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First Session of the Enlarged Presidium

Moscow, June 11. The first session of the Enlarged Presidium of the Executive of the Communist International was held on Sunday June 10: in the Red Hall of the Comintern in the Mochovaya. Comrade Zinoviev was in the chair and there were present, in addition to Comrade Bucharin and the members of the Presidium, one member from each of the Delegations.

From the report of the Secretariat it appears that all the sections of the Comintern have sent strong delegations to the Enlarged Executive and that with one or two exceptions (Australia and South Africa) all the delegates have arrived in Moscow.

It was decided that the Enlarged Executive should commence its sittings on June 12. at 6 p.m. with the report of Comrade Zinoviev.

A lively discussion arose during the consideration of the detailed points of the agenda, in which practically all the delegates took part, and many proposals were made. The agenda decided on was agreed to unanimously. In addition to the points of the agenda already published it was decided to include the date of the next World Congress and the present situation in Russia.

The following is the agenda adopted by the Presidium:

1. a) Report of Presidium.
- b) Practical measures for continuing the campaign for the United Front.
- c) Fusion of the Second and Two and a Half Internationals. Speaker: Comrade Zinoviev.

2. The World Political Situation. Speaker: Comrade Radek.
3. Fight against Fascism. Speaker: Comrade Clara Zetkin.
4. Trade Unions and Factory Councils. Speakers: Lozovsky and a representative of the German Delegation.
5. The Limits of Centralism in the Comintern (Discussion with the Scandinavian comrades). Speaker: Comrade Bucharin.
6. The Labor Movement in England.
7. Preparatory work for the drawing up of a Program of the Communist International. Speaker: Comrade Bucharin.
8. The Problems of Sections.
9. Date of the next World Congress and the Congresses of the Individual Sections.
10. Report on the Situation in Russia.
11. Other business.

It was decided to set up a number of Commissions, their size varying with the importance of the question to be considered. The Political Commission which will be set up to discuss the first point on the Agenda, will consist of 21 members, and the remaining Commissions from 9 to 15 members.

At the end of the meeting, Comrade Zinoviev invited the delegates to attend the deliberations of the Council of Leading Representatives dealing with the national question in the Federated Soviet Republics, since the national question was an important problem in practically every Section.

Comrade Zinoviev closed the sitting at 1 a.m.

The Enlarged Executive Opening Session

The Congress of the Enlarged Executive opened on Tuesday June 12, at 7 p.m. in the Andreyevsky Hall,—in which the Fourth World Congress and the recent Congress of the Russian Communist Party were held.

The Session was opened by Comrade Zinoviev who was greeted by the stormy applause of the delegates upon his entry into the hall.

There were present at the Congress the members of the Executive, 3 representatives from each of the parties of the larger countries and of the Communist Youth International, and the R.I.L.U.; 2 representatives each from countries where the Communist Parties are relatively weak, and one representative each from the countries with small Communist Parties, with the exception of Austria which sent three and Holland which sent two delegates.

Ten comrades were invited from England to attend the English Conference of which the majority have already arrived in Moscow.

The following members of the Executive were present: Zinoviev, Levy, Souvarine, Hörnle, Bucharin, Radek, Smeral, Neurath, Gennari, Gramsci, Schäffer, Schatzkin, Höglund, Schefflo, Kuusinen, Kolarov, Stirner, Katayama, Safarow. Comrades Zetkin, Macmanus and Andrews are on their way to Moscow.

In addition to the above, Comrade Falk was present from the Norwegian Party.

The following delegates from the individual Sections have already arrived in Moscow. *France:* Tibot, René, Rosmer, *Italy C.P.:* Urbani, Martini, Negri. *Germany:* Böttcher, Walcher, Ewert. *Czecho-Slovakia:* Zapatocky, Beuer. *England:* New-

bold, Stewart, Gallagher, Jackson, Pollitt, Brown. *Russia:* Lunatsharski, Piatakov, Piatnitski and Losovski. *C.Y.I.:* Schatzkin, Schüller, Gypthner, Michael, Paasonen, Flyg, Turuboten. *Spain:* Aparicio. *America:* Amter, Trachtenberg. *Austria:* Koritschoner, Frey. *Holland:* Jansen. *Denmark:* Laursen. *Sweden:* Ström. *Norway:* Traumaal, Hofno. *Canada:* Johnson. *Lithuania:* Angaretis. *Latvia:* Stutschka, Bersin. *Switzerland:* Wiesner. *Yugoslavia:* Vladetic. *Poland:* Mazeyevsky, Krejewski. *Japan:* Aoki. *South Africa:* Jones. *Finland:* Laukki, Manner. *Esthonia:* Walmann. *Ukraine:* Manuiski. *Persia:* Sultan Sade. *Turkey:* Gofforof.

The delegates of the following Countries have not yet arrived: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Greece, Georgia, Ireland, Java, Korea, Mexico, Portugal, Roumania, and Uruguay.

Election of Presidium

Comrade Zinoviev was unanimously elected Chairman of the meeting of the Enlarged Executive. The following comrades were elected to the Presidium: Trotsky—Russia; Böttcher—Germany; Tibot—France; Smeral—Czechoslovakia; Gennari—Italy; Gallacher—England; Traumaal and Höglund—Scandinavia; Amter—America; Kolarov—the Balkans; Roy—India; and Katayama, the East.

Comrade Neurath was appointed political secretary of the Congress and Comrade Heimo technical secretary.

Comrade Zinoviev informed the Congress that the Executive had decided to appoint Comrade Lenin Honorary President of the Communist International. This announcement was greeted with stormy applause.

Commissions

The Plenum thereupon elected a Political Commission to consider the resolutions on point 1. of the agenda "Practical Measures for Continuing the Campaign for a United Front", on point 2, "The World Political Situation", and on point 3, "The Fight against Fascism". This Commission consists of 21 members, as follows: Zinoviev, Trotsky, Bucharin, Piatakov, (Russia); Levy, Souvarine (France); Bötcher, Hörnle (Germany); Neurath and Smeral (Czechoslovakia); Kolarov, Vladetic (the Balkans); Traumaal, Höglund, Schefflo (Scandinavia); Matsievski (Poland); Aoki (Japan); Pollitt (England); Gennari Saitta (Italy); Laukki (Finland); Schatzkin (Y.C.I.).

The following comrades were elected on the Commission to deal with Point 5 of the agenda "The Limit of Centralism in the Comintern": Bucharin, Zinoviev, Radek, Piatakov (Russia); Zetkin replacing Hörnle (Germany); Kolarov (Bulgaria); Smeral (Czechoslovakia); Macmanus (England); Kuusinen (Finland); Urbani (Italy); Souvarine (France); Katayama (Japan); Matsievski (Poland); Schatzkin (Y.C.I.).

The following comrades were appointed to the Commission dealing with the work of preparation of the program of the Comintern: Bucharin, Radek, Piatakov, Trotsky (Russia); Smeral (Czechoslovakia); Kuusinen (Finland); Falk (Norway); Kolarov (the Balkans); Macmanus (England); Zetkin (Germany); Matsievski (Poland); Gennari (Italy); Katayama (Japan) and Comrade Varga.

The following were appointed to deal with Point 8 of the agenda, "The Problems of the Sections":

Italian Commission: Souvarine (France); Trotsky, Lunacharsky, Zinoviev, Bucharin (Russia); Zetkin, Bötcher (Germany); Beuer (Czechoslovakia); Kolarov (Bulgaria); Koritschoner (Austria); Amter (America); Falk (Norway); Schüller (Y.C.I.); Kravyski (Poland); Aoki (Japan); and Comrades Rakosi, and Dimitry.

The Balkans Commission: Neurath, Smeral (Czechoslovakia); Frey (Austria); Gennari (Italy); Hörnle (Germany); Levy (France); Gallacher (England); Radek, Piatnitsky (Russia); Schefflo (Norway); Kolarov (Bulgaria); Michael (Y.C.I.); Milutin, Vladetic (Yugoslavia).

Austrian Commission: Neurath (Czechoslovakia); Walcher (Germany); Wiesner (Switzerland); Vladetic (the Balkans); Radek, Piatnitsky (Russia); Höglund (Sweden); Milutin, Gypthner (Y.C.I.); Jansen (Holland); Gramsci (Italy); Lozovsky (Russia).

Swiss Commission: Stewart (England); Walcher (Germany); Neurath (Czechoslovakia); Stürner (South America); Lozovsky (Russia); Negri (Italy).

Dutch Commission: Hofno (Norway); Manner (Finland); Radek (Russia); Macmanus—deputy Jackson (England); Zetkin (Germany); Ren (France); Trachtenberg (America); Stutschka (Latvia).

Danish Commission: Kobetski, Piatakov (Russia); Manner (Finland); Strom (Sweden); Janson (Holland); Stutschka (Latvia); Eweri (Germany); Kravyski (Poland); Ivon Jones (South Africa).

Cooperative Commission: Khinchuk, Meshtcheryakov (Russia); Serra (Italy); Zapotosky (Czechoslovakia); Hörnle (Germany); Levy (France); Trammel, and Schefflo (Scandinavia).

Women's Commission: Kuusinen (Finland); Kolarov (The Balkans); Zetkin (Germany); Smidovitch (Russia); Neurath (Czechoslovakia); Piatnitski (Russia); Traumaal (Norway).

Speech of Comrade Zinoviev

The Session then proceeded to the consideration of the first point of the agenda. Comrade Zinoviev mounted the tribune and was greeted with general applause. He said:

Six months have passed since our last Congress. We see things much clearer today. New political questions have sprung up. We must now examine to what extent the decisions of the Fourth Congress were correct and in what manner they were carried out. In many countries the political situation has altered in favor of the capitalists. America is experiencing a boom; the situation in England and France has improved. In Central Europe the former disorganization prevails; Japan is on the eve of a crisis. The International situation is for the moment characterized by the Anglo-Russian complication. The new tendency has begun in England not because Russia has grown weaker. On the contrary, it is because it has been growing stronger. The capitalists were deceived by the new economic policy. They thought it was the beginning of our capitulation. They thought that the communists would bring about their own ruin. But our situation improved; Russian grain appeared on the world market; we have never before enjoyed such undivided support of the workers as we do today. Therefore perhaps, a new chapter in the attitude of the capitalist States towards us is beginning.

Fascism is marching onward.

We are witnessing events in Bulgaria. The King is giving the putsch the form of legality. That may happen in any revolution which does not set the King aside. We must test Fascism on its economic side. We cannot place all phenomena under one hat. In Italy Fascism is undergoing a change.

The danger of war has increased; the situation may become critical at any moment.

The Fusion of the 2. and 2½ Internationals.

In Hamburg the fusion of the second and the 2½ Internationals took place. Is it necessary to speak at length of these gentlemen here? Even from the reformist standpoint the new International has no objective; it contains only two parties of any significance at all: the German Socialist Party, and the British Labor Party. Kautsky, at one time, was against the acceptance of the Labor Party into the Second International. Has this party become better since that period? No! But the Second International has become worse. Therefore the Labor Party is able to play first fiddle. The Russian Mensheviks, who were formerly the left wing of the 2½ International, are now the right wing of the new International. Its statutes say: Ministers cannot be members of the Executive Committee. In other words, it says to the minister: when you become a thief, you cannot be a member of our honorable society, but when you come out of prison, you may join us again. These gentlemen need no International. What they want is an international parade. Will it make any impression? A temporary one perhaps, such as was made by the fusion of the German Social-democrats with the Independent Socialist Party. The German Social-Democratic Party was weakened by its union with the Independent Socialist Party; it became a thing without a soul. The union of the Second International with the 2½ International will accelerate the process of its decay.

There is only one real International—the Communist International.

That has now been made obvious. We have not yet got the majority of the proletariat behind us, but such forces as we have we have consolidated for the purposes of international action. Two great parties of our International, the German and the French, in a decisive and momentous hour, carried on a joint campaign seconded by Soviet Russia. They have practically demonstrated that they know how to work together when two bourgeoisies are at loggerheads. This was a step towards a great end, the creation of a truly United Communist World Party.

The bourgeoisie as a class is united. The German Lutterbeck, appeals for armed aid to the French General Degoutie.

The United Front.

On the question of the united front we have overcome many difficulties during this period, especially in France where even the Syndicalists have learned to apply this weapon. The question may perhaps be put: Is the United Front a strategical manoeuvre or do we really desire to work side by side with the social democratic proletariat? This method of putting the question is incorrect. Of course, we are in favour of approaching the social-democratic and the non-party workers.

We always were. But formerly we wished to achieve this end over the heads of the leaders. We have convinced ourselves that it would not work. We must again appeal to the leaders until the masses understand that our outlook upon the situation is the correct one. Is this simply a strategic manoeuvre? That depends entirely upon the leaders. If they are minded to fight, then it is a strategic manoeuvre. But I have not a spark of belief that Scheidemann and Renaudel will fight in common with us. But why perpetually repeat this? In order not to bring confusion into our own ranks. We must show the masses the whole road. If we had neglected to do this in France, the Syndicalists would never have marched with us. The tactic of the United Front contains a danger for our party, as Trotsky has rightly pointed out, namely, the danger of demoralization and deterioration. Nevertheless, our tactic is a correct one. Many have called me an obstinate opponent of the tactic of the United Front. That is not true. Formerly I had doubts, but now I am a convinced partisan of the tactic of the United Front.

The R.I.L.U. achieved considerable success during this period. Not more than a year ago many of our members believed the R.I.L.U. to be a premature creation. They will now have changed their minds.

In France, since the Fourth Congress, the Party has passed into healthy convalescence. It was obliged to undergo a severe operation, but it was proved that the health of the Party was sound. The Party has been consolidated, its membership has increased, and its press has been enlarged. The Party still lacks correct routine in conducting political action. A certain confusion of thought has placed the words "Labor Imperialism" into people's heads. One of our best comrades, Treint, has likened the overthrow of the bourgeoisie by a triumphant proletariat to labor imperialism. The bourgeois press exploited this to the full. We have nothing to do with imperialism; imperialism belongs entirely to the bourgeoisie. It was Treint, too, who rejected the point of view that we should moderate our criticism of the Social Democrats. That is wrong. We welcome the fact that the French Party has succeeded in overcoming its great difficulties.

There was also a conflict in the German Party arising out of the fact that the situation changes very rapidly in Germany and that new problems arise causing differences of opinion. With the help of the International this conflict has been settled.

The Fourth Congress was engaged with the Italian question. The Communist Party of Italy saw the arch enemy not in Mussolini but in Serrati. It failed to observe that the situation had changed since the Leghorn Conference, and that Serrati has changed with it. It wanted to carry out the decision of the Fourth Congress to affiliate with the Socialist Party solely as a matter of discipline. The Party was responsible for the fact that Serrati was obliged to stay here so long. Regarded subjectively, our Italian comrades are the best fellows in the world, but their tactics are leading to the destruction of the Party. The last Congress of the Italian Socialist Party can only be regarded as an episode. It would be the sheerest folly to break with that Party merely on that account. It will have to be considered, whether we should accept the Socialist Party as a sympathetic party or not. Let Nenni and Velli and their like dare to reject this in the face of the Italian proletariat.

We are having a dispute with the Swedish Party. There Höglund is expressing the point of view that not only for the State, but also for the Party, religion is a private affair. We must oppose this point of view stubbornly.

Second Day of Session

Morning

Wednesday, 13. June 1923.

The Second Session of the Enlarged Executive was opened by Comrade Kolarov at twelve o'clock (noon).

The Chairman's proposal to limit the reporters to one hour and fifteen minutes for discussion was adopted.

Duret (France)

The inclusion (although necessary) of the Socialist leaders in the application of the United Front tactics is fraught with dangers, which are all the greater from the fact that the Communist Parties concerned are inexperienced and not very Marxian. In France for instance, too much tolerance has been

At the Fourth Congress there was much dispute as to whether the party in America should be legal or not. We decided in favour of the legal party and now we have got it.

Our attitude toward the peasantry and toward the national question.

In this we still have a strain of the Second International in us. Our British Party still does not understand the great significance of national emancipation. On this question it is radical in words, but cannot make up its mind to some bold action either in the case of Ireland or the Colonies. The National question is a vital question of German policy. Our Party can say with justice that if we do not recognize any bourgeois fatherland, nevertheless we defend the future of the country, the people, and the nation. This our comrades recognized, but they dared not institute a practical campaign. Our Yugoslavian Party, too, does not grasp the importance of the National Question. In Czechoslovakia there are still two communist textile organisations that are divided by nationality. Nihilism reigns in the National Question. The difference between us and the bourgeois parties is not that they are afflicted with the National Question and we are not, but that they are incapable of solving the National Problem. The National Problem can only be solved in a socialist society. Our parties still do not possess the psychology that they must have the majority of the country behind them. And yet we are not a Workers' Party merely within bourgeois society. We are no close party of workers, but a Workers' Party that is a party of the whole people. This applies still more to the Peasant question. Here great sins of omission are to be recorded. In Germany, where we allowed ourselves to be taken by surprise by the Social Democrats, and in Poland, where a proper campaign for the distribution of land was not undertaken. Our slogan of a Workers' Government must be extended to:

"A Workers' and Peasants' Government".

Our American Party has understood this. The Social Democrats will have to give up many of their positions amongst the workers and seek their lot with the peasants. We must occupy the evacuated positions and at the same time compete with them for the peasants. "A Workers' and Peasants' Government" is a circumlocution for the dictatorship of the proletariat. If we intend to have a real dictatorship of the proletariat, we must understand how to win over the peasants. Many workers who have lost faith in the belief that we are able to triumph by our own strength, will be re-emboldened when they find that we have won new allies. The slogan can be of great service in all countries. It is a sign of the times that the peasants everywhere have an independent role to play. The new slogan comes unprepared. Perhaps this Executive Meeting will still not agree. But we have already achieved a certain elasticity by our tactic of the United Front. It would be wise if we rapidly adopted this slogan. The peasants stand in no real opposition to the workers. Why should we allow them to be played off against us? Let us learn from the Russian example. The proletariat must rule, but it must conduct itself skilfully and not stupidly so as not to lose power. It will be argued that our forces are not adequate. But if our party adopts the peasants, then every worker who has any connection with the land will become an agitator. If we are unable to make the peasants our supporters, we at least can induce them to be neutral. Nothing must be sacrificed of the class outlook—not a single concession. We are not only a Workers' Party, but a shrewd Workers' Party. Our parties must change their psychology. They must be imbued with that will to power which will presently lead them to victory.

The Session adjourned until tomorrow 11 A.M.

shown to the reformist leaders. The speaker criticised the political Bureau's reply to the rejection of the United Front by the socialist organisations, and the advances made to the left, which is very insignificant although perhaps more dangerous than the right wing of the Socialist Party.

The watchword of the Workers' and Peasants' Government, said the speaker, was fraught with more dangers than the watchword of the Workers' Government. In the International the Workers' Government is interpreted in two ways: either as the result of revolutionary action, or as the result of parliamentary and democratic action. On the latter interpretation there are articles by Smeral and rather obscure paragraphs of the Leipsic resolution. It is essential to make it very explicit that the

Workers' and Peasants' Government can only be attained by revolutionary means and will never be by parliamentary.

There is a great deal of inertia in connection with the national question. Too many reformed ex-social patriots in the Communist International are of the opinion that all the national movements must perforce be of an imperialist character.

At first the socialists supported all the national movements directed against Russia, because Tsarist Russia constituted a factor of reaction. When capitalism and the proletariat began to develop in Russia while other countries were entering upon the imperialist phase, the struggle against Russia ceased to be revolutionary, and it became necessary to fight against all imperialists. When Russia became Soviet Russia all the anti-imperialist movements had to gravitate towards it and should be supported by the Communists. The Russian comrades urge this quite justly. This is by no means an expression of their "Governmental Psychology" for Lenin and Zinoviev expressed these views as far back as 1917.

In conclusion the speaker said that the French Communist Party has become worthy of the other sections of the International.

Varga:

The watchword of the Workers' and Peasants' Government should be more clearly defined. One must differentiate between the working and the exploiting peasants. The working peasants are connected by many bonds with the proletariat, being similarly affected by taxation railways rates, the Trusts and in some countries also by the feudal land ownership.

It is only natural that this watchword of the Workers' and Peasants' Government should contain many perils. When we, in conformity with the United Front tactics, unite with the social democratic workers, we unite with class comrades. The watchword of Workers' and Peasants' Government however means that we are seeking an alliance with a class, the economic position of which differs from that of the proletariat. The exploitation of the peasants is not as acute as that of the proletariat. There is the danger that wide sections of the producing and exploiting peasantry will join us in its struggle against the capitalists. This may occur in the U.S.A. and in Canada where not only the working but also the exploiting peasants are opposed to the capitalists, who during the last decade have kept the prices of manufactured goods artificially at a high level by means of their Trusts, thus creating unfavourable price conditions between corn and manufactured goods, and doing harm to the peasants. The reappearance of Russia on the corn market is making this crisis still more acute.

I suggest that the formulation of the Workers' and Peasants' Government watchword be made more explicit for propaganda purposes, and that its altered form should be "Government of Workers and Working Peasants". In no country has the peasantry as yet been able to remain in power for any length of time. It must be led by a class, and the question is if it shall be led by the capitalist class, which is exploiting it or by the proletariat which is not exploiting it.

Replying to Comrade Duret, Varga said that differentiation between Parliamentarian and Revolutionary Workers' Government was undialectical and Un-Marxian.

He concluded with the remark. If this enlarged E. C. succeeds in convincing all those present that an alliance between the working class and the peasantry is absolutely necessary, it will become a milestone in the development of our movement.

Urbani (Italy):

Disputed the reference to the Italian Party in Zinoviev's report. The speaker rejected the reproach of having sabotaged fusion cast against the Italian Communist Party and especially against its Committee of Direction. He would refrain from discussing the proposals made by the reporter; that would be done in the Commissions. But he did demand positive proof of the sabotage of fusion by the Communist Party. Such proof was lacking. On the contrary, definite reasons for the check in the work of fusion could be furnished.

Zinoviev has accused us of not having conducted a press campaign on behalf of fusion. Silence was the only possible attitude, in view of the constant aggression of the socialist anti-fusionists. If we had replied, fusion would have become absolutely impossible.

We have certainly committed errors, but it is unjust to cast upon us the whole responsibility for the situation in Italy. The concrete facts justify us. The organisational guarantees proposed by Comrade Zinoviev without any political justification, have all the appearance of an unmerited gesture of defiance.

Hoeglund (Sweden)

Complained that Comrade Zinoviev's report was lacking, in as much as he had only presented a negative statement in describing the position in the Scandinavian Parties. The Executive have committed errors with regard to the Norwegian question which aggravated the situation. Everything must be done to avoid a split of Party forces in Norway. In reply to the criticism made of his article "Communism and Religion" by Comrade Zinoviev, Comrade Hoeglund stated that in this article he desired to express the opinion that the anti-religious propaganda of the Party should not interfere with the far more important tasks of fighting capitalism. The State Church of course had to be fought, but a fight against religion would repel many sections of the population whom it is our duty to gain over. The slogan of a Workers' and Peasants' Government was undoubtedly a correct one, but its significance must not be overestimated. The important thing was not to issue new slogans, but to consolidate all forces for energetically putting the old ones into practice.

Falk (Norway)

The impression created by Zinoviev's report was that the Norwegian Party, or that the section that led it, was anti-communist. This was incorrect. The Norwegian Party agreed in a centralised world movement of Communists.

It is true that there are differences of principle. There are differences over the question of centralisation. We believe that the E.C. should treat with the central organs of the Party and not with the minority of isolated persons. The Youth Movement is being organized as an entirely separate organisation, we believe with the assistance of the E.C. We consider this to be disloyal tactics. There must be loyalty on both sides.

Zinoviev said that the new tactics of the United Front were necessary because the social democrats had proved stronger and the Communist Party weaker than we had expected. This is not the case in Norway. The C.P. there is a mass Party and the Socialist Party a small Party. We decided to apply the tactic to the strong Trade Union Leaders and not to the weak social-democratic leaders. The parole of a Workers' and Farmers' Government would strengthen the reformist elements in the Party.

With regard to anti-religious propaganda, Com. Falk associated himself with what Comrade Hoeglund had said.

Bucharin:

Comrade Hoeglund expressed disappointment with Comrade Zinoviev's report. In my opinion Comrade Zinoviev had to deal with new political phenomena and the development of alarming symptoms within our brother parties, and this he did. This way of dealing with things differentiates us from the Second International. Hoeglund accuses the Executive of wanting to destroy the Norwegian Party after having done the greatest harm to the Italian Party, but he was not able to produce any proof for his assertion. I will now deal with Hoeglund's rather comical argument concerning the religious question. Comrade Zinoviev even yesterday desired to know the reason for this very sudden appearance of the religious question. Objectively, there can only be one explanation at this moment. Throughout Europe, Soviet Russia is being attacked owing to the religious persecution which it is alleged is taking place in Russia. Some Norwegian comrades are using this opportunity to assure the world that only the Russian Communists are such bad fellows, while they themselves are perfectly loyal and not at all anti-religious. This may not be so subjectively, but objectively it is so. These comrades fear the attacks of the bourgeois press. A similar thing happened in connection with centralism. Just at the moment when the bourgeois press is raising a clamour about the Moscow "Ukase" and the dependence of the Norwegian comrades on the Moscow Dictatorship, our Norwegian comrades began to busy themselves with the question of centralism. This means that the Scandinavian Communists want to appear more humane, the real Communists. Anyhow, this is the objective meaning of their action although they may not intend it to be so.

As to the basis of Hoeglund's arguments, there is not an atom of Marxism in it. The assertion that the Communist Party does not say that religion is not counter revolutionary, is not correct. At present every religion in Europe is counter-revolutionary. In the Eastern countries religion can play a certain revolutionary role, as shown by the struggle of the religiously fanatical masses of Asia against British imperialism. The emancipation of the proletariat from the yoke of capitalism,

means also the emancipation of the working class from bourgeois ideology, and religion is part of it.

Comrade Hoeglund wrote: "It is quite a different matter when the Communist Party carries on a relentless struggle against the conversion of religion into a class political institution such as the Established Church." Marxism asserts however, that every religion represents a class ideology and is therefore a class instrument.

In our Party we can tolerate religious people, for religion has taken deep root in the soul of modern humanity. It is right that we should be patient with these people in order to bring about their emancipation from old religious beliefs, but this does not mean that we as a Party have nothing to do with religion. Hoeglund told me that even the "A.B.C. of Communism" says that we must be cautious in our struggle against religion. That is only natural. In the course of our anti-religious campaign we must apply different methods to the peasants to those we apply to the workers, as we need more patience with the former. Comrade Falk asserted that to begin a campaign against religion now was extremely stupid. He is evidently oblivious of the fact that it is not we who have undertaken a campaign against religion, but rather that comrade Hoeglund is carrying on a campaign on behalf of religion.

And now a few words on Comrade Falk's speech. He asserted that Zinoviev in his speech declared that the Norwegian Communist Party is antagonistic to the Communist International. In fact, Zinoviev said just the opposite. Comrade Falk also said that in connection with various questions, we never discussed matters direct with the Norwegian Party, but always approached individuals. This also is contrary to facts. Thousands of times we asked the Norwegian Central Committee to send representatives to Moscow, to discuss these questions with them. This was not always done. As to the Y.C.L., I personally am of the opinion that, in questions concerning relations with the International, national discipline is not obligatory for individual members of any Party or for any section of that Party if this discipline is opposed to the International. In times of conflict between the International and the local sections every member of a Young Communist League or of any Party organisation is entitled to be for the International and against the Central Organisations of his country. If the Scandinavian comrades really mean to work shoulder to shoulder with the Communist International, we will find ways and means to remove all the difficulties.

Böttcher (Germany):

The main question of the tactics of the European Parties is the question of the United Front and of the Workers' Government. Hitherto the greatest success with the United Front tactics has been achieved by Germany. Nevertheless inevitable differences arise concerning the manner in which these tactics

are to be applied. In order to keep our principles intact, it is essential to lay special emphasis on the role of the Communist Party as the leader in the struggle for the establishment of Proletarian Dictatorship. The Fourth Congress established beyond doubt that the application of the United Front tactics does not mean a betrayal of proletarian dictatorship or a revision of Communist principles. We are extremely suspicious of the Social-Democratic leaders owing to the treacherous role which they have played hitherto and which, objectively, they are compelled to continue to play. However, we are confident that the Social-Democratic workers will be with us in this struggle. The Communist Parties must persist in these tactics to the end. In bringing forward the United Front watchword, we must formulate demands that will appear to be realizable in the near future even to the Social-Democratic workers. The United Front is the blood covenant between the Communist and Social-Democratic workers against the coalition policy and against the bourgeoisie. This being so, this United Front will also become the covenant between the Communist and Social-Democratic workers against the Social-Democratic leaders. Our opposition was compelled to admit that through the application of United Front tactics, we were able to occupy certain fighting positions which facilitate the working class struggle. The capture of these fighting positions is very important, for it is here that Social-Democracy will be brought down by its inherent contradictions. It is a question of workers' policy or the policy of the bourgeoisie. The ideological split which has already taken place in the Social-Democratic ranks, is an important result of the United Front tactics.

Owing to the acuteness of the West European situation, there is every reason to believe that we shall have to assume the dictatorship without the preliminary establishment of a Workers' and Peasants' Government. However, we must be prepared for an eventuality which might compel us to establish the Workers' Government in the form of a revolutionary coalition with the Social-Democrats and the Trade Unions. Such a Government must rest on the support of class organs outside parliament.

In Germany we have succeeded in rallying the sympathising workers to the Communist banner in the Factory Committees, Control Committees and in the Workers' Hundreds. All of them are organs of the United Front which assist the Communist Party in its struggle. By applying United Front tactics we have achieved the result that large sections of Social-Democratic workers are practically with us although they are still members of the Social-Democratic Party. We must do our utmost to help on this process as much as possible. Our Parties must be parties of victory—leaders of the Nation. This psychology was not yet ripe in our Party during the Ruhr struggle.

After Comrade Böttcher's speech, the Session was adjourned until the evening.

Evening

Flyg (Sweden):

The development of the opposition standpoint of Comrade Hoeglund on the question of centralisation and its effects on the attitude of the Swedish comrades towards the Comintern is of great importance to the Executive. Since the Fourth Congress Comrade Hoeglund developed a standpoint in opposition to the Executive, which he at first voiced in the Executive Committee of the Swedish Party. After the Christiania Conference, where the decisions of the Fourth World Congress had been unconditionally accepted, Hoeglund, again developed his opposition standpoint, and demanded that the Party Congress decide against the centralisation of the Comintern. In his letter of resignation he said that neither the Swedish Party nor the Comintern were ripe for any further centralisation. Comrade Hoeglund favors centralisation only within the national boundaries of Sweden and under the Executive of the Swedish Party, but he is opposed to centralisation in the Comintern. I am of the opinion that the religious question is of no small import to our party in Sweden. This is shown by an article of Hoeglund on "Communism and Religion". It is not true that if we started an anti-religious propaganda in Sweden, the entire Swedish Communist movement would vanish. It is our duty to continue in our task of spreading Marxian education.

Shatskin (Y.C.L.)

The question raised by Hoeglund's article "Communism and Religion" is an important question to

the Young Communist International, particularly from the standpoint of moulding the minds of the Communist Youth. According to the sense of Hoeglund's article, religion is a private matter also for the Communist Party. This is utterly wrong from the standpoint of Marxism. Comrade Hoeglund's standpoint is more akin to Social-Democratic "tolerance" than to the Marxist standpoint of Lenin. Surely religious sentiment was much stronger in Russia than it is now in Sweden and yet the revolutionary party, with all its anti-religious propaganda, did not become a sect as is feared by Comrade Hoeglund in Sweden.

Hitherto the burden of anti-militarist activity rested exclusively on the shoulders of the Young Communist International. This situation must be modified so that the Communist International shall make it incumbent upon its organisations to take part in this work and thus strengthen it.

Ewert (Germany):

Of all the question dealt with by Comrade Zinoviev, the most important question is that of the Workers' and Peasants' Government. This question is of paramount importance, not only for the agrarian, but also for the industrial countries. In Germany, the industrial proletariat is the most important section of the population, but nevertheless the victory of the proletariat depends on at least neutralisation of the two millions of small peasants.

A few words on the national question. In the beginning of the Ruhr conflict this question was not well enough defined in Germany, and there were differences of opinion even within the Party, which were not removed until quite lately. In Germany this is not a very difficult problem, because the bourgeoisie itself is betraying Germany and is selling it piecemeal to the Entente. In other countries this question is of course more difficult. The Ruhr conflict was the first occasion for collaboration between the French and the German Communist Parties. This collaboration was not by any means faultless, which however, does not detract from its importance as the first action of this kind.

Radek:

It is feared that owing to rigid centralism there is no spiritual life vibrating in the Communist International. From the discussion which went on here, one could gain a better lesson. While at Hamburg there was not any serious discussion upon a single question; here we are listening to a pointed public discussion already at the second Session. The workers can convince themselves that this is the only place for thorough discussion. Comrade Falk is opposed to discussing the actions of national parties at the International. But how can we put errors right if they are not pointed out to us? The Norwegian comrades have heard what the German comrades had to say. What they said has come straight from the soul of the German workers. And what do the German comrades tell us? They tell us that the only hope was in action taken by the International. Hoeglund's article draws our attention incidentally to a particular danger, which can be obviated only by outspoken discussion. Zinoviev's report contained two main points: the consolidation of the International, and the extension of the basis of our activity. In so far as the consolidation of the International is concerned, there is close connection between the Italian and Norwegian question. Comrade Urbani asked us to show him on which occasion the decisions of the Communist International had been sabotaged. He adduces the testimony of Comrade Dimitri. But the attitude of the Italian Party, shows quite clearly that the Italian Party is also largely to blame for the events in connection with the Italian question. When Comrade Urbani points out that Velli and Neni are also to blame, even this does not argue in favor of the Italian Party. Precisely because individual leaders of the Socialist Party wished to sabotage the amalgamation, it was the foremost duty of our Party to prevent it. Our Italian friends are excellent comrades, and he who has any dealings with them in Italy, comes back in a felicitous mood. But this should not prevent us from pointing out their errors. It is not a question of outside interference, but of an exchange of international experiences. Comrade Falk declares that if we wish to discuss centralism, they are ready, but that we are preferring unfounded charges. On close examination, it transpires that we are not dealing with misunderstandings. The Executive had rightly judged the situation politically. At one time the Norwegian comrades voted for the decisions of the International, declaring the Communist International competent in all questions, and then they came out in opposition. Now we ask you: What opinion do you represent now? The Norwegian Party is a sound proletarian party, and he who would try to separate it from the International will burn his fingers. The Party suffers from holding aloof from the big events, and its history fully accounts for its present situation. But this peculiarity must be overcome not by means of "ukases" but by straight talk with our Norwegian comrades. If the leading comrades will fail to appreciate this necessity, then it will be understood by the nonleading comrades. With regard to the extension of the basis of activity, we have to deal here with three questions: the Workers' and Peasants' Government, the national question, and the religious question. The religious question is of tremendous importance. This does not mean to say that we ought to make it our first task, with the backward elements of the proletariat, who are still addicted to religion, to distribute anti-religious tracts among them. Comrade Zinoviev pointed out that comrades in Russia were expelled from the Party for being married by priests. But we in Russia have a different situation from other countries. We are a beleaguered fortress, and the Communists are its defenders. The soldier who dares not oppose his aunt can still less be expected to oppose his enemy. You of the West-European parties are now recruiting new armies. Comrade Zinoviev did not suggest that you expel those members who did not break away from the Church (Zinoviev: "Quite right!"). A leader of the party must be quite clear in his own mind upon the religious question. Nevertheless in view of the psychology of the masses, it is the very question of religion which ought to be treated with the greatest prudence. And now let us turn to the Peasant question. This is by no means a new watchword. We have long since given up the

social-democratic notion that we should have nothing to do with the peasants. If we now bring this question to the front it is because our cause is moving rapidly forward. Economic demands for the improvement of the lot of the peasants are by themselves insufficient. We must be in a position to say to the peasants that they cannot hope for any improvement of their lot until we have taken over the power jointly with them. The Bolshevik Party has always championed the cause of the peasants, but it was the slogan of the revolution of 1905, the slogan of coalition with the peasantry, that has attained the greatest significance. Yet this coalition with the peasant does not mean that we should form a coalition with Witos in Poland or with the radical Socialists in France; these are counter-revolutionary peasant parties, with which we cannot form any coalition.

The national question, i. e. the education of the proletariat to the necessity of making the party representative of the nation, is in England only the propagandists' expression of the final goal. The case is different in Germany, where the national question is of quite different significance. It is characteristic that in a national-socialist paper—*Das Gewissen* (Conscience)—we find the statement that the Communists are becoming more and more National Bolshevik. National-Bolshevism in Germany in 1920 meant an alliance to save the generals, who immediately after the victory would have made short shrift of the Communist Party. To-day National-Bolshevism means that the only salvation is to come through the Communists. The strongest emphasis on the nation in Germany is a revolutionary act, just as it is in the colonies. This ought to be understood by our French friends. If Poincaré should hold sway in France for a few years longer, then it will also be the turn of our French party to take the stand that is now taken by the German party. Hoeglund reproached the Executive with having committed mistakes, which he was going to prove later on. In this he will not succeed. Much as the executive was criticized by individual friends, no one could demonstrate how the things could be done better.

The resolution to be submitted on this question must outline the new tasks for the months to come, so that no new controversies should arise and that the Communist International should continue its march forward.

Trachtenberg (America)

He was pleased to hear the references made by Zinoviev to the splendid strides made by the American Party in the past year. If the American Party has improved it is due to the action adopted at the last International Congress.

He wished to deal with the application to America of the new slogan of a Workers' and Peasants' Government issued by the International. America, unlike Europe, has no large peasant population. But there was a large farmer population, the position of whom had recently come to resemble that of the European peasants. Many of them are gradually losing possession of the land they had got freely 25 years ago. They were sinking to the position of landless tenant farmers. Statistics collected last year showed, that 75% of farms were mortgaged, and the indebtedness of the farmers had increased 130% over 1910. The farmer population had decreased because many had left the country for the cities. The temporary war prosperity of the farmers has since been snatched away by the railroads, elevator companies and other intermediaries.

This position of the farmers has induced them to organize their own political party. In the few years of its existence the Non-Partizan League has gained considerable political successes. It was advocating the nationalisation of the railroads, storage houses, elevators etc.

The Workers' Party had taken note of this position and had issued the slogan of the Workers' and the Working Farmers' Government. But the slogan was not without its dangers. The American Socialist Party had also gone amongst the farming population, but it had been ill-advised to fuse with the Non-Partizan League and similar political parties, with the result that in many States it became, as a party, completely lost. It is important that when the slogan is issued by the Party in America this danger be understood and that it be interpreted as working along with the working farmers and not with the farmers' political parties.

Johnson (Canada)

Canada is predominantly an agricultural country with a large population of poor and small tenant farmers. These farmers are in such a hopeless state that many are selling their farms entirely. In the Western States there are 150,000 Ukrainian and Russian emigrant farmers. Last year they sent a delegation to the District Party Convention of Manitoba demanding that the Party should come to their as-

sistance. The farmers' organisation was controlled by the rich grain growers and the delegation asked the Convention to assist them in forming a rival party for the poorer farmers. The Convention referred the matter to the Dominion Convention. When the latter considered the matter, the party felt itself too inexperienced and uninformed to formulate a policy. It accepted the principle of a Workers' and Peasants' Government issued by the International, but this slogan still faced the party with the

question whether the poor peasants should be taken into the party, or whether they should be organised into a separate farmers' league. The Party accordingly set up a Commission to study the question.

The speaker criticized the position of the Scandinavian delegates on the question of Centralisation and religion.

The session adjourned at 11:30 p. m.

Fourth day of Session

Morning

The Session was opened after 12 noon, Comrade Gallagher occupying the chair. The discussion on the Report of Comrade Zinoviev was continued.

Negri (Italy):

The Italian Delegation approves Zinoviev's report and particularly the attitude of the Executive on the question of centralism and of the Workers' and Peasants' Government. We would desire that the centralism of the Communist International should be accentuated in accordance with the decisions of the Fourth Congress. No concession on this point should be tolerated. We entirely approve of the attitude of the Executive on the Scandinavian question.

We do not regard a workers' government as a definite solution, but as a transition period, corresponding to a certain temporary relation of social forces. It must lead either to the dictatorship of the proletariat or to that of reaction. Its object is to prepare the way to the former.

We wholeheartedly accept the formula of a government of workers and peasants. We have never conceived anything else, because the situation in Italy has forced us to that attitude. Of 12,000,000 workers in Italy, 4,000,000 are industrial workers and 8,000,000 land workers, half of the latter being agricultural labourers and half peasants.

Replying to Zinoviev, the speaker produced quotations as to the attitude of the Party on the agrarian question. The old Socialist Party had committed errors in this sphere, but the young Communist Party has succeeded in gaining the sympathy of the peasants.

In order to prevent our Parties being permeated with peasant mentality, it is necessary that those who apply the tactic of a workers' and peasants' government should possess a clear and definite proletarian outlook.

In Italy there is a problem of fusion. We have been criticised for our rigidity on this question. There has been no sabotage on the part of our party, nor retaliation by the socialists. To achieve a successful revolution we are prepared to collaborate with the devil himself, but the result must be definitely proletarian and communist.

Koritschoner (German Austria)

The recommendations made by Zinoviev in his report indicate a big step forward, opening to us new spheres of activity. All the governments which we hitherto had in Austria, were governments in which the land-owning peasantry participated. An agitation demanding land for the workers and the landholding peasants will bring us nearer to those sections of the population which hitherto, have marched under reactionary leaders, and will win the agrarian regions of German Austria for the revolutionary class war. But the slogan must be formulated in the manner Comrade Varga proposed, namely, a Government of Workers and Working Peasants. Otherwise the effect with us would be directly counter-revolutionary, for the slogan of a Workers' and Peasants' Government would be equivalent to a coalition of the working class aristocracy and the large peasants. German Austria is today entirely a colonial country. It is completely under the domination of the League of Nations, the consequences of which are the complete surrender of political and economic independence, tremendous unemployment, progressive impoverishment, and intolerable taxation upon the workers. Hamburg undoubtedly signifies the bankruptcy of Austrian Menshevism, but we must not overlook the fact that a consolidation and better organization of the common fight against Communism was achieved. It would be dangerous to underestimate this and we must not allow the centralism of the Communist International at this moment to suffer; but on the contrary it should even be extended. By our tactic we shall increase the circle of sym-

pathizers with the Communist Party. Already in the trade unions it is to be observed that at least ten times as many people are influenced by slogans than there are organized Communists. The most urgent problem today for the Executive and for the Central European parties, is to consolidate the sectional movements in the various countries and to coordinate international action. This coordination will be of the greatest value to the Communist Parties in the Danubian and Balkan States in their fight against reformism and Fascism.

Walton Newbold (Great Britain):

The British delegates took exception to the tone of Comrade Zinoviev's speech on the subject of Nationalism and the Colonies, but they would explain their point of view in the Commission.

The tactic of the United Front was bringing the Party increased influence throughout the country. The lead of the Communists was being followed in many of the Trade Unions, especially the engineers and miners. The hold in the Trades Councils had been strengthened.

At the Edinburgh Conference last year the leaders of the Labor Party got a resolution passed attempting to exclude the Communist Party. At the forthcoming annual Labor Party Conference, at least 13 Trades Councils and 2 big Unions would support the affiliation of the Communists.

Turning to the new slogan the Workers' and Peasants' Government, the British C.P. enthusiastically welcomed it, but preferred Varga's modification: a Workers' and Working Peasants Government. The land workers in England had always been neglected by the advanced Labor Movement. There was no peasantry in England; they had been driven to the Colonies or the towns in the eighteenth century. In Ireland, there was a large peasantry and the slogan would furnish the impulse the Irish Party needed for its development.

On the subject of religion, the British C.P. is agreed as to the necessity of attacking the Churches, but this could be done best by the Party's direct and indirect educational institutions. The communist strongholds were in the mining areas of West Scotland and South Wales, and amongst the miners there was a large religious population. Similarly, almost the whole of the Irish peasantry were staunch Catholics. An attack upon religion in Ireland would make the development of the Party there impossible for many years. The British Party was always reproached with having no hold on the masses. Would it not therefore be better to attack religion indirectly and not directly?

Rosmer (France):

On the question of centralism and the relations between the Communist International, and the R.I.L.U. the French delegations could cite some useful experiences. Hoeglund is of the opinion that the Executive is ill-informed and therefore is committing errors with regard to the Norwegian party. The opponents of the Communist International for a long time said the same thing with regard to the French question. In an article by Traumaél we find another argument which is also familiar to us, namely, that the International wishes to impose a passive obedience. Traumaél takes up a double position: at one moment he is against excessive centralism, at another he is playing the part of a left communist. The men who used to use such language in France are now outside the International and are making their way towards the Second International.

Falk has attempted to lay down the limits between the Communist International and its sections. It is difficult. But we invite the Scandinavian comrades to state their opinion of the attitude of the Executive in the French question. Has experience proved that the Executive was mistaken? What Negri said this morning proved that the Scandinavians had made a mistake when they quoted the opinion of the Italians. He said they were believers in centralism in the Communist International and find that there is still not enough of it.

The speaker referred to an alarming declaration of Tranmael: either a break with our revolutionary tradition or a break with the Communist International. Such phrases should not be tolerated. They remind us of Frossard, who also placed himself between the French tradition and the Communist International. The first condition for the solution of this conflict is not to represent it in this manner.

The speech of Duret surprised the delegates from France. Duret has been in Moscow six months; he has neglected the French party, he has not furnished it with information, nor has he formulated any criticism of it. But he criticized it severely from this platform. He would not have done so if he had the slightest connection with the party. Treint is in agreement with us at bottom, but he was alone in the defense of his unfortunate term, "labor imperialism". His article was published with reservations. One cannot prevent a militant from occasionally writing stupidities. Duret knows that better than anybody. As to Treint's replies to the dissidents, we did not wait for the criticism of Duret before bringing them forward. We have had considerable success in the application of the tactic of the united front, as the discomfiture of the leaders of the reformist C.O.T. proves. We should have been far more advanced if Duret had not caused us to lose a year in sterile discussion of that tactic.

As to Hamburg, Höglund said that there was a danger in underestimating the fusion of the two internationals. If it is true that it clarifies the situation for us Communists, it is also true that it may give rise to delusions. Therefore we must unmask the action of the Social-Democrats at Hamburg. But the best way of fighting the new Social-Democratic International is to oppose it by another, to resemble it in no respect and not to barter, as the Scandinavians have done, for our attachment and aid of the Communist International.

Zapotacky (Czecho-Slovakia)

To us the question of the Workers' and Peasants' Government is not a general propagandist watchword, but is beginning to assume the character of an important question of every-day politics. As we do not wish to undertake anything which might clash with the intentions of the International, we consider it our duty to draw your attention to the conditions prevailing in our country. We are not satisfied with what was said in to-day's discussion. For us it is essential that the general watchwords should be more clearly defined.

At present the labor movement is not as strong and energetic as before, which makes leadership in militant actions considerably more difficult. This being so, the controversy about the possibility of establishing a Workers' Government by parliamentary means was automatically decided in the negative. However, these possibilities come to the front as soon as the watchword of the Workers' and Peasants' Government is given more prominence. A process of disintegration is going on at present in several directions in the camp of the government coalition.

Relations are very strained between the party of the industrial and financial bourgeoisie, led by Dr. Kramer and the agrarian party. Disintegration is going on within the agrarian party itself. A section of it can be converted into an ally of the Communist Party. By giving a clear definition to the Workers' and Peasants' Government watchword, we shall contribute to the growth of this section and to the development of its class-consciousness.

Czecho-Slovakia is a small country, but internationally, it is of considerable importance. The strength of our Party might cause us many difficulties unless we succeed in elaborating a clear and concrete line of action for the transition. Transitional aims present a danger to us only if we regard these aims as the final aim.

In the present situation the United Front tactics cannot be considered only as a manoeuvre to expose our opponents; they represent a real struggle by which we can gain new positions and make great strides forward, and which therefore can have positive results.

As to the national question, we are in full agreement with Comrade Zinoviev's definition of it. In connection with this, I merely want to say that the differences between the Czech and German Textile workers did not originate in the clash of national interests, but in the fact that the question of the Red Trade Union Movement has not been cleared up.

Kolarov (Bulgaria)

The tactics of the united front have been sufficiently studied with regard to the industrial countries. But what

shall be our attitude in the agricultural countries towards the politically organized rural masses? Bulgaria has 80% of peasants. The difference between the workers' organisations and those of the peasants is that the former are of a class nature, while the latter are corporate bodies comprising both the rich and the poor. When the rich peasants are in power their policy is to protect capitalism and to repress the labor movement.

Nevertheless, by force of circumstances, we were compelled upon more than one occasion to form a united front with the agrarian unions, e. g., for the agrarian reforms, during the prosecution of the former cabinet ministers responsible for the war, and against the first attempt of the bourgeois parties to try their strength with the aid of the Wrangel officers.

The coup d'état which has overthrown the power of the peasants' party was evidently directed against the toiling masses of the cities and villages. The great obstacle to the united front with the peasants is that our party had to defend its rights and its very existence against the peasant government.

In the agricultural countries the problem of the dictatorship may assume a new aspect, namely that of the Workers' and Peasants' Dictatorship. It was a few months ago that the Bulgarian Communist Party adopted a slogan of the Workers' and Peasants' Government and began to make propaganda for it with such success, that the alarm caused to the ruling peasants' party was one of the important reasons of their policy of terrorist repression against our party.

If the present coup d'état is the beginning of civil war, which seems to be the case, our party will be forced into a coalition with the agrarian union, with the possible result of a Workers' and Peasants' Government.

Beruzzi (Italy)

asked the Polish Communists to express their views on the national question. As yet they have not made clear their attitude towards the Ukrainians. It is essential for the Ukrainian Party to know what this attitude is. The speaker was of the opinion that the Polish Communist Party must demand for the oppressed nationalities the right to separate themselves from the country into which they were incorporated by force.

At the Fourth Congress the Italian Communist Party accepted the resolutions which were proposed. It has been said that the Italian Communist Party carried out the decisions of the C.I. only as a matter of discipline. One can hardly expect much enthusiasm when it is a question of a political marriage of convenience with Vella and Nenni. Anyhow, the Italian Communist Party carried out conscientiously the decisions of the Congress, and thus it does not deserve the reproaches launched against it.

In 1919 the situation in Italy was objectively revolutionary, but the Communist Party was only just being formed. When the Italian Communist Party came into being the counter-revolution was already victorious. Thus, there is no justification for reproaching the Italian comrades.

Mussolini was victorious because he was able to win over to his side the peasant masses, and this the Italian C.P. was not able to do. This is not mere imagination. Is there any occasion to revise our tactics in the agrarian question? As to the attitude of the Italian Communist Party towards Fascism, in the opinion of the speaker its chief fault consisted in paying too much attention to questions of internal organisations and not enough attention to the conquest and co-ordination of the masses. This has not changed since the coming into power of Fascism. While not making any accusations and maintaining a friendly tone towards revolutionaries, we must be allowed to examine their errors. For instance, in connection with Vorovsky's assassination the Italian C.P. has not made the best of all its possibilities for agitation. Moreover, there is in Italy an anti-colonial tradition which the C.P. could have put to good account.

The speaker declared that he approved (with certain reservations) of the attitude of the Executive in the Italian question. Certain measures in connection with the internal policy of the Italian P.C. were not at all a sign of distrust, as Comrade Urbani seemed inclined to think. Our sole reason for adopting these measures was — to strengthen the Party. In its relations with the Socialist Party, our Italian Communist Party must apply the tactics of the United Front which had such good results in Germany. In conclusion the speaker said: I am convinced that at the Fifth Congress of the C.I. the Italian Communist Party will be one of the best sections of the International.

Amer (U. S. A.)

Criticized the attitude of the Scandinavian Parties on the question of centralization. He attributed it partly to the fact that they had been free from the attacks of capital which the

rest of Europe had experienced. International discipline and centralization were necessary because there were big tasks before the party. Their complaint that centralization destroyed the initiative of the local organizations was unjustified. Their plea of peculiar national conditions was the one usually advanced in such cases. The International had not exerted its authority sufficiently as was the case in America. It had proved its capacity for giving advice and of using a strong hand when necessary.

Criticizing the Italian party he said, that for the Communists to have put up the barrier against the Socialists when they were prepared to fuse with the Communist Party was a crime against the Italian movement and against the International.

He was of the opinion that the question of religion had not been sufficiently agitated, especially as regards America.

Evening

The Evening Session was opened at 7.30 p.m. by Comrade Gallacher. The discussion on Zinoviev's Report was continued.

Vladetic (Jugo-Slavia)

The reproach of Comrade Zinoviev that the Jugo-Slavian Party as a result of its uncertain attitude on the national question, had kept away from the Party the proletarian masses of Slovenia, industrially the most developed country in Jugo-Slavia, was unfounded. The Jugo-Slavian Party is fighting stubbornly both against the Serbian hegemony and against the chauvinism of the Slovenian and Croatian bourgeoisie. In spite of the illegal position into which the White Terror of the Jugo-Slavian Government has forced us, we succeeded in destroying the disruptive centrist party, which in Slovenia was led by some of our former leaders, who excused themselves for this on the plea that it was in accordance with the theses on the United Front of the Fourth Congress. This is a great victory for the Communist Party and demonstrates that the masses of the Slovenian proletariat are responding to our leadership more than ever. The national problem in Jugoslavia, owing to the numerous nations and races existing under the political hegemony of the Serbian bourgeoisie, is extremely complicated. The extent of the national struggles is therefore enormous. We were unable to take part in these struggles hitherto, not because our attitude towards the national problem was false, but because we were in an illegal position. In spite of fractional conflicts, we were always unanimous as to what our attitude on the national question should be, viz., Against the Serbian Hegemony, for the Revision of the Constitution, and for the Self-determination of all Races and Nations. We gladly accept the admonitions of the Executive that we should deal more shrewdly with the national question, and we shall exert every effort in this direction. We have already been fighting for some time for the slogan of a Workers' and Peasants' Government, and we have succeeded to some extent in popularising this slogan amongst the masses. We have managed to get rid of all fractional conflicts, which is proved by the unanimous decisions of the last Party Conference, and thereby the ground has been created for better relations between the Party and the Executive, as well as for assisting the Party to deal more effectively with the difficult problems in Jugo-Slavia.

Saita (Italy)

The importance of the Rome Congress has been rightly appreciated. This Congress voted for the adhesion of the masses to the Third International. Our communist comrades frequently underestimated the masses and attach too much importance to individuals. We are of the opinion that the Italian Socialist Party has brought into the International masses which could be put to good use if we were really determined to do so. We in our Party have worked for fusion, and the communists have worked against it. At present our friends are in a minority in the S. P., and the *Avanti* is in the hands of Vella. This result is contrary to our wishes and it is not we who have brought it about. The anti-fusionists' strongest argument was that the Communists worked against the fusion. The Moscow Executive was in favour of fusion, and the Rome Managing Committee was against it.

The truth is that fusion was difficult because an attempt was made to purge the Party of 42,000 members who had joined the Third International en masse. The conditions on which the fusion was at first proposed incensed nearly all our comrades, myself excepted. The Executive of the C. I. wanted to please the communists, who did not want fusion. We were even told that in the event of being in the minority at our Congress, the con-

There the Church was openly used as a tool of the capitalists against all advanced movements of the workers. Should the American party remain silent when atheism is being discussed even in the colleges? He did not agree with Newbold that this was a campaign that could be handed over to subsidiary organizations. A similar stand against religion must be made in England.

He believed that in America, the slogan of the Workers' and Farmers' Government was necessary, but in common with the British comrades, he was of the opinion that it should be so framed that the poor and working farmer would be got to understand, that there was a cleavage between him and the exploiting farmer. To secure such a cleavage would be a victory for us. There was no danger that the peasant farmer would be a danger to the proletarian dictatorship.

ditions for our admission after our withdrawal from the S. P., would be harder still. Many comrades in the Managing Committee of the party still say that they are against fusion. They wish our Party to withdraw from the S. P. because it would weaken us. The methods employed to bring about the rapprochement between the C. P. and the S. P. were such as to prevent any possibility of a rapprochement. We are saying these things without any ill-will. If fusion is really wanted, this work must be put into the hands of men who are convinced of the necessity of such fusion.

Serra (Italy)

urged that the element of personality be altogether eliminated from the discussion on the Italian question. The comrades of the Executive of the Italian Communist Party are not in any way reproached, but a faulty policy is all the more dangerous if it is carried on with courage and devotion.

I take my Party severely to task. Has it done all it could do against Fascism? No. There were big opportunities for fighting, and the Party which would undertake to organise the working class against the reaction would have had an excellent situation. Our Party was inactive because its leaders, in their anxiety to maintain the theoretic purity of the Party at all costs, did not know how to approach the masses in a practical way.

When under compulsion, under pressure of Fascism, the tactics of the United Front were at last adopted, it was too late. The leaders of the Party permitted the militants to collaborate with the maximalists in the syndicalist organisations only a few months before the advent of Fascism.

The Italian Communist Party is the one Party which has not yet assimilated the tactics of the United Front.

Negri is afraid of the Party coming into contact with the socialist elements. I, for one, have more confidence in our Party. Let us get into contact with the masses. The masses will not pollute our theoretic purity, but we will educate and lead the masses. The future of the revolution depends on our contact with the masses.

Giacomo (Italy)

The Fascist victory in Italy took the Communist Party by surprise. The best leaders of the Party were abroad at the time of the Mussolini coup d'état. The right wing of the Social-Democrats was in tacit agreement with Mussolini. Thus, our fraction in the Socialist Party had to struggle not only against the reformists who had remained within the Party, but also against powerful opponents outside their ranks. The greatest mistake committed by our Party was that it did not support our socialist friends in their difficult struggle. They played the role of silent spectator. Although the Italian Socialist Party had only little time for intensive work, it succeeded in winning over about 43% of our Party members. It only required very little assistance on the part of our Communist Comrades and they would have won over the majority. It is absolutely necessary to deal with these facts before such an authoritative plenum as this, all the more so as the Party Conference of the Italian Socialist Party, at which our fraction will again raise the question of fusion, is to be held shortly.

Our Norwegian comrades are probably not aware how much harm they have done in Italy by their attitude. Their arguments were eagerly snapped up by the anti-fusionists. Moreover, they are entirely in the wrong in attacking the Executive. The history of the Italian Labor Movement is an example of what happens to a movement which ignores the proposals of the Communist International. Probably the Norwegian

comrades are not aware that comrade Serrati was compelled to confess here at the last Congress that he was in the wrong in Livorno and that the Comintern was right. Should the Norwegian comrades maintain their present attitude, the events which happened in Italy will be repeated in Norway.

Hoeglund (Sweden)

Comrade Radek wanted me to substantiate my criticism of the attitude of the Executive upon Scandinavian questions, and I am going to gratify his wish. We recognise that certain mistakes had been made in the Norwegian situation by both sides, which called for intervention by the Executive. The mistakes of the past and present Executive may be summarised as follows:

1. Expulsion of Lain, chairman of the Norwegian Trade Union Executive.

2. Publication of the first letter of the Executive to the Party Executive was first made in the *Pravda*, and the Norwegian Party got it only after it had already been published in the *Sozialdemokraten*, which had reprinted it from the *Pravda* for demagogic purposes.

3. The second letter of the Executive, of the 22nd. September, was drawn up without either consulting or negotiating with the Norwegian Party Executive.

4. The so-called magazine articles by comrade Tranmael were represented as though he was in favour of organic fusion with the right wing socialists, which was not the case.

5. The second letter so sharply and scathingly attacked the Tranmael following that it really aggravated the conflict instead of allaying it.

6. It was a mistake when the Executive appointed a representative of the Norwegian Party minority to a seat upon the Executive.

7. Comrade Bucharin preferred grave charges against the Mot-Dag group, pointing to fascist tendencies of some individual parts of this group. Then again, Comrade Shatzkin in the *Klassenkampen* incited the Communist Youth against the Party, although the Norwegian Party strife was declared liquidated at the last Party Congress. In the Danish question it was a mistake to negotiate with the semi-anarchist "putschists" who had committed a grave breach of discipline. Finally, Comrades Hellberg and Ernst Christiansen were expelled, although they had rendered great services to the International in hard times. Comrade Hoeglund went on to deal with the comments of Radek and Bucharin on his article "Religion and Communism", pointing out that he was not against educational work in this matter, but he merely wished to prevent any blunt anti-religious propaganda detrimental to the Party, in order not to estrange the honest religious workers and peasants. He believed that in spite of everything the discussion has shown unity upon the principal questions.

Laursen (Denmark)

Comrade Hoeglund seems to resent the fact that the E. C. acted as mediator in the Danish Party dispute. The attitude of the Executive was correct. At that time it would have been possible to reestablish a united communist organisation in Denmark, in spite of the small group imbued with anarcho-syndicalist tendencies. After the rejection of its proposal to mediate, the Executive once more approached the Danish Party and demanded that the dispute should be settled at any cost. When the Executive realised that Hellberg had caused the rejection of the proposal made by the Scandinavian Commission, it decided quite rightly that this obstacle must be removed. In the Danish Commission,

which was appointed by the Enlarged Executive, we will once more do our utmost to bring about the unification of all the Communist elements in Denmark. However, we are justified in expecting that all our Scandinavian brother Parties will do their utmost to bring about such a unification.

Aoki (Japan)

In Comrade Zinoviev's references to the Japanese movement he expressed the opinion that a legal political labour party should be formed. The Japanese comrades were not afraid of persecution or imprisonment. They had put up with suppression for the last thirteen years. But in his opinion it would be premature to form a legal political party. They needed the support and sympathy of the militant elements among the working class. These elements were indifferent to politics. They were inexperienced and had a narrow outlook on politics. Even the present leaders of the Yuaikai were losing their influence because of their reformist tendencies. Should we form a party at the risk of losing the militant elements of the working class? The syndicalist workers were opposed to the communists merely because they were political. If they formed a party they would suffer great loss, at least for some years.

Tranmael (Norway)

When considering the differences between the Norwegian Party and the International it was necessary to take into account the structure and traditions of the Party. It was organised 36 years ago mainly as a federation of Trade Unions without definite political opinions or socialist aims. Its radicalisation into a Socialist Party and finally into a Communist Party has been a long process. Its transformation into a Communist Party had begun long before its affiliation to the Third International.

On the question of the United Front, the situation in Norway is rather different than is the case in most other countries. Four-fifths of the workers follow the Communist Party, and those who are influenced by the social democrats can be reached through the Trade Unions. Under the circumstances, our appeal to the Social Democratic leaders would only serve to strengthen that Party.

The second letter of the Comintern was also sent without previous discussion with the Party Executive and was based upon incorrect and incomplete information.

The Fourth Congress decided upon a sharpening of centralisation. This was serious for a Party with the traditions of the Norwegian Party, especially in view of the experience they already had of the manner in which it was likely to be carried out. The Executive Committee made some concessions and there was no doubt that it had, in some measure, altered its views in regard to the questions at issue, among those the time required for reorganizing the Party. There was, after our Congress, reason to believe that the conflict was over. But the strife was again opened by the article by Schatzkin, reprinted in Norway, stating that if the choice rose between the Executive Committee of the Party and the International, the choice would be with the International. Such remarks pre-supposes that the strife is still to continue. Zinoviev's speech at this meeting also gives us reason to fear that the conflict has again re-opened.

There is strife in the Trade Unions which the socialists are exploiting. There are also proclaimed large strikes, and lockouts. It would, under these circumstances, be folly to induce the Trade Unions at this particular time to send a delegation to the Conference of the Profintern.