

independent socialist

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china, the monolith cracks

AT this writing, the press reports massive strikes, demonstrations and street actions by workers in Nanking, Shanghai and other centers. These struggles appear to be spreading to Canton and beyond. Open clashes have occurred between the Red Guard and anti-Mao workers. Communications and transportation have broken down in many areas of China.

These dramatic events are only the latest in a series of clashes and incidents that have rocked the "Peoples' Republic." China is a shambles; she stands on the brink of civil war and—possibly—revolution. Yet only a short while ago we were told that China was a monolith . . . solid and united in revolutionary goals. The U.S. State Department presented us with a picture of a powerful united "yellow horde" ready to inundate Southeast Asia and, then, the world. The Maoists themselves, of course, sought to present the image of a unified super-utopia filled with happy industrious people devoted to building "socialism." The "innocents abroad" came back from

the mainland with stories of contented, singing peasants and a beneficent and beloved Mao presiding over all.

Now a new kind of wind from the East has blown down this facade. What was and is the real China and how did the present conflagration occur?

Mao's China is not and never has been a socialist society. The workers never owned or controlled the means of production; the peasants do not control the land they till, with the exception of small private plots now grudgingly allowed by the regime. Control of the economy is

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editor's notes

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vietnam

THE American bombs falling on Hanoi are one more step in the deliberate escalation of the Vietnamese war, a war waged against the interests of both the American and the Vietnamese people. The Johnson Administration has again shown the world that no measure is ruled out in the protection of its political stake in South Vietnam. Only a massive and militant outpouring of protest can stop the United States in its headlong rush toward World War III.

The war in Vietnam is the most unpopular war in the history of the United States. But the organized peace movement has not yet been able to tap the disquiet and disgust of the American people. In addition to moral appeals, it must appeal to the real interests of the great majority in this country.

Until recently, the war stimulated increased employment as well as inflation. But now, while inflation continues, non-military production is being discouraged. Lay offs are on the rise. Even those workers who think they support the war are beginning to move against the concrete effects of the war. At the same time, the war is being used as an excuse to cut already-inadequate welfare funds and to stifle the Negro movement. The forces in American society which possess the power to stop the war are becoming increasingly disaffected with the Administration.

There is a danger, however. Many of those who want to end the war are ready to listen to the rightists who call for massive escalation as a way to "settle" the conflict quickly. The absence of a strong, meaningful, and clear opposition from the Left has created a vacuum in American politics that the right-wing demagogues are beginning to fill. This poses a grave threat to American democracy and to world peace.

The peace movement has an obligation to work for a new political alliance in America, an alliance of workers, the Negro people, and the poor which can reshape American policy both at home and abroad. But we must recognize that such an alliance can only be meaningful if it is both militant and independent of the war Establishment. It must call for an immediate withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, but it must do more than that. It must present a social program for the United States and for the world, based on a firm commitment to democracy, human rights, and human welfare. It must make clear its independence of both sides in the dirty war that is turning Vietnam into a wasteland. It must speak directly to the needs of the American people, for full employment, for racial equality, for the abolition of poverty, and above all, for an immediate end to the war in Vietnam. No touting of Establishment politicians who have minor differences with the Administration, can stop the war. Only a militant, independent, and democratic opposition can accomplish that.

It is to the building of such an opposition in this country that we are dedicated.

where we stand

THROUGHOUT the world, men are struggling for their rights, for control over their own lives. If these struggles are to be realized in a truly democratic society, a society in which men are free to live their own lives, certain fundamental ideas and principles must become decisive. It is these ideas and principles which independent socialists represent and for which we struggle.

For the struggle for the freedom of the vast majority is the struggle against those institutions which perpetuate their subordination to small ruling elites. Capitalism is an outlived system whose lifeblood is private profit and corporate oppression, even when represented as a "welfare state" or "mixed economy," and even when its government is administered by liberals or social-democrats. In the midst of a false prosperity based on a Permanent War Economy, it still perpetuates poverty, unemployment, racism and imperialism.

The "Communist" regimes—of Stalin, Khrushchev or Brezhnev, Titoists, Maoists, or other—have nothing in common with independent socialism. They represent a new type of totalitarian, exploitative state, based on a social system in which the state owns the means of production but only the ruling bureaucracy "owns" or controls the state. The various Communist Parties are essentially political agents of this class, not allies of socialism. This ruling class may concede reforms under pressure, like all other rulers, but the limits of such reform are set by the fact that it will not willingly give up its totalitarian state control or reform itself out of power.

The struggle against these ruling classes is the struggle for a new society in which people exercise democratic control over the economic, political and social institutions that determine their lives. Our view of socialism is not one of mere nationalization or of governing boards and bureaus. Socialist society must have its roots in democratic councils elected in factories, offices and neighborhoods. And its role must be limited to the "administration of things, not of people."

To create such a society, mass movements from below are necessary. People must learn in the course of fighting for their goals that they are capable of controlling their world. Mass action teaches man more about his capabilities than all the classrooms in the world. Socialism—control of society by the people themselves—can not be imposed by elites no matter how "well-meaning." It can only result from a mass movement offering opposition and alternatives to the ruling Establishments; seeking to fight them from below, not relying on permeation from above.

The future of American socialism must find its hope in the struggles for freedom and democracy today. The struggles of slum tenants, Negroes, farm workers, welfare clients, students, anti-war demonstrators, and rank and file trade unionists are all movements demonstrating the fact that men do desire to control their own lives. We support, participate, and learn from these struggles.

We look to the Negro struggle as the immediate agency in American society that can bring freedom and self-respect to the black twenty million, and as the spark that can ignite the struggle for freedom on a broader front. We respect the need for Negroes to organize and lead their own fight. On the basis of Black Power the Negro

is free to make alliances with others as he sees fit.

We look to the current "student rebellions" to puncture the myth of American well-being and to expose the roots of that technological and computerized barbarism which differs from the jungle variety only in that it more effectively denies human aspiration and individuality.

We look to the peace movement to bring home to America the cost of its imperialism both in lives and material resources.

While we are loyal participants in these and other movements, we feel that we bring a distinct vantage point and direction to these movements. It is our central idea that these movements can only have a revolutionary democratic impact if they can stimulate and create links with a movement of the American working class. And this is essential for only through fundamental social change can these movements reach their fruition.

Throughout modern history, the working class has initiated the democratic institutions that have shown the way for progressive struggle—the Paris Commune of 1871, the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. In America, it was the struggles of the working class which contributed most to the strengthening of whatever democratic tradition persists: from the I.W.W. to the rise of the CIO. It is this democratic impulse as well as its central social position and cohesion that leads us to look to the working class as the leading force in any truly socialist movement.

In the past few years, countless rank and file insurgencies have embroiled the labor movement. The war inflation and threats to job security will stimulate greater struggles in labor which will further belie the myths of workers' complacency.

Attempts to reform the Establishment Parties from within, both Democratic and Republican, lead only to the stultification of the democratic impulse. Struggling American workers, Negroes, students and poor must learn to rely upon themselves as the only means for their own liberation. A great step in that direction would be the creation of an independent political movement representing all these forces. Independent political action from these movements can be a step in the direction of the creation of a new political party which can offer a real alternative to Establishment politics.

INTERNATIONALLY, we work for the victory of the third camp, the unlabelled and frequently unrecognized attempt to build a popular and positive alternative to the war blocs, to the imperialist forces of the USA, the USSR, Britain, France, China, and their allies and satraps throughout the world.

As Americans we particularly oppose the presence of U.S. troops in other lands and call for their immediate withdrawal so that nations like Vietnam may determine their own destiny. We look to independent democratic movements of workers and peasants as the alternative to the future Communist rulers as leaders of the anti-colonial struggle.

The new Independent Socialist groups in America have fraternal ties to similar groups internationally. Together with them we seek to give voice to the growing feelings of people everywhere—that they have had enough of the old elitisms and wish to fight for their own needs.

(CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1)

vested in the state and the state is the fiefdom of the upper echelons of the party, government and army bureaucracies. By virtue of this control, the bureaucracy rules as a class, in its own interests. The essential social structure is the same as that of the Soviet Union, a bureaucratic class society. There are, however, certain real differences from the Russian experience.

After Stalin murdered off the Old Bolsheviks and consolidated his rule, he maintained it by an admixture of terror and some nationalist sentiment. No totalitarian society can stay in existence, let alone build its productive capacity, by terror alone. In fact, terror is inefficient and wasteful (humanist factors are not a big consideration for the bureaucracy). In China, while there was terror, the elan of the people was much higher than Stalin ever dreamed of obtaining. After all, the Maoists had smashed Chiang Kai-shek, had fired the popular imagination with dreams of a China no longer an imperialist pawn but a great modern state, had initiated preliminary reforms which whetted the appetites of and gave new hope to the wretched masses. In short, the new Maoist ruling class was in the enviable position of having tremendous mass support which they carefully disciplined and buttressed with a campaign of Orwellian "thought reform." And the peasants and workers labored, sacrificed and starved.

ECONOMIC DISASTER

In order to consolidate and maximize its power at home and abroad, the Maoist ruling class embarked upon a massive campaign of industrialization and modernization. Capital was decidedly scarce and had to be accumulated from essentially one source—out of the backs of the workers and peasants. Yet, after seventeen years, Chinese economy is still backward, the masses still extremely poor, and the economy still vulnerable to the slightest variations in the harvest. Improvements have been made on the land and important advances achieved in industry, but in relation to the scale of the problem, and even the regime's goals, these are small achievements. Agriculture is still slack and has probably not reached the 1958 level. Yet, since 1958 the population has grown by about 100 million people: far more than can have been accommodated by the modest increase in industry. Unemployment and rural employment absorbed most of the newcomers into the labor force which means that China is increasingly rural. Within agriculture things are indeed miserable. The 12 Year Agricultural Plan for 1956-67 (scrapped due to failure in 1959) set a target of 450 million tons of grain for 1967, compared to 180 tons in 1955. The actual output in 1965 was only about 190 million tons and the natural disasters in the North and South this year combined with tighter conditions on the world grain market make this year's prospects even dimmer. The means to develop industry, to expand military production (including the grossly expensive nuclear weapons and delivery systems), to feed China's new millions and sustain the old must be extracted from the sweat of the workers and peasants. Even with the best of luck, and excluding civil war, it is difficult to see how China can achieve more than a 2-3 percent increase in foodstuffs.

In a society already developed with an effective centralized administration and an elaborate communications system, such as Russia, marking time economically would

not be so important. But in an underdeveloped society geared for breakneck expansion, any check can be disastrous. Understanding why provides a key to the crisis China now faces.

Mao's China, like all totalitarian economies, requires a great degree of centralization of authority. However, the backward nature of the Chinese economy, the low level of technology and communications, combined with the incredible vastness of China and its population, encourages the growth of enclaves of local power potentially capable of resisting the central authority.

This natural parochialism led the ruling bureaucracy into certain practices which in turn precipitated the strengthening of these "independent kingdoms." In Russia, central political power was enforced through the Communist Party's complete dominance of Soviet life. Under Stalin's rule, the tendency to play particular interests off against each other—divide and thereby rule—was distinctly subordinate to the central Party's direct control. In Chinese society, the divide and rule method was dominant. The attempt was made, formalized in Mao's "theory of contradictions," to pose various sections of the bureaucracy, party, state and army, against each other in order to maintain the dominance of central control.

Stalin used the purge in response to the inevitable parochial interests that developed among Party and State bureaucrats in Russian society. If he couldn't cure the problem, he could eradicate the symptom. The Chinese, probably influenced by the more difficult problem of the same nature (Russian society in 1928 was far more advanced industrially than China in 1967), used a different method. Personnel was switched frequently from one institution to another to prevent the cadre from developing particular interests. In addition, bureaucrats were frequently given a multiplicity of functions to divide their role interest and help integrate the bureaucracy.

For example, each provincial unit of the Party (there are six regional bureaus and 27 regional parties) simultaneously combines control of the communes, industry and local military formations—a large number of district party secretaries are also political commissars to district military units. In Sinkiang, a classic example, Wang-En-Mao is simultaneously first secretary of the Party and Commander of the Sinkiang Military Region. However, the backwardness of communications and transportation imposed serious limitations on the continual transferring of bureaucrats—not to mention the obvious inefficiency of such a practice—and the multiplying of functions only served to broaden the nature of the local interest groups.

The rationale for the bureaucracy's tight rule is the need for rapid industrialization. To the extent that it succeeds in maintaining the economy at full steam ahead pace, parochial interests can perhaps be dealt with. Economic change, the turmoil of development with rapid geographical mobility and high prospects for the ambitious, would curb these parochial tendencies and integrate the country, making its different parts increasingly interdependent, but it is precisely economic advance which is most difficult to achieve.

Massive opposition to the "Great Leap Forward," and the economic disasters of 1960-61 forced the Chinese bureaucracy to operate the economy at a low tempo. Few figures have been published, but it is clear that for a long period, the country has marked time, and even the expansion of recent years has been slow, cautious and

conservative. This slackening of economic expansion has given rise to the tremendous growth of local enclaves of power to the increasing detriment of the central power apparatus.

BEHIND THE CRISIS

In addition to its severe social and economic problems, the regime faced additional difficulties. Undoubtedly, a decisive factor in Mao's present assertion of his authority is China's recent set backs in foreign policy. In South-east Asia, the most dangerous crisis since Korea directly threatens China, yet Peking, at the risk of annihilation, can do nothing about it except bluster. China's help to North Viet-Nam is the minimum conceivable by a power in China's position—no Chinese troops are fighting for Hanoi and China has not opened up its campaign on Taiwan to divert U.S. troops from South Viet-Nam as the campaign on the Sikkim border was begun Sept. '65 to divert Indian troops away from Pakistan. But Chinese impotence in Viet-nam is only the tip of the iceberg, only the most visible sign of the failure of Chinese foreign policy. The three pillars of Chinese hope, Indonesia, Ghana, and Cuba have all fallen from the fold, and Chinese influence in Latin America and Africa have diminished. Both North Korea and North Viet-Nam are now at best neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and even the Japanese Communist Party has become hostile to China. The love of Albania is no consolation for the bureaucracy. All of these facts compound the corner the bureaucracy finds itself in. Obviously, political choices of the most imperative nature are forced on the regime. The political choices are many, even though the prospects for none of them are bright: reorientation toward Russia; a militant and hostile line toward Russia and/or the U.S.; verbal militancy in foreign affairs coupled with concretely soft actions (the current policy); etc. Related to international policy are the domestic alternatives: Liebermanism; another Great Leap; centralized economic progress; decentralized advances; and various combinations thereof.

The inevitability of factionalism in a situation of sharp alternatives, once central control had diminished, the growth of independent power bases within the bureaucracy, and the necessity of making concrete choices provide the backdrop and underlying reasons for the "great proletarian cultural revolution." While questions of which leaders adhere to which factions and what the exact political lines of these groups are remain murky, the dynamics of the factional movements are clear. They begin with the fact, revealed by the Maoists, that Lui Shao-ch'i and his allies had pushed Mao into a figurehead role some time ago. They were aided by the diminution of Mao's image that resulted from the failure of the Great Leap Forward. Under the crush of China's problems, Mao has made a bid for recapturing full power. In this context, the incredible avalanche of propaganda claiming success in nuclear weaponry, car design, melon growing, ping pong—yes ping pong—as a result of an understanding of the "Thought of Chairman Mao" becomes intelligible. It is necessary for Mao to regain his image in as rapid and exalted a fashion as possible if he is to combat his factional opponents. It is important to prove his health, hence he swims the Yangtse. What at first seems idiocy, turns out to be the logic of a fight within the ruling class.

Communist society is so organized that questions of this nature cannot be resolved by voting. The system functions at optimum when one man has full power and is sole arbiter. In the absence of this, questions can only be resolved by the leading Party committees. If the stakes are high there is the danger that one faction will not take defeat in good grace and will organize support at a lower level. Mao, displaced at the top, was unable to gather support in the ranks of the Party. While he could control the top echelons of the army and some of its units, it too was fragmented into separate baronies, so too the state apparatus. In fact, since a central purpose of Mao's "revolution" has been to eliminate these independent foci of power, he could hardly use them. He had to go outside the bureaucracy for support.

The tremendous idolization of Mao and his "thought," therefore, was initiated to prepare the ground for the utilization of sections of the masses against the recalcitrant sections of the ruling class. For any ruling class such a technique is fraught with danger. The "peril" of a mass movement getting out of hand is awesome, particularly for class rule in a Communist society which cannot allow too much political leeway to such a movement. For Mao, it was a matter of good social sense to solicit his initial support among a relatively privileged group, students. Nonetheless, even the Red Guards began to get out of control. They soon became divided in loyalties between different leaders, went beyond tackling the targets suggested by the Maoists, and ran amok in the major cities, precipitating serious disorder. The scale of operations got out of hand—parading one to two million people before the Tien an Min for 4 to 7 hours nine times since last August is only one example of the scale of disorganization in the life of Peking. The Party claims ten or eleven million people have been to the capital since August, and at one time a million or two must have been camped in the city—fighting among themselves, preying on passers by.

The confusion within the Red Guards emerged in the posters put up in the capital, the factionalism that was rife sooner or later attacked every leader, including Mao and Lin Piao; new appointments seem hardly to have been made before the new leaders were attacked—Tao Chu, for example, new head of propaganda and tipped as fourth in the national pecking order, or Li Hsueh-teng, the North China Bureau secretary brought in to run Peking after the fall of Peng Chen, or the new first secretaries of Kiangsu, Shansi, Shensi and Heilungkiang. It is not surprising that threatened or prudent Party officials learned to organize their own pack of Red Guard supporters—apart from the different factions within the Red Guards (*East is Red* said there were three separate rival Red Guard headquarters in the capital), separate "Scarlet Brigades" have been rumored, plus pitched battles between workers or peasants defending Party officials and Red Guards. The revolutionary dangers must have been serious, since both the press and the leadership have issued continuous warnings to the Guards not to use force nor interfere with industry, the communes and research organizations—"Workers and poor and lower middle peasants are the main force for the revolution, and they are entirely capable of properly running their own revolutionary movements" (*People's Daily*, Sept. 7); and to Party officials, "certain persons in responsible positions" who have "been encouraging peasants and workers of uncertain ideology to act against the revolu-

tionary students . . . fighting between students and peasants must not be permitted" (*People's Daily*, Sept. 11). Even the *People's Daily* itself became trapped in its own inability to cope with the confusion—the August 11 issue was withdrawn after half an hour, and a new issue produced later in the day (the same misfortune occurred for *Hsinhua* later in the month); perhaps this lapse was one of the errors prompting the reorganization of the paper in October and the introduction of new staff and an editor from the *Liberation Army Daily*.

Once Party officials learned to organize their own Red Guard defenders, to turn the whip on the whippers, the Red Guards were no longer useful as the instrument of a purge. Since mid-September the leadership has been seeking to establish control of the Guards. The Politburo has consistently sought to get the Guards to leave Peking and return home—they were urged to go and help the harvest, to undertake Long Marches, and in mid-November, the Central Committee said free transportation was to be ended except for trips home. Meanwhile, the army was instructed to create a supervisory structure of control for the Guards, to drill them and make them subordinate to military direction. At each Peking rally there has been an increasing proportion of army detachments marching. Thus on the rallies of November 25-26, the closing rallies as NCNA optimistically described them, some 50,000 troops were said to have participated. November 21 had been set as the very last day by which the Red Guards should have left Peking, but there was the November 25 rally. On December 3, the Guards were ordered to leave Peking within 17 days, after which free transportation would be ended. However, there still seem to have been rallies on December 13, 18 and 26, and reports of further battles between Guards and Party or factory workers continued to appear on Peking posters, as did the final onslaught on Liu and Teng.

What is happening at the moment is not entirely clear. The Yugoslavs, a dubious source at best, estimate that 20 of the 27 provincial Party committees and many more lower committees have been purged or criticized. Reports indicate that local Party leaders are responding

to Red Guard assaults by organizing workers and/or peasants to fight back. The old trade unions, once docile arms of the ruling group, seem to harbor great anti-Mao strength. Indeed, what was once a fight over the loyalty of the largely student based Red Guards has become a fight over control of the trade unions. Around January 8, Mao announced that the All China Federation of Trade Unions, from which much of his opposition is coming, was to be superceded by a new All China Association of Revolutionary Workers. Obviously, the employment of the working class and/or peasantry by sections of the bureaucracy is far more dangerous than the use of students. Should the workers get "out of hand" the situation could become profoundly revolutionary. The official ideology—the social myth of China—is that the workers own and control the state and the means of production. Should the workers strike out for themselves the tendency would be to make the myth a reality, i.e., to create a real socialist society. Witness the almost immediate development of workers councils controlling industry and politics during the Hungarian Revolution.

At this juncture no one can predict what will occur in China. While stabilization is a possibility, the present dynamics of the situation seem to indicate a prolonged civil war. To the degree to which a civil war is broadened, the possibility of revolution becomes greater. Bourgeois restoration, despite the Maoist screams, is the one possibility that is virtually excluded—there is no real bourgeoisie left in China and little likelihood of any group developing an interest in private industry. Whether or not, as we hope, the civil war is turned into a socialist revolution, the vaunted "revolutionary" image of Maoism is fatally damaged. In the other camp, the ability of the U.S. Establishment to further mobilize the American public and the West to fight the "Maoist Menace" is made more difficult. Hopefully, the long-suffering Chinese masses will seize the initiative and by creating a better life for themselves catalyze radical developments throughout the world.

NIGEL HARRIS
SY LANDY

who's going to be the lesser evil in '68?

IN 1968, when the presidential sweepstakes come up again, liberals all over the country are likely to face the California Syndrome. At the risk of sounding like a Californian, I'm referring to the political pattern that was acted out in the recent Brown-Reagan contest in that state—whose denizens have this in common with New Yorkers, that they tend to think that whatever is happening in their state is What's Happening. Sometimes it is.

In '68 the problem is going to be: vote for Lyndon Johnson again or not. Among all those schizophrenic people you know whose heart is in the famous Right Place—viz. a little left of center—ulcers are going to ulcerate, psychiatrists' couches will get political, and navels will be contemplated with a glassy stare. Johnson

or Nixon? Johnson or Romney? Johnson or Reagan? Johnson or anybody? As a matter of fact, even before this point is reached, there bids fair to be a similar pattern inside the Democratic Party machine itself: Johnson or Kennedy-Fullbright, or its equivalent.

Now radicals have been wont to approach this classic problem with two handy labels, which in fact are fine as far as they go. One is called the Tweedledum-Tweedledee pattern, and the other is called the Lesser Evil pattern. Neither of these necessarily *quite* describes What's Happening. To see why, let's take a quick look at both of them in terms of 1968.

(1) The '68 race *could* be a Tweedledum-Tweedledee affair, and it may be. For example, Johnson versus Gov-

ernor Romney. One can defy even Max Lerner to insert even a razor-thin sentence between the politics respectively represented by these two millionaires. In fact, there is bound to be a sector of liberal sentiment which would indeed see the Lesser Evil in Romney, since there is as yet no evidence that Romney is quite as rascally a liar as the present Leader of the Free World. But roughly speaking, these two are politically indistinguishable: this is the defining characteristic of the Tweedledum-Tweedledee pattern. (The sociological label for this invented by the professorial witch-doctors is Consensus Politics.)

(2) In contrast, the Lesser Evil pattern means that there is a significant political difference between the two candidates, but—

To explain the “but,” let’s take—for reasons that will appear—not a current example, but *the* classic example.

The day after Reagan’s election as governor of California, a liberal pro-Brown acquaintance met me with haggard face and fevered brow, muttering “Didn’t they ever hear of Hitler? Didn’t they ever hear of Hitler?” Did he mean Reagan was Hitler? “Well,” he said darkly, “look how Hitler got started . . .” A light struck me about what was going on in his head. “Look,” I said, “you’ve heard of Hitler, so tell me this: *how did Hitler become chancellor of Germany?*”

My pro-Brown enthusiast was taken aback: “Why, he won some election or other—wasn’t it—with terror and a Reichstag fire and something like that.”—“That was after he had already become chancellor. How did he become chancellor of Germany?”

Don’t go away to look it up. In the 1932 presidential election the Nazis ran Hitler, and the main bourgeois parties ran Von Hindenburg, the Junker general who represented the right wing of the Weimar republic but not fascism. The Social-Democrats, leading a mass workers’ movement, had no doubt about what was practical, realist, hard-headed politics and what was “utopian fantasy”: so they supported Hindenburg as the obvious Lesser Evil. They rejected with scorn the revolutionary proposal to run their own *independent* candidate against both reactionary alternatives—a line, incidentally that could also break off the rank-and-file followers of the Communist Party, which was then pursuing the criminal policy of “After Hitler we come” and “Social-fascists are the main enemy.”

So the Lesser Evil, Hindenburg, won; and Hitler was defeated. *Whereupon President Hindenburg appointed Hitler to the chancellorship*, and the Nazis started taking over.

The classic case was that the people voted for the Lesser Evil and got both.

Now 1966 America is not 1932 Germany, to be sure, but the difference speaks the other way. Germany’s back was up against the wall; there was an insoluble social crisis; it had to go to revolution or fascism; the stakes were extreme. This is exactly why 1932 is the classic case of the Lesser Evil, because even when the stakes were this high, *even then* voting for the Lesser Evil meant historic disaster. Today, when the stakes are not so high, the Lesser Evil policy makes even less sense.

In 1964, you know all the people who convinced themselves that Lyndon Johnson was the lesser evil as against Goldwater, who was going to do Horrible Things in Vietnam, like defoliating the jungles. Many of them have since realized that the spiked boot was on the other foot; and they lacerate themselves with the thought that the

man they voted for “actually carried out Goldwater’s policy.” (In point of fact, this is unfair to Goldwater: he never advocated the steep escalation of the war that Johnson put through; and more to the point, he would probably have been incapable of putting it through with as little opposition as the man who could simultaneously hypnotize the liberals with “Great Society” rhetoric.)

So who was *really* the Lesser Evil in 1964? The point is that it is the question which is a disaster, not the answer. In setups where the choice is between one capitalist politician and another, *the defeat comes in accepting the limitation to this choice.*

NEW DEVELOPMENT

For the moment, so much for the Lesser Evil pattern. But there is an interesting difference between the classic case (Hitler and Hindenburg in 1932) and the Johnson-Goldwater case. *There really was a significant political difference between Hitler and Hindenburg*; the general himself would never have fascized Germany. If he called the Nazi to the chancellorship, it was because he believed that the imposition of government responsibility was the way to domesticate the wild-talking Nazis, that the burden of actually having to run the country would turn the “irresponsible” extremists into tame politicians like all the others, in the pattern usually seen (as with the Hubert Humphreys). But Hindenburg himself was not a Hitler and *he really was a Lesser Evil*. What the classic case teaches is *not* that the Lesser Evil is the *same* as the Greater Evil—this is just as nonsensical as the liberals argue it to be—but rather this: that you can’t *fight* the victory of the rightmost forces by sacrificing your own independent strength to support elements just the next step away from them.

This latter pattern is what has been going on in this country for the last two decades. Every time the liberal-labor left has made noises about its dissatisfaction with what Washington was trickling through, all the Democrats had to do was bring out the bogey of the Republican right. The lib-labs would then swoon, crying “The fascists are coming!” and vote for the Lesser Evil. In these last two decades, the Democrats have learned well that they have the lib-lab vote in their back pocket, and that therefore the forces to be appeased are those forces to the *right*. The lib-labs were kept happy enough if Hubert Humphrey showed up at a banquet to make his liberal speeches; or, before that, by the Kennedy myth which bemused them even while the first leader on this planet poised his finger over the nuclear-war button and said “Or else!” With the lib-lab votes in a pocket, politics in this country had to move steadily right—right—right—until even a Lyndon Johnson could look like a Lesser Evil. This is essentially why—even when there really is a Lesser Evil—making the Lesser Evil choice undercuts any possibility of really fighting the Right.

But now notice this: when the Lesser Evil named Johnson was elected in 1964, he did not call in the Greater Evil to power, as did Hindenburg. He did not merely act in so flabby a manner that the Right wing alternative was thereby strengthened — another classic pattern. These patterns would have been old stuff, the historic Lesser Evil pattern in full form.

What was bewildering about Johnson was that the Lesser Evil *turned out to be* the Greater Evil, if not worse. Was it then the Tweedledum-Tweedledee pattern, after

all? Am I merely then saying that the apparent difference between Johnson and Goldwater (even within the framework of capitalist politics) was just an illusion? Is the conclusion merely that all capitalist politicians have to be the same, that therefore the case against voting for the Lesser Evil is that there is no Lesser Evil?

I don't think that's the answer; I think there is a third pattern around, which is neither Tweedledee-Tweedledum nor the classic Lesser Evil choice. If the Johnson-Goldwater contest was one example, then an even better one was provided by the recent Brown-Reagan race. *For Pat Brown really is a liberal*, whatever you may think of Johnson; and thereby hangs the tale.

Because this genuine liberal, Pat Brown, acted for eight years as governor of California in no important respect differently from what a conservative Republican would have done. The operative word is *acted*. He sold out the water program to the big landholding companies as his two Republican predecessors never dared to do. He fought tooth and nail for the bracero system as no Republican governor of an agricultural state dared to do. It was he (not Clark Kerr) who in 1964 *unleashed* an army of police against the Berkeley students. After the Watts uprising, it was he who named John J. McCone's commission to whitewash the whole business, and who then supported the right wing's anti-riot law to intimidate the ghetto. It was Brown who gave the liberal Democratic CDC the final, decapitation when he personally mobilized all his strength to oust Si Casady as CDC head.* If half of this had been done by a Reagan, the lib-labs would be yelling "Fascism" all over the place. (As they will during the next four years, no doubt.)

And I repeat that I don't think this took place simply because Pat Brown was a Tweedledee reflecting image of Reagan. Here is a somewhat different interpretation:

A profound change has taken place in this country since the days of the New Deal—has taken place in the nature of capitalist politics, and therefore in the two historic wings of capitalist politics, liberalism and conservatism. In the 1930's there was a genuine difference in the programs put before capitalism by its liberal and conservative wings. The New Deal liberals proposed to save capitalism, at a time of deepgoing crisis and despair, by *statification*—that is, by increasing state intervention into the control of the economy from above. It is notorious that some of the most powerful sectors of the very class that was being saved hated Roosevelt like poison. (This added to the illusions of the "Roosevelt revolution" at the time, of course.) Roosevelt himself always insisted that a turn toward state-capitalist intervention was necessary to save capitalism itself; and he was right. In fact, the New Deal conquered not only the Democratic but the Republican Party. When Roosevelt's New Deal and Truman's Fair Deal were succeeded by Eisenhower's regime, the free-enterprise-spouting Republican continued and even intensified exactly the same social course that Roosevelt had begun. (This is the reality behind the Birchite charge that Eisenhower is a "card-carrying Communist"!)

In the three and a half decades since 1932, and be-

*THE reader is referred to the October 1966 issue of *Ramparts* magazine for a brilliant (and detailed) exposition of all this, including an analysis of how it all could be done by a man who **really is a liberal**. *Ramparts* does this in terms of concrete facts; in this article I am generalizing.

fore, during and after a second world war which intensified the process, the capitalist system itself has been going through a deepgoing process of *bureaucratic statification*. The underlying drives are beyond the scope of this article; the fact itself is plain to see. The liberals who sparked this transformation were often imbued with the illusion that they were undermining the going system; any child can now see that they knew not what they did. The conservatives who denounced all the steps in this transformation, and who had to be dragged kicking and screaming into the new stage, were also imbued with the very same illusion. But even Eisenhower—who has never been accused of being an egghead, and who, before he was nominated for the presidency, made *exactly* the same sort of free-enterprise-hurrah speeches as Reagan was paid to make for General Electric—even he was forced to act, in the highest office, no differently from a New Deal Democrat. Because that is the only way the system can now operate.

FRUITS OF LESSER EVILISM

Under the pressure of bureaucratic-statified capitalism, *liberalism and conservatism converge*. That does not mean they are identical, or are becoming identical. They merely increasingly tend to *act* in the same way in essential respects, where fundamental needs of the system are concerned. And just as the conservatives are forced to conserve and expand the statified elements of the system, so the liberals are forced to make use of the repressive measures which the conservatives advocate: because the maintenance of the system demands it. Just as when Truman vetoed Taft-Hartley and then invoked it against striking workers. What is more, because the liberal politicians can point a warning finger towards the right and because the lib-labs will respond to it, they are even more successful than the conservatives in carrying out those measures which the conservatives advocate. It is not necessary to claim that even that pitiful man, Hubert Humphrey, is merely a hypocrite. No, I fully believe, myself, that he is as sincere a liberal as the next lib-lab specimen. It is *liberalism* which requires the examination, not Humphrey's morals. Nor was that even more pathetic man, Adlai Stevenson, simply a rascal when he found himself lying like a trooper at the UN in the sight and knowledge of the whole world.

So besides Tweedledee-Tweedledums and besides the Lesser Evils who really are different in policy from the Greater Evils, we increasingly are getting this third type of case: the Lesser Evils who, as executors of the system, find themselves *acting* at every important juncture exactly like the Greater Evils, and sometimes worse. They are the product of the increasing convergence of liberalism and conservatism under conditions of bureaucratic capitalism. *There never was an era when the policy of the Lesser Evil made less sense than now.*

That's the thing to remember for 1968, as a starter.

HAL DRAPER

America's promise to the world

"WE are going to make these damn people free whether they like it or not," anonymous U.S. general quoted in N.B.C. documentary on LAOS, 4 Jan. '67.

labor complacency: the shaken myth

TO the present generation of American radicals it seems a far cry from the distant past of the great sit-in movement that gave birth to the C.I.O. Today American workers appear to be merely another bastion of The American Way of Life. The radical trade union struggles of the past appear to have resulted in stable union bureaucracies and the prosperous complacency of today's workers. The only hope that many radicals see is in an independent movement of Negroes and the poor while the broad masses of American workers fade out into the dim reactionary sunset. Of course, there are a number of problems which this view introduces. After all, Negroes and the poor are today struggling mainly for a share of the economic pie which other American workers already enjoy. If they succeed, or so the story would lead us to believe, they too would fade into the same complacency. This problem alone is enough to force radicals to question the extent to which American workers really are a part of The Great Society.

It is not enough to simply note the present prosperity of American workers. One must understand how the present situation came about and where it is going. The Second World War brought America out of the "Great Depression." Even during the war, wild cat strikes were rampant throughout the country. The war was followed by a strike movement which reached the proportions of a general strike and to which Taft-Hartley was the Establishment's response. Throughout the labor movement in the post-war period there was tremendous sentiment for an independent labor party as well as for militant labor action. But the prosperity of the period and the cold war took the wind out of the sails of the radical sentiment. American workers became less militant and less active in their unions; the union bureaucracies consolidated their power and became increasingly conservative in their social policies. At the same time, sections of the trade union bureaucracy, notably of the formerly militant CIO, moved into an alliance with the Democratic Party. And so the story would seem to end: The AFL-CIO bureaucracy issuing reactionary edicts and refusing to struggle for the needs of non-organized American workers as the unionized workers received a bit more of the big American pie with each passing year.

BUREAUCRATS VS. WORKERS

So the story would seem to end. But there's another side to the picture. The structural unemployment which the tremendous advances in automated production equipment have introduced presented a tremendous problem for the trade union movement. To the extent that the trade unions have dealt with automation at all, they have generally settled upon contracts which provided for automated jobs to close after the workers holding them retired. Such contracts exist notably in mining and steel. But such "solutions" could be temporary at best: yesterday's solutions provide today's difficulties and the

roles of industrial unions have continued to shrink. At the same time, the union bureaucrats have been notably slack in providing for operative workers' grievance machinery: by the nature of the problem, it would demand a seriously militant struggle on the part of unions since workers' job rights present such a direct challenge to management "prerogatives." Finally, the increase in workers' wages has been nowhere proportionate to soaring corporation profits: in the past five years, corporation profits have risen 80% while workers' hourly wages rose 18% in the same period, and inflation has eaten significantly into this figure. Thus the bureaucracy has failed to satisfy the needs of organized workers on two levels: in not providing a focus for the fight for the needs which all American workers share in common, notably full employment; and at the same time, in failing to expand adequately upon the gains which have already attained: in wages and job conditions.

It will be increasingly difficult in the future for the bureaucracies to get by quite as easily as they have in the past. Even in the period of labor "complacency," local and national rank and file insurgencies, together with wild cat strikes, were a constant source of strain on the bureaucracies. But it is especially important for radicals now to recognize the real potential which does exist for struggles by American workers—1967 will undoubtedly be a militant labor year.

For no matter what mechanisms are discovered for stabilizing the American economy in the throes of the War in Vietnam there will be little question but that American workers will be the ones to pay for it. While Johnson, the Congress and corporation executives discuss whether a tax increase or cuts in Administration domestic spending are preferable means for financing the War, inflation soars and the job "gains" spurred by the Vietnam War become increasingly doubtful.

1967 will be a strike year: American workers have little choice in the matter; the alternative is the sacrificial altar. Johnson has already demonstrated his willingness to invoke Taft-Hartley, even when the law does not apply, as in the recent Kohler, Union Carbide strike. And Johnson has as little choice as the workers: his war demands regular production. American corporations have a marked advantage in the situation. Since the only way that workers can exercise effective influence on collective bargaining is through work stoppages and since work stoppages are increasingly a "threat to the national interest," corporations are in a position to do what they want and wait things out: or so they would hope.

The Vietnam War cost over 20 billion dollars in 1966 and will cost even more this year. Naturally, this spurred production and the result, despite attempts to discourage private investment and actual cuts in the federal domestic budget, was increased employment. And the further result of competition from the war sector and increased employment has been high inflation throughout the economy. All economic indicators show marked signs of a

slowdown in domestic production and the job gains of the past years are receiving a set-back: notably in the auto industry where factories are operating well below capacity and thousands of workers are being laid off.

The issues for American workers this year are therefore two-fold. The demand for higher wages is an absolute necessity. Prices have risen almost 4% over the past year, realizing a proportionate loss in workers' real wages. It is no exaggeration to say that Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz' characterization of wage rises of 5% as "justifiable" actually marks the absolute minimum which workers can receive if they will realize any real wage increase at all over the next year.

But the wage issue is hardly the only one. It is notable that the unrest among oil workers is specifically over job security: the threat of automation is already so great that many oil plants will be able to function even during a strike. In automobiles, the UAW has been forced to demand an annual wage in light of management slow-downs and lay-offs. And added to the problem of job security is that of workers' grievances and job conditions: the machinery which exists to handle workers' grievances is grossly inadequate; ultimately, the work stoppage is the only recourse which many workers have to protect their rights.

The real wage set backs which workers have received in 1966 and the constant threat of lay-offs and unemployment have engendered an increasingly militant mood among many American workers. And this sentiment coupled with the failures of the bureaucracy to struggle in the past will make workers quite intolerant of any compromises in '67.

The other end of the bureaucracy's policy, alliance with the Democratic Party will have its repercussions also. Ties to the Democratic Party have prevented the bureaucracy from an effective struggle for full employment and those other needs of workers which can only be won through national legislation and action. The Democratic Party is dominated by the very interests which would have to finance the policies necessary to create full employment. Added to this is the increasing Administration emphasis upon anti-strike legislation and action. The trade union bureaucracies have placed themselves in a very uncomfortable position in view of the impending industrial situation. And the potential for rank and file struggle in the unions exists in direct proportion to the bureaucracy's commitment to the Establishment.

But radicals can aid these movements only to the extent that they recognize that the potential for struggle by American workers exists. It might be argued, for example, that workers are only struggling economically but that politically they remain tied to the Establishment. But what are Negroes and the poor struggling for if not "economic needs"? The very fact that the status quo is organized to exclude the interests of Negroes, workers and the poor forces them all into struggles which involve some form of confrontation with the Establishment. It is the radical's role to point out the broader implications of these struggles: to demonstrate the fact that an effective fight for economic needs can only be supported by true independence from the Establishment's political institutions and policies. If workers do not see this the radical's job is only more difficult.

Movements for black power in the ghetto, the inde-

pendent organization of Negroes for their own needs; the organization of the unemployed for jobs. These are tremendously important in their own right as means for wresting significant gains from the status quo. But they are also potential catalysts of a broader movement for democratic social change in the working class as a whole. Both through their example and through specific program proposals they can supply an important stimulus to independent movements of rank and file workers struggling against the labor bureaucracy. And not only for factory workers. In the past year almost a million white collar and service workers have been organized, and the examples of militant social worker and teacher unions demonstrates the potential strength of these organizations.

For radicals to take advantage of and aid these struggles it is imperative that they develop a clear conception of the relationships between these forces. American workers, Negroes, the poor and unemployed: all stand in the same relationship to American society sharing the same fundamental needs and interests. Ultimately, an effective movement for their needs is the struggle for the transformation of American society: for the creation of a society in which the vast majority of Americans do control their own lives. But such a social change can only be the result of the struggle of the American working class as a whole. The movements in that direction today are the minor struggles in which all American workers are presently engaged. Radicals can not abstain from these struggles. If they are to influence the workers, radicals must become a part of those limited struggles of the workers. This does not mean that the only thing which radicals can do is go "into the shops," although that is necessary also. Radicals can, for example, aid local and national rank and file insurgencies by making their cause known and helping to establish connections between the various rank and file movements. When workers do not struggle, it is often because they believe that they can not launch an effective fight against the bureaucracies. It is part of the radical's role to demonstrate the real possibilities for such struggles and the relationships between the various fights in which different workers are involved.

The struggle for the democratic transformation of America begins in the thousands of small battles in which American workers are daily engaged. It is through these struggles that workers test themselves, become aware of their own potential strength. It is only through such small struggles that they become willing to tackle the greater problems before them. American radicals are a part of the strengthening of that self confidence and social understanding of American workers which is indispensable for their radicalization. Self-reliance is the key to the development of a radical movement of American workers. Such self reliance is part of the struggle against the trade union bureaucracies. It is the fight against those who would teach American workers, Negroes and the poor to rely upon crumbs handed down from the Democratic and Republican Parties: those are lessons which American workers know only too well. And, if the need for a radical movement of American workers is to be realized, American radicals must become a living part of the limited struggles in which workers are presently engaged. 1967 is an excellent time to begin.

JOEL STEIN

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1967

thailand: america's asian sanctuary

AT the end of 1965 there were 12,000 U.S. military personnel in Thailand; by July, 1966, this number had risen to 25,000 and by the end of November to 34,000. Since July, U.S. "Huey" helicopters, manned by U.S. pilots, have been flying Thai counter-insurgency troops into northeast Thailand. President Johnson has announced that this year's military aid to Thailand will be raised from the planned 40 million dollars to 60 million.

This escalation was mainly in response to the growing activity of from 1,200 to 5,000 Thai guerillas known as the "Thai Patriotic Front." Many of these Americans, however, are attached to the 13th Air Force and the 606th Air Commando Squadron which have been bombing North Viet-Nam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It was only revealed in November, 1966, that the preparation for these bombings from Thailand were made in August, 1964, while Johnson was telling the electorate, "We are not going North and drop bombs . . ." A deeper and darker secret, until last summer, was the construction of a vast complex of military installations throughout Thailand, some of which rival the enormous Camranh Bay complex in Viet-Nam. C. L. Sulzberger described the extent of these bases as of last July:

American bases in Thailand have been developed at Udom, Nakhon, Phanom, Ubon, Korat, Takhli and Don Muang, but by far the most important installation is the massive air-sea complex at Sattahip. American investment in Thailand's permanent military infrastructure comes to hundreds of millions of dollars.

Thailand is being converted into one of the primary American bases for the "defense" of Asia. The Administration views Thailand as the operating base for the deterrence of future revolutions and of Chinese expansion. This build-up signals a re-emphasis on massive retaliation. The notion of Thailand as a pro-Western enclave in Asia, however, is not new to American policy—it has been an operating policy since the end of World War II. What has this meant to the people of Thailand?

Thailand (formerly Siam) was the only country in Southeast Asia never ruled directly by any European power. Of course, the sticky fingers of imperial England and France dug into the wealth of this nation, but not to the extent of dislocating its stable peasant economy. This fact and the natural wealth of Thailand combined to produce a standard of living significantly higher than that of the rest of Asia. In this context Thai society produced neither a large landlord class nor a native bourgeoisie. Instead it produced a somewhat modern version of the traditional mandarin ruling class increasingly dominated by the military. It was primarily the military that replaced the absolute monarchy in 1932 with a constitutional monarchy. It was mainly the military which began the task of modernizing Thailand. Naturally, it did so in a manner quite lucrative for itself. The military, particularly its Generals, became deeply involved in business and industry (a non-military Thai bourgeoisie is a more recent development). Military dictatorship became the political system of Thailand. The financial and political support that has sustained military dictatorship in Thailand despite a changing social structure and the appearance of

an opposition has come mostly from one source—the United States.

While the U.S. has had relations with Thailand since 1833, it was not until World War II that America recognized Thailand's strategic possibilities. At that time, Thailand's military government was headed by Marshall Phibung Songkhram, who pursued a policy, as one writer so delicately put it, "of extreme nationalism on the lines made popular in Italy, Germany and Japan." In fact, Phibun was a willing Japanese puppet. American OSS men worked with Pridi Phanomyong, a "promoter" of the 1932 coup, who led the underground Free Thai movement. Pridi, an odd sort of left-statist, ousted Phibun in 1944 by a bloodless coup. Thus, when the war ended, and the Big Three sat down to decide the fate of Asia, Thailand was in the enviable position of having an anti-Axis, liberal government. Britain, however, wanted control over Thailand—including large war reparations and a monopoly of Thai foreign trade. The U.S., which still entertained hopes for the Open Door in Asia, opposed British hegemony and managed to reduce Britain's role in Thailand. American policy at this time, and for some years to come, was to build Thailand as an independent bulwark against the sort of revolutions that were developing in China and Indo-China.

AMERICA UNDERWRITES DICTATORSHIP

American aid to Pridi was limited to a 10 million dollar loan; hardly sufficient to off-set the booty extracted by Britain or the effects of the post-war inflation. By 1947, the military became itchy for power again. Phibun, still regarded as a war criminal, was soon aided by the on-set of the Cold War and the growth of anti-Communism as the basis of U.S. foreign policy. The State Department declared that, if Phibun would stay in the background, they would not object to a change in government. Phibun bided his time by supporting the election of the conservative royalist Khuang Aphaiwong, who was immediately recognized by the U.S. With the growth of Communism in China as his excuse, Phibun seized power for himself in April, 1948. He announced a firm pro-Western foreign policy and, in less than a month, this not-so-former fascist was recognized by the U.S.

U.S. officials soon began praising Phibun's Thailand as a bastion of freedom and, more importantly, began to bolster his military dictatorship with hard cash. In 1949, Truman authorized 10 million dollars in military aid to Thailand and the State Department announced the beginning of an economic aid program. Meanwhile Phibun began arresting former Free Thai supporters and launched an anti-Communist crusade directed mainly at the Chinese Community. The suppression of opposition was urged by the U.S. The American Ambassador strongly suggested that Phibun "ferret out" any internal opposition that might be susceptible to Communism. To Phibun this meant *all* opposition. Feeling that the political atmosphere in Thailand was improving, American business began to invade the country. By 1949, U.S.-Thai trade was up to 60 million dollars from a pre-war level of \$3 mil-

lion, and 50 U.S. firms were operating where only 2 had operated before the war.

In building his dictatorship, Phibun's main partners were General Phao Siyanon, head of the enormous paramilitary police, and Marshall Sarit Thanarat, head of the Army. Phao's police force of over 48,000 men was fully armed with modern weapons, tanks, boats and even planes. Much of the money for this extensive machinery of repression came from the "non-military" aid sent by the U.S. and from the CIA, operating under the name of the Sea Supply Company. In addition to being one powerful cop, Phao supplemented his personal income by sitting on the board of directors of no less than 25 corporations and controlling the entire opium trade of Thailand, among other things. Marshall Sarit, a man of greater character, was content to sit on the boards of directors of only 20 corporations, to own two newspapers and to be chairman of the National Lottery Organization. Sarit, however, also derived power from the fact that the Ministry of Defense, tightly controlled by the Army, owned a number of industrial enterprises, the majority of the commercial broadcasting stations, a TV station, and controlling interest of the large Military Bank of Thailand. In Thailand, each Ministry is a legal entity and it is common practice for their officials to use the "revolving funds" for commercial investment.

Spurred by Mao's victory in China and the Korean war, U.S. aid to Thailand was increased from 1950 to 1954, with heavy emphasis on military aid. In 1954, Thailand received \$28.2 million in military aid as opposed to \$27.1 million in non-military aid for the entire period of 1951-54. In September, 1954, Thailand was further vouchsafed from Communism by the formation of SEATO, created largely in response to the apparent Communist victory in Indo-China. In celebration, Phibun launched a new suppression of opposition, mostly of followers of Pridi.

As Phao and Savit became increasingly powerful on their own, Phibun found that he had to play them off against each other. Soon, however, it became clear that this would not be enough and in 1955, Phibun began to introduce certain reforms in hope of basing his position on, of all things, popular support. Gradually, political parties were legalized and special areas, called "Hyde Parks," set aside for the exercise of "free speech." Unfortunately for Phibun, large numbers of Thai took the idea seriously. Left-wing and anti-U.S. parties appeared on the scene to denounce Phibun and his allies. In 1957, socialists, elected from the poverty stricken northeast, agitated for a neutralist foreign policy and sweeping domestic reforms. Thousands of students demonstrated after the 1957 elections, denouncing them as a fraud and lowering the Thai flag to half mast "in memory of dead democracy." Forty-two labor unions were organized, a Thai Labor Party formed, and strikes called. The spectre of the people emerged from years of oppression.

Such a sight was too much for the U.S. Phibun received an emergency grant of 15 million dollars. Shortly thereafter, another \$7.5 million, theoretically to pay for the Thai involvement in Korea, was sent and a \$66 million loan from the World Bank approved. Thailand was even released from its SEATO debts. But Phibun had been too badly shaken. Virtually all of the new political parties wanted to see him go.

Perceiving the drift of things, Marshall Sarit donned anti-Phibun, even anti-U.S. garb, going so far as to sup-

port the students' demonstration. In September, 1957, with Sarit remaining in the background, the military ousted Phibun and put in his place Phote Sarasin, former Ambassador to the U.S. and newly chosen Secretary-General of SEATO. By this move Sarit and the military hoped to keep U.S. aid, which they did. In January, 1958, new elections were held with the pro-Sarit parties carrying the majority—only 13% of the electorate voted. Shortly after this, General Thanom Kittikachorn replaced Phote as Prime Minister. However, as labor, student and other opposition organizations grew, Sarit felt a greater need to clamp down. Finally, in October, 1958, Sarit, returned from convalescence in America and Britain, seized power in his own name. Immediately, all political parties were banned, the constitution abolished, the Assembly dissolved, trade unions outlawed, and martial law declared—a situation that prevails to this day. Leaders of the left-wing parties were arrested and many executed, as were journalists, intellectuals, and labor leaders. A new anti-Communist drive was launched which jailed 1,080 people by 1962. In short, a permanent reign of terror was established. That this had been Sarit's intention from the start is made clear by the fact that he told Thanom, *before the coup*, that a suppression of "Communists" would be necessary to "ensure continued American trust, confidence and aid."

PROFIT AND POVERTY

The official American response to the re-establishment of military dictatorship was favorable. When informed that Sarit had taken power, one State Department official said, "We are gratified to hear that." And with good reason. Sarit's dictatorship proved to be more effective than Phibun's. Sarit took economic matters more seriously than Phibun had, introducing economic plans and encouraging the growth of a native bourgeoisie. Most of all, of course, Sarit further strengthened the military. Sarit is thought to have eliminated a certain amount of "illegal" corruption, but he by no means changed the profitability of military leadership. Choice plots of land along the U.S.-built Friendship Highway were reserved for the villas of top Generals. The Army came to own both of Thailand's TV stations, with only military officers able to get government loans to purchase TV sets. When Sarit died—of natural causes—in 1963, it was discovered that he had amassed a fortune worth 137 million dollars.

General Thanom Kittikachorn succeeded Sarit and continued the policies of the Marshal down the line—the whole period from 1958 to the present may be considered politically one. As in the past, military aid continued to grow, soaring far above regular economic aid. From 1950 to 1960 military aid totaled \$283 million (not including certain "secret" military aid), running about \$30 million a year at the end of the 1950's. Now it is up to \$60 million. But even economic aid has been used to military ends. Frank Darling estimated that out of \$216 million from 1951-1960, only about \$55 million went to real economic development. Indeed, the largest single amount of aid from 1951 to 1960 went to the building of roads designed for military purposes. More recently, there has been some shift in emphasis toward "civic action" programs and similar aid projects designed to prevent insurgency. These funds, however, are counterbalanced by direct U.S. expenditure in the military bases described earlier.

The purpose behind strengthening the military dictatorship has been military-strategic rather than simply economic. The design is more to defend a world system than to open new markets. Nonetheless, there has been a rapid expansion of American investments and trade abroad in the last few years, which has certainly added to the list of things to be defended. The "advantages" of a stable dictatorship and a market underwritten by U.S. aid in Thailand have not escaped American businessmen. Trade with Thailand has grown rapidly, and to the distinct advantage of the U.S. In 1964 Thailand exported to America \$24,654,000 worth of goods, while she imported from America \$82,770,000, creating a trade deficit of about \$58 million with the U.S.—out of a total deficit of \$68 million with the entire world. Total foreign investments in Thailand in 1964 were valued at \$250 million, of which about one-third were American. This represented 100 U.S. firms active in Thailand, accruing an average profit of 20%. This profit is made at no risk since all U.S. investments in Thailand are insured under the AID Investment Guaranty Agreement against expropriation or war. In addition, it is likely that much of the aid spent on road and other construction, over \$52 million from 1951 to 1962, went to American firms. *Business Week*, explaining AID to its readers, said:

Most projects are initiated by the aided country. Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, stringent engineering and economic requirements must be met. Then AID contracts its project out, usually to American Companies.

Things are getting better for business in Thailand all the time. In July, 1966, the Department of Commerce informed its clientel that the latest U.S.-Thai Tax Treaty "is expected to increase incentives for American private capital participation in Thailand."

Although Thailand is more or less prosperous by Asian standards, it is clear that most of the Thai people are not benefiting from American economic activity in their country. The average annual family income in Bangkok, in 1962, was \$876, but 52% of those families made less than \$577, while only 11% made more than \$1,731—the military elite and the Thai bourgeoisie make much more than that. But Bangkok has a standard of living far above that of the rest of the country. About 90% of the population lives outside Bangkok and 80% outside any city. The average per capita income for the whole country is about \$100, which means it is significantly lower among the peasants. Nor is income equally distributed among the peasants as some writers have claimed. Indeed, in vil-

lages studied by Millard Long, the upper 25% of the villagers received about 10 times the income of the rest. In the northeast, where two-fifths of the population live, the per capita income average is \$45 a year, less than half the national average. Long states that in this region, the average per capita income of 78% of the peasants is actually about \$30 a year—including "in-kind" income. It is clear that poverty and inequality are the order of the day in Thailand. It is, therefore, not surprising that guerrilla activity has begun in the northeast. Not only is the region extremely poor, even by Asian standards, but land tenure is more inequitable than in the rest of Thailand. Whereas in central Thailand 80% of the peasants own their own land, in the northeast only 30-40% do so. As a result, the vast majority of the men from the ages 20-39 are forced to go to Bangkok or Vientiane, Laos, to seek work at one time or another. It is only since the beginning of insurgent activity in the northeast that the Thai government has taken any interest at all in that area and its problems.

PAX AMERICANA

This, then, is the kind of society the U.S. government nurtures in order to build its own sanctuary in Asia. The fact is, the Thai government is no longer merely supported by American policy; it is an integral part of the structure of that policy. With the rapid growth of America's military-AID-business complex in Asia, the implications of the involvement in Thailand become even more frightening, for Thailand is only the "safest" American base of operations. Similar situations exist, not only in Viet-Nam where huge installations such as Cam Ranh Bay appear to be permanent, but in South Korea where there are 50,000 U.S. troops and in the Philippines. Added to this permanent military structure is the multi-billion dollar trade and investment in Asia by American business. In short, America's "commitment" in Asia is becoming enormous, expensive and permanent. What a structure of this nature means is that the terms of peace in Asia are those of American domination—a Pax Americana or no Pax at all. The Open Door is a dead letter for American imperialism.

The reverse side of this U.S. minted coin is the gradual but significant growth of urban and semi-industrial power centers; the strengthening of a native bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and a genuine working class, on the other. The native bourgeoisie is, of course, entirely dependent on American, European and Japanese business. The working

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class, however, represents a potential opposition to imperialism and the native ruling class. Furthermore, unlike the peasantry, the working class is located at the heart of this new power structure. Insor estimates that the number of Thai production workers grew about 5% a year from 1965 to 1960. As an indication of this, in 1955 there were 73,000 laborers in Bangkok whereas by 1960 the total number of wage earning production workers in Bangkok was 157,000. Since most Thai workers are unskilled, the 1955 and 1960 figures, although not exactly comparable, give a good idea of the growth. According to the 1960 census, the latest available, the permanent wage earning working class numbered 666,995 (including workers in production, construction, and transportation. This does not include the hundreds of thousands of workers in commerce. Of this total permanent working class, 236,965 are in manufacturing, 56,561 in construction and 106,152 in transportation.* These figures are quite amazing for a small nation that only twenty years before had virtually no working class at all. Furthermore, since the bulk of the manufacturing and construction boom has occurred since 1960, it is certain that the permanent working class is considerably larger today. The central position of the working class is expanding not only in Thailand but in Viet-Nam, Korea and the Philippines as well. Obviously, struggle by the working class at the center of power can have a greater effect than peasant warfare at the rural fringes alone.

Here, in the U.S., rigorous exposure of the nature of America's Asian-wide involvement, and of the fact that it has been hidden from the American people, is an

*ALL these figures are exclusive of managerial and administrative personnel.

urgent task for the anti-war movement. Even more important is the struggle of Negroes, the poor and the working class for domestic reforms that will make it financially more difficult for the Johnson Administration to fund the expansion of this imperial structure. It is those interests which foster and profit from a build up in Asia which oppose demands for a better life at home. With this understanding, an independent political movement must be built from domestic social movements—that is, on a class basis—that will oppose the Democratic and Republican Parties and the capitalist power structure.

KIM MOODY

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education for revolt radical teachers in american schools

TO anyone who has participated in the rent strikes, construction site demonstrations, or any of the many other community action programs in the Northern ghetto, the difficulties of organizing and sustaining action there have become only too painfully clear. The model of industrial union organization which—at first glance appears so attractive as a paradigm for action fails at crucial points. It soon becomes apparent that, while the factory integrates people, bringing them together for a common purpose and placing them in a common plight, poverty atomizes people and turns them against each other. The factory worker is faced by a specific force, management, which he must confront directly if he is to improve his wages or working conditions. Regardless of background or ideology, he soon realizes that he can only confront this opponent effectively through union organization. To the "poor," however, it is by no means so clear as to who the enemy is and how to combat him. There is no "boss" to point a finger at; the ghetto inhabitant perceives, not a single enemy, but rather enemies all around him. He sees the enemies above him: the mayor, the bureaucracy, the slumlord, the cop, the school board, the welfare department, and the entire power structure. But the tragedy is that he sees not only these real enemies

but others as enemies: the family on welfare, the junkie, the unsanitary tenant, and even his neighbor's children. When the enemy is a clearly identifiable person or group, one can organize and attack; when the enemy seems to be the world, it is hard to avoid retreating in despair and frustration. While the structure of the factory leads workers towards organization, the social dynamic of the slum tends to lead people into disunity and despair.

All this is not meant to imply that community organization on a neighborhood basis is impossible or even fruitless. Such projects have had and will continue to have important consequences in raising the level of consciousness in the ghetto, sustaining the vitality of the Movement, and engendering the atmosphere of hope and self-confidence which is the precondition for social change. Rather, what is meant is that without a more cohesive social force to provide the nucleus around which the welfare clients, unemployed, and poor can organize, efforts at community organization are little more than holding actions. The failure of today's labor movement to act as such a nucleus has been a chief disorienting influence on the American left. And more than one radical organization has sought a means to fill the vacuum created by this failure.

There is, however, one neglected institution in the ghetto which does integrate rather than atomize people, which can provide an organizing nucleus as well as indirectly affecting the level of consciousness of the workers and poor. That institution is the school.

In many ways, the school resembles the factory: large groups of individuals are brought together and confronted with a power source which frustrates them and appears omnipotent, but which is nevertheless sharply defined, clear to see, and susceptible to pressure from below. The school even goes beyond the factory in providing a social milieu, the classroom, in which the expression of ideas is, to a limited extent, allowed. Young people have traditionally served as a catalyst for social action by their elders, and it is in the schools where young people are brought together. If students in the ghetto secondary schools can be organized to demand a voice in the decisions which govern their lives, they can certainly provide a powerful force in organizing the entire ghetto.

Perhaps even more important in the long run is the fact that all workers must first go through the school experience. It is in the school that society tries to precondition the young worker-to-be for life in the shop by teaching him the habits, attitudes and values required for the smooth functioning of the economic system: dutiful obedience to a group presumed to operate with his welfare at heart but over which he has no direct control; aspirations to a view of success which is presumably reached by the proper manners, speech, and dress; consent to spending the day in enforced activity which may appear meaningless; and the sense of one's own impotence in changing the fundamental way in which the system is organized. To at least some extent, the failure of the working class to play a more militant, radical role may be attributed to the school experience. This is not to say that the school is some all-powerful conditioning agent. In fact, the school is grossly inefficient even in its pursuit of its repressive goals. Rather, it is the absence of an experience of successful revolt against irrational authority, with the self-confidence and organizational sophistication that such an experience brings, which is the millstone about the worker's neck. It might make a considerable difference in the future if a generation of young workers were to enter the shops with a background of school experience which had radicalized rather than demoralized them, which had taught them to question constantly rather than to obey uncritically, and which had convinced them of their own ability to control the forces which determine their destinies.

In brief, there are numerous advantages, both short and long term, which could be gained if the radical college students who are presently devoting so much energy to ghetto organizing on a neighborhood basis directed more of their efforts to organizing in the secondary schools. What is not immediately apparent is how such organizing should proceed. Young radicals today, perhaps more than ever before, are aware that social change must come from within the institutions affected and from below, not from outside or from above. But, whereas the New Left student might choose to live in the ghetto or even to become a worker in a shop, he cannot become a high school student again. How, then, is organization from within and from below to proceed? The answer is through teaching.

The failure of large numbers of radical college students to become secondary school teachers is, to some extent, surprising since so many have made great personal sacrifices to participate in the Movement and many more are desperately seeking post-college jobs where they can contribute most effectively to fighting the establishment. It seems likely that this failure is due to some fundamental misconceptions about teachers and their potential role.

Perhaps one misconception about teaching is a consequence of carrying the factory-school analogy too far. The teacher, like the factory foreman, is viewed as part of the establishment and teaching is perceived as merely another of the numerous traps by which the society transforms young radicals into its wardens. There is no doubt that this picture fits present-day realities and that many teachers may perceive themselves in this role. But the current level of consciousness of teachers should not be taken as limiting the potential of the teacher's role. A foreman is explicitly hired by the employer to coerce workers into producing more than they are otherwise willing to produce, but the teacher's social role is broader and potentially more constructive. A humanistically oriented society could dispense with foremen, but not with teachers. American education is based on many contradictions and hypocrisies. Democratic values are professed while the curriculum is autocratically imposed on the teachers. The development of intrinsic motivations in students is espoused while the school is structured so as to impose primarily coercive motivating procedures. The teacher is in a position either to go along with the taskmaster role imposed by the system or to rebel against it in the interests of really meaningful education. The latter alternative may jeopardize his job but, with organization and support from students and others, is at least possible.

EDUCATION FACTORY

Another misconception about teaching held by New Left students may stem from their intuitive, and quite healthy, distaste for elitist solutions. To young radicals who have learned through bitter experience that students have had to lead their own struggles on the campus (and to distrust the conservatizing forces of age), there is something naturally revolting about teachers leading or organizing students anywhere. This leads to sentiments in favor of extending a formula of "Student Power" to the secondary schools and to some embarrassment about how to deal with the problem of student control at the elementary level. The fact is that whereas students may lead their teachers into action in the universities, teachers usually have to take the initiative at the secondary school level because of the organizational inexperience of the students. What is required, of course, is neither a "follow me because I know better" approach nor indoctrination, but rather a genuine effort to help students formulate and develop their own ideas about how they can make the school meaningful in their lives and in offering whatever advice and leadership the students may call for. Democracy and frankness, when pulled out of the educational clichés and put into practice in the classroom, are potentially radicalizing forces in and of themselves.

At least as damaging as the notion that education is intrinsically a swindle has been the liberal myth that it is a panacea. To many liberals, such social evils as pov-

erty, ignorance, war and prejudice can only be eradicated by education. The causes of poverty are located by them not in the exploitative economic system but in illiteracy and the failure of the ghetto home to provide children with middle class attitudes, values, and motives. Their solution has been to focus their attention on preschool programs of "compensatory education" to counteract "cultural deprivation." This approach has attracted many New Left college students who are interested in education to the Headstart projects and elementary schools. Insofar as these programs have misled teachers into the belief that early education alone can change society and that the remodeling of ghetto children along middle-class lines is desirable, they have performed a disservice. Even where these attitudes have not prevailed and the teaching programs have been successful in humanizing the school experience and raising literacy, the gains are soon washed away by the deadening and punitive procedures the child encounters as he goes through the elementary grades. Most dangerous of all, insofar as such a philosophy of education views the parents and community solely as sources of "cultural deprivation" which must be "compensated" for, it leads the teacher into viewing the parents as enemies. Since, in the elementary grades, the children do not represent an independent force with which the teacher can ally himself, he finds himself isolated and opposed to the educational bureaucracy and parents alike.

INSURGENT ALLIANCE

The failure of a radical movement to develop among teachers has disoriented parents and other community organizations which are attempting to transform the schools. Not only are teachers and students forced into opposition to each other by the educational system, teachers and parents are also forced into mutual distrust and antagonism. If truly democratic control over an institution means participation in the decision making process by those whose lives are directly affected, then three groups must share power and control of the schools: teachers, students, and parents. Without such a tripartite alliance, the likelihood of any meaningful struggle against the educational establishment is slight. Yet, in most school boycotts and demonstrations, there has been little consultation with students who, unfortunately, have been largely viewed as *objects* of education rather than as participants. Not only are teachers typically not consulted; quite often they, rather than the school administration, are viewed as the enemy. Such an attitude on the part of parents is understandable. As black parents, for example, seeking to take control of their schools away from a white power structure that controls them in a semi-colonial fashion, they are faced with a predominantly white teaching staff which has thus far been the most apparent agent of that power structure.

In the absence of enough Negro teachers to staff the schools, the community groups seeking black power are placed in a quandry. To change the schools, it appears to them that they must first fight against the white teachers who appear as the establishment's representatives. But if teachers are the enemy and education cannot proceed without them, then all hope must be lost. In demanding the right to hire and fire teachers, the community groups further alienate the teachers by threatening their just rights to job security. Unfortunately,

placed in a quandry. To change the schools, it appears of social change from the white power structure. Their approach has been to restrict their demands to changes at the top, at the level of the school board or the local school administration, rather than to develop a program which might win teachers over into an alliance with them against the educational power structure.

The failure of the tripartite alliance to develop cannot, however, be laid at the doorsteps of the parents. Quite a different program of community demands would be raised if there were a strong, militant group of teachers willing to work together with parents in fighting the bureaucracy and, at the secondary school level, willing to work with their students in fighting for their demands. The teachers must provide the cement of the alliance. Without their active support, parent struggles for improved education are doomed. Without their active participation, student rebellion against the school is directionless. Teachers who share their students' distaste for the hypocrisy of the power structure and their anger over the meaningless curriculum and punitive rules can have considerable weight in transforming isolated acts of vandalism, rage, and defiance by students into organized, directed protest. Just as the parents need the support of teachers to press their demands for control from within the school, so do radical teachers need the support of the parent and community groups to support them from outside. Since time immemorial, students and teachers have rebelled against the inanity of the system in sporadic, isolated actions. The result has usually been expulsion or the sack. The only hope the student has is the support of the teachers and the only hope the teacher has is the support of the community.

What is required, then, is not isolated but organized action. In brief, radical students must develop an Educational Action Project of at least the dimensions of the S.D.S.-E.R.A.P. projects. College students must prepare to teach in the ghetto secondary schools and must coordinate their placement and activities so as to maximize their effects. Radical Teacher Organizations must be developed to discuss ways of implementing the tripartite alliance by contributing their ideas for action to community groups, developing their own ideas for effective education, and assisting in the self-organization of student groups.

It must be kept in mind during the development of such a movement that the chief goals are the radicalization of the three groups affected: teachers, parents, and students. In the course of the struggle, education is bound to be improved. But the situation cannot be improved by a romantic view of educational reform as the cure for all the problems of an exploitative society. Such a program of developing a cohesive group of radical teachers and the formation of parent and student alliances cannot be developed overnight. A start must be made, however, for the radical college student looking for a useful role in the Movement combined with some creative expression of his own interests. Preparation to teach Social Studies, English, or some other secondary school subject which would permit him to genuinely encounter his students' thoughts about school and society, can provide that start. In the most fundamental sense, these are times in which only radicals are fit to teach.

JULES SOREL

an open letter to the (polish) party

ON November 27, 1964, Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, both lecturers at Warsaw University, were expelled from the Polish United Workers' Party. The basis for their expulsion was a document they had written analyzing the Polish economic and political system, attacking the regime and calling for workers' democracy. They were tried *in camera* in July, 1965. Kuron was sentenced to three years in prison and Modzelewski to three and a half.

Below are selections from their "Open Letter to the Party," reprinted from the current issue of *New Politics* magazine, Vol. V, No. 2.

Readers of these selections will get only a taste of the full document which is a principled revolutionary indictment of the "Eastern central political bureaucracy," by men who are no less firm in their opposition to Western capitalism. The document offers an incisive economic and political interpretation of the bureaucratic class and offers statistics invaluable to anyone concerned with the truth about current developments in Poland and throughout Eastern Europe. The references in selections below to the "economic crisis" in Poland are based upon a penetrating economic and social analysis which can only be fully appreciated by studying the entire text in *New Politics*.

STATE OWNERSHIP of the means of production is exercised by those social groups to which the state belongs. In a nationalized economic system, only those who participate in, or can influence decisions of an economic nature . . . can affect the decisions of the state. Political power is connected with power over the process of production and the distribution of the product.

To whom does political power belong in our state? To one monopolistic Party—the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP). All essential decisions are made first in the Party . . . no important decision can be made and carried out without the approval of Party authorities. . . .

The Party is not only monopolistic, but it is also organized along monolithic lines. All factions, groups with different platforms, organized political currents, are forbidden within the Party. Every rank-and-file member . . . has no right to organize others who think as he does to follow his program, and he has no right to organize a propaganda and electoral struggle for the realization of that program. Elections to Party offices, to conferences and congresses become fictitious under such conditions. . . . Exercising political initiative in society demands organization, but in any attempt to exert influence on the decisions of the "top," the mass of rank-and-file Party members is deprived of organization, atomized, therefore powerless. The only source of political initiative can be . . . organized bodies, i.e., the (party) apparatus. . . . Information flows upward, while decisions and orders are handed down from above. . . . The fountainhead of orders is the elite, the group of people who occupy conspicuous positions in the hierarchy and who collectively make basic decisions.

In our system, the Party elite is . . . also the power elite; all decisions relating to state power are made by it. . . . By exercising state power, the Party elite has at its disposal all the nationalized means of production . . . it decides on the distribution and utilization of the entire social product. The decisions of the elite are independent, free of any control on the part of the working class and of the remaining classes and social strata. . . . Elections to the Sejm and National Councils become fictitious, with only one list of candidates drawn up by the "top" and a lack of any real differences in the programs of the PUWP and the satellite parties (United Peasant Party and Democratic Party). . . .

In 1962, the productive worker in industry created, on the average, a product worth 71,000 zloty out of which he received, as a working wage, a monthly average of 2,200 zloty. In other words, for one-third of the working day, the worker creates a subsistence minimum for himself, and for the remaining two-thirds, the surplus product.

The working class has no influence on the size of the surplus product, on its use and distribution, since . . . it is deprived of influence on the decisions of the authorities. . . . The working wage . . . is imposed from above, just as are the production norms. . . . Any organization of workers aimed at carrying on a struggle for higher wages is illegal and . . . prosecuted by the power apparatus—the police, attorney general's office, and the courts. The surplus product is thus taken away by force from the working class in proportions that have not been fixed by the workers, and is then made use of outside the range of their influence and possibility of control. . . .

To whom does the worker in our country sell his labor? To those who have at their disposal the means of production, in other words, to the *central political bureaucracy*. On account of this, the central political bureaucracy is the ruling class; it has at its exclusive command the basic means of production; it buys the labor of the working class; it takes away from the working class by force and economic coercion the surplus product and uses it for purposes that are alien and hostile to the worker in order to strengthen and expand its rule over production and society.

It is said that the bureaucracy cannot be a class, since the individual earnings of its members do not come anywhere near the individual earnings of capitalists; since no bureaucrat, taken by himself, rules anything more than his mansion, his car, and his secretary; since entrance to the bureaucratic ranks is determined by a political career and not by inheritance; and since it is relatively easy to be eliminated from the bureaucracy in a political showdown. This is quite wrong. All the above arguments prove only the obvious: the property of the bureaucracy is not of an individual nature, but constitutes the collective property of an elite which identifies itself with the state. This fact defines the principle of the bureaucracy's internal organization, but its class character does not depend

on its internal organization or mores, only on its social relationship—as a group—to the means of production and to other social classes (above all, the working class).

In view of the limited numerical strength of the bureaucratic class, its consumption of luxury articles takes up only a fractional part of the social product, but in the capitalist system, too, the personal consumption of the capitalists takes upon only an insignificant part of that product. This is not the essence of exploitation, for direct personal consumption is not an end in itself of the ruling class under any system. The privilege of high consumption, prestige and power, as well as other social privileges result from the ability to command production. Hence every ruling class aims at maintaining, strengthening and expanding its command over social production and over society; to that end, it uses the surplus product, and to that purpose it subordinates the very process of production. . . .

In our system, individual capitalists do not exist. The factories, foundries, mines and their entire production belong to the state. Since the state finds itself in the hands of a central political bureaucracy—the collective owner of the means of production and the exploiter of the working class—all means of production and maintenance have become one centralized national “capital.” The material power of the bureaucracy, the scope of its authority over production, its international position (very important for a class organized as a group identifying itself with the state) all this depends on the size of the national capital. Consequently, the bureaucracy wants to increase capital, to enlarge the producing apparatus, to accumulate. . . .

What is the class purpose of production? It is not the

profit of the given enterprise but the surplus product on a national scale. For it provides both the means for capital accumulation and the investments needed to maintain and strengthen the rule of the bureaucracy. . . .

The class goal of the bureaucracy is not profit and its accumulation, but the surplus product in its physical form and the expansion of production, i.e. production for production's sake. . . .

Workers' democracy can not limit itself to the level of an enterprise. For when economic and political decisions, the actual rule over the surplus product and the labor that creates it, do not belong to the working class, then participation of the workers in managing the enterprise must also become fictitious. Workers' self rule in an enterprise, therefore, requires full workers' democracy in the state. The working class organized under such conditions will set the goals of social production, guided by its own interests, the interest of the people living today at subsistence level. The goal of production will then be, of course, consumption for the broad masses. This signifies the overthrow of existing production and social relationships and, with them, of the bureaucracy's class rule.

Yugoslavia, has nothing in common with workers' democracy. There, the working class has no influence on the size, distribution and utilization of the surplus product and its consumption is maintained on a minimum level. Therefore, the worker is again exploited and the production goal is alien to him. . . .

Production relations based on bureaucratic ownership have become chains hampering the country's productive forces; with every day this continues, the crisis deepens. Therefore, the solution of the economic crisis requires the overthrow of these production relations and the elimination of the class rule of the bureaucracy. . . .

below the underground

FILM is an expensive, heavy-plant industrial art dominated by its sources of capital. During the last 15 years it has been challenged and assaulted by technological developments and a variety of forces which have resulted in the disintegration of its hegemony. The circumstances of its decline have had the effect of driving its most talented professionals to Europe and in America to create an active fringe, the Underground.

Confronted with the national competition of network-television, Hollywood reacted with economic retrenchment which prevented a qualitative alternative to the threat. The postwar reconstruction of European film centers with an ensuing international competition, and McCarthyism combined to further reduce the objective possibilities in Hollywood of serious independent feature films; nor was it able to maintain the high technical standards that distinguished its product previously. But these reverses also acted to prevent the access of young filmmakers to either the centers of production or to the utilization of professional tools. And a generation of intellectuals developed without either the discipline of professional engagement or a knowledge of the specific possibilities of the medium.

With no likelihood of absorption into a now closed industry, young film makers were forced into a network of fringe activity. In other arts this alienation from “Academy” might have led to new and imaginative alternative techniques, but this rejuvenation did not occur. Partly because the essence of the medium is its centralized industrial character based on a sophisticated division of labor, and the possession of a monopoly of technicians and processes by the industry. And that no resources, financial and technical, could substitute for the existing establishment. But more importantly the rejuvenation did not occur because the very social forces which exerted the reversal in the major centers, also shaped the possibilities of the independents outside.

The post-war rise of the new middle-class (a class without a cultural heritage or identity), its defensive political reaction to post-war problems, and the seizure of the major cultural institutions which was made possible in the vacuum created by the McCarthy atmosphere, encouraged in all the arts under its patronage the values that take their extreme expression in the Underground.

For with few exceptions the Underground denounces technique, content, ideas and in its haste for effect, gen-

erates serious formal confusions. It substitutes surface for form, style for content, confuses effect with meaning and crudeness with vitality. But when it is possible to hang empty canvases in major galleries, display collections of industrial waste in museums, and organize concerts in which no sound is produced, 8hour films containing one view of an ugly building, or studies of men with firecrackers hanging from their flies cannot be surprising.

Space prohibits an extensive discussion of all aspects of the movement, except to note that it seems to be composed of three major strains: a) "*Lyrical Cult Fantasies*" usually in color and with homosexual overtones (displaying male thighs and heaving stomachs) filmed in lower middle-class baroque surroundings, with red lights and an unrelated Rachmaninoff sound-track.

b) *Pop and Camp Motivated Expositions of Trivia*. Usually the academy-leader is integral with the body of the film which contains a six hour view of a sleeping man's back, a meaningless street scene, etc. This genre is usually underexposed or out-of-focus and induces wild hysteria in the audience.

c) *Subjective Mutterings*. Often a series of blurred motorcyclists with Nazi emblems out-of-focus to disjunctive noises and a party where they place each other's organs in their mouths. Others contain only one naked man making cigarette burns in photographs of women—these usually employ gate-weave and large grunting noises. Hand held camera technique allows these films to be cut before the essential action is visible. At one performance the projectionist allowed an entire reel to be out-of-focus to exclamations of deep pleasure in the audience—none of whom could distinguish between the out-of-focus image and the director's intention.

All the genre ignore social questions and seem completely devoid of conscience at the world they photograph. The attitudes of many (particularly the window designers and ladies' fashion artists) are politically conservative if not reactionary. During the N.Y. showing of TROUBLEMAKERS, a social documentary about the struggle to organize tenants in Newark, the audience hissed at the film's suggestion that perhaps important social improvement was impossible within this social system), as it is this group (genre 'b') that is most documentarist in its theory, but which refuses to generalize, or draw inference from the disgusting indignities that are often its subject. Similarly, as ideas can have no relation to art, it is possible for the Underground's theoreticians to dismiss Eisenstein as "backwoods, unreal and out-dated," apparently employing the same critical criterion that in the next paragraph are utilized to eulogize certain pop-music recordings.

The theoretical defense and critical analysis of the movement in the Village Voice and assorted film journals is usually confined to ecstatic exclamations of "beautiful" and references to "mind-blowing," which do not clarify many problems. But it indicates that this sort of defense is common in the preoccupations of the critics, the programs of the great cultural institutions and the drug-phantasies of the Underground itself.

That the underground film avoids structure, content, denounces technique and clarity and is concerned with superficial effects does not make it dissimilar to other current fads, but does make it empty.

GAVIN MACFADYEN

student revolt at CCNY

LAST December 12th, 34 students were suspended from CCNY for preventing the U.S. Army Materiel Command, which develops biological-chemical weapons such as napalm, from conducting recruitment interviews on campus.

The student action on Dec. 8th began with a CCNY SDS rally of hundreds of students in front of the Administration Building. The SDS had previously petitioned President Buell Gallagher to deny Placement Office facilities to the USAMC. The mood of the students present was militant. The student body had recently voted by a margin of almost 2 to 1, against release of class rankings by the school to the Selective Service. The questions of chemical warfare in Vietnam, the draft, and student rights were stressed by various student speakers.

At the conclusion of the rally 200 students marched down to the South Campus and decided to occupy the Placement Office where the USMAC was at work. Ten students were recognized by Dean Peace, Associate Dean of Students, and 24 other demonstrators volunteered their names: these students were subsequently called before a Student-Faculty Discipline Committee and given a "symbolic" 8-day suspension.

SDS responded to the Administration crackdown in a political manner. It called rallies and issued statements charging the Administration with permitting campus recruitment for chemical killing, refusing to carry out the student mandate against ranking, and trying to intimidate the anti-ranking movement and all other movements that fight for student rights by victimizing the 34 students. In addition, the SDS protested the undemocratic disciplinary hearings which were closed to students, faculty and the press. The SDS circulated a petition whereby the signers took collective responsibility for the sit-in action. In three days, 800 signatures were collected on a petition which required more to sign than just sympathy.

However, it is important to point out that the rallies called to protest the suspensions had disappointing turn-outs. While cold weather and tests undoubtedly contributed to the small attendance, these factors were not decisive. The demonstrations were conducted by a group of militant students opposed to the war and willing to put their necks on the chopping block. Obviously the rest of the student body was not yet willing to go that far.

Among the students who are committed at this point, there is a division in approach. One tendency feels that constant "electrification" will arouse the student body. The danger of such an approach should be clear by now. While the bulk of the student body is decidedly cool to the war, the issue which embroils them most is the anti-ranking question, for it strikes them closest to home. If a militant student movement is to be built at CCNY it will have to be built upon this basis. Radical effort has to educate the students to the idea that they have the right to more power within the school; the right to enforce the anti-ranking referendum. In the course of this campaign, the larger questions of the Vietnam War can be brought home as student consciousness and political awareness grows.

PAULINE BERGER

berkeley student strike

CHANCELLOR Roger Heyns was brought to Berkeley in the wake of the Free Speech Movement (FSM) to spearhead campus deradicalization. Clark Kerr's multiversity goal—the university as factory of the brain trust of the status quo—demanded slow, steady encroachments on the gains won by the FSM—the U of C could not afford an open confrontation with the student body. And for the 1965-66 school year, this slow chipping away appeared to have certain successes. Yet “extra”-university forces, the war in Vietnam and the rightward drift of California politics, forced Heyns into the open confrontation which led to the massively successful student strikes of December.

Following a walk out by thousands of students protesting Charter Day ceremonies honoring the war in Vietnam last May, the crackdown escalation began. The U of C. attempted to pre-empt the threatened purge of the campus demanded by Reagan. Throughout the Fall term, Heyns attempted to coerce student radical organizations and individuals, e.g. the threats to the use of the Sproul Hall steps for daily rallies. Repeatedly he met with massive student opposition and was forced to pull back. Finally, on November 30th, he allowed the “non-student” organization agitating for the War, the Navy, to come on campus with certain privileges which student campus groups did not enjoy. One demonstrator was attacked by a member of the football team egged on by campus cops, and then the demonstrator was arrested. The sit-in to protest the action was met with the arrests of six non-students and the physical intimidation of students by cops called onto the campus. The student strike of 12,000 was the students' response.

The apparent lull on the Berkeley campus was only that—a lull. In reality, as Marv Garson wrote in *New Politics* a few months before the strike, “The radical spirit has held its own since the FSM: in fact it has grown. The problem is that every attempt at radical action has failed.” Vice Chancellor Cheit's decision to call the police simply sold everyone on a program of action: the strike.

Various analyses have seen in the strike the opening of a new stage in the student movement. Just as the Negro struggle has gone from civil rights to black power, they argue, so the student movement has gone from free speech to student power. The analogy can be both very useful and misleading.

One thing which seems certain in the light of the strike is that the student body as a whole is more radical than it was in 1964—more so than anyone realized. The war in Vietnam, the black power movement, rank and file union revolts and the recent wave of strikes, attempts to organize agricultural workers—crises like these in the larger society have further radicalized a campus which was a radical hot-house to begin with.

The speed with which the strike was called, the overwhelming support it received, and the fact that, newspaper accounts to the contrary, it was only recessed because of finals, after resisting both faculty hostility and Regents ultimatums, all constitute tangible evidence of the new, hard-boiled militancy of the Berkeley students.

Furthermore, the role of the faculty during the strike

worked to reinforce this new militancy. Whereas in 1964 the faculty supported the FSM-led strike, in 1966 it went with Heyns. The students, at least, have learned a lesson. Memories of the FSM have been refocused: the self reliance of the December 2, 1964 sit-in replaced the faculty “leadership” of December 8th.

While new lessons have been learned, old ones were strengthened. Political defense was the central concern of both the FSM of 1964 and the Council of Campus Organizations (CCO) of 1966. Outside police power used to settle campus political problems triggered both Berkeley strikes. Both “free speech” and “student power” have meant the same thing in practice: the ability of organized students to defend the culture of dissent.

Prevailing definitions have developed with the new militancy. The rhetoric of liberalism—appeals to “good faith” and “dialogue,”—and the myth of the “campus community” have been outgrown. The “protest community” which has replaced it presumes a frank recognition of the irreconcilable hostility between radical students and the Liberal Administrators.

The replacement of the slogan of free speech with the call for student power does not reflect a basic reorientation of the movement. It cannot fairly be compared to the shift of the Negro struggle from middle-class integration to ghetto mobilization. Its significance lies not so much in a new stage of the student movement as in a new level of student consciousness: an open vote of no confidence in the structure of power.

In one sense, then, student power means a new militancy and a new awareness in pursuit of old goals. In another sense, however, it is just a new name for an old problem, that of the perennial attempts to tie the culture of dissent to a utopian fellowship of scholars.

POLITICS AND NOT ALIENATION

While it is true that students as students are badgered and “exploited” in a number of ways, personal alienation is not the over-riding dynamic behind the Berkeley student movement. What distinguishes the Berkeley student is not his alienation but his political consciousness.

Students are the one group in society—both because of their “extra-class” transitional character, not yet tied into the structure of production, and because of their particular involvement with ideas—whose first experiences with organization need not have a “material” focus. Or to put it another way, “abstract” political issues can readily be defined by students as concrete problems of their day to day lives.

On the UC campus, organizing around purely student concerns is not only unnecessary as a first step, it is also more difficult than political organization. Repeated attempts have been made to harness the power of political protests to anti-political movements for educational reform. And they have all failed.

Following the strike recess, anti-political “educationalism” reappeared once more, this time in the guise of the “psychedelic culture.” On December 7 a leaflet was distributed encouraging “all those who supported the strike to wear the mask of their choice to class on Wednesday.”

In part, this grabbing at gimmicks was merely a reflex of frustration to the absence of visible gains. The strike began as a demonstration; given the lack of preparation and the nearness of finals, a fight for open concessions seemed impossible. But out of the very success of the demonstration, many began talking in terms of a strike for demands, and were demoralized as a result by the stand-off which in fact was more than was hoped for at the beginning.

In part, the general orientation towards student power, in the educational reform sense, is only a reaction to the failure of a cohesive radical movement to develop in the society as a whole. Radical politics on the campus will remain in a tenuous position so long as they have no base in the larger society. Real student power can only become manifest within the context of a united force for black power and workers' power in America.

The questions, "where Berkeley is going?" or "where Berkeley should go?" are the hardest to answer. No final program is available, but certain considerations should be kept in mind.

Organization for defense has first priority, to preserve what the Strike Committee called "the space we need" to build a movement. So long as a ready mobilization of the strength of the strike remains a real possibility, the uneasy stalemate established between Administration and students may be preserved. Discussions now going on about a campus defense coordinating committee may be a step in this direction.

Perhaps steps ought to be taken in the direction of a long term movement, a serious and sustaining institutional form for the culture of dissent. A new Free Speech Union may prove to be another futile exercise in educationalism. Plans to take over and transform the ASUC have fared no better in the past. "Multi-front" organization in dorms and departments may help keep student vigilance but probably would not culminate in a campus-wide movement.

There has been some discussion of a campus-wide union organizing campaign. Support from the teaching assistant's union was decisive in the strike. Campus cafeteria workers, the custodian's union and the Alameda Central Labor Council all demonstrated support. And the Administration has agreed to AFT demands for a grievance committee.

But the need remains for a broad, continuing political organization. The SDS might play this role if it could break out of its shell. The felt need for a serious political

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organization has propelled an increasing number of students into the Independent Socialist Club; but no specific political tendency can substitute for a mass organization of the whole Berkeley radical community.

It may turn out, of course, that the question of long term organization is moot. At the time of this writing, 75 students cited for rules violations in the course of strike activity, have been called up for hearings. Anything other than perfunctory discipline would probably provoke another strike, which the Regents have said would be followed by wholesale firings and expulsions. Mass discipline would almost certainly make the strike 100% effective, even among the faculty. And given a campus brought to a standstill by students, faculty and staff, the Regents might turn to a "lockout," and close down, and occupy, the University.

A dead tool, the Regents may decide, is better than a living danger.

KIT LYONS

STUDENT revolts have rocked a number of other schools around the country. Notably at New York University where an 80% effective boycott of classes was the students' answer to a proposed tuition increase. Unfortunately, because of limited space in this issue, we are unable to cover these stories. Ed.

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the SSEU strike

TWO years ago, the Social Service Employees Union (SSEU) led a 28-day strike which won gains City workers had not known before. The union, which organized case-workers in the New York City Welfare Department away from a bureaucrat-ridden AFL-CIO local, has, in the classical pattern of labor insurgencies, set off a wave of organization of welfare workers nation-wide. Other groups of City employees, including nurses, doctors, and other hard-to-organize groups have struck and made gains in the wake of the SSEU.

Now the SSEU faces a serious test. As long as it continues to make gains through militancy, other workers will be encouraged to take the same path. At the same time, New York City, already on the verge of bankruptcy, is being caught in a squeeze between the federal government's general cutback of poverty funds and the political hostility of Gov. Rockefeller, who has already publicly advised Mayor Lindsay to cut his budget. At the same time that his Administration is running out of money, Lindsay desperately needs to create new sources of patronage to bolster his falling popularity. To this end he is reorganizing the City Administration into 11 huge super-administrations whose heads will be Lindsay patronage plums. Voters are expected to buy this plan because "it will save the taxpayers' money" at the expense of City workers. The logic of this plan dictates getting rid of the SSEU.

Unfortunately, the leadership of the SSEU, after confronting the organized hostility of the Lindsay Administration for nearly a year, is meeting new contract negotiations in a mood of deepening pessimism. Judith Mage, elected last year on a left-wing platform with the support of most union militants against the slate supported by incumbent president Joseph Tepedino, has been facing increased opposition for her stalling tactics which have failed to mobilize the union's membership against the City's demands for a no-strike-no-work action clause, a management prerogative clause, and the City's plans for a general speed-up and attack on prevailing wage rates and promotional procedures. The City wants to shackle the union which has been successful precisely because it has not relied on traditional bureaucratic methods but has enforced its contract through direct action ("work action") in the centers and forced control over hiring and transfer policies. Judy Mage has also insisted that administrative policies and increased benefits for clients be negotiated by the union. The City's long-range plan entails firing, transfer or intimidation of the Welfare Department's college-educated employees and their replacement by cheap labor recruited off of welfare rolls, which, it is hoped, will prove more grateful than the City's current charges.

Faced with this challenge, Mage has been unable to develop any clear policy, either of retreat or attack. Instead, she has reacted by attempting to buy time, prolonging negotiations until she is no longer afraid to take a militant position. Mage's vacillation provokes the very situation she fears: a confused and divided membership unwilling to strike. SSEU members, used to firm and decisive action from their leaders could react to Mage's

stalling by relaxing, in the assumption that "there won't be a strike." This tendency must be attacked. A new group of militants, the Rank and File Committee, has formed to mobilize the membership against what could be the next step downward for the panicky Mage leadership: a sellout founded on the premise that "the membership isn't militant enough." This is far from being the case. If a strike is to succeed, what is needed is a leadership capable of giving content and expression to the members' militancy and to urge them on to new accomplishments. In particular, SSEU members should not be treated like children in the belief that telling them about the state of negotiation "hurts our bargaining position."

The Rank and File Committee is urging nine points as a basis for mobilizing the SSEU as quickly as possible for a strike that can win. Summarized, they would make any job changes mandatorially negotiated with the union, guarantee workers against involuntary transfers, protect the union's freedom of action, provide cost-of-living salary increases, free clients of the need to degrade themselves by begging for clothing and household replacements, and bringing immediate improvements in workload and working conditions which would fulfill every worker's desire for a decent and humane job. The Rank and File Committee feels that the workers cannot be left out of the bargaining process. Such an attempt leaves the illusion that significant gains can be won through bargaining divorced from mass support.

The SSEU has a great deal of strength if its membership is mobilized. The union can even count on support from some Democratic Party politicians who would like to pin an anti-labor label on Lindsay; it has won goodwill from other City unions for its leadership in the fight against the Tri-partite agreement, Lindsay's first move in the strategy to crush City labor: the teachers, transport workers, sanitationmen, teamsters, and others have all promised material support. Welfare clients' organizations plan to flood welfare centers demanding service and harassing the Department's effort to maintain a skeleton staff of scabs. The City can be beaten if militant action produces a chain reaction culminating in massive labor support which will force Lindsay, for fear of further losses in labor and ghetto support, to drop his anti-labor policies or try them out somewhere else. But if fear of isolation and distrust of the membership take charge of the SSEU, it will be broken. And that will be a defeat for workers everywhere.

AN SSEU MEMBER

Baltimore Independent Socialist Union

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from the press

Its Those Outside Agitators Again

TEXAS (Nov. 17, '66)—A Starr County grand jury asserted yesterday that a strike by Rio Grande Valley farm workers was 'unlawful and un-American.' . . .

"Referring to the labor organizers (of the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee), the grand jury report said,

"We find that this group of individuals is led by non-residents of Starr County. . . ." (According to the report, the union organizers have threatened and coerced workers into striking.)

"The farm workers' strike began June 1. They seek a minimum wage of \$1.25 an hour. . . . They say they are now paid 40 cents to \$1 an hour."

These "Un-American" workers had been out for over five months seeking the "Un-American" federal minimum wage! Needless to say, it's fine for residents of Starr County to coerce and exploit fellow "residents." And one tends to doubt the amount of "coercion" necessary to lead workers out on strike for enough money to live like human beings.

"Backer of Jersey Migrant Farmers Faces Eviction.

(NOV. 17) New Jersey—A leader in a drive to improve migrant labor conditions on South Jersey farms charged here today that she and her family were being evicted in retaliation for her outspoken criticism of the way farmers treat Negro workers.

"Mrs. Lonnie C. Allen, 49-year-old president of the S.C.O.P.E. conference of farm workers . . . had been ordered to get out of her home by the end of the month by Maurice Uhland, a farmer who was fined Monday by the state for violations at the Allen home. . . .

"Mr. Uhland conceded that a major factor in Mrs. Allen's eviction was her anti-poverty activity. 'Why should I house those kind of people?' he asked."

Hershey tells it like it is

DEC. 4—The nation's draft director, Lt. Gen. L. B. Hershey said, 'Whenever we need women, I think we ought to draft them.' . . . "The public gets optimistic when we say we're not going to raise our military strength much more in Vietnam,' he said. 'But our boys are not all in Vietnam. We've got them all over the world.'"

The "credibility gap" 'on the home front

NOV. 29—President Johnson has established a special study group to search for new ways to cope with strikes that are judged to threaten the national interest.

"The panel set up quietly by the White House before the recent elections, is reported to be striving to submit by mid-December a report that the President could use as a foundation for new emergency strike legislation. . . . "Last January the President said he would propose new anti-strike legislation, but it never materialized. . . . Administration sources said that it would be politically unwise to propose a bill before the elections."

Meanwhile, labor "leaders" were out gathering votes for the Administration: hoping to repeal Taft-Hartley, no doubt.

Firemen to Study No-Strike Clause

DEC. 28—The Internat'l Assoc. of Fire Fighters named a nine-man commission today to consider altering the union's no-strike policy. . . . "The appointment of the commission, which was authorized by the union's convention last August, came in response to growing membership pressure on the union leadership to alter its constitutional provision against strikes." . . .

"The new generation of men who have entered the ranks of fire departments have often felt, with considerable justification, that they are being exploited by public officials and administrators.' . . ."

Look behind the headlines:

NEW York Times headline: "Teachers' Union Threatens Talks." The article, however, makes it clear that the **Board of Education** has refused to negotiate on major U.F.T. proposals for "smaller classes and improved teaching loads." The union has also proposed such atrocities as "the extension to 300 schools of the More Effective Schools program, which provides smaller classes and other advantages to 21 schools in underprivileged neighborhoods." The Board of Education has refused to negotiate on such issues of "management prerogatives." Similar ploys have been used to coerce the New York Social Services Employees. Needless to say, whenever management refuses to negotiate, the Times informs its readers that the union has threatened the talks.

Johnson invokes Taft-Hartley:

OCT. 10 to end a two-day strike . . . (of) 5,900 workers (at General Electric Company defense plant at Evendale, Ohio)" and "Dec.—at Kokomo Defense Plant, Union Carbide Cor-

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poration's Plant in Indiana." The Administration is relying increasingly upon coercive tactics against striking workers. According to David R. Jones of the New York Times, "There are growing signs from the Administration . . . that Mr. Johnson is seriously looking for some proposals that would diminish the danger of disruptive walkouts. . . ."

"The pressure for a new anti-strike weapon stems from widespread dissatisfaction with the two major laws now available to handle emergency disputes. These are the Railway Labor Act . . . and the Taft-Hartley Act. . . ."

"Criticism is that neither act, in the end, can prevent a strike. . . ."

"One common suggestion for dealing with emergency strikes is to alter both laws to provide the Government with a series of alternatives such as seizing and operating an industry or forcing compulsory arbitration. . . ." Workers rights are expendable.

And some call it the party of Labor:

"LEGISLATION to deal with strikes by public employees has been given top priority by Democratic leaders in the Legislature (of New York State). . . ." "We don't want to bust the unions, but we want the fines to be effective enough to prevent strikes." Big of them.

Let's Have More Official Inertia

"DEC. 10—Representative Lester L. Wolff said today that 'official inertia' was largely responsible for the failure of U.S. industries to start joint ventures with Vietnamese investors. . . ."

"He said he would seek to increase the U.S. Govt.'s guarantee of American industrial construction here to 100% from 75% as a means of encouraging investment. . . ."

"Only substantial private investment in association with Vietnamese capital can fulfill long-term goals!"

A railroad worker involved in the current dispute against the Spanish railroad system summed it up in these words: "My father was shot in the Civil War because he was a Socialist. Once upon a time I would have crawled on my knees so that my son would not lose his father, too. But I have my dignity and my responsibility toward my companions. So we have to fight for our rights."

In Case of Nuclear Attack: Have No Fear: Less people but more pain

THE Government announced today (Jan. 6, 1967) that, "The great majority of the materials the stockpile needs for nuclear war were found to be lower than for conventional war. The reason, officials said, is primarily that the population would be lower. . . ."

"In the case of opium, a new stockpile objective was established exclusively to meet the needs of atomic war. . . . The announcement said that 'opium, stockpiled as a parent substance of morphine and codeine, must be held in greater quantities for a nuclear war than a conventional war.' . . . 'Both morphine and codeine are used medically as pain killers.' "The Office of Emergency Planning . . . (assumed) that about one-third of the population would be killed. . . ."

"The Study . . . found that the population loss would be greater than the loss of plant capacity. . . ."

DEC. 22, 1966): "Using cash, credit, and agents, President Johnson for six years has been busy buying Texas hill country land and by now has become one of the largest owners of ranchland in the area. . . ."

"And where Mr. Johnson has bought, Texas has not been far behind with highway improvements. . . ."

"Although Mr. Johnson and the Texas Broadcasting Company bought much of the 775 acres in the ranch for less than \$100 an acre, similar land in the area has sold this year for \$450 an acre, and it was not in impoverished pasture."

Patient Dies from Cure

"THERE was a slight improvement in the state of man's freedom in the last year, Freedom House reported yesterday.

"The nonpartisan organization . . . issued its annual balance sheet yesterday. . . ."

"On the plus side for freedom the report listed the following:

"The 'rebuffs suffered by Communist China in its attempt to promote totalitarianism in the developing nations,' the overthrow of Premier Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and the 'new Indonesian Government's swing toward friendlier relations with the West.'

"The report also found the military situation in Vietnam had improved. . . . 'On the minus side, the report listed the French withdrawal from NATO.' One wonders what exactly the New York Times means by 'nonpartisan.'"

"A Taste of Misery Found Enlightening. . . ."

"During the week (project misery) lasted, all 35 sixth graders lost certain rights and privileges.

"They had to eat lunch at a table set apart from the rest of the students. . . . They couldn't play with other pupils during recess. They stepped off sidewalks to let others pass. . . ."

"One student, 11-year-old Cathy Pennekamp (said),

"I think Project Misery was an exciting experience. I felt I wasn't worth anything when everybody turned away from me."

Imagine how really effective the project would have been if they had lynched one of the sixth-graders, or if one of the girls had been raped by a seventh grader. "An exciting experience."

wirtz on democracy

AMERICA's Secretary of Labor has a special passion for democracy as illustrated in his frequent statements in the press questioning its "viability." "Just as science has made war too dangerous to be left to the generals, science, when it unlocks the arcane of thought and life will either have made science too dangerous to be left to the scientists or will have made government too dangerous to be left to the governed."

To hasten this latter process, Mr. Wirtz has begun with attacks upon democracy in his own field: the labor unions:

He "has expressed deep concern about the recent tendency of some union members to reject labor agreements proposed by their leaders. . . ."

"He was referring to a situation in which a union might lure a company into extending its best offer . . . and then permit members to turn down the offer so they could obtain more.

"Mr. Wirtz said the proper solution to the problem would be for unions to shun that practice and to use negotiators who could make a settlement stick with the members. He did not elaborate. . . ."