

BULLETIN

THE IV CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

Moscow.

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2.

Second session.

Nov. 9th 1922.

Chairman, Comrade Kolarow.

Contents.

Appointments of commissions. Report of the E. C. Comrade Zinoviev.

Speakers Kolarow, Humbert-Droz, Carr. Zinoviev.

Session was opened at 7 p. m. by
Comrade Kolarow.

Kolarow.—I declare the Session of the
World Congress of the III Communist
International open.

Our first duty at this Session is to
supon the agenda adopted by the
Executive Committee. Since it was pub-
lished in the Inprecor. and in the commu-
nist press, generally, it is not necessary
read it to you, as all the delegates
presumably acquainted with it. Does
anyone wish to move any amendments
to the agenda? This not being the case,
it is put to the vote.—The agenda is adopted.
We must now take the vote on the
regulations of the Congress procedure
adopted by the Enlarged Session of the
Executive Committee. As there is no ob-
jection, I declare the regulations adopted.
We must also appoint several commis-
sions for the consideration of some spe-
cial questions. I call upon Comrade Hum-
bert-Droz to put his proposals before us.
Humbert-Droz. The Presidium had
suggested to the various delegations the
necessity of selecting a number of com-
missions. The delegations met in con-
ference and moved several amendments
to the proposals of the Presidium,
which have been accepted. The var-
ious commissions have been appointed
by the Presidium. They are as follows:

The Spanish Commission.

Lozovsky, Humbert-Droz.
Italy: Graziadei.
Germany: Schreiner.
Young Communists: Doriot.
France: Paquereaux.
Co-opted: Humbert-Droz.

The Negro Commission.

Billing, Sasha, Johnstone, Safarov, Ka-
tayama.
France: Tahar Budenga.
Holland: Jansen.
Great Britain: William Joss.
Dutch colonies: Malacca.
South Africa: Bunting.
Co-opted: The American members.

The French Commission.

Russia: Lenin, Trotzky, Zinoviev.
Germany: Zetkin, Thalheimer, Becker.
Bulgaria: Kolarow.
Czecho-Slovakia: Neurath.
Italy: Bordiga.
Norway: Grepp.
Poland: Valatzky, Kostshewa.
America: Carr.
Switzerland: Welt.
Japan: Katayama.
Great Britain: Minnie Birch.
Hungary: Bela Kun.
Belgium: Van Overstraeten.
Austria: Stern.

Spain: Gonzales.
 Young Communists: Schüller.
 Profintern: Lozovsky.
 Melnitchansky and Humbert-Droz—Delegates of the Executive in France, Chairman—Trotzky, Secretary—Humbert-Droz.

The Italian Commission.

Russia: Trotzky, Zinoviev, Radek.
 Germany: Zetkin, Schuhmann, Ruth Fischer.

France: Souvarin, Ferdinand Faurés.

Great Britain: Murphy.

Czecho-Slovakia: Seidler.

Bulgaria: Kabakchiev.

Norway: Meyer.

Poland: Michalkovsky.

Austria: Stern.

America: Sullivan.

Yugo-Slavia: Raditz.

Young Communists: Vilyovich.

Profintern: Nin.

Rakosi, secretary of the commission.

The Sub-Committee for Special Consultations.

With the representatives of the
 S. P. Y.-S.

(Socialist Party of Yugo-Slavia).

Radek, Zinoviev, Trotzky, Zetkin and Kabakchiev.

The Norwegian Question.

Bukharin, Radek, Kuusinen, Kobetzky, Urbans, Samuelson, Smeral, Shatzkin. Secretary Kobetzky.

The Czecho-Slovak Question.

Germany: Secretary, Heckert, Uebericht, Ruth Fischer.

France: Rosmer, Duret.

Austria: Friedlander.

Italy: Tresso.

Russia: Radek, Zinoviev.

Poland: Keller.

Bulgaria: Issakov.

Young Communists: Vuyovich.

Profintern: Melnitchansky.

The American Commission.

Russia: Bukharin, Valetzky, Lozovsky, Katayama, Kuusinen, Radek.

Germany: Eberlein.

Balkans: Kobler.

France: Gamelon.

Italy: Azzairo.

Great Britain: Leckie.
 Young Communists: Kurella.
 Czecho-Slovakia: Schiffeld.
 Poland: Domsy.
 Holland: Karenstein.

Co-opted: Kuusinen.

The Yugo-Slav Commission.

Italy: Bombacci.
 Bulgaria: Kolarov.
 Rumania: Panker.
 Hungary: Bela Kun.
 Young Communists: Lickov.
 Austria: Friedlander.
 Czecho-Slovakia: Koren.
 Germany: Heckert.
 Poland: Pruchniak.
 France: Lespagnol.

Co-opted: Kurella.

Kolarov.—The delegates to these commissions were nominated by the various national delegations. If any alterations desired, the delegations are requested to make them now.

Carr—America: The South African comrades wish to be included into the Commission. I believe this was already decided upon yesterday, and I moved his name be included.

Kolarov. As no other alterations were proposed, I will put to the vote the composition of the commissions as it was read by the secretary.—Carried.

If necessary, other commissions will be appointed. The delegations that have yet appointed their members to the commissions already enumerated (such as the case with Austria) are invited to do so.

The Presidium has also resolved to appoint a General Secretary of the Congress, and it proposes that comrade Humbert-Droz should fill this post. As there is no objection, comrade Humbert-Droz is appointed secretary.

The Polish Party had appointed a delegate to the Presidium of the Congress who has since been replaced by comrade Markhevsky. I put this slight alteration to the vote.—Carried.

We are now coming to the first item on our agenda: the report of the Executive Committee which will be made by Comrade Zinoviev.

I call on Comrade Zinoviev to address the Congress. Zinoviev: Comrades, first of all I must report on the activity of our

Executive during the period intervening between the III and the IV Congress, and then discuss the future activity of the Communist International. Accordingly, I shall divide my report into two parts between which we may have an intermission if necessary.

I have embodied the facts and figures concerning the activity of the Executive during the past 15 months in an article which has appeared in several languages. Therefore I will not refer again to these matters.

We have two questions to consider: firstly, whether our Executive has carried out the decisions of the III Congress in the right way, and secondly whether these decisions themselves were correct. This is all the more necessary since much material has accumulated during the 15 months, which we had not at our disposal before.

Let us now consider the situation at the end of the III Congress, which was a determining factor in our entire policy. Immediately after the III Congress, it became evident that world capitalism had begun a well organised and systematic offensive against the working class throughout the world. The working class was, so to speak, beating a retreat. A large number of very important strikes on a large scale took place throughout the world during the last 15 months of our activity. In examining somewhat closely the results of these strikes, we must admit that the majority of them ended in the defeat of the workers. These strikes were in the nature of a capitalist offensive. The economic organisations of the working class have become less numerous. There were in 1920, 25,000,000 members in the trade unions. In 1922 the trade unions had only 18,000,000 members, and I am not quite sure if even this figure is not exaggerated. This fact alone shows us the difficult position of the working class during the period covered by this report.

The position of Soviet Russia during this period must be taken into account. I need not remind you, that immediately after the conclusion of the III Congress that famine on a large scale was beginning in Russia. This was not quite evident during the III Congress, but immediately after its conclusion we had to

address the workers of the whole world on behalf of the Executive of the Communist International asking support for the Russian proletariat during the famine year. This fact had enormous political consequences. You are aware that we have been accused of using the International as a weapon of the Russian Soviet Republic. There are even some "friends" who make this assertion. It is of course self-evident that there is and there ought and must be an interaction between the first proletariat republic and the Communist Party which is fighting against the bourgeoisie. From our communist viewpoint it is perfectly clear that the Communist International is of the greatest importance for Soviet Russia, and vice versa. It is utterly ridiculous to ask who is the exploited, who the subject and who the object. The Republic and the International are as the foundation and the roof of a building, they belong together.

The situation with which we were faced during the last year, was taken advantage of by our opponents, in order to fight against the idea of the proletarian dictatorship in general. The entire II International endeavoured to use the Russian famine for a campaign against the Communist International.

A special feature of their campaign was the assertion that the Communist International was only a weapon of the Soviet Republic.

The Russian Soviet Republic is such a great international factor, that no one can possibly ignore it. It is only a question on which side of the barricade one takes up his position. Let me give you as an illustration from recent events the letter of Clynes, the leader of the British Labour Party. I believe that most of you have read that letter. Mr. Clynes, one of the best known leaders of recent years, has addressed a letter to the Soviet Republic which has now been published. In this letter Clynes proposes that the Soviet Republic should endorse as soon as possible the agreement with Mr. Urquhart (which you all know) in order that the Labour Party should have a better chance of success at the coming general election. Mr. Clynes assured us that he was speaking not for himself alone but on behalf of all his colleagues. Though Great Britain is a big capitalist

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imperialist power, nevertheless the general election in that country is closely connected with the situation of Soviet Russia. The Labour Party, one of the important or rather the most important Party in the II International, cannot ignore this situation in Russia and must take sides, but on whose behalf, on which barricade? The answer is—on the side of Mr. Urquhart, on the side of the bourgeoisie. Therefore, we think that when the II International is accusing the III International of being nothing but an appendix and a weapon of Soviet Russia we can justly say that neither can the II International brush aside the Russian Soviet Republic, but must take it into account. The only difference is that the II International is endeavouring to make use of the proletarian Soviet Republic for the benefit of the bourgeoisie and not for that of the proletarians.

As I said before, the famine in Soviet Russia served for the II and 2½ Internationals as a starting point for an energetic campaign of all their parties against the III International, and we are obliged to admit that this campaign was successful to a considerable extent. To the nonparty workers, lacking in political training to be faced with the fact that famine reigned in the first Soviet Republic and that the life of the Russian workers and peasants was one of suffering and hardships, amounted to a great disappointment in the revolution in general. One can be annoyed at this, but one can not refuse to understand it. Considering the condition in which the working masses found themselves after the war, this was inevitable. It was certainly very dishonest on the part of our opponents to make use of our misfortunes, for they must have known the origin of the famine. They must have known that the traitors in the II and the 2½ Internationals and the entire tactics of imperialism were the chief culprits. It was evident however from the start that the II International would make use of this in the struggle which it has been carrying on against us, and it has indeed done so.

To recapitulate, the position of the Communist International, as well as that of the first Soviet Republic has been a very difficult one this year, and our unscrupulous opponents, the II and 2½ Interna-

tionals, endeavoured to make use of it to our detriment, achieving a certain amount of success in this attempt.

As already stated, the strikes were the nature of an offensive of the bourgeoisie. I do not want to tire you with too many tables and figures (this can be done in a pamphlet), but I will use as an illustration a country which is of the greatest importance to us in the question of the united front, I refer to France. The French comrades were the most decided opponents of the united front tactics. Matters are different now. It seems to me, however, that should our French comrades criticising so violently the Communist International, have taken into consideration the figures I am going to quote they would have certainly been obliged to express themselves in favour of the united front. The number of workers engaged in strikes in France might be termed offensive strikes, i. e., strikes for raising the working class level of existence, for higher wages, etc., has been as follows: In 1915 that is during the war, only 8,000 workers in France participated in offensive strikes. In 1916 (still during the war) their number rose to 37,000, in 1918 to 131,000, in 1919 to 1,053,000, and in the first half of 1920 it dropped to 628,000. From that time the strike curve began to go down grade. In the second half of 1920 only 57,000 workers participated in offensive strikes and in 1921 the year under consideration now only 9,000 workers.

As against that we have in the first 8 months of 1921, 160,000 French workers participating in defensive strikes. This means that in the years 1921–22 the offensive of capitalism was most active and compelled the French working class to confine itself to defensive strikes, being too weak for an offensive against the bourgeoisie which had then launched an attack all along the line.

I am of the opinion that this was the deciding factor in France, as well as in other countries in the question of the united front tactics. If our French comrades had paid attention to these figures they had studied the development of the strike movement in their own country a little more closely, I am sure that they would have from the beginning relinquished their opposition to the united front.

Such was the general situation from the beginning of our activity and all during the period covered by this report. The III Congress for the first time sharply repudiated the tactics of the so-called left elements, such as the K.A.P.—the semi-anarchic groups on the one hand, and of the right groups on the other hand. I want to remind you of the Levi group to which we had to devote some attention at the III Congress. Then there was the Italian Socialist Party figuring very prominently at the III Congress. We realised then that the formation of truly communist parties had only just begun. The III Congress left us the well known watchword "to the masses", and in the resolution on tactics it set before us the task of winning over the majority of the working class rousing and drawing into the struggle the most important social sections of the proletariat.

Zinoviev. The slogan of the United Front first formulated by our Executive in December 1921 was the direct outcome of this general situation. I believe, comrades, that now, after two sessions of the Enlarged Executive—which were in reality small world congresses—we have progressed so far that even in France the Communists as well as the Syndicalists gave up the opposition to the united front, so that a lengthy discussion of the matter will not be necessary at this congress. It is clear that our Executive was right when, in December 1921, it issued the slogan:—"To the Masses", adopting the policy of the United Front. All our strategy has been nothing but the practical application of the United Front to the concrete situation in each country. And I wish to state now that in my opinion this tactic will have to be adhered to during the coming year or coming years.

The United Front was really the first international campaign which the International attempted on a large scale. You know that we have insisted that the Communist International must be an International of action, an International of work, a centralised International Communist World Party, etc. This is an absolutely right principle, and we must abide by it. But we require years and years in order to carry it out thoroughly. It is comparatively easy to adopt a resolution to this

effect, but it is a much harder task when it comes to practical work. Even the attempt to carry out an international membership week—an undertaking which really differs very little from similar attempts by the Second International—failed because our Parties are still too heterogeneous, because our Parties are in many cases not yet communistic and have still much of the Social Democratic spirit in them, because their organisation is deficient, because it is a hard task generally to organise international action. During the past year we have attempted several international campaigns, as the campaign for Famine Relief, the campaign in connection with the S.R. Trial. Among these the campaign for the United Front was of special importance. And it must be frankly stated that this campaign did not proceed without much hindrance. We shall speak of this at greater length when we come to the special points of the agenda.

It has appeared that some groups in our Communist International are trying to bring too many of the customs of the Second International into the Third. I believe, comrades, that we cannot regard what happened in France without protest. At the time when the Communist International should have been a centralised world organisation of the proletariat, when the International was starting a wide campaign against Amsterdam in connection with the United Front, at that time an iron discipline, or, at any rate ordinary proletarian discipline should have prevailed in our ranks which however was not the case. I must say that what the French, and partly also the Italian parties have done was a hindrance to the International action which our organisation had planned. We should see this clearly and adopt the necessary measures to meet the situation. This campaign was politically very important, but it was not such as would vitally affect hundreds of thousands of comrades. But when campaigns such as these meet with so many hindrances there is cause to fear that in times of greater crises similar disturbances may occur.

Comrades, I believe that it will be best if in my report on the activity of the Executive, I take country by country. Allow me to preface this by the following

general observation. The greater the portion of the old social-democratic movement which we had taken over into our ranks, the greater the remainder of centrism and social democracy we have had to contend with in our party. You will be able to see that clearly from my review of the situation.

I begin with Germany. Germany stood in the centre of our debates at the Third World Congress. The situation of the German Party at the time of the Third World Congress was very difficult, as you know. Our enemies spoke of complete disintegration, too many of our friends were hypnotised by the temporarily difficult situation of the German Party. The Executive is proud that it has been able to render effective help to the German Party in the solution of its severe crisis. I believe that we can maintain in all truth and without exaggeration that our German Party is one of the strongest and best organised parties at this Congress* (naturally, comparatively speaking), and has the clearest political outlook. This should give us encouragement today when so many of our larger parties find themselves in similar difficulties. The French Party is the object of the greatest pessimism for many of the members of this Congress. I believe, however, that the example of the German Party should suffice to quiet the fears of this Congress, and I can say that if this Congress acts judiciously, we will be able to render help to the French Party and strengthen its position. The political situation in Germany is revolutionary, and favourable to the only true revolutionary party in Germany, that is, our Communist Party. The union of the Independent Socialist Party and the Socialist Party of Germany which we had predicted in Halle has become a fact. I remember that in Halle after the well known historical vote, when we took the occasion in the concluding speech to say that nothing remained for the Right but to join the Social Democracy, a great deal of indignation was aroused. Everybody said that this was brazen demagoguery, etc. One need not have been a prophet to predict this. It was quite clear that at this period of civil war he who would not pass over to Communism must join social democracy. This is just what has happened.

I believe that this has become in the revolutionary movement. Comrade Lenin was right when he said in his telegram of greeting to the Congress that the union of the Second and Two-and-a-half Internationals marks an advance in the revolutionary movement. Less false lies, fewer illusions are better for the working class. I believe that in Germany we will soon realise that the union has actually been an advance for our movement. We know that such old time revolutionists as Ledebur in Germany there are but two who either to join the Communists or social democrats. The German proletariat will be able to see in a few months which way it will choose.

When I ask myself, which Parties best applied the policy of the United Front, I find it has the German and Czecho-Slovak parties,—naturally, comparatively speaking. We have seen that our German Party did always emphasise sufficiently the independence of our line of action; for us the insistence upon the independence of communist agitation is the main thing. They were not always successful in it. But in general, the German Party well applied these tactics. Strikes, as the railroad strike in Germany are a classical example of the right application of the policy of the United Front. This strike was also a proof that even an economic strike usually grows into a political one. I have read an article of the German „International“ stating that the Fourth Congress will have to say clearly what is coming in Germany next? It will be a period of increasing economic conflicts or of political conflicts? The question this way is absolutely incorrect. The coming period will be one of increased economic conflicts, and also of increased political struggle. The railroad strike has shown clearly that almost every economic conflict may turn into a political conflict.

You have heard of the Shop Committees Movement which has just begun, which will doubtless have a great future. The social democrats have accused the Party of intending to call a Congress of the Shop Committees, and then to take Germany before an accomplished fact, like the Bolsheviks have done in 1917.

The Congress of Soviets (the Bolsheviks, however, had already wrenched the power from the bourgeoisie). I am sorry to say that the German Party does not merit this accusation, or rather this compliment. The Communist Party of Germany is not strong enough to be able to carry out what the Bolsheviks had done in 1917. But this campaign will be of the greatest importance for the consolidation of our ranks.

Our German Party is not grown very much numerically. It is one of the characteristic features of the movement this year that those parties whose influence upon the masses increased, did not grow numerically in the same proportion. There were various reasons for this, such as unemployment, the poverty of the proletarian who cannot afford to pay the minimum dues to the Party. There were also political causes which we may best observe in Germany. No one will deny that the influence of our German Party has considerably increased. Nevertheless their number has not grown very much. I once said at a meeting of the Russian Communist Party that Germany must advance the slogan of raising its membership to a million.

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But this will be no easy matter. I do not mean to say that the proletarian revolution should be postponed until we shall have attained those millions. In this connection I recollect that the Russian Party at the outbreak of the proletarian revolution had at most 250,000 members; the German Party is already stronger numerically than was the Russian Party in 1917. But you may rest assured that the break up of the German social democracy will go on at a more rapid pace than some of us anticipate. It is true that difference of opinion still prevails in our German Party, there are still many questions to be fought out, on which the last session of the Central Committee was not quite unanimous. But on comparing the movement now with what it was fourteen months ago we maintain that the German Party has taken a gigantic step forward. If events are not entirely misleading, the path of

the proletarian revolution in Russia leads through Germany. Thus the healing of all feuds in our Party in Germany is of first-class importance. In Germany we have only two Parties: as to the Ledebur group we prophesy that within a few months it will either go over to the Communists or disappear altogether. We can afford to wait for events to decide themselves. It is clear that in Germany we have only two parties of importance and the future shall belong to our Party.

Communication between the Executive and the German Party was of the best, if not ideal. There were many shortcomings, due in part to the fault of the Executive and partly to that of the German Party. However that may be, communications were fairly good, and practically no political event was allowed to pass without an exchange of views between the Executive and the German Party.

I now turn to France. We will yet have some special comment to make upon this subject. But I cannot pass on in my general report without touching upon it. A few months ago I wrote an article under the title of: „The Birth of a Communist Party“. In that article I stated that the birth of a Communist Party was quite a difficult matter. Yet, on considering the course of events since the Party Congress in Paris, one must say that the birth of a Communist Party in France presents even greater difficulties than might have been anticipated. There you have the formula I have made: „the greater the number of Social Democratic elements won over by us from the old Party, the greater are the difficulties that we have to overcome, in the most concrete form. This you will have occasion to observe also in Norway, and perhaps also in some other countries. In France we suddenly won over to our side the majority of the old Party, and it now requires a good deal of time before we shall have overcome all the ailments arising out of this. The situation was watched closely by the Executive and its representatives, some of whom like Humbert-Droz, spent half a year in France. This observation goes to show—let us be quite frank about it—that we have to look for quite a lot of elements for a Communist Party in the ranks of the Syndicalists, in the ranks of

I now come to Italy. The example of the Italian Party should be a classical example of the policy of the Communist Parties and the Communist International. If ever a true A. B. C. of the tactics of the Communist Parties is to be written, the most important chapter, the most important example, would be furnished by Italy. It is not the classical land for a Communist movement, but nevertheless we see much happening there with classical inevitability. From that we see that Italy is on the eve of revolution. In the fall of 1920 Italy presented the most advanced Communist movement. Our conflict with Italy at that time was not that we told the Italian comrades to make a revolution immediately. The Communist International has never demanded this of the Italian Party. Theoretically speaking it is possible that if our party had won power in the fall of 1920 the case of Hungary might have repeated itself. I do not say that this is certain. I do not know if a blockade were possible. I doubt it, but it is not impossible. It may be that if the workers had seized power in 1920, Italy would have gone the way of Hungary. We have ne-

ver demanded from the Italian comrades that they must make a revolution. Perhaps it was true that the time was not ripe for the seizure of power. If the majority accepted this standpoint, we would not have been justified in treating with the Italian Socialist Party on that account.

The cause of the break was not that they did not want to seize power. Our standpoint was, that the situation was revolutionary, and that we must be prepared for all eventualities; the reformists had to be eliminated as a preliminary to the building up of a real revolutionary party. This is why we demanded the expulsion of those who sabotaged the revolution; but the Communist International did not in the fall of 1920 demand that the Italian working class rise and seize power. Another claim is historically false. You know that D'Arragona has openly confessed that the reformists remained in the Party to prevent the revolution. That is why they had to be expelled. It was only a question of preparing the Party for a possible revolution, but not of making an immediate revolution.

As you know, the majority of the Italian Party refused to fulfil the demand of the International. They did not wish to build a revolutionary party or to break with these agents of the bourgeoisie. These words „agents of the bourgeoisie“ has caused much excitement; our friends in Italy shed tears of blood over tactlessness because in a telegram I sent I called the reformists „agents of the bourgeoisie“, but after D'Arragona's confession I believe that this will be too mild an expression to describe these gentlemen. I can think of no more diplomatic way of describing them. The reformists, these agents of the bourgeoisie, remained in the Italian Party and did all in their power to prevent a Revolution and deliver the working class to the counter-revolution.

Our Italian comrades do not agree among themselves as to whether what has recently happened in Italy is a coup d'etat, or a comedy. It might be both. Historically, it is a comedy, in a few months this will turn to the advantage of the Italian working class, but for the time being it is quite a serious change, an actual counter-revolutionary act. The

fault of our Italian comrades is not, we see, it that they did not make a revolution in 1920, but that they have permitted accomplices of the bourgeoisie remain in the Party and betray the working class into the hands of the Fascists.

You know the policy of the Executive. You know that the question of whether the Party had acted rightly or not at Livorno has been much debated at different congresses. I believe that it is clear now that we acted properly at Livorno and in the following year. Our Italian Communist Party has often acted against the policy of the Executive on the Italian question, I believe, however, comrades, that we were justified, that we could not have acted otherwise, that at the moment it was necessary to break definitely with the Italian Socialist Party for if we had not done so the Communist International would have been lost. But from the moment we saw that the members of the Italian Socialist Party recognised their faults and wished to rectify them, we could not but do everything to facilitate their return to the Communist International. It is quite clear that whatever happens the majority of the workers will leave the Maximalists and join the Communists in the coming months. And since they will belong to our Party, it is our duty to make it easy for them to return to the International. It is the function of the Communist International, to smooth the way for any section of the working class to join the Communist International, which, having seen its error, wishes to return to our fold. Of course we must demand guarantees, and we will do so. The thing that have happened in Italy must not happen again. We must have sufficient guarantees to that effect. Nevertheless we must do everything to reunite with these comrades.

I hear that many comrades in France believe that it might not be such a dangerous act to break with the Communist International. „They may abuse us a little“, they say, „but they are sure to invite us again to the Fifth or the Sixth Congress and to reunite with us“. The comrades are thinking of the case of Italy. What shall we say to this? Those who speak so, forget that during this time

the Italian Party has been destroyed and the Italian working class delivered into the hands of the Fascists. These comrades see things only from the personal standpoint. They think: we shall be expelled today, but tomorrow or after a year we will be able to return and begin our work again. The fact that in the meantime the Party and the working class may be destroyed, is a minor point for them. I believe that this is the conception of only a few isolated persons. The majority of the French Party is incapable of holding such ideas.

The lesson of the Italian Communist Party does not consist in that one or another of its leaders had fought us for two years, and then came back to Moscow; that is a subordinate matter. The personal question does not enter here. The lesson lies much deeper. The lesson is that if you give a finger to the reformists they will take the whole hand. Those who commit such errors must lead their party to destruction and cause the greatest harm to the working class of their country. We are certain to have differences not only with the Maximalists, but also with Italian Communists. In certain questions we are not of the same opinion. They have adopted a programme which is not Marxist. We have criticised and rejected it. Yet these conceptions are still deeprooted in the Italian Party. It is still tinged with absenteeism. Our friend Bordiga has won great merits in the Italian movement. The comrades have fought bravely. Under most difficult circumstances they did everything possible to keep the banner of the Communist International flying. We must acknowledge these merits, especially of comrade Bordiga; nevertheless we must say that our opinions differ very much from theirs. The tinge of absenteeism still remains. Bordiga no longer advocates anti-parliamentarianism, he has given up these views, but the spirit of anti-parliamentarianism still remained. We see it in the manner in which the party conducted the united front tactic.

The tactic of the United Front was conducted by the Italian Party from the standpoint that it was admissible only in the economical field, but not in the political. We consider this a mistake. The tactic applies to both fields. We were too late in applying the United Front tactic

in Italy, and we were also late in raising the slogan of the Labour Government. I personally erred in not conceding to comrade Bordiga's request to allow the discussion of the Italian question at the last meeting of the Enlarged Executive Committee. That was a mistake. There ought to have been an open discussion.

Nevertheless we regard the Italian Communist Party as one of the best and bravest in the Communist International. It is precisely at this most difficult moment that the party will show of what it is capable. Today I read an illegal manifesto issued by the Italian Communist Party, and I have also received the first illegal manifesto of the central organ of our party. This proves that the Italian party has not laid down its arms even in the most difficult moment (prolonged applause).

We have appointed an Italian Commission. It will have to deal with two matters: 1) the unification of the party, and 2) organisation of our forces during this epoch of Fascism. We do not know how long this epoch will last, but we must prepare for the worst.

Now about Czecho-Slovakia. In Czecho-Slovakia the Executive, of course with the help of the Party, as a whole, has successfully achieved unity. At the time of the Third Congress we had two parties and several groups in Czecho-Slovakia. It was somewhat doubtful as to whether unity could be organised in this country, where national problems play such an important part. But we have succeeded. We neglected certain opportunities in the Trade Unions. Nevertheless our party has succeeded in rallying the largest section of the trade unions under the red flag. We must say, that the united front tactic has been most brilliantly applied by the Czecho-Slovakian Party.

If you study the bourgeois Press and follow the development of affairs in the opposition Press you will admit that our party has manoeuvred skillfully and has succeeded in attracting the majority of the workers away from enemy organisations.

We hope, therefore, that the practical application of the United Front tactic will be as brilliantly continued in this country.

As you know there is one point on which we disagree with the Czecho-Slovakian

Party. (Perhaps this applies to other parties too, that we shall see later.) It is the exclusion of the so-called Opposition.

We have set up a Commission which will examine this question. Nevertheless I cannot refrain from giving our point of view on this matter now.

Our fraternal Czechoslovakian party at its last congress, expelled 7 members of the Central Committee, including its former president Sturk, on account of breach of discipline. This came quite unexpectedly for the Executive which had not been consulted in the matter. The Executive deemed it its duty immediately to annul the decision. This does not mean that the opposition had been found in the right. The Executive abides by the standpoint of the majority of the party. We do not wish to describe the opposition as the Left opposition, neither do we wish to back it politically, but we do say that the expulsion was hasty and that all the other means had not been exhausted. In the heat of the fight the guilt of this group was compared, to that of Levi. Their guilt consists in having published an appeal in spite of the Central Committee's veto. It was certainly a step that could not be approved from the point of view of Communist Party discipline. But to compare this breach of discipline with that of Paul Levi is altogether irrelevant. Levi had betrayed the working class at a moment when our brothers were being shot down. At that juncture he wrote a pamphlet to the order of the German Attorney-General. This was an act of treason to the working class, to which there was but one answer, expulsion. On the other hand the action of the Czechoslovakian comrades, although a grave breach of discipline, could not be in any way described as treason. We should do all possible to retain this group within the ranks of the party, on condition of course that there should be no further breach of discipline, and that the decisions that have been adopted shall also be carried out. We must have a disciplined party, but we cannot afford to expell members so readily: however small a group it may be before all other means have been tried. And this has not been done in the present case. We hope that these comrades will understand quite clearly

that the Executive did not put them here in order to put them on back and say: You may tread down under foot. Nothing of the kind! They have been invited in order that we may try to bring them back to the party, to convince them that party discipline is necessary and admirable thing. Should be shown that these comrades are unable to observe proletarian discipline, then is nothing to be done for them. The decision of the congress must be carried out in this case.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that in Czechoslovakia we have about some 600,000 unemployed. The misfortune and despair of the working class is enormous. The masses are in an angry mood. Now it is easy enough to form a Syndicalist group, then a K. A. P. or K. A. P. C.-S. (Communist Labour Party of Czechoslovakia — Trans.) Just now comrades should therefore understand quite clearly that they are not to be any such groups which at best may survive for six months, to the detriment of the working class. We have seen the situation as it is. In a country like Czechoslovakia, with such a large number of unemployed, we must do everything possible to prevent the formation of a separate K. A. P. group. The Communist International must do everything to avoid it, and I hope we shall succeed.

I now come to the Norwegian question. I have already said that the more movements we get from the old movement, the more difficult is the birth of a truly Communist Party. In Norway we have got the bulk of the old party, with a result which I do not intend to conceal. We are experiencing great difficulties the question is similar to that of France, of course there is some difference, but the source of the trouble is the same. In France we have received a legacy of old party traditions. In Norway there is a strong Federalist tradition and a peculiar method of organisation. The party has hitherto built upon the trade union organisation. At Halle we had a conversation with comrade Kirre Gret, the leader of the Norwegian party, and with other comrades who then promised to re-organise the party. So far this has not been done. The name of the central organ has not yet been changed. The Norwegian newspaper still carries the old name "Sozial-Demokrat" (Hear, hear). The proletarian newspapers are also called "Sozialdemokraten" (Hear, hear!). As you see, it is also high time to take action in Norway so that the demands of the Communist International may be complied with. We must not be afraid to admit that we are a Communist party. Yet we have some parties who have not yet got rid of social democratic labels. To be sure, we were born in the lap of the II International, and we have inherited some of its traditions, which cannot be outlived overnight. But when this night has lasted a couple of years, we must demand an acceleration of the process. In our Norwegian newspapers for instance you would read articles, which lend support to the Scheidemannites against the German Communists. At the same time we have survivals there which are syndicalist in the worst sense of the word. Comrade Annael used to be in the I. W. W. and still retains some of the Syndicalist tradition. He cannot understand discipline. In an article he writes: "Discipline, dis-ting degrading to the dignity of a man". And this is said by a comrade who is by no means an unregenerate high-brow, but an honest and sincere working class fighter, but, here tradition says the man. Tradition is so strong that it causes confusion in the mind of one of our best Norwegian comrades. There is also in Norway a band of intellectuals, similar to the "Clarté", group publishing a magazine which advocates practically the same principles as those of the Levi group. And our party tolerates this without taking action. This year we must act with determination. We have a delegation of the minority of the Norwegian party here, and I am sure we shall succeed in solving our problems. Norwegian comrades! You must clearly understand that the Communist International will not countenance such conditions as those which have prevailed. We are well aware of the good qualities of the Norwegian movement, and we appreciate them. The Norwegian movement is one with the working masses. It has-

comrades who are absolutely devoted to the proletarian revolution. But it must, once for all, shake off the trammels of social democracy. It must understand that it will not become a real Communist Party unless it makes short shift of such evils.

I now turn to Poland. In Poland we have an illegal mass party. The policy of coordinating the legal with the illegal is a very important one, and the experience of the past year has shown, to my way of thinking, that this co-ordination is not quite as simple as we had imagined. The Russian Communists have the experience of 1905—1906. We were then of the opinion that when a legal movement is impossible, there should be co-ordination of the legal with the illegal, with the leadership in the hands of the legal organisation. Now we have to reckon with the experience of various countries, which goes to show that such co-ordination is not quite so simple. It was possible in Poland, and it was practiced there. We have an illegal party there which at the same time is a mass party. We have almost no legal movement there, but just a very slight fringe of legality. In Poland this is possible, because the Polish Party has already gone through a revolution, because in 1905 it led the working class, because the illegal leadership has already fought in the front ranks of the working class. The party is universally acknowledged. It has proved its reliability through its activities during the revolution. Therefore, in Poland this method succeeds, while in other countries, e. g., in America, it is much more difficult, because the legal party there has not yet had occasion to work in the open, before the entire working class, in a leading capacity; because the leaders there are not so well-known. There the co-ordination between legal and illegal is of a quite different kind.

As I have already said, in Poland we have an illegal mass party, an old party with a glorious past behind it. Yet there are also important points in which the Executive of the Polish party had certain differences of opinion, such as the agrarian question, the question of nationalities, and partly the question of the United Front. The agrarian question we will discuss with our Polish comrades spec-

ially. Among our Polish comrades a conception of the agrarian question has prevailed for a long time, which in my opinion is out of date and almost social-democratic. I must recall the stand that was taken by the II Congress upon this question. At that Congress we adopted a platform wherein we proposed, in order to win over the peasantry, to include a statement of the problem of a redistribution of land.

We also met with some opposition from the Italian Socialists. The Fascisti have shown that they are able to make use of such a programme for their own demagogic purposes. This mistake of our Italian comrades has cost us much, and the same error may harm us in Poland and other countries. Fortunately the policy of the Polish Party appears to be changing and we hope that we may be able to come to an agreement with them on the agrarian question and devise a programme of action which will draw the peasantry to the party. The Communist Party is a working class party: this does not mean, however, that we represent only the demands of the industrial proletariat; we represent the working class, but we must know how to draw into our ranks all the oppressed classes fighting against the bourgeoisie.

We also had a difference of opinion with the Polish comrades on the question of nationalities. We hope that we have also disposed of this disagreement.

On the question of the United Front, it appears that a minority—and, I believe, a small minority of the Polish Party—was against the United Front. However, it is very grave that such an opposition should have appeared in one of our oldest parties. We are convinced that the Polish Party itself will be able to reconcile these differences of opinion, and has probably already done so. But this difference of opinion did exist, and it proves how difficult the practical application of the United Front is.

There is not much to say of the Balkans. I must say, however, that our Balkan Federation is functioning poorly. The Balkan Federation is practically non-existent. There are no regular meetings; I believe that we must insist that the Balkan Federation be strengthened, and that the Bulgarian Party give more attention to

this question. A few words on Roumania: we wish to tell the Congress that they have fulfilled their duty in spite of persecution. You know that the VII Congress of the Roumanian Comrades, numbering several hundred, were taken directly from the Congress to prison. Many of them have been shot; many are still in prison. The Social Democrats have shamelessly cooperated with the bourgeoisie in their crushing of the Communist Party. The merit of our Roumanian comrades is all the greater, that they have remained true to the Communist International under the most trying circumstances and have fulfilled their duty in spite of all.

The Yugo-Slavian movement has gone through a crisis. The question of legal or illegal activity has appeared. The problem has not yet been solved. The party has had great difficulties. Yugo-Slavia is again progressing however a new movement among the trade unions has begun and we hope that our party will soon regain its power. A Communist International under the most trying circumstances will deal with internal conflicts of the Yugo-Slavian Party.

In England, a most important country for the development of our organisation, we are growing very slowly. In no other country perhaps does the Communist movement make such slow progress. The problem of the adhesion of the Party to the Labour Party has been finally solved. The Party has decided to affiliate to the Labour Party. It will be one of the special tasks of the coming Executive, I believe, to give more attention to England. We do not know as yet the cause of this slow development. England is a country of a large mass organisation. You know that the Communist Party there has not a large membership. It has no organisation there which corresponds with that of the German Party. This is owing to their peculiar traditions. If we take into consideration the amount of unemployment and the stagnation of the English proletariat, the development of Communism in England is remarkable. It is practically stagnant and we must pay more attention to the English movement than we have heretofore.

We were able to send a delegation to America who remained there for

time. The greatest difficulty with which the American movement has been confronted was the problem of combining together legal and illegal work. The situation is quite different from that in Poland, Yugo-Slavia, Finland or Latvia, where we have already had a revolution and the leaders of the working class have already gained the recognition of the proletariat. In America we have quite a different situation; there is a comparatively large trade union movement, and a Communist Party with violent factional strife. Therefore, America is one of our most difficult problems, and must be studied carefully.

In Austria, in spite of all difficulties, our Party has made great progress.

In Hungary, on the contrary, the situation is pitiful. I see many comrades there who have taken part energetically in factional strife and have contributed not a little to make the situation worse. You must permit me to criticise these comrades before the forum of the Communist International. The Executive has made an energetic attempt to surmount these difficulties. I do not wish to speak

here of the political emigration. History teaches us that our cause owes much to such emigrés. Perhaps the Italian Party will have an emigration in the near future. We have sometimes thought that political emigration was a necessity. But there are emigrations and emigrations. There are emigrés who have suffered greatly after an unsuccessful revolution, but our Hungarian comrades have emigrated so much that it has become too much. I hope that the Fourth Congress will tell them energetically enough that we do not wish nor shall we allow a repetition of what we have seen. In a single day, a few weeks ago, 170 communists were arrested in Hungary. In spite of the fact that the Communist movement is gaining among the masses, the situation of our party is as bad as can be. It is our duty, at a time when the working class movement is growing and the bourgeoisie is arresting hundreds of our comrades, to conquer the differences of opinion among emigrants and build up a real underground party.

One may say that the combination of legal and illegal work in Hungary will

be easy, because the Communists there have an old tradition behind them.

In Japan we have a small party which, with the help of the Executive, has united with the best syndicalist elements. It is a young party, but it is an important nucleus, and the Japanese Party should now issue a programme. The Congress of the Parties and the peoples of the Far East, which met here in Moscow, had great importance, especially for Japan, because, for the first time, it introduced the important question of the Japanese movement.

We have had valuable results in India. I can communicate to the Congress that the work of our comrades during the past few months has been crowned with success. Comrade Roy, with a group of friends, is issuing a periodical, whose task it is to smooth our way in India. Our comrades have been able to gather together the Communist elements in India. They have found entrance into the newspapers; they have entered the trade unions. I believe that this is a great step forward.

This year we have built more or less strong nuclei of our party in Turkey, China, and Egypt. We should have no illusions in this regard; they are very small groups, but nevertheless it is a step forward, and we must help our comrades there to accomplish a double work, firstly to increase these proletarian nuclei, and secondly so become the vanguard of the whole movement against the bourgeoisie.

Important work has also been started in Australia and other countries.

I will now speak of the Profintern. As you know, comrades, the Profintern has met with opposition, even in one of the best parties—the German Party. The German Party discussed quite seriously whether the Profintern was not a premature organization, whether it should not be totally liquidated, etc. This took place under the influence of the Levi group, but it was not only the Levites who fell into this error. This was a most dangerous period for the Profintern. The Executive naturally held it its duty to fight against this liquidating tendency. It was our opinion that the Profintern was in no way premature.

The entire anti-Profintern movement

has now been defeated in Germany, and I hope in other countries, and the Profintern is on the high road to success. We can prophesy that the Profintern will experience a great growth in the coming years if not even in the next few months. The Amsterdames wish to bring about a split. They have accomplished this split in France, and have begun it in Czechoslovakia. In Germany we face a possible split of the trade unions. We believe it to be our task and that of the Profintern to combat this splitting. We want a united working class movement; the Amsterdames want splits. The more influence we gain in the trade unions, the greater will be the desire of the Amsterdames to split them, and the more energetic must be our fight against this tactic. We must organise and prepare suitable measures for this purpose. Our campaign will be the subject of a special discussion, with regard to the independent unions which they have forced us to organise in France and Czechoslovakia, and which we are now being compelled to organise in Germany and other countries, we must proclaim that the new unions, products of the splits, are born with the cry for unity upon their lips. The slogan of these new unions, produced by mass expulsions must be: Trade Union Unity!

When the Czech, German and other comrades are compelled to establish a general, or even a craft union, they must issue the watchword: Unity! Struggle for the unity of the trade union, movement. I will deal with this question in greater detail in the second part of my speech.

Our movement made considerable progress in the question of cooperation, and the organisation of the young people. I should like to make special mention of the Y.C.I. The transference of the Y.C.I. to Moscow has proved successful, and all fears in connection with this have proved groundless. The Y.C.I. has done good work. We must, however, admit in some countries the movement has become rather slack. The young communist movement in Germany and in other countries has also gone through a difficult period. This is a feature of the general situation of the working class. Nevertheless, the Y.C.I. and the Young Communist movement have remained a vanguard of the Communist International. A Young Communist Con-

gress will be held after our Congress, which we must pay the greatest attention to. We must, however, endeavour to become an overwhelming majority. The amalgamation of the II and the 2½ Internationals will be of great harm to the socialists in connection with the young peoples movement. New methods are required in order to influence the young proletarian masses which have become rather indifferent. We hope to be able to do this.

This closes the survey of our activities during the last 15 months. We have, of course, committed many errors, and we must criticise us on that account. We shall discuss frankly whether, and say we want to retain the 21 points. Our French comrades have, for instance, criticised § 9 on the basis of which Fabre was expelled. I do not think that any comrade would say that we were wrong in acting thus. This expulsion was absolutely necessary. However, some of our French comrades have objected to it, saying that we had no right to act in this manner, and that we had given a too wide interpretation to § 9. It will be for the Congress to say if we exceeded our authority in making use of § 9 in the way we did.

There is still another point. The Executive has resolved that the National Congress of the Communist Parties should as a rule be held after the World Congress. Exceptions of course may be made. I am not going to inquire whether this was absolutely necessary. But what, indeed, is the meaning of this decision? It means that we were determined to be a centralised world party, a party directed from one centre. We want the World Congress to be the leading organ for the Parties. We do not want the Communist International to be merely a meeting ground for all parties. This point of view has been violently criticised in France.

But what has the French example taught us? What would have been achieved if this Congress had met sooner? As I said before, I am not going to open any proposal to modify this decision, and would be quite ready to accept modifications. At any rate the decision means that we must remain a centralised world organisation. We have been too lax in carrying out the

points. You will be quite right in wanting to punish us for it. The 21 points must be more strictly applied henceforth. This does not mean that we have not done anything until now. The Communist International has been in existence only 3½ years now. Comrades, this is too short a period in which to organise our communist parties on a world scale. The greatest evil was not in our negligence, but in the fact that we looked upon the 21 points as a scrap of paper. However, I am of the opinion that the Congress will say that it is here in order to carry out the 21 points. We must see to it that we become a really International World Party. Hitherto we were in favour of this in principle, but it is necessary that this principle should be put into practice.

This is my report on the activity of the Executive during the last 15 months. I will deal with our future tactics later on.

The Session was resumed at 10½ p. m.

Kolarov. — In agreement with all the delegations, we will bring tonight's Session to a close. The next Session will be held tomorrow at 11 a. m. sharp. I wish to warn the comrades that the Session will begin at that hour, regardless of how many delegates are present. Therefore, everyone should endeavour to be here at least half an hour before the opening of the Session.

(The Session was closed at 10/35 p. m.).