

**WORKERS OF THE WORLD  
UNITE!**

# THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL



NO.  
**13**

**6<sup>d</sup>**

Monthly Organ of the Executive Committee of  
**THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL**

THE COMMUNIST PARTY of GT. BRITAIN  
Publications Department

---

*Now on Sale*

# THE ERRORS OF TROTSKYISM

A SYMPOSIUM



392 PAGES

**Paper - 3s. 0d. Cloth - 5s. 0d. Postage extra**

Contains, for the first time in English, the now famous Preface to Trotsky's book "1917" that started the recent controversy which has been so misrepresented by the capitalist press, together with the replies of the leaders of the Communist International.

Not merely a clash of brilliant personalities, but a permanent contribution to revolutionary theory. Not an intrigue for power, but the hammering-out of the tactics of the world revolution.

Get this book and get *all* the facts.

---

**Order from the Communist Bookshop,  
16 King Street, Covent Garden, W.C.2**

The  
**Communist  
International**

ORGAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE  
COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

Appears simultaneously in  
English, Russian, French  
and German

*Publishing Office :*  
Leningrad, Smolny, 63. Tel. 1.19.

*Editor's Office :*  
Leningrad, Smolny, Zinoviev's Cabinet

# C O N T E N T S



China Awakened	<i>F.R.</i>	- - - - -	3
The Provocation of Karl Kautsky	<i>A. Martynov</i>	- -	22
Economic Depression in Germany	<i>I. K. Sorge</i>	- -	47
"The Accumulation of Capital" (Bukharin)			
	<i>L. Rudas</i>	- - - - -	61
The Mensheviks also turn towards the Village			
	<i>A. Martynov</i>	- - - - -	69
The Coming of the Mass Communist Party in Britain			
	<i>J. T. Murphy</i>	- - - - -	86



# China Awakened

**T**HE tide of events in China has overflowed the precincts of an ordinary political strike; but the flow of national revolutionary elements is not yet sufficiently great to permit of it being described as a revolution. The first spark in the powder magazine, that in the final analysis caused the present explosion, was the killing of two Chinese workers by Japanese factory superintendents in Shanghai. The Shanghai newspaper, *Ming-Ho-Ji-Bao*, describes what happened on that occasion in the following manner :

“On the 15th of May, the workers employed in Mill No. 7, belonging to the Kagai Wata Kaisha, a Japanese textile company in Shanghai, turned up for work as usual, but found the gates of the factory closed. The Japanese superintendents, without giving any reason, declared that work at the factory had stopped. Meanwhile crowds of workers began to gather around the factory gates. On learning that work at the factory had stopped, the workers, in view of the nearness of pay day, demanded payment of the wages due to them. Instead of meeting the just demands of the workers, the Japanese superintendents began to disperse the crowd, employing iron rods with which they beat the workers. When the workers tore these iron rods out of the hands of the superintendents the latter opened fire upon the crowd from revolvers as a result of which two workers were killed and many were wounded. On hearing the firing the workers employed in the other sheds situated in the same courtyard, came out and joined their fellow workers. The officials of the mills called out a detachment of police, which together with the superintendents opened fire upon the workers. As a result of the shooting, a score or so of workers were wounded. Picking up their killed and wounded the workers in a large crowd went to the offices of their trade unions where they were advised to take their killed and wounded comrades to the police. The crowd went from place to place appealing now to the mixed court, now to the police station. Finally, the police took charge of the bodies of the killed workers and sent the wounded to the hospital.”

On the same day, at a general meeting of textile workers it was resolved to declare a strike and to put forward the following demands :

1. The dismissal and prosecution of the two Japanese superintendents responsible for the shooting.
2. Compensation to the wounded workers and to the families of the workers who were killed.
3. The Japanese factory superintendents be prohibited from carrying arms.
4. The re-instatement of all workers previously dismissed.
5. Recognition of the Labour Union.
6. Payment for the period of the strike.
7. The restoration of the payment of supplementary pay abolished by the mill management after the February strike.
8. Wages to be paid in full value dollars, and not in small silver.

Next day, the 16th of May, a joint meeting of public organisations in Shanghai including trade unions, student leagues, the Shop Assistants' Union, and the Street Traders' Union, was held, at which a committee to combat the Japanese assassins was formed and a telegram was despatched to Peking demanding that a protest be sent to the Japanese Government against the shooting down of workers in Shanghai. Another telegram was sent to the Chinese Trade Union Congress proceeding at the time in Canton, asking for aid.

The character of the demands enumerated above clearly shows that in its first stages the movement did not extend beyond the limits of an economic struggle. On the 15th of May, the Shanghai workers did not put forward any political slogans. Even the murder of two Chinese workers by the hirelings of Japanese capital, did not induce them to take up the fight against imperialism; the Shanghai workers considered that this bloody conflict could be settled by the Japanese employers agreeing to some improvement in the conditions of the workers.

Generally speaking, the Chinese workers are in the position of slaves. This is not denied even by partial English authorities. For example, a "Blue Book" was published in

England recently containing official documents concerning the position of the working class in China. The interest revealed by the British Government in the labour question in China, originates from the time of the MacDonalld Ministry which, in April, 1924, ordered the British Ambassador in Peking, Ronald MacLeay, to collect from the consular officials material concerning labour legislation and the conditions of labour in China. The picture of the conditions prevailing as painted in the "Blue Book" is indeed a depressing one. There is practically no civil code, no protection of labour, no system of factory inspection in China. The Chinese worker is a creature without rights, totally unprotected from unlimited exploitation, and completely dependent upon and at the mercy of his employer. The working day is not less than 14 to 15 hours. The sanitary conditions of the factory is beneath all criticism. The British consul, Cheffo, J. W. Nipps, in his report, says :

"The sanitary conditions in silk factories are extremely bad. In order to protect the silk, the atmosphere must be kept warm and moist. Windows and doors are, therefore, continually closed, and the air is constantly loaded with odorous dust and germs. The workers almost universally wear no clothing above the waist. They can readily be recognised in any crowd by their sallow complexion. All workers must live in the factories. Those completing their work before night are free to go where they please, but they must return by dark. This means that only a few men get out of the factories except on special occasions. When they finish their work at night, they pull out their roll of bedding and sleep on the floors, on stray boards laid across benches, or on the ground in the courtyard. They rise at the break of day, roll up their blankets, and stack them in some corner until night. Thus they work, eat, and sleep in the same quarters."

"However industrious he may be he has no assurance of keeping the earnings of his toil or even of preserving his personal safety."—writes Mr. Clenall, Consul of Foochow, in his report.

Frequently, compulsory labour is employed. For example, Mr. Archer, the British Consul at Chunking, in his report, writes :

"Almost every day, even in the Treaty Port of Chunking, gangs of men may be seen roped together with cords

round their wrists, being carried off by soldiers to act as transport coolies, and no soldier in Szechuan ever carries his own baggage on a march, and sometimes not even his rifle. These commandeered baggage coolies receive no pay but sometimes are given a kind of certificate for labour done which entitles them to preferential treatment when the next commandeering takes place."

From other sources we know that the wages of the Chinese workers are extremely low. For example, the average wage of a worker in Shanghai ranges from 24 to 28 shillings a month, and such categories of labour as porters, stevedores, and rickshaw coolies earn not more than 12 to 14 shillings a month.

Recent returns show that the number of children employed in industry in Shanghai is 173,272, of whom 150,662 are below 12 years of age (44,741 boys, and 105,921 girls). Thus, the majority of child workers (about 85 per cent.) comprise children of below 12 years of age, and of these 75 per cent. are girls. The wages of children usually do not exceed 10 shillings a month. Apprenticeship usually extends to four or five years, during which period the apprentices receive extremely low pay or no pay at all. In most of the factories work is conducted in two 12 hour shifts, sometimes in one shift of 14 or 15 hours with a brief interval for dinner. The factory children are treated in a barbarous manner. Beating is an ordinary phenomenon. Many children are ruthlessly exploited by agents who trade in these children like slave traders, and who take from the children half the wages they earn.

"A Shanghai factory, while the night shift is at work, presents a horrible spectacle," writes the *Shanghai Guide Weekly*, in an article entitled, "The Little Slaves of Capitalism in China," "In close, semi-dark premises filled with dust and vapour, half naked figures of men, women and children can be barely discerned standing at their work. Frequently the children, unable to bear the strain of continuous toil, fall as they stand, and sleep the sleep of exhaustion on the dirty floor, or on a heap of raw cotton. They are brought back to consciousness by a kick from the brutal superintendent. Right next to the rattling machinery, in the midst of the filth of the factory, are rows of baskets containing infants which the mothers feed during intervals."

Injury from machinery and poisonous gases, particularly in match factories, under such conditions, assumes a mass character.

And yet, in "civilised" England are to be found learned publicists like the *Times* Peking correspondent, who wrote literarily the following :

"It has caused some surprise that Mr. Chamberlain dwelt so much on labour conditions, presumably meaning labour in foreign owned mills. No such questions exist here.

". . . The question of child labour has arisen at Shanghai and all foreign mills are prepared to adopt restrictive regulations whether the Chinese do likewise or not. But the truth is that child labour is universal in China. As soon as they are able to walk, children are expected to share all the tasks with their elders. The hours are long, but the work is light, and any sweeping changes will merely complicate domestic arrangements and cause overwhelming hardship to parents. In the small Chinese factories throughout the country, conditions for children are usually highly detrimental to child life, but there is no demand for legislation on the subject." (*Times*, June 22nd, 1925, p. 14, under heading "The Situation in China.")

The *Times* ably defends the interests of the big British capitalists. In spite of its halting excuses, it actually stands for the unlimited exploitation of child labour.

The movement of the Shanghai workers which arose on an economic basis would not have reached its present enormous dimensions if the subsequent events in Tsingtao had not served as an additional cause for this.

In Tsingtao, where the factories are concentrated almost exclusively in the hands of the Japanese, a strike affecting ten thousand workers had been going on since the middle of April. The demands put forward by the strikers were as follows : 1. Abolition of corporal punishment, 2. Increase of wages, 3. One day's rest in seven, 4. An eight hour day for children and young persons.

It will be seen, therefore, that the textile workers put forward demands of a most moderate character. This platform of the economic struggle in itself reveals the low stand-

ard of existence of the Chinese workers. These demands are considerably lower in scale than the demands put forward by the Russian workers 20 years ago, in the period of our first revolution.

On the 9th of May, the Tsingtao capitalists were compelled to make certain concessions, but after the formal agreement had been reached it became clear that the Japanese employers were sabotaging the fulfilment of the agreement. This breach of agreement must be regarded as part of the policy of the Japanese Government, which gave its agents and consuls instructions to take measures against the strikers and to establish contact with other states in the event of the strike spreading to the factories of other nationals. The failure on the part of the capitalists to carry out the agreement roused considerable indignation among the textile workers of Tsingtao. The tense atmosphere reached white heat after the 25th of May, when the managers of the three factories most affected—the Dai Nippon, the Taikana and the Nishin—introduced 300 police officers into their factories. The workers responded to this by again coming out on strike. Upon this the Japanese imperialists declared a lockout of 7,000 workers and called two destroyers and one cruiser from Port Arthur. The workers in two factories were prepared to capitulate to the employers, but the workers of the third factory did not follow the example of their fellow workers and categorically refused to cease the fight. In order to compel these workers to go back to work the Japanese police resorted to arms, as a result of which two Chinese workers were killed and 30 injured, and 30 workers arrested. The news of the savage attack of the Japanese exploiters upon the peaceful and unarmed strikers in this town of two million population, already incensed by the events of the 15th of May, roused them to give expression to their class solidarity by organising, in conjunction with the students of 23 educational institutions, a demonstration of protest against these fresh Japanese massacres. Hardly had the demonstration reached Nanking Street in the centre of the town, when they were met by a detachment of British police, who fired a hail of bullets into the crowd. 15 persons were killed on the spot and 30 were severely wounded. This senseless shooting down of workers and representatives of labour students roused a wave of general indignation throughout China. As has been correctly stated in the Manifesto issued by the Executive Committee of the Communist International, the political significance of these shootings is equal to that of the shootings which took place on the 9th of January, 1905, in Russia. The subsequent shootings in Hankow and Canton added oil to the

flames. The cynicism of the foreign plunderers was sufficiently revealed in the statement made at the mixed court by the British chief of police in Shanghai, Everson. He said: "I was instructed to employ arms as a last resort, and when I did I was to shoot to kill."

The fact that the Chinese workers, with their own eyes, saw the true attitude of the imperialists towards the masses of the workers in their country helped to a considerable degree to awaken their revolutionary consciousness. By their volleys the British and Japanese imperialists roused and set into motion the vast masses of the people in China much more effectively than could be done by the most eloquent agitators of the Comintern. As a result, the movement which commenced as a simple economic strike, flowed into the broad arena of political struggle and came face to face with the cruel oppressors of the Chinese people—international imperialism. Already, on the 31st of May, at a large mass meeting held near the premises of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, attended by large numbers of workers and students, the following political demands were drawn up, which served as the slogan of the movement in the first stage of its development:

1. The annulment of the unequal treaties.
2. The return to China of all foreign concessions.
3. The dismissal of all foreign police and their substitution by Chinese police.
4. The transference of the municipality of Shanghai to China.
5. Release of those arrested.

Thus, on the 31st of May, the Chinese movement very definitely assumed the character of a political struggle striving towards the national liberation of China from the yoke of imperialist oppression. Recent events give us a clear reply to the question as to who will be the guiding force of the Chinese national liberation movement. In the light of recent events it becomes clear that the hegemony in the unfolding movement is being assumed more and more by the working class. The Chinese proletariat is conducting the fight not isolated from other sections of the population, but on the contrary, in conjunction with them and relying upon

them. The feature which distinguishes the Chinese liberation movement from the revolutionary movement in Russia and in other European countries is that the struggle is directed not against the home government, but against international imperialism. Consequently, in the fight for the overthrow of foreign oppression are united not only the workers and peasants, not only labour intelligentsia, but also various categories of the petty and middle bourgeoisie. Already there have been drawn into the movement universities, Chambers of Commerce, and Chinese banks. During the great French Revolution, Abbot Siess solemnly declared: "The Third Estate is the whole nation." It may be said that the national liberation movement in China now practically embraces the whole nation, with the exception of a clique of militarists, compradores, and rich merchants closely bound by economic ties with foreign capital. Even the Peking Government of Tuan Chi Jui, which is under the direct influence of the imperialist diplomats, is demanding the annulment of the unequal treaties. The unequal treaties are the chains by means of which the foreign capitalists keep the toilers of China bound in slavery.

The sweep of the movement at the present time is so great that even the Chinese Government does not dare go against it. In order not to lose the last remnants of its prestige, it is compelled to swim with the tide. The government of Tuan Chi Jui is performing this anti-imperialistic gesture with the same inimitable grace with which the Provisional Duma Committee fulfilled its unaccustomed role in the beginning of the February revolution in Russia. At that time Rodzianko, the convinced monarchist, landlord, aristocrat to the marrow of his bones, chairman of the Fourth Duma, was compelled by the development of events, in spite of the fact that it went entirely against his grain, to greet the revolutionary troops which had overthrown Russian Tsarism. Another not less convinced monarchist, Schilgin, submitted to his "August Majesty," the declaration of abdication for signature. The Chinese Government is acting in the same role at the present time and the more powerfully the movement in China will develop the less significant will be the role which the government of Tuan Chi Jui will play in the political fate of the country.

What is taking place at the present time in China finds expression in the movement combining the forms of boycott and strike. By what methods is the boycott conducted? A complete reply is given to this question in a Manifesto issued



in Shanghai. This manifesto contains a list of eight measures to be adopted in the fight against British imperialism. These are :

1. Do not serve in English homes, shops and factories.
2. Do not employ the bank notes of British banks ; do not put your money into and do not transfer money through British banks.
3. Do not buy British goods. Do not transport Chinese goods in British ships, do not insure in British companies.
4. Do not work on British steamers as engineers, seamen, etc.
5. Do not employ British steamers, automobiles, tramways.
6. Do not attend schools founded by Englishmen.
7. Do not employ British lawyers, doctors, engineers, cashiers, etc.
8. Do not sell Chinese goods to Englishmen.

*Note.*—Behave very carefully in the English settlement. Do not assault or abuse Englishmen in the Settlement at the present time.

The boycott expresses the indignation of the Chinese people against the foreign oppressors, at the same time it palpably hits the pockets of the foreign capitalists. The imperialists suffer greatest damage from the goods and financial boycott. Chinese depositors who have their money on current account in foreign banks are now demanding their money. History is repeating itself. In China at the present time the same scenes are being witnessed as were witnessed in Russia in 1905, when the Council of Workers' Deputies, in order to strike at the Tsarist autocracy through its treasury, called upon depositors to demand the return of their money deposited in banks and savings banks. In the same way as the Russian depositors in 1905 demanded payment in coin, so to-day, the Chinese depositors express their boycotting mood by refusing to accept paper dollars, pounds and yen, and are demanding coin and full weight silver. But there is extremely little silver in the banks and already there is not enough to meet the demands. Judging from reports in the British newspapers, certain foreign banks in China have al-

ready expended all their silver. This means that these banks are on the brink of ruin.

The material damage suffered by imperialists as a consequence of the strike movement is incalculable. The whole of the port and commercial and industrial life of Shanghai has come to a standstill. During the month of June the number of enterprises affected by the strike in this important port was 115, of which 89 were Japanese (63,000 workers), 26 British (36,000 workers), 35 belonging to other nations (27,000 workers), 8 municipal (4,000 workers), and 11 Chinese (26,000 workers). Furthermore 42 steamers were lying idle in the port. In addition to the factory workers there were also on strike numerous artisans, masons, painters, municipal workers, book-binders, etc., employed in foreign enterprises. Even the unorganised and despised coolies and rickshaw boys were drawn into this gigantic fight. In Shanghai alone 250,000 workers are affected.

In Hong Kong, this British fortified citadel in the Pacific Ocean, all commercial life, practically, has come to a standstill. The seamen's strike has paralysed the maritime trade of the Pacific Ocean. The strike has affected tramway workers and hotel employees. British officers and high officials are acting as strike breakers and are fulfilling the duties of butchers and bakers. Refined aristocratic ladies, who all their lives have never been compelled to do a stroke of physical work, are acting as cooks and scullery maids. Two hundred and thirty four Russian White Guards were called from Shanghai to make up crews for the British and American ships standing idly in Hong Kong. Even boy scouts of bourgeois families were recruited to act as telegram and messenger boys. In the same way as the Russian aristocracy, during the strikes in Russia in 1905, went to the Post Office to take the place of the striking post and telegraph workers, so the British aristocrats, by their blacklegging, are vainly striving to break the Chinese strike. In Hong Kong the British feel as if they are in a besieged fortress, for the slaves, upon the labour of whom all their wealth and their material prosperity depends, have revolted.

The strike movement is developing without restraint. At first the strike affected only Tsingtao and Shanghai, but now it has spread to other industrial centres. There is hardly an industrial city in China in which a strike is not proceeding in one form or another. In this national strike, in addition to the proletariat, students, merchants, and office

employees in various enterprises, are taking part, and the petty and middle bourgeois elements recognise the leadership of the working class. This fact is sufficiently proved by the following :

After a series of discussions, the Shanghai revolutionary organisations, on 26th of June, gave permission to the Chinese merchants to open their stores and banks if they held to the following conditions :

1. The cessation of the strike of the merchants in no way affects the strike of the workers. The Chamber of Commerce undertakes to render material aid to the workers on strike.
2. The merchants must hang up outside their shops white flags of mourning bearing anti-imperialist inscriptions.
3. They must give a pledge to boycott British and Japanese warehouses.

The leadership of the strike movement is in the reliable hands of the proletarian organisations, and although the merchants have dropped out of the strike since the 26th of June, their release from the fulfilment of their civic duty was arranged in an organised manner with the knowledge and consent of the workers, on strictly definite terms. The Shanghai Chamber of Commerce has already guaranteed aid to the strikers to the amount of 800,000 dollars per month. Thus, the petty and middle bourgeoisie, marching side by side with the proletariat, submits to the orders of the latter, and recognises its hegemony in the great struggle of liberation.

In the process of the growth of the strike movement arose the Trade Union Council in Shanghai. This Council practically has undertaken the duty of a strike committee, but in addition it has assumed functions, which in Russian conditions, were performed by the Council of Workers' Deputies. At one of the delegate meetings of the Shanghai Trade Union Council the following decisions were made :

1. To appoint representatives of the labour unions **to control the activities of the Chinese textile mills**, which will be reopened as a result of the agreement arrived at.
2. To prohibit Chinese mills, which will resume work from fulfilling orders for foreigners.

3. To call upon the workers employed in Chinese enterprises in which work will be resumed, to make a monthly contribution from their wages towards the strike fund.

The first point in this resolution practically means that the Chinese Trade Union Council in Shanghai is taking upon itself the responsibility for **the Workers' Control of Industry**, *i.e.*, is carrying out a slogan which our Party put forward in 1917. The establishment of control of industry is nothing more nor less than an attempt to regulate economic life, the manifestation of power in a sphere of economics, the introduction of conscious, planned guidance in the anarchy of capitalist production. This circumstance clearly shows that the Shanghai Trade Union Council reveals a tendency towards becoming a Council of Workers' Deputies to lead the economic and political struggle. True, it has not yet revealed a striving towards the seizure of political power, it is not yet conducting a struggle for power, but it has already ceased to be a purely trade union organisation, and has even emerged from the character of a strike committee and is gradually becoming an organ actually fulfilling the functions of a government. The Shanghai Trade Union Council is on the way to becoming the Council of Workers' Deputies, and for this, of course, it has every foundation.

In China, as in all predominantly agrarian countries, an enormous role will be played by the peasantry. The peasantry in China is now beginning to be drawn into the struggle for national liberation. The late Sun-Yat-Sen succeeded in the South of China, in uniting nearly 200,000 peasants under the banner of the Kuomintang. This army of 200,000 peasants recently affiliated en masse to the Peasant International.

The Canton correspondent of the *Ming-Ho-Ji-Bao*, of Shanghai, reported that the following extremely important resolution was passed by the Congress of Peasant Unions of Kwantung Province, held at the beginning of May. On the report on the political situation in China, the peasant congress resolved :

1. To issue the slogan of : Fight against international imperialism and Chinese militarism and also against the usurers and bureaucrats in the rural districts as enemies of the people.

2. To issue a manifesto to all the peasants of China, calling upon them to organise in unions and to support the national revolution.

3. To call upon the peasantry to establish unity with the workers and revolutionary soldiers and to remind them that the emancipation of the peasantry depends upon the success of the revolutionary struggle of the working class against the enemies of the people.

4. Recognising that the peasant movement in China represents part of the international peasant movement, to affiliate to the Peasant International.

5. The Peasant Congress accepts the revolutionary platform of the Kuomintang, but bearing in mind that the Kuomintang has in its membership comprador\* counter-revolutionary elements, it calls upon the Central Committee of the Kuomintang to purge the Party of the undesirable elements hostile to revolution.

6. For the purpose of protecting the interests of the peasantry to strive to secure the participation of peasant unions in the work of State institutions and to demand that the unions have their representatives in all the provincial, country and rural representative organs, both legislative and administrative.

7. To organise a peasant army by establishing armed detachments of the unions.

At this Congress of Peasant Unions, there were present 150 delegates representing 22 unions.

The above quoted resolution marks an important change in the peasant movement of China. The peasantry is openly opposing imperialism, and is beginning to realise the enormous political importance of unity with the workers and revolutionary soldiers, and for the first time regards itself as part of the international peasantry fighting for their peasant interests. The peasantry openly expressed itself in favour of the Left Wing of the Kuomintang. Special importance must be attached to points 6 and 7 of the resolution. Point 6 says, practically, that the Chinese peasants are demanding something more than mere public activity, and that for the purpose of protecting their interests they are striving to secure a place in the organs of authority of the revolutionary government of Canton.

---

\* Comprador—a native agent employed by European residents in China.

Point 7 bluntly raises the question of the armed peasantry—of the formation of a peasant army for the protection of their gains from attack by the militarists. All these facts reveal the enormous growth of the political consciousness of the Chinese peasantry. True, this resolution was passed at a congress of peasants of the most progressive and revolutionary province of China, which is the base of Kuomintang influence. Nevertheless, it is extremely symptomatic. Furthermore, in other parts of China the mass peasant movement is markedly developing.

Like France on the eve of the great revolution, present day China is cut up by provincial customs barriers. The peasant who desires to transfer his surplus crops for exchange to some other province must pay customs duties. The salt monopoly, which exists in China, imposes a heavy burden upon the Chinese peasants. The insufficiency of land, high rents, the concentration of the best irrigation canals, upon which the agriculture of China depends, in the hands of the large landowners, all this rouses great discontent among the Chinese peasants and stimulates the peasant movement.

A considerable burden is imposed upon the peasant economy of China by the interminable internecine wars of the Chinese militarists. The rival Chinese generals, by their repeated mobilisations, absorb the labour power of the peasantry into the ranks of their armies, impose heavy contributions upon the peasants and ruthlessly destroy their meagre resources.

The most dangerous enemy of the movement of the national liberation of China at the present time is the Manchurian war lord, Marshal Chang Tso Lin, because through him the imperialists will strive to crush the Chinese workers, peasants and students. For a long time Chang Tso Lin served as the mercenary of Japanese imperialism; now he is being supported not only by the Japanese but also by the British. In the face of the powerful tide of the national movement against the British and Japanese imperialists, in spite of the profound economic antagonisms which divide them, they are uniting against the working class of China. England and Japan are supporting Chang Tso Lin, who is preparing for a military dictatorship. Chang Tso Lin is definitely becoming a reactionary force. In Manchuria, where he has uncontrolled dictatorship, he has even prohibited the collection of money on behalf of the workers on

strike on the pretext that this will create a bad impression upon the British and Japanese Consuls. On the same grounds he has prohibited the Russian and Chinese workers from holding meetings in the special area of the Chinese Eastern Railway. He is clearly taking the path of counter-revolutionary struggle. Chang Tso Lin sent his son Chang Tso Ljang to Shanghai with 4,000 Mukden soldiers. A series of meetings had been arranged in Shanghai on the 25th of May, but all the places at which the meetings were to be held were occupied by troops. Chang Tso Ljang has closed all the workers' clubs in Shanghai and has prohibited the holding of meetings and demonstrations. Chang Tso Lin and his clique are becoming the suppressors of the movement.

In the quest of a firm government the Anglo-Japanese imperialists have turned their gaze towards Chang Tso Lin. They are merely waiting for a convenient moment to invite him to Peking. The policy of Tuan Chi Jui, who is swimming with the stream, certainly does not satisfy the imperialists. The notes he has sent demanding the annulment of the unequal treaties disturbs and irritates them. At the same time these notes are causing the relations between Chang Tso Lin and Tuan Chi Jui to become more acute. In all probability Chang Tso Lin will make preparations to overthrow the present government.

The arrival of Chang Tso Lin in the capital of China would mean the beginning of a bloody reaction and the establishment of the reign of white terror. At the same time Chang Tso Lin's arrival in Peking would bring him face to face with his principal antagonist, General Feng-Yu-Hsiang, whose headquarters are at Kelgan, a few hours journey from Peking. This will inevitably be the signal for a conflict between the armies of the rival generals.

In opposition to the counter-revolutionary position taken up by Chang, Feng-Yu-Hsiang, in the article he wrote for the *Workers' Weekly*, openly attacks the imperialists. Feng-Yu-Hsiang is as popular with the masses as Chang Tso Lin is hated by them. In the forthcoming armed conflict between these two generals, ultimate success will be determined not so much by the arithmetical relations of military forces as by another fundamental factor, viz., the support of the masses. Hence, in spite of the relatively superior forces of Chang Tso Lin, Feng-Yu-Hsiang has very good chances of emerging victorious from the struggle.

Moreover, Feng-Yu-Hsiang does not stand alone. He will be supported by the Kuomintang armies of Sun-Yo and Yu-Wey-Hsun.

While Chang Tso Lin is carrying on his infamous work in Mukden and Shanghai in preparation for his assumption of the dictatorship of Peking, the commander of the Huley province, General Sayo-Yao-Nan, a warm adherent of the overthrown general, Wu-Pei-Fu, is also beginning to reveal his counter-revolutionary character. On the insistence of the British, he executed eight leaders of the anti-imperialist movement and arrested the Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Man, and shot its leader, Sayo-In. At the same time he issued an order for the arrest of the leaders of the railway strike of 1923. No doubt by this means Sayo-Yao-Nan hopes to rehabilitate the credit of the Chihli clique in the eyes of the British.

The international imperialists, for reasons that may be understood, in their press, strive to make it appear that the events in China are a movement directed against foreigners as such and to compare it with the Boxer Rising of 1900. In this manner they hope to discredit the peasant movement. They tried to prove this charge by quoting the fact that in certain public places in China where formerly notices were exhibited stating that "Dogs and Chinese prohibited" notices are now exhibited bearing the inscription "Dogs and Englishmen prohibited." However, everybody understands that when a Chinese worker speaks of Englishmen in this connection he means British imperialists and only such. A clear refutation of the legend concerning the alleged anti-alien sentiments of the Chinese is the fraternal invitation sent by the Chinese Railwaymen to the General Council of the British Trades Union Congress to send a delegation to China in order that they may see for themselves the outrages committed by the British imperialists in China.

The proclamation of the boycott quoted above, as the reader observed, contained a note calling for careful behaviour in the foreign settlement, and a caution against assaulting and abusing Englishmen. This clearly shows the serious attitude towards affairs adopted by the Chinese workers. Indeed, any act of violence directed against foreigners at the present moment would merely play into the hands of the imperialists. It would provide them with a very convenient excuse to land troops for fresh shootings and for intervention. For that reason the Chinese workers are a thousand



times right when they call upon their fellow citizens to exhibit extreme caution in their attitude towards foreigners.

One must not think that the dimensions assumed by the movement is entirely spontaneous. The struggle of the Chinese workers bears an astonishingly stubborn character to a considerable degree owing to the organised leadership exercised over the masses which have been drawn into the movement.

We have already referred to the Shanghai Trade Union Council, which is excellently managing its duties as a strike committee and even partly that of a Council of Workers' Deputies. But the principal role in the leadership of the movement is played by the political parties : the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China.

The Kuomintang is a national-revolutionary party founded by the late Sun-Yat-Sen as far back as 1911. Only in January, 1924, however, did it take up a definitely militant anti-imperialist position.

The principal base of Kuomintang influence is the South of China : the province of Kwantung, with its capital Canton. During the last few months, however, the Party has managed to extend its influence to Central and Northern China. Chinese Communists belong to the Kuomintang and work in its ranks. Consequently the Kuomintang is not a Party in our understanding of the term, but is a national-revolutionary bloc. The Communists, however, do not lose their identity in the Kuomintang, but act as a compact group with definitely Communistic views, which they do not conceal. As a matter of fact the Communist group has predominant influence in the Party.

Sometimes it is endeavoured to present the Communists as the Left Wing of the Kuomintang. This, of course, does not stand criticism. Communists can no more be a fraction even the most revolutionary, of a petty bourgeois Party, than the working class can be a Left Wing of the bourgeoisie.

The Chinese Communists are the vanguard of the working class, which for tactical considerations, enters into a bloc with the radical, anti-imperialist, petty-bourgeoisie. But this does not make it a "left wing" of a petty-bourgeois Party.

The Kuomintang, however, has its left and right wings. The left wing represents the orthodox adherents of the policy of the late Sun-Yat-Sen. They fully realise the necessity of fighting against the imperialists and the expediency of allying themselves with the Communists, and also the enormous political significance of the alliance of the masses of the toilers of China with the world proletariat. On the other hand, the right wing of the Kuomintang advocates "compromise" with the imperialists and stands for a break with the Communists—for the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang.

The left wing of the Kuomintang call for the convening of the next Party Congress in Canton—the old fundamental base from which the revolutionary movement originated, while the right wing proposes that the Congress be held in Peking, where the influence of the imperialists is strongly felt.

Be it as it may, a split in the Kuomintang, or speaking more correctly, the break off of the right wing, is absolutely inevitable. The possibility is not excluded of two congresses being held simultaneously—that of the left wing in Canton and that of the right wing in Peking.

The task of the young Communist Party of China is not to force the split, but to endeavour to hold it off for as long as possible and to retain its influence over the majority of the Kuomintang.

The Communist Party of China is still numerically weak and is not yet sufficiently hardened in the struggle. Yet a difficult and responsible duty has fallen to it, namely, to lead the enormous mass movement. But this is the best method of Bolshevising a Party, and indeed, our Chinese Party is fulfilling its duty most excellently. It is closely linked up with the masses. It leads them in fact, both directly and through the Kuomintang. All the manifestoes and appeals issued by the Communist Party and the Kuomintang are impregnated with the consciousness of the seriousness of the present situation and wholly meet with the requirements of the movement. One cannot but express astonishment at the fact that this young party, with its little experience, puts forward absolutely correct slogans, really capable of rousing the masses and raising the movement to a high level.


The Communist Party is fully aware that the base of its influence and its reserve must be the trade unions. In the

beginning of May, in Canton, was held the Second Trade Union Congress of China, at which, among other politically important resolutions, a resolution was passed in favour of affiliation to the R.I.L.U.

At all events the present movement facilitates the organisational growth and consolidation of the trade unions and the Party to the fullest degree.

Whichever way the present movement may end, the Party and the trade unions will emerge from it stronger, more organised and more compact. Amidst the progress of events, the working class of China is beginning to understand the importance of the Party and the trade unions. It is self-understood that it can exercise its hegemony only through the Party of its class—the Communist Party.

F.R.



# The Provocation of Karl Kautsky

## 1. Karl Kautsky and Fyedor Dan.

**A**T the beginning of this year Kautsky submitted a report to the Bureau of the Second International on "The International and Soviet Russia." This report was of such an outrageous and provocative nature, that even the Russian Mensheviks were compelled to take objection to it on all points through their leader Dan, and balked Kautsky's projected resolution at the Bureau meeting. Kautsky, however, did not demur, and had this report published by Ditz under his own name, while Fyedor Dan replied to him in No. 11-12 of the *Sozialisticheski Vestnik* of June 20th, in an article entitled "Kautsky on Russian Menshevism." We will deal here with the main conceptions of Kautsky's Herostrasian report, and the objection put forward by Fyedor Dan, leader of the Russian Mensheviks.

Karl Kautsky writes: "On the very day of the foundation of the First International, September 28th, 1864, Marx, in the inaugural address to the International, proclaimed it the duty of the working classes to struggle against Russian absolutism with all the means at their disposal 'against the monstrous onslaughts of this barbaric power, tolerated without protest, whose head is in St. Petersburg, but whose hands are to be found in every Ministerial Cabinet in Europe.'" "Since then," said Kautsky, "two generations have come and gone, but once more a barbaric government is in power in Russia, making a mockery of the 'elementary laws of morality and justice' ". . . "The only thing that has changed is that the seat of this barbaric regime is no longer in St. Petersburg but has moved to Moscow, further away from Europe and nearer to the Tartars, and that the hands of this regime no longer desire to play a role in 'every Ministerial Cabinet' but in every proletarian movement—not only in Europe but throughout the whole world. This distinction is explained by the different nature of the origin of Tsarist and Bolshevik absolutism. . . . But we must not construct our policy in accordance with what *was*, but in accordance with what *is*, and in Russia there exists this very same

'barbaric regime' against which Marx once upon a time summoned the workers of the whole world to struggle."

After this conscientious introduction by the "Commentator" of Marx, we read in this report just as many conscientious appreciations of the present-day economic policy of the Soviet regime. Listen, workers, to what Kautsky imagines the economic situation in Russia to be: "When the capitalists and big landowners were exterminated, it became clear that ordinary robbery of proprietors of which any robber or thief is capable, is not socialism, and that there are no premises whatsoever for socialist construction in Bolshevik Russia" . . . "The Bolshevik manner of thinking, which considers the abstractions of theory not as something simplified, but as an exact reflection of actuality is absolutely blind for all transition stages. It only sees the dictatorship of capital or the dictatorship of the proletariat, fully fledged capitalism or fully fledged socialism [N.E.P., for instance!—A.M.] and no intermediary." The results of this are evident: "The stoppage in the process of production has become more and more manifest, and the more firmly established the State power of the Bolsheviks has become, the more the poverty of the masses has increased. . . It is an indisputable fact that the Bolshevik terror has not led to general well-being, but to increasing impoverishment. In this manner the Bolshevik regime is growing more and more in opposition to the interests of the masses of the people. It has to rely more and more on bayonets and hangmen. A small minority that plunges the whole State into misery, cannot rule in any other manner." It is true that various proletarians have raised themselves up to power in Russia, but "in America also there are many millionaires who were the poorest proletarians in their youth. . . The fact that they rose to unlimited power from proletarian conditions by no means implies that they think in a proletarian manner. . . They are distinguished from other ruling classes only by their exceptional coarseness and shamelessness, for especially the dishonest and brutal elements from the property-less classes are able to rise to fantastic wealth [!!] or to unrestricted power over the corpses of their own comrades."

"Thanks to this kind of management of affairs [the "millionaire" Bolsheviks who have lorded it at the expense of the people ? !] there began on the part of the toiling masses, especially among the workers in industry and transport, an increasing opposition to the ruling policy. The more savage are the dealings of the Bolshevik usurpers against the proletariat [hark, ye Russian workers!—A.M.], which is con-

tinually becoming more inconvenient. . . ." As a result "the Soviet Government at the present moment is the strongest obstacle to the advance of the proletariat throughout the whole world, worse even than the infamous regime of Horthy in Hungary, or Mussolini in Italy." It is evident that the bourgeoisie of the whole world had good reasons to love the Bolsheviks so much! The conclusion to be made from this conscientious appreciation is self-apparent: "The despotism of the Soviet regime can only be overthrown by force, just as any other military despotism such as the military monarchies of the Romanoffs, Hapsburgs, and Hohenzollerns."

But where are you going to find the forces to overthrow it? "If the decline in trade and industry, thanks to Bolshevik management, is to continue its course, the moment will still come when no democratic movement will have a chance of success in Russia. But happily there are opposing tendencies. Simultaneously with the increasing decline of society, an opposition must spring up within the ranks of the ruling elements and among the ranks of their mainstay—the Communist Party and the Red Army—an opposition which might become dangerous."

At the same time economic contacts between Russia and abroad become more firmly established, which in turn harbours danger for the Bolsheviks. "The Soviet Government has extreme need of money. In order to get this money it offers the capitalists abroad the most favourable conditions for exploiting Russia." On the other hand, the spectre of a world revolution no longer frightens the governments outside of Russia. "Under such conditions the possibility of the Soviet Government receiving loans abroad is not to be excluded." What standpoint are we to adopt with regard to these loans, asks Kautsky? "If Russia will be unconditionally granted adequate loans, the Soviet regime might be maintained yet for a long time to come." Loans should not be refused, but granted only on condition that the Bolshevik regime renounces its dictatorship, and we may be able to ensure that, since in the majority of capitalist countries in which it is possible to conclude a loan, the workers themselves have either State power in their hands—as was the case recently in Great Britain—or else they are able to bring pressure to bear.

While proposing to use negotiations for a loan for compelling political concessions on the part of the Bolsheviks, Kautsky, however, confesses that he by no means considers that the Bolsheviks will agree to such concessions. But the

sly old fellow had quite another thing in mind: "The greater its apparent stability, the less possibility there is of compelling this regime to make democratic concessions, the more probable it is that it will not maintain power, but end with a catastrophe." And it is just towards this catastrophe that Kautsky is inviting the Russian Mensheviks and S.R.'s to steer their course. "I by no means want to imply by this that I propose **preparing an armed rising.**" Oh, no! says the Judas Kautsky; we, Social-Democrats do not engage on such work; moreover, "the Bolsheviks now control the most disciplined army in the world." We only say that a nation-wide **spontaneous** rising is unavoidable in Russia and the Mensheviks and S.R.'s should prepare for this moment in order to take over the leadership of this armed rising. Let them have no fear, he goes on to say that this rising against the Bolsheviks will lead to the triumph of reaction. It is true, there will be Jewish pogroms. This, unfortunately, is unavoidable, but there is no need to fear the triumph of reaction on these grounds, especially as everything in the way of reaction has already been done by the Bolsheviks themselves to such a degree that it will be impossible to excel. "Neither have the peasants anything to fear from such a rising since whatever reactionary government might replace the Bolsheviks, the land would not be taken away from them." "Why, even the Bourbons when they returned to power in France after the overthrow of Napoleon were not able to return to the nobility and the churches, the lands that had been confiscated from them."

Under what conditions can one expect with the greatest degree of probability a nation-wide rising in Russia? "In the event of a war with Russia," answers Kautsky.

Here again, the Judas Kautsky, raising woeful eyes, says: do not understand by that that I propose or advise armed intervention in Russia. God preserve us! We Social-Democrats never suggested that, for we know that intervention might call for a patriotic awakening in the country and rally the people around the government; "but" he continues, cunningly winking at the imperialist governments, whom this mainly concerns, "throughout the Eastern States the Bolsheviks are endeavouring to prepare fires at present so that at the appropriate moment they can set alight and rob the whole of Europe. This incendiary policy is not without danger for those who pursue it. One fine day it might lead Russia into a war under very unfavourable conditions for her. And at the present time matters do not stand as they did in 1920, at the time of the war between Soviet Russia and Poland. At that time there were still large masses of workers

and peasants standing behind the Bolshevik regime, whereas now it encounters the desperate opposition of the masses at every point." After this tirade which might be copied word for word from the celebrated speeches of Curzon, when he sent the ultimatum to Russia, Kautsky added: "It is absolutely out of the question for the Social-Democrats to endeavour to save the Bolshevik system under such conditions." What is more "Neutrality in the event of a general rising of the masses of the people would be political suicide."

Thus let Russia be ignited from both ends.

We have quoted here in detail Kautsky's scurrilous report especially for the information of the Russian workers. We have refrained from our own commentaries, since the Russian workers have no need for commentaries on such documents. But in order that those foreign comrades who are quite unacquainted with what is really going on within the Soviet Republic, and who have not yet abandoned their faith in the old renegade—in order that these comrades may appreciate the full measure of the vileness of this document, we reproduce here the objections to it on the part of Fyedor Dan, leader of the Russian Mensheviks, also bubbling over with venom against the Soviet regime, and conducting a bitter irreconcilable struggle against it. We hope no one will suspect Fyedor Dan of the desire to embellish the state of affairs in the Soviet Republic. We note by the way, that Miliukoff, the leader of the Cadets, who is now acting as mediator between Kautsky and Fyedor Dan (what has Kautsky lived to see!) remarks in the "Poslednye Novosti" (The Latest News) in connection with their discussion: "One cannot deny that Dan's objections are based on a greater knowledge of Russian actualities than it is possible to expect from Kautsky."

As might be expected, Dan commences his critical remarks with regard to Kautsky's report with a low obeisance before "this old friend and teacher of Russian Social-Democracy," whose latest sally against the Russian Bolsheviks will be met "with the emotion and thanks of the workers." Why is it, however, that Dan himself does not express this gratitude, but rather objects to Kautsky? After all, he does not love the Bolsheviks any more than Kautsky does! This he makes clear at the end of his article: "Even before the pamphlet (Kautsky's) fulfilled its immediate destination, and even before it appeared in print, when it was still a manuscript memorandum destined only for a few, all the enemies of Russia Social-Democracy utilised it for a heated literary-



political attack against our Party. The S.R. blunderers, vulgarising all the ideas expressed by Kautsky, squaring and cubing every one of his erroneous deductions, keeping silent about those provisos which at the actual moment rendered his deductions of an entirely conditional nature, made haste to abuse Kautsky's authority so as to place him very nearly in the role of an apologist of that policy which in the past so often compromised the idea of Democratic Socialism in the eyes of the Russian workers, and Russian Socialism as a whole in the eyes of the international proletariat." That is the whole story in a nutshell! Dan understands that one dare not show such a document as Kautsky's memorandum even to the small circles of Russian workers who have not yet broken with Menshevism, and that it is the best means of compromising in their eyes the Menshevik idea of "Democratic Socialism," that it is the best method for pushing them into the arms of the Communist Party. Therefore, he endeavours to correct in a friendly manner, the "erroneous deductions" of the "teacher," and good-naturedly interpret those of his "provisos which **at the actual moment** (alas, not always!) rendered his deductions of an entirely conditional nature."

But no matter how much he may try to save the prestige of Kautsky, he will only unintentionally drown him, since no water exists which could now wash away the filth from Kautsky's face. So let us listen to Dan.

With regard to identifying the Bolshevik regime with the Tsarist regime, Dan writes: "Can one, instead of making a concrete social-economic analysis of such a historical phenomenon as Russian Bolshevism, restrict oneself to formal logical classifications according to which these 'children of the revolution' fall under the same heading of absolutism as the Romanoff monarchy? Such methods lead to the most unexpected conclusions, the peculiarity of which has been alluded to by even P. N. Miliukoff . . . And as Miliukoff points out, the conclusions follow from all Kautsky's deductions, that the restoration of the Romanoff monarchy would also not be such a bad thing after all if it were to replace the Bolshevik despotism, and this conclusion is justified yet more in so far as Kautsky in this connection refers to the restoration of the Bourbons, who, on returning to France, were unable to restore to the nobility and the church the property that had been confiscated from them." Trying to convince the reader that Kautsky does not seriously believe in what he has said, Dan continues: "Kautsky himself, however, certainly does not doubt that even from the point of view of the bourgeoisie, the Bourbon was a reaction, just as he does not doubt that from the point of view of the proletariat the Thermidor was

and remains a counter-revolution, although it did liberate France from the despotism of Robespierre." Having so bravely expounded such a revolutionary thought, Fyedor Dan becomes frightened at his own courageousness, and takes a step backward to meet Kautsky: "Certainly," he says, after profound thought, "from the historical point of view any counter-revolution . . . may be 'justified' by past events as an inevitable form of 'progress' [!] as the only possible way out of the impasse in view of the given correlation of forces. . . Maybe for the solution of the contradictions of the 1848 revolution, history also did not present any other actual possibility than the blood-bath carried out by Cavagnac, or any other solution for the contradictions of the Commune than the victory of Thiers.

"But these ante-dated historical conclusions by no means may serve as a guidance for political parties, fighting in the interests of their class for another way out of the impasse that is less costly [what shopkeepers' language!—A.M.] for this class." Fyedor Dan turns and twists, but no matter how much he twists, the conclusions we get from him are clear. His "friend and teacher" Kautsky is now paving the way for the Thiers, the Cavagnacs and the Romanoffs!

Furthermore, Dan subjects to criticism Kautsky's analysis of the present day economic situation of the Soviet Republic. "This pessimistic analysis," says Dan, "and these perspectives were to a certain degree correct until 1921, until the transition to the 'New Economic Policy.' They might again become true if the Bolsheviki—and, of course, nobody expects this—suddenly returned (and could return) to so-called 'military Communism,' but they by no means correspond to the process of development of present-day Russia. The daily experience of every Russian worker and peasant who lived through the famine of 1918 to 1920 bears witness against this peculiar kind of 'theory of improvement.' All figures of economic statistics also bear witness against it. . . Instead of an ever increasing disintegration of Russian economy, its restoration is now commencing: 50, 60, 70 per cent. of the paltry pre-war figure is not much, but in comparison with the zero to which Russian economy was reduced by the system of 'War Communism' this indicates great progress." Dan, of course, does not draw the conclusions from these deductions that the Soviet system is becoming stronger, but in contradistinction to Kautsky he affirms "It is not the **dying out** of productive forces, but their **growth** which will deal a knockout blow to the Bolsheviki dictatorship." We will not dispute here as to Dan's conclusions concerning

"blows to the dictatorship," for we are not dealing here with the well-meaning foolishness of Dan, but with the vileness of his "friend and teacher" Kautsky. But one fact remains indisputable. Fyedor Dan confirms that Kautsky is deceiving the western European proletariat with regard to the economic position of the Soviet Republic. Dan confirms that at the present time it is not economically dying out, but is experiencing an economic renaissance.

Further, Dan objects to the actual provocational propositions of Kautsky. He points out that the distinction made by Kautsky between the **preparation** for an "armed uprising" and the **leadership** "of a nation-wide revolt" is pure sophistry "To take up practical positions for a nation-wide revolt in reality means taking up positions for an armed rising and civil war." But, says Dan, there are absolutely no chances whatever for a democratic rising in Russia at the present moment. Where are all these conditions for a transition of power into the hands of democracy at the present moment, when not only is democratic organisation ruined through and through, but also democratic ideas have **been uprooted from the spirit of the masses; Socialist parties are reduced to the dimensions of small circles, extending their influence at best over the scant upper strata of the proletariat**, [a valuable acknowledgment—A.M.]; when the proletariat itself does not only not enjoy the former popularity among the town and peasant masses, but has become abhorrent for a considerable section of them, as a class in whose name Bolshevik violence has held sway over them? . . . For the time being the moods of both the new Russian bourgeoisie, and the peasantry, and even of the wide proletarian masses, are being nourished by a peculiar form of practicality, and concentrated on the immediate 'economic' aims. The Russian peasant will, of course, hang on tooth and nail to the land, seized during the revolution. But he is, alas, indifferent as to the **political** colour of the regime which makes this land secure for him. He longs for 'the right order' but does not yet appreciate political freedom. . . Is it not evident that under such conditions a spontaneous national revolt might serve as a basis not for a great democratic revolution, but only for a small coup d'etat. . . And that as a result of such a coup d'etat there might once more be only the triumph of one form or another of Bonapartism?" "The elements for organising such a rising," says Dan, "could only come from the ranks of the white officers whose formations are being maintained in an organised manner abroad as the trustees of the foreign imperialists, or from within the Bolshevik apparatus itself, reinforced, according to the evidence of Kautsky, by counter-

revolutionary white guard elements—in other words in both cases from a source from which one might least of all expect the triumph of democracy.”

Dan, as one might have expected from him, pictures modern Russia as a political cemetery. He cannot see, and does not wish to see the tremendous cultural movement among the proletariat, and the intermediary strata of the peasantry; he does not perceive the tremendous growth of social self-activity among the strata; he does not see the unaccountable threads which reinforce more and more the connection between the proletariat on the one hand and the middle and poor peasantry on the other. He does not see the change in ideas on the part of the democratic intellectuals with regard to the Soviet regime, in speaking of the “abhorrence of a considerable section of the town and peasant masses towards the proletariat.” He remains silent as to the fact that this hatred for the proletariat is only nourished by the kulak elements among the peasantry and by the expropriated town bourgeoisie, and the cadet intellectuals so closely akin to the latter in spirit. But, however much this may be so, Dan ultimately arrives at the indisputable conclusion: “Kautsky’s orientation with regard to a nation-wide revolt, and also with regard to unavoidable and probable perspectives, is erroneous. On the contrary, the historical probability of such a revolt recedes more and more each day.” According to Dan’s words the tactics recommended by Kautsky even in the event of success, would not lead to a nation-wide rising, but would lead to a small counter-revolutionary Bonapartist coup d’etat. But that is just the point. Kautsky in no way confuses these perspectives. As we have seen, he considers this also as being favourable for Russia.

In conclusion, Dan discloses delicately and carefully what is hidden under Kautsky’s suggestion to give the Soviet authorities a loan “only under conditions conducive to the moderation of the terrible oppression weighing down the Russian people”: “In so far as the modern State,” says Dan, “even in the event of the government being in the hands of the Socialists, is not a Socialist, but a bourgeois State, in which the capitalists are the decisive factor in the field of credits, loans, etc.—would not Kautsky’s slogan in reality be control by the Finance Committee of the League of Nations whose anxiety for the ‘moderation of the oppression weighing over the people’ the Austrian workers have been so well able to appreciate?” Here again, we see that the divergence of views between Dan and Kautsky is by no means great, for Dan also is against **State guarantees** of Russian

loans; nevertheless his opinion of the tactics recommended by Kautsky remains the correct one; Kautsky proposes that the foreign powers shower benefits on Russia in just the same way as Great Britain and Japan are showering benefits on China at the present moment.

We will not speak here about those measures with which Dan himself and Russian Mensheviks intend "saving" Russia, for this is not within the scope of this article. However, we deem it necessary to sum up and emphasise the criticism to which Dan has subjected Kautsky's report. Remember, workers: the Menshevik Dan has been compelled to admit, though this may be in a diplomatic form, that:

**(1) Kautsky is now actually paving the way for a Tsarist restoration in Russia;**

**(2) Kautsky is deceiving the international proletariat in asserting that a decline in the economic condition and a progressive impoverishment of the people is now taking place in Russia;**

**(3) Kautsky is deceiving the international proletariat in asserting that a kind of democratic revolution is now possible in Russia;**

**(4) Under the pretext of saving Russia by the foreign powers, Kautsky wants to turn Russia into a colony.**

## II.

### **Kautsky Then and Now.**

With that we might have concluded. But Kautsky is not just an ordinary White Guard. He is the theoretical leader of the Second International. In his time he has been the recognised theoretical leader of the orthodox Marxist from whom both the future Mensheviks and the future Bolsheviks learnt. Therefore, while recording Kautsky's present provocative conduct, we must explain to the younger comrades how and why it is that Kautsky became a renegade, and what are the true motives of his present shameful conduct.

When Lenin first called Kautsky a renegade, this qualification at first disconcerted even many Bolsheviks who thought that comrade Lenin in the dust of battle had gone

to extremes. It is now obvious to everyone that Lenin was absolutely right. Kautsky became a renegade a long time ago. His whole conduct after the imperialist war had broken out goes to prove this. We will give examples of a number of parallels in support of this showing what Kautsky said at the commencement of the present century, and what he has been saying during recent years.

**First parallel.** In 1902, when European capitalism was still an invincible fortress, especially in Germany, and when nobody had yet begun to think that the proletariat would be strong enough to smash the mighty German army in an open fight, Kautsky wrote in his book "On the Social Revolution": "Many politicians assert that only the despotic power of one class will make the necessary revolution, and that democracy renders it superfluous. . . . This idyll they paint us is very enticing . . . but this idyll comes from the increase of strength of only one sphere being recognised—the proletariat, while it is supposed that the other sphere, the bourgeoisie, remains in its former state. . . . They do not perceive that the present parliamentary combinations originate in the decline of parliamentarism; it is just these combinations which disclose its political and social impotence. The very nature of parliamentary combinations must be ignored in a strange way if one is to imagine that by participating in them one can help the proletariat and slowly and surely acquire political power. Parliamentarism does not only make a revolution impossible or superfluous, but it actually requires a revolution for its own regeneration. . . . The strength of the proletariat develops side by side with the strength of capital. This evolution can only end in a decisive fight between the two enemies, a fight that will not abate until the proletariat is victorious. . . . One can say that the future revolution, with the exception perhaps of the Russian, will be of the nature of a struggle of one section of the nation against the other, and only in that sense will it have more resemblance to the wars of the epoch of reformism than to the French revolution. . . . It is more likely to resemble a long **civil** war than anything else." Kautsky, by the way, in saying these words immediately makes the proviso that here the words "Civil war" must not be understood in the sense of a fight, and that now barricade fighting can no longer play a decisive role: "Militarism," he said, "will only be destroyed because they will be no longer able to count on the trustworthiness of their soldiers," and not because the insurrectionary people will vanquish the army. But an unreliable army will in turn be the result of mass action of the proletariat. Civil war will find expression in mass strikes, which, influencing the army,

will render it unreliable. In 1904, in his appendix to the book "On the Social Revolution," Kautsky, polemising with Liusnya goes yet further: "If he (Liusnya) supposes that the fate of the future revolution will be decided by force of arms, he implies by this not a struggle between the nation and the troops, but a struggle between two fractions of troops, one of whom goes over to the side of the people. This undoubtedly might occur, but after all, this would only be a particular form of the general premise 'that the army remained unreliable.'" "

That is how Kautsky pictured the Socialist revolution in 1902-4. Now see how he pictures it in 1922 in his book "The Proletarian Revolution and its Programme." "Instead of encounters between insurrectionaries and governmental troops, there will be encounters between parties for winning supporters by means of the press and meetings—there will be encounters of parties to gain the majority of votes at parliamentary elections and the struggles of parties during voting within the parliaments themselves. As a general rule, great surprises will be the exception since in this case it is only parties well-known to the population who are to be found on the field of encounter. Democracy enables the revolution to be accomplished in a peaceful manner." "Certainly," adds Kautsky, "an electoral list is a force only within democracy [i.e., within the democratic state—A.M.]. It would be absurd also to wage the struggle for democracy itself with democratic means."

Thus at a time when German militarism was vanquished and when the proletariat was able to defy it with its forces in open struggle, Kautsky renounces his old slogan of "civil war" and replaces it by a peaceful struggle of the parties without participation of the masses, armed with electoral lists and parliamentary ballots, and he goes on calling this "the proletarian revolution!"

**The second parallel.** In 1909, Kautsky sympathetically reminded us in his book "The Path to Power," how Engels not long before his death maintained that the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., as a power in itself, was the "only form whereby the proletariat might acquire political power." Kautsky wrote in this book that any bourgeois-proletarian government must meet with disaster and that a coalition of this sort "can only compromise the proletarian Party and confuse and split the proletarian Party." In 1922, in his book "The Proletarian Revolution and its Programme," he writes: "Marx said in his famous article 'Criticism of the

Social-Democratic Party Programme'—between capitalist and Communist society there lies a period of the revolutionary transformation of one into the other. The political transitional period in which the State cannot be ought else but a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat also corresponds with this"—and Kautsky continues—"we may now modify this conception on the basis of the experiences of recent years, in the following manner: Between the periods of a **purely** bourgeois and **purely** proletarian democratic State, there lies a period of the transformation of one into the other. The political transition period in which the government will as a general rule merge into the form of a coalition government also corresponds with this."

In this manner in the footprints of the "civil war" the parliamentary struggle of parties is also conveniently suppressed. For after all, what kind of parliamentary struggle of parties is it when a coalition has already been concluded?

**The third parallel.** In 1906, Kautsky in his articles "Perspectives and Motive Forces of the Russian Revolution," wrote with regard to this revolution which both the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks considered a bourgeois democratic one: "Without the confiscation of all official properties and the monasteries, without State bankruptcy, without confiscation of the big monopolies inasmuch as they are still in the hands of private persons—the railways, the petroleum wells, the mines, the iron works, etc., there will be nowhere from which to take those huge sums necessary for Russian agriculture in order to rescue it from its terrible condition."

During 1919-20 in the epoch of the German revolution, which according to the opinion of Kautsky himself, should have been transformed into a Socialist revolution under conditions of complete financial bankruptcy of Germany at a time when there was less money in Germany than in Russia in 1905—Kautsky writes in his pamphlet "What is Socialisation?": "Confiscation might appear the most simple and the most radical solution of the problem of nationalisation. . . . From the legal point of view, one might say that all capital is an accumulation of surplus value and unpaid labour. . . . But for Marxists it is economic considerations which have a decisive significance, and they speak against confiscation. . . what we require is a tranquil uninterrupted process of production without which the workers can no longer exist. Since we could only nationalise production very gradually and with great prudence in the process of confiscation of one branch of industry the terrified capitalists would begin by sabotaging



production in other branches of industry not yet socialised . . . It would perhaps be only advantageous for ourselves were we to adopt the civilised [!] method of expropriation by means of buying them out and tax assignment, and if we let the capitalist class have the unpleasant privilege that they only, the capitalist class, resorted to violent and shameful means during the period of primary capitalist accumulation."

When it was a question of Russia in 1905, he told us: You do not seem to be prepared to confiscate very much, you must not only confiscate the land—while in 1919 it was a question of his fatherland, so he told us: we must renounce all confiscation, let us realise Socialism so that the bourgeoisie will not be frightened by it!

**The fourth parallel.** In 1902, Kautsky in his book on the "Social Revolution," confronted the Russian Revolutionary proletariat with the British labour aristocracy, as a model. He wrote in his book: "The British workers give us an example which I will not exaggerate. Nowhere else is the proletariat so numerous, nowhere else does it enjoy such political freedom as in England. There is no country in which it could utilise so little political power. . . . As a political factor, the British workers lag far behind the Russian workers, who economically are the most backward and who enjoy less political freedom than in any country in Europe. The clear and sharply expressed revolutionary consciousness of the Russian workers is what gives them great force in practice. The denial of the revolution on the part of the British workers, the fact that they only recognised the interests of the moment, the so-called Realpolitik—that is what makes their actual political role equal to zero."

That is how Kautsky estimated the organised labour aristocracy of Great Britain on the one hand, and the more suppressed, and at the same time more revolutionary working masses of Russia on the other. Now see what he says about these two categories of the proletariat in 1922, in the book that I have frequently quoted, "The Proletarian Revolution and its Programme": "We have already seen that the proletariat falls into two strata. There is the one set of workers who, thanks to particular economic conditions and legislation are in such a favourable position that they are able to create strong organisations for themselves. . . . They form the rising section of the proletariat—its aristocracy. . . . But side by side with these well-disciplined, well-schooled and capable detachments we perceive a great army of those workers who live in such unfavourable conditions that they are unable to organise them-

selves. . . If such workers take power they at once want to put an end to all want and to all oppression [how awful!—A.M.]. These people, ignorant and without the slightest comprehension of the iron laws of economics think that they can get everything by force. Thanks to their ignorance and inexperience, they become, in their feverish desire to attain good conditions and freedom, an easy prey to the demagogues who either from stupidity or with calculated intent make them the rosiest promises, etc., etc. . . ”

Thus the liberation of the labour aristocracy becomes a superior benefactor, while the revolutionary spirit of the most suppressed working masses—is a product of ignorance!

**The fifth parallel.** In 1902, Kautsky foretold that world hegemony will be transferred to the Russian revolutionary proletariat. At the same time he spoke enthusiastically about the revolutionary awakening of the East. Now at the time when the proletariat in Russia has taken over power, and when the peoples of the East are carrying on a struggle for their liberation, Kautsky alludes to them contemptuously as “barbarians” “tartars,” “turkomans.” In 1905-06 when both Social-Democratic fractions in Russia looked upon the Russian Revolution as being bourgeois democratic, when Europe had not yet outlived the period of the decline of capitalism, when the chances of an approaching Socialist revolution in Europe was still very slight, Kautsky was the first—in reply to an enquiry of Plekhanov—“to bring forward the view that one must not regard the Russian revolution as bourgeois, but as a peculiar form of process on the border of a bourgeois and Socialist society which helps the disintegration of the former and prepares the latter.” At the same time, he said that the revolution in Russia will bring to power an alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry. At that time he presented a programme of economic measures for Russia which would raise her up “to the next step on the way to Socialism.” (See Kautsky: “The Agrarian Question in Russia,” *die Neue Zeit*, 1905-06). Now he rages against the crazy Bolsheviks who dared to lay the first steps to Socialism with their economic methods in such a backward country as Russia.

**The sixth parallel.** At the present time, Kautsky raves and inveighs against the Bolsheviks because while talking of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia they have actually established there the dictatorship of their Party. What did he write before about the relations between Party and class? He taught us the following in his book against Bernstein:

“In every class the masses follow the leaders, not displaying any initiative of their own, while a certain section stands quite aside from the struggle. Consequently, the political rule of the proletariat really amounts as near as possible to the rule of its elected section which might also be said with regard to the bourgeoisie and the Junkers, and about any ruling class.”

**The seventh parallel.** At the commencement of this century, though late in the day, he stood at the head of the theoretical attack against the reformists and the Bernsteinites. See what he now writes about this dispute in his book—“The Proletarian Revolution and its Programme”: “It would seem that the old dispute between the revolutionists and reformists is again rising to the surface, but in actuality after the revolution this opposition is only ‘a useless reminiscence’ and a ‘struggle for which no one has any need.’ ”

There is no dispute: memories of his old disputes with the reformists and opportunists cannot bring great pleasure to Kautsky now; just as Briand and Mussolini will not be very pleased when reminded that at one time they carried on a struggle against the bourgeoisie.

Let us sum up the position: (1) **Formerly for the “civil war,” now for the struggle by means of electoral lists instead of civil war.** (2) **Formerly for the dictatorship of the proletariat; now for coalition with the bourgeoisie.** (3) **Formerly for the confiscation of the means of production, now for gradually buying them out.** (4) **Formerly for the revolutionary working masses; now for the reformist labour aristocracy.** (5) **Formerly for the world hegemony of the Russian revolutionary proletariat, for the intensification of the Russian revolution and its transformation into a prologue to Socialism; now for the rescue of civilised Europe from these “tartars” for the rehabilitation of the bourgeois order in Russia, even under the Romanoffs.** (6) **Formerly the dictatorship of the proletariat meant the dictatorship of the proletarian party; now the dictatorship of the proletariat is a despotism worse than the despotism of Horthy, Mussolini or the Romanoffs.** (7) **Formerly—Down with the Bernsteinites; now away with unpleasant memories of the struggle against them.**

We believe that an impartial reader, who reads through these seven parallels that we present (we could present 77 if we liked) will say: “Yes, this fellow has ignited everything he constructed before, and has completely renounced his old revolutionary views.” But that, after all, is what is usually

called becoming a renegade. That is why comrade Lenin was a hundred per cent. correct when he called Karl Kautsky by this name.

### III.

#### Why Did he Become a Renegade?

How did it happen, however, that a man who was for years considered as an "orthodox" Marxist became a renegade?

In the foreword to the third edition to his book "The Path to Power," written in 1920, Kautsky himself remarks ironically in this respect: "It would appear that I have changed my convictions just at the moment when their correctness has been discovered. It would appear that I have remained true to my convictions when even in the ranks of my own party they have been mocked at and disputed, and that I have betrayed them at the moment when they were victorious. What astonishing conduct! A man without character, who has doubted his own cause, a rogue who has sold it—why, such people as this only become 'renegades' and 'Judases' when their cause meets with defeat, and not when it gains victory." It would, indeed, be a psychological enigma if Kautsky became a renegade **after** his cause had become victorious. But the honourable Kautsky has not shown his cards here. He turned renegade **not after** the final victory of the German proletariat (why, it has not conquered even yet!). But **on the eve** of the struggle—at a moment when the German proletariat was immediately faced with the task of decisive struggle for power; when it was already time to demand that the German Social-Democrats put their words into deeds, Kautsky, a middle class hanger-on in spirit, and an armchair Marxist by profession, got the wind up, and his blue funk turned him into a renegade. If we remember the main landmarks in Kautsky's fall, it will not be difficult to become convinced of this.

In the early years of the 20th century, when a **theoretical** struggle was being carried on in Germany between the revolutionary Marxists and reformists, when the **practical** revolutionary struggle at that time seethed in Russia, on the other side of Eidekunen, far removed from the vicinity of Kautsky's armchair—Kautsky was very much left-wing. But no sooner did the storm begin in Germany, no sooner did the German proletariat face the task of defending the franchise

in the Reichstag from the threatened attack on the part of the imperialist government, no sooner was it confronted with the task of snatching away the electoral rights for the Prussian Landtag from the powerful Junkers, Kautsky at once began to hesitate about this militant domestic question.

It is well-known that in 1905 a resolution was passed at the Cologne Trade Union Congress renouncing the propaganda of political mass strikes, and demanding that the Trade Unions should not bind themselves in this respect under any circumstances whatsoever. At the same time a resolution was passed at the Jena Congress of the Social-Democrats in 1905, in another spirit. This resolution recognised in principle that mass strikes are one of the best methods of struggle in conditions whereby the proletariat should prevent the franchise from being abolished, or the rights of coalition, or to struggle for some important right or other necessary for their liberation.

It is very interesting to compare how this Jena resolution was interpreted by the practical leader of the German Social-Democrats, August Bebel, and their theoretician, Karl Kautsky. Bebel in his speech at the Mannheim Party Conference in 1906, while denouncing the supposition that the Party is preparing to declare a general strike **now** as being absolutely absurd, nevertheless argued with those who feared that a general strike would inevitably result in bloodshed, he said: "If an attack be made on the franchise, or if they try to deprive the workers of the right of coalition, there cannot even be a question of—**can** we attack or not; in this case we **must** act. We are not going to allow the right that we enjoy to be snatched away from us; otherwise we will be miserable and despicable people! In such a moment there can be no place for any hesitation or prevarication. In such a moment we must go into the fray even if we all perish." That is the language that the proletarian leader, Bebel employed. But what did the armchair Marxist, Kautsky, write in face of this in the "Neue Zeit"? "In view of the peculiar political conditions of Germany, a successful mass strike is only feasible in a revolutionary situation. It would, therefore, be hopeless and perilous if we wanted to apply the general strike in a situation which cannot become revolutionary . . . Even if it went so far as to a question of abolishing the franchise in the Reichstag, we would have to ponder a long time as to whether that justifies the response of a mass strike. If we deem it necessary to dictate as to the question of a general strike, we do this because we hope that a revolutionary situation in Germany will come."

Here we at once notice the difference between two people—Bebel and Kautsky, who, however, both belong to one tendency within the Party. Kautsky foretold a revolutionary situation in the **future** and connected the declaration of a general strike with this **future** revolutionary situation. Bebel, on the contrary, asserted that a general strike by no means signifies a revolution. But at the same time, Bebel in so far as the defence of the basic rights of the proletariat is concerned, categorically bound himself to enter the struggle be it to-morrow, or be it to-day. In answer to the practical question—what will you do if the proletariat are now deprived of the franchise?—Kautsky replied: Well, we will see; we will just think it over, and if we will not be convinced that “the situation may become revolutionary” then it would be better if we refrained from striking. Victor Adler, at that time, in September, 1905, wrote ironically in the Vienna “Arbeiter Zeitung,” with regard to this contradiction between the abstract revolutionary perspectives and indecision in practical action on the part of Kautsky: “This concession of Kautsky’s deprives the question of a mass strike of all political reality, and Kautsky from quite opposite premises, if we may say, by a dialectic method **in practice** proves himself to be one of the same company as Wolfgang Heine [leader of the opportunists—A.M.]”

Five years after, in 1910—a year that opened up a new phase in the history of the German Social-Democratic Party, Kautsky, characterising the political atmosphere of these times, wrote in his book, “Political Mass Strikes,” published in 1914: “It is a sign of the times that the intensification of internal and external contradictions, and above all, the growing want of the masses have begun to increase rapidly.” One would think that corresponding with this complicated situation, which as we now know after four years led to a world catastrophe, there ought also to have been a change in Party tactics with more frequent use of demonstrations and all kinds of mass action. During that time Rosa Luxemburg also demanded this, referring to the experience of the Russian Revolution, in which the forms of the proletarian revolution have become more sharp and clear. But the leader of the German Social-Democratic Party drew just the opposite conclusions from this changing situation. On the very same page of the book where Kautsky presents the above-mentioned characteristic of the new political situation, he writes: “At the Magdeburg Congress in 1910, the foundations of the so-called ‘Marxist centre’ were laid for the first time. Since the Hanover Party Congress of 1899, the majority of congresses have always opposed the **reformist** impatience of

the State-thinking opportunists. Since 1910, the majority at every Party congress also opposed the **revolutionary impatience** of the extreme Left, and that has now become a rule. On the other hand, since that time there have been also Party Congresses where no pretext whatever has been found for attacking the Right. The two large Party Congresses in Jena in 1911 and 1913 were of this type." The theoretical leader of this "Marxist Centre" was Karl Kautsky, and he has remained so until this day, and no one has better denounced the true colours of his "centralism" than Kautsky himself in the above-mentioned quotations. From these quotations it is evident that Kautsky made his swing round to the Right just when and just because of the fact that the revolutionary situation had become more acute—not there, far away beyond Eidekunen, but there in his own Germany. It was just the time when the objective situation called for a transition to more decisive action that Kautsky began to lose hold, began to lose his red colour, and began to approach nearer and nearer to the opportunists of trade union bureaucracy. It was just at that time that Kautsky in his series of articles entitled "And what Now?" develops his famous theory of the "Exhaustion strategy" (Ermattungstrategie) in contradistinction to the "overthrow strategy" (Niederwerfungstrategie); just at this moment that he made the great discovery that after the Paris Commune the revolutionary tactic or direct onslaught, "the tactic of Hannibal" was losing the ground from beneath its feet, and that from that time on the Socialists could only meet with success by following the tactic of Babius Maxim Cunctator, "the tactic of exhaustion." Shortly afterwards, Kautsky presented a supplementary theory in another series of articles "On the Activities of the Mass," according to which we should not try to become quits in our strategical perspectives of a spontaneous movement of unorganised masses, since whatever is included in the account must also be deducted from the account. This, in short, was a complete denial of **revolutionary mass action**.

This cowardly conduct of Kautsky's during the disturbed pre-war days already foreshadowed how this hero was going to behave when the storm broke out, and days of great historical import would arrive. Now we know very well how he did behave during these days. When the war broke out, Kautsky, the leader of the Centrists, actually behaved more shamefully than the old German opportunists, such as Messrs. Schippel, David and Heine. They were at least consistent, they were formerly social patriots and remained so, but Kautsky, if we remember rightly, at one time lisped some-

thing about internationalism, while in practice he said that Social-Democracy with its class struggle is inappropriate at a time of war. The Central Committee of the Russian Cadet Party wrote in exactly the same way in its report during the period of general strike in October, 1905: "During the October period our Party took no active part, for its tactics were not adapted to the situation of a general strike." But Kautsky and his supporters consoled themselves by the fact that when the dangerous time of war will have passed, the traitors of all countries will once more unite, and in this way the International will be successfully restored.

When the German Revolution broke out and when Social-Democracy rose to power, Kautsky once more disclosed his "heroism." When the vital question of the day was to turn the self-styled power into real power, to disarm the bourgeoisie, to remove the old bureaucrats from their posts, to arm the proletariat, etc., Kautsky and those of this ilk handed over the actual and dangerous problem of organising power for solution to Messrs. Scheidemann and Noske, who solved it by shooting the revolutionary workers and building up a coalition with the bourgeoisie over their corpses. And during those critical days, when the fate of the German revolution was being sealed, Kautsky chose a comfortable job—occupying the position of President of the Socialisation Commission. In this Commission he deeply pondered over the problem of how to socialise German industry, not in the Bolshevik manner, but in an "organic" way, gradually and without confiscation, so that the German bourgeoisie would not be frightened, and the victorious Entente would not be annoyed. While he was deeply pondering over this question, his Commission was dissolved, having produced absolutely no practical results whatsoever. It could not be otherwise: the coalition merely gave this Commission the role of an auxiliary—consultative organ deprived of any importance, and no one was definitely interested in its labours and projects. The whole of this contrivance was only necessary in order to throw dust in the eyes of the workers until they could once more be bridled and a firm hand be laid on them again. The learned Kautsky who has written so many historical works, of course, was very well acquainted with the sad history of the Louis-Blanc-Luxemburg Commission of 1848 in France, which has now become proverbial. But man's conduct is not only determined by his knowledge, but also by his will and his decisiveness. Not being manly enough to intervene in the struggle at the decisive moment of the revolution, Kautsky was satisfied with being allowed to jabber about Social-Democracy behind closed doors with right Social-Democrats and



bourgeois professors. To the great dismay of this wiseacre, in his smoking cap, his circumstantial report on the Socialisation of the mining industry prepared in this ludicrous Commission, was not even read—it was simply thrown into the wastepaper basket. And that is how Karl Kautsky humbled the Russian Bolsheviks and showed the “barbarians,” how “civilised” Marxists are able to realise Socialism in practice!

In 1920, Karl Kautsky once more disclosed his heroic nature. In 1909, when the revolution has not yet broken out in Germany, Kautsky wrote in his book, “The Path to Power”: “In a highly developed industrial country, such as Germany or Great Britain, if the proletariat already now had enough strength to conquer State power, they would even to-day find the economic conditions necessary for utilising the State power for replacing capitalist production by social production.” In 1920, when the German proletariat had got what they yet lacked in 1909, when German militarism has been smashed, when the German bourgeoisie have become panic-stricken, and when the proletariat was enabled to commence an immediate struggle for power with considerable chances of success, and when it actually did start to carry on the struggle, Kautsky was frightened at the possibility of proletarian victory, and declared in the foreword to the third edition of his book, “The Struggle for Power”: “I gave the front place to Germany in those days, because I then presumed that Germany stood nearest of all to Socialism. Now I should put Great Britain in place of Germany for two reasons: ‘The war and its consequences have dislocated Germany and at the same time has retarded the tempo of possible social progress. The moral and intellectual decline of the population has reacted even more in this direction.’” When the revolution was impossible in Germany, Kautsky boasted “We will be the first to arrive at Socialism.” But when the German proletariat really came on to the streets and commenced the revolutionary struggle for power, Kautsky became frightened at these stormy revolutionary events, and saw in its activities “the signs of moral and intellectual decline of the population” and said: “Oh no, we had better let England begin . . .”

If you look back at the political career of Kautsky since 1905, up to the present time, you will become convinced that the more acute the situation in his fatherland, the more mature conditions became for great class struggles, so much the more was Kautsky overwhelmed with the sense of cowardice. Therein alone lies the psychological enigma as to why he is a renegade.

Of course, we know that Karl Kautsky is not alone, we know that he was closely connected with German Social-Democracy, that he experienced the fall together with them, and that the fall of the German Social-Democratic Party is in the long-run explained not by psychological but by objective social-political conditions. Of course, not one Marxist will say that a mass German Social-Democratic Party, proletarian in its composition, has fallen down so low simply from cowardice. We know what role has been played here by fifty years stabilisation of capital, by the astonishing growth of militarism in Germany, and the illusion connected with the parliamentary successes of the Party. We also know that role of the labour aristocracy and the trade union bureaucrats within this Party who carried with them the masses. But the objective historical reasons which explain completely the conduct of a mass party are inadequate for explaining the conduct of separate members of the Party. No one obliged Karl Kautsky to follow the stream within the Party when he saw that it was sliding into an abyss, into the bog of opportunism. After all, did not such people as Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, under similar circumstances, have the courage to remain in the minority and go against the stream? If a man who thinks himself an executor of Marx and who has never willingly sailed with the wind, has not the courage to raise a warning voice within the Party at such a moment, if on the contrary, he himself led the struggle against the Left and crawled in the wake of the trade union bureaucrats and the Bersteinites over whom so many bones have been broken during the first decade of our century, this is only explained by the fact that he, as distinct from Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, was a miserable coward.

#### IV.

#### **Why and Wherefore has the Coward now Become Brave?**

This is also a psychological enigma, but it cannot be easily solved. The aged Kautsky has thrown aside his dressing gown and smoking cap, and in their stead has adorned himself in a helmet and batten and is now summoning the Mensheviks to an armed rising against the Soviet regime, not because he has become brave; oh no! He has adopted this heroic pose because he feels that the ground of capitalism in Germany is becoming stabilised under his feet and because having witnessed the temporary retreat of the revolutionary proletariat in Germany, he thinks this is a final retreat, and that he can, therefore, screen himself behind the shield of

Hindenburg. The renegade Kautsky was filled with terror when the German revolutionary proletariat was attacking. As soon as he perceived its temporary retreat, he felt a wave of courage, and is ready to give the last ounce of strength to those who have saved him from his own terror.

Who are these saviours of his. First and foremost, the German bourgeoisie. But now the German bourgeoisie is not independent. It still feels on its neck the noose of the victory, but recently the hope has sprung up in its bosom that one of these victorious countries—Great Britain, will give it the possibility to breathe if it will humbly execute the political orders of the British imperialists. And so we see how Kautsky, having lost all his former convictions, now in his old age assumes the role of a cringer to the German bourgeoisie, which in its turn cringes before the British.

Read attentively the preface to Kautsky's report, and you will see that it is nothing else but a rehash of what we are now reading in the reactionary British press, which is endeavouring to form a united front against Russia. Read for instance the following words from this report: "The Administration of the Third International in Moscow, which is only a weapon of the Soviet Government, and only exists on its monetary subsidies, feels itself the master over all Communist Parties that comprise it, thanks to the resources that it disposes of . . . The Bolsheviks claim that the support of the poorer proletarian parties by the richer ones is an act of international solidarity. That is very true . . . But a proletarian party with self respect has never taken money from a government, even from the Socialist government of its own country." Reader, is this not a literal repetition of what we read in the innumerable false documents fabricated by the imperialist governments in order to prove that the Soviet regime is responsible for the actions of the Comintern and that every movement of the Comintern is an adequate, juridical basis for an attack against the Soviet Government? Further, we see this same political calumny in a more frank form. "They (the Bolsheviks) think that they can continue their two-handed policy because they have created different institutions both for their proletarian and Communist sections. The Communist International is engaged on world revolution and preaches the gospel of overthrowing all governments. The Soviet diplomacy, on the contrary, strives to win the confidence of these governments and to induce them to establish friendly relations with the Moscow usurpers." Is this new theory of Socialist ethics not a literal repetition of the accusations of Mr. Chamber-

lain, whose faithful lackey, Kautsky has now become! Further, Kautsky becomes absolutely brutally frank without any kind of fig-leaf as an agent of British imperialism. Here are phrases which one ought to brand with fire on Kautsky's brazen brow like the mark of Cain. "Not having the force to withhold the decline in production, they perceived the immediate means of salvation in robbing Europe which is much richer, and for this they again had need of world revolution, i.e., an open or disguised war against foreign governments" . . . . "Throughout the Eastern States, the Bolsheviks are endeavouring to prepare fires at the present so that at the appropriate moment they can set alight and rob the whole world." What do the words "rob the whole world," mean on your lips, honourable renegade? Do not you mean by this that the Soviet Government "kindles a flame in the East" in order to snatch away Chinese "concessions" from the hands of the British and Japanese, and to put them into its own pocket? Do you not mean by this, most honourable one, that the Soviet Government is taking its solemn vow to get the sacred "property" of the imperialists in the person of 300 million Indians and 400 million Chinese? Are you not trying to save this holy "property" from the Bolshevik "robbery" calculating, that the crumbs left from this property will again fall in the hands of the German bourgeoisie?

Your endeavours are in vain, Mr. Kautsky. You will not be able to save this "property." It is too late! All these "tartars," "turkomans," and other nations of the East of whom you now talk with such contempt, exactly in the same way as millions of European proletarians who have not the honour to find a corner in your so gentle heart, wish to be free, no longer want to be anybody's property, and want to throw off once and for all the shameful yoke of slavery. And they will cast it off, despite all imperialist thieves and all their servile renegades.

A. MARTYNOV.

# Economic Depression in Germany

**I**F already a few months ago (Communist International, No. 5, Russian Edition), the stabilisation of world economy could be referred to as of a limited nature at best, to be mentioned in quotation marks, then now in July, 1925, we can do so with much more emphasis. The critical position of the economic situation both in Great Britain and Germany is apparent. In spite of the caution with which the capitalist press refers to the crisis, the increase in unemployment in Great Britain, the Stinnes crash in Germany, and the situation in the Ruhr territory must be considered as notable signs of deterioration. This review is meant to serve as an indication of the degree of the existence of a crisis in the German capitalist production and at the same time of a crisis in the stabilisation of Germany.

## The Coal Crisis.

Coal production in Germany is analysed as follows:

Monthly Average in Million Tons.				
		Pit coal	Lignite	Cokes
1913 (reduced to the day area) ...	...	11.73	7.27	2.64
1922 ...	...	9.93	11.42	2.43
1924 ...	...	8.70	8.54	1.85
1925 January ...	...	11.9	12.4	2.4
February ...	...	10.5	11.1	2.1
March ...	...	11.41	12.08	2.49
April ...	...	10.36	10.72	2.34
May ...	...	10.44	10.44	2.38

The exceedingly low figures for 1924 are connected with the occupation of the Ruhr and passive resistance which still continued in the early months of 1924. The figures for June may be estimated as those for May. A total reduction in comparison with January, the month in which peace time production was even exceeded, amounts to 1.5 million tons.

The picture becomes more definite when we consider the coal output in the Ruhr district.

				Million tons	Daily work tons
January	...	...	...	9.56	378,600
February	...	...	...	8.390	349,800
March	...	...	...	9.0	347,900
April...	...	...	...	8.3	345,800
May ...	...	...	...	7.8	248,000

The figures for January are approximate to those of peace time production. But in contrast to this production in the Ruhr coal district was reduced in May by 1.76 million tons. Hence, the coal crisis of Germany is actually one of the Ruhr mines, whereas the Upper Silesian coal district shows in contrast quite a minor increase in output which is connected with the closing down of the Polish Upper Silesian coal district, the most important section of the Upper Silesian production district.

The crisis of the Ruhr mines is also seen in the increase in reserve stocks. Assuming that the reserves amounted to 2.4 million tons in January, in May they had increased to 9 million tons and in June (according to the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung") to 10 million tons; hence we see in reality that the crisis is much more critical than the production figures actually show, for the monthly output is unsaleable and unsold reserves are continually increasing.

Of 270 shafts, 35 were absolutely idle up to June 20, and 50 partly idle. During the month of May, over 10,000 miners were dismissed; the mining workers' villages in the Ruhr district are a hopeless spectacle. In Hörne, where formerly 15,000 miners lived, now there are only 7,000. In Heitingen only 9,000 instead of 14,000 miners reside. All of these miners have emigrated to France, Luxemburg and Alsace-Lothringen. According to a report in "Vorwaerts," in June, 1925, the mineowners propose by the end of this year to dismiss another 60 to 80 thousand miners.

The quantities exported show very great vacillations. In January, exports amounted to 1.33 million tons, of pit coal; in February, 727 thousand tons; in March, only about one million tons, and in April they again fell to 750,000 tons. During the month of May, we may count upon a slight increase. Thus the export of pit coal in comparison with the home requirements plays only a very insignificant role; the

home demand is 90 per cent. the decisive factor in the case. The home demand in 1913 on the basis of the present day area amounted to :

1913	...	...	...	...	...	156 million tons
1922	...	...	...	...	...	150 „ „
1924 only	...	...	...	...	...	135 „ „

The most important reasons for the crisis and also the most weight may be found in these figures.

The reduced coal consumption is explained thus :

- (1) Development of scientific methods in heating.
- (2) Extensive use of lignite, the production of which, however is also on the decline.
- (3) Oil fuel and electrification.
- (4) Crisis in other industries, reduction in purchasing power of the inhabitants and actual reduced consumption.

In contradistinction to this picture the Ruhr coal mines were greatly extended during the war and the inflation period, which is seen to a certain extent in the increase of workers in comparison with peace times. Whilst these numbered in December, 1913, 300,000 men, at the end of April, 1924, they numbered 460,000. If we take into consideration the reduction of the shifts by one half-hour, and an approximate four per cent. reduction in the production per individual miner as compared with peace times, then a smaller section of these hundred thousand new miners should be calculated for this reduced working time. The majority, however, about 70,000 represent the expansion of coal production, that is to say, a 20 per cent. increase of the area mined. The coal crisis is German coal production on a smaller basis and consequently thereby greatly accentuated. It represents the reduction in that of German coal capital, which during the war and inflation period, partly on speculative grounds, greatly increased. The extent, however, of this reduction is explained by the more or less great incapacity to reduce prices, to increase demand or to secure new markets on account of the prevailing organic composition of production capital.

The following facts are of great importance in this connection : since the end of last year, the price of pit coal has

not been reduced; but such a stagnation leads, if other obstacles are non-existent, necessarily to a reduction of prices; still, according to reports in the "Magazin der Wirtschaft," No. 20, the mineowners have not been able to decide to do so. This fact indicates that a section of the German coal mines as regards the organic composition of capital must be technically very backward compared with recent improvements. For example, the introduction of mechanical screening appliances, motors, locomotion and electrically worked borers, etc.

A reduction in coal prices corresponding with the increased organic composition of capital would imply the closing down of a large number of mines. Since, however, the Ruhr coal mines are formed into a coal syndicate and powerful combines, German coal mining has come to the pass when the conditions of ownership and organisation—monopoly and coal syndicates—have become obstacles to production. With the help of these methods the concerns are able to maintain high coal prices by reason of the composition of their capital which is technically well placed, and thereby maintain profiteering prices. Hence, the slowing down of certain mines may be accounted for either by external circumstances, the extraordinarily bad equipment from a technical point of view, and resultant reduction in coal production, or a stoppage for the purposes of gain. This contradiction is explained by the fact that big concerns with floating capital buy up these shafts in order to increase their share capital in the coal syndicate and control this increased share capital with technically highly developed shafts.

We purposely dealt so minutely with the coal crisis because the actual reasons for it to a large extent, reflect the crisis in German capitalist production generally. How this has come about will be dealt with briefly in separate sections.

### **The Difficulties in the Iron Industry.**

The decision of the raw steel company to work only on an eighty per cent. production capacity of their works ("Vössi- sche Zeitung," June, 1925), is a proof that difficulties do exist. Simultaneously, we read of a number of liquidations, for example, the Oese Steel Works, the Bochum Iron Works, the Fardensell Mines and Heinsmann and Drier. Another sign of the situation is the fact that such works which are mainly small and medium concerns are frequently offered for sale. In this way, the steel works Eicken in Hagen, has been amalgamated with the Hösch Steel Works.



Even the firm of Krupps announce reductions, especially the closing down of shafts. The causes of this crisis are practically the same as in the Ruhr coal industry, that is, a large section of the work technically does not correspond with the organic composition which has become ingrained in world economy. And in addition to all this, there is the fact that France has entered the arena as steel and iron producer with the aid of valuta dumping, the great increase of the Southern German market, and the disappearance of the Balkan and Russian markets. The import of French iron and steel products is in no way controlled by the new customs regulations.

The agreement between the German, Luxemburg, Belgian and French iron industries has not reduced the import quota of these countries to Germany, but actually increased it. At the industrial conference in the Saar district the speaker, Dr. Reichert, declared that during the last few months, 100,000 tons, on an average five times the peace imports, have been imported from abroad to iron factories. This would amount to 1.2 million tons in a year, whereas the agreements re import provide for 1.75 million tons. There is this difference, however, that France, Belgium, the Saar district, and Lothringen deliver very much cheaper to the syndicates of the heavy industries, i.e., in plain English, the renunciation of a corresponding production and provision of the country itself entirely with home produce, which is really possible, since the iron and steel production of Germany has an excess production of 25 per cent. The big business men in the iron industry let this renunciation be paid by the difference between the prices of imported iron and the level of prices of German iron; a difference which the syndicate pockets to a large extent.

The reduction of German iron production is consciously being undertaken and done in such a way as to cause the least possible financial injury to the big iron cartel. Of course, German iron industry will endeavour to equalise or at least to soften this reduction by increased export and by the unfortunately at present unknown export quota to Belgium and France.

Still, such possibilities, because of the great competition on the part of Great Britain, and especially France, are extremely negligible. The nature of the depression now existent in the iron industry points to the fact that it is not of a transitory nature in view of poor demand in the home market

There is a very indifferent market for half-iron products. Reductions and stoppages are reported also in the tin and pipe industry. The market is becoming definitely dull, especially in the machine industry, which formerly was quite brisk. The "Deutsche Bergwerk Zeitung," reports on June the 20th that foreign orders in May showed a reduction of ten per cent., whilst in the previous months such orders formed thirty per cent. of orders in general, now they can only be estimated at most 20 per cent. and further, there is the increasing decline recorded in the home market. There is an especially great drop in demand in Rhenish Westphalian power works, mining machine works, and other producers of textile machinery complain of a great depression in the home market.

However, in the machine industry, we see the endeavour to create markets by reducing prices; in general, the German machine industry is noted for its splendid organic composition.

### **Textile Industry.**

During the past few months in comparison with the first months in the year 1920, there has been an increased number of failures in the textile industry. A crisis has been avoided however, by revival in business during Whitsuntide, which had especially good influence on the textile industry. According to a report of the Textile Workers' Union (reproduced from the Berlin "Tageblatt," June 28th), the percentage of unemployed is 3.2; the percentage of short-time workers is 16.8. This percentage is considerable and certainly points to the fact that there is a very slow market though at the same time it cannot actually be termed a crisis. The depression in export plays an important part in the present situation. According to official figures, the excess of imports of textile goods in the first quarter of 1924, was 608.2 million metres. From these figures we see that 26 per cent. of the entire unfavourable trade balance in Germany is caused by the textile industry. We may take the loss of the Alsace-Lothringen textile industry as a reason, since hitherto this section was responsible for the main export industry. The customs legislation was met by very strong opposition in circles in the textile industry, for thereby the already insignificant export is hampered still more.

### **General Character of the Depression.**

From the data of the industries already described, we may get a picture of the weakest points in the German econo-

mic position ; still, we must say, that only in the coal industry is there a definite crisis. In the other branches, there is only a depression to be recorded, which increased during the month of May and during June especially. From this date also the depression in the shipbuilding industry began ; there was a slight slackness in the industry, but this had been helped by State subventions. Recently, the oldest wharf in Hamburg, the Reinerstick wharf collapsed and financial difficulties are also reported from the German Wharf Company. We see by the increase in bankruptcies, and especially by the Stinnes crash that the condition of the German economic system has deteriorated generally.

		Bankruptcies	Insolvencies.
1924 December	... ..	572	204
1925 January	... ..	766	232
February	... ..	700	216
March	... ..	766	309
April ...	... ..	687	223
May ...	... ..	807	351

(“Wirtschaftstatistik,” No. 11.)

From our point of view, the Stinnes affair is of special importance because in his combine he included practically all branches of German economy.

The furtive character of the depression is expressed in the vacillation of the number of unemployed, and still more in the variations of short-timers. This is especially noticeable if taken in connection with the tension in the labour market caused by the agricultural demand for workers. Since January there has been a drop in unemployment amongst the members of trade unions ; the percentage stood at 8.1, and dropped to 4.4 in April, in May there was a slight increase, the percentage being namely, 4.5. The dismissals in the mines justify us in assuming that there will be a further slight increase in the month of June. On the other hand, short time work dropped from 5.5 in January to 4.9 in May ; but in accordance with present records, it has risen suddenly to 5.7—thus we see an absolute increase over the January short-time data. These figures show the exceedingly great weakness and vacillation of the German market generally.

On the basis of data supplied in the “Magazin der Wirtschaft,” a stock exchange and trade journal, and not specially

friendly inclined to heavy industry, we may assume that the difficulties already enumerated in special industries are general appearances in the German capitalist economic position, i.e., capital 20 per cent. more than in peace times is faced with a home and foreign market of about 60 per cent. that of peace times. Prices according to the wholesale index of the "Berliner Tageblatt" have risen 42 per cent. over pre-war prices, and after a few weeks of a practically imperceptible drop are again rising; wages on the contrary, are considerably lower than those of British or American workers. To this must be added a too great accumulation of trade capital in comparison with consumption.

From all these various facts, we must come to the conclusion that the organic composition of German productive capital no longer corresponds with the social average which has been established in world economy. In connection with export we must consider the especially favourable position of French production and the protective tariffs in foreign countries. Thus, in examining these difficulties of German capital, we observe that they do not arise suddenly in an especially acute form, but that we are faced with a depression which, according to the "Wirtschaftskurse" began already in February and has been dragging on during the past few months. Further, if some special measures are not employed, this depression will slowly develop into a crisis of German capital generally.

### **The Tendencies of Further Development.**

The further development of the German market is dependent on the question whether the depression will be overcome or whether it will develop into a crisis. That is to say, what are the means by which a further intensification in depression may be checked?

The present weak points of German production can only be overcome by a reduction in the price level in order to adapt it to the world market, and secondly, overcome the weakness of the home market. Even were the proposals to increase the length of the working day, and to reduce wages to meet with success, these would not be sufficient to save the situation. A reduction in wages would merely bring about a further decrease in demand on the home market. The only real tangible way to save the situation would be by a change in the organic composition of capital, i.e., by bringing German heavy industry to the highest level from a technical point of view. In other words, the Americanisation, the Fordisation of German production and thereby a price reduction for all wares in mass production.

To attain this object, one thing is absolutely necessary; capital for Germany—credits.

### (a) The Credit Position.

The position of credit in Germany, is exceedingly weak. The influx of foreign credits has practically stopped since last April. One large-scale credit of 10,000,000 marks, granted to the town of Berlin, is the only one known of since the Presidential elections. The capacity of the Reichsbank to grant credits is very limited, and the President, Schacht, has declared that a further large-scale credit policy cannot be compassed by the Reichsbank. In contradistinction to the period of the credit crisis, almost a year ago, the coinage in circulation to-day amounts to 4.5 million marks. The increase from the end of February to the end of May alone was 4 million marks. The German "Bergwerkszeitung," which is usually impatient in its judgment regarding the Reichsbank, declared in an article on June 20th, 1920, that:

"It is quite clear that the Reichsbank must cease the issue of notes and coins if a crisis in the valuta is to be avoided."

This danger actually exists though it is not actually acute, as may be seen from the following facts:

Credits granted from abroad were 50 per cent. short term credits. Short term credits which have been prolonged from time to time are estimated by the "Frankfurter Zeitung" at 1.5 milliards, long term credits are estimated at 2.5 milliards. A section of the short term credits was not prolonged with the result that payments had to be made abroad. According to statements of the "Berliner Tageblatt," June 20th, 100 to 170 million gold marks were paid back in this way. This sum in itself is nothing very terrible, but will naturally grow in time. But now there is a second important factor to be considered: an unfavourable trade balance is also beginning to be felt by a transfer abroad of the Reichsbank resources. According to the "Berliner Tageblatt" the reflux from the Reichsbank abroad at the beginning of June amounted to 270 million gold marks. In view of the fact that the debit trade balance has been reduced, amounting, however, in the month of May, the most favourable one, to 351.86 millions, the attention which the "Berliner Tageblatt" and the "Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung" attach to these reflexes is quite in order, since in spite of the acceptance of foreign bills in the country itself, the banknote circulation has constantly increased. The continuation of this state of affairs

must naturally end in a reduction of the reserve of foreign bills at the Reichsbank. In the "Berliner Tageblatt," June 20th, Felix Pinner writes as follows:

"If there is no change in the trade balance during the next few months, then in a very short time the former **acceptances of foreign bills** by the Reichsbank will definitely change, and we will be faced with **the exact opposite**. As a result of such a development, the Reichsbank will be able to face an absence of foreign bills only for a certain period, and to a certain degree."

On June 30th, the Reichsbank reported a fresh decrease of 50 millions in foreign bills. Hence we see that we are dealing with a vacillation, which if it continues, will become a very serious matter. In view of this limitation of securing credits through the Reichsbank, no special improvement in German capital may be anticipated, though we may presume that credits will be granted in order to stave off further big crashes.

As we have already mentioned, the expectation of securing capital from abroad has not been realised, and as long as the difficulties of the German economic position prevail, we may expect that foreign credits will only be granted to specially safe enterprises. In the immediate future, German industry as a whole cannot expect large-scale credit. Hence we see that no very large basic help can be forthcoming to stave off the depression and its consequent development into a general crisis throughout Germany.

### (b) Customs Policy.

The customs policy must necessarily interfere with the means essential for the improvement and rationalisation of the German production apparatus. Even though the effect of the customs policy on the trade balance be contestable, and it is possible to reduce imports in favour of exports by the dumping methods of German capital, still one thing that is certain is that the level of German capital must be raised. The report in "Die Deutsche Metallarbeiterzeitung," that the firm Daimler is going to discontinue organisation in its factory on the Ford system because of the protective tariffs in the automobile industry is of interest. In this we see a glaring example of the incapacity of German capital to undertake serious restoration, and overcome the pending crisis. A similar state of affairs may be noticed in the refusal of ~~miners~~ miners to reduce the price of coal, and the policy of the

iron and steel industries in the German-French agreements to refrain from supplying the home market with cheap material may be regarded in a similar light.

### (c) Working Conditions.

The only serious attempt which has taken place to reduce prices consists in the propaganda for a reduction of wages and a lengthening of the working day. This propaganda has already led to lockouts and strikes for increased wages in the building and timber industries. And if appearances are not deceitful, the mineowners by their accumulation of enormous coal reserves, have similar intentions, i.e., when a sufficient reserve of coal is secured, then they will face the miners with an ultimatum or declare a lockout. Frequent references are being made to the introduction of an 8 or 12-hour working day, and even the "Magazin der Wirtschaft," No. 19, holds forth about this as the only means of saving the mining industry.

### (d) Agriculture.

The good harvest in Germany is the only factor capable of overcoming the depression. In connection with the protective customs plans, and the favourable harvest possibilities we often read in the papers and periodicals of heavy industry references to the fact that the land should be made accessible to industry. This point of view actually has possibilities of success on account of the rapprochement between the magnates of heavy industry and the big agriculturists. Still, if industry should succeed in reviving the home market, by increasing exports, then at best this would signify merely a juggling of the crisis and a delay in same. There can be no question of overcoming the main causes at stake.

### (e) Conclusion.

The situation may be summed up thus: (1) the position of German capitalist economy has deteriorated at least since May, 1920.

(2) The deterioration has developed into a general crisis in the mining industry, and depression in the metal, textile and shipbuilding industries.

(3) There is but small prospect of avoiding an acute crisis in German capitalist economy. Endeavours to avoid a crisis have hitherto only centred round increasing demand in the country, and causing a deterioration in working conditions.

(4) The credit question involves the possibility of a continued deficit in the trade balance developing in the future into a valuta problem.

### **The Significance for the Classes.**

The problem of a reduction in the standard of working conditions will continue to be an important point for workers even though German capitalists succeed in preventing the present increasing depression from developing into a general crisis. In spite of the fact that even now wages are 30 to 40 per cent. lower than those in Great Britain, and 200 per cent. lower than in America, still in view of the lack of credits, the necessity continues of preventing a further increase in wages, and securing an increase in the working day in the mines in order to improve the organic composition of German capital. The continuation of the reduction of German capital which has now begun, is bound to increase unemployment. This can only be counteracted by a great increase in the demand on the part of the foreign market. The position of Communists in the coming struggles will be rendered much more difficult by the antagonistic attitude of the Social-Democrats and trade unionists. The slow development of the depression and a general crisis will also render the situation difficult. Sudden, precipitated crisis will no longer lend us support and the work of Communists will be determined henceforth by the slow process of depression and threatened crises, both on the political and the industrial field.

Antagonisms have been softened within the German bourgeoisie both by the stabilisation of German capital and the momentary prevailing depression. The partial elimination of antagonisms between heavy and manufactured industry has been brought about by the reduction in the power of pure industrial capital, and consequently an increase in that of the predatory barons in favour of finance capital. Also, a certain alleviation has been brought about by the support of the protection tariff in some branches of the manufacturing industries; for example, the automobile industry, the metal industry, and the big heavy industries. At the same time, there is a better relation between finance capital, heavy industry and the big agrarians. The great need for credit on the part of big agrarians should at the moment improve their still undetermined relations to finance capital. The first steps towards an understanding have been accomplished by transforming the annuity bank into a purely agricultural credit institution. The big agrarian wing has been frightened by the momentary crisis in the German National Party, caused by the sudden change



in the heavy industry section of the German Nationalists over to the Lutheran policy of fulfilment, to the Stresseman Security Pact, and to the Hindenburg fidelity to the constitution policy.

### World Political Effects.

The momentary depression and inclination of this depression to develop into a crisis, are accompanied by the consciousness in capitalist circles, that a possible prevention of this crisis is to a large extent dependent on foreign countries (credits). This tendency receives support from the alliance of Social-Democrats with the extreme anti-Bolshevist wing. Side by side with the still prevalent strong orientation to America, there is now a new tendency; this consists in the conclusion of the German-French iron agreement, and the commercial agreement which will be concluded in a few months. According to a statement in the "Berliner Tageblatt," June 29th, British papers go so far as to indicate that a close community of interests will be established between Franco-German capital and the heavy industrial enterprises of both countries.

The relations between Germany and Great Britain gain new significance in this connection. Side by side with the increasing knowledge of the pending crisis in British capitalism, and that Germany is the decisive competitor in the iron and coal market, the fear must be intensified that with the assistance of the iron agreement with France, a still greater increase in the supply of German coal to France will be brought about in view of the contemplated agreements. On this account, recently in moderate liberal circles rumours are being circulated about the possibility of forming an industrial Anglo-German community of interests. "The Bankers' Magazine," May 25th, and "The Economist" June, 1925, demand the financing of German economy by concessions on the part of German industry to British. Further, agreements are to be arrived at in regard to markets, prices and patents. It ought to be clear to British capital that the increasing rapprochement between French and German industry will increase the power of France in juxtaposition to England, whereby the contrast between America and England will also be unfavourable for England (resulting from the increasing dependency of Germany and France on America).

The foreign political situation is an unsettled one in view of the vacillating state of the German market, which during the past few weeks wavers between depression and crisis, and

the tendency to establish new relations between France and Germany, together with the increasing interest of Great Britain to oppose this tendency, by an eventual industrial combine with Germany. Both tendencies, that of depression tending to crisis, and the proposed new groupings are essentially bound to bring about a heightened tension in class antagonisms between the imperialist powers.

I. K. SORGE.



# “The Accumulation of Capital”

A Theoretical Study by N. BUKHARIN

State Publishing House, Moscow, Leningrad, 1925.

WITHIN the precincts of this small study (about 133 pages) comrade Bukharin acquits himself of a task which was very much needed both from a Russian and International point of view. In this work he makes a start with the conflict against the ideological legacy of the late champion of the international proletariat, Rosa Luxemburg. His method is dignified, though determined, and worthy of the memory of Rosa. His argument is not only convincing, it takes away the very foundation of the theory which has played a fairly important role in the ideological tendencies in the Marxist revolutionary camp of Western Europe during recent years. Comrade Bukharin's study puts an end once and for all to a legend which for a considerable time was prevalent in Western Europe, and even at present has not yet been silenced; the legend that Rosa Luxemburg in reality was responsible for the real revolutionary **theory** of imperialism and not Hilferding and Lenin. The legend would have it that the theory of imperialism as far as Lenin was concerned was a simple acceptance of Hilferding's theories—only the revolutionary political consequences are accentuated in his interpretation which, of course, is not the case in Hilferding's. Lenin did not create an independent theory of imperialism; This task was accomplished by the late Luxemburg, in her famous book, “Die Akkumulation des Kapitals.” This interpretation is cultivated and the view actually stalks through Western Europe in certain circles, although not openly admitted in **words**, that Lenin's real importance—if not his entire importance—lay rather in the political field than in the theoretical.

Anyone acquainted with the struggles of Russian revolutionary Marxism, against the Narodniki and the legal Marxism of the past century, knows that Lenin played not only a chief role, but that his also was the decisive dictum. The

decisive moment was contained in the question **how** Russia, where the effects of the movement against the peasants for liberty began to ripen, was to develop further. I purposely write "was," although for a Marxist even at the time the question was not thus but rather: "How did Russia develop since the liberation of the peasants and **how** will it develop in the future regardless of the wishes and hopes of this or that intellectual sect." The Narodniki, however, put the question in the above way just because capitalism was also making its triumphal entry into Russia and was preparing finally the exit of all the old forms of the revolutionary struggle; because the hegemony of the struggle began to shift into the Russian proletariat, the Narodniki struggled against the change with their **negation of the facts**, with their **moral condemnation** of capitalism, with the **prescription** that Russia **was not** to develop in the way in which Western Europe had developed. **A theory of their wishes**, a "romantic theory of political economy" was what they delivered in a theory of the accumulation of capital, adhering to Sismondi, in accordance with which capital required "third persons," i.e., non-capitalist elements and strata, in order to be able to accumulate, and these accumulation necessities of capital, force capitalism to find foreign markets. The culminating point of this accumulation theory of the Narodniki was a "Crisis theory." Capitalism narrows the home market by the process of the abolition of small producers. The foreign market, it is true, provides a provisional "outlet from the difficulty" in the disposal of the surplus annual products (which the Narodniki regarded **only** as surplus value, but did not at the same time distinguish in its positive form as production and commodities, a mistake which is not so astonishing with them since it is repeated as we will see by Rosa Luxemburg). The further capitalism develops, the quicker accumulation grows, the more hopeless becomes the fate of capitalism: **the crises continue** to increase in volume, and are unsolvable. These crises amount to nothing more than the impossibility of marketing a part of the annual produce (the annual surplus produce) which results from the contradictions between the ever-increasing powers of production and the resultant strangulation of small producers and consequent reduction in consumption; the circle of consumers contracts in accordance with the advance of the accumulation of capital, and crises grow in volume and become ever more unsolvable. The majority of the inhabitants, not only of one country, but of the entire world, i.e., the small producers (small peasants and small artisans) is being slowly destroyed without any lasting advantage accruing therefrom for capitalism. Such is the argumentation of the Narodniki; hence Russia has no use for capitalism!

The fight against this theory was taken up both by the defenders of Russian capitalism (Struve) and the Marxists (Plekhanov, Lenin). The latter at the same time were in opposition to the former since they, in order to support their argument, had missed Marxism in justification of capitalism. It was Lenin chiefly who showed in his various larger works ("The Economic Content of Narodnikism and Mr. Struve's criticism," "A Characteristic of Romanticism," "The Development of Capitalism in Russia"), and smaller essays (amongst which the most important is "The Theory of the Markets") that both the theory of the Narodniki and the "Marxism" of Struve and supporters, is false. As regards the former, both their accumulation theory and their "population law" are false, so too their crisis theory is definitely incorrect for the crises in capitalist society are not based on the contrast between production and consumption, but on the contrast between the **social** character of production and the **individual** character of consumption: thereby, however, at the same time the solution of crises is indicated. This consists in the socialisation both of production and consumption: in Socialism.

This short sketch of the controversy—well-known to Russian readers—gives important points for the understanding of the fate of the Luxemburg theory in Western Europe.

The controversy between the Narodniki and the Marxists on the one hand, between the latter and the legal Marxists on the other, was practically unknown in Western Europe. This is especially true of the powerful theoretical accomplishment whereby Lenin refuted the sociological and economic "theories" of the Narodniki. This explains how it was possible for Rosa Luxemburg's book, "Die Akkumulation des Kapitals" to be received with such enthusiasm in Western Europe and just in the most revolutionary circles. Rosa Luxemburg—as Bukharin also recognises—**presented the problem** which had almost fallen into oblivion in Europe, but was well-known in Russia."

Had the history of the Russian controversy been **fully** known in Western Europe, the attitude towards Luxemburg's works would have been quite different and less enthusiastic. It is quite evident from the incomplete description which Rosa Luxemburg gives of the history of this problem that she simply took over the solution of the romantics and in accordance with the proletarian point of view lent it revolutionary deductions.

Rosa Luxemburg's description of the controversy from Sismondi to Tugan-Baranovski characteristically skips over

the most important stage in this controversy, the most important "passage of arms" in almost complete silence: the passage of arms of the Russian Marxists (Lenin is only treated here and there **rather disdainfully**). There are followers of Luxemburg who consider the first "dogma-historical" section of Luxemburg's book as a powerful methodological advance and compare it with Lenin's "State and Revolution" forgetting the "small" difference that Lenin deals with the **entire** history of the problem and that Luxemburg simply fails to deal with the most important stage! Therefore, they cannot possibly compare Luxemburg's exposition with that of Lenin because they do not know the last passage of arms which was the most important stage.

It is no easy matter to understand **why** Luxemburg herself omitted this last passage of arms from her description. Her theory of accumulation is the simple continuation of the theory of the Narodniki. Lenin's criticism already contradicted them in advance, and she was not able to understand the essence of this criticism of Lenin without rejecting her own theory already before it was published. Of course, she knew the works of Lenin very well in this connection (she quotes them, though only en passant). I have no intention of accusing Rosa Luxemburg of the slightest incorrectness, as though she would omit this last act from the controversy she described merely to gain an undisputed place for her own theory, it was simply **impossible** for her to estimate the real significance of this last act. Otherwise, she would have been compelled to describe it as minutely as the other passages of arms and then—well, then the whole foundation would have been torn away from under her own theories.

Comrade Bukharin's study continues Lenin's work. It is true that Luxemburg was criticised by Lenin in advance, a fact which does not render a special criticism of Luxemburg superfluous; on the contrary, it is all the more necessary. Comrade Bukharin accomplishes his task in true Leninist spirit, i.e., leniently in consideration of the immortal service but mercilessly against the theoretical error of our late comrade. Should he occasionally treat the murdered heroine of the proletariat rather sarcastically, this method is more applicable in view of the weakness of Rosa's theoretical position than the sarcasm which Rosa herself measures out to Karl Marx, **who was right on all points, where she herself**—as comrade Bukharin brilliantly shows—was in error.

Comrade Bukharin's book is of immense importance for all West Europe (especially, of course, for Germany). Quite

apart from his concrete solutions, which are elegant, brilliant and essentially Marxist, the importance consists in his **methodology** and in the especially **extremely clear simplicity of the language**. **Everyone** can understand the book, even the simplest worker who possesses only the very elements of political economy. This little book is a sample of how the difficult problems, so scientifically treated by Marx, may be treated in a perfectly popular manner. Just those sections of the book, which at the first glance rather terrify, the "formulæ" are practically the most brilliant section of the work. As a rule, formulæ only increase the difficulty of exposition (although they are supposed to have quite a contrary effect). Here, however, they really facilitate understanding and make the comprehension of the text more general and exhaustive. Comrade Bukharin's formulæ are tangible and brilliant. They develop the presentation of the question, they facilitate the solution of the problem. The entire mechanism of accumulation is visualised and made clear. Only the A.B.C. (I do not mean the A.B.C. of Communism, but the ordinary A.B.C.) and not mathematics is necessary to understand it.

The praise which we are here extending to the formulæ, which are by no means the most important section of the book, becomes clear when we consider what the formulæ accomplish also in a **methodological** direction. It was an error on Luxemburg's part that in considering the problem of accumulation she did not consider annual production from its two-fold aspect as is essential for every Marxist. The annual production, as Lenin already stated in his polemic against the Narodniki is divided, in view of value, into three parts: these are, constant and variable capital and surplus value. In view of its actual component parts, however, it may be divided into two sections: means of production and commodities. If this differentiation is overlooked and annual production is considered one-sidedly, from this or that viewpoint, then either we commit the error of considering capitalist society as such, only and not also, as a necessary process of work for all members of this society, "the eternal change of matter between man and nature," or we go to the other extreme, and forget the capitalist nature of this organisation of capitalist society, and regard it only as economic organism. This is an error which very many commit in relation to Marxism. Bourgeois economists naturally fell into the second error, many Marxists, however, in endeavouring to avoid this error of bourgeois economists go to the other extreme. Not so very long ago, this latter error was detected in philosophy where the entire Marxist recognition theory is falsified because of a misreading of both of these points of view, or shall

we say, a neglect to consider capitalist economy as a process of work. The process of work of capitalist economy has, just like any other, a positive content, a social form. Accumulation within capitalist society, just as its problems, can only be explained when both points of view are taken into consideration and combined. Comrade Bukharin's formulæ have just this great methodological value that they clearly and comprehensively carry back this entire problem to its source, by making clear the necessary co-ordination between the social forms and the positive content, and also the dependence of the individual sections of economy on one another.

The other methodological error of Rosa Luxemburg, which is in close connection with this first one, is that she does not consider capitalist society, which is torn, involved in contradictions, split within itself, as an entity, as an economic organism which it actually is. Capitalist society is a live organism, an economic organism. Impeded by antagonisms, they do not "dissolve" **logically**, i.e., they do not destroy one another, they do not make the existence of society impossible but they are solved dialectically, i.e., they create forms in which they are able to develop further. The accumulation of capital is just such another dialectic phenomenon as every other phenomenon in capitalist society. This was the point of view which Rosa Luxemburg took in considering the problem, and hence she forgot the unity of the economic process in contradistinction to the antagonism within the capitalist class.

Dialectic accumulation does not consist in the fact that a "pure" capitalist society becomes impossible, but rather in the fact that the further it advances the more involved it becomes in contradictions, but at the same time creates the basis of the solution of these contradictions within capitalist society itself. The "purer" the capitalism, the more socialised the work, the more glaring the contradictions between this socialised form and individual consumption, the more and the riper the pre-requisites for the solution of this contradiction. Those who take the point of view, as Rosa Luxemburg did, that in **real** capitalism other laws prevail than in "pure" capitalism of "pure" theory, are dazzled by the illusions on the surface of capitalist society and fail completely to recognise the essence and significance of Marxist abstraction.

Marx, as we know, in Volume 1 of "Capital," takes a pure capitalist society and "abstracts" from all non-capital-



istic classes. In reality, however, besides the capitalist class there exist still other classes in capitalist society (peasants, petty bourgeois). Does that mean that "real" capitalist society has different regulations from those "abstract" ones presented by Marx? Rosa Luxemburg thought so. In what relationship, however, did the "abstract" and the "real" capitalist society stand to one another, and what was then the methodological aim and use of all this abstraction. Apparently all those were right who treated the Marxian "laws" as a phantom, as an empty construction, and also those were right who wanted to state that there was a contradiction between the first and third volume of "Capital." In fact, Rosa Luxemburg constructs a new contradiction between the first and third volume of "Capital"; she considers the problem of accumulation chiefly from the point of view of circulation, she does not follow up the fundamentals of production, and hence approaches in thought those economists who want to transplant the entire political economy into the sphere of circulation (Cassel, Graziadei). Marx himself, however, gave examples in his "abstractions"; the entire third volume of "Capital" is nothing else but an illustration of this.


The relationship between the Marxian abstractions and "concrete" reality does not consist in the fact that reality is real and that they are not real. Abstract does not mean either empty or false—like every scientific abstraction, that of Marx serves to hold at a distance "disturbing" influences, "secondary effects." With the assumption of the notorious "third persons" the fate of capitalist society is, properly speaking, that of these non-capitalist strata. Thereby the entire sense of Marx's "Capital" is set aside: namely, within capitalist society the requirements of capital provide the law of motion of the entire society. A false dialectic arises in place of the true dialectic of capitalist society, and not the capitalist and working class would stand in dialectic contrast to one another, but the capitalist class and the foreign elements, "third persons," outside the economic organism of capitalist society.

Bukharin in explaining this shows that this tendency leads to a kind of "economic fatalism." Luxemburg has recourse to revolutionary passion. Bukharin shows very convincingly that this revolutionary passion and the results gained thereby are not at all in agreement with the theoretical pre-requisites of Luxemburg. Unreformed Marxism proves itself in this case to be the only revolutionary theory. The entire significance of Bukharin's book can only be appreciated by those who—like myself—were supporters of the

Luxemburg theory. Her splendid revolutionary figure, her honest struggle within German Social Democracy against opportunism, her magnetic style and fluency, all these work irresistibly on everybody and make people unable to withstand even her theoretical weaknesses, provided one has not yet been through Lenin's sober school, which destroyed everything which was false.

This Leninist spirit lives on unadulterated in Bukharin's book, which in conjunction with those works of Lenin dealing with the subject will convince everyone that imperialism can only be explained through Leninism and not by Luxemburg's theories. Bukharin's book proves once again that real theory is also revolutionary theory.

L. RUDAS.



# The Mensheviks also Turn Towards the Village

## 1. They Dream Sweet Dreams.

THE measures taken by the Soviet Government for the extension of the New Economic Policy in the villages and for rendering the Soviets more active has provoked the triumphant rejoicing of the Mensheviks. The Bolsheviks are slipping down an inclined plane, the oracular "Sozialistichesky Vestnik" gleefully declares. "The last conference," it is announced falsely in No. 9 of the "Sozialistichesky Vestnik," "openly proclaims a policy based upon the 'kulak,' not, of course, in the political sense, but in the economic sense." While it regards the policy as "based upon the 'kulak,'" it nevertheless approves of it: "it is good that economic realism is beginning to assert itself and is ousting utopianism." This is repeated by S. Schwartz in an article entitled "The Unleashing of the Elements." "It is good, of course, that Bukharin is hammering the idea into the heads of his bewildered listeners, that it is impossible to enforce socialism on the rural population, and that it is necessary to 'draw the peasantry into socialism by appealing to their private economic interests'." Mr. S. Schwartz approves the temporary measures taken by the Council of Peoples Commissaries in connection with the employment of hired labour in agriculture. He says: "It would be cheap demagogy to protest against attacks on the Code of Labour Laws. To its full extent, of course, the Labour Code cannot be applied to peasant economy, and many of its postulates have to be toned down to correspond with the technical and economic peculiarities of petty agriculture." Mr. A. Yugov, in No. 10 of the "Soz. Vestnik" also gives his blessing to these measures. "This is the first step in our direction. We, Social Democrats, of course recognise its value and consider the outcry of the left S.R.'s about the betrayal of principles of socialism by the Communists as sheer demagogy."

While slanderously abusing the measures taken by the Soviet Government which they call "a policy based on the kulak," the Mensheviks nevertheless admit that that policy

is dictated by necessity. But they are unhappy because the Bolsheviks have gone only half way. To please them the Bolsheviks should have completely restored the bourgeois system in Russia and carried out the famous Party programme adopted by the Plenum of the Menshevik Central Committee in May, 1924. They should proceed to "the extensive denationalisation of trade and industry." In the meantime they should, "in order to carry the Soviet constitution into effect," restore all the liberties, of course, for the bourgeois Parties and their followers. They should immediately abolish the G.P.U., "the privileges of the Russian Communist Party and the Communist International," and then, when the dictatorship is disposed of, should replace the Soviet Republic by "a Democratic Republic" headed by a Constituent Assembly.

The Bolsheviks not only should pursue this path, but are actually compelled to do so. They are being driven towards this goal. "Yes, it is true, industry is increasing its output," writes Yugov, in No. 10 of the "Soz. Vest" "but for that very reason the menace of an imminent catastrophe has become so real that it has compelled the Communists to retreat . . . The repair and complete re-equipment, and, in part, the reconstruction of factories and works are essential. . . . But the government does not possess the huge capital required in the near future . . . whereas industry is producing practically no profits." Hence the conclusion as to the necessity of renouncing the principle of nationalisation of industry. And, indeed, the Soviet Government has already renounced that principle, Mr. Yugov declares, lying unblushingly.

Similar consequences in the political sphere are described in a leader in No. 10 of the "Soz. Vest" in connection with the campaign for rendering the Soviets more active and attracting non-Party comrades into this work. He says: "Hitherto the machinery of the Party dictatorship consisted chiefly of people who had rallied round its banner in the days of military Communism . . . To-day, in the days of the new Economic Policy, these people have proved absolutely unfitted for their task . . . Working in the Soviets and the Executive Committees and on every kind of conference and commission, honest non-partisans would, of course, pursue a Communist policy. If the Soviet Government carries its experiment to its conclusion, the Bolshevik dictatorship might go on imagining itself to be a dictatorship of the working class until the bourgeois classes, growing stronger under its wing, find its Communist phraseology and its terroristic forms of government unnecessary and embarrassing."

The Mensheviks are sleeping soundly and dreaming of an early restoration of capitalism and of the bourgeois system in Russia. Lulled by pleasing dreams, they forget that facts have more than once derided their prophecies. They forget that once before in the pages of the "Soz. Vest" they declared with equal assurance that the Communists in Russia would never succeed in restoring industry, that they would fail to maintain the monopoly of foreign trade, stabilise the currency, etc., etc. Rejoicing triumphantly at every "retreat" of the Soviet Government, they concealed from their readers that in every case the Soviet Government "retreated" after it had gone a long way in consolidating its main positions and when the "retreat" no longer represented any danger to those positions. They wisely refrain from mentioning that the Soviet Government adopted the New Economic Policy in 1921, when it had been triumphant in the Civil War and consolidated itself politically, and that now, too, it is extending the application of the methods of the New Economic Policy in the villages only after it has succeeded in restoring the large nationalised industries to 75 per cent., carrying through the currency reform, breaking down the economic blockade, and after it has succeeded in actual fact and not merely on paper, in adapting planning principles to the economic life of the country. They wisely refrain from mentioning that the Soviet Government has proceeded to attract the non-partisans widely into the Soviet system only after it had succeeded in re-assembling the disintegrated forces of the proletariat, after it had recruited several hundred thousand proletarians of the Lenin enrolment into the Party, in proletarianising the higher educational institutions and thus guaranteeing supplies of new experts coming from, and closely connected with, the proletariat.

## **2. Why the Restoration of the Bourgeois Order is Good for the Proletariat.**

It is not astonishing that the Mensheviks are sleeping soundly and dreaming of the restoration of capitalism in Europe. That is quite natural. The mouthpieces of the bourgeoisie cannot but refrain from dreaming of the restoration of capitalism in Russia. But they would not be fulfilling their objective historical mission if they confined themselves solely to the bare announcement that capitalism will triumph over Communism in Russia. The Mensheviks are the agents of the bourgeoisie **among the proletariat**, and you cannot buy proletarians by such prospects. You must, therefore, somehow prove to the Russian worker that those prospects are good for them, and will improve the conditions

of his "class struggle." The Mensheviks are tying themselves into knots in the endeavour to prove this paradox. Their argument is not very profound. The restoration of capitalism in economically backward Russia, they declare, is inevitable whether we like it or not. Under such conditions the dictatorship of the proletariat can only be a fiction. In such conditions only a temporary dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party, a temporary outrage upon the people is possible. And when under the ægis of the Bolshevik Government the inevitable restoration of capitalism in Russia takes place, when the capitalist order is restored and the bourgeoisie is resurrected, the dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party will have but one result—the toiling classes, deprived of the political freedom of independent organisation, such as they possess in West European bourgeois democratic States, will find themselves absolutely unarmed in face of a strong bourgeoisie. "That will be the completion of the Bonapartist degeneration of the Soviet Government." "But, as long as that has not yet happened," says the leader writer in No. 9 of the "Soz.-Vest." "we do not think that the present social system in Russia can yet be called Bonapartism. . . . It is not a **bourgeois** dictatorship; it cannot and apparently will not be able to create the conditions for a bourgeois economic system; and, depriving the non-propertied classes of all possibility of resistance, it is seeking to **replace** their social independence and class defence by government measures in defence of the town and agricultural proletariat. But never and nowhere has government guardianship been able to replace the genuine independence and self-protection of the lower classes, and in proportion as the Soviet system is permeated by the elements of capitalism, the disenfranchisement of the patronised sections of the people will **objectively** facilitate their exploitation and transform them into the unwilling tools of the new masters. In this way the elements of Bonapartism will permeate the Communist New Economic Policy." Here, too, the Mensheviks are deliberately lying. They know very well that the Soviet Government has no intention of **replacing** the independent activity of the lower classes by State guardianship. They know very well that the Bolsheviks long ago adopted the policy of "workers' democracy" and of increasing the activities of the working class masses within the Party and the trade unions, that they recently adopted a policy of increasing the activity of the peasant masses, and that they are conducting an increasingly energetic struggle against the forms of bureaucracy which were inevitable formerly under the conditions of civil war. The difference between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks is that the Bolsheviks pursue a policy based upon

the independent activity of the working class and peasant masses, plus the State guardianship of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and plus a merciless struggle against the permeation of the proletariat and the peasantry by the bourgeois influences. The Mensheviks, on the other hand, are in favour of the independent activity of the workers and peasants on condition that every main economic and political position is surrendered to the bourgeoisie. That is what is meant by the substitution of the "dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party" by a free democratic system for which the Mensheviks yearn.

### 3. Who shall Replace the Dead Ally, Liberalism?

Every intelligent worker and every intelligent middle and poor peasant, who can see a little beyond his nose and who judges the Soviet Republic not only by the rags which it has inherited from Tsardom, and from the imperialist and civil wars, but also by the direction in which it is at present developing, will understand that if the Soviet Government were replaced by a bourgeois democratic government it will be a severe defeat and a great misfortune for the toiling classes. It still has to be proved that if the dream of the Mensheviks is realised, if capitalism is restored, the democratic system would also be established. It is obvious that without this proof the argument of the Mensheviks would lose every shadow of conviction for the workers and peasants. But to prove this, is just as hard as to prove that roses grow in the garden in winter. In the old days, the Mensheviks wrote that the proletariat would succeed in establishing a democratic republic in Russia if they would support the bourgeois liberals or form a coalition with them. Now, however, the Mensheviks have been regretfully obliged to admit that Russian liberalism is dead and will never be revived. Mr. D. Dalin, disputing in No. 9 of the "Soz.-Vest." with a group of right S.R.'s asks: "Whom will it fight? Does it want an alliance with those who will advocate imperialism externally, and nationalism internally, and preach that base and empty patriotism with which the bourgeois intellectuals abroad are becoming more and more infected? . . . Does it think that it can suppress all those who remain enemies of the specific Great Powers theory and of the just as specific peace and tranquility theory of which the new Bismarcks dream, the hypocritical liberals and still more hypocritical religious Russian emigrants?" The Mensheviks, to their great regret, are obliged to admit that their old traditional allies, the bourgeois liberals, now regard the very word democracy with hatred and yearn for a "strong

government," a military dictatorship. It is true that the majority of them no longer dream of the restoration of the power of the landowners, and of an alliance with them, considering that as absolutely hopeless. They base their schemes now on the kulak, the "Moujik of Stolypin," but this does not make matters any easier. "It is a very menacing symptom for the fate of our revolution," writes Mr. Dalin, "that the ideology of the Russian reactionaries beginning from the former liberals and present advocates of the military dictatorship down to the declared monarchists, considers the peasant question in a much more realistic manner than many advocates of national democracy."

Where are the Mensheviks making for? Where are they to find an ally for the realisation of their bourgeois economic dreams? Only one thing remains, to try their luck in an alliance with the middle and poor peasants, and follow in the wake of the Bolsheviks, who defended this alliance against the Mensheviks as early as 1905. And now we find that the Mensheviks have been for more than a year, speaking emphatically of the necessity of an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry. They, however, introduce one small correction into this Bolshevik slogan, namely that the alliance must be concluded not in order to fight against the restoration of capitalism in Russia, and for the overthrow of capitalism in other countries, but in order to establish a bourgeois democratic system in Russia, and to save capitalism from the danger of Communism in the West. The Russian Mensheviks are not alone in this new policy. It is apparently being also adopted by the West European Social-Democrats. It is not without significance that they are proposing to summon a peasant conference at the same time as the forthcoming Congress of the Second International.

#### **4. Alliance with the Peasantry on the Bourgeois Basis.**

An alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry on a bourgeois basis is being systematically preached in the pages of "Soz.-Vest" by the now chief theoretician of the Russian Mensheviks, D. Dalin, the same Dalin who, in his book "After War and Revolution," forecasted the coming of Socialism in ten years' time, when capitalist production throughout the world would become standardised, and when the bourgeoisie of its own free will would hand over its factories and workshops to the State. This slogan has been adopted by the Menshevik Party and included in the platform of the Plenum of the Menshevik Central Committee, held in May, 1924.



In an article entitled "With Whom?" which appeared in No. 9 of the "Soz.-Vest" Dalin writes: "We have raised the question of the relation of the village to the town, and pointed out that of the various types of peasant movement which are possible with us after the revolution, the success of the anti-town, anti-revolutionary movement is **possible**; but that we were not basing ourselves upon that objectively reactionary movement, but upon another type of peasant movement—a close alliance with the working class movement in the towns . . . During the last century, the peasantry have more than once appeared in a reactionary role. It was the peasantry who suppressed the first French revolution. . . The peasantry crushed the revolution of 1848. The peasant battalions suppressed the revolution of 1848 in Germany, Austria and Hungary, and guaranteed the military reaction in General Europe, for exactly seventy years. . . . It was a peasant army which crushed our first revolution. In comparison with these predominant peasant tendencies—that we must fully realise—a radical peasant democracy like that of the Bulgarian Party and certain elements of the Polish and Czecho-Slovakian peasantry, are rare exceptions. A real alliance of certain elements of the peasantry with the working class movement, such as is now taking place in the most culturally advanced countries, such as, for instance, France, Belgium and Austria, is a new factor in history, which deserves careful attention—what is there in common between the two types of peasant movement, the reactionary type and the democratic type? In both cases the peasantry have an alliance with one of the classes in the towns, and is associated with and acts in a permanent bloc with it. . . The peasantry either enters into a bloc with the bourgeoisie and thus creates the foundation for the Hohenzollerns, the Hapsburgs, the Poincarés and the Hortlys, or with the working class movement." Dalin says that we must base our policy on the first combination—an alliance with the democratic peasantry, but in distinction to the Communists, the Social-Democrats rely upon a **voluntary** alliance of the peasantry with the chief democratic force in modern society. A **voluntary** alliance means equality of rights and political freedom for the peasantry, freedom to determine their own political path. If we decipher the meaning of the Dalin programme, we find that it means an alliance of the proletariat with the Green International, or applied to Russia, with the Petlurists and similar peasant "democrats."

What would be the economic results of such an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry given the restora-

tion of capitalism in Russia? To this question D. Dalin replied long ago in the first number of the "Soz.-Vest.," in 1924, in an article entitled "The Disintegration of the New Village." He wrote: "If the disintegration of the village is inevitable, does that mean that the revolutionary parties and revolutionary classes can assert no influence over the village, and that nothing remains but to leave the field clear for the new kulak?" "No," replied Dalin. "The disintegration of the village does not mean economic and political bondage for the peasant masses; there are means and methods opposing the absolutism of village capitalism. Dalin goes on to explain what those measures are: "Agricultural credit is capable of freeing the peasants from the almost slavlike financial dependence on the rural bourgeoisie. . . Given freedom of social organisation all sorts of agricultural aid societies and credit institutions will gradually spring up which will replace the classic type of village usurer." The second method is "co-operation in all shapes and forms, which is a powerful weapon in the struggle of the small peasant against enslavement in its various forms. And if productive co-operatives will be unable to develop very largely in the immediate future, consumers' co-operatives, collective purchase and sale, will not only be possible, but even natural and essential. But in order that all this should be possible, that political atmosphere is necessary in which this right (the formation of co-operatives) will become a reality."

In order to create that "political atmosphere" the Mensheviks in their programme of May, 1924, advanced a political slogan corresponding with the new policy: "The proletariat is interested that the results of the liquidation of the dictatorship should be a democratic republic, under a government based upon the wide masses of the **proletariat and peasantry** and upon universal and equal suffrage and the secret ballot . . . and upon a law guaranteeing the independent organisation of the toilers for participation in the work of legislation and government." Commenting on this past point of the programme, the leader writer in Nos. 12 and 13 of the "Soz.-Vest." says: "Apart from the parliamentary and bureaucratic organs, the class organisation of the propertied classes (trade and industrial congresses, landowners' unions, stock exchange committees, Chambers of Commerce, etc.), inevitably take part and will inevitably take part in the various acts of legislation and government. The post-war period has already made clear to the working classes in many countries the necessity of securing similar participation for their own organisation (trade unions, factory

committees, labour exchanges, chambers of labour, co-operatives, peasant unions and—as in Austria for instance—Soviets of workers' and even soldiers' deputies). Our programme, therefore, provides as one of the essential factors of the republic, which should be the aim of the political struggle of the proletariat for a law guaranteeing the participation of the independent organisations of the toilers in the work of legislation and government." It is such an alliance between the trade unions and co-operatives and the trade and industrial congresses and stock exchange committees which, in the language of the Mensheviks, is called, "a government based upon the wide masses of the proletariat and the peasantry,"

In order to realise this bourgeois democratic idyll, which, by the way, the world has never yet seen, the Mensheviks need reliable political allies. The S.R. Party is now one of these allies. Dalin, in No. 9 of the "Soz.-Vest," writes: "The greatest thing which the Russian peasantry has hitherto created politically was the S.R. Party of the pre-revolutionary period . . . Through the S.R. Party, the peasant intellectuals associated themselves with the working class movement; they adopted its Socialist ideology and never had any doubt as to where and with whom they would go. The alliance of the Social-Democrats with both tendencies, was one of the elementary bases of its policy. There can be no doubt that in the new post-revolutionary period, such a solidity and strength of peasant policy and such unity as prevailed hitherto is impossible. The S.R. Party is no longer possible in its past form. But those who are speculating upon the peasantry radically and generally turning their back to the town, their former ally, and their face to 'a firm government,' the long expected Russian Bonaparte, are making a profound mistake."

Mr. Dalin writes very glibly, but one cannot help recalling the satirical verses of Leo Tolstoy, dedicated to the "heroes" of the defeat of Sevastopol:

"Long they pondered and speculated,  
Recorded topography on long scrolls,  
Glibly wrote on paper,  
But forgot about the ravine . . ."

### 5. What Would the Peasantry Gain by Such a Union?

The leading article of No. 9 of the "Soz.-Vest," entitled, "We Cannot see the Forest for the Trees," contains

the following statement: "Instead of class struggle, Bukharin promises to the peasantry co-operation, credit and taxation of the propertied classes. According to Bukharin, this is sufficient not only to protect the interests of the middle and poorest peasantry, but also to guarantee the smooth progress of the villages towards Socialism. One can truly say that never before has Russian Communism brought forward a more erroneous, more hypocritical and a more jesuitically false theory. . . . Hitherto, only mild mediocrities from the camp of learned armchair Socialists ventured to represent the fiscal system as the mainstay of the Socialist revolution. It is from them that Bukharin borrowed his profound deduction. And co-operation? How often has the Communist press written about co-operative illusions, about the illusive hope to establish Socialism in the villages by means of co-operation." In the same number of the "Soz. Vest," Mr. S. Schwartz joins in this deliberate misinterpretation with his article, "Co-operative Illusions of the Right Wing of the old Narodniki Party resuscitated in a new simplified form as as last word in Communist Wisdom."

We can imagine the reader's profound amazement on reading this Menshevik derision of credit and co-operation as a means to defend the peasantry against capitalism. "How so?" He will say—Does not the chief theorist of the Russian Mensheviks, Mr. Dalin, point out in the columns of the same "Soz.-Vest." that credit and co-operation are the only means for the protection of the peasantry from bourgeois exploitation? Is not this the only economic basis on which the Mensheviks themselves reckon to establish their union with the peasantry, is it possible that the left hand knoweth not what the right hand doeth?

Comrade reader, be not astonished. The Mensheviks do not take their idea of co-operation from the Bolsheviks. The latter's reliance on co-operation and agricultural credit is conditioned by **the preservation of proletarian dictatorship and the nationalisation of industries and foreign trade.** It is only under such conditions that they consider co-operation and agricultural credit as the road to Socialism. The Mensheviks on the other hand hold out brilliant co-operative prospects for the future happiness of Russia when proletarian dictatorship will have been liquidated there. The Mensheviks do not say what advantages peasant co-operators would receive after the liquidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But we can make a shrewd guess as to that.

At present all heavy industry is in the hands of the Soviet Power, whose aim is to reduce the cost of production

and the price of manufactured articles, in order to make them more accessible to the peasantry. This systematic policy has already had the effect of making the two parts of the "scissors" meet in Russia, and a further reduction of prices will be accompanied by a steady development of Soviet heavy industry. If the dictatorship of the proletariat were liquidated, Russian industries would fall into the hands of monopolist capitalist organisations which are fictitiously raising prices on the world markets, and which would certainly do the same in Russia. It is true that prices of manufactured articles in Russia are at present still too high **in comparison with prices abroad**. But these high prices still exist, not because, but in spite of the policy of the Soviet Power, and are due to the technical backwardness of Russia. The Soviet Power will overcome this technical backwardness just as it has overcome many other obstacles. Moreover, at present the entire foreign trade of Russia is a monopoly of the Soviet Power which is consciously and systematically endeavouring to do away with the parasitical middleman system. If proletarian dictatorship were liquidated in Russia, the first result of such liquidation would be a huge development of private trade capital and trade speculation. Finally and generally speaking, the Soviet Government is (according to the Mensheviks themselves) aiming at present to establish "State guardianship" over the working classes of the urban and rural proletariat by measures taken by the State. If the dream of the Mensheviks came true, if their May platform became a reality, "the independent organisations of the workers" would participate in the legislation and administration of Russia **side by side and in collaboration** with the "class organisations of the propertied classes." These workers' organisations—as the authors of the Menshevik platform admit—would aim at a sensible "self-limitation" (something like the "self-limitation" practised by the German Social-Democrats while in power after the November Revolution, which paved the way for Hindenburg). It is not difficult to foresee that under such conditions the new State Power in Russia would also establish "guardianship," but not over the same people. It would protect the weak, "poor" bourgeoisie from the exorbitant demands of the workers and peasants.

Our readers can see now how the Mensheviks "turn towards" the village. In olden times—in 1905, the Mensheviks were against a proletarian-peasant bloc because their attitude was that of Social-Democratic centrists, and as orthodox Marxists they founded their entire agrarian policy on the pre-eminence of big agricultural concerns over small

holdings without taking into account the conditions of the revolutionary epoch. At present they have abandoned this centralist position, but not to go to the left—to the Communists, but to the right—to the Bernsteinites. Now they occupy the old position—that of Vollmar, David and Hertz, who also favoured union with the small peasantry, however, not for the overthrow, but for the stabilisation of the capitalist order.

The Mensheviks "have grown wiser," and so have their present friends, the Social-Revolutionaries. In the epoch of 1905, when Russia was confronted by the problem of the realisation of the bourgeois revolution, the Social-Revolutionaries were still revolutionists, although of a petty bourgeois type. At the time the Mensheviks refused to form a bloc with them preferring to support "the progressive bourgeoisie" represented by the Cadets (Constitutional Democrats). But in the epoch of the compromise-revolution, when the Social-Revolutionaries went over into the counter-revolutionary camp, the Mensheviks were clever after the fact and formed a bloc with them. What then is the "face" of their present friends? Not better, but rather worse than that of the Mensheviks themselves. One has only to hear how the Social-Revolutionary gentry characterise themselves. At present the centre of the Social-Revolutionary camp is Chernov, who revised his former views, and who announces that he relinquishes "destructive" (i.e., revolutionary) Socialism and takes up, together with Mr. MacDonald, the position of "constructive" (i.e., reformist) Socialism. To the right of Mr. Chernov in the Social-Revolutionary Party is a certain Mr. B. D. and to the left—Mr. Vishniak (representatives of the Right and Left wings of the Party), whom the Social-Revolutionist, B. Arkhangilsky (of the Chernov persuasion) characterises as follows in No. 41 of "Revolutionary Russia." Vishniak says: "In the interests of unity of Party actions, it is essential to promise social-political measures . . . But to a party wishing to be, and to remain a political party—no more and no less—it should be immaterial what actually prompted the members of the Party to adopt its programme." "Therefore, our attitude to the question of the programme must undergo a radical change." It is essential to replace the programme with a world conception "by a programme without elements of a world conception." The leader of the right wing of the Party, Mr. D. plays still greater havoc with any kind of principles. He says: "Subjectively, mankind is going through a gigantic cataclysm. . . From the viewpoint of the heart—from the viewpoint of the necessity to feel differ-

ently about everything, doubt can be entertained, not only concerning the values of all the immeasurably great results of former human creativeness, but also concerning the possibility itself of human knowledge." Hence the deduction: "The question of the programme is one of the least important questions. . ." The immediate task is—to shuffle the cards well, as a preliminary, then to make everything as complicated as possible without any preliminary plan, so as to endeavour to unravel this complicated mass by submitting it to the synthesis of utterly different viewpoints after having previously shaken off the trammels of the traditional creed.

In close alliance with this jesting and clownishness, Messrs. the Mensheviks, are getting ready to save Russia and establish a Democratic Republic in which side by side with the capitalist bourgeoisie the independent organisation of workers and peasants will participate in the legislation and in the government. We can just imagine what kind of an independent role the workers and peasants would play in this government if this miracle did really happen, were they really to believe this honourable crew, and if the Mensheviks and S.R.'s were able to set up a Democratic Republic based on the hoodwinked workers and peasants after the overthrow of the Bolsheviks' dictatorship. But history has already replied on this point. Let us look for instance at the position of the independent organisations of "democratic" peasants in the French Republic governed by the left bloc. We will give by way of illustration the characterisation of the peasant organisations that comrade Bukharin presented to the last Plenum of the E.C.C.I., based on a study of the appropriate literature: "Now take France," said comrade Bukharin in his report, "where the peasantry is not so reactionary in its ideas as in Germany, there also the prospects are not too bright. There the peasantry is united in from six to seven large organisations conjointly with the big agrarians; all these organisations without exception are led by powerful agrarians and capitalists. Their organisational composition and methods are very curious. They are practically uniform in all countries, and everywhere bear the same form. One or several political parties generally act as their guardian. As far as organisation is concerned, they are something like the agricultural union embracing everyone from the agrarians to the small "dwarf" peasants and the agricultural labourers. But . . . aided by a specially adapted higher apparatus, the powerful capitalist circles always get the upper hand in the organisations. From this organisation, the wires stretched out to consumers and other various forms of co-operation (if we are to believe Mr. Dalin). These latter in turn are connected economically with the

banks. The same connection with the banks and with heavy industrial organisations is to be found in the workers' section—the sections of the agricultural proletariat. The bigger the organisation, the more certain one may be that they are led by marquises, their apparatus composed of officers' corps, while agronomists and professors act as advisers, although needless to say, they only partially participate in the direction. This organisational unity is, for the time being, formally broken up into a series of independent organisations, organised like banks in a financial-capitalist system: the organisations have branches controlled with the aid of shares, etc., thus a powerful capitalist agrarian band here also rules the roost, seizing everything it can lay hands on."

Well, reader, is that true or not? Appropriate conditions are these for the defence of the alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry from the onslaughts of capitalism in this country where the ideals of the Mensheviks are realised, and where the regime of "freedom and democracy" is firmly established!

### 6. Vandervelde's Analysis.

The alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry that the Bolsheviks are building up in the Soviet Republic differs from the alliance of the proletariat and peasantry as projected by the Mensheviks just as "water differs from stone," and "ice differs from fire." In the first place, Marxist theory confirms the firmness of this alliance, a theory that has found its subsequent development in Leninism, a theory having certain advantages over the "thick porridge" which the present assiduous Mensheviks and S.R.'s propose cooking, having previously "shuffled" all the cards. The eight years' experience of the Soviet Republic also testifies to the firmness of this alliance. However, the final test as to the stability of this union is still a question of the future. We need not dispute this point: After all, the experiment carried out by the Bolsheviks is the first serious experiment in the history of the whole world. In order to show what chances the alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry in the Soviet Republic has of becoming reinforced, let us fall back on the testimony of a man whom the Bolsheviks cannot ignore since he is their best friend and adherent—on the testimony of Monsieur Emil Vandervelde. Monsieur Vandervelde in the article "Socialism and the Peasants," appearing in the "Le Peuple" for February 1st, imprudently blurted out the truth on the prospects of the Bolshevik alli-



ance between the proletariat and the peasantry. "Marx," writes Vandervelde in his article, "only conceived the approach of the peasantry to Socialism after the expropriation of all the most highly concentrated large estates, meanwhile we may observe in various places a gravitation of the smaller peasants towards Socialism." Does this not contradict the teaching of Marx? Oh! no, replies Vandervelde: "This does not contradict, but on the contrary, confirms Marx's fundamental axiom that without capitalism, there can be no Socialism. As an example of this, we see the small peasant holders whose sons work in the town as wage labourers and who come under the political influence of the younger generation. This also applies to the rentiers of the Bourbon region who may be considered as handicraft workers, and also the small farmers in the wooded central region, who are chiefly employed in wood-cutting. Lastly, we have a similar case with the peasants in Languedoc, who have transferred from primitive methods of economy to barter. Last year, I was in the village of Vinon, along the river Dourens. In this village, nearly all the peasants are owners. There are only three or four workers, and these work in mills. There are neither landlords, nor large proprietors, as a result of which the class struggle does not exist in this locality. In spite of this, in the municipal and parliamentary elections in Vinon, the Socialists received more than 80 per cent. of the votes. What is the Socialism of these free peasants who toil hard and make a fairly good living? One dare not speak about Communism to them or even about collectivism as applied to the land. They would knock you flying with their pitchforks; why, they are even indifferent towards agricultural co-operation. Their individualism regards the latter with disgust. *But they suffer as a result of the parasitism of the middlemen* (my italics.—A.M.). They feel the burden of the far-off covert big capitalism. *They understand quite well and express their approval when you talk to them about Socialisation of transport, of electricity, the mines and the large agricultural industry. They feel their political solidarity with the other toilers against the "big capitalists"* (my italics, A.M.). On the other hand, they are thoroughly democratic, pacifist and anti-militarist in their honour. They think of the recent war with horror, and similarly when they think about what it will be in the future. *They see in Socialism a great force, the greatest of forces acting on the world . . .* (italics mine, A.M.). Is it possible, then, in commencing with this, to explain to them their conception of Socialism and slightly increase our recruiting among the peasants who are neither farmers, nor industrial proletarians?"

We were occupied, said Vandervelde, with this question in France. "Detailed investigations were continued in Italy, and *Germany, where Von-Herlach complained that the Socialists, immediately after the 1918 revolution, after only being a short time in power, left the large estates inviolable from theoretical considerations, thinking they would be able to carry out Socialisation later, and did not transfer these estates to the peasantry in order to win them over to their side* (italics are mine—A.M.) But particularly in Eastern Europe, our Balkan, Polish and Russian comrades may discover inexhaustible sources for experience and investigation. There, there are millions of revolutionary peasants. Is it possible to transform them into Socialist peasants, not merely formally, but in reality? **In other words, can we reconcile their undoubted attachment to their own piece of land and their productive equipment together to their conscious acceptance of the socialisation of capitalist property which is a means of exploitation?** Sooner or later, the realisation of the autocracy of labour will depend upon the answer to this question."

I am sure the reader will not complain about such long quotations from this article. Vandervelde presents these questions, but he himself already replied to them on the basis of his own observations, and this reply, certainly unwittingly on the part of the author, is a justification of Bolshevism and a condemnation of Menshevism. It is true, that Vandervelde refers exclusively to facts about the sympathy shown by the peasant proprietors towards the Socialists and Social-Democrats. But **the motives** of this sympathy to which Vandervelde refers, convincingly prove that if these peasants were to listen to the Communists, if they really knew the truth as to what was a Socialist and what was a Communist, as to what was hidden under the phrases of the former, and as to what cause the latter truly represents, they would undoubtedly come over to the side of the Bolshevik-Communists. Indeed, through what motives in Vandervelde's words, did the peasants whom he observed, express their sympathy towards the Socialists? Firstly, because they suffer through the parasitism of middlemen; secondly, because they feel the oppression of large capitalism, and sympathise with the socialisation of large-scale urban and rural industry; thirdly, because having learned to hate war, they sympathise with those who struggle for peace.

It may be asked, with whom would these peasants desire to enter into alliance—with the Social-Democratic Mensheviks, or with the Communist-Bolsheviks if they really found out the truth about them? In Russia, for instance, would

these peasants follow the Communists who have established the monopoly over foreign trade in order to remove the parasitical middlemen, or would they follow the Mensheviks who demand the denationalisation of foreign trade? Would they follow the Communists, who, on coming into power in Russia, nationalised the factories and workshops, or the Mensheviks, who in Russia demand their denationalisation, and the German and British Mensheviks, who while temporarily in power, did not take a single step towards their nationalisation? Would they follow the Communists, who, on coming into power in Russia, socialised the large estates on the first day, or the Mensheviks, who, while in power in Russia for seven months together with the S.R.'s were not able to solve the land question, or the German Mensheviks, who also while in power, could not decide to place their hands on the large estates of the junkers, partly through "theoretical considerations," as Herlach said, and partly through want of time (they were too busy shooting the Spartakists)? Would they have followed the Bolsheviks who were the only real fighters for peace during the imperialist war, and who, immediately upon coming into power in Russia, led the country out of the war, and who are the only defenders of the oppressed races against the imperialist robbers, or would they have followed the Mensheviks, who, during the imperialist war, were everywhere to be found on the side of the conquering bourgeoisie, who shared responsibility for the Versailles thieves' peace, pregnant with new wars, who, in Great Britain, as personified by MacDonald, supported the attack on China, under a mask of pacifism, who in France, as represented by Jouhaux and Renaudel supported the Moroccan expedition also under the guise of pacifism, and who, in May, 1925, at the Paris meeting of the E.C. of the Second International having inscribed on the agenda of the following Congress a point under the hypocritical heading "The Policy of International Socialism in the Struggle for Peace," are preparing a report on this point about—well, what do you think? About the interventionist intentions against the U.S.S.R? Not at all, they are preparing a report on the Comintern and "Communist imperialism."

The Mensheviks are also turning towards the village. And the peasants after having looked these faces up and down, will simply spit at them.

A. MARTYNOV.

# The Coming of the Mass Communist Party in Britain

A Reply to R. P. Dutt

**W**E are always glad when a sinner publicly repents and returns home, but we are also always very sorry to see the sinner relapse. In No. 11 of the "Communist International" (English Edition), Comrade R. P. Dutt begins with repentance and having repented for missing a whole historical period in the development of the British working class movement, immediately proceeds to sin again at leisure. It is a pity the repentance was not more leisurely for the subsequent sins might not have been so great.

In an attempt to recover the ground that he missed in his first article, he not only sets up a number of skittles for the joy of knocking them down, but does not hesitate at sheer misrepresentation. The purpose of the latter it is difficult to understand. Certainly it does not help to solve any of our problems, and might be usefully left to the scribes of the bourgeois press.

To deal with the misrepresentations first. After setting forth the inevitability of the disintegration of the Labour Party and the demand for the creation of a mass Communist Party, he proceeds to estimate the oppositional forces in the Labour Party, to indicate the weakness of the opposition, and to enumerate the facts indicating the progress of our Party. Then he presents three problems arising, and in the second of these, dealing with the question of what must be the role and action of the C.P. within the opposition in order to assist the development to the new Communist Party, he writes :

"Comrade Murphy in his article sets out four alternatives :

1. To "help these masses to effectively challenge the leadership they resent."

2. To "attack the prominent leaders who are typical of the movement."
3. "The Minority Movement to attempt to harness these forces."
4. To "prevent the national Left-wing bloc taking shape in the Labour Party."

Of these four he advocates the first as the "only one course to take."

"This is too simple a statement of the position. To lay down "Helping the Left-wing" as the whole statement of the Party's task in the present process is to reduce the Party to a simple element of the Left-wing and to omit entirely the distinctive task of the Party. But it is this distinctive task of the Party (which may even sometimes involve "attacking prominent leaders" **at the same time as** supporting the Left-wing in general) which must be clearly laid down, and on which the whole process through the Left-wing to the mass Communist Party depends."

Now compare this "whole statement of the Party's task" with what I actually wrote.

### **The Coming of the Mass Communist Party.**

"How ?

"By continuing our demand for affiliation to the Labour Party as an **independent workers' Party concentrating within itself the interests of the working class**, and directing the workers against the bourgeois Liberal politics of the I.L.P., Fabians, and middle class politicians who have taken advantage of the opening of the gates of the Labour Party to individual membership to retard the development of the workers along their own independent lines. By keeping abreast of the changes now clearly manifest before our eyes in the Labour Party, as a mass movement grows, which is inevitably destined to be driven closer and closer to our Party. Our Party saw the change coming in the trade union struggles and has played its proper role in developing the Minority Movement. The Labour Party now manifests similar symptoms. Whereas last year we could only look to Maxton, Kirkwood, Hicks, Purcell, etc., as individuals with left tendencies, now we know that large numbers of workers in the Labour Party locals express themselves in support

of the sentiments they express, and also know that the confusion in the minds of the comrades I have named and their colleagues prevents them harnessing these forces into an effective challenge to the existing leadership of the Labour Party. Four questions present themselves to our Party: (1) Shall we help these masses to effectively challenge the leadership which they resent? or, shall we vigorously attack the prominent leaders who are typical of the movement, drive them further from us in the hope of a direct appeal to the rank and file to join us proving successful? or, shall the Minority movement attempt to harness these forces? or, shall we permit them to drift and be content to issue calls for campaigns, with local manifestations of support and prevent the national left-wing bloc taking shape in the Labour Party?

“ . . . The first policy is the only policy we can pursue with any hope of success, with any hope of developing into a mass Communist Party. The fears of many party comrades that such a policy is dangerous to us does not alter the fact that a **mass Communist Party has to be created to conquer capitalism**. If we cannot be bold enough to risk the dangers of winning the workers and workers' leaders who are near to us, who are being attacked by the capitalists and the reactionaries as Communists, how shall we win the workers who are farther away from us than these? How can we explain this phenomenon in the Labour movement other than as a historic process of the working class finding its way towards a clear working class policy of which the Communist Party is the embodiment? We should welcome this process as the guarantee of our Marxian conclusion that a mass Communist Party will be formed in Britain as in every other country where capitalism has to be conquered by the working class. The only way our Party of to-day can prove that it is the real beginning of a mass Communist Party is seen in the measure it understands this process and shows itself capable of handling it. The “left” forces are coming nearer to us and our task is not only to win them still nearer, **but to set before them the fact that they can never carry through the revolutionary tasks for which they profess sympathy until they have joined with us in the making of a party equal to all that revolution will demand of it—a party formed not simply for parliamentary and propaganda purposes, but a party with its foundations in the factories, its units the factory groups, its purpose to lead in strikes, demonstrations, elections and in every phase of the political struggle, culminating in the seizure of power and the dictatorship of the proletariat**. It is this latter kind of party we are striving

for in the efforts we are making to transform our Party on to the factory group basis."

This quotation shows that the policy I have outlined is not a policy of "merely helping the Left-wing." It gives a very definite and specific line for the development of the Communist Party as an independent party; contrasting the Labour Party with the Communist Party both in regard to its political line and its structure. It states concretely that one must continue to demand affiliation to the Labour Party, tell the Left-wing of its weaknesses, and how we must work with them.

### **The United Front and the "Left."**

If comrade Dutt will refer again to my article and read on he will find that I state specifically a number of political issues upon which we can form a united front with the Left-wing as a means to the development of our Party—a programme of action which has been adopted by our Party. For example I wrote "there are many political questions upon which we can fight together whilst maintaining our own political valuation of them and frankly explaining to them where we think they are wrong. Upon these issues we can form a united front, not simply a platform front, but a national organised fighting front. For example, are there not many Labour Parties who will agree with us in fighting for a new Treaty with Soviet Russia, for the rights of trade unions and political organisation of the workers in the colonies and dependencies of the British Empire, for scrapping the Versailles Treaty and the Dawes Report, for international trade union unity, for the Parliamentary Labour Party to be subordinated to the Labour Party Executive, and not vice versa; for a Labour Government to be selected and controlled by the Labour Party, for Communist Party affiliation and equal rights of the Communists in the Labour Party and trade unions; for the nationalisation of banks, mines, railways, with workers' control; for State and municipal housebuilding schemes by direct labour, etc.

"I set these as examples of questions where there is a large volume of agreement which cuts straight across the policy of the present leaders in the Labour Party.

"The Communist Party can unite with local Labour Parties to fight for these demands, without giving away one iota of its revolutionary political integrity. Indeed, it is under obligation to do so if it is a party of struggle against

capitalism and not a sectarian society, and it must perforce help those who are seeking to find the best way of fighting, to come together on a national scale. The actual experience of struggling would carry the workers farther towards the Communist Party than all the propaganda appeals to join the Party separated from the tests of such experience."

This line of policy is not only a repudiation of the misrepresentations of comrade Dutt, but it destroys the foundations of his further criticisms which argue that the line I indicate is the "fundamental subordination to the Labour Party as the essential character of the daily propaganda of the Party." On the contrary, the line is that of an independent workers' party pursuing the policy of the United Front as a means to the development of this party and the revolutionising of the masses of the Labour movement.

But this error is not the only error of comrade Dutt. He says: "The uncritical presentation of the Labour Party as the essential organ of the working class, as the future revolutionary organ once the existing leadership is overthrown, leads to a fundamental approximation to the Labour government and continual blurring of the fundamental differences between the Communist Party and the Labour Party, and a continual under-estimation of our revolutionary tasks. Most of this is weakness of expression and confusion of thought, which is natural in a young Party and not yet politically serious."

Gently, gently, brother, pray. I have a very vivid recollection that it was not J.T.M. who proposed early in 1924, so close "an approximation to the Labour Government" that in the event of a general election our Party should not put forward an independent programme, but should weigh in behind the Labour Government to save it from defeat. This was comrade Dutt's proposition to the Political Bureau of our Party at this time, and if he will keep his memory fresh he will probably agree that the time is hardly ripe for the above exhibition of intellectual arrogance towards the "young party not yet politically serious." Even the Kelvingrove bye-election and the election speeches referred to did not provide us with so blatant a case of "absorption" as comrade Dutt's proposition.

From this position he swings to the other extreme, and in No. 8 of the "Communist International" damns the Labour Party to perdition and sets forward the alternative of "the leadership of a mass Communist Party" without in the



least showing how the mass Communist Party was to come into being or what would be the situation in the interim. After the criticism of comrade Martynov and myself, he remembers the interim and sets off anew to base the mass Communist Party not so much "on the ruins" of the Labour Party as on a "split in the Labour Party." With a thundering broadside quotation from comrade Zinoviev about the "inevitability of the decomposition of the Labour Party," and the "inevitable liquidation of the Labour Party" à la Martynov, all of which has never been in question, he shouts Contrast these with the declarations of comrade Murphy. "The Labour Party is increasing in strength." "The Labour Party will grow in numbers and strength." (See p. 103, No. 12.)

### **The Decomposition and Liquidation of the Labour Party.**

It is assumed that these statements are contradictory, but this is due entirely to a non-historical approach to the question and the leftist kink which repeatedly manifests itself in comrade Dutt's outbursts. What do we understand by the "decomposition of the Labour Party?" Do we mean simply a change of leadership, or the shattering of the Labour Party to fragments, or the transformation of the whole movement? It is certainly difficult to tell what comrade Dutt means. At one moment we have a picture of the Labour Party in ruins, and the C.P. rising phoenix-like from the wreckage.

"Out of the ruins of the old democratic electoral association, which was the prey of every petty bourgeois opportunist, and adventurer, must arise the solid disciplined force of the mass Communist Party of the future, and of the workers fighting under its banner." (C.I., No. 8, p. 30.)

On the next occasion we have to concentrate "on building up the revolutionary mass movement **within the Labour Party**, which mass movement must develop to the mass Communist Party." (C.I., No. 12, p. 105.)

Then we swing along to the jangle of many phrases to the conclusion that "all those tasks indicate the complete transformation of the whole movement (I presume the whole movement includes the Labour Party) from top to bottom, in outlook, leadership and organisation, which is necessitated by the revolutionary struggle to which the movement is in fact gradually advancing, but, etc. . . ." (C.I., No. 12, p. 109.)

It would appear that comrade Dutt has all the rabbits in the hat, and we can take our choice. But this kind of conjuring politics will not do. What do we mean by the decomposition of the Labour Party? If I understand the word "decomposition" aright, we mean the disintegration, the break up, the decay, the dying out of the Labour Party. That sooner or later it will die, I do not doubt for a moment, but that the Labour Party is dying at the present moment all the facts of the present period deny, and comrade Dutt is simply confusing a process of differentiation in a Party of a peculiar character which has not yet reached the full stature of its development with decomposition. To suggest that immediately new currents make their appearance or a change of leadership becomes apparent, or even the possibility of a split, that the Labour Party is, therefore, dying, damned and done for, is ridiculous. It is perfectly true that we must reckon with the possibility of a split in the Labour Party, but it is also advisable that we reckon on a variety of possibilities. To place all our cards upon the splitting of the Labour Party is neither good Marxism or good tactics. The one thing that must govern our policy is that the "inevitable split" shall be made by the reactionaries, for which they will be held fully responsible by the workers. To suggest that I have put forward "an idyllic picture of an evolutionary continuous development of the Labour Party to revolution," or even that I ignore the possibilities of a split, is utterly unwarranted.

In my first article, I wrote: "The attack on the Communist Party is the attack of the bourgeois politicians to prevent the crystallisation of working class politics (which are fundamentally revolutionary), in the Labour movement. **They will split the Labour movement, disrupt it, use constitutions, smash constitutions to achieve their object.**"

Here is no idyllic picture of gradualism or the ignoring of the "inevitability of the split," but both are treated as the incidents of the efforts to create a mass Communist Party, through a correct application of the united front policy.

It is quite good that we should learn from the experiences of the world Labour movement, but we must be exceedingly careful in drawing parallels, and in this respect comrade Dutt is again unfortunate in citing the Norwegian Labour Party. This party swung over to the Communist International on the wave of revolution which swept across Europe after the Russian Revolution. When the wave receded, and the Party was faced with the serious business of Bolshevisation, that is, of transforming itself into a Com-

munist Party, it was unequal to the task, and it split on the elementary rock of individual membership. Norway had no Communist Party. Our situation is totally different. The Labour Party leadership is not faced with the demand of Bolshevisation as a result of wholesale identification with the Communist International. On the contrary, its leaders have been and are the most bitter enemies of the Communist International. But there has been since 1920 a Communist Party steadily growing in strength, vigorously and ever more clearly pursuing an incessant fight with the leadership in circumstances increasingly favourable to the confirmation of our Party's policy in even wider sections of the Labour movement, and the Labour Party itself. The historical line of the British Labour Party is only similar to that of the Norwegian Party up to a certain point. In its approach to revolution, the lines are obviously dissimilar, and whatever split takes place in the Labour Party will not be a parallel to that of the Norwegian Labour Party.

It is quite correct to describe, and no one quarrels with the description that the structure of the Labour Party is a "primitive" form of political organisation, but to argue quite mechanically that because the Norwegian Party split or the German Social-Democrats split, or the Italian or French Socialist Parties split, therefore, the British Labour Party will split at exactly the same stage on exactly the same issue is wrong. It would also be wrong to say the British Labour Party will not split, and indeed nobody says it will not split. Certainly I do not say that such will not be its fate. But what I have said, and what I repeat, is that the Labour Party is passing through a process of differentiation, in which the political thinking is becoming clearer, and that through this process, which accompanies the widening and deepening of the class struggle, the mass Communist Party will come into being through our winning of more and more workers to the ranks of our existing Party, through a proper application of the united front tactics.

The ultimate fate of the Labour Party I did not discuss. It was not in question. But approaching the Labour Party historically and analysing the process of differentiation going on within it, I indicated the lines upon which our Party could reap the results of this process and develop into a mass Communist Party, not through basing its policy upon splits, but by striving to so revolutionise it that the workers cast off the right-wing leaders and elect left leaders and Communists and come under the hegemony of our Party. This is by no means subordinating our Party to the

Labour Party, or making the Labour Party the basis of all our activity. But so long as the Labour Party remains a composition of the trade unions and Labour organisations, we cannot escape the task of drawing them into the path of revolutionary struggle, as the means of defeating the reformist leaders. It is not our task to split the Labour Party, although a split may be forced upon the Labour Party by the reactionaries, but certainly not by us. The task of revolutionising the "whole movement" means also the revolutionising of the Labour Party, which comprises a very big percentage of that movement. The Communist International and our Party as a section of the International have undertaken this task on the basis of uniting the workers in struggle. This policy does not leave out of account the possibility of a split, but gives us a firm, determined line should a split occur, and that is—once again pursue the united front policy as a means of winning the masses, and winning those who remain under the leadership of the right-wing.

That we should continue this line is becoming increasingly important with every day that passes. Had comrade Dutt looked at what is developing under our noses and placed it in proper historical perspective, instead of viewing the situation from the premises of "crises" and "splits" in the Labour Party, he would have seen the development of the Labour Party amidst objective conditions which are driving the great bulk of the Labour movement to the left and on to the path leading to revolutionary struggle. Here, let me make a further correction. When comrade Dutt talks about the activity of the masses, and seeks to separate the masses from the Labour Party, he is confusing the situation in the most stupid fashion. Are not the bulk of the masses who are active, in the Labour Party? Did not 5½ millions vote for the Labour Party at the last election? Was there ever a period of wider and more intense political activity in the history of the Labour Party than there is to-day? At no time, comrade Dutt. Speak to any worker and ask him if he can hear the crashing ruins about his ears! He will laugh you to scorn, and rightly so. He will show you that the more acute the situation becomes the greater the numbers who flock to the Labour Party, and the clearer and sharper become the lines of differentiation within its most conscious political elements. If, through this process, the Liberal, Menshevik leadership is swept away does this mean the liquidation of the Labour Party? Rubbish. It may increase its strength, extend its reach, carry it further along the path of revolutionary struggle. But will that make it into a Bol-

shevik Party, and remove the necessity for the building of the mass Communist Party? Not in the least. There is no alternative to the mass Communist Party to lead the working class to Communism, but at what stage the Labour Party will vanish, and leave the field entirely to the mass Communist Party is another proposition.

### **The Leftism of Dutt.**

Comrade Dutt is troubled with a leftist outlook in this regard. He is obviously afraid of the Labour Party treading the revolutionary path. He is scared almost to death at the prospect of the Communist Party ever getting its representatives on to the Labour Party Executive. He holds his hands up in alarm and shouts: "The Labour Party is treated as actually advancing into the revolutionary period, becoming a revolutionary organ—increasing in strength as the workers become more class conscious." The effect of this outlook is tremendous and significant. Indeed it is terrifying. But not half so bad as a Communist leader developing the leftist kink. Listen again: "The trade unions and the Labour Party are the shell within which develops the movement of the masses towards the new revolutionary struggle. But neither the trade unions nor the Labour Party is capable of conducting the revolutionary struggle."

Have we not heard this before? Is it not an echo of the old S.L.P., the I.W.W., the leftists of the Comintern Congresses who were unable to realise that it is only as the masses enter the path of revolutionary conflict with their unions and their "electoral machines" (Labour Parties) that they learn the inadequacy of these instruments to secure and complete their victory? It is due to the shattering of illusions in the minds of the masses through actual experience that the development of the mass Communist Party becomes possible. But these struggles are not struggles separate and apart from the trade unions and Labour Parties. These latter are not brick buildings, but living combinations of human beings. They are neither "shells" nor dance rooms in which the masses whirl about, but actually the masses conducting activities under limitations created by themselves. When in the course of struggle these workers find those limitations or constitutions standing in the way, they bend or break these limitations. For example, the Labour Party constitution was not formed for strike action. But 1920 saw a joint Congress of the Labour Party and the trade unions set up Councils of Action to conduct strike action against war on Russia. Was this not a revolutionary action?

Again, when in quite recent days the Miners' Federation challenged the mineowners and the State, and marshalled the Trades Union Congress into line, subjected itself to the leadership of the General Council, secured the backing of the Labour Party, in short, pursued the line which the Communist Party had been urging upon them, was this not a revolutionary line? Most certainly it was. And what is more, the Labour Party has grown as a result. It has called into consciousness many workers who were not interested previously, simultaneously with the development of the strength and influence of our Party within its ranks. The growth of the Labour Party, therefore, as we move forward to revolutionary struggles is not retarded, and indeed, if comrade Dutt will cast his eye over the history of the Russian Revolution, he will discover that the Menshevik Party was much greater than the Bolshevik Party, say in the February Revolution, which I would suggest is much further along the route to the Bolshevik Revolution than what we have reached in this country as yet. There is thus nothing contradictory in insisting that the Labour Party will grow in strength and power as the workers become more class conscious, so long as we do not cherish any illusions as to what is required to carry the struggle to a workers' victory.

### **The Possibilities of a Landslide Towards the "Left."**

Let us approach the position of the Labour Party and the unions from another angle. It is generally agreed that the foundations of British Imperialism are crumbling, that British imperialism can no longer afford to maintain British Labour as an aristocracy of labour among the nations, that the working class of this country have now got to fight every inch of the way against continuous attacks from the capitalist class. In these circumstances, where lies the basis for a social pacifist policy in the ranks of the unions and the Labour Party? Is not the history of the last twelve months eloquent with evidence that the basis for social pacifism in the Labour movement is becoming narrower and narrower? What is the meaning of the march of the trade unions towards united action, the rivalry between the General Council of the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party Executive, and especially its right-wing, but the evidence of the approaching revolutionary crash making the masses ever more and more conscious that MacDonald and his middle class clique have got to go? Historical parallels are useful, but nowhere is there a complete parallel to the position in Britain. In this respect, I well remember comrade Lenin quoting with approval the diagnosis of the social forces in Britain, made by Lloyd George after comparing them with France and

Germany, who have large agricultural populations. He said: "Four-fifths of our country is occupied industrially and commercially; only one-fifth is under agriculture. It is one of the things I have constantly in mind when I think of the dangers which threaten our future. . . This country is more top-heavy than any country in the world, and if it begins to rock, the crash here, for that reason, will be greater than in any other land." Comrade Lenin said in regard to this statement: "It would be no sin on our part to learn something from Mr. Lloyd George."

I would ask—has this country not begun to rock? And rocking, is it not shaking to its foundations, every element of social pacifism within the Labour movement? The social pacifists seek for something to cling to, and find nothing but appeals to the bourgeoisie who can no longer help them, while the masses of the Labour Party and the unions become increasingly convinced of the necessity of struggle and—a united struggle.

We are thus face to face at this stage with not a mere split in the Labour movement, but the whole Labour movement being pushed over to the left. Contrast the resolutions on the Trades Union Congress agenda with those of the Labour Party Executive. Can anyone doubt, with the preponderating weight of the unions in the Labour Party that the line of struggle upon which the trade unions are being forced, and which now finds expression in its sharper class war declarations, will not force themselves upon the Labour Party? The Labour Party as the political expression of the unions cannot help but feel this pressure; it must feel the effect, and is feeling the effect. So much is this the case, that everyone who has eyes to see is witness to a terrific struggle in the Labour Party between the middle class incubus, the thorough reactionaries such as Thomas, and the working class forces, who are increasingly in sympathy with the C.P. This struggle may split the Labour Party, and yet it may not. Contrary to a split, it may cast off a number of leaders and pitch them into the Liberal Party or the Tory Party, or out of political life entirely. Their efforts to prepare the grounds for a split have been obvious enough. Did not Cramp, the chairman of the Labour Party declare that if it came to a choice between unity with the Russian unions and Amsterdam, large unions would split away? The danger of that is not yet entirely passed, but the fate of any leaders who take that line at present is not likely to be a happy one, so profound and widespread is the demand for unity. Nor can we ignore the efforts to so increase the individual membership of the local Labour Parties in order to get free

of the unions and secure the real structure of a social democratic party. But simultaneously with this effort to escape and find a new track, we are witness to the revolutionary process developing on a large scale in the local Labour Parties. Witness the large numbers of local Labour Parties challenging the expulsion decree directed against the Communists. So far has this process gone that whatever hopes the "right" wing elements ever had of getting the Labour Parties free from the unions and their revolutionary tendencies, one can see little chance of a splitting movement in the direction of a new Social-Democratic Party based upon the individual sections of the Labour Party, having the ghost of a chance of success. No one can possibly dispute the fact of widespread disgust with the imperialist policy of the right wing, or the growing conviction that drastic revolutionary measures will have to be adopted to meet the challenges of the imperialists. So much is this the case, so much is the right wing conscious that it stands no chance of success by means of split at present that they are deliberately moving back to the unions, and striving to keep the unions and the Labour Party closer to each other. Witness the efforts of Thomas and Bondfield to get back to the General Council.

### What Then?

What do these developments say to us?

They tell us that whatever splits there may be lying ahead of the Labour Party, there is also the possibility and probability of the whole Labour movement swinging leftward under the pressure of the deepening class antagonisms. I do not mean to suggest for a moment that Thomas and Co. will become revolutionary, but because they have no other social basis than the working class, they will travel with the working class along the path of revolutionary struggle in order to betray the revolution even as Ebert and Co. betrayed it in Germany. For, let us make no mistake about it, the trade unions and the Labour Party must enter the revolutionary struggle, whatever their defects, because they cannot escape it. This is neither underestimating the role of the Communist Party nor the factory committees. As a matter of fact, both the trade unions and the Labour Parties may become important factors once again in the creation of the factory committees, exactly as they played no small part in the creation of Councils of Action, exactly as the Mensheviks played no small part in the creation of Soviets. The possibility of the Labour Party growing in strength and power as the masses become more class conscious is, therefore, to be expected as the whole working class becomes more politically



conscious through the development of revolution and even as the Communist Party goes from strength to strength until it has secured the majority of the workers behind it. Then begins the decay, the decomposition, the disintegration of the Labour Party Mensheviks. But if historical precedents are anything to go by, I would remind comrade Dutt that the Mensheviks of Russia passed out of the picture a few years after the revolution and not in the early stages of the struggle for power.

What then should be our line of action? Should it be that of working for a split in the Labour Party, because Thomas, Clynes and MacDonald refrain from splitting away from the trade unions and thus become identified with strike action and the like, as in the recent miners' dispute? Not in the least, but by keeping abreast of the struggle, by leading it along its logical and inevitable path, bringing them face to face with the masses before the realities of the fight, we shall expose them to the workers until the workers drop them out of the Labour Party and the Labour Movement. I know no better illustration of this policy than the policy we pursued throughout the recent crisis. Step by step, our Party gave the lead as the situation developed, until the point was reached when Thomas, for example, said exactly the same as the Communist Party—"Strike." It appeared at that moment to the average worker that our Party was eclipsed, when the very next step tore the sham to pieces. The government retreated after threatening to use "all the powers of the State to defeat the workers." Immediately, Labour leaders cried out that in nine months' time the issue would depend upon whether our working class brothers in the Army will shoot their brothers in industry. At once our Party gave the lead for the next step which the struggle demanded, and called on the Trades Union Council and the Labour Party to enlighten our brothers in uniform, to tell the truth to them about the struggle. This was classic. At once Labour leader after Labour leader tumbled over each other to assure the capitalist class that they really did not mean to damage them or their army, and before the eyes of the whole working class, those leaders stood exposed, and our Party stepped again to the front as the only party that dared to give the lead which every class conscious worker knew instinctively to be the right one.

It is thus that our Party will win the workers into its ranks, secure the hegemony of the Labour movement, and ultimately the actual leadership of the decisive majority of the working class, marshalling around it the sum total of the

social forces that can be used for the complete liquidation of capitalism and the leading of humanity towards the goal of Communism.

Pursuing this course, our Party can face the question of splits, or no splits, in the Labour Party quite unperturbed. We are for the revolutionising of the Labour Party, and the trade unions, and against splits. Splits at this stage of revolutionary history are the answers of the reactionaries to the demands for the revolutionary struggle. Our slogan is—Workers, Unite for Battle! This is the basis of our strategy and tactics, and not the “inevitability of splits.” The “decomposition of the Labour Party” and the liquidation of the Labour Party of which comrades Zinoviev and Martynov speak, are the sequel to the successful application of our policy along the lines I have indicated, and which our Party is pursuing.

The two-fold task of our party enunciated in conclusion by comrade Dutt, is simply a rehash of the policy I had already outlined and translated into concrete propositions. The skittles he sets up concerning the future of the Labour Party now prove to be skittles indeed, for the exercise of his leftist proclivities. His approach to the problems of our movement in his two articles is not the approach of a Marxist, but that of an intellectual, who has lost touch with realities.

J. T. MURPHY.



Editorial and Publication Department  
of the All-Union Central Committee  
of Water-Transport Workers

Publishing House "NA VAKHTE"

Moscow, Solyatka, 12 Labour Palace, Room 120

*Publishes:*

Daily Newspaper "NA VAKHTE"

AND THE

Illustrated Monthly Journal "RUPOR"

---

---

Reflecting the life and conditions of  
the Water-Transport Workers of the  
Soviet Union and other Countries.  
These Journals survey the Trade Union  
Movement of the Water - Transport  
Workers in the Soviet Union and abroad;  
the work of the Central Committee of  
the Union, and of the Local Trade  
Union Organisations of the Union;  
all the latest achievements in the field  
of river and sea transport in general;  
and also publishes a number of  
**BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS**  
on questions concerning Trade Unions,  
— Transport and Popular Science. —

---

---

*Branch Offices and Publishing House:*

LENINGRAD:

Vassilievsky Ostrov, 4th Line, No. 9, Room 7

and NIZHNI NOVGOROD: Debakader No. 4

**Centropress  
Limited, T.U.**



**Number 168  
Camberwell  
Road, S.E.5**