

The Banner of the C. I.
The Outcome in the Saar
Recollections of Lenin

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THE BANNER OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL — THE BANNER OF MARX, ENGELS, LENIN AND STALIN

ELEVEN years have elapsed since the death of Lenin, the brilliant teacher, theoretician and leader of the world proletariat, the leader and organizer of the Bolshevik Party, of the first victorious socialist revolution, the creator of the first socialist state in the world—the U.S.S.R., the founder of the Communist International, which leads the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for working-class power, for socialism throughout the world.

The whole of Lenin's life was devoted to working out the revolutionary theory, strategy and tactics of the proletariat, to the creation of a proletarian party capable of leading the working class to the overthrow of the power of the exploiting classes and to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Russian proletariat succeeded in gaining its great October victory only thanks to the fact that Lenin created and fostered the Bolshevik Party, armed with the best scientific theory, strategy and tactics, and uniting in its ranks the best sons of the working class who were completely devoted to the struggle for the proletarian revolution and were capable of making the greatest sacrifices.

The great October socialist revolution, carried out by the Russian proletariat, under the leadership of Lenin and the Bolshevik Party, laid the foundation for a new era in the development of human society, namely, the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the era of the world socialist revolution.

"Lenin's greatness, above all, lies in the fact that in creating the Soviet Republic, he thus gave a practical demonstration to the oppressed masses of the whole world that there is still hope of ridding themselves of their oppressors, that the rule of the landlords and capitalists is not eternal, that the kingdom of labor can be created by the efforts of the toilers themselves, and that this kingdom must be created on earth and not in heaven. In this way he filled the hearts of the workers and peasants of the whole world with the hope of liberation. And this explains the fact that Lenin's name became the most beloved name for the toilers and the exploited masses." *

* * *

Marx and Engels, the brilliant founders of scientific socialism, were Lenin's teachers. But, brilliant thinkers as Marx and Engels were, they could not foresee all the possibilities of the development of the class struggle over the many decades following

their death, in the new period of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. Lenin was the brilliant disciple of Marx and Engels, the one who continued their work, and not only re-established Marxism, distorted as it was by the theoreticians of the Second International, but developed it further in accordance with the needs of the proletarian class struggle in the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions.

There is a whole chasm between the Marxism of Lenin and the "Marxism" of the Social-Democrats of the Second International and of the renegades from Communism.

The Social-Democrats openly revised Marxism by leaving out its revolutionary essence, while the renegades from the Communist Movement (Ryazanov, Zinoviev and others), in spite of the spirit of the ever-living and ever-developing teachings of Marx, have repeatedly tried to make out that Marx and Engels having said everything there was to say, all that is left for those who come after them is to repeat and explain this doctrine. Such an interpretation of Marxism converts Marxism into a dogma, into a congealed formula.

This dogmatic conception of Marxism was alien to Lenin, the disciple, who continued the work of Marx and Engels.

The manner in which Lenin understood the development of Marxism is best shown in his works. In his *State and Revolution* (end of chapter 3), where he counterposes Marx to the utopians, Lenin says the following:

"Marx deduced from the whole history of Socialism and of political struggle that the State was bound to disappear, and that the transitional form of its disappearance (the transition from the political State to the non-State) would be the 'proletariat organized as the ruling class.' But Marx did not undertake the task of 'discovering' the political 'forms' of this future age. He limited himself to an exact observation of French history, its analysis and the conclusion to which the year 1851 has led, *viz.*, that matters were moving towards the destruction of the capitalist machinery of the State.

"And when the mass revolutionary movement of the proletariat burst forth, Marx, in spite of the failure of that movement, in spite of its short life and its patent weakness, began to study what political forms it had disclosed.

"The Commune was the form 'discovered at last' by the proletarian revolution, under which the

* J. Stalin: "On Lenin."

economic liberation of Labor can proceed. The Commune was the first attempt of a proletarian revolution to *break up* the bourgeois State, and constitutes the political form, 'discovered at last,' which can and must take the place of the broken machine. We shall see below that the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, in different surroundings and under different circumstances, have confirmed Marx's brilliant analysis of history."

It was in this Marxist fashion that Lenin understood Marxism, as the scientific theory of the class struggle of the proletariat, gradually supplemented and further developed on the basis of the new historical experience of this struggle.

Thus, continuing the work of Marx, Lenin, in the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 pointed to the Soviets as the concrete form to be taken by the dictatorship of the proletariat in all countries where it is possible to bring about the transition to socialism.

Lenin developed Marxism further on the basis of a study of the historical course of the development of the working class movement. Since the period when the center of the revolutionary storms was transferred to Russia, when Russian problems became the basic problems facing the international working class movement, the further development of Marxist thought became mainly linked with the development of the Russian working class movement, with the development of the Bolshevik Party and its struggle for the overthrow of tsarism and capitalism, for working class power.

The victory of the socialist revolution in former tsarist Russia, the establishment of the Socialist Soviet Union, was not only the mightiest historical triumph of Marxism-Leninism—the only genuine Marxism in the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions—but made the further development of Marxist-Leninist theory necessary and possible.

The German fascists have proclaimed that they have annihilated Marxism in Germany. . . . But hardly a year after this solemn statement was made Goering himself was forced to make a new statement to the effect that Marxism is alive, that the struggle against it must be intensified, and that Marxism cannot be destroyed in Germany without destroying it on a world scale. Marxism is alive in Germany, we say, because it cannot be destroyed, since the working class exists, and Marxism is the revolutionary theory of this class. What has been destroyed is only the pseudo-Marxism of Social-Democracy with the aid of which Social-Democracy held back the masses from the revolutionary struggle, as well as the democratic illusions of the masses.

It is only the Social-Democratic, anti-Marxist theory regarding the peaceful democratic road to socialism that has become bankrupt.

Marxism-Leninism is not only alive. In the Soviet

Union, Lenin's Party is in power and is advancing from victory to victory. Thanks to the Leninist leadership of the Bolshevik Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., thanks to the leadership of our brilliant leader, Comrade Stalin, the eleven years that have passed without Lenin have brought the toiling masses a number of new tremendous victories. Socialist heavy industry has successfully over-fulfilled its plan, and the working class has scaled new heights of modern technique. The collective farm system has become consolidated finally and irrevocably, the collective farmers are becoming well-to-do and the collective farms are becoming Bolshevik farms. The ability of the U.S.S.R. to defend itself has grown enormously and has provided the toiling masses with new possibilities for defending their rights to engage in socialist construction and to attain a better life. The most important capitalist States have been compelled to invite the Soviet Union into the League of Nations and to recognize it as a great Power. The Bolshevik words uttered by the representative of the first socialist State have begun to be heard from the tribune of the League of Nations, this assembly of the most important representatives of the capitalist world.

There is a growth throughout the world of the sympathy of very large masses of toilers for the Soviet Union, the land which shows the oppressed of all countries that the road to their liberation lies through armed uprising against the exploiting classes, and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat which means broad democracy for all those who toil and a ruthless dictatorship against the exploiting classes.

These huge successes achieved by the Soviet Union are successes gained by the theory, strategy and tactics of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and constitute the realization in practice of what is the only correct scientific theory.

The socialist development of the Soviet Union necessitates the further development of the theory of Marx and Lenin. The existence of the socialist State has enriched the proletariat by new methods of struggle against the tyranny of the exploiting classes. Socialism has been converted from a theory into a real activity being carried out by 170,000,000 people. Not only has the correctness of the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin been demonstrated thereby, but it has also determined the path of the development of the entire world to socialism. Not only has the theory of the transition from capitalism to socialism through the dictatorship of the proletariat been confirmed thereby, but it has also provided an example of how to carry this theory into practice. Therefore, anyone who seriously faces the problem of the struggle for socialism must study the experiences of the Soviet Union, and master the

theory which has led the Soviet Union to world-historic victories. Therefore, anyone who adopts a hostile attitude to the Soviet Union, who refuses to recognize this tremendous process of the reconstruction of human society, is a pseudo-socialist, *i.e.*, a socialist only in words, and in practice an adherent of the existing capitalist system of the oppression and exploitation of the toiling masses.

Marx and Engels formulated the laws of the development of capitalist society and demonstrated that the contradictions between the development of the productive forces and the relations of production which have become a hindrance to it under capitalism inevitably lead to the socialist revolution, and proved that the dictatorship of the proletariat must be the transitional form from capitalism to socialism, from the State to a society without a State. Lenin developed the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat further, and disclosed the Soviets as the concrete form for bringing about this dictatorship. He proved that it is possible to break the imperial chain of States first of all in the weakest links in this chain, proved that the victory of socialism in a single country is possible, and defined the tactics and strategy of the proletariat in the socialist revolution. Stalin developed the theory of the transition from capitalism to socialism to a higher stage. In the culminating period which to a certain extent called to mind the culminating period of November, 1917, Stalin ideologically shattered those who departed from Leninism on the question which has become a fundamental one, namely, that of the possibility of constructing socialism in one country under conditions where the world revolution is postponed. He also showed in practice how this mighty task may be victoriously accomplished if the proletariat is correctly led, thereby creating a mighty lever for the development of the world revolution. At the same time, Stalin defined the tactics of the Communists in the capitalist countries when the proletariat is already in power in one country and is successfully building the new socialist society.

Lenin, and later Comrade Stalin, have enriched Marxism, and have shown the whole world what tremendous reserves of strength the proletariat has in what is the only correct theory, if guided by it in a Bolshevik manner. Lenin showed that the age-old dream of the toilers, their liberation from the hateful yoke of the exploiters can be realized, and that what is needed is first and foremost the creation of a Bolshevik Party, to liquidate all the opportunists, to isolate the leaders of the Social-Democracy from the masses, and to win over the majority of the working class and, despite difficulties and unavoidable sacrifices, to proceed to armed uprising for the conquest of the dictatorship of the proletariat. His brilliant successor, Comrade Stalin, has shown how

socialism has to be built, showed what are the paths that lead to its final victory if there is a firm, unwavering Bolshevik Party, and that the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat requires immeasurably fewer victims than does continued suffering under the yoke of capitalism.

The successes achieved by socialism in the U.S.S.R. have proved to the whole world the correctness of the theory, strategy and tactics of Lenin and Stalin.

The victory of fascism in Germany and Austria which rose organically out of bourgeois democracy in the circumstances of the crisis of capitalism has proved to the whole world the incorrectness of the theory, strategy and tactics of Social-Democracy.

The theory of Marxism-Leninism is becoming the theory of ever-increasing masses of toilers throughout the world.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is becoming the goal of the struggle carried on by ever new millions of workers in the capitalist countries.

Socialism is becoming the glorious dream of all those who suffer from the brutal exploitation and oppression of the toilers.

For many years Social-Democracy saved capitalism from the proletarian revolution.

"Petty-bourgeois democracy in the capitalist countries, represented in its leading section by the Second and Second-and-Half Internationals, is the main support of capitalism at the present time in so far as it retains influence over the majority or a considerable section of the industrial workers and office employees who fear that in case of revolution they will lose the comparative well-being they enjoy through the privileges of imperialism. But the growing economic crisis is everywhere worsening the conditions of the broad masses, and this circumstance, along with the ever more evident inevitability of new imperialist wars while capitalism is preserved, renders the above-mentioned support ever more shaky."

The first round of imperialist wars and revolutions could not as yet shatter this prop of capitalism among the masses of the people. It grew stronger during the years of stabilization. But as a result of the world economic crisis and the intensification of the world crisis of capitalism, as a result of the incredible torments of hunger and unemployment, and faced with the horrors of fascism and the threat of a new war, the formerly passive masses are beginning to come into movement. The social buttress of capitalism among the masses of the people has not yet been completely shattered, but is becoming more and more so in all capitalist countries:—

"The masses of the people have not yet reached the point of storming capitalism, but the idea of storming capitalism is maturing in the consciousness of the masses—there can hardly be any doubt about this." (Stalin, Seventeenth Party Congress, C.P.S.U.)

The revolutionary crisis is maturing and will continue to mature. The slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the slogan of Soviet Power, is becoming more and more popular.

The Thirteenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. stated in 1933 that at any moment a turning point may be reached which will signify the transformation of the economic crisis into a revolutionary crisis. This turning point has not yet been reached on a world or all-European scale, or even in some big imperialist country, but sharp changes and turns of events have taken place in a number of countries during the past year such as demonstrate the maturing of a world revolutionary crisis and which in some countries have already led to the entire apparatus of the bourgeois State being thrown out of gear. The armed struggle in Austria and the general strike in France in February, 1934, the tremendous growth of the strike movement in America, the united front movement in all the capitalist countries, and particularly the armed struggle in Spain and the proletarian uprising in Asturias in October, 1934, show that the class struggle of the proletariat is rising month by month to an ever higher level, that ever broader masses of the toilers, formerly passive and far removed from the political struggle, are being attracted into the revolutionary struggle. The forecast made by Comrade Stalin to the effect that "the revolutionary crisis will mature the more rapidly as the bourgeoisie become more involved in military combinations, as they take up terrorist methods of struggle more frequently against the working class and the toiling peasants," is being confirmed.

The experience of the last year of the class struggle has shown the broad masses of the workers that if the fascist offensive and the preparation for war are to be smashed, all the forces of the working class need to be united and the level of the struggle must be raised to that of the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The toiling masses in all countries are turning more and more to this path. The determination of the Social-Democratic workers to fight alongside the Communists is rising in all countries. In a number of countries agreement has been reached between the Communist Parties and the Social-Democratic Parties for the joint struggle against the capitalist offensive, fascism and war.

The aim of our strategy is to overthrow the capitalist system as a whole. But taking into account the present state of the organization and class consciousness of the workers, the immediate tactical problem facing the Communists at present is to offer determined resistance to the capitalist attack on the standards of living of the workers, to sweep back the fascist offensive and the preparations of a new imperialist war, so as to prepare the masses in the process of these struggles for a determined struggle

for power. The most important task, under these conditions, facing the revolutionary party of the proletariat in all capitalist countries is to establish *the united front of the working masses*.

For many years the Communists consolidated their ranks by fighting against Social-Democracy and opportunists of all kinds, and carrying on propaganda for Leninist theory and preparing cadres to lead big mass movements. But it was not possible for them to carry the decisive strata of the proletariat with them. But now, when the revolutionary crisis is maturing in all countries, when a profound unrest has begun among the broadest masses of the toilers, the Communists can and must address themselves to the whole of the working class, speak to millions of people and rouse these millions to the revolutionary struggle. The time has now come when the Communists must base all their tactics on setting into motion the millions who were previously indifferent to the revolutionary struggle. Only the bold application of the tactics of the united front will open for the Communists the path to the broad masses of the workers who are under the influence of the reformists, will make it possible for these masses to be taught the revolutionary class struggle, by raising them from the struggle for elementary demands and the defense of their every-day needs to the struggle against fascism, war and capitalism as a whole. For millions of Social-Democratic and unorganized workers the united front is a school of class struggle, no matter how the Social-Democratic leaders try to limit the scope of joint action. The Communist Parties must therefore display the greatest initiative, flexibility and wisdom at the present day, based on a study of the principles of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and on the experience of the international labor movements as a whole. Therefore, the present international situation, which faces each Communist with tasks which are higher than at any time in the history of the working class movement, also presents much higher demands in respect to the ability to apply Leninist theory, tactics and strategy to the concrete conditions of the present day in their own country.

How can the masses be roused for the overthrow of the capitalist regime? How can the masses be roused to the determined struggle against the capitalist state?

The experience of the revolutionary class struggle shows that for this purpose all the forces of the revolutionary party must be concentrated on the point that is most vulnerable so far as capital is concerned. Though the working class is not yet ready to begin the storming of capitalism, it is revolting with all its strength against a further worsening of its conditions, against fascist terror and the preparations for a new imperialist war. The strug-

gle against fascism and the preparations for a new war, is drawing very large masses into the movement, showing them the disgusting face of modern capitalism.

Does this mean that in concentrating the struggle against the capitalist offensive, fascism and preparations for war, the Communists hope to "ennoble" capitalism, to ameliorate its morals, and to avoid war while capitalism continues to exist?

Is it possible to bring about a state of affairs where capitalism exists without war and imperialist robbery. This would mean that capitalism would cease to be imperialism, must cease to be capitalism, and cease to be itself. Is it possible to induce the capitalists to give up their attacks on the standard of living of the working class, to give up their attempts to destroy the last vestiges of the democratic rights and social gains of the working class, to abandon their transition to fascism? It would mean that in conditions where the class struggle is being sharpened, capitalism must not resort to ever more violent methods of struggle against the working class, must not transfer the burdens of the crisis and the depression on the toiling masses. Theoretically a situation could be conceived where capitalism continues to exist but is not in a condition to increase its plundering of the working masses, is not in a condition to throw itself into a new military adventure, is not in a position to reorganize its State apparatus. But to achieve this, such a pressure on capitalism by the toiling masses is required as would be tantamount to the beginning of revolution.

Therefore, when we speak of the struggle against the capitalist offensive, against fascism and war, under the leadership of the Communists, this is a method of drawing the masses into a determined struggle against fascism as a whole, for the overthrow of capitalism in a revolutionary manner, because the masses have seen the weakness of capitalism and are passing on to the decisive struggle for its overthrow.

Therefore, the fact that the organization of the struggle against the capitalist offensive, fascism and war is advanced as the basic tactical task, arises from the Leninist setting of the question of the rallying of the masses and the formation of the revolutionary army of the proletariat for decisive class battles.

If under these circumstances the Communist International places the tactics of the united front in the forefront, this is because these very united front tactics are the form of the struggle and of the organization of the masses which correspond most closely to the present conditions of upsurge of the revolutionary movement of the masses and can facilitate and ensure the approach of the masses to a revolutionary position, the rallying of millions of workers to the revolutionary front.

"With the vanguard alone victory is impossible.

To throw the vanguard alone into the decisive battle when the whole class, when the broad masses have not yet taken up a position either of direct support of the vanguard, or at least of benevolent neutrality towards it . . . would not merely be folly, but a crime. And in order that actually the whole class, that actually the broad masses of toilers and those oppressed by capital may take up such a position, propaganda and agitation alone are not sufficient. For this the masses must have their own political experience. Such is the fundamental law of all great revolutions, confirmed now with astonishing force and vividness not only in Russia but also in Germany." (*Lenin*: Vol. xvii.)

The October Socialist Revolution was victorious because the entire working class and the broad masses of peasants took up a position either of direct support or of benevolent neutrality towards the Communist Party. In 1919 the German Communist Party was unable to win because it was an insignificant minority, only the vanguard, without the support of the masses. In 1933 the German Communist Party could not call the masses to the struggle because, although it was a mass party, it did not have the support of the majority of the working class; on the contrary the majority of the working class supported the Social-Democrats, and the broad masses of the working class had not yet become convinced on the basis of their own political experience that the only way out was the revolutionary way indicated by the Communists. In 1933 the vanguard of the German working class already realized the necessity of overthrowing capitalism and the inevitability of the incredible suffering which the proletariat would have to undergo under the power of the fascists. But the broad masses of the proletariat still remained neutral in this struggle against fascism. Therefore, the German Communist Party was unable to call the masses to the decisive struggle.

The masses learn rapidly under the heel of fascism, and under the threat of fascism. They need to be united and must be taught in the struggle. Socialist revolutionary consciousness must be brought to the masses by the Communists. It is absolutely harmful and fatal to expect that the masses will themselves arrive at an understanding of the need for the revolutionary struggle. For the revolution the masses must be organized.

The tactics of the united front and the strengthening of the Communist Party are two tasks closely inter-connected.

The Communist Parties have become ideologically strong in an unceasing struggle against the capitalist offensive, against fascism and war. In the first round of proletarian revolutions, the situation which was favorable for the proletariat could not be used to achieve victory in the foremost capitalist countries because the Communist Parties were still weak,

inexperienced and without authority among the masses, and did not know how to carry with them the broad masses of the people who were prepared to advance to storm capitalism. Nowadays, on the other hand, the highest duty facing the politically consolidated and solid Communist Parties, which know that events are moving towards revolution is to try now to break the masses away from the S.-D. Party, to unite them under their banners, to win their confidence by leading the every-day struggles on the basis of the united front, so as in the long run to stand at the head of their struggle for socialism.

The experience of the entire development of the class struggle of the proletariat shows that the victory over fascism requires that the struggle of the masses be raised to the level of the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for socialism. In a number of countries agreements have been reached between the Communists and Social-Democratic Parties for joint struggle against fascism and war. *This is only the first step, the first stage.* The united front struggle is an extremely important stage in the mighty liberation struggle of the proletariat, but in the decisive class struggles for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for socialism, the proletariat will only be victorious *under the banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, under the banner of the Communist International.*

Therefore the task of all tasks is to strengthen the Communist Parties and to carry on a determined struggle against conciliation and opportunism, for the winning of the majority of the working class and to prepare them for decisive class battles.

The Bolsheviks were strong in the fact that over 30 years ago, at the dawn of the Russian working class movement, they split away from Menshevism, and cleansed their Party of the opportunists, the Mensheviks. The Bolsheviks are strong now owing to the fact that, like Lenin 20 years earlier, Comrade Stalin in 1923-26 recognized in the disputes with Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev the new Menshevism which led to the departure of the followers of Trotsky and Zinoviev into the camp of counter-revolution.

The Mensheviks, from whom Lenin and the Bolsheviks split in 1902 on the question of the first point in the Party Statutes, have long since become a party of counter-revolution and have fought alongside the white guard generals against the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. The Trotskyites,

who waged the struggle against Bolshevism on the question of the possibility of constructing socialism in one country alone, have become the foremost detachment of international counter-revolution. Zinoviev, Kamenev and Co., who at first combatted the Bolshevik Party on the same question of the possibility of constructing socialism in one country, trained the counter-revolutionary groups which organized terror against the leaders of the Bolshevik Party and committed the dastardly murder of Comrade Kirov, just as 16 years ago the gangs led by Noske murdered Luxemburg and Liebknecht.

In a revolutionary situation the masses learn rapidly and the Social-Democratic workers of yesterday are quickly coming into the camp of revolution.

But in a revolutionary situation ghosts walk quickly and opportunists rapidly slip into the camp of counter-revolution.

Lenin taught us to be merciless towards our enemies, but he also taught us to deal mercilessly with the opportunists—the agents of the class enemy in the ranks of our own Party.

A party of the proletariat which wishes to lead the masses to victory must be like the Bolshevik Party. It must rouse the hatred of the working masses towards the bourgeoisie, and teach them to be ruthless towards the class enemy. It must teach the members of the Party to guard the unity and purity of their Party like the apple of their eye.

In order that the proletariat can be victorious, it must have a genuine Bolshevik Party, consisting of the best people of the working class.

“We Communists are people of a special mold. We are made of special material. We are those who comprise the army of the great proletarian strategist, the army of Comrade Lenin. There is nothing higher than the honor to belong to this army. There is nothing higher than the title of member of the Party founded and led by Comrade Lenin. It is not given to all to be members of such a Party. It is not given to all to withstand the stress and storm that accompanies membership in such a Party. Sons of the working class, sons of poverty and struggle, sons of incredible privation and heroic efforts—these are the ones who must first of all be members of such a Party. That is why the Leninist Party, the Communist Party, at the same time calls itself the Party of the working class.” (Joseph Stalin, *Lenin.*)

ON THE OUTCOME OF THE PLEBISCITE IN THE SAAR

By F. DAVID

THE Saar plebiscite has occupied the center of the attention of the whole of the working-class movement of the whole world for many months past. This small region of 800,000 inhabitants has of late

drawn to itself the attention not only of the workers of Germany, but far beyond its own boundaries. It was not so much the fate of the inhabitants of the Saar, as chiefly the influence that the outcome of the

plebiscite would have upon the position of German fascism, that agitated both the enemies and the supporters of fascism.

The voting took place on January 13. There took part in it 529,000 persons, of whom 476,000 voted in favor of joining Germany, 46,600 for the maintenance of the regime of the League of Nations (status quo), and 2,000 for joining France.

Nobody doubted that the majority of voters would be in favor of joining Germany. One of the best informed journalists in France, D'Ormesson, on the eve of January 13, wrote in the *Temps* as follows: "If Hitler gets a majority not exceeding 75 per cent in the Saar, then everybody will turn from him, including the present masters of Germany." What was not clear was the extent of this majority. The voting showed that 90.8 per cent voted in favor of Germany.

The Saar population has for many years borne upon its back the age-old quarrel of the French and German bourgeoisie. This little region, which can be traversed by train from one end to the other in half an hour, lies on the borders of France and Germany, and is one of the main causes for the imperialist contradictions in Europe.

The importance of the Saar for both Germany and France lies in the enormous wealth stored up in the bowels of the earth. There are 9.4 billion tons of coal beneath the surface of this small scrap of Europe. In 1933, the output of coal there was 10.5 million tons, *i.e.*, more than was produced in the whole of Poland and approximately as much as the output of Czechoslovakia. There are 73,000 workers and employees engaged in the mines.

These workers with the members of their families make up an army of 200,000 persons. The mines feed directly one-fourth of the Saar population. In 1933 only 8 to 9 per cent of the output of coal (948,000 tons) was delivered to Germany, 4,000,000 tons were sold to France, and the remainder—over one-half—was used in the Saar itself for the requirements of the metal industry.

There are 36,000 workers and employees occupied in the iron and steel works of the Saar, and, together with members of their families, they make up another army of about 100,000 persons. These works produce over 20 per cent of the iron and steel produced in the whole of Germany. But in order to produce iron, not only coal but also ore is required. And this has to be brought from the neighboring French deposits of Briey and Longwy. *German coal and French ore create iron, steel and the eternal quarrel between the imperialist robbers.*

This quarrel has dragged already over many decades before the world war. When, in 1871, Bismarck dictated his Frankfurt Peace Treaty to vanquished France at the point of the sword, he, of course, did

not forget the interests of the Saar mining industrialists. Lorraine, with its rich deposits of ore, went over to Germany; it had to supply the Saar with ore. The Briey and Longwy mines, which lay 30 kilometres from the Saar, were left to France by Bismarck, since the ores from these mines contain a great deal of phosphorus and were therefore not suitable for production. But in the eighties of the last century a new discovery was made by the French chemist, Thomas, which made it possible to free the ore from phosphorus. The Saar metal industry began to use the French ores brought in from Briey and Longwy which lay close by.

Since then the Saar question has been a bone of contention between the "Comite des Forges" (the French Metal Industrialists' Union) and the magnates of German heavy industry. One side wants to own the Saar coal and the other French ores.

Questions of this sort are decided by the sword. And thus Germany was defeated in the World War and the Versailles Treaty was concluded. The coal mines of the Saar, which had hitherto been Prussian State property, became the property of the French government. The Saar was occupied by the French army. The motive for this given in the Versailles Treaty was to give France an opportunity of restoring the coal mines of Northern France which had been devastated by the war. After 15 years, as established by the Versailles Treaty, the population of the Saar had to decide by a general vote the question of to whom the Saar should belong: to Germany or to France.

Before Hitler's advent to power, there was no doubt at all as to whom the Saar population would vote for. All the political parties of Germany and the Saar, without exception, although for different reasons, advocated that the forthcoming voting should be in favor of joining Germany, for the Saar population is purely German. But when Hitler came to power, the question arose as to how to vote.

* * *

Why is it that in spite of the two years of the Hitler regime, 90 per cent of the Saar population voted in favor of joining Germany?

The point is that even huge masses of opponents of the Hitler regime voted in favor of joining Germany. In Germany itself, at the last general elections, where fascist terror is after all considerably greater than it was in the Saar, a higher percentage of voters, according to the information of the fascists themselves, voted against Hitler. Huge anti-fascist united front demonstrations took place in Seltzbach (Saar) on August 26, 1934, and in Saarbrücken on January 6, 1935, in which many more took part than the number of votes cast in favor of the status quo.

Huge masses of Hitler's opponents voted on January 13 in favor of joining Germany in order to ex-

press their national link with the German people and their protest against the Versailles oppression. Tens of thousands of those who voted for joining Germany will fight tomorrow in the anti-fascist front against the regime of the brown hangmen.

Workers in the mining villages said to those who agitated in favor of the status quo: "We want to join our German brothers so as to fight against Hitler together with them. The status quo situation cannot hold out for long. If the Saar does not go to Germany it will in the long run go to France, and our district is populated by Germans exclusively."

The Saar Catholics said: "Hitler persecutes the Catholics. But for the very reasons that we are Christians, we must join our brother Catholics in Germany in order to suffer and fight together with them."

The Saar electors voted, not in favor of Hitler, but on behalf of Germany.

For fifteen years the Saar has been under the heel of the French occupants. French officials and directors ran the mines, and behaved in a manner usual for conquerors. The mines were rapaciously exploited, the French bourgeoisie tried to get as much as possible and to give nothing in exchange. The most elementary safety measures to safeguard the lives of the miners were not observed. Consequently nowhere in the world was there such a high percentage of accidents as in the Saar mines. The majority of the stock of the Saar iron and steel industry is in the hands of French capitalists. *National and social oppression went hand in hand. The French occupants were at the same time capitalists and exploiters.*

For long years the French bourgeoisie has been pursuing the policy of Frenchizing the district in the Saar. French schools were established to which the miners had to send their children, often under penalty of dismissal. The French capitalists, openly in the first few years, and then behind the screen of the government commission of the League of Nations, gradually and step by step took away from the Saar toilers the few rights and liberties they had won for themselves. The population waited for January 13, 1935, with a view to putting an end to this rule, to express by voting their protest, their hatred towards the oppressors, and to avenge all their wrongs. And thus the population acted, and as a result fell out of the frying-pan and into the fire.

For a whole year the terror of the German fascists has been raging in the Saar. The German capitalists of the Saar, of course, led by Rechling, the steel magnate who at one time fled from the German revolution and welcomed the advent of the French troops of occupation, were not loath to play a patriotic tune this time. Rechling, in 1918, could not wait for the arrival of General Andlauer, the commander

of the army of occupation, who was hated more than any other by the Saar inhabitants, and he arranged for the French troops to occupy Velkingen, his residency, before the date established by the armistice; now he has become the leader of the "German Front", a united organization formed by the fascists, which includes all the unified bourgeois parties of the Saar. The fascist terror knew no bounds, resorting to terror on the streets as well as to economic and moral terror. During 1934, the workers' districts and villages of the Saar were flooded with leaflets in which, among other things, it stated:

"At the last minute we appeal to you in grave words!

"You don't want to become a scoundrel!

"You don't want yourself and your children to be hated and anathematized!

"You don't want to be branded a traitor to your fatherland!

"You don't want to emigrate to Lorraine in 1935!

"Don't forget the year 1935!"

Landlords turned the open supporters of the status quo out of their apartments, who were frequently unable to rent rooms elsewhere. German employers and foremen in the factories invited the workers to join the German Front, threatening to dismiss them if they did not.

During the last few months the same practice was used by German managers and foremen in establishments belong to French firms. At the same time the government commission, appointed by the League of Nations and influenced to a considerable degree by the French, actually closed its eyes to the street terror of the fascist bands maintained at the expense of the German government. Long before the transition of power to the "Third Empire" in the Saar, the Hitler government, for which extra tens of thousands of votes in the Saar was of considerable importance, paid the French bourgeoisie handsomely for the right to terrorize the Saar population.

The Franco-German agreement, concluded long before the plebiscite, concerning the regulations governing the purchase of the Saar mines, contains several secret, unpublished points, as we are assured by the English liberal press. It asserts that the Hitler government has undertaken to make big concessions when the forthcoming Franco-German trade agreement is concluded; as well as several other very tangible concessions.

The demonstrative announcement about the agreement reached between the French and German governments and the transfer of the French management of the Saar mines to Lorraine a few weeks before January 13, created the conviction amongst the Saar population that the affiliation of the Saar to Germany

has already been decided and that the voting was a mere formality.

The Hitler government has spent many millions of marks on the Saar campaign. Besides payments to the French, millions were spent on agitation, bribery, the upkeep of a broad network of well-paid agents of fascist organizations in each town, in every workers' district and in every region, and on the maintenance of bands.

In the Saar, 72 per cent of the population is Catholic. The influence of the Catholic priests in the Saar is very great. The party of the Catholic Center which took part in the unification and joined in the "German Front", had 14 out of the 30 seats in the Saar parliament. In general, despite the exclusive industrial development of the Saar, the district is backward with all the narrowness of outlook characteristic of such a province. Only after the war did the population awaken to active political life. Before the war the Saar was the domain of Stumm, the well-known industrial magnate, and of the Catholic priests. Before the November revolution in 1918, the Saar was known in Germany as the "Konigreich Stumm", which had a double meaning: the kingdom of Stumm and the kingdom where nobody, except Stumm, had a voice, all were dumb (stumm in German means dumb). But even after the war, only a small stratum, about 25 to 30 per cent of the population, freed itself to a smaller or greater extent from the ideological influence of the capitalists and of the Catholic Church. The strongest trade union organization in the Saar was the Christian miners' union.

The Catholic bishops Treuer and Pflantz, under whose jurisdiction the Saar region was, called upon the Catholics to vote for Germany. Catholics who openly came out for the status quo were anathematized and banned from the church.

The regional organization of the German Social-Democratic Party of the Saar joined the united front with the Communist Party, agitated on behalf of the status quo; the C.C. of the German Social-Democratic Party, however, openly sabotaged the agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Communists. This agreement and the whole campaign on behalf of the status quo were in sharp opposition to the whole policy of the Prague C.C. which aimed at an agreement with that section of the German bourgeoisie and generals of the Reichswehr which is in favor of "reforming the Hitler regime" and of joint work with the Social-Democratic leaders. The Prague C.C. dared not come out openly against the united front and against the status quo in the Saar, but actually it did its utmost to sabotage it.

Although the leadership of the Saar Social-Democratic organizations declared for the status quo, they were against and hindered the organization of proletarian self-defense.

The leadership of the Saar trade unions all along declared against the trade unions advancing the status quo slogan, arguing that the trade unions are, so to say, neutral and should not deal with politics. Only in the middle of December, a month before the voting, did they declare for the status quo.

* * *

The Communist Party advocated voting for the status quo. Was this a correct slogan? Undoubtedly, yes!

The Communist Party approached the solution to the Saar question from the viewpoint of the interests of the proletarian revolution in Germany. Quite independently of the chances of victory in the Saar, the Communists were obliged to unfurl the banner of irreconcilable struggle against German fascism in the Saar, the threshold of the Third Empire. The Communists linked up the problem of solving the national question in the Saar with the general problem of the German revolution.

The task consisted of demonstrating in the Saar the determined will of the German working class to struggle against fascism and thereby to deliver a blow against Hitler. There is only one way to freedom from national oppression and that is the road indicated by the C.P.G. in its program for the social and national liberation of the German nation. A blow against fascism is a step in this direction.

At the March 30, 1925, session of the Yugoslav Commission of the E.C.C.I., Comrade Stalin, with his characteristic conciseness, gave us the formula of the Leninist principle of approaching the national question. He said:

"The Bolsheviks never divorced the national question from the general question of the revolution, either before October or after October. The fundamental essence of the Bolshevik approach to the national question consists in the fact that the Bolsheviks always dealt with the national question in indissoluble connection with the revolutionary prospects."

Our slogan—in favor of the status quo—was dictated not only by the interests of the proletariat and the rest of the toiling population of the Saar, who, through the fact of the Saar being joined to Germany, lose all the miserable remains of those democratic liberties which remained after fifteen years' rule by the French. It was dictated by the interests of the organization of the proletarian revolution in Germany. Our slogan, consequently, was also dictated by the interests of the struggle against national oppression. Only a Germany freed from oppression by fascism and capitalism, only Soviet Germany, will become a center of attraction and will be able to unite together all toiling Germans residing outside of her borders.

At the beginning of the World War, when broad

masses of the people were seized with chauvinist fervor, the Bolsheviks put forward the slogan of the defeat of the "fatherland" and the conversion of the imperialist war into a civil war. During the first months of the war these slogans met with a very weak response among the masses. But this did not prevent the Bolsheviks from stubbornly and persistently agitating on behalf of their slogans. They were swimming against the stream.

In November, 1914, Lenin wrote:

"The war of our days is a people's war. It does not follow from this truth that one must swim with the 'popular' current of chauvinism. . . . Propaganda of the class struggle even in the midst of war is the duty of a Socialist; work directed towards transforming the war of the peoples into a civil war is the only Socialist work in the epoch of an imperialist armed conflict of the bourgeoisie of all nations. . . . If not today, then tomorrow. . . . the proletarian banner of civil war will rally not only hundreds of thousands of enlightened workers, but also millions of semi-proletarians and petty bourgeois who are now being fooled by socialism." (Lenin, *The Imperialist War*, International Publishers, p. 88.)

To vote against joining the Saar to Germany meant to vote for the defeat of their own bourgeois "fatherland"—it meant to swim against the stream. In addition the vote took place under conditions when there is no war, when the disarmed masses face the fascists who are armed to the teeth. To vote against their own "fatherland" under those conditions demands a high degree of class consciousness.

The Communist Party was not successful in convincing the electors of the Saar that to vote against joining the "Third Empire" means to cast their vote against Hitler, and not against Germany, the Germany of the toilers suffering under the yoke of Hitler. However, the Communist Party fulfilled its duty as an irreconcilable fighter against fascism; it showed to the whole world that under all circumstances it is the mortal enemy of fascism and will use the slightest chance to aim a blow against fascism.

A number of mistakes committed by the Communist Party of Germany, which had an influence upon the outcome of the vote, must also be pointed out. *The Communist Party did not concentrate its main blow against the nationalist, chauvinist intoxication which was systematically organized by the fascists.* To the incitement against the Communists as "traitors to the fatherland", it was necessary to reply with widespread agitation for our program of social and national liberation of the German people. It was necessary to raise fully the question as to what fatherland was being referred to. The fatherland of Krupp and Siemens, Schacht and Goering, Hitler and Goebbels, the fatherland of fascist terror and capitalist oppression, is not the father-

land of the workers and toilers of Germany. The fatherland of the German working class is the Germany which fought in the course of centuries for the liberation of the peasant masses, the Germany of the 75-year-old class struggle against capitalism, the Germany of Marx and Engels, the Germany of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, the Germany of Thaelmann.

In an exceptionally complicated situation, the Communist Party was unable to direct its blows against chauvinism, to develop its program for social and national liberation. This put its stamp upon the entire campaign. The campaign for the status quo in a united front with Social-Democracy—developed by the Communist Party rather late, only in the summer of 1934—was mainly confined to joint rallies and meetings, but joint actions against the German and French capitalists were pushed into the background. The Communist paper *Arbeiter Zeitung*, published in Saarbruecken, instead of a serious analysis of the situation, published sonorous "Left" articles that did not take into account the real state of mind of the masses.

The leaders of the Second International are rushing to use the outcome of the voting in the Saar as an argument against the united front between Communist and Social-Democratic workers. The inciter is the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, whose central organ, the *Zuricher Volksrecht*, published a devastating article on the subject of the Saar plebiscite and against the united front and at the same time against the Soviet Union.

Swiss Social-Democracy, which is at the moment passing through an acute inner-party crisis in consequence of its rejection of the united front, has seized upon this argument in order to aim a blow at the Swiss Social-Democratic workers who are rebelling against the policy of their C.C. The opposition inside the Swiss Social-Democratic Party has taken on an acute form in recent months, reaching a split situation in the party. Ernst Walter, the leader of the biggest Social-Democratic organization in Zurich, has been expelled from the Party and together with him a considerable number of important workers in the Swiss Social-Democratic Party; the Zurich Socialist youth organization has been dissolved. The C.C. of Swiss Social-Democracy wants to split the Zurich organization and to expel a number of organizations throughout Switzerland.

The *Volksrecht* tries to explain the small percentage of votes cast in favor of the status quo by pointing to the existence of the united front in the Saar. It alleges that, thanks to the united front, "different electors supposed that not only the question of the return to Germany of the Saar would be decided, but also the question as to whether the Saar would then be under brown or under red

terror". It is difficult to imagine that in the whole of the Saar region one single voter could be found who would suppose that the status quo meant a regime of red terror!

It is true that the Communist Party in the Saar region developed the program of the proletarian revolution, the program of Soviet Germany. This is exactly the things that the Swiss Social-Democratic leaders do not like. These leaders fear most of all a revolutionary struggle against fascism, the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet Power. The high percentage of votes cast for joining Germany called forth by entirely different causes, is explained by the Social-Democratic leaders as caused by the agitation of the German Communist Party for a Soviet Germany. This only shows the blind hatred of Soviet Power by these gentlemen.

The article concludes with a defense of the terrorists who murdered Comrade Kirov and declares that there is no essential difference between the fascist dictatorship in Germany and Italy and the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union. The C.C. of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, which signed the minority statement at the plenary session of the Executive Committee of the Second International calling for a united front with the Communists, were forced to print in their central organ, the *Berner Tagewacht*, a series of articles on the Soviet Union, where it was admitted that in the Soviet Union the working class rules, having in its hands all the reins of power and are themselves building a new life. The provocative attack on the Soviet Union in the *Volksrecht* is the revenge for the favorable articles in the *Berner Tagewacht*.

The Prague C.C. of the German Social-Democratic Party, with the consent of the Second International, did its utmost to sabotage the united front in the Saar. Now the Prague Central Committee is trying to use the outcome of the voting against the united front. The *Neuer Forwaerts* states:

"The struggle in the Saar, which has concluded, has shown various questions in a new light. Serious thought must be given by those who have hitherto seen in the formation of the united front a great magic means to win the hearts of the entire proletariat and to smash all the jails."

This maneuver will not be successful. The leaders of the Second International, who by their policy paved the way for fascism, are the ones who are chiefly to blame for Hitler's coming to power in Germany and also for his coming to power in the Saar. Now, when in a number of countries in Europe the united front is making its first steps, they are trying to use the successes of German fascism in the Saar (the successes of the same fascism), whose coming to power they helped along against the united

front of struggle of the Communist and Social-Democratic workers.

The harm which the leaders of the Second International did to the interests of the working class, and the harm which they are continuing to do, and which led to the successes of fascism, cannot be rectified by the first endeavors of the united front. The lesson to be learned from the united front in the Saar is that the united front was set up too late, the united front limited itself in the main to rallies and meetings, joint actions against the German and French capitalists were pushed into the background. The conclusion that the workers of capitalist countries will draw from the outcome of the voting in the Saar is: to extend the united front still more widely, to convert it into a front of joint action against the bourgeoisie.

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How will the outcome of the Saar voting influence the situation in Germany?

German fascism—this time in complete unity with the French government—is trying to convince the world at large that the return to Germany of the Saar will help to bring peace to Europe. This argument had no little effect upon those who voted as well, for they imagined that the non-return of the Saar to Germany would in the long run lead to the Saar becoming a *place d'armes* of future war. Actually, the outcome of the voting will bring fresh fuel to the adventurist and provocative foreign policy of the "Third Empire". Already by January 15, the *Volksischer Beobachter* had published a leading article which described in detail the plebiscites in those territories which had left Germany between the years 1920 and 1935. The article is written in a tone that is artificially calm, but points out, nevertheless, that frequently "these plebiscites failed to reveal the real mood of the voters". If the *Volksischer Beobachter* was cunning and diplomatic on the day when the figures of the Saar plebiscite were published, the *Deutsch Front*, organ of the "German Front in the Saar", published the same day an article inspired from Berlin, in which it says:

"Germany still has frontiers which are open wounds. The victory in the Saar is only the beginning of the retribution for the robbery which has been made of German territories. We are beginning, with the Saar, to rectify the injustices caused to Germany."

The newspaper gives a map illustrating the article, and showing Germany's adjusted frontiers, in order to make what was written more precise. On this map of Germany, the following territories are joined to Germany besides the Saar: Alsace and Lorraine, Eupen and Malmedy, the north part of Schleswig, Memel, Danzig, the Polish corridor, Upper Silesia, German Bohemia and the Southern Tyrol. The

conclusion which the foreign policy of Germany under Hitler draws from the *outcome of the Saar plebiscite points to new sources of wars in Europe, new sources of a world conflagration*. The slogan of national-socialism is *to create a Germany one hundred million strong*, and fresh fuel has been added to this slogan. These tasks were formulated in black and white in a secret document on the program of foreign policy of the Hitler government, which was published last year in the *Petit Parisien*:

"The task of national-socialist foreign policy is to unite all the regions which surround Germany and where Germans are living, and to achieve the return of the German colonies."

Hitler is trying to use the Saar plebiscite for a new chauvinist campaign. A mighty Germany, one hundred million strong, which will become the mightiest power in Europe, and direct its policy of expansion into the East, into Soviet Ukraine. This is what German fascism at tens of thousands of meetings is trying to knock into the heads of its listeners. But very soon the victorious exclamations of the fascists will be drowned in the cries of hunger and necessity of the broad masses of the people who have been deceived by Hitler. Very soon those who voted for Hitler will become convinced of their fatal mistake. *The blood of the workers is already being shed in the Saar*. In Germany itself the whole of the laboring population is groaning under the yoke of brown slavery.

The outcome of the Saar plebiscite is a serious lesson to the Communist Party of Germany. The Communist Party must show the broad masses of Germans its road for liberation from the social and national oppression. The Party must concentrate its attack against the systematic incitement of chauvinism by the fascists.

The heroic German Communist Party will boldly and fearlessly unfurl the banner of proletarian internationalism against the new wave of chauvinism, against new imperialist provocation on the part of the fascist regime, against the increasing danger of a

new imperialist war and in particular war against the Soviet Union.

Against the fascist slogan of a greater Germany of blood and violence, the Communist Party will offer its program of social and national liberation of the German people, which will open wide the gates of Germany for the free unity of all toiling Germans. To the slogan of a "mighty fascist Germany", the Communists will reply in the words of the program for social and national liberation:

"We are internationalists, because our class, the proletariat, is enslaved on an international scale, because our enemy, capital, has international connections, because only in joint struggle with the whole of the international proletariat can we obtain true national freedom. Only we internationalists can achieve the unity of the whole of the German people, because we alone can give true self-determination, true democratic freedom, social freedom, to all the toiling population of Germany. Only the proletarian revolution, only the revolutionary working class under our leadership, can be the force that will smash the Versailles Treaty and liquidate all the burdens of war indemnities, and will open wide the gates of Germany for the free unity of all toiling Germans."

The German Communist Party, which represents the interests of the whole of the German proletariat, will gather together all the toiling masses of the country into a people's front of struggle against the fascism of Hitler, and for its overthrow. The Communist Party will act as the organizer of the freedom of the whole of the toiling people of Germany from the yoke of fascist dictatorship.

The German Communist Party will widely extend the united front with the Social-Democratic and Christian workers, putting forward demands and slogans which the masses can understand and which they are ready to follow into the struggle, to suit every concrete case; the Communist Party, in organizing this struggle, will lead the working masses and their supporters, the toilers in town and country, to decisive battles for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and a Soviet Government.

MORE PROPAGANDA OF LENINISM

By K. GOTTWALD

LENINISM ENTERED THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA LONG BEFORE THE WAR

AMONG the broad circles of the working-class movement of the pre-War Social-Democracy in Western Europe the name of Lenin was comparatively little known. The basic works of Marx and Engels at that time were in most cases out of reach of the masses and the so-called "popular" literature which was dished out to us by the then existing par-

ties consisted of a very cheap revisionist mess. As a result of this there existed a mass of confusion in our heads. There was not even one basic question of Marxism about which we had a clear notion.

The historic treachery of the Second International in 1914 took place in the midst of such an ideological confusion and opportunistic regeneration. True, the masses of Social-Democratic workers instinctively felt that something terrible was taking place, but they could not understand the essence of the events and

did not know what to counterpose to the treachery of the leaders.

Only Leninism opened the eyes of hundreds of thousands of Social-Democratic workers. My mind goes back to what took place in my case when I read my first book by Lenin. This was Lenin's *State and Revolution*. This book was a complete discovery for me: it seemed to me that a new world was opening before my eyes. I at once understood things which formerly, in the course of many years, I blindly passed by. Thousands of other workers felt the same way. And we said to ourselves: had we known *this* before the war, then our secretaries and Party leaders would not have had such an easy job deceiving us! I state without any hesitation: If the teachings of Leninism would have been in the possession of the working class of Western Europe before the war, even to the extent that they are known today, Europe today would look altogether different.

The situation on the eleventh anniversary of Lenin's death is such that the world is entering a new round of revolutions and wars. The Communist International and its Parties are a guarantee that this time the events of 1914-18 will not be repeated—and this is the work of Lenin and Stalin. We must, nevertheless, see that the majority of the working class in the capitalist countries are still infected with various anti-proletarian ideologies. The task of spreading among these masses the clear light of Leninism is the urgent revolutionary task of our Parties. This is especially in connection with our *united front tactics*, with our international struggle for *unity of action of the proletariat*, we must, in a comradesly manner, patiently, and step by step, convince the masses of the Social-Democratic workers that only the road of Lenin, the path of Leninism, will lead the working class to a brighter future.

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One of the problems on which there exists great confusion among Social-Democratic workers is the *problem of the State*. This is so especially in countries where the Social-Democrats participate in the Government. Our point of view on the problem of the bourgeois State is pictured by the Social-Democratic leaders in such a way as to create a barrier between the Social-Democratic workers and us.

How can we destroy this barrier, how are we to explain to the Social-Democratic workers the real meaning of Leninism and how are we to build our arguments? I conceive of these arguments in the following manner:

You say "the State—that is we". You think: The State is a definite territory and the population inhabiting it. You think: The State is something above all classes and which is just towards all sections of the population. You think: The State is something mysterious, something, so to say, inherent in the nature of mankind, something which has

existed since time immemorial, something which is bound to live forever, something unapproachable, something like the holy spirit floating over the waves. But all of this is a deep deception. Look around and think things over.

In what form does the State present itself to you? In various forms. It personifies itself in the form of a policeman with his helmet and club, many of you have felt the effects of this club on your own backs. Or it presents itself in the form of a gendarme with a rifle in hand. How often have you seen the points of their bayonets pointed at you during strikes! Or you see the State personified by the jailer with his big ring of keys, the jailer who put you behind the bars. I should think that many of you have made the acquaintance of the State in this form. Others see the State in the person of a tax collector. Ask our farmers and small handicraftsmen, for they know the State from this point of view only too well. Finally, our youth comes into close contact with the State in the army barracks.

Then the State is not "we", not the territory from one frontier to another, not the holy spirit floating above the waves; the State is something much more concrete, it is the police, the stool pigeons, the gendarmes, the country sheriffs, the judges in the courts, the army, the barracks, the prisons, the policemen, clubs, revolvers, rifles, machine-guns, cannons, tanks and bombing planes.

The State is an organization of violence of one class for the oppression of another class. Or, in other words, the State is a stick with which one class, the *ruling class*, beats the other class, the class of the *oppressed*. And in each case when this stick (the State) is in the hands of the *bourgeoisie* it is used to beat the *proletariat*.

In *State and Revolution* Lenin stated the following on the class character of the State apparatus:

"The State is therefore formed, a special force is created in the form of special bodies of armed men, and every revolution, in shattering the State machinery, demonstrates to us how the governing class aims at the restoration of the special bodies of armed men at its service, and how the oppressed class tries to create a new organization of a similar nature, capable of serving not the exploiting but the exploited class."

But when you lead the Social-Democratic worker to this point he says: "Very well, let us suppose that this is so. But it is precisely our Party that has as its aim the seizure of political power and it also wants to take this stick, *i.e.*, the State, into our hands, into the hands of the workers. But, our Party is attempting to achieve this in a democratic way and not, as you Communists, by means of violence and bloodshed." To this we must reply: "Listen, brother, you think that the proletariat can hope to achieve victory

if the Social-Democracy receives the famous 51 per cent of all votes in the parliamentary elections. You are making a grave mistake. Let us suppose that the present Social-Democracy is really a proletarian party and that the votes cast for it actually serve the interests of the working class (in reality the situation is absolutely different). As long as the capitalists maintain power and as long as they are the masters over the means of production, they will hold in their hands also the monopoly over education, propaganda and agitation. They control the schools, the church, the theaters, the cinema, the press, the books, they own the printing machines, paper, radio, buildings, meeting halls, libraries, etc. What is the value, in the face of such a monopoly, of all the pitiful means of agitation at the disposal of the workers? Is it not clear that the ruling bourgeoisie with the help of its monopoly of education and agitation can spread its ideology in the ranks of the workers and even to a greater extent among the wavering sections of the petty bourgeoisie? How is it possible under these conditions for a real working class party ever to receive '51 per cent' of the votes?"

This is one side of the question. But let us go further. Let us suppose that on one fine day parliament will actually have 51 per cent representatives of the working class. Does this solve the problem of "political power"? Will the ruling class, the bourgeoisie, bow to this expression of "the will of the people" and will it hand over to the peoples' representatives in parliament (congress) political power on a plate of gold? It would care nothing for the results of the elections, it would send parliament to the devil and continue to rule as before. Is this so difficult to understand? Has there ever been a case in history when one class "voluntarily" transferred power to another? Never! Even the transformation from the rule of feudalism to the rule of the bourgeoisie was accompanied with a whole series of revolutions. And it is less possible to avoid revolution today, when it is a question of a struggle for power between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This, then, is the second side of the question.

Finally, the living examples of Germany and Austria showed with the greatest objectivity where this "democratic path" leads to. No! It is impossible to avoid revolution!

If all of this is so, then the question here arises about the *organs of revolutionary struggle for power*. These organs are the *Soviets, as the broadest and most embracing organization*, not only of the working class, but also of its allies, *viz., the village poor, the toiling peasants and soldiers*. Only the Soviets, representing the broadest organization of the whole toiling population and which are the embodiment of the leading role of the proletariat, are in a position to solve such a gigantic task as the destruction of the bourgeois State apparatus. Only the Soviets can tear

the power from the hands of the bourgeoisie and establish a *new type of State, a new form of State organization*.

The fact of the matter is that the Soviets are not only the organs of struggle for power, but the *organs of power, the basic organs of proletarian dictatorship*. Already Karl Marx, after the experience of the Paris Commune, stated categorically that the proletariat cannot take over from the bourgeoisie the existing State apparatus and utilize it for its own purposes, but that this apparatus must be *destroyed* and another one set up in its place. And it is the Soviets that are this very form of State organization of the proletariat, moreover, the *most democratic form* realizable. In other words—the proletariat cannot simply tear this stick (State apparatus) out of the hands of the bourgeoisie, but must *break the stick* and make itself a new one, *viz., the Soviet apparatus*. The bourgeois State, independent of its form (monarchy, republic, parliamentary, democracy, fascism), represents the *dictatorship of a minority*, of the bourgeoisie over a majority, the proletariat and the toiling population in general. The Soviet State, this is the *dictatorship of the overwhelming majority* over a meager minority, over the bourgeoisie, and represents, therefore, the *broadest proletarian democracy*.

"Under bourgeois democracy the capitalists, by a thousand and one tricks—which are the more artful and effective the more 'pure' democracy is developed—keep the masses *away* from the work of administration and frustrate the freedom of the press, the right of assembly, etc. The Soviet government is the *first* in the world or, strictly speaking, the *second*, because the Paris Commune began to do the same thing, to *attract* the masses, precisely the *exploited* masses, to the work of administration. For the toiling masses, participation in bourgeois parliaments (which *never decide* the important questions under bourgeois democracy, because they are decided by the Stock Exchange and the banks) is *hindered* by a thousand and one obstacles, and the workers know and feel, see and realize perfectly well that the bourgeois parliaments are institutions alien to them, *instruments for the oppression* of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, institutions of the hostile class, of the exploiting minority.

"The Soviets are the direct organization of the toiling and exploited masses themselves, which *enables* them to organize and administer the State themselves in every possible way. And in this it is precisely the vanguard of the toiling and exploited, the urban proletariat, that enjoys the advantage in that it is best organized by the large enterprises; it is much easier for it to elect and watch elections. The Soviet organization automatically *helps* to unite all the toilers and exploited round their vanguard, the proletariat. The old bourgeois apparatus, the bureaucracy, the privileges of wealth, of bourgeois education, of social connections, etc., which are the more varied the more

highly bourgeois democracy is developed—all this disappears under the Soviet organization. Freedom of the press ceases to be hypocrisy, because the printing presses and stocks of paper are taken away from the bourgeoisie. The same thing applies to the best buildings, the palaces, the mansions and manor houses. The Soviet government has taken thousands and thousands of these best buildings from the exploiters, and in this way it has made the right of assembly—without which democracy is a fraud—a million times more 'democratic'. The indirect elections to the non-local Soviets make it easier to hold Congresses of Soviets, they make the *entire apparatus* less costly, more flexible, more accessible to the workers and peasants at a time when life is seething and it is necessary to be able quickly to recall a deputy or to elect him to the general Congress of Soviets.

"Proletarian democracy is a million times more democratic than any bourgeois democracy: Soviet government is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic." (V. I. Lenin. *The Proletarian Revolution and Renegade Kautsky*, pp. 32-33.)

Is any better confirmation needed for these words of Lenin than the biographies of hundreds, thousands, and millions of Soviet proletarian men and women, collective farm men and women who have become genuine leaders of Soviet organs, factories, State farms, collective farms, and military units. Is any better illustration needed for these words than those new and determined steps, confirmed by the Seventh Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., for the further development of Soviet Democracy? Yes, within the Soviet borders, every toiler can say with truth: "The State—that is we!"

The "pure" democrats from the Second International have performed the most crooked tricks with the conception of dictatorship. For example, in Germany there exists a dictatorship, and a dictatorship exists also in the Soviet Union. But what deduction do they draw from this? The dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. (*i.e.*, proletarian dictatorship) and the dictatorship in fascist Germany (*i.e.*, dictatorship of the capitalist class), are, they claim, one and the same thing. Or, they say, in capitalist countries the workers work for wages, and in the Soviet Union they work for wages. They therefore conclude this is one and the same thing. Or, they claim that in the capitalist countries there exists an army, the police and the gendarmes, and in the Soviet Union there is an army, the militia and the G.P.U. The conclusion is—both of these are one and the same thing. And no matter how impossible this may sound, the workers sometimes believe them. The explanation of why they believe them is quite simple.

Let us return to our comparison of the State with a stick. The fascist dictatorship in Germany and the dictatorship of capital in all capitalist countries in general is a stick. The proletarian dictatorship in the

Soviet Union is also a stick. True, it is a stick of a different character altogether. Then, they are "one and the same thing", but at the same time they are as different as heaven and earth. In capitalist countries this stick is used to beat the proletariat and the toiling population. In the Soviet Union this stick is in the hands of the proletariat who uses it to beat his former exploiters. And this is no longer one and the same thing. This is just the same as if I am the one that's beaten or the one who is doing the beating.

It is true that in the Soviet Union the workers work for wages. But to whom do all the factories, all the machines, and all the means of production in the Soviet Union belong? They belong to the toiling population and its proletarian State, the Soviets, and to whom belong the factories in the capitalist countries? To the capitalists. Then perhaps this is one and the same thing? But then it would be one and the same thing if I work for my own benefit or when I work for some exploiter. Each of us understands that this is not the same. Certainly, in the Soviet Union there is an army, militia and in general an armed State apparatus. But in whose hands is this apparatus? It is in the *hands of the proletariat*. Against whom is this apparatus used? It is used against the remnants of the bourgeoisie and their allies at home and abroad. However, in whose hands is the State apparatus in the capitalist countries? In the hands of the bourgeoisie. Against whom is this apparatus directed? Against the toiling population. Is there not a difference here? Is this one and the same thing? Certainly a prison remains a prison. But the whole question is who is thrown into this prison? In capitalist countries it is the toilers who are cast into prison, while in the Soviet Union it is the counter-revolutionary White Guards and bourgeois bandits who are put behind the bars. And there certainly is a big difference in that.

* * *

In connection with the problem of the State, the mass of Social-Democratic workers attach very great importance to the question of "*defense of the fatherland*". In this question on our part there should be a very patient and painstaking explanation to help the Social-Democratic workers to appreciate our point of view. First of all, we have to deal here with such a question: the character of any given war is not decided by the war being "defensive" or "aggressive", because the bourgeoisie of each country always considers "its" war as "defensive". This question is decided by *what class* is conducting the war. This and nothing else defines the character and the aims of the war. If the war is being conducted by a reactionary class, by the bourgeoisie, then the character and aims of such a war are *reactionary*, irrespective of which side is the "aggressor". Further, we must explain to the Social-Democratic workers, that the

proletariat can only in the last resort avert such a reactionary imperialist war in one country or another by means of overthrowing the rule of the bourgeoisie and establishing Soviet Power. It is also in this very same manner that the proletariat can reach a conclusion of the war most favorable to the toiling masses if the war has already begun.

We must explain to the Social-Democratic workers that the slogan of "defend the fatherland" is tantamount to a complete rejection of the class struggle and leads to the subordination of the interests of the proletariat, to the interests of the bourgeoisie, particularly at a time when the bourgeoisie is in a most difficult position, when its entire system is being torn to pieces by deep crisis. We contrast this with our slogan of the defeat of the bourgeoisie of our country. We call upon the proletariat to utilize to a maximum degree the difficulties and the crisis of bourgeois rule in order to deliver a death-blow to the bourgeoisie. It is precisely in this that the *root* of Bolshevik-Leninist tactics during imperialist wars lies. The October Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet Union are glaring proof of the correctness of this tactic. How fatal the social-chauvinist tactic of "defending the fatherland" is can be seen from the entire experience of the war and post-war period. For this tactic gave the bourgeoisie the possibility of emerging from its fatal crisis of the war and post-war period and preparing the masses for a new blood bath.

In order to show the Social-Democratic workers the madness of this slogan of defending the bourgeoisie "fatherland" we may cite the following comparison: Imagine for one moment that you are sitting in prison. The prison is attacked, say, by a band of highwaymen. At this moment one of the prisoners shouts the slogan: "All in defense of our prison from the attacks of the enemy!" What would you think of such a person? Either he has gone mad, or he has been bribed by the prison authorities. And what would you yourself do in this situation? What would be the most natural tactic to pursue under these circumstances? You would say to the other prisoners:

"Let us make use of the panic and confusion among the jailers, let's break the bars and the gates, seize the rifles and free ourselves from prison. The main thing is first of all to free ourselves."

Our "war heroes" of the Second International try to justify their policy of the "defense of the fatherland" and their preparations for a new 1914 by pointing to the Soviet Union. For, they say, what sin is there in voting for war credits, building battleships, militarizing the youth and preaching the defense of the fatherland if the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union are doing the very same thing? In such a case all crooks work according to the same recipe. There is an army in the Soviet Union and an army in the capitalist countries; there are tanks in one country and there are tanks in the other. There are aeroplanes here and aeroplanes there; the defense of the fatherland here and the defense of the fatherland there. It would seem that it is all one and the same thing. No, the one is as far apart from the other as is heaven from earth. The fact of the matter is that we Communists are not pacifists, but revolutionaries. We do not keep to the teaching that one should not fight against evil and put up your left cheek after the right has been struck. We are not against war "in general", but only against *reactionary wars* and understand the usefulness of *revolutionary wars*. At the same time we are not against the defense of the fatherland "in general", but only against the defense of the bourgeoisie "fatherland". But we are all the more for the defense of our *proletarian* fatherland.

Is any better confirmation needed for this Leninist-Stalinist setting of the question of the fatherland than the heroic history of the Soviet Republics? Yes, the word "fatherland" sounds differently there. It is not a false and hackneyed word by means of which imperialists lead sons of the working class to slaughter (and will do so again unless we interfere). There, in the U.S.S.R., the toilers have won their fatherland. And this fatherland is the real fatherland of all the toilers, of all the workers of the world.

RECOLLECTIONS OF LENIN

By ROBERT MINOR

I DON'T know in what auditorium it was that I first saw Vladimir Ilyitch Lenin. It may have been the hall in the Metropole Hotel in which the sittings of the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet Congress were held. At any rate, Comrade Sverdlov, who acted as chairman of the C.E.C., was there—one of the first of the Russian Bolshevik leaders that I met.

I remember standing at a distance and looking at the grouping of leaders around the rostrum—the

leaders of the Bolshevik Revolution!—and the great thrill, and the desire to identify each one by name. But I could as yet only go by impressions of physical appearance. A Russian comrade who had been in America, at my request pointed out Lenin.

My whole sense of proportion was disturbed; Lenin, a small, modest looking man, standing in a corner with his foot raised and resting on some object, so drably dressed, with a worker's cap and not even the polished high boots that were then almost universal—

Lenin spoiled the picture of a gathering of great men. I watched him closely to decide whether a mistake had been made; no, this was Lenin, he resembled his photographs, only so much less *important*-looking than all the rest. For some minutes I surveyed the company, entranced with the idea that here at last were the leaders of the successful revolution—the giants of action in the greatest of all events of history! My eyes constantly wandered back to the obscure, small man in the corner who was talking with someone. Then I noticed the peculiar play of his features as he spoke, and as he listened. Gradually he became the visual center of the room and of the gathering. Everything else faded into its place and proportion. Without having understood a single word that was spoken at the gathering I left filled with the impression of just one man—Lenin.

* * *

Boris Reinstein asked me if I wanted to go to see the "Old Man". Yes! How Lenin could spare the time, in those terrific months of the spring and summer of 1918, I do not know! But I believe it is to be accounted for by the intense interest he had throughout every minute of the Revolution in Russia, in the effect of this event upon the outside world and on the Socialists of other lands. I must have been with him on this occasion (I think it was in the latter part of April) for fifteen minutes.

Yet there was very little said by Lenin. He had the way, always, of making the other person wag his tongue, while he used his ears. He wanted to know every minute detail of reaction among the working class of the United States. He asked questions about the attitude of the trade unions toward the Bolshevik Revolution.

I told him of the appreciation among the advanced sections of A. F. of L. workers of the action of the workers and sailors of Petrograd (Leningrad) which had saved the life of Tom Mooney by inducing the intervention of President Wilson which caused the commutation of the death sentence by the governor of California. When I told him I conveyed the official thanks of the trade unions constituting the Mooney defense organization to him as the head of the Bolshevik Party for this magnificent act of international solidarity, Lenin said not one word; merely his eyes glistened.

We discussed the reactionary attitude of the leaders of the American Federation of Labor, of which the Executive Board (as well as the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party) had refused to defend Tom Mooney; and the San Francisco top layer of trade-union leaders who participated actively in the frame-up and condemnation of the strike leader Mooney to death. It was mentioned that the aged Gompers supported the San Francisco labor leaders in the frame-up of Mooney. Soon Lenin said: "About Gompers, tell me—will he *never* die?"

We spoke of the prospect of revolution in Europe, he mentioned the lack of reliable news; and then of the technical methods of getting information across frontiers. I confess that I was surprised to find the foremost chief of the world's revolutionary forces eager to talk about the smallest details of paper, cardboard, ink, etc., in regard to the technical question of transmitting information. Only on this subject did he do most of the talking; for the rest of it he plied me with questions. He asked about Jim Larkin, who at that time represented the pre-Bolshevik attitude among Irish-American revolutionists. I mentioned that in the last speech I heard Larkin make he had spoken of himself as a Catholic. Lenin's reply to this consisted of one word:

"Well? . . ."

Putting it this way, in question form, as though inviting me to proceed, bothered me until I had done a lot of thinking on the subject afterward. Especially I want to tell this incident to everyone in connection with the reading of Lenin's pamphlet, *Religion*.

In this first encounter Comrade Lenin began by speaking in Russian. I only knew enough to say I couldn't speak Russian, but could speak French. Lenin said he could not speak English very well. We spoke in French a while, he switched to German, and then to my astonishment he began speaking in perfect English, only slightly hesitating for a word now and then, but with never an error. (All of our many subsequent conversations were in English, and I do not recall a single instance of his making an error in grammar.) He appeared interested in knowing how difficult a foreigner found the Russian language.

* * *

It was about the second time I called on Comrade Lenin, during the months when the White Guardists were resorting to wholesale attempts at assassination of the revolutionary leaders, that he, after the first greetings, asked abruptly:

"What do you think of the Red Terror?"

I replied that I believed that if the bourgeoisie were not made to know that their efforts to destroy the revolution would result in their own physical destruction, the revolution would have been dead before this. To this Lenin said nothing, but from the feel of his eyes upon me I felt that the question had not been casual. After a pause and a few other words, he asked suddenly, and seemingly out of connection with all else:

"Have you seen Kropotkin?"

"Yes," I said.

"What is he like?" asked Lenin.

"He is a hopeless bourgeois," I answered.

"Yes?" he said, in a questioning tone. "How is that?"

I described my visit to Kropotkin, how Kropotkin, whom I had formerly idealized, had wildly denounced me for refusing to support the "war for democracy"

of the Allied Powers; and how he had continued the denunciation as a group of Americans in military uniform, members of the Young Men's Christian Association attached to the army and then on duty in Moscow, had entered and were bowing before him, greeting him (to his obvious satisfaction) as "Prince"; and how I had left, disillusioned with my "hero" Kropotkin.

Comrade Lenin's only comment was: "Hm. . . That's interesting."

But later some light was thrown upon this conversation: A man I had met as a translator in the press box at the sessions of the Soviet Congress in July, encountered me on the street and in much trepidation said: "The bourgeoisie is in a terrible state of fear and anxiety; some of the most influential are now trying to arrange for Kropotkin to see Lenin and to plead with him to call a halt to the Red Terror."

* * *

Lenin was speaking in a large Moscow hall, high up on a dais with several tiers. I couldn't yet understand much, but recall his constant reiteration of the word: "obyektivno!" (objectively). I had to shift my position by walking in front of the platform. My shoes squeaked with a loud noise. Lenin paused in the middle of a sentence, his finger raised in the air; he looked down at me with a pained, annoyed expression. I shall always remember this uncomfortably.

The unassuming character of Comrade Lenin became the more startling as I became more and more conscious of his character as the greatest force in the shaping of the world in the greatest moment of all history. On one occasion, as I was putting on my overcoat, about to leave his office, my elbow touched a large, revolving book-case, and several heavy books fell to the floor. Instantly Lenin in a matter-of-fact way stooped down and began picking them up, as he continued the conversation.

* * *

In the summer of that year I saw the hard steel character of Lenin, the Bolshevik, from an angle that had not yet appeared in my personal contacts with him.

A man whom I had known slightly in Chicago, or, at least, who claimed acquaintance with me in connection with the organization of the struggle to save Tom Mooney, turned up in Moscow, telling me that he, an anarchist, was commander of a "partisan" regiment at the front in the struggle with the Kaledin counter-revolutionary army. Although there was something unexplained in his absence from the front at that time, and some anarchists in Moscow whom I asked about it expressed doubt of his integrity, they later told me their suspicions were allayed, that the man was honest. But the man suddenly dropped

out of sight. A few days later his wife came to me with tears in her eyes, showed me a photograph of her little daughter (whom I recognized even though I had forgotten the parents), informed me that her husband had been arrested, tried for desertion and stealing, and condemned to death by a Red Army tribunal. She pleaded with me to believe that her husband was innocent, that he was a victim of too hasty action and perhaps a "plot of disloyal elements", and begged me to ask Lenin to intercede for a re-examination of the case. I wrote a hasty memorandum of what was told me, expressing the idea that since the man had had a past record in the labor struggle in America, etc., it seemed that a re-examination was justified. With this memorandum I hastened to Comrade Lenin's office.

One of his secretarial staff took the paper in to Lenin, shortly returning, telling me that Comrade Lenin was in the midst of a Polburo meeting and could not come out; but that he had read carefully my letter and would instantly act as I suggested. Late that night a courier, one of the Lettish Sharpshooters, knocked on my door and delivered a reply from Comrade Lenin. It was written in his own hand in ink. I could barely read Russian well enough at that time to make it out, but its contents were burned into my brain:

"Comrade Minor: I have caused an examination of the case of the person* as I promised. The facts are disclosed to be the following: the person deserted his post at the front during an action. He stole the pay of his regiment. For such a man I cannot intercede. It is necessary to shoot him [*nado rastrelyat*]. *Proshchai*,

"LENIN."

The above text is only from memory after sixteen years. The note was treasured by me and carried in my pocket until I was about to cross the military lines between the Red Army and the German army at Minsk in the middle of November, 1918, and it was considered necessary to get rid of all documents of Bolshevik origin. Comrades Bukharin, Radek and others were in Minsk, having come in with the Red Army. I met Bukharin and others coming out of a food store; they were half starved; each was loaded with his arms full of bread, sausages and cheese. When it came time for me to slip across the freight-yard in the night to the German lines so as to conceal myself in a freight-car full of German ex-war prisoners bound for Berlin, Comrade Bukharin pointed out that I would need my Soviet credentials up to the line, and that I would imperatively need to be *without* any Soviet documents immediately

* The person referred to was a commander of a "black flag" detachment on the southern front.

after crossing the line; therefore, he said, a comrade would go with me, to whom I could give my Bolshevik documents at the line. A comrade whom I had not previously met went with me and took the papers at the edge of the freight-yard. I did not recognize him or get his name with certainty. Could this note in Lenin's handwriting be found?

But to go back a bit. After the incident of my request regarding the condemned deserter, I visited Comrade Lenin several times; but always with other matters to discuss, and never was the case referred to again between us.

* * *

In 1918, during the period when the bourgeoisie of the Allied countries pretended to think that "German war prisoners" in Siberia were being "armed by the Bolsheviks" for the benefit of the Kaiser, I suggested to Comrade Lenin that three men, known as citizens of the three leading Allied countries, of France, of England, and myself of the United States, should take a trip over this territory and then issue a statement showing the absurdity of the wild tale. He seemed to think it over a few seconds, then said: "I am doubtful of that; — is a man who is here today and there tomorrow. No, we can't do that."

To me the most astounding thing about this greatest creative genius and giant of action, whose hand has guided the course of the human race in the biggest moment of history, was his habit of self-effacement in a conversation. After the Third Congress of the Communist International I visited him when I had a bad cold. He himself was not well, but he commented with sympathy on my cold. Shortly afterward he was taken down with a severe illness and I did not see him for several weeks. The newspapers and comrades' personal word kept me informed of his condition, and when he returned to work, I visited him. When I walked into his office, he asked, "Well! did you recover from that cold?" And when I left I remembered with chagrin that we had not spoken of *his* health, but only of mine!

* * *

The German revolution came, and the ending of the war on November 11, 1918. In a feverish desire to go to Germany, I arranged with Comrade Reinstein for a farewell visit to Comrade Lenin. There was a question as to whether I should not wait for the First Congress of the Third International, in which Reinstein said Lenin hoped I would participate; but the time of that was uncertain, the German revolution appeared to be on; and I regret to say that I decided to go.

This farewell visit to Comrade Lenin became involved with the fact that just at that time it was necessary to try to stave off the international coun-

ter-revolutionary intervention, and the Bolsheviks were raising the question of an agreement on debts. It was considered necessary to give the widest publicity to the willingness of the Bolsheviks to come to some arrangement on this score. For this reason, on my farewell visit to Comrade Lenin, I said that I would, on reaching Germany, try to get published in an American newspaper (the *Philadelphia Public Ledger* was considered most likely) an interview quoting Lenin to this effect. Comrade Lenin gave me, orally, for this purpose, a brief outline of what could be said on this subject. I made a none-too-good job of this interview, due to my own confusion on basic questions of the revolution; but the *New York World* did at least publish a very prominent "sensation" story giving great publicity to the gist of the idea—that Lenin was willing to make some sort of an arrangement on international debts. However, the Berlin correspondent of the *New York World* made alterations in the interview, shortening and vulgarizing the most important parts of it; making my not-well-done job into something much worse.

Three years later, when I returned to Moscow the Third Congress of the Communist International, I met Comrade Lenin in the auditorium in the Kremlin. After a word of greeting, I said: "Comrade Lenin, I owe you a profound apology."

"What for?" he asked.

"For a very bad journalistic blunder that I made," I answered.

"Oh, I had forgotten all about that!" he said.

But I was and am sure that his was a friendly "forgetfulness". I promised myself never to make the same sort of error again.

* * *

In the fall of 1921 I had an urgent letter to send to Comrade Lenin, stating the facts of an important matter preparatory to a visit in which I would discuss the matter with him. I got a little boy, about ten or twelve years old, the orphan of a Red Army soldier killed in action, to take the letter to the Kremlin. In order to inspire discipline, I explained to the boy that it was a letter to Comrade Lenin; that he must go quickly, deliver the letter instantly, get an answer and return without a moment's delay. The child was tremendously impressed and rushed away to the Kremlin. I waited, and waited; hours went by and the boy did not return. At last, as night fell, in walked the young fellow with his head high and a very self-important air about him. I exploded with anger: "Where have you been, young comrade?"

"Oh," said the boy, "*I've been talking with Comrade Lenin!*"

I was told afterward at the Kremlin that this was true; that the boy had refused to give the letter to anyone but Lenin personally; that he had waited until

a meeting was finished; that Comrade Lenin had then kept him there and plied him with questions concerning the treatment of the children of fallen Red Army soldiers.

But about the same letter. It was long—about three pages. When I came to his office, Comrade Lenin began the conversation by saying:

"First of all, Comrade Minor, you ought to know that when you address as long a letter as this to a comrade as busy as I am, you ought to put up in the left-hand corner—very briefly—telegraph style—just what the subject of the letter is; and, second, just what you are recommending to be done. Don't you think you ought to do that?" (I think Comrade Lozovsky was present at this conversation.)

It was always a source of wonder to me that in all of the many times that I went to see him—probably twelve or more times—it was always possible to see him (with the one exception referred to above, when he was at a Polburo meeting). I was completely at a loss to account for it until I learned two or three things: that he made this a consistent policy—always to see, if possible, those who had problems to bring to him, that he was doubly interested in keeping in touch with people from *outside* countries, and, not the least important, that Comrade Lenin *organized his time* in such a way as to be able to make the best use of it. But one day I overstepped the limit: overwhelmed with appreciation of the fact that Comrade Lenin had found time to see me and settle a matter in a few minutes that I hadn't been able in many days to get settled anywhere else, I exclaimed: "Comrade Lenin, you 'have more time' than anyone else in Moscow!" Of course I did not mean this literally; I meant that he *managed* to avoid that inaccessibility which men in responsible posts often fall into.

But Comrade Lenin looked at me with an expression of dismay. "No, Comrade Minor," he said, "I *haven't* more time than other people!" On his face I read momentarily the huge and crushing burden that this leader of the world bore, a burden which undoubtedly helped to cut to fifty-four years the greatest life that a man ever lived.

* * *

Immediately after the Third Congress of the Communist International, a number of us from America visited Comrade Lenin at 12 o'clock midnight—the only time he was free—to discuss questions of Party forms under the conditions of that time, the question of our then intangible plan for the founding of the *Daily Worker*, and smaller matters. Comrade Lenin gave us very sharp and clear ideas upon these subjects. I cannot undertake to reconstruct here from memory the formulations he gave us in the affirmative of the two main questions we placed before him; his views are well known and in writing

by himself, and inexact quotations are not to be desired. One of the comrades present, having strong factional ideas of an ultra-"Left" nature, constantly broke into Comrade Lenin's sentences with his own views. Each time Comrade Lenin stopped and waited patiently until the interruption was ended; then proceeded; but the interview was marred. Another comrade was dubious about participation in electoral struggles and asked Comrade Lenin:

"What do you think as to whether we should participate in elections of *administrative* offices; shouldn't we participate only in elections for *legislative* office, in which, if successful, the Communists would not take responsibility for the administration of capitalist office?"

Comrade Lenin replied:

"I think Eichorn made rather good use of an administrative post." (He referred to the Left Social-Democrat Eichorn, who, at the first stage of the German revolution in 1918 was given the post of commissioner of Berlin police; Eichorn used the office to distribute army rifles to the Spartakus workers in Berlin.)

* * *

The last time I saw Comrade Lenin was toward the end of 1921. I was about to return to America and I asked him to let me bring to see him the comrade who was to take my place. Comrade Lenin was intensely interested in all who came from the United States, and was especially curious to know of all indications of the turning of the native American working class on to the revolutionary path, at a time when the Communist Party of the United States was based mainly on the revolutionary immigrant sections of the working class. His first question to the newly introduced comrade was:

"Are you an American?"

"Yes," replied the comrade.

"But are you an *American American*?" asked Comrade Lenin.

"Yes," he said.

"Where were you born? America; yes; and where was your father born?" On being told that the comrade was the son of a European farmer who had migrated to America, he said "Ah!" Then, smiling in a quizzical way: "Minor is an *American American*. Comrade Minor, your father was born in America—and your mother? Yes," he continued, "And your grandfathers? On both sides? Yes? Born in America. Well, tell me, how far back were they in America?" I replied that they were in America long before the revolutionary war against England. Instantly Comrade Lenin asked:

"And in the American revolution, *what did they do?*"

I answered that all that were on record participated in the Revolution.

"Ah-ha!" he said. "You can use that in your trial!" (There wasn't any trial.)

We discussed long the matter of the factional quarrel in the Communist Party of the United States, mostly by Comrade Lenin asking questions. I don't know whether it was then or at some other time he

asked me what was the nature of the quarrel, and I replied rather clumsily that it was a fight between "dreamers" of revolution and "realists". Instantly Comrade Lenin's face clouded at the word "realists".

"You mean," he said, "in the best sense of the word."

RECOLLECTIONS OF LENIN

By MAX BEDACHT

IT has been my fortune to meet Lenin and to discuss with him problems of our Party. The first of these meetings took place in April, 1921. There were in existence several Communist groups not united in one Communist Party. There was the United Communist Party, the result of a unification of the Communist Labor Party and a split-off section of the Communist Party. I was a delegate of this Party. At the same time a formidable group of the Communist Party still maintained a separate existence. We could not get together. Many of our comrades considered hair-splitting discussion about "action of the masses" as against "mass action" more important than the organizational unity of the fundamentally healthy section of the Left-Wing element in America.

My task at this interview with Comrade Lenin was to bring to his attention our problems and to get his advice.

A Red Army soldier had informed me of the time I was to come. As I entered Comrade Lenin's office, Lenin arose from behind his desk at the other end of the room and came to greet me, in the most informal and friendly manner. I had been concerned over possible language difficulties and started to speak to Lenin in German, because I knew that he spoke that language. Lenin said, "You come from America. Let us talk English." Our talk then proceeded in English, which he spoke quite fluently.

Among the numerous questions Lenin asked me, ninety-nine per cent dealt with the relationship of the Party to the masses, with the ideology of the masses, with the issues that dominated the minds of the masses, and, of course, with the methods the Party uses to get to the masses. He pointed out that the conditions discussed by Engels and Marx in their correspondence with Sorge and Florence Kelly are still predominant—a general ideological backwardness of the masses as a result of the strength of their democratic illusions, and, on the other hand, an abstract approach of the American revolutionists towards the workers. He complained that we in America do not understand that we have to start our work on the basis of the conceptions prevailing among the workers; we talk over their heads; we consider the

problems of the proletarian revolution as an abstraction; we do not see that the revolution and the masses cannot be separated; the masses must make the revolution. It is no use to wail about the backwardness of the masses; our task is to change this backwardness into class consciousness.

Comrade Lenin especially emphasized the need of orientating toward the *American workers*. He pointed out that this could not be done mechanically by disregarding the masses of foreign-born workers; it was rather the task of concentrating upon the *problems of the American class struggle*. As soon as the American workers will realize that the problems we Communists discuss and deal with are *their* immediate problems, we will have access to them and they will listen to us and will come to us.

In discussing the difficulties of unifying our American Party, Comrade Lenin criticized the actions of some of the language federations of the Party, especially the Russian. He exclaimed: "Why does our Russian federation insist on being the leader of the American movement?" I cracked a joke, which seemed to amuse Comrade Lenin, by saying that our Russian comrades in America know that Lenin is a Russian and deduct therefrom that every Russian is a Lenin and automatically entitled to leadership.

Our discussion centered around immediate steps for the unification of our Party. Lenin pointed out that we do not yet have a Communist Party in America. The Party is only in the process of formation. No group can claim to be that Party. The first task was to crystallize organizationally a unified Party with the best elements of all the groups—Communist Party, Communist Labor Party, remaining healthy Left elements in the Socialist Party, healthy elements in the I.W.W. (syndicalist) movements, etc. In the course of this effort and in the further action of that Party it would crystallize within the Party a uniform Bolshevik ideology.

Although this was my first interview with Lenin, I had seen him previously at a momentous occasion, the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March, 1921. This was the Congress that decided upon the New Economic Policy. It was the Congress that rejected Trotsky's proposals

of the regimentation of the trade unions. It was the Congress that passed the now classical resolution against factionalism within the Communist Party.

I also saw Lenin on the occasion of a parade in honor of the Red Army returning from the suppression of the Kronstadt Rebellion. Lenin spoke from a platform in Red Square; on the same occasion I spoke from the same platform in the name of the foreign delegation.

The next time I came in contact with Lenin was at the Third Congress of the Communist International. Acting not only as a delegate but also as a translator at the Congress, I usually sat on the steps of the rostrum to take notes on the speeches. Comrade Lenin also sat there quite frequently to make his notes. He made comments on the speeches to the people near him. As a translator, I also had to translate Comrade Lenin's speeches; this was more than a labor of love, since he was very easy to translate. Although his speeches were packed full of content, they were simple in construction, in expression and in presentation. And there was never any doubt as to the point he wanted to make.

At the end of the Third Congress, upon the request of the American delegation to that Congress, Lenin granted the delegation an interview. This interview was held in Lenin's office at two o'clock one morning.

At this interview the whole American delegation, at that time already representing one unified Communist Party in America, discussed the problem of reaching the masses. The Party had been driven underground. These matters were the subject of my previous discussion with Comrade Lenin. As a result of that discussion I had made a draft of a resolution for an open Party in the United States.

When the delegation came to Lenin and the discussion started, Lenin pulled out from a drawer of his desk this draft resolution. I had shown this draft to our delegation and had been given hints about evident Right-Wingism and Centrism in it. Lenin surprised the delegation by commenting on the draft, saying that in general it was all right, except that the author was trying to be a little too radical; trying to be too radical is not so good, he remarked,—all one has to do is just be a Bolshevik.

The discussion centered around the problem of an open Party. I recall Comrade Nick Hurwich declaring that any step toward the establishment of an openly functioning political Party in America was out of the question. He opined that the Bolshevik conceptions of our American Party are so weak that if that Party would go into such mass work it would be contaminated by the backwardness of the mass and would lose what little Bolshevik color it might possess.

Lenin argued very patiently against this concep-

tion. He used a most simple analogy. He said—you are here on one side of the street and the masses are on the other. Your work, your aim and object require absolutely to get together with the masses. Do you think it is a good argument for you to say that the street is muddy and if you try to cross over you will get dirty? What of it if you do get dirty? But you will achieve your object—contact with the mass. The chances are that in your activity with the masses and within the mass, the dirt will be rubbed off. The Party is not only the bearer of revolutionary understanding among the masses, but the mass has a whole lot to give to the Party. Though there may be danger in contact with the mass, the remedy for the overcoming of the danger is exactly contact with the mass, work among the masses. The result will be the development of a mass Party, the improvement of its conceptions and its ability of leadership, and the growth of its influence.

Comrade Hurwich, not yet satisfied, claimed that especially among the leaders of our Party there were many ideological weaklings. They were Centrists and we would surely lose them to the backward masses. Lenin again answered with an analogy. He pictured two localities separated by a chasm. The interests of both these localities would be tremendously enhanced by the building of a bridge over that chasm. Without the bridge the communication between these places is cumbersome and difficult and time-consuming. What would you say, he asked Comrade Hurwich, to an argument raised against the building of the bridge, that in the course of the building of the bridge someone might fall off and break his neck and that to prevent such an accident the bridge should not be built? The main question, he said, was not the possible cost of the bridge, but the need of it, the absolute need to find a way of getting across.

Another question that arose in this discussion was that of parliamentary action. Our Party then was distinctly anti-parliamentarian. Comrade Lenin criticized us very severely for our stand on the question of parliamentary action. He pointed out that we approach the problem from a purely artificial point of view. We do not see that the democratic illusions of the masses cannot be overcome by propaganda alone; the masses learn out of the experiences of their own efforts. Our propaganda in the main only formulates and voices these experiences for the masses. But if we do not lead the workers into struggle, they will never gain these experiences; in that case our propaganda will remain hanging in the air and will find no response.

Some comrade then raised the question of putting up in elections, candidates for executive offices. This question was the outgrowth of a conception in our Party that it might be permissible for a Communist

to run for election to a legislative post, but that it was out of the question for him to run for an executive post. Comrade Lenin pointed out that this discussion could only arise out of a conception of capitalist parliamentarism. If we consider the question from the standpoint of our position as representatives of the working class, we would see that no matter what position we might be elected to, we can always represent the working class in that position. The idea that an executive post in the hands of a Communist would be bad can only arise out of the conception that when a Communist becomes a sheriff, for instance, he cannot try to be the sheriff of the working class, but must necessarily become the sheriff of the capitalist class and State. But a revolutionary sheriff can very well be and must make himself the defender of the working class against capitalist institutions and capitalist laws. Only bourgeois parliamentarism will maintain that the sheriff under all conditions must be the sheriff of the ruling class.

Lenin pointed out that in the German revolution in 1918 in Berlin, workers did not at all lose by the fact that Emil Eichorn became Police President in Berlin. Eichorn opened the armories to the working class and armed the workers. Isn't that something worth while having? Isn't it clear from this historic experience that the working class cannot lose by having its representatives in executive posts as well as in legislative posts, providing these representatives will follow a revolutionary line? Of course it is another question as to how long the bourgeois State will permit such revolutionary officials to stay in office. But

that is part of the revolutionary education from the revolutionary utilization of parliamentarism.

No one could resist the comradely spirit with which Lenin discussed all problems, and the untiring patience with which he argued against wrong conceptions. One could not help being impressed with the fact that, although Lenin asked innumerable questions about American conditions and the status of our movement, yet in general he was better informed about America than the leaders of our Party were.

More tragic were the conditions under which I saw Lenin the last time. This was at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern. His illness was then already evident. A nurse accompanied him to the hall. He looked sick, and his delivery of the speech he had come to make showed that he was far from well. Yet his speech was as simple and as striking as any. This was to be his last speech that I heard.

A little over a year after he made this speech, Lenin died. But though Lenin died, Leninism keeps alive. It keeps alive by the action and leadership of the Bolshevik Party Lenin built. It keeps alive by the action and leadership of the Communist International founded by Lenin. It keeps alive in the leadership of the great Stalin, the faithful co-worker of Lenin, untiringly fighting to continue the work of Lenin. It keeps alive by the growing revolutionary consciousness of the masses of the exploited. It keeps alive by the victorious advance of socialism in the Soviet Union and by the Leninist-Stalinist leadership of the C.P.S.U.

REMINISCENCES OF LENIN

By WM. GALLACHER

IN 1920 I got appointed by the comrades in Glasgow, associated with the Clyde Workers' Committee (Shop Stewards Movement) to attend the Second Congress of the Communist International. We were at that time "Left" sectarian and refused to participate in the discussions taking place between the B. S. P. and the S. L. P. on the questions of the formation of a Communist Party in Britain.

We had the project in view of starting a "pure" Communist Party in Scotland, a party that would not under any circumstances touch either the Labor Party or parliamentary activity.

As I hadn't a passport, and as there was little likelihood of getting one, I set out for Newcastle, where, after a week's effort, I succeeded, with the assistance of a Norwegian comrade, who was a fireman, in getting safely stowed away on a ship for Bergen. From Bergen I traveled up to Vords, from Vords to Murmansk, and from there to Leningrad. When I arrived at Leningrad the Congress, which

had opened there, was in session in Moscow, to where it had been transferred after the opening.

In Smolny I was made comfortable in a room while some of the comrades tried to find an interpreter. While I was writing one of them came in and handed me *Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder*, which had just been printed in English. I started reading it quite casually but when I came to the section dealing with Britain and saw what it had to say about me, I sat up with a jolt. I had come away from Glasgow with the notion that our case against the Labor Party and against participation in parliament was so sound, so unassailable, that all I would have to do would be to put a few well-rehearsed arguments and the B. S. P. and S. L. P. would be wiped off the map. It was a real shock to find that already before I had been anywhere near the Congress, all the fancy building I had been doing was knocked into complete ruin. But at that time all the questions raised by Lenin were far from

being clear to me, as was evident later in my speeches at the Congress.

I got to Moscow on a Saturday at midday, was taken to a hotel just in time to be taken to a "subotnik". I got a job till eight at night stacking pig-iron in a foundry. On Sunday I was persuaded to play a football match and got myself kicked all over the field for an hour and a half. At night I met and had a very interesting talk with a young French comrade named Lefevre, who had been lost along with another companion and three fishermen between Murmansk and Vords.

On Monday, with other delegates, I made my way to the Kremlin and to my first acquaintance with an International Congress. In the main hall, groups of delegates were standing chatting and arguing.

We passed through into the side room where delegates sat drinking tea, writing reports or preparing speeches. I was introduced to Radek, to Bukharin, to delegates from this and that country, and then I got into a group and some one said: "This is Comrade Lenin", just like that. I held out my hand and said "Hello". I was stuck for anything else to say.

He said, with a smile, as he was told that I was Comrade Gallacher from Glasgow: "We are very pleased to have you at our Congress." I said something about being glad to be there and then we went on talking about other things. I kept saying to myself: "Christ, there's war everywhere, there are internal problems and external problems that would almost seem unsurmountable. Yet here is a comrade supremely confident that the Bolsheviks can carry through to victory." Lenin joked and laughed with the comrades and occasionally when I said something he would look at me in a quaint way. I later discovered that this was in consequence of my English. He had difficulty in understanding it.

I immediately felt that I was talking, not to some "far-away great" man hedged around with an impossible barrier of airs, but to Lenin, the great Party comrade who had a warm smile and cheery word for every proletarian fighter.

When I got going in the discussions on the political resolution and the trade union resolution, I got a very rough handling. Some of my best arguments were simply riddled. Radek and others of them, when I got up to speak, never missed a chance of "cutting in". Naturally I would snap back at them and things sometimes got very hot. As I felt the ground slipping away from beneath my feet, I got very bad tempered. But Lenin, while carrying on an irreconcilable criticism "in principle" of my line, would always take the opportunity of saying something helpful, something that took away a lot of the soreness from the difficult position my wrong ideas had rushed me into.

In the Political Commission the same thing was going on as in the open sessions. Every time I got up to speak I would say things in such an offensive way that interruptions would start and then two or three of us would be at it hammer and tongs. On several occasions at these sittings Lenin passed me short, penciled notes explaining a point or showing me where I was wrong.

When the sitting would finish, I'd tear up my own notes and I tore up Lenin's along with them. It seems incredible now that I could do such a thing, but I never thought of it at the time. Towards the end of the Political Commission, when I had been very aggressive about the B. S. P. and S. L. P., he passed me across a note which in a very short caustic way gave an estimation of these groups. At night I mentioned in confidence to one or two comrades that Lenin had given me a note about the B. S. P. and S. L. P. which, if I had shown them, would have made them blink. "Where is it?" one of them asked. "Oh, I tore it up", I casually replied. "You what? You tore up a note in Lenin's handwriting?" He was aghast. "I tore up several," I said, "but they were personal and I didn't think he'd want me to keep them." This fellow, who turned out later to be a thorough renegade, got me to promise if I got another that I would give it to him, though it should have been obvious to me at the time that what he was interested in was the handwriting of a "great man", not in Lenin's politics.

Two days later in the Political Commission, in the midst of a breeze and while I was speaking, some one made a reference to *Infantile Sickness*. "Yes", I said, "I've read it, but I'm no infant. It's alright to treat me as one and slap me around when I'm not here, but when I'm here you'll find I'm an old hand at the game." This latter phrase caught Lenin's attention and some time later, when Willie Paul visited Russia, Lenin repeated it to him with a quite credible Scotch accent. When I sat down after this effort he passed me a note which read, "When I wrote my little book, I hadn't met you." I gave that note to the aforementioned renegade to my present great regret.

While insistent in carrying through his political line, Lenin gave both in the open sessions and in the Political Commission every conceivable assistance to myself and other comrades in order to help us to political clarity. He showed all the time the utmost patience and consideration and this when he was carrying the main burden of responsibility for all the bitter internal and external struggles with which the revolution was faced.

Then when I went to visit him at home I had my greatest experience. I sat down before him and we talked of the building of a party and its role in leading the revolutionary struggle. I had never

thought much about the Party before, but I began then to get a real understanding of what a Communist Party should be. He was dead against the project for a separate party in Scotland. I would have to work, join up in the newly formed party in Britain. I made objections, I couldn't work with this one or the other one.

"If you put the revolution first," he said, "you won't find any difficulty. For the revolution you will work with all sorts of people for a part of the way at any rate. But if you start off by shutting yourself away from every one, instead of getting in amongst them and fighting for the time of revolutionary advance, you won't get anywhere. Get into the Party and fight for the line of the Communist International and you'll have the strength of the Communist International behind you."

In all our talk the "revolution" was the living, throbbing theme of all that was said. I never had an experience like it. I couldn't think of Lenin personally. I couldn't think of anything but the revolution and the necessity of advancing the revolution whatever the cost might be. This, ever since, seemed to me to be the outstanding quality of Lenin's great genius. He never thought of himself, he was the living embodiment of the revolutionary struggle and he carried with him wherever he went the inspiration of his own great conviction.

During the course of the Congress I had another very close friend, Artem, who was killed in an accident the following year. Artem, or Serjief, as he was more commonly known, used to talk a lot with me of the experience they had in the early days of the Party. He was only about 19 or 20 when Lenin broke with the Mensheviks. He was absolutely devoted to Lenin and the Party.

In the course of one of our talks he said to me: "We have another great leader who is never heard of outside the Party, Comrade Stalin. Often when there is an exceptionally difficult problem before the Political Bureau, all eyes will turn to Stalin. In a few well-chosen sentences he will give his solution and it's always clear and decisive." That was the first

time I'd ever heard the name of Stalin. When I returned to Glasgow and reported my impressions of the Congress it was the first time any of the Glasgow comrades heard his name. It wasn't till I was over again in 1923 that I had the opportunity of meeting Stalin and learning at first hand how correct the estimation of Serjief was.

On several occasions I was in the company of Trotzky. I spoke with him at a great demonstration at the end of the Second Congress in the Bolshoi Theatre but, strangely enough, I have never at any time exchanged a word with Trotzky. Not one solitary word. When I got back to Glasgow I told the comrades, "when you talk with Lenin you can't think about Lenin personally, you can only think about the revolution, but you can't come anywhere near Trotzky without immediately realizing that this is Trotzky". Long before he became a counter-revolutionary he was the supreme petty-bourgeois intellectual, who saw the world mirrored in his own image.

It was arranged that John Reed and I should go to Baku to the toilers of the East Congress there. Then a message came to the hotel, Lenin wanted to see me. Off I went to the Kremlin. "When can you go home?" he asked me. "I'm going to Baku," I replied. He smiled and nodded his head in a negative way. "There's a big movement developing in Britain," he said. "Councils of Action have been set up to stop the attack that is being made against us. You ought to get back as quick as possible. Do you agree?" "I agree," I answered. "When can you go, then?" he asked. "Tomorrow, if you like," I replied. He smiled broader than ever. "Why not tonight?" he said. "You could catch the night train." "All right," I said, "tonight. I've got to pack." "Good," he said, standing up and holding out his hand, "be very careful on the way back, and when you get to Britain we'll look to you as a loyal fighter for the revolution and the Communist International."

We shook hands very warmly, then I went on my way. That is the last memory I have of our great Comrade Lenin.

THE STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH INNER SOVIET REGIONS IN THE SEMI-COLONIAL COUNTRIES

By V. MYRO

CHINA has remained until very recently the only country where the overthrow of the old order and establishment of a firm Soviet government in *various regions of the interior* was brought about prior to the victory of the revolution on a national scale.

Is a repetition of such a situation possible in any other countries? And if it is, then what are the preconditions necessary for it?

The present article represents an attempt to answer these questions.

I. THE "GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION" OF THE CONTENDING CLASS FORCES

In September-October of 1917, when outlining his plan for the armed struggle for power, Lenin insistently stressed the point that "the decisive word lies . . . in the working-class quarters of Petersburg and Moscow"* and that the most immediate task was to "encircle Petersburg and to isolate it, and to take it by a combined attack by the fleet, the workers and the troops."**

The events which followed showed the whole world how correct Lenin was when he attached such great and decisive importance to the struggle for Petrograd and Moscow. The victory of the proletarian revolution in these most important industrial and cultural-political centers of the country immediately gave it a decisive preponderance over the forces of the counter-revolution on a national scale.

Comrade Stalin was also very definite in stressing the tremendous importance of Moscow and Petrograd, which became transformed into the main bases of the revolution. In an article entitled "The War Situation in the South", printed in the *Pravda* on Dec. 28, 1919, he wrote the following:

"At the beginning of the October Revolution a certain geographic differentiation between the revolution and the counter-revolution was to be noted. In the course of the further development of the Civil War, the districts controlled by the revolution and the counter-revolution became defined once and for all. Inner Russia with its industrial and cultural and political centers, Moscow and Petrograd, the national composition of whose population was uniform, mainly Russian became transformed into the bases of the revolution. As for the outlying regions of Russia, and mainly those in the south and the east, they became transformed into the bases of the counter-revolution. These regions in the south and the east were without industrial and cultural-political centers of any importance, while their populations to a very great degree varied from the national point of view, being composed of the privileged Cossack-colonizers on the one hand, and on the other hand of peoples deprived of full rights such as the Tartars, Bakshirs, Girizians (in the east), the Ukrainians, Chechens, Ingushes and other Mussulman peoples.

"It will not be difficult to understand that there is nothing unnatural in such a geographic distribution of the contending forces in Russia. In actual fact, where else should you expect to find a base for the Soviet Government than among the proletariat of Petrograd and Moscow. Who else could be the firm support of the Denikin-Kolchak counter-revolution than the Cossacks, the age-long weapon of Russian imperialism, who enjoyed privileges and were organized as a military caste, and

who had long exploited the non-Russian peoples on the borders of Russia?

"Is it not clear that there could not possibly be any other 'geographic distribution'?"

It stands to reason that such a "geographic distribution" of the contending class forces is by no means a specific peculiarity, one not to be repeated, of the proletarian revolution in Russia. On the contrary, it is characteristic of many other countries, especially in *Western European* countries. In a number of countries which are economically developed and politically centralized, the most important class battles, the outcome of which to a very great degree determined the development of the revolution, took place, as a rule, not in the outlying districts, but in the biggest cities, and most often in the capitals of the countries concerned. The revolutionary government in these cases at first established itself in the center, and then proceeded to spread its authority to the outlying districts. The defeat of the revolution in the center as a rule meant its defeat on a national scale as well. Thus, for instance, the main base for the great bourgeois revolution in France was Paris, with its heroic plebeian rank and file, and Paris maintained its dominating importance both in the bourgeois revolutions which followed in 1830 and 1848, as well as in 1871 during the existence of the Commune.

But it is the "Russian" type of the development of the Civil War, according to which the most important industrial and cultural-political centers in the country become the base for the revolution, does not constitute a specific feature, one not to be repeated, but is of much wider significance, then, on the other hand, *this type of development of the civil war is by no means something obligatory for all countries and peoples.* The experience of the Soviet Revolution in China is above all witness to this.

In China the revolution has still not been victorious on a national scale. But the power of the Soviets has been established on one-sixth of its territory. The most important and vital centers in the country, namely the biggest towns, including the capital, are still in the hands of the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang government, which has the support of world imperialism. But the workers and peasants, led by the heroic Communist Party of China, are masters of an important section of Chinese territory. The revolution has been victorious at different points in the outlying regions of the country before the forces of the counter-revolution have been smashed in the main centers.

Is this type of the development of the civil war a specific peculiarity, one not to be repeated, of the Soviet Revolution in China, or is it of wider significance? Is the "geographical distribution" of the contending class forces after the "Chinese" fashion possible in any other countries?

The history of the class struggle in the colonial and

* *Works*, Vol. XXI, p. 197, Russian edition.

** *Works*, Vol. XXI, p. 320, Russian edition.

semi-colonial countries provides a quite definite reply to this question.

In the colonial and semi-colonial countries, the most important class battles have in the past, at least in the first stages of the revolutionary struggle, been fought out not so much in the capitals or other big centers as in outlying regions. The far-distant outlying regions have in many cases become the main base of support for armed uprisings. Prior to being victorious on a national scale, the revolution has embraced the outlying regions, on the outskirts. The uprising has "spread" over tremendous territories, has dragged on over many months and on some occasions for years. What is more, at times more or less firmly established regions of revolt have come into being with their own revolutionary governments and armies.

The armed struggle conducted by the North American colonists against England lasted seven years (1775 to 1783), while the main base in the hands of the insurgents was far-distant Virginia, whereas the most important centers (New York, Boston, etc.) were in the hands of the British forces for a long time.

The so-called "War for Independence" of the countries of Southern and Caribbean America against Spain extended over a period of 16 years (1810 to 1826); and the armed struggle broke out in the first instance not in the residential districts of the Spanish Viceroyalties, but in the agricultural districts or in towns of second-rate importance, and it was only after the insurgent regiments had consolidated their forces to a considerable degree that the revolutionary armies undertook the offensive against the "capitals".

The Taiping uprising in China (1850-64) broke out in the province of Guansi, and after gradually spreading to the north, resulted in the establishment of the independent insurgent State of "Taiping Tyango"; and the main part of the country, including Peking, remained in the hands of the counter-revolutionary government and its army.

The Sepoy uprising in India (1857-58) covered a tremendous territory in the north of India; a big section of the country, however, including such very big centers as Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, etc., remained in the hands of the British.

The Persian revolution of 1908 also began in the outlying regions, namely, in Azerbaijan, Gilyani and Ispagani districts, and it was only later that the insurgents advanced on Teheran and occupied it.

The "Young Turk" uprising in 1908 began in the far-distant territory of Macedonia.

The Mexican revolution of 1908 broke out in the northern states of Sonora, Coaguilya, etc.; and it was only after firmly establishing themselves there that the army of insurgents moved southwards and occupied the capital.

The Kemal revolution in Turkey in 1919 also broke out in the outlying districts of Anatolia, and

it was only after the revolutionary government and its army had been set up and become consolidated that they moved forward to the most important centers. (Smyrna became "Kemalist" only in 1922, and Constantinople in 1923.)

In all the cases above-mentioned, the specific "geographical distribution" of the contending class forces was determined by the special features of the economic and political structure of the corresponding countries, and by the character of the revolutionary tasks waiting to be solved and by the concrete correlation of class forces in the "centers" and on the "outskirts" of the one or other country. In all the cases mentioned, the forces of revolution in the "centers" were weaker, while the forces of counter-revolution were of greater importance than were those in the "outlying districts".

If, for instance, we take the present (Soviet) stage of the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution in China, then it contains, among other features, the following which are characteristic, and which exert decisive influence on the "geographic distribution" of the contending forces in China, *viz.*:

1. *A high level in the development of the peasant movement*, which assists in consolidating the forces of the revolution in the agrarian "outlying districts" and which renders it easy to establish inner Soviet regions long before it becomes directly possible to overthrow the central counter-revolutionary government.

2. *The weakness of the Kuomintang State apparatus*, which has become more or less firmly consolidated with the aid of interested imperialist groupings in the most important industrial and cultural-political centers, but which has not sufficient forces and means at its disposal to bring about real control over the "depths" and "outlying districts" where the revolutionary (Soviet) movement is developing.

* * *

In what countries *at the present time* is it most likely possible that the "geographical differentiation" of the contending forces will follow "*Chinese*" lines?

As we have shown above, such a differentiation in the past was also characteristic of the semi-colonial countries (China, Turkey, Persia, etc.) and of the colonies (North America in the 18th century, and South and Caribbean America during the first quarter of the 19th century). But *in the imperialist epoch* the most favorable conditions for the development of civil war along "Chinese" lines are to be found not so much in the colonies as in the "*semi-colonial countries*". It is precisely in these latter countries that the preconditions for the overthrow of the old authorities in some or other districts in the "depths" or in the "outlying regions" can be found long before the forces of revolution turn out to be adequate for the overthrow of the central government of the counter-revolution.

Here we come right up against a question of first importance, namely, *that of the distinctive features*

which come to light in the imperialist epoch between the political situation in the colonies and that in the semi-colonial countries, features which are of tremendous importance from the point of view of the problem of the "geographic differentiation" of the contending class forces. But we must deal a little more at length with these distinctive features.

What constitute the special conditions of the development of the class struggle in the semi-colonies of the present day as compared with the colonies?

Each colony represents a sphere of the monopolist political domination of some one imperialist State. The State apparatus in the colonial country is, as a rule, an obedient weapon in the hands of the ruling classes of the imperialist dominating country (exceptions are only to be found in some colonies which have a certain self-government and especially certain British dominions). In the majority of cases economic domination in the colonies is also concentrated in the hands of the imperialist dominating countries.

In the majority of semi-colonial countries, on the contrary, no single imperialist State has a monopoly of political and economic domination. Here the struggle between the imperialist States for levers of political influence and for the commanding heights of the national economy is as a rule sharper, more tense and of a more stormy character than in the colonies.

This brings about a tremendous sharpening of the internal contradictions in the camp of the "national" ruling classes of the semi-colonial countries. Here we usually find a permanent struggle going on between various bourgeois-landowning groupings, who are connected with some or other of the contending imperialist States. The foreign capitalists, in their own interests, stir up and sharpen the inner contradictions in the camp of the "national" ruling classes and provoke plots, military outbreaks and "palace revolutions", all of which bring about serious disorganization in the State apparatus of the semi-colonial countries, and weaken its power to resist the revolutionary insurgent masses of the people.

By the very fact of this one circumstance, the "national" governments in the semi-colonial countries frequently enjoy only nominal power in a number of regions; in many regions their power is disputed by the local, civil or military administration, which in actual fact is independent of the "center". This renders it exceedingly difficult for the ruling classes in the semi-colonial countries to undertake an agreed and centralized struggle against the revolutionary outbreaks in the "depths" and in the "outlying regions."

Apart from this, the main instrument in the semi-colonial countries used to suppress the revolutionary uprising, are the governmental armies which are as a rule far worse trained, organized and technically supplied than the colonial armies of the imperialist State, to maintain which their masters beyond the seas do not spare either forces nor means. Thus,

for instance, according to official data for the year 1931, the Brazilian Army had only 41 airplanes (with a total horse-power of 24,725) in a territory covering 8,525,000 square kilometers while the Anglo-Indian Army in a territory half the size (4,675,000 square meters) had 196 airplanes (with a total horse-power of 103,900).

It should also be borne in mind that discipline is far weaker in the armies and navies of the semi-colonial countries than in the colonial armies and navies of the imperialist States; during the last two years especially, revolutionary outbreaks have become extraordinarily frequent among the armed forces of the semi-colonial countries (the numerous cases where various sections of Chiang Kai-shek's army passed over to the Chinese Red Army; the number of revolutionary outbreaks of the armed forces of Brazil, Peru, Chile and other countries in Southern and Caribbean America, etc.).

Finally, whereas when revolutionary uprisings spread in the colonial countries, the imperialist States usually find it possible in case of necessity to secure support from the whole of their military power in the home country (by the despatch of reserves, etc.) in the semi-colonial countries, on the other hand, any attempts at open military intervention frequently come up against various difficulties of a diplomatic and open character. Thus, for instance, in 1933, when the revolutionary struggle in Cuba had become very much aggravated, the U.S. was compelled, having in mind the international situation, to refrain from direct intervention, although the development of events in Cuba directly threatened the interests of U.S. capital.

Thus, as a result of a number of causes and especially as a result of the tremendous weakness of the State apparatus existing there, by comparison with the colonial countries, the semi-colonial countries present more favorable conditions for such a geographical distribution of the contending class forces, under which the overthrow of the old authorities in one or other of the "depths" or "outlying districts" can take place before they have been overthrown in the main vital centers of the country.

II. WHAT CONDITIONS ARE NECESSARY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INNER SOVIET REGIONS?

The fact that the semi-colonial countries, generally speaking, present the most favorable conditions for such a "geographical distribution" of the contending class forces, under which it becomes possible and advisable to establish inner Soviet regions, by no means, of course, implies that these regions can be established at any moment, independent of the general political situation, and of the degree to which the revolutionary forces have been prepared.

First, it is essential that at least in some regions in the country a situation of revolutionary upsurge should

have developed which ensures that broad masses of toilers are rallied for the armed struggle for Soviet Power. Should there be an absence of sufficient revolutionary movement among the masses, *if only in some regions in the country*, attempts at armed uprisings would be of putschist and adventurist character, and would only lead to a useless expenditure of the revolutionary forces, and would compromise the very idea of the armed struggle for Soviet Power. This, however, does not imply that the establishment of inner Soviet regions only becomes possible if there is an *all-national* revolutionary crisis. Herein precisely lies the special feature of the situation in certain countries (primarily *semi-colonial countries*), where the State apparatus is shattered and unstable, namely that here it is possible for the revolutionary classes to seize power in *certain regions prior to* its becoming directly possible for them to seize power on an *all-national* scale.

Second, what is needed is that a certain coordination should exist between the level attained by the upsurge of the working-class movement and the level attained by that of the peasant movement. Should the working-class movement be very much behind, the establishment of a firm proletarian core in the revolutionary insurgent army would be very much hindered or would even be completely ruled out; the movement of revolt in such a case would be characterized by all the weaknesses inherent in a purely peasant movement (its scattered character, weak organization, etc.). On the other hand, should the peasant movement lag very much behind, and should broad masses of peasants be insufficiently prepared (if only in certain regions in the country) for armed struggle, the construction of a revolutionary insurgent army would, generally speaking, become impossible (for only peasants would constitute the main forces of the revolutionary army).

Third, what is needed is that the movement should be headed by a Communist Party sufficiently firm and able to carry on the struggle, a party whose leadership would ensure that a correct political line is being pursued. Should the opposite be the case, the destruction of the hotbeds of the Soviet movement is absolutely unavoidable. Proof of this is provided particularly by the history of the struggle of the Chinese revolutionary army which came into being in August, 1927, after the military uprising in Nanchang, and headed by the Communists Ye-Tin and Che-Lun. This army was very soon smashed up mainly as a result of the *political* mistakes committed by its leaders, and what was left of it had to undergo a fundamental reorganization before it could develop in close cooperation with other partisan, working-class, and peasant detachments into the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of Soviet China.

The *three* conditions above-mentioned are *absolutely necessary*, and, should they be lacking, the establish-

ment and consolidation of inner Soviet regions are, generally speaking, *impossible*. One could point to a whole number of other political conditions which are not absolutely essential but the existence of which could very much *facilitate* the seizure by the revolutionary classes of various regions in the country, and the establishment by them of an army of insurgents.

Thus, for instance, a *sharp aggravation of inner contradictions in the camp of the ruling classes* could be a very favorable factor, especially in those cases where these contradictions lead to direct armed conflicts and "internal wars" (like the wars between various military cliques in China or the war between the "Paulists" and the supporters of the Vargas government in Brazil in 1932). In such cases the revolutionary discontent of the masses increases, the disorganization of the State apparatus becomes more intensified, there is an increase in the quantity of arms in the country, and the passage to the side of the revolution of whole military detachments in the service of both of the contending bourgeois-landowning camps, etc., becomes facilitated.

A *war between different semi-colonial countries* (after the fashion of the Peru-Colombia war of 1933 or the Bolivia-Paraguay war which has continued until this day) could be another factor operating in this direction, on condition, of course, that the Communist Party carries on active work to rally and organize the revolutionary forces. In such cases, especially if the war is of a long-drawn-out character, the slogan of the passage of the government troops to the side of the revolutionary insurgents would meet with a favorable response among the soldiers of the contending countries.

In general, if only the necessary political and other conditions are at hand for a wide development of the revolutionary movement, *revolts in the army or navy*, whatever the basis at which they arise, can, if there is only a certain contact between the Communist Party and the insurgents, serve even as the starting point for an armed struggle to establish Soviet regions. If the revolt in the army or fleet has not even set the revolution going on a national scale, then, in any case, the soldiers and sailors in revolt could break into the interior of the country, so that, after uniting there with peasant detachments already in action and taking hold of workers' militia led by the Communists, they could establish inner Soviet regions.

III. "THE OPTIMAL VARIANT" OF THE OPERATIVE BASE IN THE STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH INNER SOVIET REGIONS

Even in those semi-colonial countries, which, generally speaking, provide the best conditions for the establishment of inner Soviet regions, by no means all regions are to an equal degree favorable for this purpose. *It stands to reason that when preparing the armed struggle for Soviet Power it is far from*

always possible for the Communist Party to "select" one or other district, according to its own wish, *as its main basis for operation!* Much here depends on the concrete development of events which it is not possible to foresee in all its details *in advance*.

Nonetheless, the Party must aim at bringing about the "optimal variant"; it must strive to bring about a situation where the armed struggle develops *as far as possible* in the most favorable regions. If this is not immediately possible, then in any case without tying one's hands with dogmatic consideration and above all carefully bearing in mind the concrete conditions of the struggle, it would nevertheless be advisable to strive to bring about a situation in the near future where the main basis for the revolutionary struggle is transferred from districts which are less favorable to those which are more so, in a corresponding fashion transferring the main kernel of the revolutionary army being established.

But what regions are the most "optimal" as far as the establishment of Soviet territories is concerned?

1. From the general political point of view those districts are the most favorable where broad sections of the population live under conditions of especially severe exploitation. Thus, for instance, in the South and Carribean American countries these are primarily the regions mainly populated by Indian peasants. The establishment of an Indian Soviet region in one of the South and Carribean American countries, on the condition that the action undertaken by the revolutionary army bears the character of a national-liberation war, would thereby draw to the side of the revolutionary army the sympathy of millions of Indian toilers in all the other countries of South and Carribean America.

2. It is highly advisable that a peasant insurgent movement should already be in existence in the districts where it is proposed to establish Soviet Power. Peasant partisan detachments (even small ones) can, if they are assured the necessary political leadership from the Communist Party, serve as the primary core around which will be formed the revolutionary army which will defend the Soviet territory. These detachments will provide cadres of tested fighters who are already acquainted with military affairs, who know the weak sides of their opponents, and who have made a good study of the given region from the military point of view, etc. In addition, these partisan detachments can be utilized from the very first stages of the struggle as the main driving force to bring about the unexpected seizure of military stores, arsenals, etc., which will ensure that the revolutionary army which is being organized will have a certain supply of arms and military supplies; they can also be used to destroy the communications of the government troops, so as to prevent them from

concentrating in masses in the district where the armed uprising takes place, and also to win time for the organization of a more or less big revolutionary army.

3. The territory proposed for the organization of Soviet regions should as far as possible be extensive. Should the opposite be the case it would be difficult to ensure that it will be possible for the revolutionary army to maneuver and to retreat, in case the results of the military actions are unfavorable, to a locality which the enemy cannot easily approach.

4. This territory should be so placed that it should as far as possible impede the speedy concentration of the armed forces of the enemy on its borders, as well as disorganize their regular supplies. Should the enemy have well organized communications at their disposal (railways, navigable rivers, sea routes, etc.), the Soviet districts would be exceptionally vulnerable from the blows of the counter-revolution. Thus, for instance, it is generally speaking, inadvisable to establish Soviet regions along the river banks; the enemy would make good use of their own fleet or of the big fleet of the imperialist States and would be in a position systematically to bring forward reserves, make descents on them, and bombard them from the sea, etc. It is well known that the Chinese Red Army, as a rule, avoids advancing along the river banks, but prefers to concentrate its forces in the inner regions of the country.

5. The Soviet territory should as far as possible be placed at a certain distance away from those places in the country where foreign interests are especially powerful (for instance, away from those localities where the most important foreign enterprises and concessions are concentrated). Should the opposite be the case it would be difficult to avoid or even to delay direct armed intervention of the interested imperialist States.

6. The Soviet regions should have their own internal supply base, sufficient to supply both the revolutionary army that protects them as well as the broad sections of the toiling population. Thus, for instance, in those districts which systematically import food supplies (for instance, in districts which are completely devoted to "monoculture" (cultivating one specific product), it would be practically impossible, when a blockade would be inevitable following the organization of the Soviet regions, to feed the revolutionary army and the wide sections of the population. Of course, when establishing Soviet Power it might be possible to pursue a course aiming at the abolition of this "monoculture" and replacing it by "multi-cultured economy" (the cultivation of a number of different kinds of products in a particular region—*Ed.*), but this is a long-drawn-out process which would inevitably be spread over a few years at the very least. A certain pos-

sibility to maneuver exists in such a case, but as a rule districts which are completely mono-cultured are far less favorable for the revolutionary armies carrying on long-drawn-out actions than districts where multi-cultured economy exists.

7. It is highly desirable that there should be at least the most primitive industry in the Soviet regions, to ensure that the arms in the possession of the revolutionary army could at least be repaired, if not actually manufactured, and that the means of transport could also be repaired, etc. Of course such industry (smithies, armaments workshops, etc.) can be established after Soviet Power has been brought into being in one or another district, but this would require at least several months of preparatory work, whereas the revolutionary insurgent army will, as a rule, right from the very beginning, feel the inadequacy of its supply of arms, explosives, etc., and it will not always be possible to cover this deficiency by the military trophies won.

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The question of the selection of a basis for operations can only be concretely solved in the actual process of the struggle in connection with the numerous circumstances which it is impossible to take into account *in advance* in all the details.

But this, of course, does not mean that everything should be left to the mercy of the spontaneous development of events. Events have to be *directed*, the struggle has to be *regulated* and *organized* and *constructed* according to a definite plan. Hence, the conclusion that *efforts must be made to ensure such favorable conditions for the struggle as will facilitate and speed up the victory*.

IV. THE PREPARATION OF THE STRUGGLE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET REGIONS

The preparation of the struggle to establish inner Soviet regions presupposes first and foremost a general intensification of the work of the Communist Party, especially on the territory which is proposed as the basic region of support in the oncoming struggle. Party work should primarily cover the biggest factories in the most important branches of industry, and also the biggest villages, plantations, etc. A mass struggle must be carried on for the partial demands, based on a very wide *united front*, while the treacherous role of the opponents of the Communist Party must be exposed in action, in practice, in the very course of the mass battles, and not only through wordy agitation, etc. In brief, what is needed is that there should be an intensification of the development of the struggle to win over the majority of the working class and wide masses of toilers to the side of the Party. All these points constitute the main pre-conditions for a successful struggle to establish inner Soviet regions.

This, however, does not exclude the necessity for most careful preparation in certain special directions. What does this special preparation consist of?

1. The timely concentration of the best Party organizers, agitators and propagandists on the territory selected as the basis of support for the struggle to establish Soviet regions. The strengthening of the leadership of the Party organizations of the given regions by including the most tested Party elements who have really shown their loyalty to Communism (mainly the best proletarian elements closely linked up with the masses of the workers). The systematic transfer to the given district of big supplies of Party literature (manifestoes, newspapers, pamphlets, etc.).

2. The establishment of direct contact with peasant insurgent detachments, if such are already in action in the given region. The mobilization of a section of the Party members who have some acquaintance with military affairs, and are sufficiently tested politically to be allocated to the partisan detachments in action. The task facing these Party workers is to win, step by step, the confidence of the partisans in action, in the very process of the struggle, in the war situation, and thereby to ensure that the Communists obtain the leadership of the partisan detachments. They must do so, further, so as to give the armed struggle of the partisans a really revolutionary character, by combining it with the current economic and political struggle of the broad masses of the toilers in town and country—and stimulating the partisan detachments to such acts as the destruction of the landowners' police, the seizure of the landowners' stores, and their division amongst the peasants, etc. The establishment of Party nuclei in the peasant detachments. The summoning of conferences of delegates from peasant detachments to elect a central staff or revolutionary committee, including as far as possible representatives from the Communist Party. To give publicity systematically in the Party press to the struggle carried on by the partisan detachments, and to expose the lying campaign of the reactionary press against the insurgents. The organization of mass meetings, demonstrations and strikes in defense of arrested partisans. To carry on systematic agitation among the broad masses of toilers in town and country in favor of joining the peasant detachments.

3. The establishment of workers' defense groups ("fives", "tens", etc.), in the towns, and their systematic military education training. To ensure that there is iron revolutionary discipline in the ranks of the workers' defense groups and that they are subordinate to the leading center. In the period directly preceding the struggle to establish Soviet regions, some of the workers' defense groups may be utilized for individual joint actions along with the peasant

partisan detachments, and to liberate arrested revolutionaries, etc. In the course of time the workers' defense groups become merged in the ranks of the revolutionary army organized on Soviet territory.

4. The intensification of activity among the armed forces of the ruling classes (in the army, fleet, police, etc.) To mobilize especially the most decisive, energetic and politically tested members of the Party for this work. The systematic struggle for the current and direct demands put forward by the masses of soldiers. The main task facing all this activity is to prepare systematically the passage of the armed forces to the side of the revolution in the Soviet region.

5. All members of the Party must be made acquainted with the foundations of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine regarding the armed uprising. A study of the corresponding works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism in the whole network of Party educational organizations (in circles, Party schools, etc.). As far as possible to acquaint wider sections in the Party with at least an elementary knowledge of military affairs.

V. THE ARMED STRUGGLE FOR THE SOVIET REGIONS

The military technical plan of the struggle to establish Soviet regions must be so constructed as to take the concrete conditions into account. *Universal recipes would be exceedingly harmful.* In practice a whole series of the most varied alternatives to this plan is possible. It depends exclusively on the local situation, on the concrete situation, whether the struggle to establish Soviet regions begins with a general strike in the towns, and develops into an armed uprising, or whether with the mass seizure by the peasants of the landowners' estates, or as a result of an attack on military stores, arsenals, etc., by peasants, insurrectionary detachments and workers' militia, concentrated beforehand at definite points, or whether it begins following an uprising by the soldiers and sailors, or following on some other incident.

But what is important is that immediately, from the very beginning of the struggle decisively, all the existing forces on whom the leading revolutionary center can calculate, should be immediately drawn into the struggle. Once the struggle has begun the insurgents must advance boldly, all waverings must be cast aside, cowards thrown out of the ranks, and traitors summarily dealt with. Hesitation would equal defeat.

On receiving the corresponding instructions from the leading revolutionary center, the peasant partisan detachments, workers' militia and the insurrectionaries among the government troops, etc., must in the shortest possible time hew a way for themselves from the points where they are originally placed, to the territory selected beforehand as the main basis of operations. On their road they must "pass by" the

main center of resistance of the enemy, and as far as possible avoid struggle with any big enemy forces, if there are such, and must wipe out any secondary spheres of resistance. At the same time they must make themselves masters of supplies of arms and military stores, destroying all railway lines, bridges, etc., behind them, and increasing their forces by reinforcements from among the toiling population.

After concentrating their forces on the territory previously decided on, the insurgents establish a *revolutionary army* here with a centralized leadership, and ensure the establishment of a *revolutionary government* by the toiling masses of the given territory. If the leaders of the army carry through a correct political line, calculated first and foremost on letting loose a mass revolutionary movement, then the army, basing itself on the broad masses of toilers, will grow into an exceptionally serious force, and *the possibility of maintaining a firm hold on the territory first seized will become quite a real one.* After establishing covering parties on the borders of the Sovietized territory, the leaders of the revolutionary army at the same time adopt "diversion" measures in the rear of the main forces of the enemy advancing on this territory, making special efforts to destroy the latter's communications. After beating off the enemy, the revolutionary army extends the boundaries of the Soviet territory, and expands as a result of reinforcements from the broad sections of the toiling population, and of enemy detachments who come over to its side.

This is the "optimal variant" of the plan of operations. Whether it will be possible to carry this variant into life, or whether it is necessary to alter it under the pressure of the concrete conditions of the struggle, is determined in the actual process of the struggle. In any case efforts must be made to make at least *as close an approach to this "optimal variant" as possible.*

However, it is more than likely that in *actual practice* it will turn out to be a *task beyond their power*, to maintain a firm hold on the territory originally seized. What is more, it would be a *big mistake* if the insurgents were to strive to maintain their hold on this territory *at all costs*, even if it meant expending a big section of their forces in the struggle against the superior forces of the enemy. *The main thing is not the maintenance of the territory but the preservation of the armed cadres of the revolution.* If the revolutionary army is faced by an enemy which has preserved its fighting capacity and which is numerically superior to it, it may have to evacuate the territory originally occupied, and to retreat to other regions less accessible to the enemy. If the armed forces of the revolution are preserved, they will be able without great difficulty to establish themselves on new territory.

After organizing a new center for the Soviet movement, the revolutionary army will renew the struggle, always growing by drawing into its ranks the local toiling population and the enemy detachments who come over to its side. It is possible that, under the pressure of the superior forces of the counter-revolutionary army, it will have to change its territorial base several times, now retreating still further into the interior, at other times returning to territory previously evacuated. In the last analysis, however, if only the political line pursued by the leaders of the Soviet movement is correct, the revolutionary army will undoubtedly be able to beat off the offensive of the enemy, and to consolidate its forces on the territory selected, and then to transform it into a more or less stable center for the Soviet movement.

All this, however, does not mean that, as soon as the enemy appears, the insurgents must immediately evacuate the points occupied without offering any resistance. Such tactics of "permanent evacuation" were applied by the Brazilian insurrectionaries in the years 1924 to 1927 (the so-called "Colonna Prestessa"), who carried through a cavalry raid extending over 75,000 kilometers, with the enemy in the rear practically the whole of the time—a feat unexampled in recent military history. But the "Colonna Prestessa" was under petty-bourgeois leadership, its political line was not really revolutionary, and it was unable to rally around itself the broad masses of the toiling population, and therefore could not calculate on maintaining a firm hold on any definite territory. All that remained for it to do was to keep changing its locality from one end of the huge territory of Brazil to another, with all possible persistence, and to avoid any serious conflicts with the government troops.

As regards a Soviet insurgent army, led politically by a Communist Party, it is, of course, not excluded that it might also have, for a certain time, to avoid decisive battle with the armed forces of the counter-revolution. But as soon as it succeeds in loosening the mass revolutionary movement (and primarily the struggle of the peasantry for the land) in the front and the rear of the advancing enemy, thereby creating a mass base for itself, it would immediately be faced with the real possibility of entrenching itself for a long time without the risk of losing the main cadres of the army in struggles carried on against the superior forces of the enemy.

Thus, in the first phases of the struggle, which precede the firm consolidation of the Soviet territory,

the actions of the insurrectionary army must mainly have the character of a "small" *partisan war*. The insurgents develop the maximum of mobility, and under no circumstances concentrate in big masses at fortified points, they transfer the struggle to the open field; they operate in relatively small detachments; they appear simultaneously in the front, on the flanks and in the rear of the enemy; they disorganize, wear out and scatter the enemy's forces, and prevent the enemy from concentrating in big masses. While they *have in view* the perspective of firmly establishing themselves on a definite, previously determined territory, and while making use of every possibility to make this perspective a reality, as soon as possible, the revolutionary forces, however, do not in case of necessity avoid moving from one locality to another, everywhere kindling the flame of the mass revolutionary struggle.

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The extremely rich experience of the establishment and of the struggle of the *Chinese Red Army* shows that the *methods of "little" warfare are the most suitable for a Soviet army which is in the process of establishment*. While avoiding conflicts with the government troops when concentrated at one spot in big masses, and while undertaking a concentrated offensive against them and surrounding them, when the enemy troops were weak, the small newly-formed detachments of the Chinese Red Army were able to defend themselves and to inflict a series of defeats on the enemy. After in this way receiving a certain breathing space, they then developed into a big army, more or less firmly established in definite regions. Of course, they had to retreat on several occasions, and to yield their territory to the enemy, but their *armed cadres* were preserved and saved from destruction. The territory they lost was compensated for by the time they gained which enabled them to extend the small detachments into a big army.

In China the struggle to establish firm Soviet territories extended over quite a lengthy period of time. It was only at the end of the year 1929, and especially at the beginning of the year 1930, that the Soviet movement emerged from its original phase of partisan warfare, and obtained a more or less stable territorial base. But this primary, preparatory phase of "small" warfare was absolutely necessary; without it the powerful Red Army of Soviet China, which has for several years already successfully repulsed the onslaught of the armed forces of the counter-revolution, could not have been brought together.

THE SOCIALIST PARTY REJECTS THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY TRADITIONS

A Review of *America at the Crossroads*—by David P. Berenberg.
Published by Rand School Press, New York, 1934.

By C. REDMILL

THE author of the book under review, David P. Berenberg, is one of the editors of the official theoretical organ of the Socialist Party of America: *The American Socialist Quarterly* and is parading as a "Marxist" and "Left" leader in the Socialist Party. For example, in the discussion preceding the convention of the Socialist Party, Berenberg very "sharply" criticized the program of the Socialist Party, fearing that the program is not constructed skillfully enough to catch the workers. He is afraid that the program of the Socialist Party has "a certain tenderness for liberal and middle-class elements, and perhaps for certain labor elements that think themselves as middle class".* He is therefore led to conclude that "the workers are alienated by a movement dominated by the wish to placate middle-class liberals".** The author therefore proposed to go "back" to Marx and adopt a program similar to the Communist Manifesto.

One would therefore be led to believe that a book by such a "Left", dealing with such a problem as "America at the Crossroads", would be an attempt to present the problems facing the American working class, at least in a "new" way. But as a matter of fact, it is simply a repetition of the old propaganda of the Socialist Party. The only problem of interest in the book is its attempt to show that the American Socialist Party carries forward the American traditions and that this party has its roots in American soil and has the solution to the problems facing the American workers. The chapters dealing with these problems are entitled "The American Dream", "The Development of American Capitalism", "The American People", "Conditions Making for Socialism", and the "Cross Roads".

This attempt at "Americanization" is of interest to the Communist movement in the United States, especially at this time, because the working class is beginning to look for a revolutionary way out of the crisis. This attempt of Berenberg is another proof that the only inheritor of the revolutionary traditions of America can be and is the Communist Party of the United States, as it has shown in the last period, especially since its Eighth Convention.

In the past the American Communist Party, with few exceptions, on every national holiday, limited

itself to propaganda that showed up the bourgeois character of the war for independence and of the Civil War. This is a seeming "Left" position. But actually in the American Communist Party this was an expression of the remnants of its Socialist past. To utilize correctly the revolutionary heritage of the past is a tremendous step in the direction of the Bolshevization of the Communist Party. For only a real revolutionary party, guiding itself by Marxism-Leninism, is interested in educating the working class in the revolutionary traditions of its own country as well as that of the international working class, in order to use these in the revolutionary class struggle for the overthrow of capitalism. The Socialist Party, on the contrary, which rejects the proletarian revolution and therefore rejects the class struggle, cannot and does not want to inherit America's revolutionary past.

This is clearly shown in Berenberg's book. In many places in the book there are references to the "tradition of revolt", to "force and violence", etc. But it is interesting to see how the author deals with these questions. For example, on page 42 we find the following:

"There have been draft riots, bread riots, rent riots, strike riots, *race riots by the hundreds*. Contemplating this record of organized violence, to say nothing of the *many lynchings in the South, North, East and West*, the student of history is forced to the conclusion that there is so much insistence on the American love for law and order, precisely because the American has so little of it. The claim is a wish fulfillment!" (My emphasis—C. R.)

Here the author refers to force and violence, and in one breath, without any differentiation, he bunches together the heroic revolutionary struggles of the past with race riots and lynchings, the most miserable, shameful acts of oppression and white chauvinism on the part of the ruling class.

The author's attempt to classify together these various acts of force and violence is done only in order to discredit the revolutionary traditions. And there are many revolutionary traditions in America's past. For example, in the declaration of the Continental Congress in 1774, we hear the following call to action, a call that sounds almost prophetic to the present-day wage slaves:

**American Socialist Quarterly*, Vol. III, No. 2, p. 38.

***Ibid*, p. 33.

"We are reduced to the alternative of choosing an unconditional submission to the tyranny of irritated masters, or resistance by force. The latter is our choice. We have counted the cost of the contest, and nothing is so dreadful as voluntary slavery."

One cannot help, in this connection, but recall the message of John Brown, the Abolitionist, on the day of his execution, which he succeeded in smuggling out of jail and which will forever remain a call to arms for the oppressed:

"I, John Brown, am now quite *certain* that the crimes of this *guilty* land will never be purged away but with *blood*. I had, as I now think, vainly flattered myself that without very much bloodshed it might be done." (See Woodrow Wilson's *History of the American People*, Vol. VIII.)

Does not this manly courage and the spirit of self-sacrifice in the cause of freeing the Negro nation from slavery inspire one to struggle against capitalism and its lynchings and terror against the Negro and white toilers? It is disgusting to think that this "Left" Socialist classifies the hero of Harper's Ferry with the iron heel of the ruling class and with lynchings. Such calls to struggle for the overthrow of the ruling class, Berenberg tries to discredit by his underhand methods.

The American workers, though, who are interested in the overthrow of wage slavery and of unemployment, misery and starvation imposed upon them by capitalism, have much to learn from the past. The art of organization of revolution and revolutionary methods of struggle reached a high level of development in America. Take, for example, the following description of revolutionary methods given by Lord Dunmore, Governor of Virginia, in 1774:

"A committee is chosen in every county to carry the association of the Congress into execution. . . . Every city, besides, is arming an independent company to protect their committee and to be employed against the government should occasion require. Not a justice of the peace acts except as a committeeman. Abolishing the courts of justice was the first step taken." (My emphasis—C. R.)

Those are the traditions that are not to the liking of a Berenberg or a Socialist Party, but of these traditions the revolutionary workers are proud. They teach the workers that in order to overthrow the ruling class, they must establish themselves as a dictatorship against their oppressors. They teach the lessons of a revolutionary form of struggle.

Berenberg lists (pp. 40-41) the War for Independence, and the Civil War in one lump with the progressive movement of 1912, the LaFollette movement of 1924, and the Roosevelt landslide of 1932. He concludes that they are "revolts all of them". "Aimless, stupid, purposeless, rebellious, most of

them!" What an obvious falsification of history it is to try and picture the Roosevelt landslide and the 1924 LaFollette movement (in which the S. P. merged with LaFollette) as revolts. Berenberg, of course, would not call the 1924 LaFollette movement "purposeless" and "stupid". Berenberg himself was an ardent campaigner for Bob LaFollette. What Berenberg really objects to is the fact that those "revolts" were not led by the Socialist Party. Those "revolts" actually express the hopes of Berenberg and his Socialist Party. But those are not the revolts that can overthrow capitalism and establish the working class in power.

* * *

What kind of traditions does Mr. Berenberg propose for us to inherit? In the American traditions of the past there are some that we must claim, there are others that we must reject. The working class rejects the bourgeois content of the movements of the 18th and 19th centuries, but they claim the revolutionary methods and forms of struggle against oppression. The heroism and greatness of the struggles of the past, the Revolutionary War for Independence, Shays' Rebellion, the Abolitionist Movement, the Civil War, etc., are the events that can inspire the working class of the United States to struggle against capitalist oppression and for a new society that will know no oppression of man by man.

The American as well as the European bourgeoisie at one time was a revolutionary class—it, too, had to use revolutionary methods to overthrow national and feudal oppression. "The great men, preparing in France [and America as well—C. R.] the mind for the coming great revolution, themselves acted in the highest degree revolutionary" (Engels). The bourgeoisie, though, could go no further than the establishment of a bourgeois system of society, dependent on the exploitation of the working class. It could, therefore, only replace one rule of class oppression by another. It therefore inevitably became reactionary.

In estimating the revolutionary struggles of the past, Engels stated the following:

"Now we know that the kingdom of reason was no more, no less, than the idealizing of the kingdom of the bourgeoisie, that eternal right, that was then advocated, found its realization in bourgeois justice; that government by reason, Rousseau's Contract Social [in America it was advocated and embodied in the Declaration of Independence—C. R.] was embodied in a bourgeois-democratic republic—and could be embodied in nothing else. The great thinkers of the 18th century—like also the thinkers of former centuries—could not surpass the limits imposed by their epoch."

It is these bourgeois traditions, the bourgeois content of the revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries,

that Berenberg wants us to inherit. He says on page 92:

"If, early in their history they [the capitalists—C. R.], too, fought for democratic form of government, they have long since passed beyond the need for them. Now they want to forget the days of their democratic fervor. Now they yearn for the Dictatorship of Capital, for the unquestioned rule of their class. By means of Supreme Court decisions, by the process of injunction, by the increase of the executive power they seek to whittle away our democratic rights. *By innuendo, scorn and mockery they [the capitalists—C. R.] seek to undermine the workers' faith in democracy.*

"*If democracy is to live in America, or elsewhere, it must be preserved by the workers.*" (My emphasis—C. R.)

So, we see, Mr. Berenberg wants the workers in America today to preserve bourgeois democracy in the face of the decline of parliamentary democracy, not only to struggle to retain those rights that the bourgeoisie are trying to take away from us, but to defend the system of bourgeois democracy itself. This he proposes instead of using the revolutionary traditions to mobilize and inspire the workers to struggle for the overthrow of capitalism and its capitalist class dictatorship as embodied in bourgeois democracy. Berenberg wants us to inherit those traditions which we must reject, the traditions which today have become reactionary.

* * *

Is it true, as Mr. Berenberg states, that the bourgeoisie voluntarily give up their democratic form of government because it is not a dictatorship of capital, "the unquestioned rule of their class", and go over to fascism, which the author pictures as "the revolt of the middle classes"? (p. 77.) Of course it is not true. The reason the bourgeoisie resorts to fascism is because bourgeois democracy, especially during the years of the crisis, is becoming ever more exposed to the workers as a form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and because the workers are beginning to seek a revolutionary way out. The bourgeoisie resorts to fascism, to this reactionary, bloody, terroristic rule of monopolist capital, because it is the only method by which they can keep, at least temporarily, the workers from finding a revolutionary way out of the crisis. The working class must struggle with all its power against fascism, which greatly worsens its exploitation and oppression, but it must not do that in order to preserve the rule of the capitalists in another form.

Does that mean that the working class in America must not struggle to preserve those few civil rights that they were still able to retain? On the contrary, the working class must and does struggle to preserve those civil rights. The bourgeois attack against the civil rights gained by the workers is a pre-

lude to the further worsening conditions of the workers, to a lowered standard of living and towards the introduction of fascist terror. But the working class must have no illusions about bourgeois democracy, as a form of the dictatorship of the ruling class. In this struggle against fascism and fascization, the revolutionary workers and the Communist Party expose the propaganda of the bourgeoisie by showing what is the class essence of this bourgeois democracy.

In this struggle against the fascization of the American government we can and must also utilize the American revolutionary traditions. The Communist Party does that in the Manifesto published at its Eighth Convention. The Manifesto compares the Declaration of Independence to present-day conditions, and points out that never was there such a mass of people so

"... completely deprived of all semblance of 'the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness'. Never were there such 'destructive' effects upon these rights by 'any form of government', as those exerted today by the existing form of government in the United States. Never have the exploited masses suffered such a 'long train of abuses' or been so 'reduced under absolute despotism' as today under capitalist rule."

Thus they refer to the revolutionary past of the bourgeoisie in order to expose their reactionary present. The Communist Party, though, does not idealize the past of the American bourgeoisie and it does not forget the class character of the American democratic traditions.

The Socialist Party's attempt, however, to inherit the traditions of the past is done, not for the purpose of mobilizing the working class for the struggle for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, but is done in order to preserve bourgeois democracy—the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

* * *

Another central question running through the whole book of Berenberg is his vilification and falsification of Communism and of the achievements of the Soviet Union. In his slander of Communism, he attempts to use the hatred of the workers against fascism. Fascism and the dictatorship of the proletariat are presented as essentially the same, although differing in form. The author then continues to answer the question as to where lies the difference between the Communists and the Socialists. He says:

"It is in this, that Socialists do not wish to set up a Dictatorship of a few in the name of the workers. They wish rather to set up a government by the workers, for the workers. They desire workers' control of industry."

This is nothing but a subterfuge in order to fool the workers.

Berenberg continues his "objective" presentation

of the difference between the Socialists and the Communists in the following manner:

"There are many differences between Socialists and Communists, but in the end they simmer down to this: that the Communist has no faith in the workers, that he looks upon them as children in need of leadership, and upon himself as their chosen leader. To find salvation they need only to follow him. The Socialist, on the other hand, looks upon the worker as fully able to look after himself and his affairs." (Page 94.)

What is there in back of these phrases, that the Communists have no faith in the workers, that they look upon them "as children in need of leadership", while the Socialists, on the contrary, look upon the worker "as fully able to look after himself and his affairs"? Behind these phrases are those conceptions that Lenin called "tailism", i.e., the desire of the Socialists to drag behind the backward workers instead of being in the vanguard of the proletariat. Behind these phrases of Berenberg is the refusal of the Socialists to struggle against the penetration of bourgeois influence in the ranks of the working class. Berenberg's position means to agree to the subordination of the workers to the leadership of the bourgeoisie and thereby to betray the interests of the working class.

Mr. Berenberg knows well enough that the American workers, not yet acquainted with the revolutionary theories of Marxism and not yet under the leadership of its revolutionary party, are still following the old bourgeois parties and that many of them still belong to company unions. Berenberg also knows that the leadership of the A. F. of L., which is now supported by the leadership of Berenberg's Socialist Party, has and is, by all means, trying to chain the workers to capitalism by trying to keep them from the class struggle. Berenberg knows all of that, but to him it does not matter, for actually, despite words to the contrary, such a theory of "tailism" advocated by Berenberg shows that he does not stand on the position of the class struggle.

The Communists who are honestly struggling to free the workers, know that the working class cannot free itself unless they succeed in smashing the influence of those who bring into the working class bourgeois ideology, unless the ideas of Marxism-Leninism penetrate the consciousness of the masses and unless the working class will have its own devoted revolutionary leadership.

Does that mean that the Communists want to establish "a Dictatorship of a few in the name of the workers", as Berenberg claims? No! The Communists want to, and in the Soviet Union they actually have established a real dictatorship of the working class. But this dictatorship of the working class is possible only if the working class is led by its vanguard, the Communist Party.

What worker who participated with the Communists in strikes, on the picket line, in demonstrations, in trade unions, in hunger marches, in the veterans' movement, in the struggle against war and fascism, in the struggle for civil rights, or any other struggle in which the workers are engaged, will believe this cowardly statement of Berenberg that the Communists have no faith in the workers? The Communist Party rouses the working masses to struggle, because it has faith in them. In the strike struggles, it advocates workers' control while the Socialist Party supports the Greens, the Gormans, and other labor bureaucrats.

Does the S. P. leadership try to hinder, by all means at its disposal, the united front movement of the workers because it has faith in the working class or because it fears the mass movement of the workers? Obviously because of the latter.

Berenberg knows well enough that the C. P. is carrying on a struggle in its ranks against every minute expression of bureaucracy that now and then raises its head in the C. P., because it is an expression of a Social-Democratic lack of faith in the workers. Berenberg's slander is an attempt to discredit the C. P. especially among those workers among whom an urge is being developed for a united front with the Communists. But the bases for the united front in America are so deep-rooted that Mr. Berenberg will not succeed in stopping it by slander.

The Communist Party, as the advanced part of the working class, despite all kinds of terror and oppression, not only speaks of freeing the workers and establishing workers' control of industry, but actually organizes the working class to struggle for it.

"At the basis of these activities lies the general conviction among Marxists that . . . the worker is the sole and natural representative of the whole of the toiling and exploited population. . . ." (Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 453.)

The working class learns in the different struggles for its daily bread, in the struggle against unemployment, for its union, in the struggle for civil rights, in the struggle against fascism and war. The Communist Party will keep on being in the forefront of these struggles and fight for rank-and-file leadership in the struggles, and the workers, despite the Berenbergs and the Socialist Party, are beginning to learn that the program of the American Communist Party is the only correct one and are beginning to accept it as their program. The growing tendency for the united front is an indication of this.

Wherein, actually, lies the basic difference between the Socialists and the Communists? The basic difference lies in the fact that the Communist Party points out to the workers that the only way out of the misery and class oppression existing under capitalism, is through the revolutionary overthrow of the

capitalist class and through the raising of "the proletariat to the position of the ruling class" (Marx), *i.e.*, the establishment of its own dictatorship. The Socialist Party, in rejecting the proletarian revolution, in rejecting the struggle for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, becomes, although it does not admit it, a defender of bourgeois democracy. The S. P., by thus rejecting the revolutionary struggle, actually paves the way for political reaction. The basic difference, therefore, between the Socialist Party and the Communist Party is that the former, despite words to the contrary, is a defender of decaying capitalism, while the Communist Party struggles for its overthrow and struggles for every imme-

diately demand in the interest of the working masses.

The vilification of Berenberg against Communism reads like statements from the Civic Federation or like those of the infamous Fish. Berenberg, in his attempt to vilify the American Communist Party, slanders the Soviet Union with the old lies spread by the bourgeois and socialist press. The arguments are old, and have been answered time and again.

The book is another proof showing what a great gap exists between some of the "Left" leaders in the Socialist Party and the rank-and-file members of that party, who are at the crossroads and are really and honestly interested in finding a revolutionary way out of the catacomb of capitalism.

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