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From Socialist Appeal, Vol. IV No. 28, 13 July 1940, p. 3.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghanfor ETOL.
Will Stalin try to seize the Dardanelles?
The answer is: “I do not know but I think it highly probable.”
This question, which is discussed by everyone and on every occasion, affords an opportunity to repeat in concise form the propositions which best explain Stalin’s foreign policy beginning with the Hitler-Stalin pact.
Every step that he has taken since he entered into a pact with Hitler and the pact itself can be best explained by taking the foregoing two basic propositions as a guide.
Does his war against Finland conflict with this theory? Not at all. When his demands on Finland were refused by the Finnish government, Stalin’s prestige was at stake. Thinking that the Red Army could settle with Finland in quick order, he took a chance on military action. The peace with Finland can be explained only by the fact that to continue the war would have risked being involved in a conflict with the Allied powers. In addition Hitler, anxious to make his coup in Norway, was impatient at the slowness of the Red Army which made possible Allied intervention, and probably exerted pressure on Stalin to make peace.
Against whom was Stalin, in the early stages of the war, preparing his defensive positions? Obviously against all possible enemies. He is not so foolish as to trust Hitler and he understood that the Allies would not feel very kindly towards him after he had double-crossed them.
But a new factor entered into the situation after Hitler made his spectacular drive westward and succeeded in laying low the Netherlands, Belgium and France.
That was as unexpected for Stalin as it was for everybody else and far more uncomfortable. For there looms before him a Hitler completely dominating Europe and having a common frontier with the Soviet Union.
Stalin’s calculations when he signed the pact with Hitler were not fulfilled one hundred percent. The pact saved him from war but enabled Hitler to gain complete hegemony over Europe. Whereas Stalin, expected either that England and France would not go to war over Poland or if they did it would he a prolonged and exhausting war.
From now oh fear of an attack by Hitler will be another basic factor added to the above-mentioned two that will dictate Stalin’s policies. When he sent additional troops into Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania, he was not afraid of the Allies. There was nothing to be afraid of as far as they were concerned. That move can be explained only as motivated by fear of Hitler.
It is true that from the very beginning of the war Stalin had his eye on Bessarabia. Having once belonged to the Soviet Union and seized by Rumania it was most natural that it should be taken back whenever there was an opportunity. Stalin’s seizure of northern Bukovina, however, clearly indicates a desire on his part to strengthen his defensive position against Hitler.
The theory advanced by some people who see the class struggle only as a struggle against Stalin, to the effect that the march of the Red Army into Bessarabia was dictated by Hitler because the latter wants Stalin to guard the Rumanian oil wells for him, has absolutely no sense whatever. Against whom must the oil wells be guarded by Stalin? Against France which has already capitulated? Against England, after Rumania has switched to Hitler and after Turkey has moved away from England?
Why should Hitler ask Stalin to guard the oil wells now when they need no guarding?
And should Stalin attempt to seize the Dardanelles, that seizure also will be explained by the two propositions first mentioned and the additional one of fear of Hitler.
While the question whether Stalin’s present moves are made with the knowledge and consent of Hitler is an interesting one, it is absolutely irrelevant as far as explaining his motives in making those moves. That would be relevant only if Hitler today were in a position to stop Stalin and failed to do so.
It is important here to emphasize the point that we have stressed since Stalin began, sending the Red Army outside of the Soviet Union. We defend the Soviet Union not because we think we have the correct explanation for Stalin’s moves (although we do think so), but because nationalized property still exists in the Soviet Union and so long as it will exist we shall defend it regardless of Stalin’s policies.
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