/o Vladimir Derer,
10 Park Drive, London NW11.

HANDS OFF THE POLISH WORKERS!



**LABOUR MOVEMENT MARCH
TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY**

Originally called for March 15th,
because of the ban on marches
will now take place on

Sunday, April 12th

Assemble: Speakers Corner, 2 pm.

All Socialists and Labour Movement organisations welcome.
No Cold War slogans.

Meeting before the march to be addressed by:

Frank Dobson MP (to convey message of support from Labour Party NEC)

Tariq Ali

Reg Race MP

Phillip Whitehead MP

"All Democratic Socialists should support the efforts of the Polish trade union 'Solidarity' to introduce real democratic accountability into Poland. Socialism can only be established by consent. The struggle in Poland also offers real hope for a peaceful Europe free from nuclear weapons in East and West."

TONY BENN, 15 February 1981

SPONSORS:

Tony Benn MP
Bernard Dix (NUPE)
Frank Dobson MP
Martin Flannery MP
Eric Heffer MP
Ron Keating (NUPE)
Ken Livingstone
Reg Race MP
Jo Richardson MP
Phillip Whitehead MP

The Labour Party
Brent East CLP
Eastern European Solidarity Campaign
Hendon South CLP
Ilford South CLP
International Campaign against
Repression
International Marxist Group
Labour Focus on Eastern Europe
Labour-Poland Solidarity Committee
Polish Solidarity Campaign
Socialist Campaign for Labour Victory

Show your solidarity with our Polish brothers and sisters by joining in the march. Get your Labour Party or other socialist organisations and your trade union to sponsor this demonstration.

Contact: Hands Off The Polish Workers Campaign
158 Thorold Rd, Ilford.
Tel: 01-514 0060

Solidarity Telex Numbers

(Telef. in front of number means telephone number instead of a telex number.)

Beskidy-Bielsko-Biala	0352-10	Opole	0732386
Bydgoszcz	0562197	Olsztyn	052215
Bialystok	852122	Opoczno	886080
Bytom	033250	Plock	83640
Czestochowa	037248	Poznan	0413260
Gorzow Wielkopolski	044202	Przemysl	0633413
Grudziadz	055212	Pila	telef4144
Katowice	0315292	Rzeszow	0633320
Kalisz	telef72744	Radom	067455
Krakow	telef24997	Szczecin	0425490
Kielce	06122004	Suwalki	822548
Legnica	0787320	Stalowa Wola	062104
Lodz	telef34062	Slupsk	0534307
Mazowsze (Warsaw)	816077	Torun	055301
Gdansk	0512184	Walbrzych	074557
		Wroclaw	07715500
			or 0712678

DECEMBER 1970



In December 1970, the Polish Communist Party leadership under Gomulka decided to raise prices by over 30% and to use force against working class protests. A strike began in the Lenin shipyard, Gdansk, spread to the whole city and to nearby Gdynia. Workers were shot down by the police and army. The strikes spread in a few days to Szczecin, Elblag, Slupsk and many other towns. Police and army units killed hundreds of workers, before Gomulka was replaced by Gierek. New strikes took place in

January with the workers demanding democratic unions outside political control. But the government managed to avoid granting the demand. The 1970 experience has been of fundamental importance for the Solidarity movement. We publish memoirs of 1970 all taken from a special commemorative issue of Robotnik, except the article by S. Wadolowski, Vice-Chairperson of Szczecin Solidarity, which is taken from Jedność No.17, the newspaper of Szczecin Solidarity.

GDANSK

Anna Walentynowicz on December 1970

There was an increase in prices on Saturday. On Monday the people went to the head office. There they discovered that the director had no influence over price rises and could only possibly raise the bonus by about 5%. So, 300 people from the shipyard went to the Regional Committee building to ask for an explanation. When they didn't come back for a long time, a second group was organised to see what was happening. I was with them. Going there we met some friends who were on their way back. They hadn't found out anything. They were pushing a radio car in front of them and broadcasting an announcement with their demands.

Afterwards we went to the polytechnic to apologise for not helping the students during their March 1968 demonstrations for bread and freedom. The rector came out and said that the decision to raise prices was correct, but nobody listened to him. The students talked to us and promised help. But when we went again at 7 p.m., hardly anybody was there. It turned out that they were shut up in the student hostels. However, many of them jumped through the windows and joined us later.

A cordon of police was standing near the bridge, and now things began. The first police canister burst, spreading tear gas around.

A crowd was massing near Party headquarters, and there was a call through a loudhailer for the people to go back to work. I remember a shipyard worker climbing on to the roof of a tramcar, ripping off his shirt to bare his breast and shouting: 'Shoot! What have we got to live for?' But at that time there had not yet been any shooting.

On my way back, I met some colleagues who were coming out of the rows of shipyards, dressed in asbestos overalls and safety-helmets. I raised my hands in the air and called: 'Wait a minute. You've got to think it over'. But nobody heard me. The people shouted, 'The army's here.'

Someone made an appeal through a megaphone that the women should go to prepare food in the kitchen. I was already there.

From all sides came the sound of volleys. A helicopter was firing into the shipyard. Policemen disguised as soldiers were firing at people coming into the shipyard. The first dead fell. From the hospital hung white sheets on which red crosses had been drawn in the blood of those murdered. There were very many sheets, so many had fallen.

And later .. I don't know, I was slaving away in the kitchen the whole time. I was there when the shipyard workers capitulated. I often thought afterwards about those who perished. Will their blood be a poisoned seed or a sign of reconciliation?


I found myself on the list of those to be dismissed. However, I was selected for the delegation to go to Warsaw for a meeting with the authorities. This was in January 1971. Three coaches were brought up and off we went — not to Warsaw, however, but only to the nearby offices of the Regional National Council. I really don't know why at a time when a period of speaking the truth should have begun, one more lie was added to the already long list. We wanted to inform our colleagues that we weren't in Warsaw, but the blockade was tight.

At one point the meeting with representatives from the highest authorities entered a very sharp discussion. And this certainly convinced us. Just like the others I shouted to Gierek: 'We will help'. Just like the others I believed that they were real tears that ran down the gentleman's cheeks as he spoke: and that while he remained Minister of Internal Affairs there would be no bloodshed in Poland. I felt that I was being recharged with hope and faith like a battery. But disillusion was quick to follow.

A month passed, and the agitation didn't stop. In May 1971 a strike exploded. I ran to the head office where a crowd had already gathered. It turned out that one of the causes of the conflict was a new system of dividing bonuses. People still remembered Jaroszewicz's promise that we ourselves decide how to allocate them. Why, once again, had nobody asked us our opinion? He was disregarding the December troubles, and a rumour was going round that he was working for the UB. /Secret Police/

I went up to the microphone, composed and thoughtful, I managed to convince the staff that they should go back to work, after forcing the management to transmit our demands to the authorities. And the people listened to me. My speech turned out to be very unfortunate for me. Thereafter there were as many as four foremen who followed my every movement at work. It was also said that I had collected money for the victims of December. At the time this was not true.

My activities in organising the commemoration of December, my persecution by the police and the security police, my activities in



The police in action against the workers in Gdansk.

the Free Coastal Unions — these all belong to the years that followed.

Who would have thought that this road, so full of suffering, would have led to 'Solidarity'?

Fragments of Recollections

The Shipyard Delegation at the Regional Committee (KW)

We appointed a delegation from our shipyard to go to the regional committee. The earlier one, from the Lenin Shipyard, hadn't returned. The director Gryglewski, who was with us, had to guarantee that we would return. The regional committee building had already burned down, so we went to the Regional National Council (RN) building. It was surrounded by the army. We wanted to talk to the soldiers, but it was as if they had lost their tongues. We then knew for certain that they were soldiers from a neighbouring county.

Tadeusz Beim received us in the lobby. He told us to wait a little while and we would talk. We were led from room to room. I don't know whether they were looking for a place to eavesdrop on us or whether they wanted to wear us down psychologically. Our demands were simply: for withdrawal of the price rise; for release of the delegation that had been detained and of those taken to the concentration camp at Wejherow. There were 3,500 people held there. We also demanded supplies of food, and called for an international conference. When we put forward our demand that the T.V. should report the strike and our demands, they hedged by saying that this would lead to similar disturbances throughout the country. They were very unpleasant to us, treating us like enemies.

It all lasted a long time, and the shipyard began to grow alarmed. The workers there threatened to set the building on fire if we didn't return.

The strikers to the soldiers.

They fired at those trying to leave the shipyard by gate no. 2. They hit them near the hospital. This wasn't done by the army. The police had been taken to Pruszcz where they changed into army uniforms in a little wood.

I said: 'Attention! A special bulletin for the Polish Army. Soldiers! They are ordering you to shoot. Who are you shooting at? Your brothers. They told you that the Germans want to overthrow the system. These are not Germans.' I told them how they have to fight, how to defend Poland. Just like Kosciuszko and Pulaski, like Mickiewicz who was also a soldier. They all fought for Poland. And then even if you die you won't stain your uniform, you won't die like a traitor. And when you get such an order to shoot your brothers, kill your officer and choose one of your own. We are struggling to prevent the red bourgeoisie from ruling here.

I spoke to them about the economic situation. How sausage costs 150 zlotys a kilo, and earnings are 100 zl. daily, which is not even enough to buy a child sweets.


(Taken from an account by Kazimierz Szotoch, a member of the strike committee.)

The burning of the Regional Committee building, 15 December.

The burning of the regional committee building lasted a good few hours, for the police drove us back a few times. We caught some tear gas grenades dropped from helicopters and threw them into the windows. The building was burning sluggishly, pouring out smoke. In the end, petrol was poured through the bars of the entrance doors into the hall. Something started to burn, probably the stairs or the carpets. Then a white curtain was hung from a window, and just over a dozen police came on to the first-floor balcony with their hands up. A slim young man in overalls climbed the window bars, tore down the red flag and raised a red and white one. The people intoned a hymn, stood to attention and took off their helmets.

Next the police standing on the balcony were ordered to throw down their arms, helmets, clubs and jackets. Opinions were divided as to whether they should also take off their trousers. Some in trousers, others in underpants, climbed down the window bars to a lorry below and were taken to the shipyard under guard.

The people started to wander about in a relaxed mood. I was at the Blednik when I heard some loud engines. At first I thought they were aeroplanes, but in fact they were tanks and armoured vehicles. The fact that they had come so far made me angry so I went off in the direction of the Regional Committee. I thought I would be returning alone, but it turned out that I was in a crowd which, with heavy steps and determined faces, was moving towards the tanks.



A lorry-load of workers flying the Polish flag during the struggle in Gdansk.

GDYNIA

Reminiscences

On the Gdynia Shipyard Viaduct

I listened to Kocistek's speech in the evening. He called on everybody to resume work the following day.

There was no trouble on the journey. After arriving at the station for Gdynia Shipyard, the train stopped and everyone poured out onto the platform, from where the steps lead directly to a gangway across the railway-line. Youngsters of 18-20 always dashed up the steps first and this probably saved the lives of older people. Without any warning a burst of fire from a machine-gun tore into those who were half-way up the steps and three young shipyard workers fell on the gangway. At that moment a large group of people had reached the steps. Now two rather than one machine-guns opened fire, later a third joined in. People turned back to the train.

Those that were on the platform and succeeded in jumping into the train probably saved their lives by doing so. The train goes slowly along the street which runs from Gdynia shipyard to the town. There were already circles gathering in the street. And then a helicopter which had been tracking our train slowed down to a hover and began to fire on the unarmed people. I saw them falling, although I cannot say if they were killed or wounded.

In Gdynia Hospital, 17 December.

Just as we arrived at admissions a howl of ambulance sirens broke out and almost in an instant, stretchers of severely wounded people were coming in from a whole fleet of ambulances.

Operations, dressings, transfusions, drip-feeds all went on without cease. It was different from normal hospital work which does not vary day in, day out; it has stayed alive in the mind as an (unrepeatable) human drama. I cannot forget the deaths of the young 18-20 year olds, nor a death caused by shooting in the back.

Shot in the back! What an answer to the workers' response to Kocistek's appeal for a return to work. Nor is it surprising therefore that the wounded MO functionaries who were brought in straight from the shipyards had to be hidden from the summary justice of the workers (such are medical ethics).

Several hours that day I spent dealing with people who came to give blood. I cannot say how many there were. Carload arrived after carload. There were several dozen people waiting for hours at a time completely silent like a wall. Each wanted to give as much as possible, but the majority demanded an undertaking that their blood should not be given to militiamen.

Almost all of us stayed at the hospital two or three days; the pressure of the work acted almost as a relief in those tragic hours, but it was awful to hear the shooting shatter the nocturnal calm and to wait for the next terrible events to occur.

Remembered Fragments

Looting the Stores

It was the ORHO and MO officers who broke the window-panes. Since they were broken and the bits were lying around on the pavements, people—vandal-types—came and took things. There were several tens of thousands of people around me, workers these were, and I did not see any of them touch anything. Bottles were needed for the petrol, the wine from the stores was poured away, but nobody stole anything.

Street-fighting

Tank after tank came. On the platforms, by gates nos. 2 and 3, there was not even a fingers-breadth of space. Tanks don't make the grade in street-fighting. A 'Stara' car appears, a tank moves, and smashes through it, but the caterpillar tracks fold up and

both the tank and car catch alight. Then the tanks are engulfed in smoke and everyone falls upon them and sets them alight.

If you put a lighted wick into a bottle filled with petrol, and throw it at a tank, the tank catches fire.

People—shipyard workers who had served on tanks in the war—jumped onto the tanks. If someone failed to jump They took ropes from the hooks and threw them under the tracks and pulled out the gears, so that the tank went round and round on one track. It was also possible to throw the wick from the lantern under the other. Then the tank comes to a stop and out fly the birds.

The Capitulation of Gdynia Shipyard

The Chief Director, Zaczek, called in the army and gave us four

hours after which force would be used, we would be bombarded, destroyed. The demands were not met, but we had to end the strike. The strike committee signed the capitulation. I run to the BHP — the workers are in tears, this is treachery. I hear the communiqué: to come out, then the demands will be met. Many people were shattered, they said: it will be better like that; they cannot kill so many of us. When we came out the army and MO were standing on the side. They were told that there were 6000 of us and 20,000 to come.

In January 1971 our strike committee was revived. A delegation went to Gierek. I was there. We wanted lists of those who had been killed to be handed over. We did not know whether to laugh or cry, when we heard that only 45 had been killed. We were aware that some officers had not wanted to give the order to open fire and that there had been revolts amongst them.

SZCZECIN

From that moment I became an activist

— By Stanislaw Wadolowski

Ten years ago — in December 1970 — when the Gdansk and Gdynia shipyards went on strike, work also stopped at the Szczecin shipyard. It was Thursday. At 10.00 they shipyard workers went out into the town. They went in the direction of Grunwald Square. There the militia was already waiting for them with water cannons and tear gas. The militia blocked the way and dispersed the workers, but nonetheless about 500 of them managed to reach the Chrobry Ramparts and from there the shipyard.


Here however the shipyard workers were again split up and the drawbridge was raised. The trains stopped running making communication between enterprises more difficult. The dispersed groups of workers were chased back to the shipyard escorted by the militia.

This, however, did not scare the workers off! Workers from all the enterprises marched on the Provincial Party Committee building and set it on fire. This was a practical demonstration of the 'trust' between workers, because at the time the Party also represented workers and nearby stood the militia. Next the workers went to the Provincial Militia Headquarters and set to burning down the door and entering the building. They did not manage to get inside, shots were fired and the first victims fell.

Proof of how well the Trade Unions were then functioning is the fact that its members went next to burn down the Central Trade Union Council building. This was achieved to a certain extent and the workers then marched on the prison in Kaszubska Street. The bravest of their colleagues attempted to rescue the workers who had been brought there. (Many workers had been taken to the prison and other detention centres and militia stations.) Here too shots were fired. A curfew was declared from 1800, announced on radio and TV by Jozef Cyrankiewicz.

The following day we returned to work — to the Szczecin shipyard. Outside our shipyard — outside the gate — stood tanks. Whose tanks? The workers' tanks, of course, because it is the workers who pay for the tanks to be built and accordingly they were not turned on the workers .. However, they did not open fire and even began to withdraw as the shipyard workers advanced metre by metre, pouring petrol and setting it alight. Part of the workforce went to the Shipyard Director's Office to protest against the tanks being at the shipyard. And then the most tragic thing happened. On the shipyard premises — inside the perimeter of the shipyard — fire was opened on the shipyard workers. The militia shot at random into the dense crowd. The workers' militia was shooting workers! Two people were killed: a young boy of 19 who was about to complete his training at the Shipbuilding Technical College and an older man. They began taking the wounded away, and from that moment I became a union activist.

I could not bear to watch as they carried off the wounded. I remember it as if it was today, an unconscious young man with his knee shattered being carried away. He was my colleague from work. One after another they were carried off. I was at the time a technical workers and I returned to my post. Naturally I couldn't remain indifferent, quite simply, I cried. I didn't know what to do



Stasek Wadolowski, Vice-Chairperson of Szczecin Solidarity.

with myself. It was at this very time that talk began of forming a strike committee and organising a strike in the shipyard. I didn't believe that talking would achieve anything here. I thought we should go out, stop the shooting, rescue those taken and end this macabre spectacle as quickly as possible to prevent further bloodshed and more people being killed.

At the shipyard gate I met Mużzynski, the Party secretary. I told him that we weren't going for talks, or to form teams, but to stop the shooting. That the shooting must be stopped! The shipyard was completely surrounded. (I don't speak of other enterprises because as a shipyard worker I was not present at other workplaces and I'm speaking only of that in which I took part myself.) We left the shipyard, I forced the Party secretary to come with us saying that I would not be able to make the army withdraw, but if the Party secretary whom they must know was with me ... they had caused trouble so they can now help us make the army leave ..



A police vehicle in Szczecin burning.

Some of the workers followed us. Starting in May 1st Street there was a smoke screen and the army and militia were shooting blindly into the crowd which they couldn't see for the smoke. We walked with our hands up — yes, yes, with our hands up, that was on 17 December — and we walked shouting: don't shoot, we are coming to negotiate ...

The people — shipyard workers and others from the town stopped where the No.1 doesn't turn and we continued down May 1st Street. In the street there were tanks and the commanding officer, Colonel Urbanowicz. We went up to him and demanded that they stop shooting at the workers and withdraw the troops. We told him that we could manage on our own, that we could settle the matter ourselves, that the workers were not a threat and that the sons of workers and militiamen who were also workers should not shoot at fellow-workers. In view of this Colonel Urbanowicz ordered the tanks to withdraw and allowed contact to be made with the shipyard workers.

I witnessed an incident. A young boy, maybe 18-19 years old, threw a petrol bomb into a tank which set on fire. A young man with severe burns was taken from the tank and an officer shot the boy who had thrown the bomb in the forehead. He simply lost control. I don't know what I would have done, but scenes like this are horrible to watch. It is a horrific sight to see people shooting at one another.

The troops withdrew. We joined with the repair shipyard and the other shipyards. We then returned outside the main building of the Szczecin shipyard. There everyone had something to say. Some said that we should go and burn down those workers' premises which had aimed arms at the workers. Others — myself included — considered it pointless to have people getting shot at.

They shot at us ...


On the morning of 18 December, I went to the shipyard. Nobody there was working. People were waiting around, considering what to do next. At about 8 a.m. we were informed that near the main gates was a mass meeting. I ran there quickly. People were shouting about unjust price increases, demands were being made for a return to the old prices. Tension was increased by the news that behind our backs, near the gate stood tanks and armed infantry. Out of the shouting crowd a group was chosen for discussion with management. Others followed the group. They had to go out of the gates in order to reach the management building. A part went to the top and the crowd stayed by the gate. The tanks moved towards them, however nobody was frightened. People ran out

I thought that we had self-respect, that sacrifices were pointless, that there should be a strike of occupation. Then together with the people from outside the shipyard we gathered in the main hall to appoint a strike committee.

I was appointed to the newly formed strike committee as a representative of the three-person team in my section. During the first two days we were fed. Then — we were still green then — we allowed ourselves to be taken in. They said that they wanted to negotiate. A three-person delegation led by Mielek Dopierata — the chairperson of the Strike Committee in 1970 — left the shipyard to go and talk and negotiate with the Szczecin authorities. The delegation did not return to the shipyard and the strike was called off over loudspeakers. Panic ensued.

We left the shipyard having won nothing. Our only victory was that they did not put us inside and we were able to return to work. But there were no other changes. All that changed were the authorities at the top. Gierk replaced Gomulka and the second Edward's team came to power. Our Walaszek who had run Szczecin is most likely ruling somewhere else, he had not wanted to leave. In effect, everything remained the same. New strikes started and in January 1971 again a strike committee was formed. Once again vehicles leaving the shipyard bore the sign 'the strike continues!'. This did not last long. Kaim came with numerous officials. Again discussions began in the main hall. Literally everyone — Party members and non-Party members — slung mud at Walaszek, the authorities, the official trade unions. And then Kaim announced that Comrade Walaszek had asked to be allowed to resign from his post. Everyone heaved a sigh of relief. But nothing further happened, the authorities did not change their course of action.

And on 17 January 1971 the strike began. The strike was headed by Edmund Baluka, somewhat similar to Lech Walesa in his attitude and personality. Brave, aggressive, wise, a fantastic bloke and colleague. Again we formed a strike committee and the strike



The Party Provincial Headquarters in Szczecin, being set alight. On the extreme right, part of the crowd standing on top of a tank.

continued, so much the more menacing because it was not recognised by the authorities. And then Mieczysław F. Rakowski read out what he again read out this year during the strike: 'what do they want, there is a threat of intervention'. At the end of August 1980 Rakowski made exactly the same statement he'd made 10 years earlier changing only the dates and conditions (we compared the tapes).

of the way of the tank caterpillars, jumped up onto the tanks, painted over the view-finders, ruined the antennae and carbines. The tanks retreated. Evidently this time the purpose of their action was to shield the movements of the infantry. The soldiers put on their masks and behind the tanks, which began to advance again, threw smoke bombs. But the wind was blowing towards them.

The infantry opened fire. I threw back the last smoke bomb. It was then that I fell. My friends rushed towards me, grabbed my arms and legs and carried me out of the firing line. I didn't wait long for the operation. They took the bullet out of my shoulder.

When I regained consciousness, a boy next to me, who had been wounded in the head, died. Later I found out

This could not have been done by the infantry, because then the bullet would have entered by his back in a horizontal direction. There must have been a sniper on the roof who was aiming at the head but missed. I wanted to look at the bullet which had hit me, but it was already gone — some functionary had taken it away the day after the operation. I received a disability pension from my place of work.

The pension was for ... 'an accident at work'. The People's Council paid me compensation of 40,000 zł. In December 1970 I was twenty years old and had been one of the best athletes in the shipyard. For ten years now I have been able to move around only in a wheelchair.

(This was written up on the basis of a discussion with a participant in the strike whose name was Z. Nagorki.)



Police emerging from lorries and doing battle with workers near the Warski shipyard

Edmund Baluka Must be Allowed to Return to Szczecin

The August Agreements pledged that all those victimised as a result of the 1970-71 strikes should be able to return to work in the shipyards. One of the foremost of such people is Edmund Baluka, the leader of the Warski shipyard workers during the Baltic crisis of 1970-71. Harassed and forced into exile after the strikes Baluka has campaigned tirelessly on behalf of Polish workers' interests during his exile in the West in the 1970s. Pictured recently in Paris, he has written to the Polish authorities and to the Szczecin Solidarity seeking to return. His case has been taken up by Solidarity in Szczecin. Letters should be sent to the Polish Embassy demanding that he be allowed to return to his homeland. (On the 1970-71 strike in Szczecin and that earlier attempt to form genuine trade unions, see the interview with Edmund Baluka in *Labour Focus* Vol.1 No.2, May 1977).



A Brief Guide to the Party, Solidarity and Catholic Organisations

(Socialists confronting the problem of trying to understand the complexities of developments in Poland can be discouraged by the bewildering array of names and initials in this issue of *Labour Focus* and in the press. We are therefore offering this brief guide.)

1. OFFICIAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

PRL: The Polish People's Republic.


The Wojewoda and Wojewodship: The names of the Provincial Governor and the Province; there are 49 provinces in Poland and they are the main administrative units within the state. Each province has a Governor and a Provincial First Party Secretary, both of whom, especially the second, wield considerable power at a local level.

PUMP: The Polish United Workers' Party, official name of the Communist Party.

The Party Central Committee: This is the governing council of the Communist Party which meets every few months and has the sole power to appoint members of the day-to-day leading bodies of the Party, the Politburo and the Secretariat (on which, see below). The Central Committee meetings also in fact take the decisions on the key government appointments, for example, the appointment of the Premier. Despite a certain degree of day-to-day autonomy of the government from the Party leadership at the present time in Poland, the Party leadership wields decisive power. CC meetings acquire great importance when the Politburo and/or

What's Where?

The map below shows the 49 provinces of Poland. We have numbered those provinces that have figured prominently in the events of last year. The dots indicate the provincial capitals, of the same name as the province.



1. Warsaw 2. Gdansk (including Gdynia) 3. Szczecin 4. Katowice (including Bytom, Jasztrebie, Sosnowiec and Zuzbra) 6. Jelenia Gora 7. Bielsko Biala 8. Nowy Sacz 9. Krosno (including Ustrzyki Dolne) 10. Rzeszow 11. Lodz 12. Bydgoszcz 13. Torun 14. Wroclaw 15. Radom 16. Lublin 17. Czestochowa 18. Poznan

Secretariat are split on important issues. A CC Plenum is a full meeting of the Committee.

Politburo and Secretariat: The former has the task of taking the key political decisions on the problems coming before the regime. The Secretariat has the task of managing the day-to-day running of the Party leadership; tasks within the secretariat are divided up between various **Central Committee Secretaries**, eg. the one for propaganda, or for economic affairs or for defence and security. The most powerful figures in the Party leadership are those who have membership of both the Politburo and the Secretariat. The Party leader is formally titled, the First Secretary of the Central Committee.

The Party Apparatus: These are the professional officials working for the Party itself as opposed to the government or one of the Party's satellite organisations. Central, Provincial, city and factory secretaries are such apparatus members, while a member of the Politburo, the Central Committee or a Provincial Committee need not necessarily be part of this professional Party apparatus: s/he could be in theory a worker given time off to attend the relevant meetings. The Party apparatus at present numbers some 10,000 (roughly) officials.

Party membership: It now stands at about 3.2 million members. In the 1970s, for the first time since the late 1950s, working class membership grew, from 40% to 46% of the Party. Of these working class members (bearing in mind that the term is a very broad one) 27% are in 168 of the

largest factories — precisely the area where Solidarity is strongest. Somewhere between 800,000 and 1½ million Party members are in Solidarity, and overwhelmingly defied a ban by the Party leadership on their involvement in the 27 March 4-hour general strike over the Bydgoszcz affair.

The Party Congress: Normally held every 5 years, it adopts policy resolutions and elects the Central Committee. Its composition and decisions are normally firmly controlled from above. Since August agitation at the base of the Party has pushed the leadership to call an Extraordinary Congress (the last one was only last year in February 1980). A congress commission has been set up to organise the event but the congress's date has been repeatedly postponed while the crisis between the leadership and base and within the leadership continues.

The Nomenklatura: A key institution because it is the means by which the Party leadership nationally and locally ensures its administrative grip on all the key institutions in the society: the system involves the relevant Party committee having the right to **appoint** without election whoever it wishes (Party member or non-Party member) to given posts in society. Anyone with career ambitions in any important field must win a place on the nomenklatura list, meaning that s/he is acceptable to the Party apparatus (which guards the list). The size of the list in Poland today is estimated to be about 200,000.

Party leadership factions: These are never stable and have much more to do with tactical issues and bureaucratic interests than with ideologies or political principles — another reason for their shifting character. At the present time within the leadership it is thought that there are two principal antagonistic groups: that around Kania, Jaruzelski and Barcikowski wishing to regain Party control over Solidarity without head-on confrontations; and that led by Olszowski and Grabski favouring a confrontationist line.

The Democratic Party and the United Peasants Party: These are satellite parties of the PUWP, without any independent life of their own. The first is supposed to represent private artisans and small traders; the second, peasants.

The United National Front: This is an entirely decorative body, uniting all the recognised political groupings in the state; its only function is a negative one: you have to be a member of a group involved in the Front in order to be a candidate on the single electoral list at election times.

The Sejm: The Polish Parliament. The Deputies are elected from a single slate approved by the United National Front which is in turn controlled by the Party leadership. The list does contain more candidates than Sejm places so to this extent a choice is possible.

The Council of State: This is a collective presidency of the state and its Chairperson is the titular head of state. It has largely ceremonial functions, given that the real locus of power is the Party leadership.

The Milicja: The ordinary police.

SZSP: Socialist Union of Polish Students.

SOLIDARITY

NSZZ: These initials stand for 'Independent Self-Governing Trade Union'. They are part of the organisation's official title.

MKS: Inter-factory Strike Committee.

MKZ and MKR: Inter-factory Trade Union Committee and Inter-Factory Workers' Committee. The two groups of initials are interchangeable: in most regions, MKZ is used but in some, such as Szczecin, MKR is used. These bodies are the key organisations of Solidarity, the ones that take the crucial decisions on policy and strike action. They

consist of a delegate plenum, made up of delegates from each of the factories affiliated to Solidarity, and a Presidium which runs the day-to-day business of the organisation between each plenum. The Presidium has a chairperson who is the main spokesperson for the organisation. The MKZ plenum or delegate assembly meets at varying intervals in different regions. In the autumn of 1980, for example, the plenum in Walbrzych was meeting weekly on a Thursday evening, whereas in Szczecin it was meeting roughly monthly. At the start of the movement there were over 80 MKZs, but as a result of mergers the number is down to about 50. Lech Walesa declared his intention of reducing the number of MKZs in the country to about 13, but this would be very difficult to achieve. At present the MKZs correspond to the administrative division of the country into provinces and they negotiate with the provincial governors, or, less frequently, with the real power in the province, the Party First Secretary.

The Factory Committee: This is the body from which delegates go to the MKZ meetings. The Factory Committee, sometimes known as a Workers' Committee, has delegates from the different departments in the plant, meeting in a delegate assembly. But there are also presidia and a chairperson carrying out the same types of functions as at the regional level. By the end of February elections for the factory committees had been held throughout the country. (Elections on a regional level had been scheduled to have taken place by now, but have not as yet been held in most places. Thus the regional leaderships largely remain those who played a key role in initiating Solidarity on the regional level.)

The KKP: The National Co-ordinating Committee. This is the national leadership of Solidarity, but as its name suggests it does not have power to do more than co-ordinate regionally instigated policies and to use its moral authority to give advice to regional leaderships. At first the Gdansk and Szczecin leaderships were reluctant to have any national organisational structure, but they were persuaded of its necessity to help the weaker centres of the movement. Today the trend of the Gdansk leadership is to seek to enhance the power of the KKP in order to strengthen discipline within the movement and thereby provide greater flexibility. The KKP is attended by two delegates from each MKZ, one of whom would normally be the MKZ chairperson. The two delegates are in principle mandated by their regional organisation on the various issues up for decision: they are thus regional delegates, not representatives. The KKP meets at irregular intervals but often at least once a week if a crisis is on. Since 12 February, the KKP has had a national Presidium, which runs the national organisation between meetings, and it has also had an administrative secretariat since late November.

Branch Commissions: Solidarity is organised on a regional and factory basis, not according to branches of industry and trades on a national scale. This makes it different from the main institutions of the British trade unions, and much more like a national structure of Trades Councils. It is, indeed, striking that in a period of acute class conflict with a strong political edge in Britain during the 1920-26 period the trades councils became powerful centres of working class organisation. So also in Solidarity the class principle predominates over the sectional one in organisational matters. But Solidarity does have what it calls Branch Commissions on a national and regional level. These organise workers in particular occupations and industries. But they are very much subordinated to the regional MKZs: only the latter can take strike decisions for example. The branch bodies are thus co-ordinating and advisory bodies. They grew up first out of such struggles as those of the health workers, printing workers, teachers and railway workers in late 1980.

3. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Resources: The bulk of the Church's income derives from donations from its congregations. The rest comes from some small farms it has been allowed to keep and from the Vatican. Church personnel in the 1970s:

Number of priests: 11,239 (1937) and 18,151 (1972)

Number of Churches and Chapels: 7,257 (1937) and 13,392 (1972)

Number of Monks and Nuns: 24,000 (1937) and 30,000 (1972)

Ordinations of priests in the 1970s were running at double the pre-war level. They are trained in 24 diocesan seminaries and 23 monastic seminaries (since last August the government has given the Church two more seminaries, in Szczecin and Koszalin). The Church also has 17,000 religious education centres, a Catholic University in Lublin and a Theology College in Warsaw.

Church leadership: Since the late 1940s, the Church has been led by Cardinal Wyszynski, now in his eighties. The aged Primate now delegates a great deal of practical responsibility to the Secretary to the Episcopate, Mgr. Dabrowski who has played a prominent political role since the August crisis. Under Dabrowski is the Episcopate's official spokesperson, Abbot Orszulik. The Archbishop of Krakow, Mgr Macharski is also a Cardinal — he took over from Cardinal Wojtyla when the latter became Pope in 1978. Cardinal Wyszynski rules through the Episcopal Conference which meets several times a year.

The Politics of the Hierarchy: During the 1970s, the Episcopate has sought to defend its rural base while seeking to appeal to the growing young urban population through developing the themes of defence of civil liberties and also through a drive against 'immorality' — against abortion, contraception, divorce, alcoholism, 'decadent' attitudes etc. It always seeks to present itself as the voice of the entire population and as the symbol of the nation's unity, above politics. At the same time, it has used its popular influence to seek concessions from the regime, offering the latter in return political support against mass popular movements: in 1956 it strongly backed Gomulka and raised no voice against the suppression of the radical workers' and intellectuals afterwards. In 1968 it took no clear stand in defence of the students and in opposition to the anti-semitic campaign; in 1970-71 it called on the workers to end their strikes and pray for calm and it did the same at the height of the August strike with Cardinal Wyszynski's famous televised speech on 26 August. (Following the workers' hostile reaction to the speech, the hierarchy said it had been censored, but when Rome published the full text this charge of censorship turned out to have been false.) This was followed by Abbot Orszulik's attack on the KOR in December (see section on that incident in this issue). The hierarchy appears to have toyed with the idea of seeking to turn Solidarity into a Church-controlled union while at the same time diluting its class consciousness and militancy as well as its radically democratic thrust. At the same time, its usefulness for the Government has been hampered by the Soviet leadership's strong hostility to Rural Solidarity and by the fact that the Episcopate must back that organisation to preserve its rural base. During recent weeks the Episcopate's adviser to Solidarity has argued, against the Union's other advisors, that the crucial issue is not defence of militants under attack from the police (such as Kuron and Michnik and the victims of police violence in Bydgoszcz) but the battle for Rural Solidarity. A trade-off between the Church and Party hierarchies along these lines cannot be ruled out.

(Continued on page 38.)

Solidarity Across Poland

GDANSK

The entire movement began in Gdansk and was prepared by the activity of a small group of independent trade unionists who co-operation a bulletin called *The Coastal Worker*, which had links with the KOR (on which see the guide in the front of this issue). Lech Walesa, a veteran of the Lenin Shipyard workers' strike committee in 1970, was in this group, but in some ways the moving spirit was Andrzej Gwiazda Solidarity's Vice-President, a worker in the Elmor factory in Gdansk who created a core of activists there which included Bogdan Lis, a 28-year-old Communist Party member now number 3 in the Solidarity leadership, and Alina Pienkowska another young Solidarity national leader. We begin this section with an interview with

Gwiazda published in the official Polish journal, *Literatura* and translated here from the French journal *L'Alternative*. We secondly publish an account by one of the experts involved in negotiating the Gdansk Agreement of what happened over the crucial 'Leading role of the Party' formula in the final text: it throws a dramatic new light on the role of the experts in the strike. Finally we publish an interview with a group of Gdansk leaders which first appeared in the local official magazine called *Czas*. The interview focuses on the relationship between Solidarity and the KOR. It is translated here from the Austrian socialist magazine, *Gegenstimme*.

Leading the Union:

Interview with National Vice-President Andrzej Gwiazda

Have you heard any sign of dissatisfaction with Solidarity on the part of the workers?

Virtually none at all. In fact, the people who do report such views come from the outside, and they are not borne out in our own relations with the workers. I would not like to make any categorical judgment. But I am sure of one thing: that during these last two-and-a-half months, society has made an enormous advance towards self-awareness that is undoubtedly linked to the great social expectations.

Do these expectations not feed the growth of radicalism among the workers?

You know, I'd have preferred to dampen down an excess of radicalism rather than arouse people from slumber. But it must be said that both here in Gdansk and in other inter-factory committees around the country, we mainly hear the voices of people who are alarmed at the continuation of strikes. We move around, we calm people down, we explain things. But to those whose hair stands on end in fear, I would say: 'Keep cool, don't panic: if there is an unofficial strike somewhere, that means someone has been wronged, or at least has been wronged in the eyes of the workers, and that they are protesting as best they can. The thing to do is either to explain that there is no reason for going on strike, or else to support them in their action.' For they are on strike not because they don't want to work, but because in most cases they have a concrete reason to strike. If the director shows up and says: 'I don't give a damn if you go on strike, I won't sort anything out for you,' then the only solution is an immediate strike leading to dismissal of the director.

You also mentioned cases of passivity...

My own definition is very imprecise. Most often passivity is bound up with fear resulting from a severe clampdown by the local authorities on the new trade unions. That's exactly what happened in the well-known case at Czestochowa, where the provincial authorities tried to outmanoeuvre the strike call for 12 November by calling on union militants to make a declaration of loyalty. They confiscated union materials and provoked a state of tension and agitation in society. The situation was also difficult in Olsztyn, but there too Solidarity's organisation and activities were eventually authorised.

What kind of problems do you have with the elections now beginning in Solidarity?

We say to people: don't be shy of taking positions of responsibility; we want to have a genuine trade union apparatus, not for our own use but in order to achieve concrete things; and so you have to say, 'Yes, I want to be elected'. And if someone doesn't have the courage to say this, he must at least state: I want to achieve this or that. And such a statement is already an electoral programme. People will no longer be voting for Franek or Fenek but for a programme: that protective clothing should always be provided, for example, or that proper cupboards should be fitted in the changing-rooms. And after six months people can say to Franek: 'What's happened about the cupboards then? You made a promise, and we voted for you so that you would sort out the cupboards. But you haven't done anything, you creep. We're going to get rid of you.' Or they might say: 'Get stuck into it; we didn't vote for you but for what

you were going to do.' Another time people might say: 'So, you're in the union and you're doing nothing,' and they might get the answer. 'If only I knew what can be done! But I told you I didn't know.' And it's true, you couldn't get angry with a man like that!

Okay, but courage is one thing, the will to act something else ...

And the third thing is that people should participate, and that the need for an electoral programme should be clear to them. The way in which people think is changing: they can't vote any more for Malinowski because he's a great guy, or because he can stay on his feet after a half-litre of vodka, or because he can tell good jokes. No, Malinowski should have an action programme; he should know what he wants to do in the union. Of course I'm over-simplifying. But if such a way of thinking took root, then the activity and sensitiveness that has recently made such a powerful appearance in society would be considerably strengthened. It is very important, indeed, that these should not be weakened. In any case, I know from my contacts with workers that this idea is finding a positive echo.

Hasn't anyone expressed doubts to you? Hasn't anyone asked, for example: 'What will this lead to?' 'Is it all worth the effort?'

No. At the moment people are convinced that they will really achieve something if they all set their minds on it.

But so far there has been an elusive, unstable situation which won't disappear overnight. It is itself bound up with a feeling of anxiety. Let's hope that the situation will gradually become more stable in a positive sense. But aren't you afraid that these social attitudes will grow much weaker as there is a gradual normalisation of life?



Andrzej Gwiazda

We can't rule it out. But even if that were to happen, things would not go so far that all activity ceased. There is such great negligence that we'll have things to do for a long time to come! And then, none of us talks about immediate results and rapid success; both I and my comrades say that a huge task, full of interest and hard work, lies ahead of us. We have to get down to this task, giving a lot of help to union militants. Such activity will encompass a wide range of problems, from the simplest to the most complicated. There will certainly be a place for a financial study of the enterprise, and also for the centralisation of information about job safety and living conditions. Although we have set up specialised working groups at central level, the main information should come from the workers themselves. In every enterprise, town and region, there are plenty of things to do that no one will do in our place.

And are such ideas catching on?

Yes, they are. For people's needs, including mental needs, have been piling up for a long time. There was a lot of discontent, for example, about the fact that work had to be sabotaged, that a load of crap was being produced, that work was being performed in breach of the elementary rules. There was a violent hatred of work that could have only such shoddy results. It's curious that this will to do a good job is reappearing among young people — a will that used to be alive in the generation of old foremen who would get stomach ulcers and heart attacks because someone ordered them to produce any old rubbish as long as it was produced quickly and in large quantity. Young people earning as much as 14,000 zlotys a month have come to join the union simply because they couldn't do a good job, and because the guidelines and rhythms imposed from above forced them to botch up their work.

You have been attacked on the ground that you don't want to hear of joint responsibility and co-management but only of some control function ...

Concepts are often mixed up in our discussions, and in certain cases, at least, we ought to define each concept before the discussion takes place. Co-management of an enterprise? It may be that we'll be forced into it.

If the management provided by the economic administrative apparatus is inefficient?

First there has to be a management, and then we can talk about co-management. If there is no real enterprise management, it is hard to agree to co-management. Enterprises have not been managed in the past — if by management we understand a rational mode of organisation. According to that definition, it is really difficult to give the term 'management' to the economic disorder we have known so far.

What you have just said contains the positive suggestion that enterprise management will become more rational.

That has to be done. If this trade union and social movement is not broken, then rationalisation is inevitable. Just think that, up until now, the authorities could treat a manager as a punching-ball, and that he had to hold his tongue and applaud in order to retain his post. At the moment, managers faced with pressure from the workers may come out in favour of a genuine rationalisation of the economy. And these people do have a real influence over the economy.

Okay, but in my view such a rationalisation cannot take place only at the level of an industrial enterprise; it also has to go from the top to the bottom. And we won't achieve that without a profound economic reform.

As long as it's clear that we won't achieve it either without a profound political reform. For only a profound political reform can restore people's confidence.

Does Solidarity intend to participate in the drafting, and later in the application, of the economic reform?

If Solidarity is to do something, if it is to co-participate in the economic reform, it must have concrete information at its disposal. So long as your hands are empty, you can't just dream up a reform over a glass of drink — not even if you're paid for it.

Have you discussed such matters with the government?

I have raised them at every meeting. In a nutshell, unless the new unions have concrete information, they can make no practical contribution to the development of the economic reform. That's what I think. I can't see how I could correct something that I don't know about.

And if you had the information? I mean that apart from this condition, there must still be a headquarters of people who can give a competent opinion.

Obviously. I am completely in favour of such a group, provided that before it begins activity, a study group is first established to draw up a kind of 'inventory of what exists in our economy' — an inventory independent of official control mechanisms. Besides, in my view the very functioning of the trade unions has a positive influence on the economy.

Apart from your function in mobilising and leading workers, you should as Solidarity militants also have a certain educative function in assisting the common apprenticeship in democracy. As things stand, do you think that this group of union leaders, formed spontaneously at every level, is really sufficient to direct this process?

Certainly not. We simply have to teach our militants a number of new things. Did you notice the silence in the hall at Pruszcz when I spoke of elections? And yet these were militants of the new sugar industry unions. It was clear that several of them, hearing talk of this question for the first time in their life, were just about beginning to think of the way in which workers' representatives should be elected. A genuine election is an interesting experience — I went through one at the booksellers' congress. There I could see with my own eyes how a workers' assembly, divided into groups and grouplets, terrified by the presence of the manager and other official figures, and with absolutely no faith in the possibilities of success (the point was to organise Solidarity among themselves), transformed itself into a fighting democratic organisation after four hours of discussion.

How did that happen?

I explained a number of things to them. I called things by their name, calmly but without hiding anything. They listened to me, fearfully at first, but when they saw that nothing would happen to them, that the officials were also listening and not even saying what they had prepared in advance, well then, they set up their own Solidarity. They stopped asking themselves: 'Is it possible?', 'Will they allow it?'

Does this idea still have a massive resonance in society?

Yes, indisputably. For example, one of the things which people like the most, and ask the most questions about, is the recallability of delegates. The Solidarity statutes affirm that the same principles apply to recall as to elections: if there is a majority for such a motion, then anyone in a position of responsibility may be dismissed from office. At any time. And this is precisely what people regard as a guarantee of democracy.

Do you have many disputes?

We don't have any disputes — not so far at any rate. In Gdansk, for example, there is very good co-operation with the authorities: the Party Secretary Fiszbach is regarded as a firm supporter of reforms. The same is true of Kolodziej, the provincial governor. This is probably why it was easier to find common ground for quarrel-free discussion.

You are probably all pondering whether it is realistic to write the new unions once and for all into the future reformed model of economy and society. Do you personally think that this is realistic?

In what system? With the existence of independent, self-managed trade unions, the system today differs from the former system in which the unions effectively depended on the administration. Up until now, whenever the Prime Minister spoke to a delegation of workers, the scene was typical of so-called 'top-quality activity'. The workers would listen to the prime minister's speech and applaud. But now the prime minister is faced not with a flatterer, but with a partner who tells him what the workers really think. Not a few extremists, a few radicals, but the workers plain and simple. And nowadays awareness is becoming very widespread.

So, the change of system depends first on the position taken by the workers, and secondly on the skill and flexibility of the authorities with regard to the introduction of reforms and the self-regulation of activity. Changes since August demonstrate that, with or without violent disturbances, this process has some chance of success.

Yes, there is some chance. But I don't know if the process will be successful. For such chances have already existed several times before, only to be 'stifled' by the ruling apparatus at intermediary and lower levels. Perhaps it is necessary to attract new people to the apparatus although that would provoke resistance on the part of its former members. Here, then, is the problem. Even the most enlightened Central Committee initiatives may encounter such resistance and get bogged down.

If we literally took that view, there would be no point in doing anything at all.

It would just prove that our system is very difficult to reform. And this is a crucial problem in our country.

Do you remember our discussion in the Gdansk shipyards on the sixth day of the August strike? You said then that even if you lost this time round, you would win in the end. I agreed with you: this judgement referred above all to ethical and moral values, the realm of conscience. After those six days, it was already clear that something would be inscribed for ever in the consciousness of society, and that it would therefore bear fruit. Several months have passed since then, and whereas this summer you gave the independent unions a 5 per cent chance of success, it would be possible today to give the democratisation process a 50 to 60% chance ...

Even more! As I see it, the greatest danger now threatening the unions is not defeat but attrition. Defeat in itself is not dangerous, so long as one loses publicly in a manner that is understandable to public opinion.

What is the cure for this danger of attrition?

Experts and the 'Leading Role': A Participant's Account

(After the August Agreements a battle raged between Solidarity and the government over the organisation's legal registration. The key issue in dispute was the government's insistence that Solidarity's Statutes should contain the phrase about 'the leading role of the Communist Party' which was contained in the Gdansk Agreement. The phrase itself is one of the most central code-phrases of Stalinism, giving the Party apparatus the right to control virtually every sphere of social life. The compromise which led to Solidarity's registration on 11 November, still left the regime and its allies in neighbouring countries able to cite the Gdansk Agreements as the legitimate basis for opposing every political struggle that Solidarity took up on the grounds that it challenged the Party's 'leading role'.

It had been thought that this clause had been accepted, however reluctantly, by the MKS delegates in Gdansk after a full discussion, as a necessary compromise: the government was assumed to have made this the absolute sticking point, although it was curious that the phrase was not contained in the Szczecin Agreement of the day before.

But one of the Gdansk MKS experts, Jadwiga Staniszkis, a distinguished sociologist and Marxist, has subsequently explained the real context in which this clause, and indeed the whole agreement, was negotiated. At the same time, she reveals the extraordinarily important political, decision-making role of the Experts, and in particular of the Catholic Mazowiecki. She also reveals the way in which the democracy of the MKS was

On 21 or 22 August, Mazowiecki and Geremek decided to travel to Gdansk to give the MKS a list of intellectuals who had signed a resolution supporting the MKS and the idea of negotiations. They stayed in the yard for a day, and it then became clear that there were going to be negotiations with Jagielski. Either Walesa or the regional leader then said it would be a good idea to have a few specialists, and Mazowiecki was asked if he would invite some economists, sociologists, legal experts, and so on. He phoned all kinds of people, and I was one of those on his list. However, an economist from Gdansk, who had personal contact with the yard, had already called me the day before. I had been there a number of times since 1970, interviewing people about their experiences for a book on which I was working at the time. Anyway, I had already arrived there on Saturday the 23rd.

(It wasn't just Catholics like Mazowiecki and Wielowieski who were in this group of experts.) There were also some people from the 'Flying University' like Geremek and Kuczynski. Kowalik was also connected with the Flying University, as well as with the group of 'true communists'.

(There was a very special atmosphere in the discussions between the two sets of experts.) I had strange, surreal feelings. Since critically-minded people had had rather an ambivalent position in the Poland of the 1970s, even an official like the government planning expert Pajestka was critical to a slight degree. And even though Kowalik, Mazowiecki and myself were slightly more critical, all of us belonged to the same Warsaw establishment, met at the same conferences, and so on. This is why the talks went so fast. The atmosphere was very pleasant. But it was also very dangerous, creating inner loyalties (among experts on both sides) in relation to the negotiations.

Mazowiecki decided not to release any information about conflict in the negotiations to the plenary meeting of workers' delegates, thinking that such information would disturb the proceedings. But this was the first step on a road that eventually led to the abolition of the twice-daily meeting of voting delegates. This happened partly because the atmosphere was so pleasant: one didn't really have the feeling that there were two sides involved. The talks went very smoothly — the same wavelength, the same world of ideas.

In my opinion, the presence of experts was not very beneficial to the workers. It led to a packaging of their demands, but it also distorted the authentic expression of the movement. They were really so much against the system that they didn't even want to touch it. And that was distorted. They were somehow 'liberalised' in the manner of the intelligentsia ... There was a certain over-articulation in the direction of liberalism, and at the same time less and less direct, practical democracy.

We are looking for it all the time. It's hard to say what we will find, since we are indeed going through an epoch of 'things never before seen'.

overridden, and shows how an alternative ideological formula would have been possible.

When we remember that every phrase in the Gdansk Agreements became a battle line between gigantic social forces inside and outside Poland in the subsequent months, it is difficult to over-estimate the importance of the events which Jadwiga Staniszkis describes. The other three experts with a direct experience of these events — Mazowiecki, Kowalik and Geremek — have not to our knowledge placed their own version of what happened on public record.

One final point should be remembered. The discussions between the MKS experts and the government side were not taped on broadcast — some indeed have suggested that this was the government's reason for favouring the creation of teams of experts. So all these negotiations took place behind closed doors.

The text below is an edited extract from a long interview given by Jadwiga Staniszkis to the Austrian socialist journalist, Michael Seigert and published in the West Berlin left-wing daily, Tageszeitung on 17, 21 and 22 October. (Michael Seigert's reportage from Poland in Tageszeitung last autumn was a tour de force of socialist journalism.) For the sake of readability we have removed the original questions and connected Ms Staniszkis's account with phrases in brackets. We have checked the English text with the author.)

(It has been said that if Walesa had faced the government officials alone, the results might have been worse, and the workers might have fallen into traps.) But there is only one thing which might have become more difficult — and that is the legal registration of the new union ... But none of us were aware of such matters, neither Mazowiecki nor Kowalik nor I. I had never before been interested in the trade unions.

The clause (on the 'leading role of the Party', point 1 of the Agreement) was manipulated through, without a vote in the large hall. The rules clearly stated that all fundamental questions, and all questions on which there was dispute in the Presidium, should be put to a vote. But there was no vote on the matter, even though some people in the Presidium were against the clause.

It was an interesting situation from the point of view of the workers' class consciousness. I was in the small working-group when the Government initially formulated this demand on the second or third day of negotiations. There were twelve people present — three negotiators and three experts on each side. On the third day the government people said that independent trade unions would constitute an ideological precedent, and that the workers' side should withdraw their demand for such independent unions.

Now, the workers didn't see things in these terms. They saw the MKS as a purely pragmatic creation, fulfilling the role of technical co-ordination. They didn't think in terms of class representatives on both sides, and they didn't really have a model. And so, precisely because they didn't really grasp the significance of this point, it wasn't so easy to get them to accept the 'leading role' formula. The government should have explained all this in advance, but it wanted to avoid doing so because this would give the workers a new way of looking at power.

Instead, they used the intellectuals, and we immediately understood what all this meant. They wanted to use the experts and the workers' trust in the experts as a means of introducing this formula. For if the government had been alone vis-à-vis the workers, it would never have been able to introduce it in that way.

I saw the workers' reaction. 'Why bring that in here?', 'That will all be worked out in practice'. For them it was only a practical question. There was a difference in imagination. Radicalism is a problem of imagination.

For the Party, the 'leading role' formula is absolutely fundamental. But not for the workers. The way in which it was introduced, seemed unfair to many delegates. And on the last day, some of them were not let into the meeting because of their dissenting views. There were quite a few such

incidents, and for the same reason radicalism was increasing in the General Assembly just as it was decreasing in the Presidium.

Everything that was not democratically decided — for example, point 8 (concerning wage rises) and the political formula (the leading role of the Party) — has now become a time-bomb. This is pedagogically very good, because it shows that any interference or manipulation just backfires in the case of such a movement.

During the Gdansk negotiations, it was possible to get concessions from the government side on this question. They weren't pressing hard. At worst, they would have accepted some formulation which accepted the Constitution, as happened in Szczecin. In fact, the Szczecin formulation was introduced by the government and not negotiated upon. It was congenial to them, and they readily accepted it. The Party didn't enter into the matter.

I think it was Mazowiecki's fault. They wanted to show the Party how loyal they were, and to present an argument in favour of their Catholic movement which has already been used in Parliament and in certain informal items of information. They want more Sejm delegates, greater freedom of movement for the opposition, more newspapers, and so on. They use the argument that they make a strong input into the mass movement, and that they can tame the movement. But they are mistaken. For some of these workers, now radicalised, will probably refuse to accept the formula, and a much greater problem will have been created through this open workers' rebellion.

Mazowiecki and all the experts knew that the government side was in a panic because of the miners' strike and they would probably have agreed to a formula involving a non-institutional definition of socialism — for instance, nationalisation of the means of production and popular power. One could have negotiated on that. But there was no negotiation over the substance, just refinement of the form. The government side got more than they expected.


On Saturday 30 August — the last day before the negotiations were completed and after point one had been signed — the workers decided to negotiate all the other points themselves because they were unhappy with the political formula in point one (on the leading role of the Party). That whole night from Saturday to Sunday they negotiated on their own and, with the exception of point 8 (wage increases) they achieved more radical solutions. There were three workers — Gwiazda, Lis and Koblinski — doing all the negotiating themselves, on all the clauses after the first three, taking the government side through them twice over during the Saturday night. They were very skilful and did it all without the experts.

At the end of the negotiations, it was a dramatic moment when Jagielski spoke and paraphrased point one: he spoke of what it meant to him, how happy he was that we had given our approval to his Party, and so on. It was at this moment that the workers understood what this formula, that had been so neatly packaged for them, really meant. They were so upset that Walesa said afterwards: our only chance now is if the Central Committee refuses to accept it. But on Saturday afternoon the Party leadership accepted it.

From that moment on, they wanted to throw all the experts out of the shipyard. That didn't hit me very hard, because I did not collaborate on this formula. I had been against it.

When the government put forward this demand and I realised that the workers did not see the significance, I refused to negotiate on it: first of all because the form of the formula was not important, and on the other hand, because it should have been discussed with all the workers, all the delegates. I was against the discreet way of proceeding. At stake was an ideological decision that should have been taken by the workers

themselves, not by the experts. It was a matter for decision, not for expertise.



Delegates of the Inter-factory Strike Committee meeting in the Lenin Shipyard during the August strike.

So on Thursday 28 August, I told the Presidium: I think this should be decided by the workers and we experts should withdraw for a while. The other experts said they would stay on and co-operate in the elaboration of the formula. I withdrew from the group of three experts and Geremek took my place. Later on, when they worked on practical matters like the Health Service, work-time and so on, I returned.

I have a feeling that this business with the formula was so much against the true feelings of the workers that at least one should have discussed it with them. But it was only read to them without explanation as a formula that had been accepted definitively by the Presidium and the experts. The workers were shocked.

(No regular plenary meetings of the shipyard workers and delegates that might have opened up a process of learning and politicisation took place) because the workers would not have agreed to the proposals: they were very radical although one third of them (200) were Party members. The leadership was afraid, and also the experts dissuaded them from holding such meetings. So radical was the mood that the workers didn't even want Party members to be in the trade unions. Their protest could have been used as an argument in the negotiations. In my view, it would have been better to show the government the true opinions of the workers, to articulate them. For this was an ideological precedent of rebellion against the institutionalised definition of socialism. For me socialism is not a one-party system, it has nothing to do with a party but with the organisation of society, with (socialised) ownership of the means of production and so on. My attitude was that it was arrogant on the part of the experts to wish to phrase the formula on behalf of the workers. It should have been discussed with all the delegates. Of course, that was risky, because we knew how radical they were. But it was their movement and they had the right to express their attitude.

(As to my own relations with the various opposition trends) my present position of 'get-rid-of-the-influence-of-the-clergy' is very unpopular. That's why I have not got equally good relations with everybody. I have visited Gdansk and made speeches and I am doing research on the strikes and on the situation after the strike. I'm not even a real Marxist, but I was critical of Mazowiecki because I thought it was a distortion of the movement if he made use of it. Manipulation, even if well-intentioned, should be avoided in such a situation. It only brings small successes. It's not worth it.

Solidarity and KOR: An Interview with Gdansk Leaders

(This interview was published in the Gdansk weekly Czas (The Times) last December. Kecik is a KOR member concerned with agricultural problems. Bogdan Borusewicz is both in KOR and in the Gdansk Solidarity leadership. The other speakers are Solidarity leaders.)

We wanted to know how you interpret the leading role of the party?

Walesa: 'Czas' — what is it? What movement do you stand for?

Our time, the present day.

Walesa: Your statements are very dangerous. The whole interview is very dangerous. Leave me out of this.

Are you afraid?

Walesa: I'm not afraid. There are many problems which you have got to put up with and the question of the leading role of the party ... we could talk about this for a long time, but such talk has many snags, and there are plenty of those already. Every additional tiny snag will breed additional mistrust. You are aware of our situation, aren't you?

But that's a question in everybody's minds: why do you avoid mentioning 'the leading role of the party' in your statute?

Lis: It's quite simple, the leading role of the party ...

Walesa: Oh, Bogdan, that's dangerous.

Lis: Why dangerous? The party has a leading role, but in the state. The trade unions, however, are an organisation with its own administration.

Gwiazda: ... and independence.

Lis: It would not be independent, if there was such a thing as the 'leading role of the party' in the trade unions... Then, it would also be more difficult to understand the fact that party officials are not allowed to hold a position in the trade unions.

Walesa: Leave me out of such questions. We've got plenty of problems organising the trade unions.

Namely?

Walesa: Well, everything you write up from this interview will be censored anyway.

We are not going to chat about the weather. The government assert that they have kept the agreement (after the strikes in the summer of 1980) to the full extent. And you disagree with this.

Walesa: People look upon some of our demands as being trifling or not corresponding to the political situation. We do not refer to capitalism, we know that the present social situation is good for us. That is what reality is like, and we want to help to improve it. We must have a frank talk about this topic with Premier Pinkowski.

Gwiazda: You're absolutely wrong. You can talk about all sorts of things to the people, but about very little to the premier.

Walesa: The premier must be a realist and must know what's going on.

in your executive commission you back people who have been said to have belonged to the opposition. Is it right for you to do this, taking into account your present situation?

Walesa: What is all this about, ladies and gentlemen ... I belong to the opposition, to the free trade unions. We have all been regarded as the opposition. One should define the term 'opposition' because very few people have a clear notion what it means. I for one didn't even know what KOR stood for.

Lis: We don't ask anybody whether he/she is a member of the party or of the KOR. The trade unions don't represent a political programme but a social organisation.

Walesa: The whole affair is based on the fact that KOR taught us this job. Now the pupils have surpassed their teachers. Neither Andrzej, nor I, nor anybody else in our movement is able to forget those who opened our eyes. The question arises whether we have a right to forget them. I believe we haven't.

Gwiazda: Especially if you wear on your lapel something like the badge of 'Solidarity'.

What does KOR mean to 'Solidarity'?

Walentynowicz: The social change which is currently going on is to a large extent due to the people in KOR. As a worker I am indebted to them for it. First their representatives defended us in Radom /after the 1976 strikes/. Then they extended their activities to other places. They didn't only defend the workers, they also taught them how to defend themselves against any reprisals. When tension began to grow groups had already been organised so as to be in a position to influence the course of

events. And it was owing to these groups that the strikes took a peaceful course, that no one went out into the streets.

Gwiazda: KOR taught the people that there are other means of arguing with the authorities than molotov cocktails.

Borusewicz: The lessons of history are independent of KOR. December 1970 provided such a lesson. As a matter of fact, it was by no means so clear that this situation was not going to arise again. But since those new groups found themselves in the very centre of the strikes, they were able to see to it that the principles which had been worked out were really put into practice. Our experience turned out to be profitable. We stuck to the principle of not risking total confrontation. **The idea** of the occupation of the factories was **the idea** of the free trade unions.

What did the trade unions' dependence on KOR look like?

Borusewicz: The authorities considered the free trade unions as one of the most dangerous kinds of opposition movements, because they were active among the workers.

Walentynowicz: Kuron told us what we had to do was to form committees, **not to set fire** to them, as was the case in 1970. That was taken up by our workers here on the Baltic coast in 1978. Eventually the free trade unions were founded, and Borusewicz made the most important contribution to that: he invited the people who taught us to defend our rights.



Andrzej Gwiazda, Lech Walesa, Bogdan Lis, Bogdan Borusewicz, Alina Pienkowska.

What was the relationship of KOR to the free trade unions?

Borusewicz: Oppositional activities in the different circles and areas were completely autonomous and independent. I didn't organise the free trade unions on the instructions of KOR, but there were those initiatives coming from the **base**.

Kecik: KOR assisted those who organised themselves.

Pienkowska: The influence of KOR on social awareness was immense. The fact that the strike could be ended in this—and not any other possible—way is due to them, after all.

Kecik: The demands that by now have come to be recognised as justified have been put forward by KOR for years.

Gwiazda: The whole of our economic and political foundation and superstructure was established as a war-structure and make an opposition necessary.

Borusewicz: I don't think the results of the latest events were exclusively the work of KOR. It was also based on an immense social discontent that had been growing for years. The peaceful development of the strike — that's due to KOR.

Do you have your own concept of socialism?

Borusewicz: KOR does not have any political concept, because it is not a political organisation. The majority of our people have a socialist background, but some don't want to be classed at all. They have joined our movement on a social basis. In general there is a great number of people who haven't got a political programme, but simply a social one. And they are against politicising KOR. I count myself as one of them.

Kecik: So do I. Politicising KOR would be its end. For the political ideas of the people united within it are too heterogeneous.

Borusewicz: It seems to me that it is time to engender a political concept. At this moment, people expect more of us than we can possibly do. Normally, society focuses on the party. In Poland nowadays, however, society gathers round the free trade unions. That's a bad thing. Thus, there is an increasing necessity to formulate a political programme. It would be good if the party took the lead and removed people's social expectations from our shoulders. But will it do so? In the eyes of the people the new trade unions should do everything: they should fill the role of trade unions, participate in the administration of the country, be a political party, and act as a militia, that is confine drunkards and thieves, they should teach morals — and that's a great problem for us.

Basically, KOR might as well cease to exist.

Kecik: Of course, yes.

Borusewicz: You don't know how things will turn out. You should not precipitate any abolition.

Kecik: If we could be sure there would be an end to political reprisals ...

Borusewicz: In any case, Leszek Moczulski is in prison.

Kecik: Although nobody in KOR identifies with his ideas and activities, we have decided to defend him. KOR said so immediately after he'd been arrested.

Borusewicz: The point was that, in an interview with *Der Spiegel*, he had said that he did not recognise our government. He is free to do so, that is his business, and people mustn't lock him up for that.

Gwiazda: It is just that he has got to submit to certain laws.

Kecik: Our constitution doesn't require uniformity of opinion. It does, however, require that people don't try and use force to

destroy social order. Moczulski does not appear to have organised any movement of that sort.

Borusewicz: Coming back to KOR — it was simply that a new awareness began to take shape. In KOR, there were about 30 people, 15 of which were more than 70 years old.

Kecik: What can 30 people really achieve among 35 million people ...

Pienkowska: .. unless they find support in society?

Kecik: We were simply obliged to act in some way or another.

Borusewicz: ... to propagate the slogans.

Pienkowska: The press, when attacking Kuron and Michnik, was trying to discourage KOR. But the result was that the foundation committees /of Solidarity/ came to us and asked us what kind of organisation it was.

Borusewicz: What the authorities want to happen is that, while this movement is being legalised, KOR has to continue existing in the underground. For years people didn't talk about this, but now many of them want to see an ideologist of the party or some such guy from the ZK and a representative of KOR enter into an open clash of ideas.

Pienkowska: During that night of the strike, when the 21 demands were established, the delegates of all the firms concerned wanted to incorporate the abolition of censorship and free elections. A representative of KOR was the only one to plead for them to be reasonable. He told them that in 1968 such activities had led to the intervention in Czechoslovakia and he managed to convince them.

Aren't you afraid of bureaucracy?

Borusewicz: We must keep to the democratic mechanisms, as they are described in the statutes. Of course, in front of flashlights and microphones, you can easily stumble into something — we are human, after all.

SZCZECIN

Szczecin was the second main centre of the August strikes and is a key pillar of Solidarity. We have attempted to give a fairly detailed account of the movement in Szczecin both because very little has been written about it in the West and also because its story is illustrative of many of the more general features of the movement across the country. We have also included some articles from the

Szczecin MKR paper, *Jedność (Unity)*, Solidarity's most substantial newspaper. Some of the articles should be of special interest to socialists since they exemplify some of the left-wing trends of thought inside Solidarity. We are very grateful to the NATFHE activist who supplied much of the material in this section, including many of the pictures.

The Town

On a hill, near the mouth of the Odra river, with its back to the East German border, the weather-beaten hulk of St. Jacob's Cathedral dominates the sky-line for visitors entering the North Western port of Szczecin. The Church's rough, rust-coloured exterior, resembling a capsized ship that has taken a hammering on the Baltic, seems to sum up the atmosphere in this city of 400,000 people so closely connected to the sea. The city's other notable artistic features — the fine art nouveau facades on some of the older buildings — is less expressive of Szczecin life than the huge tower-blocks that brutally interrupt the horizon at every turn.

Szczecin has a reputation as a tough city. In German hands before the war, it was resettled after 1945 by Poles — and other nationalities such as Ukrainians and Belorussians — drawn mainly from pre-war Poland's Eastern territories. One foreign visitor who knows it well likened it to an American frontier town or Chicago in the 1930s, saying it lacked the sort of informal social networks and ties that make life run more smoothly in longer-established communities. Its militia has a special reputation for brutality, and some say that organised crime is stronger than anywhere outside Warsaw's Praga district.

Working conditions in Szczecin's main

industries — the shipyards, docks and chemical plants — are very harsh. Dockworkers suffer from lung diseases and bone diseases — dockers working on the conveyor belt are like broken old men by 45. The welders and other workers in the shipyards are prone to terrible industrial accidents through non-enforcement of safety standards and the pressure to earn extra money on overtime. The chemical workers also face serious health hazards.

Szczecin is not one of Poland's major intellectual centres. There is no university, but 5 higher educational institutions: a polytechnic (the equivalent of a technological university), a pedagogical

institute, a School of Seamanship, a School of Agriculture and a School of Medicine.

Some 55,000 workers are involved in industries connected to the sea. These are divided among the *Warski* shipyard, employing 12,000, the *Parnica*, *Gryfia*, *Odra* and *Yacht* shipyards, and the docks and dock-related plants. Their productive efforts are supported by the workers in many small subsidiary enterprises, especially those supplying components for the shipyards. The city's second focus of production is chemicals: the *Police* plant employs some 10,000 workers, and a second chemical factory a further 3,000. There is also a steel plant employing some 4,000 workers.

Szczecin's recent history hinges around the Warski shipyard, and around the terrible events of 1970 in which so many Warski employees were massacred. Despite the killings in December 1970, the Warski yard continued to lead the workers' struggle for their rights in January and February 1971, re-launching the strike movement after Edward Gierek had replaced Gomulka as Party leader. The historic confrontation between Gierek and the Warski workers on strike in 1971 has become famous through the publication in the West of tape-recordings of the discussion. In the struggles of 1970-71, a bond was forged between the shipyard workers of Szczecin and their fellow-workers in Gdansk that has remained unbroken ever since.

As a result of their struggle the shipyard workers won considerable material benefits in 1971 and 1972 — in place of the handful of new flats made available each year to shipyard workers in the 1960s, more than 4,000 were opened for Warski workers at

this time. The Party leadership thus hoped to create divisions between the shipyard workers and the rest of the city's working class, which had come out in a general strike along with the shipyards in December. The police also used the new social calm to hunt down the key leaders of the strike



Szczecin Province First Party Secretary, J. Brych (centre) in the process of getting down on his knees in St. Jacob's Cathedral, during the commemoration service for the workers killed in 1970.

movement. Edmund Baluka, the chairman of the Warski strike committee, was hounded into exile. Others died in similar circumstances.

In 1976, before the price increases that led to mass strikes around the country, a group of young shipyard workers was drafted into the army and deposited on an island in the Odra

estuary as a precautionary measure. There was a sit-down strike in the Gryfia shipyard at this time, but no other incident was reported.

In the late 1970s, open political opposition groups emerged in Szczecin. There was a **Robotnik** circle, and ROPCio and later the KPN were prominent. Leszek Moczulski, the leader of the KPN, addressed a meeting in a church in Szczecin attended by some hundreds of people. A group of workers even established an independent trade union committee in a small town outside the city. But these groups seem to have remained completely isolated from the workers in the big plants both before and after the events of 1980.

Brych, the Szczecin Party secretary during the late 1970s, appears to have a very low reputation as a colourless bureaucrat with an autocratic and petty style of work. He did, however, manage to keep afloat during the August crisis, winning himself promotion to the Warsaw apparatus shortly afterwards. His approach can be illustrated by the following example. During the very bad winter of 1979 when there were acute energy shortages, Brych ordered the director of the *Police* chemical plant to work the factory at full throttle. Objections that the delicate machinery could be damaged by such an order were brushed aside. As a result very costly machinery broke down and production halted. In revenge Brych had the director up on a charge brought by the Public Prosecutor. The charge was dismissed. But this year Brych, safe in Warsaw, got his revenge: the director was sacked for corruption!

The August Strike

The Gdansk strike began on 14 August. The next day, one big enterprise in Szczecin struck briefly, settling for a wage increase. But the strike movement in Szczecin really began on the following Monday 18 August in the Warski shipyard.

Jacek, a worker in the shipyard, explained how everything began. Before the Gdansk strike, Jacek and his friends had known about the stoppages in various parts of the country following the price increases of 1 July. They also knew of the Lublin general strike in mid-July. On Friday, 15 August, some people from Gdansk arrived at the Warski yard with news from their city. But the full scope of the crisis was only revealed on the Saturday, a working day, when a quite unprecedented event occurred: with no apparent reason, the entire work-force was given a 10% pay rise. 'This made us realise that something very big was happening in Gdansk, something unique. There was a very unusual atmosphere in the shipyard. Everybody remembered 1970 and felt that the time had come to settle accounts over what had been going on in the country. The time had come for great events. And we wondered what could be happening in Gdansk.'



Placards inside the Warski shipyards. The one on the left lists the names of plants in the city on strike, showing at the bottom that on 27 August, 328 factories were supporting the MKS demands. The other two placards list the 36 demands of the MKS.

Jacek and his family went out of Szczecin on the Sunday, and on the way back picked up a woman who told them that the Warski yard would strike the next day. People expected the shipyard workers to act.

Jacek then explained what happened on Monday, 18 August:

'Work began as usual. At 10 a.m. we had our usual break, and a group of workers from one of the Kadlub departments — tough, burly blokes as you can imagine — started to move around the yard saying: "What shall we do? Gdansk is on strike, we must help." They urged people to meet at the gate, and between 11 and 12 workers began to gather inside the main gate. When I arrived at 1 p.m., there were 2,000 or more people demanding that the director come to speak with them at the yard.



A family reunion through the railings of the Warski yard. The placard on the left says: Free Trade Unions Defend Workers' Rights

'Eventually the director arrived with the Szczecin First Secretary, Brych. A platform and loudspeakers were fixed up, and then they asked what was going on and what people wanted. A worker shouted: "What's the news from Gdansk?"

'The Director didn't want to tell us. He just said that there were negotiations between the workers and the authorities. We asked: "What do the Gdansk workers want?" We had no hard information, just that something big was happening. People shouted: "Why is it so difficult to get a new flat?" Another person shouted: "What about the people thrown out in 1970?" Brych said there were no political prisoners in Poland, and this provoked whistles from the shipyard workers.

'There were problems with the microphones. The platform was too far from the loudspeaker system and the workers had to push it closer. (Later, there were claims that this was a physical assault on the platform!)

'The Party Secretary, Brych, proposed that we should delegate one person from each department to go to the Administration building for discussions. We refused, of course, because the building is outside the shipyard gates and the delegates could be

easily arrested. And we knew what happened in 1970.

'Then a worker came forward and said it was impossible to talk in this situation: he suggested we elect between 3 and 5 delegates from each department to meet and discuss everything. He was a worker from the ZSA-Mera company, one of the plants that supply components to the yard and keep workers there to handle them. He said the delegates should assemble at 4 p.m. with lists of demands. The meeting would be in the hall on the first floor of the production management building inside the shipyard, to the right of the main gate near the river-side. (The same hall had been used for the delegate assemblies in 1970-71.)

'I wasn't a delegate. But the meeting in the hall was broadcast over the shipyard's loudspeaker system. When the delegate meeting started, each delegation read out their department's demands covering all the problems we face in everyday life. Then a Presidium was elected which brought everything together in 36 general demands on all the key issues.

'Marian Jurczyk was chosen as chairman of the strike committee. Of course, no one was known to everybody: after all, there are some 12,000 workers in the shipyard. But we knew that Marian Jurczyk had been a member of the strike committee in 1970, that he had not changed his ideas since then, and that he would give his life for the workers' movement and the workers' struggle. What mattered for us was to have completely trustworthy leaders. Trust and confidence were much more important than ability.

'We also immediately elected a guard for the shipyards, made up of workers. The loudspeakers broadcast the 36 demands. The Warski director accepted those demands which could be granted by the shipyard management, but said that many could be dealt with only by higher, national authorities. So the Presidium declared that we were on strike and would wait for a government negotiating commission to arrive at the yard.



'We are striking and solidarising ourselves with the employees of the Szczecin shipyard' says the placard at the gates of the Bumar works.

'The first evening of the strike was unforgettable. It was a warm summer evening, and there was a wonderful atmosphere. We were not afraid to occupy the shipyard. You must remember that, living in a socialist country, we feel the

shipyard rightfully belongs to us, the workers. The television says that we are the owners. And, in fact, we merely want to make these words a reality. So we were not afraid. But it was still extraordinary to think of what we had done.'

That evening, the strike committee closed the yard. Everyone had the right to leave, but only the women workers were allowed to come and go. The rank-and-file Party members in the yard — 3,700 according to official statistics — also joined the strike. But not the directors, the heads of departments, or the First Party Secretary. (Not only were all these people Party members, but they had been appointed by higher Party echelons under the *nomenklatura* system.) During the strike between 5,000 and 6,000 workers stayed in the yards all the time. At the main gate a sign was put up: 'We express our solidarity with the shipyard workers in Gdansk.' A wooden cross was erected, along with a picture of the Madonna of Czestochowa. A loudspeaker urged the large factories to join the strike, while declaring that services essential to the population should be maintained.

On that first day, the Parnica shipyard and the Gryfia repair yard also came out on strike, immediately establishing contact with the Presidium of the Warski committee, and six local factories sent delegations of solidarity. On the second day about a score of large factories in the province were on strike; and on the third day, with 53 enterprises out, the movement had become a general strike. The number of plants on strike continued to rise every day, until by the end the number had reached more than 300, employing about 150,000 people in the Szczecin province. Services considered essential, such as hospitals, shops, banks and restaurants, as well as theatres, museums and higher educational institutions, put up signs saying 'Working, we support the demands of the striking workers'. The teachers' council at the Polytechnic sacked their rector, an incompetent Party official. The plants on strike put up two Polish flags at the entrance along with a notice saying: 'Strike: We support the Demands of the shipyard workers'.

During the strike, life in the city remained calm. Supplies of food were quite adequate, so there was no hoarding. Crime is said to have fallen by 80% — even the criminals were out! The only inconvenience to the population was the halting of public transport and refuse collection.

Many shipyard workers on holiday returned to Szczecin to join the occupation. Jacek described his own experience of the struggle:

'At first I thought that economic pressure from the strike would force the government to give in within 3 or 5 days. But we soon saw that the government was not concerned with the economic effects. Economics didn't matter to the government.

'During the days of occupation we talked

and we listened. It was a great school of history for us workers. We saw what was happening with our own eyes; we also heard what the official media said was happening. And we listened to Western radio stations like Free Europe and the BBC. We learnt that the foreign radio stations told the real truth, especially the BBC — "This is a report from Tim Sebastian in Warsaw" — we listened all the time. The foreign radio stations won back a very important role in people's minds, also giving us important news about the international situation.

'Although we spent our time talking, listening and waiting in the relaxed summer weather, the occupation was a tremendous strain on us all. One of the workers had a heart attack, and four others had to go to a psychiatric hospital because of the strain. We knew that our only tactic was to stay firm and united until the other side caved in. And we had to be on our guard against provocations and attacks. In the first few days, Marian Jurczyk spoke to us over the loudspeakers about some crates of vodka that had been brought into the yards. He recalled how the Germans had paid the local farmers partly in vodka rather than money or food, in order to keep them drunk and submissive.'

The movement required very little agitation to spread. In several plants, the strike was initiated by the Party Secretary or even the director. In some cases this may have been an attempt to control the strike leadership but in others it expressed strong support from the lower levels of the Party itself. And, of course, it is also possible that these motives were combined. It is even reported that a worker member of the Party Central Committee joined the strike in one of the shipyards.

The Inter-factory Strike Committee (MKS) established to lead the general strike had a 15-member Presidium, of whom 5 were Party members and 12 had been departmental representatives in the official trade unions. Both deputy chairmen were in the Party (one of them was apparently responsible for the very hostile attitude towards Western journalists.) Members of political opposition groups played no role in either the start or the further conduct of the strike. Within the strike leadership it was the Warski yard leaders who played a dominant role.

One of the Presidium members, Stasek Wisniewski, a shipyard electrician for 25 years, explained some additional features. Throughout the strike he acted as personal guard for Marian Jurczyk, the MKS Chairman, who used to get threatening phone calls and was protected every night by five guards in his secret sleeping-place. Food was brought in from the outside, and every day workers in a bakery adjoining the yard passed hot fresh bread down from the window to the workers on strike.

'We met as the Presidium in the production director's room downstairs, below the hall where the MKS assembly met. This was in order to give us peace and quiet for discussion, but not to keep things secret

from the workers. In fact everything was recorded, so that nobody could say we were hiding anything. I had a bag that I carried everywhere and it made the Party officials very nervous — they thought it was a gun or something. Actually it was a 1912 edition of Mickiewicz poems!

There were some provocations, but we managed to put a stop to them. Our worst moment was on the fifth day when Barcikowski (the leading figure on the government side) broke off negotiations. Very tired, having slept only about 2 hours a night, we were in a dark mood and expected the worst.

'The shipyard inter-com system was very important to us. Although Marian Jurczyk was not well known to everyone, his voice had become very familiar. So if the loudspeakers didn't carry his voice for a long time, people would get worried that



Stasek Wisniewski, member of the MKS and MKR presidium and editor of the Warski Solidarity bulletin, *Kommunikat*, sitting between two uniformed Silesian miners during a meeting.

something had happened to him. The inter-com transmission centre was not in the yard but in the management headquarters just outside the main gate. So we had a permanent guard of 10 people there to control the management building and protect the transmission centre. The Warski director, Mr. Ozymek, stayed in the management building throughout the strike. He played a good role, supporting the strike although he was formally part of the government side. He maintained good relations with Mr Jurczyk, provided us with typists and so on.

Stasek explained that religion, being a private matter, had nothing to do with Solidarity, which is not a religious organisation. 'On the first Sunday after the strike started, there was a big debate among shipyard leaders on whether mass should be held in the yard. In the end we agreed, since people who didn't want to attend didn't have to.'

On that Sunday, 24 August, the first issue of the official strike bulletin, *Jednosc*, appeared. (*Jednosc* — the Polish word for

unity — subsequently became the newspaper of Szczecin Solidarity.) It noted that 120 plants in the region were attached to the MKS. Some of these, such as the provincial and children's hospitals, the electricity generating stations, the central heating network and the locomotive repair plant, were continuing the work under MKS authority.

Negotiations had been started on Thursday, 21 August with the arrival of Vice-Premier Barcikowski in the Warski yard. Stasek described this first confrontation, which took place in the main hall of the production management building: 'When Barcikowski first arrived at the yard, he tried to disrupt our organisation by taking matters out of the hands of our chairman, steering discussion onto all sorts of secondary problems. But we put a stop to that by making people put written questions to him through our chair. If our chairman thought they were irrelevant or misleading, he would hold them back. Barcikowski tried to treat the MKS as the representative only of Warski. But we put a stop to that too.'

The first discussion brought no results. Negotiations were continued on Friday 22nd in the afternoon and evening and a third round was held on Saturday August 23rd. The government commission accepted more and more of the demands and on the Saturday, it agreed to the establishment of communication between Szczecin and Gdansk. Four delegates from the strike committee, together with one representative of the Government commission, Vice-Minister for Heavy and Agricultural Machinery Bialkowski, went to Gdansk to try to work out a method of achieving joint aims. On the same day, representatives of the two sides in Szczecin began the work of editing those of the workers' demands that the government had already agreed to. On Sunday 24th, three of the delegates who had gone to Gdansk returned to the Warski yard, leaving the fourth member behind while bringing a Gdansk delegate to Szczecin: through this exchange, consultation between the two centres could be improved. And on the Sunday evening, a plenary session of the MKS formalised the united position of the two centres by formally agreeing that the overriding demand was that for independent trade unions.

That Sunday the government side had broken off negotiations. The Central Committee meeting in Warsaw was removing Prime Minister Babiuch and forcing Gierek to make a public self-criticism. Gierek's appeal on TV that evening made no impact on the Szczecin workers. The next day, Monday, 50 more plants in the area joined the MKS, bringing the total to 170. *Jednosc* No.2 explained that especially numerous among the new centres of support were health workers, those in education and in co-operative work-places, adding that many of these groups of workers added new demands especially concerning problems in their own occupation. On Monday afternoon, the MKS plenum discussed the demands on

which there were still differences with the government. These concerned meat deliveries, strike pay, no victimisation of strikers, the publication of a final communique, and the post-strike activities of the MKS as founding centre of the free trade unions. At the same time, at 10 a.m., Szczecin delegates set off for Gdansk to find out the thinking of the strike leadership there on the precise formulation of the demand for free trade unions. At 7 p.m., the Szczecin delegates, having completed their discussions in Gdansk set off again for home. Also on that day, the MKS set up a fund for the new trade union and by the end of the day a staggering 1.5 million zlotys has been collected. (By the Wednesday morning the figure had risen to 2,850,000 zl.) In the afternoon an MKS delegation left the shipyard and laid wreaths on the graves of those who were killed in 1970 and also laid commemorative wreaths in St. Jacob's Cathedral.

On Wednesday 27 August, a delegation arrived in Szczecin from the Wroclaw MKS and a decision was taken to transform the Szczecin MKS into an Inter-Province Strike Committee for Szczecin, Bydgoszcz and Wroclaw Provinces. By this time some 306 plants in Szczecin were in the MKS.

Meanwhile at the beginning of the week, Barcikowski had called his experts together and restarted negotiations with the MKS leaders and their experts. These negotiations were taped but not actually broadcast over the Warski loud-speakers.



A crowd outside the main management building of Warski at the end of the strike.

The main expert on the government side was Professor Wopatka; on the MKS side, the experts were Messrs Kwatkowski, Piatkowski, Zielinski, Kitlowski and Ziemianin; also professor Timowski who arrived on the 10th day of the strike. Stasek described his meeting with some 150 delegates in Warski as a very moving moment: the workers seeing this famous old professor with them knowing that the whole country was on their side.

Despite the large number of people milling round, the Solidarity headquarters in Malopolska Street seems to be well organised and efficiently run. It is housed on two floors of the old official trade union building — one of those burnt by the crowd in 1970 and subsequently restored. A priest came and blessed the offices when Solidarity moved in. I was given a warm welcome, was told that Marian Jurczyk



At the end of the strike leaders of both sides walking out of the shipyard. on the left (with armband) the leader of the MKS workers' militia, in the middle (with the striped tie) Vice-Premier Barcikowski, on the right (with black tie) Warski Director Ozymek.

'We wanted lawyers to frame our demands correctly, and we wanted other intellectuals from the Polytechnic to help us. We prepared carefully for each session. When Barcikowski arrived, we would remain completely silent, refusing to answer his greeting. The business always started with Marian Jurczyk reading out a list of the new factories joining the MKS: 60, 160, 200 and so on. We sang the national anthem.

The other leading negotiator was Zabinski, the Opole Party secretary, but he played second fiddle to Barcikowski. He accepted many of our demands only to be overruled by Barcikowski. Zabinski even cried when we reached the final agreement.

'Agreement was reached in the middle of the night, in the early hours of Saturday morning. We met at 2 a.m. The only experts present were those on our side: Mr Kwatkowski, Mr Piatkowski, Mr Zielinski, Dr Kitlowski and Dr Ziemiancki. After some discussion of various points, at 3 a.m. Barcikowski said he agreed, to the whole text. We were completely taken by surprise. We had not expected such swift agreement.

'At this time we didn't know what was happening in Silesia. The events there were very important, but the government was trying to prevent contact being established. Communications were cut off, trains were being searched and so on. But on the Saturday some miners from Zabrze (in Silesia) managed to get through to us, bringing their list of demands.

'When agreement was reached,

A Talk with Marian Jurczyk

would be happy to talk to me and was asked to wait for a little while because the Presidium were on their way to a reception in the city.

In the administrative office, there was a large transparent plastic box for donations to the organisation, filled with notes and coins. People were coming in with problems to discuss or messages for the secretary.

Barcikowski wanted us to come out of the shipyard to the management building for the signing of the agreement. We were reluctant to do so, because of our memories of 1970. But in the end we agreed.'

Jacek explained what he thought of Barcikowski: 'During and after the strike, I changed my view of him! At first I saw him as a partner. Of course, he was on the other side of the barricades, but he seemed broad-minded and a good negotiating partner. But towards the end of the strike, he did terrible things, changing his position. And when the strike was over he went on TV after the news one night, saying appalling things, threatening the workers. And after that I realised what he was: a son of a bitch.'

Another observer of events in Szczecin pointed out the differences between the styles of Jagielski in Gdansk and Barcikowski. Jagielski behaved at all times like a dignified government leader, serious and authoritative. Barcikowski on the other hand adopted the tactics that Gierek had used in dealing with the Szczecin workers during the strike in January 1971: he sought to present himself as being on a lower level than the workers themselves, more gullible, easily taken for a ride. In this way he sought to lower their defences and put them off their guard.

In conclusion, Jacek said that the weeks immediately after the end of the strike were a very worrying time, until Solidarity emerged as a national organisation at the end of September.

One veteran worker from the 1970 general strike arrived with material concerning the events of 1970 at the huge Police chemical plant in the northern suburbs of Szczecin. He showed me one of the canvas arm-bands that had been worn by the workers' guard during the 1970 strike at Police.

I had already learnt something about the Szczecin Solidarity chairperson. Aged 46,

Marian Jurczyk was born in the countryside near Lodz and started work at the age of 16. He became a worker in the Warski shipyard in Szczecin and took part in the 1970-71 strikes and was a departmental representative in the official trade union. He studied at evening classes to the middle level of technical college. I had been told that he is a devout Catholic, a moderate influence within the Solidarity leadership, and that he has a great ability to express the common position of the workers on the problems that confront them.

Eventually Marian Jurczyk came and invited me into the large room that must have been used by the previous head of the official trade unions and is now used by Solidarity's leaders. In one corner there was a small Christmas tree. In another a large desk. We sat down in armchairs on two sides of a long, low table. At the far end, one of the Vice-Chairmen of Szczecin Solidarity, Stanislaw Kocian from the Police plant was talking quietly to the Police worker with the material from the 1970 strike. At our end, I sat with my interpreter on one side and Mr. Jurczyk sat with Stanislaw Wisniewski, the editor of the Solidarity bulletin in the Warski shipyard on the other side of the table.

The immediate and lasting impression that he gives is of a calm, quiet-spoken and open person. During our talk he devoted himself entirely to me telling people who kept trying to gain his time that he would see them later. I took this as a sign of both his politeness and also as a sign of the importance he attached to making Solidarity's views clear to Western trade unionists.

I asked him first why the Szczecin workers had gone on strike and he explained that they had followed the lead given by the Gdansk workers. 'We thought that our fellow workers in Gdansk were putting forward the right demands and we wanted to support them.'

He explained his own background of involvement in the 1970-71 movement: 'No one knows how many people were killed in Szczecin at that time. The government is trying to conceal the truth about what happened and the numbers killed. It says there were 17 deaths, but this is ridiculous. I think the true figure is 200 or more. I was on the strike committee at that time, though not its chairman, and I think that the mistake we made was to leave the shipyard. We demanded in August that all those who were sacked in 1970 get their jobs back, and this has been carried out.'

I asked him about progress on the other

parts of the August Agreements. 'We are very optimistic that all the points in the Agreements will be met by the government, but things have not gone at all smoothly. The economic situation in the country is not good, but the government's policy has brought this upon us. Solidarity does not seek to take over the government, but we do insist on controlling what the government does, because we are the representatives of the workers. In the past all was lost because unreliable and irresponsible people were in power. Solidarity must ensure that this doesn't happen again, that things go right in the future.'

'At the moment one issue being discussed with the government is Free Saturdays. We want all Saturdays to be free. The government said only two Saturdays a month can be free. We rejected this so now they have offered us 3 Saturdays off a



Marian Jurczyk addressing a Solidarity memorial meeting for the dead of 1970.

month. We, here in Szczecin, have replied that our MKR cannot decide on this on our own — it is a matter for our National Coordinating Commission to decide.'

Marian Jurczyk went on to explain that Poland has the potential to have a very high level of culture for its people, but the past years have done great damage to people's moral outlook. 'For example, during the harvest time this year we sent workers from the shipyards to help with digging up the potatoes. But the farm workers said that our people were stupid to come and they spent the time when our men were there drinking vodka.'

I asked about government attempts to divide the movement and about Solidarity's

organisational plans. Smiling broadly, he said there had been repeated attempts by the government to split them, 'but for us the main thing is to preserve our unity. Our two key ideas are Solidarity and Peace.'

'We will remain based on geographical regions but with some structures for the different branches of industry within the region. So, for example, after the strike of health workers we set up a health commission here. But these commissions will not have great power: decisions will be taken by the regional organisation. We plan to eventually have 16 regional organisations across the country, with the really important decisions going to Gdansk.'

I asked him to say more about Solidarity's aim of controlling the government and economic management. He explained that if a factory director does a good job, Solidarity will co-operate with him. 'But if not, we will get him removed. After the strike in Szczecin we operated in this way. In the shipyard we had no problems with the director, relations have been very good. But elsewhere, workers in some plants did demand the removal of certain directors. And when Solidarity insisted, the party got rid of them.'

But he went on to explain that more generally Solidarity concerns itself with the social problems of the workers. 'We discuss with the workers, find out what they want, analyse their views and the situation in the country and come forward with plans. We must be consulted by the government because we are representative of the people, and we can propose plans for the government to introduce.' But he added that every step forward must be thought out and prepared very carefully.

I explained that British trade unionists would like to know how they could help Solidarity without of course wanting to be accused of interfering in any way. He said they were extremely grateful for the interest and sympathy of people abroad and he said that they would very much like to talk to British trade unionists because they know of our long experience and traditions in the trade union field.

Feeling rather guilty at taking up more of his time, I thanked Marian Jurczyk for talking to me. I told him about the terrible economic crisis and unemployment in Britain and said that we envied the way the Polish workers had handled the job of removing an unpopular government last August. He laughed and promised to send us instructions!

A NATFHE trade unionist

Building Solidarity in Szczecin

One of the most striking, and also most baffling, features of the Polish crisis is the enormous gulf between surface appearances and underlying realities. A casual tour around a city like Szczecin would lead a Western visitor to conclude that little has changed. Visible signs of the vast social earthquake that has shaken to its foundations the outwardly monumental

structures of the Polish state are extremely rare. For Poland's revolution from below has been accompanied by none of the dramatic public manifestations usual in such situations. Solidarity's millions have not been flooding through the streets, pouring into gigantic mass meetings, sweeping away the trappings and symbols of the established order, or strewing

around the normal confetti of great popular movements — leaflets, posters of every shape and colour, slogans on every wall, notices of meetings in every possible place on every conceivable subject.

On the streets all the old forms of life seem to proceed almost entirely as before. The old

By Oliver MacDonald

authorities remain in place and indeed Solidarity itself recognises and negotiates with them and does so in a tone of moderation which might almost persuade one to believe that the country is nearly united and almost everyone knows his/her place — whether as trade unionist, manager, bishop or bureaucrat.

This surface picture of business as usual — in reality a totally misleading one — is then, if one were to believe the official media and indeed Western newspaper reports, suddenly interrupted by a convulsive strike and confrontation. The Polish press says it is caused by Solidarity; the Western press with its spurious 'balance' puts it down to hot heads on 'both sides'. Either way the confrontations seem to appear from nowhere.

But if you visit the Warski shipyard in Szczecin, the subterranean earthquake in Polish society hits you with shocking force. Walking along Firlicka Street from the town centre the road bends to the right and you pass huge hoardings in praise of the Polish United Workers Party's achievements in Warski. Production ever upwards, dramatic rises in membership of the official youth organisation, in 1979 out of 12,000 Warski workers, 3,700 Party members in the Yard! Then the main gate of the yard comes in view, and outside it on the left is the management building, and another shock: in every window of this building, the same poster with two words on it, 'December 1970', and dripping from these words, blood. Past this building a long display of large, blown-up photographs of the August strike. And ahead, next to the gate, the monument to the dead of 1970 with a huge pile of wreaths in front and a simple, makeshift wooden cross behind. The plaque itself: an exploding dum-dum bullet.

Today, while the skin of the system seems almost unblemished, its internal organs have been ripped apart by the working class movement itself. The profuse haemorrhaging within the Party's inner institutions and arteries has been taking place behind the walls of the factories themselves, where the employees often exercise almost complete power. The workers are acting with extraordinary unity and militancy: any move to undermine them brings an iron response causing waves of pain throughout the bureaucratic system. And the attitude of the very largely young workers in the big plants is a long way from simple trade unionism — concerns over wages and sectional problems play an evidently secondary role, though a real and necessary one, within the movement. The workers are battling for a complete reorientation of socio-economic policy and for political rights, not only for themselves but for all sections of the Polish working population — intellectuals, peasants and students as well. Yet all this is being fought for without any public flamboyance and with a great determination to conserve their strength and organisation within the factory and regional organisations of Solidarity. Action when taken follows careful deliberation and preparation, but the debates and differences of opinion within the movement are conducted overwhelmingly within its own ranks inside the factories and within the regional Solidarity organisation. Too much is at stake for idle public chatter or melodramatic gestures.

This closed character of the internal engines of Solidarity's power leads many Western journalists and indeed some Polish intellectuals to gravely underestimate the fierce intransigence of the gigantic mass movement, believing that there are no limits to the possibilities of compromise and then being shocked by demonstrations of a political militancy that they had persuaded themselves had evaporated.

This in turn leads some observers down a largely misleading path of searching for hot-heads, emotional people as opposed to the supposedly rational, moderate wing of the movement. Differences over tactics and even strategy do, of course, exist within the movement's leadership, though it would be an error to see these as a split between the emotional and the rational. It is also true that the movement has grown in self-confidence and determination as the months have gone by and this has been reflected in the changing composition of Solidarity leaderships. We could add that the administrative and white-collar members of Solidarity are sometimes less decisive than the manual workers. But these are not the chief features of the movement. The main factors are a common awareness of working class interests and of basic working class principles which must be defended by whatever means are needed and are not open to compromise. There can be wide differences of view on how best to defend them, but when the decision is taken, the workers' ranks close like a steel trap. The movement is ready to seek agreement by lengthy negotiations and is ready to compromise on inessentials. But when these fail the workers act with an unbreakable unity.

These are some of the features of Solidarity in Szczecin during its first months of existence. The following account of events in the city between September and January is fragmentary and overwhelmingly drawn from published material, especially the Solidarity bulletin in the Warski shipyard, **Kommunikat**, and the provincial Solidarity paper, **Jedność** (Unity).

LAUNCHING SOLIDARITY

One of the main anchors of Szczecin Solidarity's policy has been its link with Gdansk. At the beginning of September, just after the strike movement ended, strong contact with Gdansk was established and Leszek Dlouchy, the **Jedność** editor from the Gryfia shipyard, was sent to Gdansk for the first meeting to plan the creation of the new trade union. On 17 September, Marian Jurczyk and Stasek Wadolowski represented Szczecin at the Gdansk meeting of 39 local MKRs that officially founded Solidarity.

At the same time, the post-August Szczecin workers' leadership came from a background quite different from the Gdansk strike leaders. They had not been engaged in any political opposition group or unofficial trade union committee and a number of prominent members of the MKR presidium in Szczecin were Party members. (The two vice-chairpersons during the strike, Jurczuk and Fiszbain were both Party members; the latter appears to have left the leadership soon after the end of the strike). And the Szczecin leadership was more ready to talk to the local Party and state organisations than was the case in Gdansk immediately after the strike. Thus, some MKR leaders participated in a Mixed Commission of Government Party and Solidarity representatives until the commission proposed its own dissolution in November (see below).

The Szczecin leaders were also from the first concerned to stick strictly to the letter of the law and to try to resolve all problems and disputes within the framework of established procedures. They were determined to throw the onus of legal infringement firmly onto the side of the government, Party and factory management. In this connection Wojciech Duklanowski from F.K. 'Unikon' criticised some workers' commissions in **Jedność** No.13. Pointing out that the Party leadership was trying to divert the workers from the main tasks — socio-economic renewal and democratic freedoms — by attacking one or two extremely corrupt Party

leaders, he says some of the workers commissions have fallen for this trap. They have been inclined to seek vengeance against one or two corrupt officials and have also been provoked into acting on unconfirmed rumours leading to court action being taken against members of workers commissions by those accused of malpractice. Demands by workers commissions for the sacking of various factory managers were pressed successfully during the first weeks after the strike, but the general policy of the Solidarity leadership involved passing such issues over to the Mixed Commission.

The task for which the Mixed Commission was established was to supervise the implementation of the August Agreements, but it took over a number of other very important functions, such as monitoring the development of negotiations between individual workers' commissions and factory managements and creating a Szczecin provincial commission to supervise pay agreements; most important of all, it took up some 800 individual cases of disputes, more than 90% of which were settled in favour of the complainers. These complaints involved such matters as complaints by individual citizens against administrative organisations, economic and political conflicts as well as those arising from working conditions between employees and managers, helping to create departmental committees in the factories, taking up problems in the commercial and agricultural fields; it also looked at complaints of economic offences, redirecting them to tax collection and public accounts bodies.

On the whole the Szczecin Party leadership presented itself in a posture of readiness to work with Solidarity, avoiding open confrontation with it. One sign of this was the readiness of the local daily paper, **Kurier Szczeciński**, to sign an agreement with the MKR on 11 September on 'The Principles of co-operation in the field of information'. At the same time, the Party authorities seem to have sought to bog the workers down in endless, amicable discussion that led nowhere except to disorganise the efforts of the workers' commissions. In October, a delegate from Szczecin's railway construction enterprises told an MKR plenum of a striking example of these delaying tactics. He described the course of talks which workers in this sector had been forced to pursue for 42 days with 7 different government commissions! (**Jedność** No.12, 3 November)

The government's other tactic seems to have involved attempts to turn public opinion against Solidarity, partly through provocations — at the end of October, the MKR plenum was given an account of how individuals falsely posing as official Solidarity representatives urged the workers to go on strike. And the local press quickly reneged on the 11 September agreement, spreading lies, distortions and misleading half-truths about the independent workers' movement. (**Jedność** No.12, 3 November.)

OCTOBER 3rd IN SZCZECIN

During September, the battle to establish Solidarity's right to exist was the crucial national issue. The government seemed bent on trying to avoid granting the organisation legal registration. To press their demand, the Solidarity national leadership proposed a one-hour strike for 3 October throughout the country.

On 29 September the MKR plenum met to discuss its view of the proposal. Out of about 1000 factory delegates only one vote was cast against the one-hour strike. The meaning of this vote can be grasped only when it

is remembered that in contrast with many other provinces, the workers in Szczecin had not been having to fight a daily battle against bureaucratic attack in order to set their organisation on its feet. The local Party leadership seems to have been very cautious and in some ways accommodating: the vote was in large measure an expression of class solidarity with workers in other parts of the country as well as a protest against government foot-dragging over legal registration.

The 3 October strike was designed to involve only selected factories in the different regions. In Szczecin the following work-places were chosen: the Warski, Gryfia, Parnica and Teliga (Yacht) shipyards and the Swinoujscie sea repair yard; the Swinoujscie Port, Polmo, Salfa and MPK. The railway construction workers were excused involvement at the request of the contractors' workers' commission. On the other hand, the tanker drivers and ship charter service workers also struck.

The Szczecin workers did not see the strike as a means of inflicting economic costs on the government: it was to be a purely political demonstration of strength. For this reason production quotas were still fulfilled in the majority of striking work-places on the day of the strike (*Jedność*, 8 October).

The day after the strike, *Jedność*, the MKS strike bulletin in August, was relaunched to counter the failure of the local media to accurately report on Solidarity's activity in the city and throughout the country. The new issue promised to inform the workers of events throughout the country, to try to give answers to questions in the minds of the workers and to publish the workers' own views and feelings about events.

CONSOLIDATION

During October, Szczecin Solidarity consolidated its organisation. Thanks to the fund started during the August strike (see article above) there was no shortage of funds and the MKR was extremely sparing in its expenditure as the following balance sheet (published in *Kommunikat* No.11) shows:

Expenses and Income September 3 – October 27

1. Balance in Account, 27 Oct.	5,815,075 zl.
2.a) Income (according to bank statements 3 Sept. to 21 Oct.)	78,855
b) Expenditure:	
i) Cassette recorders	14,060
ii) Cassette tapes	5,680
iii) Tape-recorder tapes	1,200
iv) Batteries for 5 cassettes	155
v) travel and food expenses	14,720
vi) salaries for lawyers	14,000
vii) costs of printing <i>Jedność</i>	1,400
viii) costs of petrol	3,100
ix) costs of postage and printing	484
x) allowances	2,500
TOTAL as of 27 October	57,299
c) ready cash in shipyard bank accounts and MKR bank account and other holdings ..	21,556
3. Wealth as of 27 October:	
cash balance at the end of period ...	5,827,139
permanent equipment	20,940
TOTAL	5,848,079

The balance-sheet also suggests that at this time, the organisation's dues system was not yet fully operating for all the workplaces. It is difficult for trade unionists in Britain to grasp the enormity of the task facing local Solidarities in attempting to establish an organisation system which had to comprise, in a city like Szczecin, thousands of

local branches with branch committees, secretaries, treasurers etc. all being built up from scratch without any previous experience of independent trade unionism, without a tradition of open, democratic debate and in conditions where leadership involved considerable potential risks of savage bureaucratic reprisals. Yet the following account of workers' commission elections in the Odra shipyard demonstrates the enormous organisational capacities and discipline of the workers.



Symbol taken from *Kommunikat*

ELECTING A FACTORY COMMITTEE

The Odra elections took place on 9 October (in most parts of Poland, elections of workers' commissions took place much later, in December in January). By this time 98% of Odra's 400 workers were members of Solidarity. The founding workers' commission decided not to wait for legal registration before holding elections on the basis of Solidarity's draft statutes. A mandates commission was set up to draw up a register of members and check off those who came to the election meeting against the register, as well as supervising the election itself ensuring observance of the rules. They acquired use of a large meeting hall at the Economic Secondary School. They got the management to agree that workers could knock off at 2 p.m. The Odra inter-com was used to make announcements about the election, posters on the election were posted and leaflets urging participation were distributed. Here, for example, is one to young employees:

Young Workers!

The best guarantee that the younger generation of workers' interests are protected is young people's participation in leading organisations defending working class interests, for example, in the Plenum of NSZZ Solidarity's Factory Commission.

Vote for the Candidates of Young People!

Cezar Ukrainski, one of the Odra workers elected to the workers' commission, later described the election from the time when people assembled at 3 p.m.:

'A good attendance. The mandate commission is already working. A hum, discussions. I can sense the tension among those present.

'3.15: First to speak was the chairperson of the Factory Workers' Commission, Jan Szylar. He asks the meeting to stand and sing the hymn, "Poland has not yet died ...", which creates a

special, solemn atmosphere. The agenda was read out and a chairperson proposed.

'3.20: The chairperson, Romuald Wolodzko, a factory delegate from the Warski shipyard during the strike, greeted the meeting with a few words and invited the MKR representative, Aleksander Krystosiak from Parnica shipyard, and our shipyard's chief director, Stanislaw Prazucha, onto the podium. The electoral rules were read out. In an open vote they were accepted unanimously.

'3.40: We reach the actual elections. From the hall come the names of the first candidates. It is difficult to hear. Someone proposes that nominators should go up to the microphone to avoid mistakes or problems. Emotion grows.

'4.10: The list of candidates is closed with a total of 23. After the list is verified — candidates had to agree to being nominated and had to introduce themselves — 20 candidates remained. In open voting it was agreed by a majority to have two opposed accepted slates. The typists write the names on the electoral ballots. In the meantime we are choosing members of the Scrutiny Committee and discussion some resolutions. There was a proposal to give a vote of confidence to the PKZP management on the grounds that their activity had been satisfactory and there was no need for a change. The resolution was carried by a majority. Candidates were elected to the post of Public Inspector of Work and to the Control Commission.

'5.00: Electoral cards are handed out. A moment of concentration, consideration for and against. People have to weigh things up: soon there will be practical action which these people must be able to ensure are successful. The ballot box is slowly filled up and the first voters leave their dilemmas behind ... After this first vote, a break: we could go out into the corridor, smoke (you couldn't inside) and stretch our legs. For the first time that day, discussion, lobbying, explanations of doubts.

'5.30: After the break electoral cards are handed out for voting on the SIP and the Control Commission. The tension visible in people's faces during the first vote is less evident now. When the votes had been gathered in, the elections were already over and a guy from Parnica spoke, talking about an exchange of letters with Lech Walesa and answering questions. If there was time we could discuss it for a bit. The atmosphere is expectant ... who has been elected? Next to speak was the director of our shipyard, Stanislaw Prazuch. He spoke of plan targets and was inclined to assume that they could be carried out. He stated his position on one of our demands that we consider most important, the Odra shipyard's entry into the Federation of Coastal Repair Shipyards: he is against it.

'7.00: The chairperson of the Scrutiny Committee, B. Belczyk, enters the hall. Silence falls. He reads out the 13 names that got the highest votes and enter the Presidium. Three young people are among those elected. Now the assembly must choose the chairperson from the 13 Presidium members. This election is swiftly completed.

'7.20: The minutes of the commission on resolutions are read out. Among others there is the resolution that the shipyard workers support Odra's entry into the Federation of Coastal Repair Yards.

'7.40: The result of the Chairperson election is announced. Among the members of the Plenum there are only three serious candidates for the post. The differences in the numbers of votes for each are minimal. Jan Szylar is named Chairperson.

'People slowly leave the hall leaving only the factory commission behind to discuss the start of its work ... Among its members, half were members of the strike committee.

'8.00: The elections are over. The newly-elected factory commission of NSZZ Solidarity leaves

the meeting hall, impressed by the fact that tomorrow morning there will be ordinary work and additional responsibilities: what will they be and what will happen over the registration of our statutes? To many such questions we ourselves will have to give an answer, through our own activity.'

NO RETREAT ON REGISTRATION

With the menace of confrontation over Solidarity's legal registration still hanging over the workers, Party leader Kania came to Szczecin in the middle of October to meet the MKR. He spent three hours discussing with 19 MKR leaders led by Marian Jurczyk. **Jedność** (16 October) contained a detailed account of the discussions. The MKR complained about the inadequacy and censored nature of information about Solidarity in the Szczecin press. Both sides agreed that in Szczecin contact with both the government and the Episcopate was easy, but the MKR stated that it was not satisfied with progress on implementing the August Agreements. Concerning pay, Kania gave assurances that the government would stick to its undertakings despite the economic difficulties. He added that it was essential for the authorities to regain the workers' confidence and that this required better work organisation. He said that once Solidarity was legally recognised it would have access to the mass media.

The MKR stressed the need to reform the school history syllabuses and also drew attention to the removal of a cross from the ephigy on the back of the 10 zł. coin. Kania agreed to this latter point and undertook to correct matters. He said the state would continue to support the PGRs (state farms) since the experience of East Germany and Bulgaria had shown that this was a suitable form of agricultural organisation. Strikes were discussed and the MKR said that avoiding a general strike would depend on good will from both sides. Kania said that the authorities wished to co-operate with the whole trade union movement. He also said that all possible steps would be taken to make available adequate food supplies. The MKR in turn stressed the importance of adequate raw material supplies for industry.

Despite Kania's moderate tone, the Warsaw authorities refused to register Solidarity and the organisation's National Co-ordinating Committee asked provincial plenums to consider the proposal for a general strike starting on 12 November if the Supreme Court failed to register Solidarity in an acceptable way on the preceding day.

The Szczecin MKR scheduled a plenum of factory delegates for 30 October, and prepared for this with a meeting of delegates from all the maritime-linked enterprises in the city on 28 October. This meeting heard reports of the workers' views in the various plants on the issue of registration and the general strike. **Kommunikat**, the Solidarity bulletin in the Warski Shipyard summarised these reports (**Kommunikat**, No.11):

Transocean: the change in the statute is illegal: there should be a strike

WSM: Indignation at the court decision, fear of consequences of a strike — the entry of foreign armies.

S.U.M.: Indignation at the court decision.

Zegluga Szczecinska (Navigation): Manual workers indignant at court decision, in favour of instantaneous strike; administrative staff fear of a strike leading to a confrontation.

Zegluga on the Odra (Navigation): The government is slowly returning to the pre-August positions, provoking anxiety; prefer the agreed counter-actions.

Odra Shipyard: agree to all actions decided by the Szczecin MKR.

Gryfia Shipyard: agree to all actions decided by the Szczecin MKR.

Z.G.R.: Discussed what should be done and urge that MKR takes a decisive position.

ZPS: Discussed the statute changes and will back all MKR action.

Centrala Rybna: fear of intervention.

C.P.N.: mood of seriousness, ready for a strike, no retreat.

Morska Agencja: opinion summed up by the words 'mixed feelings'.

P.R.S.: the actions of the Government and the Court are destructive: the sympathy of public opinion has been roused on Solidarity's side.

PLO & PZM: the sailors and part of the administrative staff are ready to strike. There is universal indignation at the Court decision.

The 30 October plenum met amid a campaign by the local mass media to turn the middle classes against Solidarity and to weaken the movement's preparations for action on 12 November. Delegates for 609 plants attended the plenum at the Korabia Cultural Centre near the Warski yard. On the main question facing the meeting, the general strike proposed for 12 November, many speakers stressed the increasingly dangerous tensions in the country, and said that if the gains of the past months were to be preserved the only way forward was to strike. All speakers placed responsibility for the crisis fully on the shoulders of the state authorities and the Party who were trying to back out of the August Agreements. A delegate from Meratronik argued that there should be no decision on a strike until the court's decision could be studied. After a 15-minute break, the vote was taken: 780 delegates for strike action, 2 (the delegates from Meratronik) against, and 10 abstentions.

Stasek Wadolowski, the meeting's chairperson, denounced the media coverage of Solidarity's activity, mentioning especially the local TV and the evening paper **Kurier Szczecinski**. Other items included a discussion of worker-management relations in the factories, the balance-sheet of implementation of the August Agreements so far, reports on the work of the National Co-ordinating Committee, and consideration of various recent provocations against the movement in Szczecin. The meeting also expressed general indignation over the tendentious East German and Czechoslovak press coverage of events in Poland.

As a result of Wadolowski's criticism, the **Kurier** editor present at the meeting demonstratively walked out and the following day's issue of the paper carried an attack on Wadolowski as well as an attempted justification of **Kurier's** attitude towards reporting on Solidarity. But the organisation's leadership was prepared for this and had a battle-plan for hitting back.

Jedność No.?? reports that the night of 6-7 November witnessed feverish activity at Solidarity's headquarters in the fire-station in Firlicka street. People were coming and going, telephones ringing, posters and banners were being hung up to dry and megaphones were being put in working order.

At about 2.30 a.m. a gigantic load of printed leaflets arrived, some 400,000 of them, much more than the total run of Szczecin's two daily papers combined. The tram workers have four trams ready to move by 4 a.m. Students load them up with leaflets. Others move off with the latest issue of **Jedność** and piles of leaflets: these will be issued to the population at the Ruch Newspaper Kiosks all over the city. Students will stand by the kiosks in case of trouble.

At 4.30 four trams leave the depot loaded up with leaflets and students. Several cars drive in front of the trams so that they can be on hand in the event of any police provocation. Each tram has two flags in front and a big sign saying 'Solidarity' as well as placards saying 'The working class is the healthy foundation of socialism' and 'Democracy is not just a government gesture to society'. Between 4.30—9 a.m. and again between 2—4 p.m. the trams criss-cross the city. They stop at the usual places but instead of picking up passengers they give out leaflets, while a student reads out the text of the leaflet over a loudspeaker.

People react in different ways: most pick up the leaflets and hide them; some, uncomprehending, don't pick them up, after all mass action like it has never been seen before in Szczecin. The leaflets are blown about by the wind and some people run down the street after them. The trams trundle along surrounded by a white cloud of paper. At the newspaper stands a copy of the leaflet is put into every copy of **Kurier**.

The action was a complete success and the shocked police steered clear of everything. Afterwards, **Kurier** adopted a more cautious approach to distorting the news about Solidarity, preferring to select the most uncompromising sections of Wadolowski's speeches and report them without comment in the hope of scaring the middle classes.

THE STUDENTS MOVE

In the Autumn and winter of 1980 workers in a number of occupations with the most pressing economic difficulties organised national struggles for wage increases and improvements in working conditions, making use of the great political victory won by the working class in August. One of the earlier of these battles involved printing workers. In the 1950s they had been fourth in the national wage tables, but since then they had fallen very far behind ending up as one of the lower paid sections of workers. A



'Watch out on the road' — cartoon in **Kommunikat**

national printers' strike began in Poznan and spread to Szczecin among other cities in early October. The printing workers won their main demands and formed a print-workers section of Solidarity both nationally and in Szczecin.

Another important sectional strike involved workers in the health service. This began in Gdansk on 7 November. The strike focused mainly on low pay and chronic staff shortages: 51% of health workers earned less than 3,000 zł a month and the service is some 40% understaffed. Negotiations on these problems had been scheduled in the Gdansk agreement but had not materialised.

On Sunday 9 November students at Szczecin's Pomeranian Academy of Medicine (PAM) decided to strike and occupy the student cultural centre 'Trans'. (See *Jedność* No. 14 for extensive coverage.) The decision was taken first by the PAM Independent Student Association (on the ISA see below) and quickly backed by the old official youth organisation in PAM, the SZSP. A 12-member strike committee was formed that day, involving ISA and SZSP members as well as independent students elected at a mass meeting in Trans that night. The occupation began immediately that night, as the strike committee woke up students in the hostels so that they could participate. By 6 a.m. on the Monday morning 600 students were occupying; by midday the figure had risen to 1300.

The strike's aim was expressed in a large poster saying: 'We solidarise with the Health Service, which can't go on strike'. As every day passed, student self-management of the occupation developed. Working committees were established to organise the various tasks, posters and leaflets were produced, communiques were issued at the hospitals informing the population about the health workers' complaints concerning the medical service. The students laid down their own rules for the running of the occupation. Actors came from the national theatre and gave readings of Milosc's poetry; another evening a film was shown.

From the first day, solidarity delegations arrived at the cultural centre. By Wednesday 12 November support had come from 21 enterprises of all sorts. Money sent was allocated by the students towards the buying of medical equipment that is most urgently needed. The *Sluchacze Zawodowego Studium Medycznego* broke off its theory classes as a gesture of support but worked in hospitals as attendants and in other jobs where they were most required.

On 15 November the MKR in Szczecin called on the area's MPs in the Sejm to intervene to bring a settlement of the dispute. And on the 17th a government commission headed by Minister A. Jedynek signed an agreement with the health service workers' leaders. The following pay increases were to take effect from 1 December: those earning less than 4000 zł would get a rise of 1,300 zł; those earning 4-6,000 would get another 1,000; those earning 6-8,000 would get another 800 and those earning above 8,000 would get another 400 a month. There were also to be increases in overtime pay, more funds were to be given to medical academics and institutions, the government pledged that 5% of national income would go to the health services plus 2% of all investment outlays. The government also promised to consult with Solidarity on future policy.

The students' sudden entry onto the public stage in Szczecin, both in the *Kurier* affair and in the PAM strike had been preceded by a lengthy period of gestation within the city's five colleges. As early as 25 September a 'Provisional Founding Committee of the Independent


Student Association' had issued an appeal to the student community. It called, among other things, for a democratisation of education, for pluralism in the student movement and for a student organisation not tied, like the official youth organisation, the SZSP, to one particular ideology (in the SZSP's case, so-called 'Marxism-Leninism'). (On the origins of the Szczecin student movement, see *Jedność* No. 10.)

On 2 October, the Pax Youth Association Centre organised a discussion forum in which several hundred students participated, and the meeting resulted in the creation of TKZs, that is Provisional Founding Committees, in all five colleges. During the many subsequent meetings in October clarification of the issues was greatly helped by numerous student publications from other parts of the country, where the movement was further developed. One of the biggest issues debated by the Szczecin students was whether the new organisation should be non-political: this in the end carried the day on the grounds that in this way it could more effectively present the students' wishes to the academic and political authorities. Many members of the SZSP participated, but quite a few of the so-called 'activists' adopted the line that 'we must change as much as possible so that everything remains the same'.

The strongest base for the Independent Student Association was in the Pedagogical Institute where the organisation was recognised in a joint communique of the Founding Committee and the Rector on 6 October. The NZS there (Polish initials for Independent Student Association) began an information bulletin called *Polcebkciem*. In the Pomeranian Medical Academy the situation was more complicated. The TKZ and the SZSP formed a joint commission along with some non-aligned students, but there was disunity when about 80 students signed a declaration joining the Wrocław-initiated Association of Polish students, which the SZSP-led joint commission swiftly denounced. In the Polytechnic, one group of TKZ leaders paralysed the movement for a while by insisting that every action of the TKZ, even the most minute, must first be agreed by a mass meeting of students. In the Agricultural Academy great efforts were made to launch the NZS and on 25 October the TKZ there launched its own bulletin, *Kret* (the Mole).

Kret's first issue reported that the MKR had made its meeting hall available for a meeting of all the representatives of the independent student movement in the 5 colleges on 12 October. A second meeting was scheduled for 30 October in Korabia with leaders of Szczecin Solidarity. *Kret* editors announce enticingly: 'There is a real possibility that the meeting will be attended by Lech Walesa from Gdansk (if his time permits).' By the time that the PAM student occupation was over, the Szczecin student movement was rallying around the Independent Student Association established nationally at a delegate meeting in Warsaw on 18-19 October.

The friendly relations established between Solidarity and the student movement also applied to its links with the emerging Rural Solidarity in the Province. While workers from a number of state farms were in Szczecin Solidarity itself, private farmers organised separately. *Kommunikat* No. 36 reported that Rural Solidarity had held its provincial founding conference on 11 November. The Warski workers' cultural centre, Korabia was made available to the farmers and the MKR produced 1,000 copies of Rural Solidarity's statutes for the occasion, 'in the interests of worker-peasant solidarity', as *Kommunikat* explained. Earlier, in mid-October, Solidarity leaders had also held a meeting with representatives of private artisans who complained about the injustices that they suffered at the hands of the authorities.



DYSCYPLINA, ZDECYDOWANIE I

DETERMINACJA POLSKIEJ

KLASY ROBOTNICZEJ

— GWARANCJA TYCH DOKONAŃ !

Szczecin Solidarity leaflet with translation below

SOLIDARITY MEANS:

- the way to get the country back on its feet
- social calm and stability
- maintenance of standards and good organisation
- the fight against abuses
- respect for the working people
- the defence of workers' rights
- the battle for decent living standards
- a clear road for the younger generation

THE DISCIPLINE, RESOLUTENESS, AND DETERMINATION OF THE POLISH WORKING CLASS ARE THE GUARANTEE OF THESE CONQUESTS

KKP MEETING AND THE ENDING OF THE MIXED COMMISSION

On 18-19 November the national leadership of Solidarity came to Szczecin for a meeting of the National Co-ordinating Committee. The MKR made the gathering an occasion for celebration as well as business: on the second day of the visit, there was a mass meeting in the Kasprowicze Park's summer theatre attended by over 30,000 people and in the evening Szczecin artists, actors and actresses put on a theatrical evening for the Solidarity leaders at the Wspolczesny Theatre.

But the first job of the visit was a meeting between Lech Walesa and departmental delegates from Warski and the MKR plenum; then a meeting with the MKR Presidium, followed by a meeting with the workers from the coastal enterprises. A thousand people crowded into Korabia for this latter meeting. First Walesa spoke and answered questions. He then introduced the meeting's other speaker, Jacek Kuron, who, in the words of the *Jedność* reporter, 'was greeted with a long ovation'.

The week after the National Co-ordinating Committee's (KKP) visit, the Mixed Commission set up at the end of the August strike was disbanded and its Vice-President and MKR leader Jaroslaw Mroczek, along with MKR deputy Chairperson Jurczuk and MKR member

Zielinski withdrew from Solidarity. The proposal to disband the Mixed Commission came from the commission itself, arguing that with the registration of Solidarity, the commission's functions should be taken over by the Solidarity National Co-ordinating Committee and by the appropriate governmental bodies. However, it also seems likely that there had been conflict between the Mixed Commission and sections of the Solidarity membership. Although the Commission stated that out of the 800 disputes it took up, 90% were settled in the complainant's favour, it may have to some extent been an alternative centre of policy to the MKR Presidium itself. Furthermore, three MKR leaders who resigned from Solidarity indicated that they now felt alienated from the movement and this distance can be seen in Mroczek's case in the answers he gave during an interview with the Party weekly, *Polityka* on 18 October. On the issue of the future organisation of trade union activity he considered there would be a return to industrial branch unions and that the work would be carried out by others than those currently leading Solidarity. And in reaction to *Polityka's* question about his attitude to unemployment, he replied: 'Unemployment? Let's call it more gently a labour market. If we demand from directors that they carry out their responsibilities well, then they should have the right to sack people.'

There was no public dispute over the resignation of the 3 MKR leaders, which was handled very smoothly, but as a result, the MKR Presidium was undoubtedly strengthened around the leadership of Marian Jurczyk and Stasek Wadolowski. The growing weight and vigour of *Jedność* was also a powerful aid to the strengthening of the movement.

JEDNOŚĆ

Jedność has, since the start of December, been the most substantial mouthpiece that Solidarity has anywhere in the country. It is explicitly proletarian in its political outlook, with articles championing the working class as the leading force in social and political life.

It is not simply a bulletin but a fully fledged tabloid and it contains not only official Solidarity communiqués and news reports, but major feature articles, theoretical pieces, discussions, readers' letters, poems and so on. Above all, *Jedność's* editors have mounted a direct ideological challenge to the local official media and the political authorities, explicitly contesting their view of such issues as the economic crisis, the nature of socialism, the role of the working class, of the media and even the social character of the government itself. It thus seeks to champion the struggle of Solidarity in the field of ideas as well as in the arena of practical disputes.

Equally remarkable, the paper's editors have successfully carried through the technical and political battle to make *Jedność* a mass paper. When faced with insuperable obstacles to production in Szczecin itself they got it produced in a nearby town. When able to bring production back to the city they used the strong support of workers in a paper mill, who were prepared to produce extra paper for *Jedność* on their free Saturdays, and also of printing workers who were ready to put in extra hours to get the paper out. When preparing the special issue for the 1970 commemoration in December (see the photo of its front cover on pg.28 of this issue) the police subjected the editors to severe harassment which would have led to an immediate strike in the shipyards if the editors had informed the workers of what they were facing. Instead, the editors and printers beat the problem themselves and instead of 15,000 copies (the figure allowed

by the police and by national standards very large for Solidarity) 50,000 copies came out on the day. And after Christmas, *Jedność* was ready to do battle with official censorship, gaining a 100,000 run for the paper and sales in the Ruch kiosks while refusing to tolerate the censor's pencil. When the authorities tried to censor the second large-circulation number in January, Solidarity closed down the official press in the city in response.

Most of the editors came from the Pedagogical Institute and joined *Jedność's* founder, Leszek Dlouchy during the August strike. Two more editors, from PAX, joined the board later. While working very closely with the MKR leadership, the *Jedność's* board is not under the Solidarity leadership's editorial control: there is agreement that the board alone should take the decisions on content.

The Warski workers are served with an excellent bulletin of their own, edited by Stasek Wisniewski of the MKR Presidium and printed in some 6,000 copies almost daily on the off-set machine in the shipyard, with permission of the shipyard director, Ozymek. It contains cartoons and discussion articles as well as information and official Solidarity statements.

IN MEMORY OF 1970

It is hard to exaggerate the importance of the memory of 1970 in the lives and thoughts of the workers in Szczecin. The MKR took immense care to organise the ceremony, in conjunction with the Warski Workers' Commission, in the way that met with the wishes of the workers themselves. The ceremony began at 7 a.m. on 17 December, with a mass for the dead at St. Jacob's Cathedral. At 10 a.m. a delegation from the MKR and the Shipyard workers' commission visited the graves of the dead workers. At 4 p.m. the main commemoration ceremony took place at the main gate of the Warski shipyard where the monument was built. The railway union's band played and the monument was opened by a young Warski editor crippled by a police sniper in 1970 (the shipyard workers had made a special entrance for him to his home). In the evening there was an MKR commemoration meeting in Korabia.

The entire ceremony was a working class event, organised exclusively by Solidarity. Unlike in Gdansk, no provision was made for official participation by the government, although Provincial Party Secretary Brych and Warski director Ozymek joined in the commemoration. The official participants were Warski delegates, the MKR Presidium, 300 delegates of factories in



Holding a wreath at grave of 1970 victims (left to right): Vice-Chairperson S. Wadolowski, Chairperson Marian Jurczyk, Vice-Chairperson Stanislaw Kocjan (from the 'Police' chemical plant).

Western Pomerania, a miners' delegation, national leaders of Solidarity, the Polish Episcopate, representatives of individual peasants and newspaper correspondents. During the commemoration the participants unanimously supported a resolution pledging themselves to defend the principles of equality and social justice; to struggle for the right to suitable reward for work and to a just division of the product of work for a secure life, medical care and access to the cultural achievements of humanity; to uphold the right to a dignified life in an independent country and to preserve the beliefs of their forefathers; to strengthen unity in action to achieve harmony among citizens and to act in solidarity to prevent anyone attacking the people's work or the people themselves; to extend a friendly hand to the people of all countries, but to prevent any slandering of our ideas or any attempt to end the right to freedom and the achievements already gained; to ensure respect for the law and the bringing to justice of those responsible for the December tragedy as well as those responsible for bringing the country to the brink of catastrophe. The resolution ended by appealing for God's help.

Those who had lived through the nightmare of 1970 could scarcely have dreamed of the transformation of their lives that has taken place since August 1980 in Szczecin. The road to the final victory of the Szczecin workers in the struggle to control their own destiny remains a long one. But today at least they have a gigantic weapon of organised Solidarity in their hands, a force that no enemy can ignore or trifle with.



Leader of workers' guard in Warski in 1980 strike assisting an invalid from 1970 in unveiling the monument to the dead.

A Selection from 'Jedność'

(We are publishing here an all too small selection of material from Jedność, (Unity), the newspaper of Szczecin Solidarity. The choice is a purely personal one but it will give socialists in Britain some idea of the paper's spirit. It also gives the lie to the fashionable idea that there are no Marxists in Poland. The radical

socialist outlook strongly expressed in some of the pieces is representative of a trend that can be found frequently among younger intellectuals inside and outside the Party working with complete dedication in an organic relationship with the workers' movement. All articles in the earliest issues were unsigned.)

An Independent Union in 1956

(The following letter was sent to the Szczecin MKS towards the end of the August strike and was published in Jedność No.8, 20 October.)

'Friends,

I'm writing this letter because maybe the sharing of a few thoughts could in some way be helpful. First of all I'd like to introduce myself. My name is Wojciech Bazikowski and I live in Gdynia. At present I am within the Kielce Province and this letter is being sent courtesy of my daughter. I am 45 years of age and a former ship's mechanic from Dalmor. For ten years on an invalid pension due to an accident at sea. No doubt some of the older workers of the Factory for Trawler Building may remember me, maybe from the building of the ship Aries in 1966, or maybe from the repair shipyard. Now let me share a few thought which people should recall.

In October 1956 I was a union delegate of the school of sea fishing (at the time I was a second mechanic on the ship Jan Turlejski) to the election meeting of the newly created Trade Union of Dockers and Seamen. I'd like to remind you that the Dockers, at a stormy meeting in the hall of the Maritime School, also decided to join the union. As leader of the new union we elected the last leader of the Transport Workers — Dockers and Sailors section before the war, engineer Urban Krzyzanowski. Krzyzanowski was elected after nearly 20 years because people trusted him, remembering his hard and honest defence of workers' and sailors' rights before the war. Our chief demands when creating the new union were:

- The genuine representation of the interests and rights of union members.
- The independence of the union from the Maritime Ministry, in other words the state apparatus which we understood to be the creation of an independent trade union.
- The inclusion of our union into the International Union of Maritime and Dock Workers which grouped together unions (mainly left-wing) from over 60 countries.

After the election of a new union leadership I was one of the 300 delegates of the coast to the famous 'open party meeting' in the Ministry, where the delegates gave a decisive vote of no-confidence in the Minister Popir and where we demanded that Prof. Darski take over as Minister. The delegates of the coast in October showed a decisive solidarity and unity of purpose in their demands. After the union's creation only the first two demands were realised. The third, despite strenuous efforts turned out to be unachievable. The authorities were desperately afraid of our union joining the international union. Such an entry would have indicated that in the event of a strike by our union, no Polish ship would have been loaded or unloaded at foreign ports by dockers who were members of this union.

I write about this because despite what the strikers are currently being accused of, there has existed within People's Poland the precedent for the creation of a relatively independent trade union, which was independent only a short time but in that time genuinely did a lot of good. In time, the worthwhile people within the union were outmanoeuvred and how it looked these days, well, you know better than me. Remember that you are not demanding anything new, but continuing what an older generation demanded 24 years ago. My generation made the mistake because it allowed to be taken away what was one of the most worthwhile gains of October on the coast. Don't make the same mistake. Create one strong union of shipyard workers, dockers and maritime workers and people genuinely connected to our maritime economy. Only such a union has a chance of really



Jedność issue devoted to the memory of 1970. The picture shows the Provincial Party headquarters being burnt down in front of a huge crowd.

defending the interests of working people with that real strength of which everyone will have to take account. Elect trusted, hard and wise people.

I'd like in this letter to remember one more wonderful page of solidarity of people connected with the sea, at present almost completely forgotten. In 1957, the fleet of the firm Dalmor was on strike. The ships left their fishing grounds and returned to Gdynia. The authorities wanted to victimise the members of the strike committee and the ships' captains by sacking them. This was not achieved because in solidarity with us, the Gdansk and Commune shipyards threatened to strike if a hair of the striking fishermen was touched. We didn't win much but the decisive stance of the above mentioned unions ensured that there really wasn't a single victimisation. At the time we were all members of the same union.

Elect to the leadership of the union people in whom you really have faith, people who can't be bought and create a united and strong union. If you are accused of creating a precedent, don't worry: a similar union was created 24 years ago. You have shown great decisiveness, steadfastness and maybe more political wisdom than we did, the people from 24 years ago. Don't waste this. Despite the fact that I stand now, as a pensioner, somewhat on the sidelines of the action, I am with you with all my heart. Social justice and the sovereignty of our country have always been matters dearest to me. I am returning to the coast only at the beginning of September. My means are somewhat limited. But if I can be of help in anything, I am always at your service. If you think that these few thoughts and reminiscences are of any value, you may read this letter to everyone who you wish.

I wish you success and send you my full backing.
Wojciech Bazikowski.

The Workers' Trade Union Movement 'Solidarity' and Socialism

(The following is an official declaration by the Inter-College Coordinating Committee of Solidarity in the Szczecin region, the body that links together the staff of Szczecin's five colleges of Higher Education. It was published as a special supplement to Jedność No.14 and reproduced in Kommunikat, the Warski shipyard workers' bulletin.

'Hitherto all movements have been either minority movements or movements in the interests of the minority. The proletarian movement is a huge independent movement representing the interests of the majority.'

— Karl Marx.

In the three decades since the founding of the Polish People's Republic, the working class has realised that it can't simply depend upon the graces or good wishes of the ruling stratum, whose interests are clearly at odds with those of the workers, peasants and intellectuals. The workers of the Baltic Coast in August 1980 demanded that the highest authorities accept the existence of 'trade unions independent of the party and employers'. The independent and self-governing trade union 'Solidarity' has become a reality. **Since that time our Union has become increasingly strong thanks to the massive support that the broad masses of the working people have given to it.**

The crucial changes now taking place are proof of the Polish working class's transformation from a class in itself into a class for itself, into a class possessing not only labour power but also the power of imagination, of intellect and reflection, into a class of educated and uncompromising people, firm in work and in the struggle for its liberation, into a class of disciplined and just people who, thanks to their correct thinking and deep Christian feeling identify with injustice and with the struggle of the nations of the world against it, into a class of people who understand the inexorable need to introduce far-reaching and radical changes in the relations of production and in the entire superstructure.

The thinking of the Polish working class has the clarity of a great savant just as its work has the relentlessness and heroism of Prometheus. The Polish proletarians have no illusions, that is, they are aware that they must unceasingly carry their activity forward, whose aim is the complete liberation of labour from the restrictions which still lie heavily upon it, restrictions which lie embedded in the relations of production as well as in the superstructure.

The historical process in which an every more powerful working class is breaking through the restrictions on production, exchange and consumption has been going on uninterruptedly for years. The workers' movement continually grows in strength and the trade union Solidarity is a good example of this process. Among the intellectuals at the same time the conviction of the importance of the role of the working class in Poland is growing. The consciousness of various groups of intellectuals is growing so quickly that it seems they will be proletarianised in the near future. The trade union Solidarity meanwhile wins a new ally in the form of working (progressive) intellectuals.

Nor should changes within the working class be ignored. They are taking place slowly, while the formation of a truly progressive form of organisation of an independent peasant movement will also require a great amount of work and a long period of time.

No matter how one looks at our reality, the key to understanding it lies in the long struggle of the Polish proletariat for the liberation of labour. What is involved in this struggle?

If we reply that it involves true socialism, undistorted socialism, we will not be explaining very much. We will therefore try to explain the essence of this struggle.

The right to private property in the means of production was abolished in our country when production was put under state ownership. These facts are commonly accepted in Poland. The

argument begins when official propaganda tells the entire nation that in Poland the means of production are socially owned. Theoretically, under socialism the means of production should be held in common ownership by those who actually use them, that is, the working class. But if the social ownership of the means of production is to be a true fact and not simply a propaganda statement then it involves control over one's own labour power, control and the full right to decide on the social subject of that labour; it means a structure of legal and political norms in harmony with the needs of the world of labour.

State ownership and social ownership of the means of production are two completely different concepts which should never be confused. The means of production may be owned by the state but this does not mean that they are thereby the social property of the working class.

We will now attempt to reply to the question mentioned earlier about the logic of working class demands.

This class, acting in a framework within which private ownership of the means of production has been legally (and only legally!!!) abolished, is carrying on a definite struggle to socially control the state-owned means of production, of which the events of 1956, 1970, 1976 and 1980 are examples and are external manifestations of the process of working-class liberation. If this is the essence of the workers' struggle, then the trade union movement Solidarity is a socialist movement in the purest sense of the term.

Socialism, furthermore, is not a condition but a process of historical change realised by the historical initiative of the working class which attempts to intensify the power of its own labour by socialising the state-owned means of production.

It clearly emerges from this that the socialist trade union movement Solidarity will resolutely and absolutely oppose all forms of parasitism upon the living organism of the nation's labour. The thinker who said that in societies 'drones kill those who work' was right.

In post-war Poland, the working class, functioning in conditions in which the government had abolished private ownership of the means of production, was caught in the process of the growth of an administrative and managerial apparatus. For years the apparatus has strengthened its monopoly, benefiting from the influences and privileges which it procured for itself in the legal and political structure of the state.

And even though it has no legal basis for private use of state-owned means of production, in practice it nevertheless has the role of a private owner of socialist means of production. It had to take over these means, against the interests of the Polish working class.

The world of working people now demands the proper return of this illegally acquired ownership. Furthermore, this world holds before its eyes a book and reads that socialism in fact gave the actual user the ownership of the means of production, or rather the right to decide what concerns himself, his work and the state.

The fact that the ruling stratum appeals so frequently to the interests of the working class (how many times has it been betrayed!!!) or to the good of the nation means nothing. No intelligent person takes such statements seriously. We can be happy, however, that in conditions where capitalist ownership has been abolished, the ruling stratum with its allied interest groups could not enforce its monopoly of power sufficiently to completely enslave the Polish world of labour, the working classes of the Polish nation. It will be that much more difficult for it to rule with the old methods.

The trade union movement Solidarity will do this successfully thanks to the socialist social order. Its present programme is a sincere response to the deformation and perversion of the system's basis.

The independent and self-governing trade union Solidarity takes upon itself the responsibility of defending the interests of working people. The working class will in any case reach out sooner or later in a radical way for the very roots of the social evil.

The history of the strike struggle is the open book of the Polish working class.

The proletarians have nothing to lose in this struggle except their degradation.

**Inter-College Consultation Committee
'Solidarity'
Szczecin Region**

Who is who?

(Taken from Jedność No.11, 30 October, Szczecin.)

'For us, Communism is not a **state** stage which was to be brought about, neither is it an **ideal** towards which we should direct reality. What we mean by communism is the real movement which brings down the status quo.' (Karl Marx)

A spectre is haunting Poland — the spectre of anti-socialist forces. Everybody who has a corrupt and middle-class style of thought and life to defend has united to organise a holy war against this spectre. They pin the label on all who think differently from them. It's as if a particularly group of people had a 'patent' on socialism and the rest of the nation was obliged to passively abase itself before a fantasy world through the unmasking of reality.

But the worst of such ways of thinking is the attribution which has come to fruition since the war of the label 'anti-socialist forces' to the workers' movement itself. Has anyone ever seen such a thing as an authentic movement of the workers, directed towards the liberation of the proletariat, which had an anti-socialist character? For the real liberation of the proletariat can only take place on the road of the socialisation (something quite different from state ownership) of the means of production. It is



Jedność editorial board, from left to right: Jerzy Debnicki, Leszek Dłouchy, Jerzy Wojciechowski, Michał Kawecki, Jarosław Piwar, Krzysztof Sataciński, Mirosław Latka.

necessary for the workers and peasants to become the real owners of the machines and tools with which they work and of the land which they cultivate. They desire a guarantee of their right to decide about the most fundamental questions which is the very opposite of wanting to personally fill managerial posts in the state or economic apparatuses. They long for the government, the administration and the other apparatuses to become genuinely representative and spokespeople for the interests of those whose hard daily labour 'provides the basic preconditions for the existence of the nation. This movement, as is evident, is socialist in its very essence, and anybody who cannot grasp this is condemned to remain on the sidelines of the current history of the nation, far from the creative current of history.

Might it not be the case that the people who shout about anti-socialist forces are really getting at something else altogether? More than once in the history of ideology someone has proclaimed that they have found the one and only key to the building of socialism and found the solution to all human problems. The feudal ideologies talked about socialism after the bourgeois revolution in France; the petty bourgeoisie similarly wanted to reorganise the world according to its own socialist fantasies; there came a time when German philosophy considered their conception of socialism to be the only 'authentic' one and the bourgeoisie to this day talks about socialism of its own kind, intended to preserve the old order in the world. This is to leave out utopian socialism and all those who over the centuries have distorted, deformed and mangled the humanist ideals of working-class progressive socialism.

Who then are the anti-socialist forces? He who wants to strike home must first understand.

But what is the significance of the fact that the movement of workers called NSZZ 'Solidarity' calls for a progressive socialism? What might this socialism look like? What guarantees are there that **this** will be the real thing? Such a guarantee can only be provided by the nation itself, by the activity of the workers themselves through realising their own aspirations and not through the voices of professional parliamentarians. The ideals of the proletariat cannot be 'incorrect' because they are developed directly from labour, from what makes a human being a human being.

The Media Pundits

(From Jedność No.9, 24 October 1980.)

First came Jerzy Ambroziewicz — who deserves a place in history as the first strike correspondent on Polish TV. To give him his due, he didn't say very much and what he did say wasn't too bad, since no-one can remember much about it. Beyond that, he did of course preface what he said with 'I personally ...'.

Then along came Ryszard Wojna, who talked much too much and did it very pompously. Mr Wojna has for some time now given the impression of knowing absolutely everything and that must indeed be so, since it's obvious that he isn't able to learn anything from what's going on. He does on the other hand teach, or rather instruct other people, warn them and threaten them. He was in great form on 26 August on TV and the next day in his article, 'The dividing line', in **Trybuna Ludu**. As a member of the Sejm and CC member, he was of course at liberty to expound. Unfortunately, Wojna's threats weren't the first we'd heard, and the media men weren't the only ones muttering them. Have we heard the last of them, or does anyone else fancy comparing the

situation to the 18th century and the partitions?

After Wojna came Mieczysław F. Rakowski, editor-in-chief of **Polityka**, the next super-correspondent on TV. His line, for a change, is rather original. He made plain his views on the current crisis and strikes in a speech at the 6th CC Plenum of the PUPW, when he said: 'As has been said from this platform before, the prime movers and participants in these strikes are younger workers. The conclusion is obvious: our methods of bringing up and educating youth are incorrect.'

And he continues to try and push his own mean version of reality in his new job. As a thoroughbred bourgeois ideologue, trying to keep up with events, he's prepared to put his mind to elevating education or anything else onto a pedestal to defend his position — anything, that is, except real, live human toil. It was after all hard, heavy work that shaped the ideological consciousness of the Polish working class. That consciousness — as it turned out — is the driving force behind developments now. All pseudo-ideologues must be relegated to the sidelines, for they represent yet another constraint on progress in society.

The Most Urgent Tasks — By Ferdinand Wolinski

(The following article, from Jedność No.16, 12 December 1980, provoked a sharp attack from the authorities when it appeared.)

The spirit of change that has swept across the nation from the Baltic is inspired by the demand for full socialist democracy in all spheres of Polish society. We have to acknowledge that hitherto the party, in 35 years of power, has had disproportionate success in the sphere of economic policies favouring individual members, who have enjoyed a very high standard of living. Economic success as regards industrialisation has been achieved thanks to credit taken out abroad, with scant consideration for the potential consequences, namely the disaster to which that course has led. Now we discover that party members have been treating the running of the country as if it were their own private business. What with their contempt for working people, the behaviour of many party worthies and their minions has been somewhat reminiscent of that of an occupying power in a subjugated country. Superciliousness and corruption, not to mention the egocentricity of influential individuals, have alienated the party from the Polish people as a whole. The only course left open was for mass self-defence.

During the events of August, the party, as the so-called leading power in the country, showed no evidence whatsoever of patriotism. Its leadership and the state did nothing to halt huge losses, blamed on the striking workers, as they did not want workers' participation in the power structure. It is obvious that the party's destructive policies must stop, as must its hold on sinecures and consequent inaction.

Now that most workers have declared themselves behind the independent, autonomous unions, party members are wondering how to prevent workers' participation in the country's power structures.

But what we need next are governments representing the entire working class, modelled on the ones so thoroughly described in our textbooks.

The first stage of democratisation should involve the restoration of old and valuable principles, among them: a) justice, b) consideration for the individual, and c) a fair economic deal for all rational citizens. These should be the aim of all whose notions of justice have not been distorted and corrupted by private interests in the worst sense of the phrase. All the trumpeting and declarations we have heard hitherto about the high moral standards of party members, about their adherence to the law and their exemplary lifestyles were mere bluff to the working class, that has consistently been treated like pariahs. All the declarations and propaganda about great successes were a smoke screen over the private advantages many party members seized, stealing the common wealth of the nation, collectively created by the hands of the working class.

So one of the tasks of the independent, autonomous unions will be to cleanse all government departments, institutions and state and collective enterprises of those incapable of reorientation, of the malicious and of careerists, the opportunists with diplomas, of those with dirty hands in private enterprise and of surplus office workers.

Justice, inseparable partner of socialist democracy, is the guarantee of the development of democracy even in the political sphere, and is therefore the ally of the party. Justice is the guarantor of a socialist legal system, the equal rights of all citizens, and therefore their rights to have their physical and material needs satisfied. It demands the collectivisation of means of production and division of labour, and implies broad involvement of the working class and working masses in decision-making on the national economy.

Justice must reclaim its true meaning, given the distortion it has suffered so long. This it will achieve when those with dirty hands are made accountable to the producers.

Consideration for the individual is inextricably linked with the notion of justice. The individual worker is therefore all the more entitled to respect. The Christian faith provides the most apt definition of respect: may the highest (in the social scale) service the lowest. In many cases it is necessary to lead the simple, helpless worker on to the right path, in work and outside it. Such action enhances the dignity both of the person offering aid and of the one receiving it. This characteristic has been lost in human relations in the post-war period. Its place has been taken by lack of consideration. Thus not only has the respect for the individual worker's work been diminished, so has respect of the individual, and therefore the entire working class — with the exception, we understand, of party members.

Is not the squandering of the nation's wealth an indignity to the working masses, when the wealth has been created by them and they are exhorted to work forever harder without adequate recompense? This lack of regard for people's work has increased in recent years since the new regional division was brought in, with a huge administrative network (49 regions were created) and a plethora of directorships instituted, even in kindergartens. Promotions were not awarded in consideration of sound work experience, or economically appropriate running of concerns, they were made in a conceited, nonchalant manner degrading the workers. To this, and other matters, the working class responded with strikes.

What most embittered it was that the nation had been pushed to the edge of disaster by those that regarded themselves as being in sole possession of the right to administer it. This squandering of the nation's wealth by people with no regard for the role of economic planning is contrary to the aims of a correct approach, which would depend on making decisions to achieve the best (most appropriate) possible financial results and production targets. To this is linked good work organisation, a condition of which is the exercise of care in numbers of productive workers hired, and even more care in hiring unproductive (office) workers, so that the latter do not exceed 10 per cent of the number of productive workers. That is the ratio in advanced Western capitalist countries. Economies could be made by eliminating duplication of so-called centralised cooperative productive concerns. Their work could be apportioned to a series of concerns, increasing their self-regulatory powers. This would produce savings and remove from superfluous work some 150-200,000 people who could be transferred to productive work.

There should only be one director in units of 500 workers or less; in units of up to 1500, a director and a deputy on technical matters; in units above that number, a director, a technical deputy and an administrative/financial deputy. Redundancies among superfluous office staff should take place first among wives of well-paid workers (above 10,000 zlotys with premiums, bonuses and additional pay). The titularies of the posts in which rationalisations are to be made should be involved in discussions on them, so that the impact on their lives of the posts being cut will be plain. That way the concerns affected will not complain about the lack of workers.

In a country with 12 million workers in state enterprises and some 3 million in private concerns, there are some 3.5 million party members. That gives a ration of 4:1. The ratio should be respected in hierarchies in all government departments, institutions, and enterprises, in the ministries as in the allocation of ministerial portfolios; thus the finance minister's portfolio should be given to a non-party member so that the nation has control and an accurate picture of its financial standing. This ratio of party to non-party members is necessary so that workers' councils and workplace councils and all members of autonomous independent unions are informed about the current economic situation in each workplace, and through the mass media.

The role of NSZZ Solidarity members in conferences, councils, meetings and workers' briefings is indispensable, and to this end the proceedings of ministers' councils and the Sejm should be broadcast in their entirety on radio or television. The CC plenum and congress should take place with the participation of non-

Party union members and be transmitted in their entirety on radio, so that the nation should at last know the substance of the Party's debates. We cannot have one Poland for Party members and another for non-Party members.

This position towards the state and party does not threaten the essential, political role of the party. All Poles realised the significance of alliance with the USSR long ago. Our geographic location compels not mere maintenance of the link, rather its

The Workers and Kurier

(From *Jedność* No.13, 13 November 1980. See the article 'Building Solidarity in Szczecin' for information on the incident referred to here. See also the mass leaflet on the case printed below.)

The *Szczecin Kurier*, in its article, 'The right to one's own Judgement' of 31 October launched a personal attack on a member of the MKR Presidium, Stanislaw Wadolowski. If the only issue was the personal reference of editor X about S. Wadolowski, it wouldn't be worth taking up, as we should generally not consider *Kurier* worth bothering about.

But quite another matter is at stake, the conflict between two opposing methods of thinking and of viewing the world: on one side, the workers' vision of reality, expressed by S. Wadolowski; on the other, the bourgeois interpretation of social relations expressed by the editorial board of *Szczecin Kurier*. So the individual problem here concerns us only in as much as it illustrates a wider phenomenon of social significance.

Things began with the MKR's charge that the editors of *Szczecin Kurier* gave their own interpretation of the MKR's work, its plenary meetings, etc., an interpretation which did not correspond to the feelings of the working people. The *Kurier* editors don't accept this criticism and defend themselves with arguments that can be summarised in three basic points:

1. '...everyone has the right to express personal opinions and judgments...'
2. '...even more does the press /have the right — Jed. Ed./, if it is to express public opinion ...'
3. There exists the agreement, 'The Principles of Co-operation in the field of information', signed on 11 September 1980 by the MKR and the editors of *Kurier*, which they have to abide by.

We have examined each of these points and compared the contents of *Kurier*'s editorial declaration with reality.

On Point 1: This view is only superficially correct and in reality contains an obvious falsehood, because not everyone has this right and this possibility to publicly express their thoughts and opinions. For example, have the representatives of NSZZ Solidarity been given access to the mass media, so that they could communicate information to wider social circles in our country? In fact the old rule still holds good: if you have an opinion of your own then you can publicly state it at your auntie's during a name-day celebration, but beyond that, nowhere. We know where rights like that led us and we have no wish to continue along that road.

Furthermore, the fact that the press, radio and television can now say more than they could before August 1980 is a gain that was not won by the *Kurier* nor by any editors: they should kindly remember that!!

On Point 2: The issue here is that the press and other mass media should express precisely public opinion and not their own private — and repeatedly not of the best quality — vision of reality. And who expresses, through *Kurier*, their criticisms of S. Wadolowski?

One thing is certain: it's not the working class. And how do we know this? Surely, at the MKR plenum in the Korabia hall on 30 October, the usual *Kurier* editor noticed what the reaction of the assembled workers' representatives (from 609 workplaces!) was towards S. Wadolowski's criticisms. The enormous applause from the meeting showed that S. Wadolowski was only expressing the views of the overwhelming majority and not, as has been suggested, the personal view of the meeting's chairperson. And the Gentlemen Editors then use *Kurier* to express their own personal view, hoping that they reflect public opinion.

Without a Title It's More Interesting — By Michal Kawecki

(From *Jedność* No.16, 12 December 1980.)

'Thought which is inconsistent with the truth gives birth to facts that are inconsistent with the truth, in other words distortions and falsehoods.'

K. Marx

'The direct object of industrial co-operation is the product, not profit.'

K. Marx

ever-increasing reinforcement.

The working class, as participant in administration of the nation, an equal partner with the party in all respects, will very quickly lift the country out of its slump, taking into account the principles of justice, appropriate economic policies, economies and a proper regard for honest working people, stressing increased production, and eliminating from its ranks anti-socialist elements, the lazy and the drunkards.

But when their views are disapproved of by the representatives of the working class, they become nervous and seek explanations for this state of affairs in places where they can't find any.

And what is the real basis for the difference between the workers and the editors in their views of reality?

It is simply that you get a completely different picture of the world from behind the desk of an editor's little office, smelling of coffee than if you look at the world from behind a milling machine, a steering wheel or a plough. If there are different worlds then opinions about it must also differ — whether the issue is a strike or anything else.

So whose mouthpiece, then, are the *Kurier* editors? Well, they manage to appeal perfectly to the so-called common sense which always to some extent resembles the truth and in which trivial matters are given more weight than the important ones. And this common sense embraces the courteous, alienated, soured middle-class layers among the intellectuals.

On Point 3: After making a detailed study of 'The Principles of Co-operation in the field of information' (which the *Kurier* editors should also urgently make) one can only conclude that the *Kurier* editors should fairly inform the society of everything that goes on in NSZZ Solidarity. Not a word is included about 'personal opinions' and information means the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

We can see how *Kurier* fulfils that obligation by looking at the latest report 'From the Plenary session of the Szczecin MKR' (31 October). The meeting's agenda supposedly covered 8 points and *Kurier* reported, inaccurately, only a part of the proceedings, dismissing the rest with the remark that 'the remaining business of the plenum followed the agenda' — true, but incomplete and thus a distortion of the truth. It stemmed from the *Kurier* editor's exit from the hall (to the satisfaction of the meeting) and his consequent ignorance of what happened afterwards. *Kurier* anyway wouldn't want to write about the great many interesting things that followed. It wouldn't include in its columns how the workers discussed: what a strong sense of responsibility they felt for the country's future, how highly disciplined they are, how united, how splendidly organised and genuinely committed. *Kurier* in any case dubbed that commitment 'appealing to emotion'. The same issue contains a personal attack — the right to a personal opinion, you see, on the member of the MKR Presidium who chaired this memorable plenum, Stanislaw Wadolowski. But at least the workers can see who has right on their side.

It is high time that journalists ponder their tasks and responsibilities in the context of the general division of labour within the country: who is the real subject of national activity, the force that must be served by everybody else — from scholars and directors to reporters and secretaries. Let the mass media listen with due respect to the voice of the working people and adopt an attitude of serving it. Those who stand in total opposition to the workers' movement become an antagonistic force, induce the tensions of class conflict, deepen the crisis — whatever declarations and assurances to the contrary appear in *Kurier*, and not only there. And from all this comes the old style of thought: one thing in declarations and quite another in deeds and everything superficial, in the style of the bourgeois — '... for the sake of a house, ... for the sake of Stasiek, ... for the sake of a horse, ... for the sake of a tree...' (J. Tuwim)

In the mass media for a number of decades a lot of space has been taken up with calls for more productive work, for the observance of discipline and for better quality work. In periods of especial social tension, the politico-state apparatus throws warning and even threats at the working people. How ironical that they try to convince us, hard working and feeling the effects of the fatal economic and social policies on our own skin, that the continuing strikes undermine national interests and even — and this word sounds ominous — the interests of socialism.

The strike is the law of the down-trodden, who have been deprived of all other means of social action. It is a radical act of self-defence and its impact has deep social and political causes. Instead of attacking the effects, it would be better to tackle removing the causes; a step beneficial to both sides. Sadly, the present leadership attacks strikes in an increasingly strident way, saying that in practice they are an unnecessary weapon. We can easily foresee that the *power apparatus* will try to include in the new trade union law an anti-strike formula along the lines that '...a strike may be proclaimed after all (?) other (?) means have been exhausted ...'. In this way the dubious holders of society's mandate will be to dub every authentic workers' protest as 'the irresponsible action of hostile elements'.

But surely the working class, even during the August strike, demonstrated that it was, without a shadow of a doubt, on the side of socialism. It described its attitude to the system in the words '*progressive socialism — yes, distortions — no!*'. (1)

So who will believe the lying propaganda when it screams about the anti-socialist forces, the hostile position of some of the union leaders or the uncommonly-dangerous for-socialism personage, Jacek Kuron?

In Polish society, the understanding of the important positive role of the working class is increasingly becoming a widespread conviction. Masses of working people are conscious of the fact that they have been totally disinherited from power and do not possess the means to influence the legal-political state system. This class has been forced by the prevailing quasi-socialist relations to create its own workers' union organisations to act in defence of its interests and at the same time to defend the needs of other occupational groups. It brought into being NSZZ Solidarity.

The union movement Solidarity, organising the majority of the working class, has the character of an authentic working class representative; as such it is the purest form of *socialist movement*. All the activities of Solidarity express the will and intentions of the working class which makes up its majority and unequivocally establishes its working class profile.

The politico-state apparatus is attempting (up to now ineffectively) to weaken our movement and to discredit some of our union leaders. If the need arises, NSZZ Solidarity will organise protest actions in defence of the world of the working people regardless of threatened sanctions, which in any case are unable to stem the discontent and wrath of millions of working people.

Throughout the 30-odd years of post-war history, the economic-politico-state apparatus of our country has continually resorted to the same ways and means of administering human labour, naively believing in their effectiveness. One of these methods is to call for harder work and to issue warnings and threats to the world of labour when it organises protest actions. Yet it is well known that propaganda means less than concrete changes in working methods in factories and work places. *People do not need to be specially cajoled to work hard. It is enough to create the appropriate conditions for them.*

Another of the changes in the legal-politico-state structure is the sharpening of formal work discipline and the weighing down of workers with additional responsibilities without any expansion of their actual rights. (As also the strengthening of the politico-state and economic apparatus's role as super-arbitrator.) It is sufficient here to remember the Gierk Labour Code with its famous anti-strike clause, number 52.

Yet another example of the actions of the power apparatus in the field of directing people's work are the changes in the sphere of enterprise economics. There is the simply magical belief in the economic model that favours profit and bases its functioning upon it. In our view, gearing enterprises to profit, in other words to an exclusively economic result, will not improve either the economic or the social situation.

Footnote

(1) This was the sign put up above the platform in the MKS meeting hall in the Warski yard during the strike.

In our view, gearing enterprises to profit, in other words to an exclusively economic result, will not improve either the economic or the social situation. Where profit is counted *the most important role is given exclusively to the production plan, not to people*. 'Business does not think, business calculates. Motives — these are its figures.' (Karl Marx)

Wherever high profits have been achieved, they have been at the expense of *huge human costs*, undoubtedly including factory illnesses, accidents at work, the break up of personal ties between people, the break up of families, demoralisation, alcoholism, a decline in work motivation, etc. (Pope John Paul II spoke of these things in Silesia.)

Thus the extent to which the state gains, the society loses. National stagnation deepens.

The examples cited may seem small but are representative of the entire activity of our power apparatus in its approach to the practical problems of the people's work. It must be said that this drive from above over the last 10 years did not simply fail to improve conditions, but did the opposite: the situation has deteriorated. How can this state of affairs be explained?

The historical experience of the Polish People's Republic clearly proves that the *power apparatus* does not represent the interests of the working class. (If it did, how can we explain the events of 1956, 1970, 1976 and 1980?) This apparatus is not the representative of the *world of labour*; worse, it's *denial, negation*. In this situation, the power apparatus is still only a force of exploitation and violation of the world of the people's labour.

Between the *apparatus* on one side and *labour* on the other, a deep class conflict exists which causes antagonisms and conflict in the social life of our country. There remains the class struggle of the Polish proletariat whose aim is social control over the nationalised means of production and, through that, with strengthening the forces of the entire people's labour.

Up to now the only effectively disposer of the socialist means of production is the politico-state and economic apparatus, acting as



Workers massed near the Warski shipyard in Szczecin in December 1970

a whole as a collective monopoly, as de facto private owners. It influences all spheres of life as well as the most important — control over the use of force: the militia, army, court and prison apparatuses.

On the left of the *power apparatus* is the *world of labour* with its own needs and aspirations which run counter to those of the former. The world of labour's needs and aspirations are authentically represented by the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity, organising in unions both Party and non-Party people.

In every way the concept of a two-pronged line of action by NSZZ Solidarity is becoming valid: firstly, its role as the defender of the workers' interests and secondly, its role as a force controlling the power apparatus and exerting the necessary pressure on it, without however participating in government. This conception

has emerged out of our sad experience of past years.

The world of the people's labour has been forced to take up this defensive struggle. It cannot be denied that in defending itself the **subject of national work** will have to work out appropriate peaceful means of struggle, among which the strike weapon is one of many.

As can be seen, the workers' trade union movement 'Solidarity' is faced with a whole series of practical and theoretical questions. The future effectiveness of the practical actions will depend upon an efficacious solution to these questions. As an authentic organisation of the world of working people we have enormous

The Old Worker — By Benedikt Dyrlich

(This poem, from Jedność No. 6, was translated into Polish by Istvan Dabi from its original language Lusation, spoken by a Slavonic-speaking minority in the GDR.)

he sat opposite me
on the crowded evening bus rocking
on his way home it was stuffy
work weary hands bounced
on top of an old bag head nodding
over the handbar
resting uneasily
only his eyes measured
people carefully
as if to ask did
they know
that it was for them that he had spent
all his strength

SZCZECIN SOLIDARITY LEAFLETS

Solidarity Elections

Read this before voting!

Independent Trade Union
'Solidarity'

THINK BEFORE NOMINATING A CANDIDATE! THINK BEFORE VOTING!

You come to work every day and you know the people at your place of work ... But do you really know them? Who are the people whom you want to write in onto your voting slip?

HAVE YOU TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT HOW THE CANDIDATE BEHAVES ON A DAY TO DAY BASIS AT WORK!

DOES he exhibit a slavish attitude to his superiors, an ingratiating one to his colleagues and contempt for his subordinates?

DOES he say what he thinks under all circumstances, does he listen carefully to what others have to say?

WILL he represent Your interests in negotiations with management in a determined and uncompromising way?

Judge people on the basis of their actions not just their words!!!

REMEMBER: a great deal depends on you today.

REMEMBER: if we elect as union officials the best, most honest, most courageous and most uncompromising among us, those who are dedicated to the ideals of solidarity and social justice, then the great opportunity created by the 'Polish August' will be exploited for the good of all of us, the working people in the whole of Poland.

REMEMBER: irresponsible union officials can hamper the process of renewal and let us down.

REMEMBER: it is in these very elections that the responsibility is yours, because you have the freedom of nominating candidates and of voting in accordance with your own conscience.

THINK IT OVER!

IF a candidate is a member of political organisations think about whether he took advantage of his membership of these organisations to gain undue advantages, promotion, perquisites and other privileges, and whether he really served the ideals of the working class.

IF the candidate claims to be a Christian, consider whether he had the courage of his convictions under all circumstances and whether you have real respect for him.

CONSIDER, don't be guided by passing sympathy or passing fancy! Don't be fooled by cheap emotional declarations!

LET'S ELECT PEOPLE WHO WON'T LET US DOWN!!!

Independent Trade Union 'Solidarity'
Szczecin Trades Council

superiority over the ruling apparatus because we have at our disposal an audacious, humanistic theory of human labour. This fact without exaggeration can generally decide the success of the trade union movement 'Solidarity'.

A scholar once wrote that 'the effective theory is capable of moving the masses, when it supplies proof *ad hominem* and demonstrates this *ad hominem*, when it becomes radical. It is precisely within informed radicalism where I would be inclined to search for the superiority of our ideas over the timorous ideas of the ruling apparatus which, in consequence of its restricted horizons, are simply false.



Mother and child with flag saying 'Support the Demands of the Shipyards' during the August strike.

Mass Leaflet

(This is the text of the leaflet distributed in 400,000 copies on 7 November; see article on 'Building Solidarity in Szczecin'.)

What Kurier doesn't inform you about!

On 30 October, 780 delegates from 609 work-places in the Szczecin region decided on the most important issues facing the working class. The discussion was held in a thoroughly responsible, attentive and committed atmosphere.

The spokesperson for the Szczecin railway workers spoke of a hunger-strike in the Wroclaw railway yards. Zajiryd, the Minister responsible, despite assurances on the TV to the contrary, pulled away from any negotiations and thus prolonged this tragic situation. He lied in front of the TV cameras, overstating the railway workers' claim by 1,000 zlotys. The railway workers declared the man should not be a government minister.

A shipyard worker said that in our concern for our children's future, everybody in Solidarity must be prepared, if necessary, to make sacrifices. Today our collective activity can prevent us falling into the abyss — tomorrow it may be too late.

Solidarity is quite prepared to respect the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic, the fundamental principles of the system and the leading role of the Party in society, but despite this the Warsaw District Court, having gone against the norms of justice, changed the statutes.

Solidarity helped the Adolf Warski Shipyard in Szczecin to get raw materials for production. Without our initiative and help there was a danger of stoppages at work without any strike being declared. The work-force at the Gryfia Shipyard brought forward by eight days the completion date for the M/T Kulbak. The daily cost of keeping the ship in the yard was 250,000 zl. This was on the initiative of Solidarity, despite obstacles from the technical administration. In the Gryfia repair shipyard, 98% of the work-force belongs to Solidarity.

On 30 October during the discussion in Korabia a representative of the editorial board of *Kurier Szczeciński* left the meeting before the end and instead of giving accurate information about Solidarity, he wrote a libellous article about a member of the Presidium of the Szczecin MKR — Stanislaw Wadolowski.

WARSAW

Warsaw Solidarity is one of the most militant regional branches, centred in a number of large factories such as Ursus Tractors, the Zeran Car plant, the Nowotki works, and the Huta Warszawa Steel plant. Its chairperson Zbigniew Bujak is from Ursus, a key centre in the 1976 strikes against price increases. He is in his early 30s and had previous experience as a member of the official youth organisation. We publish here a lengthy discussion between him and members of the editorial board of one of Warsaw Solidarity's bulletins NTO, which is described in a separate interview with one of its editors, Wlodek Wypych.

Warsaw Solidarity has faced much less co-operation from the Warsaw Party and city authorities than many other Solidarity branches. In November of last year it was galvanised by the Narozniak affair, when police raided its offices after one of its members had obtained a copy of a document from the Public Prosecutor's Office planning to round up a number of Solidarity activists and advisors. Since that time Warsaw Solidarity has been in the forefront of all the major struggles of Solidarity to defend itself and gain the implementation of the August Agreements.

The Organisation of the Working Class —

Discussion between Z. Bujak and NTO Editorial Board

We publish below the transcript of a discussion which took place on 4 January 1981 with Zbigniew Bujak, chairperson of the MKZ NSZZ Solidarity for the Mazowsze region. We hope that some of the problems touched on in the discussion and some of the opinions expressed will arouse the interest of our readers. We await letters and replies.

Participants in the discussion were: Zbigniew Bujak, Wojciech Kaminski, Barbara Markiewicz, Jozef Orzel, Henryk Szlajfer, Wlodzimierz Wypych, Zbigniew Zawadski. All the subheadings are by the editors.

We hope to return in future issues to the various themes of discussion, especially the problem of workers' self-management.

PERSPECTIVES: WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT

Wypych: In September, when Solidarity was created, discussion began on the Union's programme of action. Various alternatives were considered: should the Trade Union organise its own activity in defence of the immediate economic and social interests of the workers? Or should it also aim for the reconstruction of the whole existing social and economic system? In other words, should it fulfil the role of a trade union in the traditional sense, or should it stand at the forefront of the process of social renewal. Has this alternative still been posed in the decisions of recent weeks?

Bujak: This was, indeed, one of the basic problems at the birth of the movement. For us activists, it became clear that the most suitable form was a pure trade union organisation concerning itself exclusively with the defence of workers' interests. But as the first days already showed, workers and indeed the whole society began to press us into matters going beyond the competency of a trade union. This was also related to the Gdansk Agreements, which contained provisions not of a strictly trade-union character. The trade union was the only organisation at that time which could assume responsibility for supervising the implementation of the agreement. We were faced with the need to act in spheres that went beyond pure trade-union activity. Recently, it seems the Trade Union has begun to discover a way out from this troublesome situation. The first sign is the creation of the Committee to Defend People Persecuted for their Beliefs — a body which, though called into being by the trade union National Committee, is not linked to the unions in any way except as its sponsors. And this is precisely the way in which the Trade Union will enter into other spheres. The next thing which the Trade Union will have to take up is the creation of workers' councils with certain management responsibilities. This would free the union from its involuntary responsibility for taking an interest in production, the management of material, and so on. The initiative for such councils ought to come from outside the union, but since these are the only milieu in which such a project can be born, they must themselves take on the task. Once workers' councils are formed, however, they too should operate outside the framework of the union.

Szlajfer: If I understood correctly, you're talking about a kind of 'packaging' of the Trade Union. The Committee to Defend Political Prisoners, workers' councils, maybe later a commission on economic reform or some kind of organ dealing with censorship — in reality these would be groups coming out of the Trade Union which would immediately cease to be trade-union projects. Nevertheless, the union would be able to draw its own conclusions from the practical results of their activity (for instance, a programme for economic reform or enterprise autonomy).

Bujak: Yes. At this moment, for example, it is important to create a consumers' protection movement that would relieve the Trade Union of

responsibility in this sphere. But there is one point I would like to emphasise. If workers' councils are set up, perhaps with their own higher regional, trade or even national body, they will also be able to give an opinion on various economic programmes. Of course, the union would not necessarily agree with that opinion: it will have to work out its own views on a plan for the economy and develop a programme of its own.

Szlajfer: That's an interesting conception. So far, whenever I've heard discussion on the position to be taken by the Trade Union, all these big problems of economic reform, self-management, consumer protection, enterprise autonomy and so on, have been put off to the future. The main argument was that we are not in a position to raise these matters. And so your conception is very interesting: it is a project of practical activity for today.

Bujak: On the one hand the Trade Union will help to create such extra-union bodies, and on the other it will affirm the right to develop its own programme and views on other programmes.

Zawadski: What you said about self-management is very interesting. But is your opinion widespread within Solidarity? Still quite popular seems to be the idea that Solidarity should not concern itself with such matters, that it should organise itself to exercise a function of pure control in response to various actions taken by the authorities.

Bujak: I don't know where such ideas come from: probably from people who think of the Trade Union in quite abstract categories. The workforce don't ask whether we should concern ourselves with this or not; they just ask for our concrete views on concrete questions. We either have a view or we don't — and in such a situation it's obviously better to have one.

Szlajfer: When I was in Silesia, I clearly saw something which perhaps re-emerged in Ursus. Thus, in Huta Katowice Solidarity quite quickly got stuck into wage questions, and by October November /1980/ it was already beginning to engage in activity which did not fit, let us say, the classical model of trade unions. For instance, they demanded a visit from NIK controllers, and together with them they checked on the management of Huta Katowice. In November they checked on grocery warehouses in Sosnowiec, Dabrowa Gornicza and Bedzynie, in order to find out whether the authorities were intentionally holding back supplies from the market. (It indeed emerged that something like 'petty sabotage' had been going on, at least in this region.) The Solidarity people in Huta did not stop to consider whether this was in their field of competence. They just did it.

If the workforce accepts this idea of self-management — workers' councils — then a certain problem will arise. Self-management has already existed in Poland, but it was silently liquidated or transformed into the KSR. Some of the workforce may therefore be suspicious of such a conception. It would require something more than self-management within an individual institution. And so, there has arisen talk of workers' councils embracing several or more workplaces and regions.

Bujak: For the present, Solidarity is faced with the very big problem of economic reforms.

Zawadski: Socio-economic reforms, rather.

Bujak: It's above all a question of economic reforms which only subsequently touch on the social sphere. Self-management, as conceived by the Trade Union, is very difficult to introduce. First, it's very difficult to realise at enterprise level: one would need an extremely aware workforce able to see how it could be done, what forms would enjoy authority, and how self-management activity could be supervised.

Secondly, the whole problem is closely connected with economic reforms; and such reforms, in my view, are linked to the degree of trade-union development and organisation. Without an adequately organised Trade Union, there could be major difficulties in the path of reforms. Many economists consider that the reforms must be quick and very thorough. And this demands highly energetic activity for public enlightenment, which can only come from the dynamism of the Trade Union. Workers' self-management is a possibility only because of the existence of the trade union. If the idea collapsed in Hungary and has not functioned well in Yugoslavia, this is because they did not have strong trade unions. As for the way in which a workers' council will actually function in an enterprise, I see it in general as a kind of reverse side of the Trade Union. In very simple terms, the council might say that a certain part of the profits should be allocated for expansion of the enterprise, while the union might reject this and say that they're needed to raise workers' pensions.

Orzel: In other words the sides would be: the management, the workers' councils and the trade union?

Bujak: The management in that model would stand on the sidelines.

Szlajfer: That's a very important point. Up to now self-management in Poland has failed, among other reasons, because the management and the Party committee have had the status of sides to the negotiations.

Bujak: In the model we have talked about, the director is not a side, but an adviser of self-management.

Wypych: In other words, an executive organ of self-management.

Kaminski: That only makes sense if the management is elected by self-management bodies.

Bujak: Of course, the director is employed by the workers' council.

Zawadski: Is there discussion about such a project in the National Committee?

Bujak: This plan arose shortly before we entered into talks with the authorities. If the authorities were really concerned with reforms and a solution to the crisis, they would have to take something from this plan. We must consider what the Trade Union itself has to do. Some people in the workplaces are born social activists, born to defend the workers' interests. But others are also emerging who want to play a role in workplace affairs, being interested in such things as production, the use of machinery and work-time, technology and management. These engineers, technicians and numerous workers, who can be clearly seen in Ursus, for example, are discovering a field of activity in the trade unions. But, in my opinion, their field of activity ought to be their own workers' self-management. To create such a field and convince them to enter it, is another, very difficult problem. But the people, the cadres, are already there for self-management.

REFORM AND ECONOMIC POLICY

Zawadski: The kind of self-management you mention is, in my opinion, the last thing that the authorities in this country will agree to. The introduction of something of this nature would require maximum social pressure, which at the present time can only be embodied in Solidarity.

Bujak: Five months ago we thought that Solidarity was the last thing that the government would agree to. It is not only support and pressure for the realisation of such a programme which are needed, but also the creation of the right economic conditions for the introduction of this type of, what I call, economic reform. Until now, the most realistic and comprehensive programme of necessary changes has been presented by Prof. Stefan Kurowski. The introduction of reform must go together with a programme of minimal demands on the part of the Union. For example, prices are raised by 30% and the Union does not demand a pay increase in return (with the exception of the lowest paid). At the moment, most people would find such a programme unacceptable. There would have to be a lot given in return for such a 30% increase. The price is workers' self-management which would give people great freedom of action at plant level. People would need to know what they are getting in return for such a price increase. Only on such terms can we as a Union push it through.

Purely economic matters are another problem altogether, eg. the matter of a moratorium on Poland's repayment of loans. It was said at the EEC conference in France that there is a chance of Poland getting such a moratorium. Then our experts could go on important raw materials and supplies needed for the economy, which would then have a chance of starting to function normally. Then this whole economic reform could be introduced and loans needed to finance it be sought from the West. Such a loan would be necessary to ease tension in the transitory period. Economists say that this scenario is possible and realistic.

Szlajfer: I see one problem here. The tone of the Western economic press is unequivocal: we will grant a moratorium (in fact there is no alternative but to do so); however, obtaining additional long-term credit will be a very difficult matter. For example, in August we received a loan of this kind for \$325m from a consortium of Western banks. As has now transpired from the foreign press, the loan was held up until the USSR would give a guarantee on one third of the sum. Western banks do not want to pump money into us any longer. And we need to closely examine whether a strategy for solving the crisis can be built on yet another long-term loan.

Next, the reform programme which is gradually emerging would lead to local unemployment in some parts of the country and the need for a change in the price system. N.B. The question of re-training should be taken up. These are two great problems for Solidarity, and it seems to me that up to now they have not been emphasised enough.

Bujak: Concerning loans: it is not only the economists who think we should stop lamenting the fact that Poland lies in the middle of Europe, and start making use of it. If the West wants peace here, and it does, it should pay for it.

Markiewicz: Another matter continues to give me cause for reflection. How to force the government to even begin working on these reforms. You say that 'when they ask us, we will present our programme'. I am afraid that the authorities will not do this. For example, it has just come to light that the 40 odd investments that had been suspended are now again underway, because the Russians will help. So, attempts are made to preserve the status quo for as long as possible in order to resist new initiatives. How to fight this?

Bujak: And exactly here we return to the question of the degree of union organisation. The most powerful pressure is society's awareness. Society should be presented with various alternative programmes, including that of the union which will say: 'Listen, the next 3 years will be difficult, but there is a possible way out.' If we manage to point the way out and to persuade people that it is realistic, people will choose our programme. Then the authorities will have to choose: either to accept our programme and put it into practice or face a confrontation.

Markiewicz: So in a certain sense Solidarity must take upon itself the weight of carrying the reform through?

Bujak: Perhaps not the weight, but the responsibility. If the Union makes a mistake in its programme, if we assess the mechanisms wrongly, forget some key element and the reform flops, we lose everything. But without this risk we wouldn't be able to do anything.

Kaminski: We can count on the awareness and support of society only if what we offer is an all-embracing programme. In return for price rises and other hardships, apart from self-management, full-scale changes in the economic and financial systems, schooling, culture and many other areas will have to be altered — in short, a massive programme of social reforms.



Cartoon from NTO highlighting lack of government investment in private agriculture.

Orzel: At the present moment there are several, even tens of projects for economic change. But in November and December the influences of the same industrial and branch lobby that had run the life of the economy before the summer of 1980 re-emerged. An effect of the activities of this lobby is, for example, the withdrawal of the programme of suspending investments. The question is how to create the conditions necessary for the introduction of reforms despite these pressure groups? Reforms which would destroy the lobby. Action by the working masses in the cause of reform is something positive, but there would be a conflict between this tendency and the interests of certain sectors of the masses (eg. suspended investments, local unemployment). A part of the workforce on whom the Union depends would become the natural allies of those opposed to reform.

Bujak: Will the authorities agree to these reforms? It is possible that they will not agree, and then the Union would revert to a purely defensive stand and concern itself with fighting only for workers' rights and merely demanding pay rises every so often, and no more. Then the matter of resolving the crisis would rest only with the authorities. If the projects which we consider to be realistic and for which the Union takes responsibility are not accepted — we become only a side in a dispute. Co-responsibility? — Yes, of course, but with joint decision-making. If not, we withdraw to a purely defensive position and only observe events on the market.

INFORMATION AND DEMOCRACY WITHIN SOLIDARITY

Kaminski: Our possibilities of influencing social consciousness are closely linked to the means for propaganda activity. In this connection, I would like to ask about the position with the Solidarity weekly and access to the media. If these things are arranged, then the union's chances automatically increase.

Bujak: The question of the weekly will be settled in the next few days, perhaps at the next National Committee. We have agreement for a weekly: all that remain are organisational matters. I fear that we may be shown as inadequately prepared. As for radio and television, we received a reply that the mass media belong to the state, which will not easily allow access to them. From the authorities' point of view, it would be the next critical step and it is therefore unlikely that agreement will be reached. This mainly concerns access to T.V. studios for the purpose of making programmes; but if we had ready-made programmes, then the authorities would screen them. We have to have our own radio-television studio, and we will have one. We have mentioned the question to the Japanese and West German trade unions, and we will receive help.

Szlajfer: Will the weekly Solidarity come under censorship?

Bujak: Yes.

Zawadski: Why?

Bujak: This matter was discussed, and it was stated that it is of utmost importance that a new code should be drawn up. On the other hand, some form of censorship is necessary simply for geo-political reasons, and the union is compelled to be realistic. The struggle for a new censorship code is continuing. What is important is the question of regional and factory papers, and here we categorically do not want any censorship.

Zawadski: Let us move on. The question of internal democracy has recently been worrying a number of people. I suggest we discuss, for example, the danger of bureaucratisation within the union.

Bujak: At the start this is certainly not a danger. Solidarity is a hugely spontaneous movement, full of life and vitality, and there is no question of bureaucratisation. The problem will begin to arise when the various terms of office in the union come to an end. What will happen then? There will be a problem of member-activists who have shown themselves to be useful and now have to move aside. For example, they won't go to a higher position when their term is finished, and it will be a pity to lose such people. There aren't many activists and we can't cast them off. So positions will undoubtedly be sought for them — perhaps by forcible means. In other words there is a real danger that the process of bureaucratisation will then begin.

Orzel: Will the election rules be sufficiently unambiguous? Is it possible for someone to have access to a higher union position without having been elected at his/her workplace?

Bujak: This hasn't yet been finally decided. There are many different views, and a real battle for democracy is going to begin.

A related question is the need for a union involved in normal activity to take dozens of democratic decisions. When such an organisation is first formed (and particularly in the conditions we face) the number of vital decisions is incomparably greater. If they are taken by a leadership committee with no worked-out democratic mechanism for settling matters, there is no way that all decisions can be democratically reached. There will perhaps be a situation in which ten per cent of decisions are reached collectively, while the remainder are taken in an informal manner. This is a normal situation, and we shouldn't be surprised at it. Of course we should struggle against it. But at this stage it is unavoidable.

Zawadski: But it is also unavoidable that if undemocratic habits arise at such a stage, then they will tend to persist once the situation has calmed down.

Bujak: We'll have to root them out and struggle against them.

Orzel: This isn't a question of subjective tendencies. All institutions in the world have a tendency towards centralisation. Bad decisions are most

often the function of bad organisation. Solidarity activists have to do so many things forced upon them by the authorities, that they do not always have the time to concern themselves with workplace problems. This could lead to isolation of the activists. One possible solution is the model of 'doughnutisation' of the union: that is, the formation of bodies which take over certain problems and thereby lighten the burden of union structures. How can we guard against this kind of danger?

Bujak: It's simple. This kind of phenomenon can be prevented through a flow of information from region to circle to members to circle to region. If both region and members impose such a flow, then the danger will disappear.

Zawadski: But information about the work of the Mazowsze Presidium is getting worse not better.

Bujak: This is an interesting point. I have known for some time that there is a weak flow of information from the Presidium. Strong pressure was exerted for the creation of further circles that would guarantee the correct flow of information. The Presidium Chairperson was called on to provide information for the secretary, and there is a chief consultant responsible for providing an information-pack /to all the advisers/. One person receives information from all the MKZs; a secretary is responsible for the flow of information between the various bodies of the Presidium; and there are others who answer for the dissemination of information to the workplaces. All this is functioning, and yet the flow of information is worse than at the beginning. There is a growing feeling that the Presidium discusses behind doors that are ever more tightly closed.

Orzel: Previously the press representatives wrote reports of each presidium, and these were printed in sufficient number for everyone interested to receive one. Now the representative writes further communiques that are distributed in 20 to 50 copies. There used to be two or three printed communiques every day in Mazowsze, but now there is one every three or four days. Is it not possible for these communiques to be duplicated in one or two thousand copies?

Bujak: I'll say more. There is a decision that reports of Presidium discussions should be distributed in three thousand copies, and distributed to the workplace. There is a folder containing all communiques for duplication and distribution, and the director of polygraphy is responsible for ensuring that this is done on time.

Szlajfer: But the information just isn't there.


Bujak: I really don't know why this is happening.

Zawadski: As for what is happening in the National Committee, no one has any idea at all.

Bujak: For each National Committee there is a communique and a report on attendance. This, too, should reach everywhere, and yet it doesn't.

Szlajfer: Following the Szczecin meeting of the National Committee, a half-page communique was published more or less in the style of *Trybuna Ludu*: that such a meeting had taken place. There are rumours of conflict and antagonism, and it's worrying that the fact that some people from Szczecin have left the National Committee was first reported by *Polityka*.

Bujak: I've also noticed that some communiques are no different in style from *Trybuna Ludu*, and I have requested that there should be reports rather than communiques of Presidium discussions.



Wypych: Everyone here has started complaining, and we've lost track of the real question. When we talk of the union's programme of activity, we have in mind a certain vision of a democratic society — one in which there would be full shelves in the shops as well as some degree of freedom. For some time now in the official press, mention has been made of union representation within the Sejm. This isn't a new idea: it was once put forward by Lange. And in any case, the Hungarian Parliament has for some time had a Workers' Chamber. This is surely a very important matter, particularly as regards a future economic reform. For a reform requires a great deal of legislation which must, before acceptance, be canvassed in the trade unions. Their representation in the Sejm could raise to an appropriate level the dialogue with the authorities. It could give it an institutional form.

Bujak: The Sejm forum is perhaps a realistic idea, although in a different context. But what you mention, which I would refer to simply as the flow of information between society and the authorities, would be channelled by the institutions we have already discussed: self-governing committees that are charged with providing correct information for society, as opposed to the misleading channels provided by the security forces.

Wypych: The flow of information is one thing, but legislative work is another.

Szlajfer: In my view, if we take the model of self-governing councils, then these should have representation within the Sejm rather than Solidarity as a trade union.

INDEPENDENCE, PRESS, EXPERTS

Zawadski: Let's finish on the Sejm. Has anyone anything else to say about internal democracy?

Szlajfer: Yes: one thing about the independence of the union as a whole. In October/November the union effectively won independence from the Party. But union independence might have a broader meaning if we also take the Church into account. — not as a natural enemy but as a natural ally, yet one which could also limit the union's independence.

Bujak: As I see it, this isn't a question of independence but of influence. Practically speaking, there is no selection of union members: anyone is able to join. Independence of the union will be formed in the same way as the orientation of the people involved in it. If the leadership is won by the PUWP, then that will be the motor force. This isn't a danger. If there are different groupings, then they will each try to impose their own programme; and, of course, in this sense we can talk about dependence. But the overall independence of the union is also apparent in this process. It's a mixed orientation of which I am not afraid.

Szlajfer: Perhaps it would be useful to adopt statutes that express this problem of influence.

Bujak: I can see a danger when the union begins to lose its independence. As far as I can see, the only guarantee at present that this will not happen, is the independence of the union press. If it remains independent, and able to talk freely and openly about union policy, then this will somewhat influence developments within the union. But we have to be on our guard against a situation in which readers feel that the editors regard something as dangerous. If a paper starts attacking the Presidium, we shall have to reply and take a position; but the possibility of this is a concrete guarantee that the executive is functioning properly. It would be dangerous for the presidium to make any attempt to interfere with what is written by a union paper. For after this happened a couple of times, the paper would cease to fulfil its task. I'm a bit worried that some of these papers carry nothing which attacks the leadership. The presidium is regarded as a sacred cow, and we don't want things to be like that.

Wypych: There is an understandable tendency for internal union matters not to be displaced outside.

Szlajfer: It's difficult to find a balance between the need to defend the union and its institutions, and the need to criticise the executive. Criticism of various union bodies is viewed with mistrust. It's clear that a very tense situation like the strike demands maximum unity and suspension of critical comment. But it's as if this 'war situation' has been transferred into the normal functioning of the union, including moments of truce. Regardless of an editorial board's views, the Presidium should understand that criticism is necessary.

Bujak: There has to be mechanism for introducing the habit of criticism. People are not used to it: they must realise that it's a normally accepted form, not evidence of a break-up or of fractionalism.

Zawadski: Next there's the problem of the experts. The movement which created Solidarity has not been able to develop its own activists in sufficient number, and so it has to use the assistance of people somewhat different from the mainstream workers of the movement. Naturally these

people, too, fight for influence within the union, and they also vie with one another. This situation seems to me rather dangerous, raising the possibility of manipulation of the union.

Bujak: In my view this is a normal situation. It couldn't be otherwise.

Zawadski: I understand that it couldn't be otherwise. But is there no danger in this at the moment?

Bujak: Maybe there is. But there are some circles — the democratic opposition, for example — which are prepared to give aid and which have won the full confidence of myself and numerous other people. With all due reservations about individual cases, this was a milieu to which we could turn for help. Also helping us are a large number not directly linked to any milieu. Now, it's true that these people, who alone can act as advisors, really do have an enormous influence on what happens in the union. What they say is analysed and not always adopted, but on numerous occasions their ideas do carry the day. It could be said that the experts have enormous influence on the executive, while the workforce itself has only a small influence. But the experts' role will diminish as the union's model of functioning is established. Then they will become a single voice within a broader discussion, and the influence of the circle will grow accordingly.

Szlajfer: It's also natural that there should be different groups of experts. We should fight for the public articulation of their different views, and against a monopoly of influence by one group over the union.

Bujak: In Warsaw, such a danger of monopoly does not exist. Influence is exerted by many-sided opinions coming from many different milieux. There will be many groups of experts, a whole mosaic of views.

Kaminski: This raises again the question of an independent press. Each group should have its own paper, and indeed such papers could become centres around which groups are formed. I think *Robotnik*, for example, should become a union paper.

Bujak: Well, have you heard how the workers in Ursus voted after a meeting with the *Robotnik* editorial board? Henri Wujec, in fact, having described the paper's activity, asked: 'I'd like some idea of who is in favour of *Robotnik* becoming a Solidarity paper?' Two people. And who was against? The entire hall. Somebody then stood up and explained why: 'The unions exist, but it's like something which simply happened. So, there must also be a paper which criticises them, and it would be better if *Robotnik* remained independent.'

Kaminski: Pluralism of the union press has an enormous bearing on union democracy as a guarantee of the struggle between different programmes. These should be clearly expressed in union papers, not through personal quarrels and argy-bargy.

INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS

Zawadski: I'd like us to talk a bit about international matters. How do things stand in this respect?

Bujak: I would like to form a separate foreign policy body, because at the moment things are in rather a mess. We want to adopt the principle that, as a region, we shall maintain contacts not with, let us say, a French union but with a regional body in Paris. In my view contact should be decentralised, so that not only regions but also factory workforces become involved. To this we should add contact with Polonia.* This year a number of children will be sent abroad on holidays which Polonia is organising for Solidarity.

It's worth mentioning a problem which occurred when the Italian unions visited us. One condition imposed on them was that they should also meet with the /official/ branch unions. However, the Italians were very annoyed and stated that the whole matter would be written up in their press. The authorities then became so worried that they withdrew their demand. The problem of foreign contacts is now very important, but it has so far been somewhat neglected.

Markiewicz: Is Solidarity now a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO)?

Bujak: No, not at the moment. We're not yet ready for this.

*Polonia — The word refers to the Polish emigration living in the West.

'We want socialisation of the mass media' — a talk with Wlodek Wypych of NTO

Warsaw Solidarity — the Mazowsze Committee as it's called, after the region in which Poland's capital is situated — has two provincial publications, *Niezależność* ('Independence') and NTO, whose initials refer to 'Science, Technology, and Education'. But the latter's name gives less of a picture of the journal's contents than the symbol at the back of very issue, which suggests the bold and iconoclastic approach of the bulletin.

Since Warsaw is Poland's overwhelmingly preponderant centre of intellectual activity, it is hardly surprising that Solidarity in the capital should seek to cater for scientific workers. What is perhaps more unexpected for those who picture Polish intellectual life as rather rarified and elitist, is the journal's popularity in the factories.

But a glance at the contents of NTO explains why. The journal's style is blunt and direct and its range of interest is immense. It contains on-the-spot reports from centres of conflict such as Bielsko Biala or Rzeszow as well as discussions on questions like censorship, economic problems and cultural issues. And its features include everything from Hungary in 1956 to the resurrection of the work of a little known early 20th century Polish Marxist.

Labour Focus talked to one of NTO's founders and editors, Wlodek Wypych, about the bulletin's work. He explained that the journal began just after the August agreements as the bulletin of an independent trade union of scientific workers, and when Solidarity was created the union joined it along with NTO. The editorial team is drawn from all the Warsaw colleges. Wlodek himself comes from the


Economic Planning Institute. 'In a nutshell, we are also from the so-called "intelligentsia",' he explained, 'but many of us have also worked as workers — I myself was at one time a printing worker.'

While NTO is a Mazowsze Committee bulletin, its contents are not controlled by the regional Solidarity leadership. 'We have always reserved the right to criticise MKZ decisions,' explained Wlodek, 'but up to now we haven't actually used that right. Decisions to publish this or that article are decided by the editorial team either through a search for a compromise or else through simply voting for or against.'

The magazine comes out roughly every ten days in some 10,000 copies. They are distributed to the Solidarity circles in Warsaw's Higher Schools, research institutes and factories as well as a large number of other institutions. They can also be obtained from Solidarity's headquarters.

Up to now NTO has not faced censorship. 'Along with other internal trade union publications, we will defend ourselves against any attempt to gag us. And remember, we have the backing not only of our several thousands of readers but also of the entire union.'

As to the future, the editors see the magazine as covering every sort of social and cultural issue. They also hope to publish an 'international' issue, containing information on trade unions in the West, their organisational forms and methods of struggle. 'We would also like to help towards establishing stable co-operation between Solidarity and unions in the West, not only so that they can help us, but also so that on suitable occasions we can help them,' explained Wlodek.



I asked him how he thought the press as a whole should develop and what its role should be in relation to the working class movement. 'We consider that the independent trade union press is an important factor in the democratisation of social life in our country and will help the emergence of a genuine public opinion, though this will really require a battle to change the role of the mass media which up to now are controlled by the authorities. And when it comes to the problem of censorship, we put forward the slogan of *socialisation of the mass media*, which we think is no less important than the genuine socialisation of the means of production.'

Polish Feminist Group Formed

Towards the end of November 1980 in the Sigma Club (1) at Warsaw University, about 100 women met to establish the first feminist group in Poland. Krystina Kowalewska, one of the group's founders, spoke with Imma Palme of the Vienna defence journal *Gegenstimme*.

'We examine the experience of Western feminists, but of course we must apply the lessons of these movements to the very specific situation of Poland. We already have some contacts, but we need as much information as possible about the women's movements in other countries.'

And what does this women's group plan to do? According to Krystina, 'We want to bring out a women's paper and set up a women's theatre. We have to do serious work on the history of women, their thought and their life. At the moment we're planning a seminar circle on Polish women who have managed to break out of the traditional mode of existence to become artists or scientists. We also want to set up a feminist Gallery.'

The group has already drawn up a list of demands which they would like to discuss with men in the factories and with Solidarity. (See the document below.)

'We want to develop and strengthen the women's movement here. Articles, propaganda, theatre, newspapers — all this should help us put an end to the traditional prejudices about women. But for all this we absolutely need the help of the Western women's movement.'

What the Warsaw women need above all is information material: books, journals, films, videos and cassettes dealing with the women's movement and the problems and situation of women.

Materials should be sent to:
Krystina Kowalewska
Uniwersytet Warszawski
U. Krakowski Przedmieście 24,
00-325 Warszawa.

Footnote: Sigma Club

Woman and Russia

An Almanach produced
by women and
for women
in the Soviet Union

Published by Sheba, £1.95.

AIMS OF FEMINISTS

Women's Demands

1. The possibility of a break in studies for women students who are more than three months pregnant.
2. Greater consideration of famous women in school textbooks.
3. The launching of a wide-ranging investigation into the situation of women.
4. Development of women's self-consciousness and consolidation of their authority. Struggle against the demands made upon women to conform.
5. The informing of society about woman's situation and role.
6. The expansion of services.
7. A campaign about the creative organisation of free time, which leads to many-sided development of the personality in the intellectual, artistic and physical spheres.
8. Raising of the social prestige of unmarried, separated or otherwise unattached women, and an improvement in their economic situation.
9. Equal status in law for marital and non-marital associations.
10. Raising of men's sense of responsibility for their children and for abortions; at present women are almost alone to suffer the psychological and moral problems connected with abortion.
11. A curb on the arrogant and paternalistic way in which women's teams are treated.
12. Measures against the inhibition of women's efforts at school and in the family; against hackneyed images and harmful myths, such as the idea that women are happy in a subordinate position, or that immaturity and intellectual inferiority are preordained for them.

Our Goals:

We want as many women as possible to get involved in struggle against the persisting exploitation and injustice.

- * Unpaid leave should be available for both parents and capable of

being taken by either parent at any given time. Such leave should be spread over three years; maternity/paternity leave should be granted to both parents.

- * A monthly allowance and social services for housewives.
- * Equal pay for men and women with the same training and length of service; today wages are lower in the so-called women's occupations which involve the same degree of mental and physical fatigue.
- * Application of the Equal Opportunities Act to the female sex: a) in access to institutes of higher education where women are now in a minority; and b) in appointment and promotion in managerial positions, where at present women are disadvantaged even if they have the same or higher qualifications than men.
- * We want both sexes to have the same social and economic status in any kind of occupation or office.

We want to disseminate our ideas through:

- 1) A feminist publication.
- 2) A feminist theatre.
- 3) A feminist art gallery.
- 4) Meetings, seminars and conversations with well-known women who propagate women's ideas and art, deal with the psychology and specific characteristics of women, and represent the most interesting aspects of women.
- 5) A centralised pool of information covering feminist movements; great women figures both past and present; and the situation of women in Poland and in the world.
- 6) Contact with feminist movements in other countries; there is already contact with those in West Germany, France and the USSR.
- 7) We want to protect women's interests: we are for the development of their consciousness, and for the fulfilment of their cultural, scientific, social and existential needs through publicisation of the existence of such needs.

Continued from page 9.

Government-sponsored Church Groups:

1. PAX: Started after the war by a group of pre-war Fascists led by Piasecki it takes a position both for the established political order and for Catholicism. It is very wealthy, possessing industrial establishments, a monopoly on religious trinkets, publishing houses etc. It runs the only Catholic daily, *Slowo Powszechnie*, has deputies in the Polish Parliament and has a youth wing. But it lacks important popular support and has been increasingly squeezed by the growing rapprochement of Church and Government. After Piasecki's death in the late 1970s, there were some hints of a possible reconciliation between PAX and the Church hierarchy, but this has not materialised. After the August crisis there was an upheaval in the PAX leadership with Piasecki's old guard being weakened as younger officials were promoted. PAX has sought to establish a base for itself in Solidarity and initially at least has some success in Jastrzebie, the Silesian mining centre, where the MKZ Presidium was initially pro-PAX, and in Katowice where the editor of the bulletin 'Our Solidarity' was a PAX member. But this influence has now declined.

2. ODiSS, Neo-Znak and the PZKS: These three organisations essentially involve the same trend, which could be described as occupying a position mid-way between PAX and the independent Catholic groups (on which, see below). ODiSS stands for the Documentation and Social Studies Centre, an officially recognised group with Sejm deputies; neo-Znak is the name of a group of Sejm deputies who were part of the old Znak group (see below) but staged a coup within the group in 1976 and gained a monopoly of Znak's Sejm deputies, while they were repudiated by the independent Catholic Movement. The PZKS is the Polish Catholic Social Union and since its launching in January it is the new form of neo-Znak. Its official aim is reconciliation between Government, Church and Solidarity, leaving vague on whose terms the reconciliation takes

place. It offers itself as a mediator. Its leader is Janusz Zablocki, who is also editor of the group's new fortnightly 'Order' published with official blessing in a 20,000 run. Another of the group's leaders, Jerzy Ozdowski was made a Vice-Premier in November. The Party leadership's encouragement of this group is undoubtedly aimed at weakening the influence of the independent Catholic movement, but intriguingly the group seems to have received the blessing also of the Catholic hierarchy and Pope John Paul II. The latter received Ozdowski in Rome in the autumn (he had pointedly shunned the group during his 1979 visit to Poland), with Mgr Dabrowski indicating hierarchy support by holding a meeting with the Neo-Znak deputies and Party leader Kania in November. The tendency has some peasant support and has been trying to gain working class support. The editor of 'Our Solidarity' in Jastrzebie in the autumn of 1980 was a neo-Znak supporter.

The Independent Catholic Movement: This is a movement of the Catholic intelligentsia which is independent both of the government and the Church hierarchy. It involves a loose association of the following organisations: the Catholic weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny* (print run 40,000) the Catholic monthlies *Wież* and *Znak*, and the Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs (known by their Polish initials as KIK). The former Znak group of Sejm deputies was destroyed by Zablocki's coup in 1976 after the agitation against the amendments to Poland's constitution at the end of 1975. The five authorised KIKs have been operating in Warsaw, Krakow, Wroclaw, Poznan and Torun for many years with a total membership of about 10,000. But with the August crisis, the KIKs' leaders saw a chance to utilise the working class upsurge to expand the scope of their activities. Mazowiecki, the editor of *Wież*, has been one of the most important advisers to Solidarity since the August strike. Like the Neo-Znak group, he has sought to achieve a reconciliation between Solidarity and the Government, opposing most of the

Solidarity strike actions, but he has done so on tactical grounds rather than on principle. He reportedly does not wish Solidarity to become a Church-controlled union — indeed relaxations between the KIK movement and the Church hierarchy are by no means always relaxed and the Episcopate insists that any priest who writes for the independent Catholic press must get the article cleared by higher authority first.


Since August the KIK movement has expanded rapidly and by January at least a dozen new Clubs had started in different cities around the country. The KIKs have provided legal advice and the use of their headquarters to Solidarity especially during the early days of the movement, when it lacked essential facilities. Relations between KIK leaders and the KOR have not always been smooth, with the former sometimes seeing KOR as a rival point of reference for young intellectuals.

The Dominicans: Though a Dominican monastic order is not, of course, a political movement, it has played an important role for a number of years in making facilities available for free intellectual debate on a wide range of issues.

KATOWICE

The Province of Katowice in Upper Silesia is the most heavily industrialised area in Poland. The great strike there at the end of August delivered the decisive blow to the Party leadership forcing it to agree to the 21 demands of Gdansk. The two big centres of the strike had been in Jastrzebie, which is a relatively recent but large mining centre and the gigantic new Huta Katowice steel complex involving some 38,000 workers. At the same time, since the signing of the Jastrzebie and Katowice Agreements there in early September, Solidarity in the region has had a very turbulent experience. One problem was the continued existence of the old official miners' union and its extremely disruptive activity. A second point of controversy was the Jastrzebie MKZ leadership under Sienkiewicz which had a strong PAX element within it and which seems to have been used to some extent by the Party apparatus to create divisions within Solidarity: Jastrzebie was encouraged to try to poach members from other regions and its leaders were also said to have sought to sow discord between Szczecin and Gdansk (without success). A third controversial figure has been Kazimierz Switon, a former political prisoner for his activity in seeking to promote independent trade unions in the province, who made a number of attacks on Jacek Kuron, one of which is in the interview that we publish below. Earlier this year, the leadership of Jastrzebie Solidarity was changed and the MKZs of Jastrzebie and Bytom merged with the Katowice

MKZ under Chairperson Andrzej Rozplochowski from Huta Katowice. The long and vivid interview below was made before these latter changes and published in the official Party weekly *Polityka*. It has been translated for Labour Focus by Ewa Barker.



Map of Katowice

We only just made it to this discussion, the threat of a rail strike hangs in the air. This morning in the station in Warsaw we heard an announcement: 'This will be the last local train travelling westwards.' Does this strike, like the hunger strikes of some Solidarity miners, have roots in the relationship with the old Unions, the so-called 'branch unions'?

Rozplochowski: There is no relationship with the branch unions. We are in the opening stages of organisation so it's difficult to talk of co-operation. Apart from that, the old unions are seeking confrontation with Solidarity and the community. They come out with demands identical to Solidarity's and introduce them into agreements with Government committees, eg. steelworkers, builders and other trade unions. We have our hands so full with our own troubles that we have no time to even think about the branch unions. As far as the railmen are concerned, there has been no official MKZ strike decision. The conflict is based on differences between agreements signed with Solidarity and the branch union.

Would you say the point is to eliminate the old union?

Cierniewski: The old unions contain people, most of them may even be honest, who may or may not join us eventually. The old unions attempt to copy Solidarity, usurping the rights which we have won for ourselves. That is, they come to the discussion table and join in a dialogue which we have initiated in order to capture a portion of the workforce. When the old unions create their own programme, gain some membership and become genuine partners in talks with the employers, then we will co-operate. At present we are talking to them about social and legal matters (Aid Funds, etc.) and nobody is doing anybody any favours. Later when they've held some elections in their organisation and become something more than an appointed group — we'll see.

The strike committees, and later Solidarity, acted in the interests of the whole community. Gdansk acted for Kielce, Solidarity acted for those who could not, or had not the courage to strike. Can you now deny anyone the right to benefit from your success?

Cierniewski: All right, but let it be a choice from below. Let the workers decide to which union they want to belong, without being

automatically assumed to be members of the old union.

Rozplochowski: Representatives of the branch unions arrive with the Government commissions and sit on their side of the table — that means something, after all. And then they produce our demands and say that they've been making them for a long time.



Andrzej Rozplochowski, Chairperson of Katowice MKZ

Was the hunger strike in Jastrzembie a form of protest against the activities of the branch unions?

Rozplochowski: No, no. We have nothing to do with this hunger strike.

Switon: We discussed this hunger strike at the meeting of the coordinating committee. If you want democracy how can you use such a tactic to try to prevent someone from organising their own conference? They shouldn't be on hunger strike because the majority of them still retain the membership of the branch union, so this union has full rights to represent them.

Cierniewski: The simplest way of resolving the question of the trade union movement in Poland would be to conduct simultaneous elections in both structures.

Waliszewski: In our biggest enterprise, the small-engined car factory (FSM), we have already had elections in both unions. Out of a workforce of 9000, 250 people have signed up for the old union. Popularity is not won by slogans but by concrete deeds. Poland now has a good climate for democracy and that is our victory. Meanwhile they're muddying the waters, causing wild cat strikes, threatening people 'if you throw in your card, you'll be the loser'. Let's see them in action, instead of imitating us.

Surely time should decide the fate of the old unions, not hunger strikes and the threat of a rail stoppage?

Rozplochowski: It is not a question of the old unions, but of the authorities which are behind them. Some important centres of power are acting in contradictory directions. On the one hand they appeal for peace, unity and work, while on the other hand they shove a stick into the anthep. In the field of wages the wishes of the workforces concerning the principles of allocation are not honoured. People are bitter, and their consciousness is so high that they won't let themselves be bought off with money. We demand guarantees of changes. It's not enough to tell us that we have to work etc. We want concrete plans for the repair of the economy. They don't need to tell us how to work, we know how. Polish labour is appreciated, even abroad. But for what and for whom? The Government must put forward concrete propositions. The proposal for the so-called 'small economic reform' is evidence that they've not drawn the correct conclusions from the present situation and are playing for time, trying to make people tired, trying to exhaust them, waiting for people eventually to turn on each other. The conservative forces in the country are counting on being able to step in with reprisals at that point, because then the community will have lost faith in Solidarity. But this is a mistaken, suicidal idea, because the community and Solidarity are one and the same. It is a broad, organised opposition and the honest majority has placed its hopes on Solidarity.

Waliszewski: Solidarity was born out of people, out of struggle, while the branch unions of the old unions were born out of Head Offices. They've often told us 'we don't know yet what the Head Office will say' whereas on the shop floor we don't have to wait for decisions and proposals.

Let's go back to this exhaustion. I don't know if anybody is consciously counting on it, but it is a fact that in Poland everything is quick to heat up and quick to cool down again. Can you ignore the growing bitterness with 'things in general' and with the longing for 'some strong hand to pull it all back into line'?

Cierniewski: Solidarity has completed the stage of making demands, but to a serious extent they have not yet been fulfilled. We want to force the honest members of the Government to present us with real data, eg. the number of Catholics in Poland — we have only had silence on this score — or the data on economic plans and wages. It's well known that if they changed the wages structure in mining, many problems could be avoided. The ministry knows about this and the structure is to be changed in March. But people don't want to wait that long, it's procrastination, they ought at least to publish the preparatory material. Similarly, they want to modify the free Saturday plans on the principle of making up the time lost. There are still people in this country who don't want to put our house in order.

The Government often acts sluggishly, too slow...

Cierniewski: We didn't say 'Government' we said 'dishonest people' ...

... yes, but the ministers have become firemen, rushing from blaze to blaze. Here a rumpus, there a strike, elsewhere a hunger strike, while undertaking to change the wage structure or carry through the 'small economic reform' is not something that can be done in a day, especially on the basis of present habits and with the existing apparatus. On what grounds do you criticise the small economic reform project?

Rozplochowski: First of all the membership of the team which put it together. These are people who haven't a clue about the correct way to organise work. In essence they're the same people who've run our economy up till now while the genuinely respected experts who have put forward constructive propositions have not been invited. The team ought to be formed from people who have the backing of the community, because there is no trust in those others and no one believes that they're capable of sensible ideas.

Who would you like to see on the committee?

Rozplochowski: Well, at least Dr. Stefan Kurowski from Warsaw — surely he's an economist of European stature.

Who else?



Kazimierz Switon, secretary of Katowice MKZ, whose attack on Kuron in this interview caused widespread protests within Solidarity. He is pictured here with Lech Walesa (centre) and Marian Jurczyk (right).

Cierniewski: My dear Mr Editor, after all, entire plans for protection of the environment exist, which have never even seen the light of day!

What other economists would you like to see on the Reform Committee?

Rozplochowski: If it turns out to be necessary Solidarity can present names of people from each region together with propositions which they have to put forward.

Switon: I think their point is to make the organisation of our union more difficult for us. The authorities know full well what professionals are available in Poland, who are the people who could do something. Yet nothing is done so the policy is deliberate.

So much for the personnel. What are your reservations about the merits of the 'small reform' as such.

Cierniewski: As far as the merits of the plans are concerned, I don't believe it possible that someone who was a good man for

the job in '58 can be good at each stage. That undermines the trust in the people at the top. The community knows in any case who was honest and good, and we can express it. But if we have somebody who has lasted through all the stages, was always considered good but his results were not good — then the community has a right not to trust him.

Rozplochowski: We cannot be drawn into a situation of letting the Government come to us and ask what we, Solidarity, propose for the economic reforms. That is not our business. They are trying to saddle us with sharing the government and responsibility for this country. We can do it as individual citizens, but not as the union. That's what we have a Government for, and on that score they will have to give an account of themselves. I would see it this way: let us open a list if you like, of people who have some authority and could propose rapid, concrete, basic economic reforms. In this case we cannot talk of renewal but of rebuilding, building quite new economic mechanisms. The State must reveal the realities of the budget — where, how much, for what: the concrete details of our debts, not 20 billion in all, but to whom, for what, when.

Cierniewski: Generally we don't know what they're talking about.

Rozplochowski: Until we have openness we will not be led out in the field by mere declarations. You mentioned these trouble spots, strikes here and there in the country. This is not the result of Solidarity's anarchy, but of deliberate Government activity. Under the banner of Solidarity, in its rank and file, they plant people whose aim is to disrupt, to make trouble.

Can you give a concrete example?

Waliszewski: That's not so simple.

Switon: An example of such activity can be the case of a headquarters for Solidarity-Jastrzombie here in Katowice. We want to have one MKZ, one territorial union divided on the basis of regions, yet here someone else gets granted a building. Who's doing this?

But are the Jastrzombie people not members of Solidarity?

Switon: Yes, they too are Solidarity, but they want to assume control of the whole of Silesia.

Waliszewski: There's no point in talking about it since the people from Jastrzombie have not come to join this conversation.

We were waiting with that question in the hope that they would arrive, but even without them it is important to raise the matter.

Cierniewski: Perhaps we will still wait for them, but we have another example of Government activities. They say that some investments have to be halted. All right, but if they unilaterally decide to halt work in the coal fields and lowlands of Lublin, then that amounts to an attempt to provoke a strike there. What will happen to the thousands of people? If construction work is halted for 5 years, who will call certain people to account for matters which qualify to be brought before the public prosecutor? You have to explain to the workforce what the situation is and why these decisions have been made.

Just now you talked about the high level of consciousness among people. Do you think that people don't know that there is no money to continue these investments? Is there any group of workers who will agree to the withdrawal of an investment from which they made their living?

Cierniewski: Of course, but the justifications have to be explained. The United Mining Construction Workers have been in a state of warning strike since the 12th of November. Today, the 24th, no one has opened any negotiations.

Are they striking because they are afraid of losing their jobs?

Cierniewski: They want to know the basis of limiting the investments, what solutions there are.

But what about the principle. Do you agree that there must be cuts in investment? If so, what should happen to these people?



Bytom miners during the 3 October strike.

Rozplochowski: The Government cannot just cut investment and consider that the end of the matter. There is domestic housing being built there, there are people involved. You can't disrupt communities like that. The Government, as the representative organ of the community must act in accordance with the community's wishes. You have to tell people how much has been spent on the investment to date, how much it would cost to continue it, why it is being discontinued and then give the people work and the same conditions, because that is what a trade union fights for. And what about the apartments? If someone has already been allocated one, will they have to go back to the other end of Poland and carry on waiting? We are not robots, to be treated like this. Every man is a creative, live being.

Switon: And on accommodation, we have put forward a proposal that the headquarters of the county police, now being completed, be converted into a hospital. In a situation of universal shortage you have to look at all possibilities.

How do you view the proportions of your activity spent on the shopfloor and at the national level? You reject joint responsibility for Government yet you express yourselves on the matter of the Committee and the small reform — at some level you do, after all, involves yourselves.

Cierniewski: That is a matter of expressing opinions, of opposing economic plans.

Rozplochowski: We will not be answerable for it, but we do have the right to express opinions, draw conclusions, oppose what is evil and express satisfaction with anything the Government does well. We claim the right to speak on all matters.

Let us return to the Lublin lowlands. The responsibility for frittering away much investment and the impossibility of carrying that investment through rests with the Government. But since this situation exists is it possible to break off the investment plans painlessly, is there a way out which does not involve conflict?

Rozplochowski: Damage has to be done, but you have to consult with the people affected, even in the wretched Lublin lowlands.

But no one is capable of obtaining their consent to the closure of this investment, not the Government, not Walesa, not even a Saint. No one will say: 'come on lads, let's pack up, leave for God knows where. Walesa told us the countryside needs people. We've also heard of emigration ...'

Rozplochowski: Here in Silesia the mining industry is also short of people. They've come here from all over the country. Why couldn't they return to their own places and we could then take the men released from the interrupted investments. When development in Silesia was being forced, other parts of the country were collapsing for want of labour, people are needed

there.

Switon: Lots of people will have to be retrained. Walesa is right when he says the countryside needs people.

Johanowicz: Round our way, in Silesian Siemianowice we have a shortage of building professionals. It would be a shame to let these people return to the villages. We recruit bricklayers, plumbers, carpenters from the whole of Poland. Unskilled workers can go to farming, because that's where manpower is needed, but we can employ the skilled people, give them apartments.

If Solidarity is convinced of the need for an unpopular measure eg. breaking off investments or raising the price of certain articles so that others need not become more expensive, will it say so loudly and give support to such decisions?

Rozplochowski: Solidarity will always express the will of its membership, that majority which has joined our organisation.

The majority may not accept any price rises at all.

Rozplochowski: To develop our opinions we are creating our own centre for social studies. We will be working this out and examining these things sensibly.

Whose job is it to inform the community of unpopular things, that we can't keep on shortening working hours, that this has to get more expensive and that has to wait?

Rozplochowski: If the community knows that the Government is pursuing sensible economic policies then nobody will make unrealistic demands and everyone will understand the needs of the day.

Let us now move to internal Solidarity matters. How do the specific details of your activity in Silesia differ from, for example, those on the coast and what is your relationship with Solidarity in Jastrzembie, whose representatives, unfortunately, have not come to this meeting.

Rozplochowski: Gentlemen, you are at the moment in the headquarters of MKZ Katowice and we will express our opinions to you. If you want to know about MKZ Jastrzembie then please go and talk to them.

You do not know why they are not here?

Rozplochowski: No. It's possible to speculate. Giving them a headquarters here points to the disruptive activities of some cells, which specialise in sabotage inside Solidarity. Some people are sed, inspired, pulled around by their noses.

You exclude the possibility of a genuine difference of opinion?

Rozplochowski: No, but that would be revealed at the National Co-ordinating Committee, and a joint programme would be decided there. As far as Katowice is concerned, our position does not differ from that taken by Gdansk and others.

But surely the specific qualities of this region and its people must emerge and shape the activities of Solidarity here.

Rozplochowski: That mentality, separatism, is especially encouraged by the Government. It's the special domain of Messrs Brek and Gruzdien, a division into Silesia and the rest. Especially perfidious was the way people were bribed via their stomachs, because this was the only region where you could buy a piece of sausage or other goods. We want to smash this barrier, it does not exist and never will.

Mr. Switon, how is it that the largest concentration of the working class did not take part in the protests of 1970 and equally before and after that date things were more peaceful here than in some other regions? As a veteran of the movement for independent trade unions, what is your opinion of this question?

Switon: You yourselves must know the cost, in sacrifice and harassment, of creating a nucleus of this movement in Silesia.

This movement originated in Silesia, and not, as was reported by someone in the 'Western Daily' with the backing of KOR. That's not true. This movement started here independently, with only the help of the movement for civil and human rights (ROPCiO). It was started by eight people, on my initiative incidentally, in order to reach the exploited working class of Silesia. I don't really have to tell you that it is difficult to devise a system in mining worse than the 4-shift system. Miners' entire families would revolt against it and if the existing unions did not defend them, it was up to us to make people aware that they could organise themselves on the basis of Pt.87 of the ILO Convention. The authorities did not want independent trade unions to arise, especially here. It is known that on the coast, even after the events of 1970 such unions were not established, not until two months after we had given a lead. There these unions did indeed base themselves on KOR activity, but not here in Katowice.

One of our contacts revealed to us that in February Lech Walesa told him: 'I believe such a union will one day arise in Poland, but not in my lifetime.'

Switon: He belonged to them and he said that? He did not say it to me. Perhaps he said it because it was then only a tiny seed. Lots of people, especially members of the Warsaw intelligentsia, used to laugh at me and say that Switon was mad.

After Gdansk and Szczecin, Silesia started to move, but not the older miners with traditions in GOP, but on the contrary, Jastrzembie and Huta Katowice where the majority were workers newly arrived in the region, young in years and status.'

Switon: I know the mentality of these people. It's true that they are afraid and don't want to take risks. I was always surprised when risings came to Silesia. We organised these unions for 2½ years and quite frankly we only had one Silesian, Roman K., who, by the way, now spits at me, but that's not important.

And where do you come from?

Switon: From Katowice. I knew from experience that the movement could only be taken up by people newly-arrived in Silesia. Look at our MKZs and ZKR's, they're all young people. I'm one of the eldest by about 20 years.

Rozplochowski: The strike in the steelworks had nothing to do with our friend Kazimierz. After three days of strike we fetched him in secret in the middle of the night from his house so that he could help us as a theoretician of this movement. I'm not a Silesian either. I was born in Gdansk and raised in Kujawy.

Well now we're on the subject perhaps you could all tell me a few words about yourselves.

Rozplochowski: I'm 30, a car mechanic and engine driver. I'm finishing a higher education course for mature students.

Johanowicz: I'm an administration worker in Siemianowice. I was born in Lodz and have been here for ten years. I'm studying the education of work at the University of Silesia. I'm 38.

Waliszewski: I was born in Gdansk and lived there for 23 years. For four years I've been at the FSM (small-engined car factory) in Tychy. I qualified at the Polytechnic in Gdansk as an electronic engineer. I wanted to say that the FSM struck on the night of 28-29 August and its labour force is 95% non-Silesian.

Osinski: I'm 32, although I was born in the Kujawy, I was raised in Grudziadz in the Pomorze (coastal) region. I'm a maintenance plumber. We have no Silesian comrades amongst our strike leadership.

And Mr. Kazimierz?

Switon: I'm 49, born in Katowice, a radio-mechanic. I once had a radio and television workshop but they took it away from me. I have six children, four sons and two daughters.

That is the norm for a working class activist these days. Is it true that two currents have become discernible in Solidarity, the radical and the moderate? Two of our interviewees from Szczecin have resigned, not being able to accept the direction the movement is taking.

Osinski: Unfortunately an error of tactics was committed there. At the meeting of the National Committee in Szczecin Mr. Kuron sat with the presidium, presumably as an advisor ...

Rozplochowski: It was not an error of tactics, nor was it a mistake. Walesa has always said, right from the beginning that Gdansk has three groups of advisors, the primate, Mazowiecki and Kuron. As Poles we have no right to reject any group of people just for the views they hold, provided they mean well.

But do these two currents exist?

Rozplochowski: That's probably something created by the authorities, as a further element of their divide and rule tactic.

Switon: The authorities must realise that in any system, however good it is, the unions stand in opposition to the authorities. It can't be any other way, for there is no Government which will give the unions all that they demand.

Do you discuss the question of turning Solidarity into a political movement?

Switon: No chance. The Trade Union movement must be apolitical.

Are there people who, by their actions, in practice are moving it in that direction?

Johanowicz: Perhaps there are such people. You can feel that there are those who would like it if the union, apart from defending workers' interests, moved into a wider arena. But at this moment, we, as activists ...

Switon: trade union activists ...

Johanowicz: ... as trade union activists, have to make people conscious of the fact that we can't play party politics because that's not what Solidarity was created for.

Rozplochowski: The constitutions guarantees the freedom of organisation, and that is also the subject of international conventions. Our major source of weakness was the monolith. As trade unionists we make trade unions, but we cannot forbid others to organise on a different basis for the good of Poland. If they do not find support amongst the people of our nation they will die a natural death.



'Of course, I have confidence in you,' said the bureaucrat. (Cartoon from *Kommunikat*.)

Do you consider that here, at this time, elections can decide this question?

Rozplochowski: Of course.

Osinski: These are political matters. Let us leave them. Presumably what you're concerned about is whether we have any aims to overturn socialism. Let's ask, what is the basis of socialism? The working class. Solidarity also has this basis.

Rozplochowski: What is socialism anyway, is it the system that for 36 years we've had ...

Osinski: If anyone is afraid that socialism will be abolished, they either fail to understand socialism, or think that the deformations should continue as a compulsory feature.

Switon: We'll talk of economic matters, and not express our opinions on political questions.

Sometimes it's difficult to draw a line between them.

Switon: Politics is striving for power. We, as founders of the first independent trade union in Katowice since the war, decided from the outset that it was to be an apolitical organisation. That is why I opposed the acceptance of Borusewicz into the MKZ in Gdansk, because as a political activist, he ought not to be active in the unions. And now I am against Kuron's presence at the praesidium table. People involved in active politics should keep out of union matters.

Johanowicz: Kazik, I'm one hundred per cent behind you on this. It is even declared in our statutes that we are an apolitical organisation and that people who want to act in the political sphere and govern should find their field of activity in another organisation. We do not want to govern, that's what the Government of Prime Minister Pinkowski is for, the party takes care of ideological matters and we take care of workers' interests. Let each organisation act in its own field.

But whatever name you give it, if you keep on saying no, no, no, in the name of 10 million people and back it with the threat of strike then you can topple the Government, without being a political organisation in name.

Switon: The government can change while the system does not.

In your opinion, do people want a socialist system?

Rozplochowski: Of course, the answer is yes, but a real, genuine, just one.

People do not want a return to capitalism, so that it will be like the West?

Osinski: I've never met it anywhere.

Switon: As a radio-mechanic I visited a lot of people's houses where they talk more freely. I created the unions on the basis of what I heard and I can say that people do not want to change the socialist system, they only want to mend it. They want to participate in government and they want an organisation which will guarantee that right for them.

Since we are talking about democracy, how do you resolve the differences of opinion between Solidarity at the Katowice steelworks and the MKZ in Jastrzembie? What are they based on?

Switon: These differences started on the 13th of September. We went to Jastrzembie to see how they organise their activity ... What is happening in this region and what methods are being applied is not a matter of indifference to me since I have spent many hours on the boards in jail thinking about the union in great detail. We saw then, that the lads in Jastrzembie were making one big mistake. They were not asking people to sign out of the old unions, but accepting them into Solidarity on a simple declaration of intent. The statutes still didn't exist at that time, but I was of the opinion that a person could only belong to one union and later this was confirmed by the statutes. It turned out that I was right, for since Jastrzembie was not signing people out of the old union the old union could go ahead and call itself a conference. And that was the beginning.

Rozplochowski: Jastrzembie doesn't talk to us, but it talks with the Party, and it's done that from the very beginning. We do not deny the Party, but until it gets itself cleaned up, until it renews itself, until it gains people's confidence — we will not talk to it.

Switon: Apart from the person of Grudzien, nothing has changed here. The prosecutors who condemned me, surely they ought to stand down. They are kept on just to annoy us. Only last Thursday they stopped our people and kept them under arrest for 2-3 hours for distributing the 'Free Unionist'.

Rozplochowski: We can see a hardening of attitudes developing. For example, as you probably already know we had a row over the so-called squat on the new housing estates in

Sosnowiec. These apartments had stood empty for six months. A squat was organised, people were directed into the flats, some here, some there, there were even Xerox copies of documents purporting to prove that it was a Solidarity action, signed 'Andrew', ie. with my name. We had nothing to do with it! And when people had already settled in an eviction took place. Police lorries arrived, they wanted to throw people out, children, furniture and all. Only then did the Katowice steelworks Solidarity committee ...

Were these flats built to house steel workers?

Rozplochowski: Among others. Anyway the chairman protested at the methods of this eviction and then there was a fuss that Solidarity is backing lawlessness. Probably that was the point of the whole exercise. And now, a few moments ago I was informed that there had been a call from the Sosnowiec president postponing our appointed meeting for tomorrow and changing the subject to be discussed: they can discuss grievances, but not the eviction itself. As a result about 20 women from the evicted families have come to the steelworks and begun a hunger strike, until the matter is brought under control.

Perhaps these apartments were allocated to other, equally needy families?

Rozplochowski: That is something we don't know, but we do know the kind of swindles that went on in housing.

You claim you had nothing to do with the squat?

Rozplochowski: Nothing. They wanted to mix us up in it. A month ago the Assistant Mayor of Katowice, Wnuk, at a meeting with the vice-president Kopec said that if anyone found an empty flat, they could move in and get it sorted out for themselves. We heard that. And now the Sosnowiec president ... there you are ... I really don't know what we're going to do with these twenty women.

You accuse the authorities of contradictory actions, yet the authorities accuse you of exactly the same. They maintain that they negotiate with one unit of Solidarity, arrive at some common agreements and then another unit will ignore these agreements. Your statutes even forbid higher level bodies to interfere in the affairs of lower level bodies. So what kind of partner are you?

Rozplochowski: At the last National Co-ordinating Committee we decided which sectors are the most important ones on a national level: teachers, health workers, sugar refiners (they've been on strike for the last couple of weeks after all), textile workers and light engineering generally. Their cases must be settled immediately. Others will have to wait and nobody is to jump the gun or demand the arrival of the Government Commission to open negotiations.

But what guarantees are there that other groups of workers will obey this and wait. It's only an appeal, after all. Supposing a drawing pin factory in Middle Wallop wants to go on strike, what's to stop it?

Rozplochowski: Well no, not all at once. The statutes lay down that you have to take the matter to the regional office first of all, that the majority of the workforce has decided this and that its will is expressed at a mass meeting ...

Waliszewski: If it's a factory matter then they can strike, if it affects the region or even the whole of Poland, then they can't. We think, and it's useful if the directors know this, it is not necessary to strike against the dictatorial and despotic decisions of the director. It is enough to replace him, painlessly, with someone else. Wider strikes, on the other hand, we will organise only in the case of Government decisions which go against the feelings of the community.

Do you think though, that, for a society in our situation, the ultimate weapon is too often employed? Strikes, hunger strikes—surely this weapon cannot be used too often, or it will become too commonplace. And apart from the causes which reach back over the last 10, or even 35 years, we also have a bad harvest and the chaos of the new post-August period.

Rozplochowski: I cannot accept such explanations. Bad harvests occur everywhere and people manage somehow. The chief fault lies in the incompetence of the Government. As for the hunger strikes ...? It's difficult to talk people who are in despair out of them. I try to put myself in the situation of those people, as you put it, in Middle Wallop. No one wants to talk to them, yet they want to draw attention to themselves, to declare that they exist, that they too ought to count for something. Some acts of violent protest are caused by the authorities themselves, with provocation and pressure.

Do you think that chaos is in the interests of the authorities?

Rozplochowski: We reckon that it's at least partly true. The authorities prefer an atmosphere of confrontation and excitement.

Is this your opinion of the whole government? Do you not see any allies there?

Switon: They say that the new first secretary of the Katowice district Andrzej Zabinski wants to establish democratic relationships. We find it difficult to judge him, since we have not talked to him. But what can he do by himself anyway? Apart from him there are no changes in the personnel of the Katowice authorities.



MA

SPELNIAMY WASZE ZYCIENIA!

'We're honouring your Agreement!' From the Warski shipyard workers' bulletin *Kommunikat*.

Do you think that the conditions for co-operation are less favourable here than in other regions? During our interviews with the MKZ organisations in Gdansk and Szczecin we learned that your colleagues were rather pleased with their local agreements, even though neither J Brych nor T Fiszbach were new secretaries.

Rozplochowski: Perhaps there the strike movement left them with a lasting impression of strength. Here it is different and our situation hasn't changed much.

Switon: Perhaps that's an exaggeration. Before August I was continually stopped, whereas now I act freely, I travel around, I write, attend meetings and say whatever seems to me appropriate.

Are there party members among you?

Switon: Yes, our six-member MKZ praesidium has two party people.

Cierniewski: I am in the party.

Waliszewski: Whereas in Tychy we don't have any.

We would like to ask you now about coal. On the one hand there are the free Saturdays and Sundays, on the other the coal and financial balances of the country.

Rozplochowski: The fall in the quantity of coal is not the result of free Saturdays, nor the decision to abandon the four brigade system — but of the realistic accounting of what is extracted. The statistics used to be falsified, and you can't use the paper on which all those glowing reports were written as fuel.

Let's talk of the coal which has been genuinely extracted. Won't there be less of it now?

Cierniewski: In the short term — yes. Coal extraction was carried on during all the so-called days of rest. But it was carried on by plunder, without regard to cost. Expensive equipment was buried underground, the plant was not maintained, consequently causing conditions which paralysed operations for a fortnight or a week at a time.

How should it be done?

Cierniewski: In my opinion we should have four shifts, but not four brigades. One of the shifts should be engaged not on extraction, but in maintenance work and preventive measures against subsidence. Such measures look beautiful on paper, but there is never any time to actually carry them out.

Switon: In the light of this, the decision to halt the development of the Lublin lowlands seems very strange. If there is such a shortage of coal, then in my opinion the matter should have been treated quite differently.

How can the shortage of coal be compensated, if the investments will have to be put aside for the time being?

Rozplochowski: But we have already said that much of the coal which used to be extracted was a fiction. In one of the mines the director even ordered the construction of a machine which mixed coal with stones. It was tonnage which was dug, not calories.

Now we will have less tonnage, but also less calories. Less coal.

Rozplochowski: Well then, less must be sold.

And what will we use to pay off our debts? After all you're meant to be defending not only the miners' interests, but also the interests of other professions, the whole community.

Switon: We even make appeals for better performance at work. Everyone will understand you first have to work and then you can divide the profits of it.

Waliszewski: There would certainly be more coal if the work was better organised.

The chief method of persuading miners to work harder used to be, as you yourselves have pointed out, through their stomachs, which actually made some people resentful of Silesia. What do you think about this?

Waliszewski: There should be equality. Poland is all one.

Switon: I would allow privileges like more sanatoriums, because the work is harmful to your health. At a pinch I suppose slightly stocked shops ... But then, why should other people have why should a country which could be self-sufficient in food ... port it as well, suffer shortages?

The questions of how much we produce and how this should be divided are slightly separate. Meat rationing is soon to be introduced and the plan is to give miners an extra kilogramme a month. Do you think this is right?

Switon: We don't know this. We haven't discussed it.

Waliszewski: We would have to know exactly how much meat there is in all, how much of that is to be allocated and what each person's share comes to. As it is, who knows?

Forgive me, gentlemen, there has been so much written on this topic lately, you only have to pick up any newspaper ...

Waliszewski: But how are we to know if it's true?

Well, what can you trust?

Rozplochowski: If the data was given to some objective commission ...

A commission could also say it didn't know if the data was true. We understand lack of trust, but this does not change our question, should the shares be equal or should miners be privileged?

Switon: That is not our business, let the miners speak out on this one.

Can you suspect that they will want less, when they can get more?

Switon: We don't know.

You don't want to get on the wrong side of anyone do you? Neither the miners, nor the workers. You prefer to leave the unpleasant decisions to someone else.

Rozplochowski: It would be against the principles of our union to express an opinion without consulting the interested parties.

And your personal opinion?

Rozplochowski: Let's leave my opinion out of it, that is not the point.

Waliszewski: But on the subject of privilege, a farming co-operative approached our director and suggested: 'You can have as many potatoes as you like at official prices, but give us three coupons for a baby Fiat 126. The director approached us, as Solidarity, for an opinion. We discussed it and came out categorically against. If we are to clean up, let's start with our own back yard. The miners in Jastrzembie also gave up their pit shops, which were better stocked.

Switon: There you are, so why do you assume in advance that they will not give up a privileged meat ration?

One of you said that there is one Poland. In our previous conversations with Solidarity we have often heard the argument that since we're all Poles, we'll manage to agree somehow. There are some questions, however, where Polishness does not see to help much. For example, Polish shop assistants want the shops to shut on free Saturdays, while Polish customers want them open.

Switon: I think Saturdays should be free for everyone.

If there are consultations over this question, will you take a clear line on this? Will you say this in opposition to the interests of the consumers?

Switon: If this is the position we reach at the National Committee ...

Rozplochowski: But only on condition that there will be normal supplies available and that shopping can be done on Fridays.

What do you think about the Katowice steelworks and its expansion? For many Poles it is a symbol of economic gigantomania — for you it is your place of work.

Rozplochowski: That is a matter that must be looked at by honest impartial professionals. It would be idiotic to put a bomb under it, as someone has suggested.

But should it be expanded?

Rozplochowski: It's difficult to say without the necessary expertise. How much materials the plant has already got ready, what we will lose if we give up the third furnace .. It has to be worked out by economists, but not the ones who want to dilute the question, but honest, impartial ones.

At lot is being said these days about calling people to account, and a lot about building; the past and the future. Can we reconcile these matters, since every attempt at

making peace is suspected as an attempt to paper over the cracks.

Cierniewski: We are not after a witch-hunt against this or that person. We want a climate of honesty. It's true, we have evidence against many individuals, but we will leave that up to the investigation and prosecution departments. We will see how they get on.

Rozplochowski: Each case has to be considered separately, so that injustices are not committed, but accounts have to be made. Too much of this sort of thing has accumulated. If people steal and then calmly leave the country ... The border between breaking the law and exploiting it is fluid, if someone has taken advantage of his position and connections to make personal gains, he may be all right with the law, but not with us.

Cierniewski: The calibre of incidents varies. If someone in the mines gets some fitted furniture built for himself then it is, after all, just a trifle. But if through a wrong decision he wastes 10,000 tons of coal then the matter is more serious.

Switon: I think that all salaries should be made public, from top to bottom. Then everyone could work out what people could afford. Wages in the party apparatus are said to be quite low, but it was common for them to live like kings.

Waliszewski: Wages should be decided by parliament.

What differentials and levels of wages would be approved by the community? For example, how much should the director of a mine get — 20,000 zlotys?

Switon: Oh! They could get 20,000 legally, but what about the bonuses?

Waliszewski: There were cases of mine directors getting more in a year in bonuses than in wages.

Would such a sum, 20,000, be tolerated?

Rozplochowski: First of all, you'd have to decide the minimum, what is the lowest wage, and then how many times bigger can you make the highest. That's how they do it in Sweden.

What do you think of the continuing pressure for wage rises? Some say that their wages are below average so they demand parity, others say that maybe they are above the average, but if they don't get a rise there will be a flow of people out of their trade. In the end we're dividing up little worthless bits of paper.

Cierniewski: Do you understand Solidarity's basic policy on wages? I believe everyone should get a rise because of the increase in the cost of living, but the rises should be equal, or those who earn less should get the biggest rises, never the other way round. In mining we have got a rise in wage rates, but a very small rise in earnings, because it depends on the number of days worked and that has decreased.

But we are not just concerned with the miners! Do you not think that too much has been promised on a national scale? Perhaps the question of rises should be renegotiated?

Rozplochowski: That may not be impossible, but we must know more. We approached the then minister, Mrs. Milczarek, on 18 November to give us an account on the 19th ...

You give short deadlines, it must be admitted.

Rozplochowski: But they have these things in the ministry! A list of where, in which branches, the negotiations have already taken place, where they are in progress and where they have yet to begin. Because it's not true that new demands keep being made. Often it's just the same things, guaranteed by the agreements made on the coast. Madame Minister did not give us a reply, perhaps that's why she is no longer a minister. We want to unify and level the wages system, so that the strongest sections do not pull the greatest rises for themselves, leaving nothing in the kitty for the weakest.

Would you accept the setting up of a mixed Commission, composed of Solidarity and Government representatives ...

Rozplochowski: No, not a mixed commission.

And who is to put forward the proposals that have to be accepted by the community and digested by the treasury.

Rozplochowski: It's the Government who started the race to the kitty. Lublin struck back in July — and got some, then in the August the coast struck — and got some, in September, Silesia — and again they talked of wage rises.

The old management attempted to buy off the pressure with banknotes, and it didn't work. We ask you, is a renegotiation of the Gdansk agreement on the question of wages possible, or is it holy untouchable writ?

Cierniewski: We can discuss it, but only in the framework of a general restructuring of the wages system. First of all, a plumber working for PGR cannot earn a different wage from a shipyard plumber. Secondly you have to delimit how much the top salary is going to differ from the bottom.

Rozplochowski: Let us build such a wages structure, we'll add something for harmful conditions, changing the gang-wage agreements. Yes, please, we'll talk about that sort of thing.

Waliszewski: But that won't be so simple. Those that have already got substantial rises will not be keen to give them up.

Precisely! And who will tell them that they've got to give them up?

Rozplochowski: That is a matter for the future. For the time being let the Government honour its pledge made in point 8 of the Gdansk agreement, and we will approach the government with proposals when the new round of collective bargaining begins next year.

Will our crumbling market last till next year, behind the fragile line of defending Turkish tea, vinegar and macaroni?

Cierniewski: How can we help, when we don't know what the situation is?

Switon: We have the ability to help, but only if the Government stops getting in our way. If we are to take control of the wave of wildcat demands, we have to organise ourselves, to recover our balance, to have access to the media — and not be continually treated as the fifth wheel on a cart!

Are the fears of the Government to let you have access to the media totally unjustified? It must be asking itself: who will be the editor of your paper, Switon or Kuron? Will it be a union organ or a political one?

Cierniewski: Why have the attacks on Kuron stopped ever since he sat at the presidium table at the National Co-ordinating Committee of Solidarity?

You've answered your own question. It's because he sat at the praesidium table. The authorities are trying to avoid conflict with Solidarity, but that does not mean that they have made their peace with Kuron. Who sits on the praesidium is a question for your side.

Switon: I think it was either stupidity or provocation. We demonstrate that we are an apolitical union and then we allow a person who is manifestly political to sit on the praesidium.

Rozplochowski: Nevertheless my opinion is that the main reason for making access to the media difficult for us is the fear that if we were to have our own way — we would unmask all the wrongdoings and mistakes.

The foreign press says that the situation in Poland is dangerous. Do you share this view?

Rozplochowski: Yes, it's grave because of the fault of the authorities. There are still many people there who don't want to do what's right, even at the cost of chaos. Solidarity's line is based on the whole community, while these people have a line based on their fear of losing their positions.

Perhaps not only that. Perhaps there are also international agreements, and our duties towards our allies?

Rozplochowski: But we have no desire to touch them. If we are

to seek a compromise, who is to make the concessions? The overwhelming majority or a few individuals?

Cierniewski: If we could, we would prove the accusations that Solidarity is against Socialism to be totally baseless — because such accusations are being made, even if they are wrapped in cotton wool. If we could, we would prove that we only want a better socialism.

Rozplochowski: The community only rejects the kind of socialism represented by the old regime.

When you decide on large-scale actions, do you consider how they must look from outside, from the capitals of our allies?

Rozplochowski: What are they afraid of? We're tidying up our own back yard, in our sovereign state.

Cierniewski: After all we also want to be governed by communists. Communists, but not pseudo-communists, who hide

their own private interests behind the party banner.

Switon: But I agree up to a point, that if we are to pass for an apolitical union, political activists should not enter our governing bodies.

Neither the Soviet Union, nor Czechoslovakia, nor the GDR care if we confiscate corruptly obtained villas. But they do care if the execution of certain agreements made with the Government is called into question. If you demand of the Government that it is responsible, surely it ought to concern you as well.

Waliszewski: And are we not concerned? When we struck at the FSM, did we not listen to persuasion that it might turn into something more serious?

Rozplochowski: We don't want to arouse any fears, but nor do we want to abandon the work we have undertaken.

WALBRZYCH



(Photo: Pawel Malko, Warszawa.)

Miners on strike at the Maurice Thorez Mine in Walbrzych.

Building Solidarity in Walbrzych: Problems of Working Class Unity — By Oliver MacDonald

(The following article owes a great deal to a talk with Jan Litynski, KOR member and founder and editor of Robotnik, to whom the official media of Eastern Europe pay tribute for his vision and determination over recent years in helping to keep alive the idea of independent trade unions by vilifying him and his fellow KOR members. Needless to say he is not responsible for any of the opinions expressed here.)

Walbrzych is the capital of the province of the same name in the region, known as Lower Silesia. It has a population of some

150,000 but the region around it includes Swidnica, 25 kms away with 60,000 people and many other towns of between 10 and 30,000, all heavily industrialised.

In Walbrzych itself there are three coal mines and there is a fourth in Nowa Ruda some 35kms away. These employ more than 25,000 miners, working in some of the most difficult mining conditions in the whole of Europe. The coal is very high quality anthracite but special geological conditions make extraction very difficult and also very dangerous: often the miners must work

lying down to dig the extremely narrow seams.

The area is also a centre of the production of pre-fabricated parts for the building industry. Some 25,000 workers are involved in such work. Swidnica contains a number of engineering factories each employing about 2,000 or 3,000 workers and the other small towns typically centre on factories involving between 800 and 1,000 workers.

One special feature of Walbrzych is the fact that many of the miners came there from France and Belgium after the war and those that came were very largely either

Communist workers or sympathetic to the party. Other parts of the population came from the former Polish territories in the East, now incorporated in the USSR.

These social factors are said to have given the Party a strong base in the area without a tradition of strikes or social disturbances. After the launching of the unofficial workers' paper **Robotnik** in autumn 1977 an electronics factory worker in Walbrzych, Jacek Pilchowski, joined the paper's editorial board and distributed the paper locally with a small group of comrades. But they remained fairly isolated — there was, for example, some unrest and even strikes before the August upheaval which the **Robotnik** group did not learn about.

In the 1960s and early 1970s the miners were in a very good material position compared to other sections of workers. But more recently this superiority has been eroded. Miners' wages: good wages for face workers — 12-14,000 zlotys, for surface workers 8-9,000 zlotys. Jurek Szulc, Chairman of MKZ, is a miner. His monthly wage packet was 10,000 zl. for 31.3 hours. A textile worker in the area on the other hand would get 7-8,000 zl.

The movement began in Walbrzych on 27 August, at the height of the Gdansk struggle. Miners in one of the two coal fields of the Thorez mine struck, both in solidarity with Gdansk and for their own demands. The very next day there was practically a general strike in the city with about 28-30 factories out and with a united strike committee being established — an MKS, to use the Polish initials. Workers in factories in the smaller towns in the region sent messages and delegations of solidarity with the Walbrzych workers but tended not to strike themselves.

The strike suddenly stopped on Monday, 1 September, the day after the signing of the Gdansk agreements. The reason for the sudden end of the strike without a local agreement being negotiated remains obscure, especially as miners' strikes have a reputation of being very difficult to stop once they get going. But it seems that there was a sudden, widely believed rumour that the Russians had invaded the country: a wave of fear swept the city and the workers called off the strike.

After the end of the strike the MKS became the organising nucleus of the new union while during September the movement of local strikes continued. These were over all sorts of specific issues. On 10 September, for example, a strike broke out in a frozen food factory employing about 200 workers, mainly women. The factory hadn't struck before and the workers raised about 20 demands. Some concerned the working conditions of the women preparing the frozen vegetables and meat — these were really appalling. They also attacked the three-shift system which is very general, and hits married women hard (it is a special problem in the textile industry). Another question was the special supply of meat that the workers were receiving: up till then this was being given more or less under the counter, with a nod and a wink from management, but the workers were

demanding that it be handled in an official way. But the main demand was for higher wages. The factory was part of a larger enterprise with its headquarters in Wroclaw and a mass meeting was held after with the local manager and also the chief manager from Wroclaw in attendance. For the first time ever, the workers were able to speak up and denounce the local manager who, very tense, hit back attacking individual workers by name. Some of the workers retreated in the face of his threats, others came forward with very sharp, strong criticisms of him. Meanwhile the Wroclaw chief was very friendly and 'reasonable' — a typical scene in many factories where the workers were first gaining strength. The strike ended after two days with the workers gaining a small wage rise and a promise to meet their other demands. In this as in other cases the MKS leadership was directly involved in assisting the strikes and the negotiations.

During these struggles in September the miners' problems loomed large. First of all, there was the 4-brigade system of work, a rotating shift system involving six days work a week at irregular times of the day or night. It involved the miners having rest period which didn't correspond to those of their families and friends. When this is added to the fact that the miners in practice had to work 7 days a week, we find a nightmarish cycle of labour.

Linked to an ever increasing work pressure in the last few years, there has been a collapse of safety standards: there simply was no adequate time allocated for safety procedures and the miners' equipment also was not kept in proper repair. New machines were being wasted, and the organisation of work was not being adequately carried out. Materials needed were not available and others materials were lying around unused. The mines had two plan targets: a coal production target and a scrap metal target. Equipment that should have been used in the mine was tossed into the scrap metal plan target.

And this situation was closely connected to corruption by party officials, up to and including the city and regional party secretaries. Materials allocated to the mines were being used by officials to build villas for themselves and other materials were being ordered from abroad and charged to the mines while going straight into the officials' private building activity.

So the miners confronted a cruel contrast: in the last years of Gierk they were being pressed for more and more output and even finding that their traditional 13th and 14th month bonuses were being cancelled for absence from work, including for sick leave, while the resources of the mines, the product of their own labour was being squandered in waste and corruption. More, the speed-up itself was directly linked to the vicious circle of declining safety standards, disorganisation of production, waste of equipment and increased possibilities of corruption.

The city and regional party secretaries were so discredited from the very start of the movement that they could not be involved

in negotiations with the MKZ — talks were carried on instead with the deputy regional secretary, Josef Nowak, and the party secretary for propaganda.

The miners' first demands were for an end to Sunday working with no loss of pay, an increased food supply, the ending of the four-brigade system. Then, at a mass meeting of miners in September, the regional party secretary was violently attacked. The meeting was in particular given details of his involvement in the ordering of materials, charged to the Thorez mine, for use in building private villas. A tape recording was made of the discussion and was circulated to workers' meetings throughout Walbrzych.

The party leadership locally banned the circulation of the tape but the battle continued and became interwoven with the October 3rd one-hour national strike by Solidarity in its campaign for legal recognition. The Thorez miners wanted to use the occasion to launch an unlimited strike and it was only with difficulty that the MKZ leadership checked them — on the morning of 3 October the local vice-president, Stanislaw Wrobel, himself from the mine had to rush there to dissuade the miners from taking action.

The October 3rd strike was a complete success in Walbrzych and the surrounding towns. And as a result of it, the regional Solidarity won a number of immediate concessions: they were provided with an electric roneo machine, a car, some extra offices, a weekly column in the local daily paper and also a verbal assurance that gifts for Solidarity from Western trade unions would be allowed through customs. And two days later, a mass meeting on the corruption issue was held in the Solidarity headquarters. The meeting was attended by the local prosecutor and the deputy regional governor.



(Photo: Tages Anzeiger)

3 October, Walbrzych: taxi-drivers listen to a list of Szczepanski's illegal properties.

The meeting ranged widely over the entire history of the area during more than a decade. One target of attack was the Walbrzych party secretary in the 1960s, Barlicki, who had been very active in the party drive against students and intellectuals in 1968. Workers explained how he had ordered truncheons and shields to be produced in many factories and had paid miners to go on the rampage against the striking students in Wrocław. This was one of a number of provocations organised by Barlicki who, after the August crisis, had taken over as head of national radio and TV from Maciej Szczepanski, arrested on charges of massive corruption. The accusations against the current regional party secretary, Groczmalicki, were repeated and dozens of other officials from plant directors to officials from the economic ministries and from the judicial administration were implicated.

Soon afterwards both the City Party secretary and Groczmalicki were removed and significantly Nowak, the deputy regional secretary who had been handling the negotiations with Solidarity, was made regional secretary. Nowak had shown himself to be a very skilful operator in handling Solidarity: always solicitous and friendly, promising many things, explaining all sorts of difficulties and above all keeping an unending — and largely inconclusive — dialogue going. In comparison with Wrocław, relations between the Walbrzych MKZ and the Party leadership were good.

As the workers won concessions and the strikes and ferment of the previous two months subsided in mid-October, a whole set of new problems quickly confronted the Solidarity leadership. While the September battles were on, there had been a high degree of unity and enthusiasm for the struggle, and the Presidium of the MKZ worked extremely hard and effectively. But as relations with the authorities stabilised, the problems of establishing a firm, permanent organisational structure and administrative apparatus came to the fore.

In the field of administration, many of the regional MKZs have been provided with assistance by the local radical intelligentsia from the university or colleges in the area. Their voluntary efforts have helped to establish and run the MKZ office, handling a lot of the paper work, typing, servicing the local bulletin and generally organising an office administration. But in Walbrzych there was no such local intelligentsia and the MKZ had a lot of difficulties in the administrative field, resulting at times in political tensions and difficulties. In addition, there was the inevitable problem that those most capable and active in leading a strike movement may be less temperamentally suited to the routine tasks of union organisation.

Jacek Pilchowski, the secretary of the MKZ and long-standing member of the editorial board of *Robotnik*, asked *Robotnik*'s founder and editor, Jan Litynski, to come down from Warsaw and help with the building of the union. Litynski, just out of

jail, went to Walbrzych in September and has been assisting the MKZ there ever since. But he has been very determined not to try to substitute himself for the workers' leadership in any field: thus, although he is on the editorial board of the Solidarity bulletin, he refused the suggestion that he should actually edit it. His task has been that of doing educational work on trade union problems for the MKZ, giving courses to rank-and-file workers.

But the main problem that the Walbrzych Solidarity has faced has been that of establishing a stable organisation of the workers. The overwhelming majority of the workers in the region have joined Solidarity — only some 10%, mainly clerical and administrative staff, remained in the old official unions, and these in turn changed their names to NSZZ trade unions (ie. 'Independent Self-Managing Trade Unions'), the name Solidarity has itself adopted.

By mid-October, Solidarity had 120,000 members in the province, drawn from 361 enterprises. The MKZ was meeting every Thursday, with hundreds of delegates of all ages coming from all the different factories to discuss the main problems. The meetings were prepared by the MKZ Presidium. On 23 October, for example, the MKZ assembly discussed the following main topics: a report on the problems of registering Solidarity at the Warsaw Court; the project of a national strike on 27 October in the event that the court refused to register the union; a report by the miners' leader Bogdan Kocik explaining why, for technical reasons, it was impossible for the miners to strike on the 27th, followed by a lengthy discussion; a report on the hunger strike by railway workers in Wrocław in their battle for higher wages and better conditions; a report on the establishment of a commission for workers in the transport sector (where previously the workers had been attached to particular enterprises with no unified body to deal with their particular problems); a report on the organisation of a lecture programme on the history of trade unionism and the development of the trade union movement.


For hundreds of delegates from vastly different plants and background without any previous collective traditions or experience to decide such major issues within the space of a single evening, this is an extraordinary demonstration of the unity and awareness of the new movement in Walbrzych. At the same time, considerable tensions arose between the leadership of the miners and leaders of other sections of workers.

Within Solidarity locally there is a special miners' commission — such 'branch commissions' as they are called, exist for various branches of industry within the regional structures of the union. The miners' commission in Walbrzych has about 20 members, representing the various mines. About one third of all workers in the mines in the region are party members, and the proportion is especially high among

administrative workers in the mines. Both the strikes in the mines and the miners' commission itself are led by these supervisory staff in the party. As a result of this the miners' commission has had a very specific atmosphere and does not necessarily closely reflect the attitudes of the coal-face workers. This gap has been enhanced by the lack of many mass meetings of the miners themselves.

The Walbrzych miners' leaders were from the start in contact with the miners' leadership in Jasztrebie and, in September they actually went to Warsaw with the aim of registering their own separate miners' union. In the end they decided against doing so and withdrew their registration papers, but established a link-up with Jasztrebie through a confederation of mine workers, loosely coordinated and transcending the regional Solidarity structure.

In considering the problems between the miners' leadership and other sections of Solidarity, it should also be remembered that the miners' relatively high pay and other material benefits has created the danger of sectional tensions and envy of the miners.



The miners' conditions of work were a fundamental issue in the first weeks of Solidarity's existence in Silesia.

Against this background a crisis erupted in the MKZ in late October. The miners' leadership attacked the secretary, Jacek Pilchowski, because of his links with KOR, the focus of unremitting attack in the party press, and because they said he had held a meeting with the regional governor without authorisation from the Presidium. As a result of this attack he decided to withdraw from the Presidium while remaining a member of the MKZ itself and being in charge of its publishing operations. In this way he hoped to avoid a sharp split between the miners' leaders and the other members of the Presidium.

But the conflict between the two wings continued. And at the end of November Pilchowski was thrown off the MKZ itself. Factory representatives protested very strongly on his behalf, and people attending the meeting demanded a vote. But the chairman ruled this out of order, apparently on the grounds that before the union elections there was no responsible body that could take a vote. Pilchowski himself decided not to continue the battle for re-instatement. After his dismissal, police gave an order that he should not be allowed back in his old job at the electronics factory, but the workers there voted to strike unless he was immediately re-instated and the police backed down.

The miners' leadership did not stop at Pilchowski's removal. At the instigation of the Jastrzebie MKZ leadership they planned

to pull the miners out of the Walbrzych MKZ altogether and to directly affiliate to Jastrzebie. This proposal could have led to a decisive showdown with the miners' commission which would have had to have a mass meeting of the miners themselves. At such a meeting it could not be ruled out that the miners would withdraw their support altogether from the commission leaders. Such considerations may have weighed with the miners' commission because after a two-hour discussion they decided not to try to break away and join Jastrzebie.

During this crisis there was a real threat to the existence of the Walbrzych MKZ. Some of the workers from the towns around Walbrzych were so disturbed by the conflict that they considered linking up with Wroclaw MKZ.

Throughout the conflict matters were made worse by a tendency among the factory workers to identify the miners themselves with the actions of the miners' commission. But the crisis was overcome, the MKZ remained united and in December the union elections began in Walbrzych. These have provided the basis for renewed unity in the organisation. The composition of the plant committees is being substantially altered through the elections which have resulted in the replacement of about half the former delegates. It seems that some of those who have been replaced had been talkers rather than doers. What is not clear is whether the new committees are more radical than the old.

Jan Litynski, the **Robotnik** editor and KO member has found that amongst the workers themselves KOR is very popular, mainly because of the Party's propaganda against it. The workers have shown a strong religious attachment. The miners' saint i St. Barbara and her saint's day, 4 December, has always been a miners' holiday. This time, instead of official speeches, medal presentations and banquets, 4 December was marked by a mass celebrated by the Archbishop of Wroclaw, who invoked the steadfast 'Solidarity' of St. Barbara who was ready to die rather than abandon her faith. Religion is seen by the workers as a symbol of their freedom.

At Christmas 1980 one Western visitor considered that the Walbrzych workers' readiness to back Solidarity's actions on issues like political prisoners or censorship was less strong than it had been at the start of the movement. The Solidarity organisation had gone through a difficult period with its unity sorely tested. But by March Walbrzych was gaining showing its strength and unity. When members of the KOR were threatened with prosecution, the Walbrzych miners threatened to strike in their defence. The miners were in action again in defence of the Bydgoszcz workers on 27 March. Walbrzych's workers are in the forefront of the movement.

PARTY

One of the most crucial questions in the current crisis is whether the radical currents seeking democratisation at the base of the Communist Party will be able to create strong links with Solidarity on the basis of respecting its aims and its autonomy. We publish below an article on the anti-apparatus movement,

followed by an interview with its founder, Zbigniew Iwanow, and articles from Party members in two key centres of the movement, Torun and Lodz. Finally we publish the first full picture of the Polish nomenklatura to have been published.

The Anti-Apparatus Movement — By Peter Green

Amongst the places where Party members led the strikes in August, one of the most significant was Torun. The MKZ there was led by a Party member from the Towimor ship-machinery plant called Zbigniew Iwanow, who has subsequently become famous throughout Poland as the founder of a new movement for democratic change and working class control within the Communist Party.

When the August strikes ended, Iwanow was elected First Secretary of his Party organisation in the factory. He and his comrades then launched a movement which subsequently spread to at least 17 provinces throughout the country. They established what they called a Consultative Commission, deriving the idea from the MKS established in Torun during the strike. Instead of the exclusively vertical links from basic Party organisations upwards to the higher Party committees, they were to build horizontal links between rank-and-file organisations through the Consultative Commission. The sole precondition for affiliation to the Commission was that the Party organisation should have democratically elected its own secretary (the

equivalent rule for the MKS was that the factory had first to strike before it could affiliate). Very quickly one Party organisation after another in Torun affiliated to the Commission, and by early this year 7,000 members out of a 17,000 total in Torun city were affiliated to the Consultative Commission. The body has become in effect an alternative leadership to the City Committee.

The consultative commissions were built in the battle by rank-and-file Party members for an extraordinary Party Congress. (The last Congress had taken place only in February 1980, and they normally take place every 5 years.) This demand was in turn linked to the membership's determination to prevent the leadership attacking the workers and their organisation Solidarity in the name of the Party itself. The Party rank and file had gone through a profound crisis in August as they saw the Gierek government seeking to break the mass strike and threatening to open an irreparable gulf between the Party rank and file and the mass of non-Party workers. So the demand for the Congress was linked to a campaign to radically

reform the Party Statutes, to democratise the Party, and to prevent such a breach with the workers ever happening again.

The Kania group at first tried to oppose a speedy Congress, claiming it would be won by the confrontationist wing of the Party anyway. But in the autumn, the Central Committee finally agreed to an extraordinary congress, while simultaneously Kania denounced the construction of horizontal links at the base of the Party as a violation of democratic centralism. On 24 November, the Torun Party Control Commission expelled Iwanow from the Party on the grounds that he had challenged the Marxist-Leninist World Outlook (they had a picture of him taking communion at the factory gate during the August strike) and also on grounds of factionalism.

But this didn't stop the struggle. Iwanow continued to function as if he was a Party member, and the horizontal movement, by now called the 'Anti-Apparatus' movement, spread to other centres. Amongst the first were nearby Bydgoszcz

and Lodz, where two factories, Fonica and Marchlewski, were the driving force. By November (according to *Le Monde*), Radom, Katowice and Krakow had become involved. The movement also spread to Gdansk, Szczecin, Pulawy, Poznan and Pabianice by early 1981.

The characteristic components of the movement have been the large industrial plants and the universities and colleges. In Torun a philosophy lecturer from the University, 29-year-old Lech Witkowski, played a leading role along with Zbigniew Iwanow. University branches were also involved in the other centres, and an important ideological influence within the movement has been the Warsaw—University-based Sigma Club and its bulletin *Common Discussion*. (This bulletin has reprinted many texts from Torun and other centres, organising written discussion on changes in the statutes with regard to Marxism and Catholicism, the social character of the Polish state, and so on.) Sigma developed as a semi-official club in Warsaw University during the 1970s. One venture that it was associated with in 1979 was a dramatised performance of the 10th Party Congress in the Soviet Union, which many Sigma members regard as a watershed in the history of the Bolshevik Party. The script was a verbatim transcript of the Congress debates: the audience had to join faction caucuses in the interval — Workers' Opposition, the Trotsky-Bukharin group and the Lenin group — and then vote on the different lines in the trade union debate at the end of the performance! Sigma is quite a strong influence among the Warsaw students, and members of the Club have founded a women's movement (see the section on Warsaw in this issue).

By the beginning of March, the factory Party organisations around the country involved in the anti-apparatus movement were planning to hold a delegate conference in Torun in response to the Party leadership's postponement of the Congress (which was originally scheduled for March but is now due in July). In the end they decided not to call the conference on the grounds that it could have laid them open to expulsion for 'factionalism'. But during the early months of 1981, the movement has deepened and widened as Party members have twice defied the leadership by participating in big Solidarity strike actions. By the end of March no fewer than thirteen or fourteen thousand individual proposals for changes to the Party statutes had poured in from the membership; while the Higher Party School itself (linked to the Central Committee) has now published its own new draft statutes, involving, amongst other things, the legalisation of horizontal links at the base. This swelling tide has produced a hysterical reaction from sections of the Party apparatus, with Kociolek, the Warsaw Party Secretary, declaring that 'an attack on the apparatus is an attack on the Party' — a precisely formulated of the average consciousness of the apparatchiks.

According to George Kolankiewicz (from whom a great deal of the information in this article comes), during the last 10 years 70% of Central Committee members have been drawn from a band of Party secretaries and economic managers who, in terms of occupation, account for only 4.3% of the Party membership. This statistic alone gives some idea of the weight of the apparatus in the leading councils of the organisation. Over 80% of the membership of the

Preparatory Commission for the Extraordinary Congress are apparatus people.

The following demands loom large in the anti-apparatus movement: accountability of all officials to the organs that elected them; election of all secretaries from the shop floor; abolition of the special career grade of apparatchik; limits on the length of tenure of secretariat posts; voting by secret ballot; the recallability of officials; a free choice of candidates at all levels; at least a 100% increment of candidates over posts at local level, and 50% at higher levels. Further points are that all persons holding high office must have been democratically elected and that there should be a right to hold no-confidence votes which, if carried, require the defeated official to resign. After Party conferences, the delegates elected to them will retain their status until the next conference, enabling the membership to swiftly reconvene the conference, so that delegates would in effect be able to act as watchdogs over the people they elected to higher posts.

Changes such as these, if combined with the right to form political tendencies within the Party, would bring about a major change in the entire functioning of the political system. But at the same time, the fate of the struggle inside the Party depends above all on the continued strengthening of Solidarity and upon a growing organised support for Solidarity within the rank and file of the Party. It was from the workers' mass action that the anti-apparatus movement grew, and it is by its assistance to the needs of independent mass movement that the anti-apparatus movement will ultimately be judged.

'The most anti-socialist group in Poland is the party political bureau'

(The following interview with Zbigniew Iwanow, leader of the 'anti-apparatus movement' in Torun, was carried out by a correspondent from the French journal of the Fourth International Inprecor from which we have taken this translation.)

What happened in the Communist Party within the factory?

It began with the strike. Most party militants in our factory, Towimor, were for the strike. Some were on the strike committee. Stanichevsky was our delegate to Gdansk. After the strike, we soon realised that Solidarity was a safeguard for the people. But we owed it to ourselves to seek safeguards within the Party, because the Party had already suffered too many crises and one more might be deadly.

We realised that the most important thing was to organise really democratic elections within the Party. In spite of the opposition of the Party leadership in the town and the region we were able very quickly within our factory to arrange democratic elections after 15 August using Party rules which said that there must be a vote if 30 per cent of the militants demand it.

After the new vote members of the strike committee were elected to the Towimor Party leadership. The first phase of our work was to help Solidarity because we knew it was important that the union grew.

Later we had to split from Solidarity because the constitution of Solidarity says that people who hold Party posts cannot hold responsibilities in Solidarity. It is not possible to have two major positions and to do them both well. Despite all that, we did everything to help our MKZ comrades because we are still members of Solidarity.

We saw, very quickly, that the changes we had instigated in our Party in the factory were insufficient. Thus we sought contacts with likeminded members of other Party organisations. The quickest response came from the Party at the University.

We succeeded in establishing an inter-factory commission. We had no

confidence in anything the authorities said. They were passive and did nothing. The people 'up there' were compromised. At the end of September, at the start, there were 8 Party organisations in the commission. The first aim was to organise really democratic elections and to outline a programme, really originating in the rank and file, for the Party Congress. The commission was not warmly received by the regional authorities (laughter). They sensed themselves to be in danger.

Now we have 32 organisations in the commission. It has no leader. There is a weekly meeting. Each time somebody else chairs to avoid one person dominating. All documents drawn up by the commission are circularised in the rank and file Party organisations where they are debated to see if they meet with approval. The basis of those discussions is what the militants want and ask for. We concentrate on problems such as how do we see the Party evolving in the future or how to work with Solidarity?

We have outlined two key issues: changing the Party constitution and the role of the Party in society.

We will now explain to you the nature of the conflict between us and the Party leadership. We are workers, not diplomats, we do not mince our words in the meetings. When we think someone is a thief or a gangster we say so.

The people who do not want a regeneration of the Party listen without pleasure because they are not used to it. They think we should always applaud the First Secretary's speeches without questioning if it is right. They would not shout in the hall that he is an idiot or that he tells lies.

It was over these problems of manner and not of substance that they expelled me from the Party — it was a bit like the Inquisition. One Sunday, I was told that I must attend a meeting on Monday. On the Monday they expelled me, and on the same day the factory organisation rejected it.

Hence I am the only Party Secretary who is not in the Party! Of course I

appealed in writing but it is three months later and still no reply — it is true that the commission must have lots of work to expel other militants who are bigger fish than me!

Today the Party control commission is coming to discuss my case (laughter). It is a ploy to win time because this commission can do nothing to reverse the decision. It is playing for time. I am doing nothing else. Just continuing my work.

How can you impose democratic elections at all levels before the congress?

In the present Party rules there are several points which are undemocratic and we want them changed. The number of candidates is limited — that cannot continue. Votes can be manipulated because everybody is not a delegate.

Here, in our discussions, we have gone still further. We think that the Party authorities at all levels should be elected by direct suffrage.

For example, in a Party meeting to elect a secretary there would be several candidates, each outlines their programme and finally there is a knowledgeable vote. Everybody, by voting for his or her candidate, would feel responsible for the candidate of her or his choice.

Also we have considered the role of the Party. Until now our Party has played a role that it should not have: it doubles with the functions of the state (administration, police). This is why we think that this duplication of state apparatus in all fields of the Party apparatus, this bureaucracy, has to disappear.

We must also consider the role of the CP in the factory and what it should be. It must be a force making positive proposals on all the problems and not an instrument of government. I would like a Party like that in our country. To join this Party one should wait a year or two in order to show what you can do, to get some quality not quantity.

Will the debate continue after the Congress?

Of course.

You have spoken about self-management in the factories but how do you envisage it in society as a whole so that the workers really decide?

Now, you say that the factories belong to us. Not true. They are in the hands of the government. The government is led by a very limited group — not even all the Political Bureau of the Party — but only a few of them.

It is they who decide. Society has no influence and it bears the conse-

quences of their decisions. That is why we want to make this reform as quickly as possible. How to achieve this reform? To clean up Poland

I think that the factories must have greater autonomy and the ultimate aim is to let the workers decide. I see that as a series of councils of all the workers from all parts of the factory. They could not be bought. Otherwise the one with more money would win.

The workers would decide how to develop the factory, how to share things, how to recruit, that would be a reform of all the factory administration. Marketing would be developed.

Do you have contact with organisations in other towns who agree with your projects? What type of contact do you have?

Yes, we are particularly in contact with Gdansk and Krakow. We send our material. We meet them. But what we propose meets strong opposition because such a reform would severely limit the administration, especially in Warsaw.

Don't you think that the Government, already confronted by Solidarity, and seeing people like you question them will react violently?

We have no choice. We must see as many people as possible who think like us, educate them and inform them. But we are already doing that. We have many meetings where they discuss with us. It is necessary that the people cease to be frightened.

How do you see collaboration happening between Party radicals and Solidarity?

There are many areas where we think along the same lines especially on social politics. Neither the Party nor Solidarity can be isolated from the problems of the moment. In the present circumstances to say, as the Government suggests, that Solidarity should only concern itself with economic problems is impossible. What distinguishes us from Solidarity is international politics. We are in very specific conditions. Unfortunately in our country we have better conditions. Obviously I am speaking of the weather. (Laughter)

(At this moment the interview ends as the Party control commission arrives in the Party offices in the factory. The Party control commission upheld Iwanow's expulsion from the Party.)

The struggle for the political representation of the working class

Likelihood — barriers — methods

By Andrzej Zybortowicz

(This article is an introduction to a set of documents from Torun published by the Sigma Club.)

Three months have passed since agreements were signed in Wyrbrzez and Slask. The situation in the country is far from being stabilised. We must not delude ourselves into thinking that the registration of Solidarity automatically guarantees peace in the country. The spectre of confrontation still haunts us. Conviction that the changes are temporary is hitherto as strong in the centres of power as among the public which is full of fearful doubts.

It has become clear that breakthroughs in the unions are not enough. Only changes in the PUWP can lead to definitive progress in Poland. Only if the Party can regain the confidence of its members, as well as that of the people as a whole, will the haunting prospect of confrontation cease. The Party holds power today (though somewhat eroded — fortunately for us all) but it has no authority. The significance of Party leaders' actions between August and November has not been at all clear to the public and everything points to the Party's crisis of credibility deepening. The hopes one might have had in the new Party secretary, having seen his performance marked by a reasoned approach, are dashed by the day to day practice of Party officials in the provinces.

We have before us (and when I write 'us' I mean the public as a whole) the task of reforming the Party, the task of achieving proper representation for workers in the Party. The decisive sources of this social crisis (and of previous ones) lie in the Party's method of exercising power.

Not everyone is convinced now about the wisdom and possibility of pursuing reform in this organisation. Much hope has been invested in Solidarity; I would say too much. Independent trade unions are an achievement in our society, but they do not have the power to attend to everything that needs attention. So it is wrong

for so many groupings — including those within the Party — to concentrate their energy exclusively on the trade union movement. The level of consciousness in the Polish working class is such that however well Solidarity copes with matters concerning trade union representation, sooner or later workers will realise the need for political representation. If the PUWP is not recognised by the working class as its proper means of political representation, whatever the declarations, intentions and promises, then we shall have to support the emergence of a workers' political party from union organisation.

Taking up the struggle now for workers' representation in the PUWP is the shortest and least costly route to ensure workers' power and to assure the triumph of socialism in Poland.

Campaigns to reform the PUWP, to re-establish links with the masses, have been undertaken several times in the history of this organisation. Each time the Party declared it had regained authority in society it always turned out that any gains were partial and superficial. We must understand the reasons for failures hitherto if we are to make the most of this opportunity to reform the PUWP. All the more so, as many are of the opinion that the organisation won't be given another chance to 're-establish links with the masses'. The community has a memory — a mistake may be made more than once, but can't be repeated indefinitely.

Hitherto, after each episode of workers' unrest, there came a new team full of good intentions, which tried to build links with the masses. After a time the links were severed. On what grounds? I am convinced that such severing of links was inevitable. Why? The Party's functioning has hitherto depended essentially on the intermediate levels in the hierarchy in their widest sense. The principle on which this apparatus worked was always uncompromising domination of the Party executive over the rank and file. The executive mediated in contacts between the 'top' and the 'bottom'. Individuals within the apparatus became the real

force behind mechanisms adopted until now, and their personal interests outweighed those of the Party as a whole and of society as a whole every time.

Party reform can only meet with success if there is thoroughgoing reconsideration of the role of the Party's intermediate tiers and the way they operate.

For this to happen, two conditions must be fulfilled:

- 1) very far-reaching changes in Party personnel at all levels;
- 2) far-reaching changes in the functioning of the apparatus, as regards recall and accountability.

The NEW apparatus must face NEW tasks, to be carried out under NEW circumstances, characterised by the executive carrying out the will of the Party as a whole, or to put it another way, with the 'base' of the Party controlling the 'top'. Reform thus understood would signify genuine change in the class composition of the PUWP.

Evidence from previous attempts at Party reform (and reform of other organisations in society) indicates that it will be implemented only if forced to a conclusion by the rank and file. The rank and file can only force reforms and concessions from those in power when it is organised. That is why it is an urgent task to organise the mass of Party members so that they force an extraordinary conference and it be won by the working class.

A precondition for winning the confidence is to win the campaign for election of delegates. If the delegates chosen are tainted, people in whom there is no confidence, then the conference, far from regaining authority for the PUWP, could be a nail in its coffin.

We must take up immediately the struggle to smash the Party executive's monopoly power over personnel and policies. This can only be done with organisation among the 'grey' masses of Party members.

What is to be done?

(This is an article from a Party member involved in the inner Party struggle in Lodz.)

The events which have been taking place in Poland since mid-1980 have a revolutionary character. Workers in big industry are the initiators and chief driving force of the process. They have been joined by ever broader circles of society as a whole. The movement tends to reject once and for all the present system of exercising power and the methods of building socialism now in force. Its aim is that the dictatorship of the proletariat should no longer be a dictatorship over the proletariat, and that the right to expression should be guaranteed for the broad masses both in law and in reality. Up until now, the hypertrophied apparatus of state, party and economy has forced the nation to carry out its arbitrary and subjectivist decisions. But it is no longer possible to govern in that way, since it deprives people of their dignity and turns them into an instrument for achieving goals that have nothing in common with their class interests.

The revolutionary process that we are witnessing is of a spontaneous nature. The Party and state do not control it, but are drifting dangerously in the face of mounting demands. It is the organs of the self-managed independent union 'Solidarity' which have the most influence on the actions of the masses. But they too are bowing to the pressure of needs and to the state of mind of the masses. In the consciousness of society, 'Solidarity' represents all those who define themselves as 'we' against a Party and state defined as 'them'. A system of dual power is gradually emerging, in which the Party, and especially its leading bodies, finds itself on the wrong side of the fence. It is necessary that the Party, together with 'Solidarity' and the other organisations of society, should clearly place itself on the side of 'us'. Otherwise, the existence and leading role of the Party lose all significance.

So, what is to be done? What are the burning questions of our movement?

It is this Leninist-sounding question that provides the means to

Below /in the texts to which this is an introduction/ is material based on the possibilities of such rank and file organisation among Party members in the Torun region. (We shall ignore the middle tiers.) The aim of such activity is to struggle to ensure links are forged in workplaces, ending the isolation that made opposition to manipulation from on high impossible.

Even the most sincere undertakings given by the Party meant nothing if the paperwork got buried as it was being processed by higher authority. Mutual support and dissemination of essential information is most important.

A few words of warning on the material below. Evidence from Torun indicates that this type of activity can meet with disinclination or opposition from higher authorities. There are often accusations of fractional activity, unrepresentative activity, ill-considered action or unconstitutional behaviour. It is possible that there will be attempts to characterise such rank and file movements as anarchic. Concerns in which action is taken without waiting for official guidelines and democratic elections and whose new workplace committees undertake activity in urban or regional districts must account for their actions to the area and regional commission controlling the Party.

There may be a blockade on information about the work of the commission. To overcome this some establishments belonging to the Torun commission have suggested circulating information at branch level. The organ of the Torun KK POP is still the temporary presidium, alongside which the editorial group works to ensure the flow of information among the members of the commission.

Evidence from setting up the commission indicates that to ensure contact between Party workplace organisations it was often necessary to act through the level of divisional Party organisation, where the workplace committee machinery obstructed the organisation of elections and access of workplace organisations to participation in the commission's work.

tackle the problem. Today the Party ought to become the head and driving force of the revolution, if it is not to end up in the rubbish-bin of history. It must therefore take action with a view to redistributing personal income and privately-owned goods: those who are too rich should quite simply lose a significant part of their wealth for the benefit of the poor. Unless it lowers the highest incomes and taxes the possessions of the best-off groups, the government will only fuel inflation and the 'black market' through the wage rises it has introduced. And in that case it is the poor who will pay the costs of the crisis. The growth in the mass of money on the market would be smaller if a decision were made to decapitate the wage pyramid in the state sector and to limit the income of the private sector. In order to consummate the revolutionary process, it is also necessary to severely punish those who have illegally enriched themselves, and to use their wealth for aid to the poor. To this end an extraordinary commission should be set up, consisting of representatives of 'Solidarity', other trade unions and organisations, the militia, the Higher Chamber of Control, and the National Coordinatory Commission. Its task should be to seek out and make public all cases of excessive enrichment. It would thereby make it possible to check on suspicions and gossip in every case in question.

The present Party leadership is acting much too slowly: either it underestimates the gravity of the situation, or it does not have the necessary political competence. It is scandalous and disturbing that a preparatory commission has still not been established for the Party congress, and that theses for the extraordinary congress have not been published. A lot of time has already been wasted. The decisions of the 6th Plenum were a late and inadequate response to the situation in the country. The extraordinary congress should be held at the latest in January next year (1981), and should seriously analyse the crisis and indicate the ways of resolving it. The most important matter, however, is the election of a new and genuinely competent leadership, whose members

should be known to the nation as judicious people of integrity. In particular, they should have the mentality of leaders rather than hired employees. The Party now needs men of the masses who represent the workers' interests, and above all the interests of the least favoured layers of society. The new leaders should go to the masses, and not rest content with meeting middle cadres.

The extraordinary congress cannot be prepared by those who have always used now-rejected methods and are only ready to change them under pressure. The congress preparatory commission should appeal to militants who have had the courage and imagination to oppose subjectivism and totalitarianism and have themselves taken part in the 'Solidarity' workers' movement.

The congress ought to make real changes in the mode of organisation of Polish communists. The Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) is so compromised that, unless it is changed from top to bottom, it will be unable to regain the confidence of the masses. We propose that the PUWP should be transformed into a new party: the Polish Socialist Workers' Party. As its name suggests, it would be a party with three essential characteristics:

- 1) 'Polish' — that is, independent, born out of the experience, tradition and history of the Polish nation; geared in its programme and practice to the specificity of our culture; working to achieve our national interests in the best possible way.
- 2) 'Socialist' — that is, with the goal of constructing a society based on social ownership of the principal means of production, and the on the principle of redistributing goods in accordance with the quality and quantity of the work performed; with the goal, too, of strengthening links between Poland and the socialist countries, and of supporting left-wing governments and movements.
- 3) 'Workers' — that is, representing above all the section of the population that lives from wage labour: the working class and intelligentsia.

The Polish Socialist Workers Party would link itself above all to the great tradition of two parties: the Polish Socialist Party and the Polish Workers Party. Hence the two epithets 'socialist' and 'workers'. The name Polish Socialist Workers Party would be identical to that of the party of Hungarian Communists. Their HSWP created in 1956 was also the expression of a renewal process, and linked itself to the tradition of the Socialist Party.

Acceptance by the PSWP of the models of action associated with the PPS and PPR would enable it to get over the disease of the PUWP (and, in particular, of its leading structures): namely, 'sectarianism'. This disease was inherited by the PUWP from the 'minority' wing of the Communist Party of Poland. It is expressed in the following symptoms: lack of confidence in its own people; inability to accept the autonomy of any organisation; the choice for leadership posts of incompetent and docile people enjoying the leadership's trust; manipulation of information; the search for a class enemy behind every criticism; a panic fear of any form of opposition; the attempt to gather all power and all initiative in a single hand.

The PSWP would have to be a mass party, but not like the PUWP has been in the last period. At the present time, it is enough that one in ten should be communist among the twelve million wage-earners of the socialised sector. The Party should select its members with such care that it appears as the moral vanguard of the nation. Thus the exchange of PUWP for PSWP cards would be the occasion for an examination of the Party membership. We may expect that persons who voluntarily make this choice will really be genuine communists. For, as Lenin rightly said, the most precious members join the party when it is in a bad way.

The PSWP would regroup the honest, active and modest supporters of socialism, independently of their religion. It is

necessary to break with the dogma, still to be found now and again, according to which atheism alone can be a source of socialist inspiration. In Marxism it is not atheism but humanism which counts: that is to say, faith in humanity and social progress. Various members of the party who lacked this ideal, and who used it as an instrument for their own career, have already caused us enough harm.

The PSWP should exercise a leading role in the state: not alone, however, but together with parties representing the other two classes of our society, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. At the same time it would be necessary to rebuild the peasant movement, as well as the movement of artisans and traders. These three parties — of the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie — might form a people's bloc in the Diet and within the national councils (that also include people who do not belong to any party). Each of these parties would have its own autonomous youth organisation.

The PSWP should be a less costly and less bureaucratic party than the PUWP. It should base itself more on the devotion of its militants, restricting the apparatus of paid functionaries to the minimum necessary. Members of the central and regional leadership ought to belong to workplace cells not just in a formal way but in actual reality. It should be obligatory for them to take part in all cell meetings, being subject to control by the cell and giving it an account of their activity. This would be an antidote to the chronic lack of ties between leadership and rank-and-file. An end must be made to the classroom-type lectures which turn meetings and plenums into exalted church services. For such a style does not facilitate the exchange of opinions or the making of criticism. Instead of reports read out at the meeting, there should be seriously prepared written material that everyone can read in advance and so form an opinion of his own. Instead of the system whereby privileges are given to certain contributors by virtue of their place on the presidium — a system which serves to underline their power — there should be an undifferentiated 'round-table' structure whereby everyone can take part in discussion on a basis of equality.

In the present situation, it has now become urgent to hold elections at every level of the Party and to elect delegates for the extraordinary congress. It is especially important that these elections should have a democratic character, that the mass of members should be completely free to vote for the people they trust.

We hope that the independent, self-managed trade union will be a factor standing in the way of the degeneration of the Party and the state power; and that it will prevent Party bodies from breaking their ties with the masses and obstinately maintaining a bureaucratic routine. The Party ought to respond, through general directives for the government and state administration, to the needs and interests of working people who should be able to express themselves in a spontaneous and unfettered way. The leading role of the Party cannot be based only on constitutional and administrative guarantees. It must base itself above all on real authority. To govern against one's own people is not a long-term possibility. The task is to win its support and confidence, showing that the Party is a revolutionary combat party which represents the poor and oppressed.

Members of leading bodies find it very hard to grasp all these truths and demands, apparently failing to understand the roots of the present conflict and the need to take rapid action. They have no links with the mass of members, and are not aware of their state of mind. In such a situation, only firm, resolute pressure 'from below' can save the Party and country from catastrophe.

B. Rogowski
Lodz

14 November 1980

Apparatus Power: the Nomenklatura

(This detailed list of nomenklatura appointments is a unique document: the nomenklatura has hitherto been a closely guarded secret within the Party apparatuses of all the East European countries. We are reprinting

List of posts falling under the nomenklatura of the Party Central Committee, regional committees and district (town and neighbourhood) committees

A. Nomenklatura posts of the Party Central Committee

I. Party functions: personnel politically responsible for Party bodies and publications; secretaries of Party committees

1. Heads of Central Committee departments, their deputies, the inspectors, main instructors and political reporters of the Central Committee.
2. The first secretaries and zonal secretaries of regional Party committees.
3. The rector, vice-rectors, institute (group) directors, and scientific workers at the Academy of Social Sciences.
4. The chief and deputy editors of *Trybuna Ludu*, *Nowe Drogi*, *Zycie Partii* and *Chlopska Droga*.
5. The directors of the Bydgoszcz and Katowice Party schools.
6. The first secretaries of Party committees in the ministries and central state administration.

II. High state functions: the administration of state and economy

1. The president and vice-presidents of the Diet of the People's Republic of Poland.
2. The president and deputy-presidents, the secretary and members of the Council of State.
3. The president and vice-presidents of the Council of Ministers.
4. The president and vice-presidents of the Supreme Chamber of Control.
5. The president and vice-presidents of the Council of Ministers Planning Commission.
6. Ministers, vice-ministers and directors-general.
7. Chairmen of the presidia of regional people's councils.
8. Ambassadors and plenipotentiaries, embassy and legation advisors, consuls-general.
9. The presidents of the Supreme Court and regional tribunals.
10. The public prosecutor of the People's Republic of Poland, his deputies, and regional public prosecutors.
11. The president and vice-presidents of the Polish Academy of Sciences, the administrative secretary and his assistants.
12. The head of the Diet Chancellery and the Council of State Chancellery.
13. The commander-in-chief of the police force, and his deputy.
14. Regional commanders, their first deputies charged with state security, the first deputies charged with the police.
15. The chairman and vice-chairmen of the National Raw Materials Board.
16. The chairman of the National Mining Board.
17. The presidents and vice-presidents of the State Administration.
18. The president and vice-presidents of the National Bank of Poland, and the directors of central banks.
19. Delegates of the government of the People's Republic of Poland.
20. The chairmen and vice-chairmen of the central, regional and sectional boards of the Co-operative Unions.
21. Members of the secretariat of artisan organisations.
22. The directors-general of nationwide industrial unions and of the central management and offices of domestic trade.
23. The regional directors-general of the Polish Railways and of National Telecommunications.
24. The directors-general of the regional unions of Public Works.
25. The commander-in-chief of the Fire Brigade.
26. The directors-general of public institutions (Lot, Orbis, Wars, etc.).
27. The deputy to the permanent Comecon representative of the People's Republic of Poland, the deputy to the Comecon secretary-general nominated by the People's Republic of Poland.
28. Directors of the various Polish offices abroad; the departmental heads of the Comecon Secretariat and UN Secretariat nominated by the People's Republic of Poland.

III. Functions in social organisations

1. The president, vice-president and secretary of the Polish Committee of the National Unity Front.
2. The presidents, vice-presidents and secretaries of the Central Trade Union Council; the presidents, vice-presidents and secretaries of the Trade Union Federations.
3. The president, secretary-general and secretaries of the Association of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy.
4. The presidents, vice-presidents and secretaries of the youth organisations.
5. The president of the National Women's Council, and the president of the League of Women.
6. The presidents and secretaries-general of the Higher Technical Organisation and the Polish Economic Society.
7. The chairman of the Higher Council of Cooperatives.
8. The president, *ex officio* vice-presidents and secretaries of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Association.
9. The president and secretary-general of the Society of Polish Journalists.
10. The president and secretary-general of the Union of Polish Writers.
11. The president and secretary-general of the Association of Polish Jurists.
12. The president of the Higher Lawyers Council.
13. The president and vice-presidents of the Union of Agricultural Circles.
14. The president and vice-presidents of the Union of Agricultural Producer Co-operatives.
15. Full-time presidents, vice-presidents and secretaries of social and cultural associations.
16. The president of the National Defence League.
17. The president and vice-presidents of the Volunteer Firemen's Association.

IV. Functions in the Army

1. The head and deputy-head of the General Staff.
2. The head and deputy-heads of the political directorate of the Army.
3. The inspector-general of Home Defence.
4. The inspector-general of (military) instruction.
5. The Senior Commissariat officer.
6. The inspector-general of the Engineering Corps.
7. The commanders of military regions and their assistants responsible for political matters.
8. Commanders of the Armed Forces and their deputies responsible for political matters in: a) the air force, b) the navy, c) aerial defence, and d) military defence of the frontiers.
9. The head of the Internal Military Corps.
10. The head of the personnel department at the Ministry of National Defence.
11. The head of the (Military) Instruction Inspectorate.
12. The head of the Home Defence Inspectorate.
13. The head of the directorate of the Second General Staff.
14. Persons proposed for the rank of general.

V. Functions in the mass media, publishing houses and scientific institutions

1. The chairman, deputies and directors-general of the Radio and Television Board.
2. The chairman, vice-chairmen and directors of the 'RSW-Prasa' Board.
3. The chief and deputy editors and the directors of: the Polish Press Agency, the Polish 'Interpress' Agency, the Central Photographic Agency, Artistic and Graphic Publications, the

text from the French journal on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, *L'Alternative*.)

Society for Documentary Film Production, and Polish Film News.

4. The director of the publishing co-operative *Ksiazka i Wiedza*.
5. The chief editors of *Ideologia i Polityka* and *Zagadnienia i Materialy*.
6. The directors and chief editors of scientific and literary publishing houses.
7. The chief editors of national circulation dailies, weeklies and monthlies.
8. The directors-general of Polish Radio and Television.
9. The directors of specialised national institutes of scientific research.
10. The directors of the foreign broadcasting service of the Polish Academy of Sciences.
11. Departmental secretaries and assistant secretaries, as well as directors of the Bureau of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

B. Nomenklatura posts of regional Party committees

I. Party functions: personnel politically responsible for Party bodies and publications; the secretaries of Party committees

1. The first secretary and the secretaries of various sections of the district, town and neighbourhood committees.
2. Personnel politically responsible for the regional Party committees.
3. The chief and deputy editors and the secretaries of the regional committee press.
4. The first secretaries of Party committees in higher education; the first secretary of Party committees in the presidia of regional people's councils; the first secretary in the regional police directorate.
5. Full-time secretaries of Party committees in enterprises and combines falling under the regional committee nomenklatura, including all those placed under Central Committee management.

II. Functions in government bodies, regional administration and the economic apparatus

1. The vice-chairmen and secretaries of the presidia of regional people's councils.
2. The chairman of the Regional Economic Planning Commission, and regional school inspectors.
3. Heads of departments of the regional people's council presidia (as estimated by the executive committees of the regional Party committee).
4. Deputy regional commanders (except the first deputies responsible for State Security and for the Police).
5. Heads of departments of the regional police force (as estimated by the executive committees of the regional Party committee).
6. The vice-presidents of regional tribunals.
7. Deputy regional public prosecutors.
8. The directors of regional penal institutions.
9. The chairmen of (regional) delegations to the Supreme Chamber of Control, the regional inspectors of P.I.H. and O.K.R.
10. The presidium chairmen of district, town and neighbourhood people's councils.
11. District police commanders and their deputies responsible for State Security.
12. The presidents of district tribunals.
13. District public prosecutors.
14. The presidents of regional administrative tribunals for social insurance.
15. The chairmen of regional arbitration commissions.
16. The directors (presidents) of regional economic organisations, industry unions, regional organs, and regionally administered co-operatives and enterprises (except the chief director of the regional union of Public Works).
17. Regional branch directors of the National Bank of Poland, the Agricultural Bank, the Polish Savings Bank, the State Insurance House, and the Social Insurance Department.
18. The directors-general of key combines and enterprises (and deputy directors if so decided by the regional Party committee).
19. Regional commanders of the Fire Brigade.
20. Directors of medical establishments and of the social services.
21. Leaders of the regional delegations of the General Office for the Supervision of Press, Publications and Public Performances.

III. Functions in social organisations

1. The presidents, vice-presidents and secretaries of regional committees of the National Unity Front.
2. The presidents, vice-presidents and secretaries of the regional trade-union councils.
3. The presidents, vice-presidents and secretaries of the regional leaderships of youth organisations.
4. The president and (full-time) members of the regional leadership of the Association of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy.
5. The chairmen, vice-chairmen and secretaries of the regional leadership of the Union of Agricultural Circles.
6. The presidents of the regional women's council and of the regional League of Women leadership.
7. The presidents, vice-presidents and secretaries of the regional leadership of the Trade Union Federations.
8. The regional presidents and full-time leaders of artistic, social, cultural, sporting and paramilitary associations, as well as professional bodies such as the Higher Technical Organisation and the Association of Polish Jurists.

IV. Functions in the mass media, publishing houses and scientific institutions

1. The chief and deputy directors of Polish Radio broadcasting stations and of Polish Television centres.
2. The chief and deputy editors of the main local dailies and cultural and social magazines.
3. The chief and deputy editors of regional press and book publishing houses.
4. The rectors and vice-rectors of higher education establishments.
5. Theatre managers and artistic directors.
6. The directors of (regional) museums.

C. Nomenklatura posts of district (town and neighbourhood) Party committees

I. Functions in the Party: personnel politically responsible for Party bodies; secretaries of Party committees

1. Those politically responsible for district (town and neighbourhood) committees.
2. The first secretaries of town committees (not integrated into a district) and of rural communes.
3. The (full-time) secretaries of Party base committees and organisations in enterprises coming under the district nomenklatura.

II. Functions in government bodies, local administration and the economic apparatus

1. The vice-presidents and secretaries of the presidia of district, town and neighbourhood people's councils.
2. The chairman of the District Economic Planning Commission, and the departmental heads of the district people's council presidia (as estimated by the executive committee of the district Party committee).
3. Primary and secondary school inspectors, the heads of secondary technical colleges.
4. The vice-presidents of district tribunals.
5. Deputy district public prosecutors.

6. Assistant district police commanders (not coming under the regional Party committee nomenklatura).
7. The chairmen of people's councils in towns not integrated into a district.
8. The chairmen of commune people's councils, and commune heads.
9. Commune police station chiefs.
10. District commanders of the Citizens Volunteer Militia.
11. District commanders of the Fire Brigade.
12. The directors of state farms, both integrated and autonomous.
14. The directors (presidents) of district economic organs.
15. Branch directors of the National Bank of Poland, the Agricultural Bank, the Polish Savings Bank, the State Insurance House, S.O.P., at the level of one or more districts.
16. The directors of industrial-commercial enterprises for public workers and the supply of services (not coming under the regional Party committee nomenklatura); the chairmen of co-operatives.
17. The directors (heads) of important medical establishments (hospitals, sanatoria).

18. The directors of enterprises forming part of a combine; the directors of factories forming part of a multi-factory enterprise.

III. Functions in social organisations

1. The presidents of district committees of the National Unity Front.
2. The presidents of district trade-union commissions.
3. The presidents of the district leaderships of the Association of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy.
4. The presidents of the district leaderships of youth organisations.
5. The presidents of the district leaderships of Agricultural Circles.
6. The presidents of the district womens council and of the district League of Women leadership.
7. The presidents of district physical culture committees.

Warsaw, October 1972

THE THREAT FROM OUTSIDE

Is There a Threat of Intervention? — By Jacek Kuron

(This article first appeared in Robotnik No.68-9 in the winter of 1980. It caused considerable controversy when it appeared in Poland.)

What are the limits to our freedom at the moment? How far can we go forward before what happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968 happens here?

People are always afraid that some specific event, e.g. a decision of 'Solidarity' about a strike, will perhaps overstep that limit. Now, the idea of looking at reality in this way, that intervention will follow because an anti-Soviet slogan is raised or someone from the KOR has some sort of function in Solidarity is complete nonsense.

And so to the first point. I think and I'm not alone in this opinion, that intervention in Poland would cost the Russians a great deal and they really don't want this at all.

Firstly they know — and this is the general feeling of the society — that the situation here would appear different from that in Czechoslovakia; that here it would lead to war.

Whether the Russians will invade or not depends on their possibility of intervening as well as on their judgement of whether Poland is slipping away from their sphere of influence.

Secondly, the mere fact of war in Poland would set in motion various centrifugal forces in the Soviet Union. Already various things are happening there strengthening nationalist conflicts, and the economic situation is worsening.

Thirdly, I deeply believe that a war in Poland would evoke tremendous support from public opinion for the governments of the West, and they would have to apply an economic blockade against the USSR. This would greatly encourage the Chinese, who have their own scores to settle with the Soviet Union, and who would gain considerable help from the West and would in effect form a new front in the Far East.

So by invading the Russians would most certainly lose the possibility of conducting their imperialist policies in Asia — expansion in the direction of the Indian Ocean. Perhaps, as the result of a military policy which would necessarily lead to the cutting off of Western aid, this would lead to the revolt of various countries in our camp, on which the cost of the armaments would fall. And this could mean the end of the Soviet Union.

I think that the Soviet leadership is becoming aware of all this and as long as it does not become necessary will refrain from intervention. But when would it appear that they really have to? When they recognise that Poland is slipping away from their sphere of influence? One would have to be Brezhnev to know this, and I don't expect that even Brezhnev would know this just now. Moscow has no fixed rules for invasion. I think that in the present situation it is disposed to accept various things as long as its control is not generally threatened.

Even so, such a general threat has nothing in common with the gestures made or stances taken or the words that are spoken.

If someone considers that ritual gestures are necessary here, let him make them. It doesn't seem that the great Soviet Union is very keen on this. There's an old saying: 'Moskwa slowam nie dowieriajet'. It's true that Moscow has no faith in words, either

affectionate or full of hatred. It must make sure, and making sure here means the army and the police.

As long as the Communists have the army and the police and, of course, the central administration, Moscow can still count on better times coming for them and on taking away everything from us. We are counting on even worse times coming for them and then they'll give back even more to us.

In Poland today a great social movement is being born — many movements, as there are others, not just trade unions. The people, having taken the hitherto-prevailing policies of the authorities to the limit are now taking their fate into their own hands. And nobody can stop them. It's possible to cry that they should stop, but that won't help at all.

And anyway to stop now would mean to condemn themselves to a catastrophe, as if the central steering system had already broken down and nothing new put into its place.

So we have on one side these great social movements, independent and self-governing, in various spheres of life; but on the other side the need to preserve the so-called 'leading role' of the party, in other words its control over the central administration, the police and the army. It is necessary to reconcile both these things. We must do this. We must form a completely new model resting on a compromise.

The point is that everything which determines the internal politics of the state should be settled by negotiation between the self-governing and independent organisations of society and the state authorities. The new model of social relations is in fact the institutional form that these negotiations take.

Such a model can't be thought out at a desk. It must be worked out through all these movements and through discussion. There will certainly be many ideas and they will be controversial. Only in this way can a model which becomes the property of the whole society be formed.

The process of the formation of these movements, the working out of the new model, is at the same time a process of wresting power from the communists in succeeding areas of social life. Such limitations on the power of the communists can lead to their losing it completely. It is in this sense that we must risk invasion by Soviet tanks.

But because we do not want this, neither do we want to—we cannot—cross the boundary which is the overthrow of central communist authority. We will not go this far only while we are building the institutions for negotiation. Without this each successive and unavoidable conflict threatens to explode and thus creates the risk of the unintentional overthrow of the government.

I am convinced that intervention will not happen. This is no irrational faith. What has happened up until now, what we have succeeded in obtaining so far, shows clearly that there exists in our society the strength, the talent and the possibility to organise ourselves and achieve the necessary reforms without disturbing the borders watched over by Russian tanks.

Disorganisation of Reservists in Ukraine — By David Satter

(This article first appeared in the Financial Times of 13 February under the title, 'Soviet reservists on Polish border sent home after 5 months'. We republish the complete text below. It was written by David Satter in Moscow.)

The Soviet Union has demobilised all reservists in the strategic Trans-Carpathia area near the Polish border. However, they have been warned that they may be recalled at any moment, according to reliable reports.

The demobilisation took place in early December, after reservists had been on active duty for more than five months. It was still in effect at the end of last month despite periodic crises in the Polish situation. There was no certainty when the reservists would be recalled, but the heads of all enterprises in the Trans-Carpathians were sent specific instructions for facilitating rapid mobilisation if necessary.

According to reports, the call-up of reservists in Trans-Carpathia in August proceeded amid scenes of near chaos. Residents of the area were dragooned on the street, cars were commandeered on the roads, and reservists deserted the assembly points en masse.

Because of this Mr Yuri Ilnitsky, the party First Secretary in the Trans-Carpathians, lost his post in early December, according to the report. So did regional party secretaries with responsibility for organisational matters and regional military commissars responsible for mobilisation.

After the order to demobilise, directors of factories and organisations were instructed to verify the addresses of their employees, to prepare for them to be replaced in critical

jobs in the event of a new call-up, and to put all cars and lorries belonging to each enterprise but reserved for emergency military use in good working order.

The mobilisation was described as routine 're-training' although it affected all reservists under the age of 35 in the Trans-Carpathians. A new call-up would be necessary at some time in the future, it was said, because of the disorganisation last August. Mobilisation then took almost two weeks to complete because of repeated desertions which took place on such a scale that it was impossible to punish individuals. The statutory time limit for 're-training' in the Soviet Union is three months and its extension without explanation led to severe demoralisation among reservists. Many of them are of Polish, Czech or Hungarian descent, who believed they were being mobilised for a possible invasion of Poland.

At first, they were told they would remain on duty until the beginning of 1981. The decision to demobilise may have reflected a Soviet view that an invasion of Poland was not imminent then. It was not known whether Soviet troops along other parts of the Polish border had also been demobilised.

The desertions of reservists, many of whom regularly left assembly points to sleep at home with their families, were said to reflect the low morale of people in the area who are well informed about events in Poland and sympathise strongly with the Poles. The mobilisation greatly strained the area's economy and led to bureaucratic confusion since there were no local provisions for paying reservists for more than three months on what was officially described as 're-training'. It seems likely,

however, that in view of the long period of mobilisation, any new call-up of reservists in the area will signal that an invasion is almost underway.

News of the demobilisation coincides, paradoxically, with a growing feeling among Western observers in Moscow that the danger of a Soviet invasion of Poland has increased. Soviet officials have hinted that Moscow's patience is wearing thin and *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, the Writers' Union weekly, said on Wednesday that the Polish question would be decided in the 'near future'. Past experience in the Polish situation has shown, however, that Soviet propaganda has often intensified after the immediate crisis had already passed and official statements can be a very poor guide to the Soviet leaders' real intentions.

Intensification of the Soviet press campaign over Poland in the past two weeks is a source of psychological pressure on the Polish free trade unionists and it prepares the Soviet people for a possible invasion. However, it commits the Soviet authorities to nothing, and could be quickly dropped with no lasting consequences.


Far more important may prove to be the Soviet leaders' reading of the future of detente and arms control, the likely policies of the new US administration and their own chances in such critical areas as the Gulf. The Soviet Union is beginning to achieve military superiority in selected areas and will be reluctant to make any move which would automatically create powerful public support in the West for a massive military build up. Moscow made far greater strides in building up its forces relative to the West during the period of detente than it could have done under conditions of cold war.

Political Prisoners

A number of members of the KPN are being held in jail. Four of them have been given serious charges for anti-state activity. A socialist is also in jail though not yet charged. His name is Krzysztof Bzdyl, aged 30, from Krakow. An economist, Bzdyl is a member of a group called the 'Movement to Co-ordinate the Polish Socialists'. He participated in the Foundation of the KPN, was arrested on 6 December 1980 along with others associated with the KPN and is being held in jail in Warsaw.

The KPN is a nationalist organisation founded in the autumn of 1979 by Leszek Moczulski. The initials stand for the Conference for Polish Independence. It urged all Poles who support the struggle for independence to subordinate all their differences on other questions such as social programmes to a united struggle for independence. On this basis Bzdyl and his socialist group joined the organisation.

The KPN was not a large organisation and not very important — for example, in relation to the KOR — before August 1980. But since the arrest of its leader and other members it has become very widely known.



Leszek Moczulski at the funeral of a pre-war Cavalry commander in Warsaw in the late 1970s.

Leszek Moczulski is an historian and journalist who in the West could be described as a right-wing nationalist. He was charged with telling a *Der Spiegel* correspondent that his aim was to overthrow the Polish Communist Party. Moczulski has been in jail since last September.

The people in jail are being charged for their political beliefs and are political prisoners. The fact that Solidarity disagrees with their views does not prevent it from demanding the immediate release of all KPN members.

CHURCH

Talks between Vatican and Kremlin

(The following article appeared in the German news weekly Der Spiegel in the first week in January.)

Ever since early September 1980 there have been secret contacts between the Soviet leadership and the Vatican. The aim has been to find a method of damming up the revolt in Poland which has been inconvenient for both sides. One of Moscow's first emissaries to Rome was one of 'the directors of the foreign department of the CPSU', who in September met the Vatican representative responsible for Eastern policy together with Cardinal Agostino Caseroli, Secretary of the Curia. The official reason for the meeting was an exchange of views on the forthcoming Madrid Conference. In reality, as stated by a Vatican source, the secret talks were mainly concerned with the situation in Poland. Caseroli assured the Moscow representative that Pope Wojtyla and the Vatican would do everything 'to ward off the misfortune facing Poland'.

Naturally such an assurance was somewhat unclear for the

Moscow leadership in the long run. In early December, immediately after the 'Eastern summit' in Moscow, another Soviet mediator left for Rome. This time it was a man of much greater political calibre: 53-year-old First Deputy of the CPSU Central Committee Department for International Affairs, Viktor Zagladin, an experienced Soviet choice for delicate missions to the West. Officially this trouble-shooter met leading Italian Communists, including Enrico Berlinguer, during the feverish crisis week. But on the sidelines of this meeting, the family visitor from Moscow also had contacts with the Curia. In the opinion of the Turin daily *La Stampa*, these unusual talks signified that the Soviet government would put back the possibility of invasion if the Church 'acted to dampen the strong revolt of the striking Polish workers'.

The Vatican did not wish to officially confirm Zagladin's confession, but nor did it deny it.

Adam Michnik on Church

(The following are extracts from a speech and question-and-answer session given by Adam Michnik at a large meeting in the Large Lecture Hall of Warsaw University. Michnik, one of the main KOR theoreticians, gave a survey of Poland's post-war history and current situation. The extract is taken from the French journal on Eastern Europe L'Alternative.)

How should we now interpret the Church's determining role, which is not directly linked to the election of Wojtyla as Pope or his trip to Poland? Actually I shall try to formulate the question in a different way. The Church's role can be both difficult and complex. But an observer of social phenomena is led to conclude that, **in the long term** rather than the immediate future, the Church offers a perfect model of coexistence between an independent social entity and the government. This model brings together two crucial factors: a thorough awareness of existing realities, and constant pressure on the government. Although in the last few days this attitude has certainly been exposed to some stress, the really vital question remains that model of behaviour in a situation not of one's own making. It is a model from which we must still draw all the various lessons. The Pope's visit revealed that Poles now have a new attitude going beyond a confessional framework. The question we must ask today is: what type of **modus vivendi** is the Church seeking with the government? will it try to build around itself a monolithic **political** institution under its own direction? Would we, in that case, have the situation feared by Western observers: a kind of **Iranianization** of Poland, with a Shah who can barely manage to prop himself



Conference of Polish Bishops

up, and a powerful Ayatollah who thinks only of toppling the regime? (*Noises in the hall.*) I can clearly see such tendencies in our Church. And I can also see others: especially a tendency to **Paxisation** (1), in which the Church would have great confessional freedom at the price of a new-style alliance between the altar and the government. A very clear answer can be read in the homilies of the Pope and the priests close to Solidarity. Their aim is an open Church in a pluralist society — a Church which does not wish to be authoritarian, but defends its own rights as part of the overall rights of humanity. I stress once again, however, that this is not the only tendency that people are trying to impose on the Episcopate.

Why is KOR's attitude to the Church more and more critical? Why is Cardinal Wyszynski being criticised?

First of all, I am not up with KOR's criticisms of the Catholic Church. If you are referring to the *Trybuna Ludu* article (*laughter*), let's be clear that that is just a pack of lies. I know you find that difficult to believe. But I, too, found it difficult to believe when I read in the article that KOR was founded in Geneva in 1975 ... As for KOR's attitude to the Church, such documents have never existed. And if Catholic or clerical KOR members had ever toyed with such ideas, the lay wing of KOR would have held them back. We continue to support the current formed around the Primate of Poland. Personally, I think it right that the Cardinal should wish to collaborate with the government. If I have understood him, the person who asked this question has a negative view of such collaboration, referring to the example of Pax or of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union. But that is absurd. What is true is that the Primate has always been very prudent and responsible in his behaviour, taking into account the danger from abroad. And in that respect I completely identify with him. Quite another matter is one's view of his August homily given during the strikes which, as you know, was cut by television. (2) No one in KOR has every taken a public position on this affair, and it's a pure lie to suggest otherwise. Still, I have no intention of dodging the issue. And, well, speaking for myself, I didn't like that homily. I think the Primate made a mistake in giving that homily which was not understood by the bulk of the population. But I don't think we can reduce the ideological position of the Primate and the Episcopate to that single unfortunate homily.

Abbot Orszulik Attacks KOR

The French, Italian, American, British and Vatican press have simultaneously noted that at a press conference given on 13 December, the spokesman of the Polish Episcopate, Father Orszulik, took a critical view of precisely such provocative statements /made by the KOR /

At this press conference, in front of Western journalists, particular stress was placed on the necessity to limit 'the activities which could inflict great damage on Polish interests'. 'Noisy and irresponsible declarations which were directed against our

Eastern neighbour' were also criticised. The Western press states that what is intended here is a critical appraisal of the KOR and Moczulski's KPN /Confederation for an Independent Poland/. The British BBC have identified Jacek Kuron as a proclaimer of these provocative slogans while the Paris *Le Figaro* of 13 December explains that it is intended to condemn 'those within the KOR and the dissident milieu who are unable to show a sense of responsibility'.

Protest by 48 priests

(The following letter of protest from 48 priests in South-East Poland has been translated from NTO, the Warsaw Solidarity Bulletin.)

Letter Addressed to the Priest Director of the Press Bureau of the Polish Episcopate in Warsaw, Priest Director Alojzy Orszulik. Przemysl, 16 December 1980.

The recent appearance of the Priest Director in his role as press spokesman for the Polish Episcopate (and also a number of other appearances) has produced enormous amazement and indignation among the clergy and the faithful. In his statements the Priest Director openly attacked the democratic opposition circles and, indirectly, NSZZ Solidarity accusing them of inappropriate actions. This was echoed by numerous radio and press commentaries in both the East and the West. Interested circles in society read this as an official condemnation by the Episcopate of the opposition in Poland. The naming of people and institutions is a straightforward denunciation which could have fatal consequences both for those people and for the Church whose mission should make it steer very clear of such behaviour. People and institutions who have performed great services for both the workers and the entire nation, have been wronged. In this way the Priest Director, consciously or unconsciously, has added his voice to the barrage of propaganda instigated by our neighbours, 'worried for our fate'. We do not consider that the correspondents have misinterpreted the intentions of the Priest Director. In that case an official explanation should have appeared a long time ago. Presumably the Priest Director forgot about this.

Presumably the Priest Director forgot about the fact that when making public statements he is not stating his own personal view but is speaking on behalf of the Polish Church. Yet its view is diametrically opposed to his statement. The Church in Poland owes its present status not to the policy of flirtation with the atheist circle ruling our country whose aim is the destruction of our country (of which presumably the Priest Director is very well aware) but to all those right-thinking members of the Church and nation who, for the past 35 years, have paid a high price for their continual attempts to wrench the Church's right to exist in the present situation from the hands of the authorities.

With complete firmness we declare that if the Priest Director, for purely personal reasons, is not able to state what is really the Church's position today, then he has no right to represent that Church in this office. This office is intended for a person of unshakeable character and civil courage. In relation to the above, we consider that in the future the Director of the press bureau of the Polish Episcopate should weigh each word spoken to the press.

Each one of us wants peace in this country. Each one of us depends upon peace in this country and a correct solution to all our problems. But the methods used by the Priest Director do not further this aim.

Signed by 48 priests in Przemysl and the Przemysl diocese.

Kuron's response

(The following is an extract from an interview given by Jacek Kuron to Le Monde and published on 9 January.)

In December there was a lot of talk about the statement made by Father Orszulik, Priest Director of the press bureau of the Polish Episcopate. Is it the case that the Church itself is against you?

Kuron: You have included the Church in the forces attacking

KOR and me personally. In this statement there is, I believe, an enormous misunderstanding. We should not identify the Episcopate with the Church, nor should we say that Father Orszulik's statements are representative of the positions of the Episcopate. We should also not limit the role of the Church to that of a political institution and extend the enormous authority enjoyed by the Church to a few sentences by the Director of the Episcopal press bureau.

Meeting with Cardinal

(The following is a report published in the Warsaw Solidarity Bulletin NTO.)

Statement by the Press Spokesperson of MSZ Solidarity, Mazowsze region, J. Onyskiewicz.

On 5 January 1981 Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski met a delegation from MSZ Solidarity, Mazowsze region ...

The Mazowsze representatives exchanged views with the cardinal concerning the press campaign against persons connected with Solidarity — a campaign to which some people have recently tried to add the authority of the Church. The will to defend all members and collaborators of the union was also emphasised ... In the final part of the meeting the cardinal stressed the support which the Polish Episcopate gives to Solidarity. Any attempt to break this support will not be successful.



Lech Walesa with members of the Episcopate

Reactions of Neighbouring Governments

By Susannah Fry

When talking about the East European regimes' responses to Poland one has to distinguish between their public response and what one can surmise they are thinking in private — the reaction of one set of Communist Party leaders to what looks frighteningly like the imminent dethronement of another.

The basic element of this private reaction is the fear of an independent trade union movement. Such a movement is an alternative power base; whatever legal limits may be placed on its freedom of action it has the potential to overthrow the regime. As Solidarity has developed, the governments of other East European countries have become increasingly nervous. For, after all, what has been happening in Poland is not specifically Polish. Such a revolt from below could equally well happen in any of the so-called workers' states and each of them has reason to fear that it might be the next in line.

The Method

How do they try to play down this possibility in public? The first premise of their propaganda is that the crisis must be shown to be specific to Poland. It is portrayed as the result of errors within the system, perpetrated either by individual people who can be identified and got rid of, or by groups of people who were infected by the atmosphere in which such errors/crimes were tolerated. The line is that there were many people within the Polish Party who were aware of what was happening, but they were not listened to. If their views had been heeded the crisis could have been averted. Either way, the crisis is not a crisis of the system as a whole but a crisis of popular confidence; this confidence can be restored with the help of a purged and invigorated Party.

Having thus disposed of the causes of the crisis the East European countries then go on to deal with its consequences in a similar way. They divide the 'movement of renewal' (the official Polish phrase for what has been going on since August) into two camps. On the one side there are the goodies, and on the other the 'anti-socialist forces'. As the crisis has developed different groups have been identified as falling into these two categories. At first the Party was good and the strikers were bad; then it became clear that not all Party members were good and that some of the strikers might not be as bad as others. Now commentators attempt to distinguish between 'ordinary workers' (good) and 'extremists' (bad) — members of KOR and Solidarity leaders fall into the latter category. The Party has got back into the 'good' list, although one may speculate that future purges or failure to deal with the 'anti-socialist' forces may again introduce an element of uncertainty.

To make them seem more threatening the 'anti-socialist forces' are portrayed as having close links with forces outside Poland who are seen to be wanting Poland's destruction. These shadowy elements, subsumed under the all-purpose labels of 'imperialist subversion' and 'West German revanchism' have been invoked by all the Communist leaderships, the Polish one included, in an attempt to explain away Solidarity's continuing radicalism and success.

As a background to their tales of alarm about subversion and reaction the East European propagandists lay considerable emphasis on the danger of Poland's imminent economic collapse. This serves several purposes: it shows up strikers in a bad light as people who are unconcerned that

they are leading Poland to the brink of the abyss; it highlights the economic aid being given to Poland by the other CMEA countries and therefore — hopefully — makes the people of these countries hostile to the Poles, who they see as wasting their money; and it enables the East European governments to make propaganda points about the slowness/rapaciousness/political motives of Poland's West European creditors.

Bulgaria

Each of the countries of Eastern Europe has given a different emphasis to Polish affairs in its own media. At one end of the spectrum — and at the other end of Europe — Bulgaria and Romania have given them as little attention as possible. Until the crisis in February Bulgaria was careful to take no independent stand. Major events were described using Polish, Soviet and other East European reports; any comment was simply re-hashed from these sources. Until the strikes at the end of January and the beginning of February such comment was, in any case, minimal. These strikes, however, made all the East European countries extremely nervous and this was reflected in Bulgaria's increased coverage of and hostile comment on the events. Jaruzelski's appointment as Premier clearly assuaged the regime's fears; a week later the Bulgarian Party paper, *Rabotnichsko Delo* was talking of the 'optimistic situation', even thinking in terms of a rapprochement with Solidarity.

'We must remember that more than one million members of the PUWP are members of Solidarity too. In other words, not all members of these trade unions can be put in the same category.'

(*Rabotnichsko Delo*, 20 February 1981).

Romania

Romania has given its population even less in the way of hard news. The Romanian people has been informed about some of the major events in Poland by means of factual reports from Polish government sources. Comment on major events, however, is Ceausescu's prerogative, and he would prefer to ignore Poland as much as possible. In his first major pronouncement on the situation, last October, he attempted to show that the crisis was the result of a specifically Polish situation — the continued existence of capitalist modes of production in agriculture — and, of course, the weakness of the Polish Party.

'We do not wish to interfere in any way in Poland's internal affairs, but I must say, for the knowledge of our Party, that had the country's development problems been solved together with the working class, with the people, had proper action been taken against that state of affairs in time, and had a firm attitude been taken against the anti-socialist elements and forces, these events could not have happened ... All this powerfully proves that any violation of socialist rules and principles, failure to understand the contradictions and solve them in time can bring highly consequential events. It is obvious that as long as there are classes, economic sectors whose basis differs, class struggle phenomena will continue and will always show in one way or another.'

The strikes pose quite a problem for Romania in every sphere. As far as foreign policy is concerned Ceausescu has strenuously tried to distance himself from the Warsaw Pact and pursue an independent line — he didn't allow

Romanian forces to be used in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and has expressed opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan. One of the planks of his foreign policy — for Western consumption, anyhow, is opposition to 'interference in the internal affairs of other countries', and he voiced this, with reference to Poland, in a speech to the Central Committee on 26 March. On the other hand, he has every reason to be worried about working-class discontent and opposition to his policies. This flared up in the miners' strike in the Jiu Valley in 1977, and it might well do so again, since the economic situation seems to be getting steadily worse.

Domestic developments since August indicate that at least the more superficial Polish lessons have been taken to heart: laws have been passed obliging Party and state officials to declare their personal wealth, forbidding them — apparently — from owning houses while in office, regulating the construction of holiday homes and providing for more worker participation in local government. The head of the trade unions has been sacked, and replaced by a former Minister of State Security; the agriculture minister has also been removed and it has been publicly admitted that Romanian agricultural policy has been wrong. Though observers may draw their own conclusions, the regime is taking care not to be seen to attach too much importance to the Polish events. While they were obviously enough of a threat to Ceausescu to force him back into the fold of the Warsaw Pact in December, little has been said about them since and it remains to be seen how Romania's attitude will develop.

Hungary

By contrast the Hungarian media, which was one of the first to say there were strikes in Poland, has given extensive coverage of the official Polish version of events. The Hungarians are just as anxious as all the other countries that working-class discontent should not get out of hand. There is evidence that the Polish events have found an echo in Hungary — the trade union leader Sandor Gaspar admitted as much in the autumn — but the leadership has tried to pre-empt such actions by reminding Hungarian workers how lucky they are. The equivalent of the Hungarian TUC Congress, which was held just before Christmas, provided plenty of opportunity for the regime to emphasise the rights and the independence which the Hungarian union possesses — including, apparently, the right to strike. The leaders have bent over backwards to assure the workers that they are the ones that count, that their grievances are nearly always justified and will receive sympathetic treatment. Some legal measures have also been taken to democratise the trade unions, while a five-day week has been introduced ahead of schedule. The regime's nervousness is, however, modified by the knowledge that Hungary's economic problems are not nearly as bad as Poland's.

Hungarian reporting of events has been the most even-handed of all the East European countries; those of the workers' demands which have reached the official Polish media have been reported in Hungary. Similarly, comment has been fairly well-informed and not malicious. There has been criticism of the 'extreme', 'anti-socialist' elements, which are portrayed as preventing honest workers from working and generally stirring things up, but there have been few personal attacks on Solidarity leaders or on oppositionists. By contrast with the other countries, Hungary factually reported the strike

at the end of January and the beginning of February; however, the Hungarian media now appears to be simply keeping quiet. When the February strikes ended and Jaruzelski was appointed Premier, the Hungarian regime defined its attitude to Solidarity much more clearly. The strikes were now said to have been instigated by elements similar to those which were active in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, who wanted 'to turn the working masses against socialism' (*Nepszabadsag*, 15 February 1981). While not dismissing Solidarity out of hand, they emphasised that 'one must try to distinguish between its leaders, certain spokesmen and representatives, and the masses of Polish workers, who are fighting for the purification of socialism, for Poland's socialist prosperity'. (Janos Berecz, Politburo member, 19 February 1981) The crisis in Bydgoszcz has been given much less attention than previous events; and comment has tended to be more critical.

East Germany

The attitude of the GDR, as reflected in the media for domestic consumption, has diverged somewhat from the consistently hard line one might have expected. The fact that most people in the GDR can receive West German television produced a curious situation at first, with the regime apparently unsure about how to react. The media played down the crisis for days and then, on 24 August, suddenly broadcast the whole of Edward Gierek's speech to the nation live on television. If the people of the GDR had really been relying on their own media to tell them what was happening in Poland they would have been puzzled at this apparent over-reaction; however, they knew — and the government knew they knew — exactly what was going on. It was not until long after the agreements — in fact, after the one-hour strike on 3 October — that the GDR leadership took a public stand. Honecker made an important speech at Gera on 14 October in which he said that Poland was an important link in the socialist community, and the GDR would make sure it stayed that way. The impact of the events in Poland could be inferred from the rest of the speech and the concomitant measures to isolate the GDR from the West (by increasing the minimum currency exchange requirement for visitors from West Germany) and from Poland itself (by severely restricting cross-border travel). Subsequent statements emphasised that Poland could sort out its own problems, while drawing attention to the economic assistance the GDR was providing to enable it to do so.

Until the end of January East German coverage of Polish issues was not particularly detailed, and the public was provided with little informed comment from correspondents in Warsaw. The media generally repeated Soviet or Czechoslovak stories and accusations, or they quoted criticisms by leaders of other CPs — the USA and Denmark, for example. This low-key approach may have been valuable in that when the GDR did deliver a very tough line on the subject — as it has done since the end of January — this has been noticed.

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia, by contrast, has taken such a tough line from the start that its only possible next step would be to demand that the Solidarity leadership be shot at dawn. It is probably the more vulnerable of the two countries internally, with a highly unpopular leadership, and the post-68 economic recovery now disintegrating. Its population may not have access to Western media in the same way as the GDR's, but they are not completely isolated from it either. Czechoslovakia also has a small Polish population near Ostrava — just across the border from Katowice — which has, apparently, caused some trouble. One could list many

reasons why the Czechoslovak leaders should be nervous, but their own anti-Solidarity propaganda campaign provides the most telling evidence.

The official Czechoslovak line took shape only slowly. At first people were told as little as possible about what was actually going on; what the strikers were demanding, what the agreements consisted of. After the agreements were concluded, it appeared that the new trade unions were here to stay. At this point the Czechoslovak leadership seems to have decided that since people were going to get information from somewhere, they might as well be offered something which at least masqueraded as information on their own television and radio. The basic element of this propaganda was an attack on what were described as 'the so-called free trade unions' (though how they had come into existence and what they stood for was never explained). They were categorised as 'anti-socialist', and great stress was laid on their links with oppositionists in Poland — the KOR and the KPN — and with forces like the AFL-CIO and 'West German revanchists' outside the country.

By late November, early December, when East European anxiety about the situation was visibly increasing, these criticisms of Solidarity were extended to include comparisons between Poland 1980 and Czechoslovakia 1968. The line was that 'anti-communist centres', who were manipulating the Polish situation from abroad, had profited from their experiences in 1968. Now, in Poland, they were going in for 'gradual, discreet and unprovocative destabilisation', but their goal was clear: 'to set in motion and accelerate some sort of anti-socialist aggressive trade unionism'. (*Rude Pravo*, 27 November 1980)

Another frequent point of reference was 'Marxism-Leninism'. In East European communist jargon this means party orthodoxy: a divergence from Leninist principles — though what these are is never stated — is, in effect, heresy. The Czechs have suggested, though never openly stated, that independent trade unions are not quite Leninist. (The Poles, for their part, are trying to pretend that they are and that in fact the process of renewal marks a return to Leninist principles.) The new year, ushered in by the confrontation over the five-day week, saw Czechoslovak propaganda become even more strident. References to the discreet destabilisation of anti-communist centres were replaced by shrill comments on the 'chaos and anarchy' now prevailing, stirred up by the 'counter-revolutionary Walesa's trade unions' (sic) at the bidding of the Vatican, KOR, Leszek Moczulski, the AFL-CIO and West German revanchists. Czechoslovakia is the only East European country to have attacked the Vatican in these terms for its influence on Solidarity; this hysteria is probably directed more at Catholics at home, where the regime has recently been trying to crack down on the Church, than at Catholics in Poland. Although the situation in Poland is now immeasurably calmer than it was in January these vicious attacks are still continuing.

The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union has been the least willing of all the East European countries to mention the existence of Solidarity. Throughout, it has concentrated its propaganda attack on the twin — and largely interchangeable — bogies of Western interference and anti-socialist forces in Poland. Moscow has also put a great deal of emphasis — more than any other country — on the economic aid which it's giving Poland and, by implication, the goods which this is depriving its own population of. As the situation has developed the vague talk about subversive centres in the West who were somehow

fomenting revolution in Poland became more concrete. First the Soviets revealed that there was a trade union called Solidarity; then that organisations like the KPN and the KOR, people like Moczulski and Michnik, were working from within it, concealing their counter-revolutionary intentions with statements about the good of the workers. Finally, by mid-January it was being dismissed as an organisation; it was said to be 'not interested in normalisation' and to have ambitions to become a political force. By comparison with that of the other countries, however, Soviet anti-Solidarity propaganda has been fairly restrained. Personal attacks on Walesa and the dissidents have been left to Czechoslovakia, the faithful lieutenant. The Soviet Union is clearly much happier when its propaganda can follow the familiar lines — European security, detente and peace — and when it can attack familiar targets like world reaction, imperialism and Radio Free Europe. It finds it hard to strike the right balance when these forces of reaction appear inside a fraternal socialist country and its concept of European security is really questioned.

Inside the country the regime has responded to the Polish events by clamping down on all opposition movements, completing the process which began earlier in the year after the invasion of Afghanistan and the Olympics. There is really no way of knowing whether people sympathise with the Poles, whether they are hostile or simply indifferent — or, indeed, how much information they have about what is going on. One report that government call-up of reservists in the Sub-Carpathian region (on Poland's south-east border) at the end of last year had to be abandoned in the face of non-cooperation and indifference, indicates that there is some sympathy with the Poles, since these reserves were presumably called up in case there was an invasion. (*Herald Tribune*, 14 February 1981) (However, it also begs the question of why the Soviet government would call up reserves from that particular region to perform such a sensitive task.)

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia, not being a member of the Warsaw Pact, is different; because it is on the sidelines invasion rumours can be freely discussed, speculation about what will happen next is permitted. However, although strikes are by no means unknown in Yugoslavia the Polish crisis does touch a raw nerve. Commentators have been at pains to point out that the Polish workers are going a bit too far; they portray the government as being willing to do its best to honour the agreements whereas Solidarity members are seen as at best unrealistic, at worst maximalist. However, at least one member of the government Dusan Dragosavac, has criticised current coverage of the situation as being biased in favour of Solidarity against the PUPW. The Yugoslav leadership is also being hypersensitive to any manifestations of internal dissent at the moment, although this may be only partly a reflection of the fears which the Polish crisis has provoked.

The Crises

Since August, three major crises have erupted in Poland, each time raising the possibility of Soviet intervention. The first was in December, and culminated in the Warsaw Pact summit; the second took place in January and February over the free Saturdays issue; the third, over the Bydgoszcz events, is still in progress.

In the case of the first two crises, the East European countries responded to events which they thought were getting out of hand, but revealed comparatively little to their own population about what was happening. The Bydgoszcz events are rather different, since they

appear to have been indirectly instigated as a result of Soviet pressure.

The strikes in late November and early December 1980 considerably alarmed the East European regime, which saw them as a threat to the operation of the security forces and the Warsaw Pact's defence system. They prompted the most ominous statements so far from Czechoslovakia — where the situation was compared with 1968 — and the first really direct warning from the Soviet Union. Concrete steps were taken which fuelled Western suspicions that intervention was in the offing: Czechoslovak-Polish border traffic was stopped, Western military observers were barred from the border area, and the Polish leaders were summoned to a conference in Moscow. The communique issued from the meeting, however, merely reiterated the line that Poland could solve its own problems, appearing to indicate that no steps would be taken yet.

Things calmed down for a while over Christmas; but as soon as the free Saturdays issue came up, the East European regimes went back on the offensive, describing Solidarity as an 'organisation sheltering counter-revolutionaries' (**Rude Pravo**) and constantly elaborating on its anti-socialist and destructive nature. But it was

the continuation of strikes after the free Saturdays issue had been settled — and the profoundly 'subversive' demands of the strikers — which really appears to have alarmed the Eastern Bloc regimes. The GDR and Bulgaria now also began to echo the increasingly frequent Soviet complaints about the chaos and anarchy prevailing in Poland. A new and disturbing element was the description of Solidarity as a potential force of political opposition. It began to look as if both the Polish regime and those of its neighbours were moving towards confrontation.

This crisis was defused by the appointment of Jaruzelski as Premier. It's hard to tell whether the increased tension was genuine or whether in fact it was carefully stage-managed with the aim of bringing about a change of leadership (and, if this is the case, whether it was Pinkowski or Kania who was to be got rid of). However, even if the relief expressed by the East European countries at Jaruzelski's appointment was genuine, their support was and still is conditional on his doing something about Solidarity.

The third crisis, following the events in Bydgoszcz, was in fact a direct result of a provocation by the authorities. It appears that

hard-line forces within the Party and the government took the initiative; and it is probably correct to assume that they have at least tacit support from the Soviet Union. Brezhnev's speech at the Soviet Party Congress was perhaps misleadingly conciliatory. The example of Poland, he said, showed how the Party must 'lend a sensitive ear to the voice of the masses, struggle resolutely against all manifestations of bureaucracy and voluntarism, actively develop socialist democracy and pursue a well-thought out and realistic policy in foreign economic relations.'

Subsequent developments, however, rather belie this impression. When the Polish and Soviet leaders met after the Congress, they said that attempts to weaken the socialist community must be given a 'firm and resolute rebuff'. Polish communists had it in them to 'turn the course of events' and remove the dangers hanging over the Polish people. This statement implied that changes would have to be made, and some people in the Polish leadership clearly thought it gave them a green light. Soon afterwards an openly anti-semitic rally was held in Warsaw (given extensive coverage only by Czechoslovakia), and this was followed by the events in Bydgoszcz.

Charter Support for Solidarity

Events in Poland, and the Husak regime's violent attacks on Solidarity, have produced a concerned reaction among supporters of the Charter 77 movement well aware of the broader significance for Eastern Europe. Thus a Charter statement of 14 December 1980, signed by spokespersons Marie Hromadkova and Milos Rejchrt and by Ladislav Lis on behalf of the Prague spokespersons' collective, makes a strong appeal against any outside intervention in Poland. 'The way in which things have so far developed in Poland,' they write, 'is an encouragement for all those seeking a peaceful, democratic solution to the problems of our world; it is also a guarantee that the Polish people can itself master the present critical situation, as stated by the Polish leadership and a number of officials from other countries. We fully share this point of view, and are therefore all the more alarmed at attitudes suggesting an intention to intervene from outside in the Polish situation.' The positions put forward in the Czechoslovak media, which they describe in some detail, 'disorients our public opinion,

harms the friendly relations between our peoples, and is in blatant contradiction with the ethical norms and bases of international relations ... Our public opinion is alarmed at those troop movements on Poland's borders which no official statement has tried to explain. In this context, our public opinion is beginning to fear that Czechs and Slovaks will have to spill their own blood and that of their Polish brothers.'

The Charter statement ends with a warning about the consequences of intervention. 'The historical experience of our peoples shows that a violent outside intervention does not solve the country's internal problems, but on the contrary deepens and exacerbates them, producing feelings of hatred and guilt as a weight upon later generations ... For this reason we believe that the officials of the Czechoslovak state would help to calm our public opinion, sustain the positive hopes and developments in Polish society, and deepen the friendship between our peoples, if they were to clearly indicate that Czechoslovakia will in no way interfere in the free course of

events in Poland.'

In response to the mounting attacks on KOR, three Charter spokespersons, Vaclav Maly, Bedrich Placak and Jaroslav Sabata, addressed a letter of solidarity to KOR on 10 February 1980. 'We consider it our duty,' they write, 'to send you this expression of our solidarity. You and we are linked by a common task — to join forces in creating a just society in which the interests of all will coincide with the free development of every individual's potential. The beginning of the road you have taken was marked by a noble act — the defence of persecuted workers. Your efforts won you respect and natural authority in the whole of Polish society. You have since then inspired and effectively supported civic initiatives beyond the frontiers of your country. Your selfless, noble and courageous work cannot be demeaned by slander or suppressed by violence. May it continue to meet with the people's understanding and further the attainment of humanitarian objectives.'

MESSAGE OF GREETINGS TO THE POLISH WORKERS FROM THE BEIJING APRIL FIFTH FORUM

Dear Polish Workers!

Your struggle has won a great victory that impressed people all over the world. Your victory clearly shows the tremendous power and new class conscientiousness generated by the solidarity of the working class. It has clearly proved that the revisionist bureaucratic monopolistic privileged class and expansionism are only paper tigers in front of the people's revolutionary power. It clearly shows that the proletarian democratic revolution is an inevitable trend in historical development. It breaks through national boundaries, giving it a wide international significance. We, the young generation of the Chinese working class express our enthusiastic congratulations and salute!

We wish you a continuous progress and contribute tremendously to the realisation of democratic socialism!

Working people of all countries, unite!
'April Fifth Forum' Editorial Board,
Beijing, China. Sept., 1980.

If Edmund Baluka Needs to ...

The picture here is an advertising stunt that Edmund Baluka, the Chairperson of the Szczecin Strike Committee in the grim days of 1970-71, very kindly agreed to do for us. To be honest he doesn't need to read **Labour Focus** in order to find out what is going on in Poland. But there are very few Balukas! So we hope you will agree that we are worth preserving. If so you can help us to keep our head above water by subscribing, giving us small donations and publicising our bulletin. You will find our address and subscription rates on the inside front cover of this issue.

One way to help us is to buy a complete set of back issues — there are very few left of some — for the modest price of £20. As a record of the opposition movements in Eastern Europe — largely in their own words — since we started in the spring of 1977, they are unrivalled in English.



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