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THE KUOMINTANG REGIONS

MANCHURIA UNDER THE FOREIGN  
YOKE

THE EPIC MARCH OF THE CHINESE  
RED ARMY

IMPERIALIST RIVALRY IN THE FAR EAST

THE NEW SOVIET DISTRICTS

THE LEADERS OF MODERN CHINA  
(With plates)

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REALLY IS

MAPS, MANIFESTOES OF SOVIET  
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# CHINA AT BAY

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
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# THE STRUGGLE FOR THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST UNITED FRONT, AND THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

By WAN MING.

## I.—The New Policy of the Communist Party of China.

**T**HE appeal of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese People's Soviet Republic and of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, headed "To the whole people of China concerning resistance to Japan and the salvation of the fatherland,"\* represents the beginning of the application by the Communist Party of China of the new policy.

The appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and of the Soviet Government of China puts forward the definite meaning of the anti-imperialist united front and the forms it is to take, in the following way:

THE FORMATION OF A UNITED PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR THE WHOLE OF CHINA, AND THE ORGANISATION OF A UNITED ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY FOR THE WHOLE OF CHINA.

It would be wrong, however, to draw the conclusion therefrom that the Communist Party and the Soviets in China insist that a united anti-imperialist front can begin only with these forms of struggle, and that they underestimate the different forms in which this united front may begin, and which arise out of the most elementary anti-imperialist demands. In putting forward their proposals regarding the basic content and the highest forms of the anti-imperialist united front, the C.C. of the C.P. of China and the Central Soviet Government of China make it obligatory upon the whole party and upon all the Soviets to increase their attention ten-fold to the organisation of the mass anti-imperialist movement, if only on the basis of primitive forms and around the most elementary demands.

The C.C. of the C.P. of China and the Central Soviet Government of China regard the formation of a Chinese people's government of national defence and of a Chinese united anti-Japanese army as the final outcome of a systematic, stubborn and flexible struggle by ALL HEROIC FIGHTERS, PARTY AND NON-PARTY, to establish, consolidate and extend the widest anti-imperialist united front of the Chinese people on the basis of a general fighting programme of resistance to Japan and a struggle to save the fatherland.

The chief and most important of all the conditions on the basis of which the Communist Party of China has elaborated its new policy is

the rise of the NATIONAL STRUGGLE AGAINST JAPANESE IMPERIALISM, AND FOR THE SALVATION OF THE COUNTRY, AND THE NEED FOR ORGANISING THIS STRUGGLE. To-day great changes are taking place in China from the point of view of the alignment of class forces. Not only the working-class, the peasantry and the toilers in general are more and more realising the need for a determined struggle for their national and social liberation, not only are broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie fighting against the imperialist yoke, unemployment and death from starvation, but a considerable section of the national bourgeoisie are also more energetically striving to find a way of resisting Japanese imperialism. The historic slogan issued by the C.P. of China after the events of September 18, 1931, i.e., "a national-revolutionary war of the armed people against Japanese imperialism and in defence of the national independence of China, and of its territorial integrity and unification as a state," has now become not only the slogan of the Communist Party; it is finding support in many other parties, groups, and among the vast masses. A significant change is also to be observed in the attitude of the military units of the different generals to the question of the defence of the state and national defence. It is a fact that not only numerous soldiers, including a considerable section of the junior and middle officers, but also individual representatives of the high command are hostile towards Japanese imperialism and its agent, as a result of which there have been several cases of whole army corps and units of the Kuomintang armies turning their weapons against the enemies of the people.

Numerous facts can be quoted which testify to these changes taking place among different strata of the population and different political parties and groupings, as well as among the military units of the Chinese generals, in the direction of the struggle against Japanese imperialism.\*

What is the explanation of the national character of the struggle to resist Japan and save the fatherland?

Above all, the unceasing onslaught of Japanese imperialism upon the whole of China and its openly rapacious, colonial policy in Manchukuo.

\* See Comrade Wan Ming's speech at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, as published in the "Communist International," No. 17/18, 1935.

\* See page 73.

About half the territory of China has already been either directly occupied by Japanese imperialism or is in fact under the heel of the Japanese militarists. And half of the territory of China is in danger of further occupation by the Japanese imperialist robbers. Japanese imperialism has utilised the situation in Europe, which is becoming more and more complicated in connection with the Italo-Abyssinian war, to make an open declaration about forming "Huabei-Ko," and has advanced new demands according to which Japan will set up a complete protectorate over the whole of China. The frankly rapacious policy of oppression pursued by Japanese imperialism on the territory of Manchukuo, which it has occupied has caused unprecedented alarm among the population of the whole of China. The feats of "civilisation" performed by Japanese imperialism and its Kwantung army on the territory of Manchukuo include the following: the mass murder of peaceful citizens, the mass burning of towns and villages, the rape of Chinese women and girls, unexampled insults and outrages directed against the elementary human dignity of the Chinese, the destruction and disarming of Chinese armed forces of all types and the confiscation of all types of arms from the population, plunder and devastation, and the famous "reorganisation" of all political institutions, accompanied by wage reductions and the increase in unemployment. Further, the growth of unbearable taxation and extortions, the seizure of the horses and cattle of the peasants, the order prohibiting peasants sowing maize within a distance of 12 miles from the railway lines, mass compulsory labour on construction jobs of strategic importance, the seizure of all resources of raw materials (mines, pits, forests, etc) and transport (railways, steamship companies, automobile companies), the seizure or forcible purchase of Chinese industrial enterprises for a mere song. Also the elimination of Chinese traders and Chinese banks, the appropriation of the fertile lands of the Chinese peasants and landlords and their transfer to Japanese and Korean settlers, the confiscation of big stretches of land for the requirements of war construction, the burning of all advanced Chinese literature, not only of the progressive kind, but also all Chinese books on literature, history, geography, etc., the prohibition of the teaching of these subjects in schools, the compulsory teaching of the Japanese language and the history of Japan to Chinese school children, the mass sale of opium, morphia and other narcotics, and the encouragement of mass prostitution among Japanese and Korean women, gambling, etc. All this unequivocally shows the entire Chinese people that under Japanese occupation not only

are the toiling masses of China subjected to unheard-of colonial exploitation and oppression, but that the propertied classes of China are at the mercy of the Japanese robbers as well. All this is clearly convincing the Chinese people that side by side with the open policy of colonial enslavement, Japanese imperialism is pursuing a policy in Manchuria aiming at the physical annihilation and demoralisation of the Chinese people.

This rapacious policy pursued by Japanese imperialism on the territory of Manchukuo, and its unceasing offensive to achieve the seizure of further territory have awakened among all Chinese the realisation of the fact that what has befallen 40 million of their brothers in Manchuria and Jehol, may strike 95 million of their countrymen in the five northern provinces (Hopeh, Shantung, Shansi, Chabar and Suiyuan) to-morrow, and befall the 400 million who constitute the great people of China the day after, if they do not unite their forces for serious, determined armed resistance against Japanese aggression.

The struggle against Japanese imperialism and for the salvation of the fatherland is assuming a more and more national character for the additional reason that China during recent years has been experiencing a serious, and ever increasing, economic crisis. The following are phenomena which are characteristic of China to-day: the unexampled degradation of agriculture, the unbearable poverty of the peasants, the mass unemployment and the death by starvation of millions, the passage of Chinese industrial enterprises into the hands of the imperialists, and first and foremost to the Japanese, the bankruptcy and closing down of Chinese banks, and the restrictions upon Chinese trade and collapse of numerous Chinese trading enterprises. Beside this there are the constantly recurring natural disasters, such as floods, droughts, pests of locusts, etc., which doom to poverty and starvation not only the toilers, but also considerable sections of the petty-bourgeoisie and middle-class property-holders in the villages and towns.

The responsibility for all this misery and suffering lies at the door of all the imperialists and militarists; but the prime responsibility for the misery of the Chinese people lies with the Japanese imperialists and the Nanking Kuomintang government, led by Chang Kai-shek and Wan Ching-wei. Consequently, all those who are against the exploiters and oppressors of the Chinese people cannot but aim their weapons first and foremost against Japanese imperialism and the Nanking government.

Finally, the national character of the struggle against Japanese imperialism for the salvation of the fatherland is the result of the fact that while

the foreign and home policy of the Kuomintang has broken down entirely, a new government is growing up, the government of the people themselves, the government of the Soviets, which is pursuing a new national policy the very reverse of that of the Kuomintang. Previously, not only a large section of the national bourgeoisie, but also considerable circles of the petty bourgeoisie as well, were inspired with confidence in the Kuomintang, and counted on it being in a position, in the long run, to introduce some sort of national and social reforms in their interests. Now, however, in connection with the unceasing capitulation of the Nanking government to Japanese imperialism, and the hopeless economic and political situation of the country under the Kuomintang régime, not only the petty bourgeoisie, but a considerable section of the national bourgeoisie, in addition, are freeing themselves from the illusions they held concerning the Kuomintang, and are turning for a way out to the toiling masses who are carrying on the struggle against Japanese imperialism and its agents. The victorious development of the Soviet revolution and the success of the policy of the Soviets are inspiring broad masses of the people with the certainty that if the masses of the people take power into their own hands, then, despite all sacrifices, difficulties and mistakes, everything will work out much better than under the Kuomintang régime.

The Chinese people are directly confronted with the following alternatives: EITHER THEY WILL RISE UP AND RESIST THE ONSLAUGHT OF JAPANESE IMPERIALISM AND SAVE THE FATHERLAND, — WHICH WILL MEAN LIFE; OR THEY WILL FOLLOW THE NANKING GOVERNMENT AND REJECT THE NATIONAL-LIBERATION STRUGGLE—WHICH WILL MEAN DEATH! This is the explanation of the rise of the national struggle against Japanese imperialism for the salvation of the fatherland.

If success is to be assured for this national struggle, it must be organised. It was for just this purpose that the C.P. of China first of all drew up its new policy of establishing the broadest anti-imperialist united front.

Secondly, THE BASIC PECULIARITIES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION ARE THE CONDITIONS WHICH CONSTITUTE THE STARTING POINT for the policy elaborated by the C.P. of China. What do these peculiarities amount to? The first peculiarity is that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China is passing through the Soviet stage of its development, in which two torrents of revolution unite — THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST AND THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTIONS.

In his speech delivered at the session of the plenum of the E.C.C.I., held in August, 1927, Comrade Stalin, when dealing with the stages of the

Chinese revolution and of its chief tasks at each of these stages, pointed out that,

“while the first stage was distinguished for the fact that the edge of revolution was directed chiefly against foreign imperialism, the characteristic feature of the second stage is the fact that the revolution directs its edge chiefly against the enemies inside the country and, first and foremost, against the feudal lords, against the feudal régime. Did the first stage solve its task of overthrowing foreign imperialism? No it did not. It passed on the completion of this task as a legacy to the second stage of the Chinese revolution. It only gave the first impetus to the revolutionary masses against imperialism, so as to finish its run and pass on this work to the future. It is most likely that the second stage of the revolution will not be able to effect the complete solution of the task of driving out the imperialists. It is giving a further impetus to broad masses of the Chinese peasants and workers against imperialism, but does this so as to leave the culmination of this work to the next stage of the Chinese revolution, the Soviet stage. And there is nothing surprising in this. Is it not well-known that analogical facts have occurred in the history of our revolution, although in a different situation and under different circumstances? Is it not well known that the first stage of our revolution did not fully solve its task of completing the agrarian revolution, but passed this task on to the next stage of the revolution, to the October revolution, which wholly and completely solved the task of uprooting feudal survivals? Consequently, it will not be surprising if the Chinese revolution will not be able to complete the agrarian revolution fully, if the second stage of revolution sets millions of peasants into motion and rouses them against feudal survivals, leaving the culmination of this work to the next stage of the revolution, the Soviet stage. This also will only be a circumstance favouring the future Soviet revolution in China.”\*

The fact that the main content of the Soviet stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China is not only the agrarian revolution but also the anti-imperialist revolution is, as Comrade Stalin indicated, only a circumstance favouring the Chinese revolution, since it is just this circumstance that endows the Chinese Soviet revolution to-day with its real strength and very wide scope. The task facing the Communist Party of China is not only to correctly understand and appraise the inter-relations between these two revolutionary torrents, but also by its correct policy to combine the solution of the tasks facing both the revolutionary torrents in a manner which will give the greatest scope and strength to the development of the revolutionary struggle.

In connection with the broad extent of the development of the agrarian revolution in the Soviet districts, and the tremendous upsurge of the anti-imperialist revolution throughout the country under the slogan of armed resistance to Japanese imperialism, it is THE TASK OF THE PARTY OF BOLSHEVIKS TO PURSUE A BOLD, FLEXIBLE, AND CORRECT POLICY, AND SO COMBINE THESE TWO GREAT TORRENTS OF THE SOVIET REVOLUTION, SO AS TO ENDOU THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE REVOLU-

\* Compendium “On the Opposition,” Russ. Ed. pp. 656-657, State Publishing House, 1928.

TION WITH AS GREAT FORCES AND SCOPE AS POSSIBLE, BY DRAWING INTO THE NATIONAL AND SOCIAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE CIRCLES NOT ONLY OF TRULY REVOLUTIONARY, CLASS-CONSCIOUS AND HONEST ELEMENTS, BUT ALSO OF ALLIES AND TEMPORARY SUPPORTERS FROM AMONG DIFFERENT STRATA AND CLASSES OF CHINESE SOCIETY, EVEN THOSE THAT ARE TEMPORARILY WAVERING. Our new policy raises the task of establishing a broad anti-imperialist front on these lines, first and foremost.

The second peculiarity in the development of the Chinese Soviet revolution is that its enemies are all imperialist Powers. It is this that is the main difficulty facing the Chinese Soviet revolution, but at the same time it is partly a point assisting its development, since the sharpening of contradictions and the internecine warfare between the rival imperialists and their henchmen in China cannot fail to lead to a weakening of their positions and of the general front. And thus objective possibilities are created of their being used by the revolution in its own interests. The correct and skilful policy to be pursued by the Bolshevik party in this case is to APPRAISE PROPERLY THE RÔLE AND IMPORTANCE OF THESE INDIRECT RESERVES OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION, TO UTILISE THEM FLEXIBLY, SKILFULLY, CORRECTLY AND OPPORTUNELY IN THE INTERESTS OF REVOLUTION—TO CONCENTRATE THE FORCES OF REVOLUTION EVERYWHERE AND AT ALL TIMES AGAINST THE ENEMY WHO AT EACH GIVEN MOMENT IS THE MOST DANGEROUS, THE MOST HATED BY ALL THE PEOPLE AND THE MOST ISOLATED FROM SUPPORT BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD.

To-day, when on the one hand, the further onslaught of Japanese imperialism in North, Central and South China is sharpening the contradictions not only between Japan and America, but also between Japan and England, throughout the Far East, and on the other hand the tense atmosphere throughout the whole of Europe in general and the Italo-Abyssinian war in particular, are still further complicating the struggle between the imperialists, the question of the rôle and importance of the indirect reserves of the revolution is of especially great importance. Our new policy sets the task of utilising all the indirect reserves of the revolution.

The third peculiarity in the development of the Chinese Soviet revolution is that the armed struggle between the revolution and the counter-revolution is OF QUITE A LONG-DRAWN-OUT CHARACTER. This being so, the task of the party of Bolsheviks is to undertake a skilful and flexible mobilisation of all the extensive and inexhaustible forces of the masses of the people, and to use all possible forms and methods of revolutionary struggle. Only if this is done shall we gain a

victory over the enemy, and this task is also raised by our new policy.

Finally, the fourth fundamental peculiarity of the development of the Chinese Soviet revolution is that up to now it has been developing unevenly as regards territory, and in this connection it has only led, after a number of years, TO THE FIRST VICTORY OVER A CONSIDERABLE PART OF ITS TERRITORY. The point indicated by the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of China to the effect that: "the stability of the powers of reaction in different regions is uneven and, therefore, in the event of a general revolutionary upsurge, a victory is possible at first in one or a number of important provinces"—has, in the main, been justified, in practice. INITIAL VICTORY HAS BEEN ACHIEVED BY THE SOVIET REVOLUTION ON THE TERRITORY OF A NUMBER OF PROVINCES, but in consequence of a number of specific peculiarities, and first and foremost because of the weakness of the revolutionary movement, IT HAS NOT YET SPREAD TO A SINGLE IMPORTANT TOWN (CAPITAL) IN THESE PROVINCES. This is, of course, a negative feature, a weakness of the revolution. At the same time, however, at a certain stage of the development of events this is a point assisting the revolution partly, since it provides it with greater opportunities and more time to prepare and to collect its forces, and first and foremost its armed forces, and at the same time provides better opportunities for avoiding conflicts with the superior forces of powerful opponents, which are premature, unprepared, and disadvantageous as far as the revolution is concerned.

The task and the essence of our new policy consists in just this: that it is based upon a correct appraisal of the rôle and significance of the unequal development of the revolutionary movement of the country, it is calculated upon the correct use being made of the initial victory of the revolution, as a base and starting point from which to prepare for and gain complete success, and that it proposes Soviets around which the whole of the Chinese people should centre in their struggle for emancipation.

The third condition which constituted the starting point of the new policy elaborated by the Communist Party of China is the GROWING STRENGTH OF THE RED ARMY AND THE SOVIETS, in spite of all their weaknesses. In their policy of developing the anti-imperialist and agrarian revolution, and especially the glorious struggle against the rapacious onslaught of Japanese imperialism and the national treachery of the Nanking government, the Soviets have won enormous sympathy and authority for themselves among the masses of the people. More than this, all the units of the Red Army are growing and

gathering strength in the long, difficult, but successful struggle, repulsing one after another the military campaigns of Chang Kai-shek, who has the support of the imperialists. The last great march of the chief forces of the Red Army, from Kiangsi to Fukiang, in particular, the fact that they broke through the strategic cordon of the million-strong army of the enemy, their advance over a distance of 3,000 miles of territory intersected by high mountain ranges and great rivers, and the fact that the plan drawn up in advance by the C.C. of the C.P. of China and the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Chinese Soviet Republic, namely, to link up with other big units of the fourth army and organise new territorial bases was fulfilled—all these heroic feats of the Red Army of China have revealed in practice the infinite support and sympathy which the masses of the people extend to the Soviets. By its fighting power, by its legendary military art in these heroic feats, the Red Army of China rouses admiration in the hearts of all friends, causes alarm to all enemies, and imbues all those of little faith with the conviction of its invincibility. By force of this, all the enemies of Japanese imperialism and its agents—whatever the motives that guide them, whether truly national-liberation sentiments and patriotic feelings or simply militarist and imperialist contradictions—have to reckon with the Chinese Red Army and the Soviets, not only as a big political force, but also as a big military factor. This circumstance without a doubt provides the Red Army and the Soviets with still further opportunities of fulfilling their glorious rôle as the centre around which the entire Chinese people are rallying in organising resistance to Japan and the struggle to save their fatherland.

However, we must say quite frankly that what dictates the need for establishing a broad anti-imperialist united front is not only the growing might of the Red Army and the Soviets, but also the fact that they have their weak sides. The point is that from the viewpoint of a real military force, the Red Army alone is still not enough to conquer Japanese imperialism and its agents, while considerable sections of the population, from the point of view of their political outlook, are still not free from the influence of other governmental authorities, other parties and groupings, and are not yet adherents to the Soviets to-day. At the same time the national crisis of the Chinese people is so serious that if means are not rapidly found of organising the broadest masses of the people and of uniting the various armed forces, irrespective of their political convictions and party membership, for the common cause of offering resistance to Japan and saving the father-

land, then the oldest country in the world, with a history and culture 5,000 years old will soon be completely converted into a colony under the heel of foreign robbers, and the greatest people in the world, numbering 400 millions, will be subjected once and for all to colonial slavery. Our new policy is the only means by which the whole of the Chinese people can unite with the Red Army and the Soviets for the sacred national-liberation struggle.

Finally, the fourth condition which constitutes the starting-point of the new policy elaborated by OUR PARTY IS THE NECESSITY OF CORRECTING THE MISTAKES WHICH HAVE MANIFESTED THEMSELVES IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF OUR WORK IN THE SOVIET AND NON-SOVIET REGIONS. There are quite a number of mistakes and shortcomings in our work, and they are first and foremost of a "leftist"-sectarian nature. They prevent our party from acting as leader on a national scale, as a national factor, and this is especially necessary in the new situation to-day. The cause of the Chinese revolution cannot be advanced unless these mistakes and shortcomings are overcome.

#### 11. Concerning the Relations Between the Soviet Government and a People's Government of National Defence, and Between the Red Army and a United Anti-Japanese Army.

The Chinese Soviet Government is fundamentally a people's Government, since it is the power of the people themselves engaged in defending their own interests. At the same time it is actually, in addition, a government of national defence, since it is fighting for the organisation of a national liberation war of the armed people against Japanese imperialism in defence of the national independence, territorial integrity and the unification of China as a state, since it is fighting for complete national freedom for the entire Chinese people. However, the Soviet government of China to-day is still not a GOVERNMENT COVERING THE WHOLE OF CHINA, since for the time being it controls only one section of Chinese territory. And at the same time, in connection with the growing offensive of Japanese imperialism against the whole of China and the need for rallying the whole of the Chinese people for armed struggle against Japanese aggression and to save the fatherland, the question of the unification of China into one state is of first-class importance. In China to-day, the consequences of the fact that as a state the country is divided up, are to be felt more strongly than ever before. And it is just for this reason that the C.C. of the C.P. of China and the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, are taking upon themselves the initiative in forming a people's government of national defence to cover the whole of China, in

which there shall participate representatives not only of the Soviet Government and the Manchurian anti-Japanese organs of the people's government in the localities, but also of all parties, groups, political and military authorities, mass organisations and social groupings, who are really striving for the national defence of China against the Japanese imperialists.

How, concretely, will such a government of national defence covering the whole of China, be formed? At present it is difficult to say. The C.P. of China and the Soviet Government of China are sincerely desirous of forming such a government as quickly as possible. In their manifesto already mentioned,\* the C.C. of the C.P. of China and the C.E.C. of the Chinese Soviet Republic declared openly that

"The Soviet Government is prepared to take upon itself the initiative in establishing a Chinese government of national defence, it is prepared immediately to enter into negotiations for the organisation of a government of national defence and to take part in it along with all political parties and groups in China, with all prominent politicians and social figures, with all mass organisations, with all local military and political authorities who wish to participate in the struggle to resist Japan and save our fatherland."

And further the Communist Party and the Soviet Government of China declared:

"The government of national defence which is organised as a result of these negotiations must be regarded as a provisional central organ for the struggle to save China, and it must take measures to convene a really representative body of all the Chinese people, elected on the basis of democratic liberties, which will decide along which roads the struggle for the integrity and independence of China must travel further. The Soviet Government and the Communist Party of China will support the convention of such a representative body and its decisions, with all the means at their disposal, since the Soviet Government of China sincerely and warmly respects the opinion and the will of its people."

What should be the nature of such a Chinese government of national defence? The manifesto deals with this point in the following way:

"The main task facing this people's government will be to organise resistance to Japanese imperialism and the salvation of our fatherland. Therefore the following must be the main points in its programme.

(1) Armed resistance to Japanese expansion and the return of all occupied territories.

(2) Assistance to those who are starving, capital repairs to river beds and river dams so as to combat floods and droughts.

(3) Confiscation of all the property of Japanese imperialists in China and its transfer to a fund to cover the cost of the war against Japan.

(4) Confiscation of all the land, rice, grain and other property in the hands of all national traitors and Japanese agents, and their transfer to a fund to help the unemployed, the poor and those participating in the anti-Japanese struggle.

(5) Abolition of all unbearable taxation and requisitions—regulation of financial policy, the monetary system and the whole of our national economy.

(6) Increase in wages and salaries, and an improve-

ment in the material conditions of the workers, peasants, army men and intellectuals.

(7) Democratic liberties, and the release of all political prisoners.

(8) Universal education free of charge, and the provision of work to young people finishing their studies.

(9) Equal rights for all nationalities inhabiting China, and the defence of the freedom of the person, property, and of the right of domicile, and the right of every inhabitant of China itself and of Chinese emigrants abroad to pursue their occupations.

(10) The establishment of contacts with all the masses of the people whose attitude towards Japanese imperialism is hostile (with the Japanese toiling people, with the Koreans, with the people of Formosa, etc.) for the purpose of joint struggle against the common enemy. The establishment of an alliance with all nations and states who support or sympathise with the national struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people, and friendly relations with all powers and nations who observe benevolent neutrality towards the military operations carried on between Japanese imperialism and the Chinese people."

From the contents of this programme it is clear that such a Chinese government of national defence is a government of the anti-imperialist united front. At the same time its programme not only does not contradict the interests of the Soviet government, but, on the contrary, the Soviet government is fighting and must fight to get it carried out consistently.

Therefore, the Chinese Soviet Government can and must pursue this programme in all localities which are subject to its authority, setting an example to all those who consider themselves to be supporters of the government of national defence.

But at the same time, we must clearly point to the fact that the Soviet government, whose main task is to obtain the complete, final, national and social emancipation of the whole of the Chinese people, cannot limit its actions to the framework of the programme of the government of national defence. Thus, for example, on the question of launching the agrarian revolution, the Soviet government is already putting into practice the programme demands of the government of national defence concerning the confiscation in favour of the people of the lands of traitors to the people, as a composite part, and the starting point, of the agrarian revolution; but at the same time, it not only cannot reject its line of principle aiming at the final elimination of ownership of the land by feudal landlords in China, but is also fighting to get this line operated, in accordance with the given objective and subjective conditions of struggle. For, from the point of view of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government of China, the complete abolition of the ownership of land by feudal landlords and the transfer of land to the peasants, not only do not contradict the tasks of the anti-imperialist struggle, but are an

\* See page 73.

indissoluble part of these tasks and a guarantee that they will really be fulfilled. By abolishing the ownership of land by feudal landlords, and by transferring these lands to the peasantry, the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people, hundreds of millions of peasants, can be aroused to undertake a decisive struggle against Japanese imperialism. Only by abolishing private ownership of the land by the landlords can we save the overwhelming majority of our people—the peasantry—from death by starvation. Only by freeing the peasantry from the yoke of the feudal landlords can we lay down the economic basis for the development of the whole of the economy of China. And only by clearing all the feudal survivals of the Middle Ages out of China can we lead our backward and uncultured country on to the road to development as a modern cultural state. It was no accident that the national revolutionary, Sun Yat-Sen, at one time advanced the idea of giving “the land to those who plough,” and now even such a reactionary militarist as Yen Si-shan, has been forced to admit that “it is necessary to revise land relations” in China.

As regards the inter-relations between the united anti-Japanese army and the Red Army, the manifesto of the C.C. of the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic states the following:

“The united anti-Japanese army must include all troops and armed detachments who desire to fight against Japanese imperialism and its agents. A general staff for this joint army must be established under the guidance of the government of national defence. This general staff will be set up either by means of electing representatives from the commanders and the rank-and-file of all anti-Japanese military units, or by some other democratic means. This question must also be decided by a majority of the representatives of all sides and by the will of the people. The Red Army is prepared to be the first to enter into this anti-Japanese united army for the purpose of fulfilling its sacred duty of saving our fatherland.”

It is difficult as yet to define how the concrete establishment of such a united anti-Japanese army and its leading Headquarters' Staff, under the government of national defence, will come about. But what is certain is that the Red Army, which is the army of the whole of the Chinese people, fighting for national and social emancipation, will constitute one of the composite parts of this united anti-Japanese army. The most important and most complicated task is to give concrete shape to this united army, and to ensure that it has a staff of commanders, who are united and ready to fight. The one thing we must always remember is that once the Red Army joins this united army, it must not only see that it does not weaken its military efficiency but, on the contrary, it must strengthen and increase it to the utmost, so as to really guarantee that it will always play

its most important rôle as the most militant, and the strongest, troops, those best able to manoeuvre, the shock troops of the whole of the united anti-Japanese army.

### III.—Let us Make a Complete All-Round Change in all Spheres of Our Activity!

The general political line which the C.P. of China has pursued to this day since the Fourth Plenum of the C.C. (in January, 1931) has, without doubt, been correct. This has already been confirmed, first and foremost, by the entire victorious development of the Soviets and the Red Army. From the very beginning of the Manchurian events, the Party has advanced its main political slogan of organising a national-revolutionary war of the armed people against Japanese imperialism, in defence of the national independence, territorial integrity and the unity of China as a state; and this slogan has fully justified itself in practice. But the chief weakness and mistake of our party still remains the same, namely, that, firstly, we have not regarded the policy of the anti-imperialist united front as the only, the chief tactical weapon, with the aid of which it is possible to carry out in practice our political slogan of the need to conduct a national-revolutionary war; secondly, we have not succeeded in linking up our anti-imperialist united front tactics with the whole of our policy in all spheres of work and struggle. And now, in connection with the changed situation in China, the Party must seriously overcome these weaknesses and mistakes. Only then shall we bring about a change in all spheres of our work and struggle. The Communist Party of China really can and must act as the generally recognised leader of the Chinese people in their struggle for emancipation. Only if this is done will the Communist Party and the Soviets be able to combine the tasks which aim at consolidating the fighting power of the Red Army with the task of developing the national anti-imperialist united front throughout the country, to the point of the formation of a people's government of national defence and a united anti-Japanese army, covering the whole of China.

We must once and for all put an end to our serious “leftist” sectarian mistakes and traditions in our mass policy and mass work in the Kuomintang regions and in Manchuria. And in the Soviet regions as well we must bring about a change in our policy, primarily in the sense of endowing it with a profoundly popular, clearly expressed, national character. Our policy in the Soviet regions is a practical exhibition of all our work, and an example which attracts the attention of the whole of China and the whole world and

which determines first and foremost the attitude to us of various strata of Chinese society and of the whole world. Consequently, the success or failure of our struggle to establish a broad anti-imperialist united front depends, to a considerable degree, upon our policy in the Soviet regions.

Since the size of this article does not permit me to dwell in detail on this question, let us restrict ourselves to pointing out just a few of the essential changes in our policy in the Soviet regions, which changes the leaders of the Communist Party of China are discussing to-day, and intend to introduce:

#### **(a) In the Sphere of Economic Policy.**

**Agrarian Policy.** While in the main adhering to our course of eliminating feudal survivals, we must introduce the following changes on this question for the sake of rallying together the broadest national anti-Japanese front: firstly, we must not confiscate the lands of handicraftsmen, artisans, teachers, small-traders, and certain workers, who do not cultivate their own land but who acquired them previously out of their own savings. They must either be allowed to lease them out (not under conditions of exploitation, of course) or else the State must compensate them to the extent of the value of their lands, if they are transferred to the common land fund at the demand of the peasant masses; secondly, we must discontinue the practice of confiscating the lands and so-called surplus agricultural implements of the kulaks: in the event of the equal distribution of the land at the demand of the peasants, that owned by the kulaks will go into the common fund to be distributed; third, we must not confiscate the lands of landowners in the areas who are to-day really taking part in armed struggle against Japanese imperialism and to save the fatherland; fourthly, in relation to the land ownership of traders who are at the same time, big landowners, we should limit ourselves to confiscating their lands without touching their trading enterprises;

**The Policy as Regards Trade and Industry.** In order to ensure regular supplies to the Red Army, and to improve the material position of the masses of the people, it is essential, firstly, not only to develop mass co-operatives and state undertakings to the utmost, but to encourage the development of private trade industry in every way; secondly, the Soviets must revise all instructions which hinder and restrict free trade and the growth of industry; thirdly, to change the attitude adopted towards Chambers of Commerce, i.e., not to dissolve them, but to use them in the interests of developing trade and industry in the Soviet regions, as well as of trade relations between the Soviet and non-Soviet regions; fourthly, to revise

our taxation policy in the sense of giving greater freedom for the development of private trade and industry, etc., etc.

**(b) The Policy on Questions of Labour.** While continuing the line of improving the material, legal and cultural conditions of workers and agricultural labourers to the utmost, it is essential, firstly, to reject all extreme demands which are either incapable of fulfilment in the circumstances which exist to-day in the Soviet regions, or which lead to further economic ruin and unemployment; secondly, it is essential for the time being to refrain from organising so-called "workers' control of industry," the necessary conditions for which do not exist as yet.

**(c) In the Sphere of Political Administration.** The Constitution must be altered by definitely extending democratic liberties to correspond with the present relation of class forces in the struggle against Japanese imperialism, and to correspond with the requirements of the new policy. Concretely, approximately the following changes must be introduced: firstly, civil rights must be granted not only to workers, peasants, Red Army men and all toilers, but also to all the urban petty-bourgeoisie, and to all who really participate in the armed struggle against Japanese imperialism and to save the fatherland; of course, in the electoral system, we must now, as previously, safeguard the predominance of workers' votes; secondly, non-toiling elements must be allowed to take up work in the corresponding Soviet organs (not only bourgeois specialists, but other bourgeois elements as well), in order to make use of their experience, connections, and means in the interests of the revolution (for example, the participation of individual traders and industrialists in the work of the trading and industrial sections of the Soviets, etc.); thirdly, democratic rights and liberties must be extended to all the non-Communist parties, groups, social and mass organisations, which engage in struggle not against the Soviet government, but against the imperialists and their lackeys; fourthly, we must not exclude the possibility of the participation in the Soviet organs of representatives of truly national-revolutionary parties and groups, which are honestly fighting side by side with the Soviets and the Communist Party against Japan and to save the fatherland; fifthly, while on the whole maintaining the present workers' and peasants' composition of the Red Army, and keeping control, both military and political, in our own hands, we must make it possible for the petty-bourgeois youth (primarily revolutionary intellectuals, students, clerks, etc.), to join the ranks of the Red Army in order to

conduct a joint armed struggle against Japanese imperialism, and to save the fatherland, etc., etc.

#### **(d) In the Sphere of Foreign Policy.**

Firstly, we must relinquish our undifferentiated and like approach to all imperialist powers without exception. The main blow must be directed against Japanese imperialism. As for the other imperialist powers, the Soviets should not only strive to obtain more or less normal relations with them, but should not exclude the possibility, under definite conditions, of fighting together with them against the common enemy; secondly, we must put an end to the old partisan traditions in relation to foreign diplomatic, trading, cultural and religious institutions and people, eliminate the cases which actually occur of their being arrested and of demands for ransom being made without any special need. They must be allowed to pursue their occupations provided they observe the Soviet law, and do not engage in counter-revolutionary struggle against the Soviets, and on the basis of new treaties concluded between them and the Soviets on the basis of equality; thirdly, the Soviets should also seriously pursue a policy of differentiation as regards the various governments and groupings inside China. The Soviets must at each given moment, direct their main blows AGAINST THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL ENEMY OF THE RED ARMY AND OF THE PEOPLE, and first and foremost against the lackeys of Japanese imperialism. The Soviets must not only do their utmost to ensure friendly relations with all who really want to fight against Japanese imperialism and its lackeys, but must, in addition, establish normal relations with all those who, for one reason or another, are not conducting a fight against the Red Army.

Obviously, now as previously, the whole of our policy in general and our activities in the Soviet regions in particular, must be subordinated primarily to the interests of the national revolutionary struggle of the armed people, and must ensure its success.

#### **IV.—The New Policy of the C.P. of China Will Triumph Over the New Policy of Japanese Imperialism.**

Japanese imperialism, taking account of what, as far as it is concerned, is the extremely favourable international situation which has arisen in connection with the Italo-Abyssinian war, recently declared its new policy in relation to China. The essence of this "new" policy amounts to intensifying the pace of the seizure of Northern China and preparations to swallow up the whole of China. The immediate measures which have been adopted during the last few months in connection with the "new" policy of Japanese imperialism in China are as follow: A frank declaration by Japan

of its intention to establish a so-called "Huabei Ko" as quickly as possible on the territory of the five north Chinese provinces (Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Chahar and Szechwan), the mass despatch of Japanese land and sea forces into China, the disembarkation of Japanese troops in Swatow, Amoy, Fuchow and Hankow, the military demonstrations of Japanese troops in Shanghai, and the presentation of constant new demands to the Nanking Government with a view to finally establishing a Japanese protectorate over the whole of China. It is clear that the "new" policy of Japanese imperialism in China is the continuation of her old line directed towards completely destroying the independence of China as a state, and once and for all enslaving the Chinese people and depriving them of their existence as a nation.

In face of this new menacing offensive on the part of Japanese imperialism, the northern militarists, like Sun Sche-yun and others, openly capitulated. They have thrown out their foul slogan: "Why let the Nanking Government have the monopoly in connection with the sale of China, rather let us take part ourselves in bartering with Japan!" and are now ready, at the command of Japanese imperialism, to begin military operations against their own Chinese troops and their own people. The Nanking Kuomintang Government, as heretofore, continues to carry out its policy of "non-resistance," despite the serious internal differences which exist on the question of a further offensive on the part of Japanese imperialists over the whole of China.

Only the Communist Party of China comes forward firmly and surely upon the Chinese arena of political struggle, conducting its policy of organising the whole of the Chinese people and all the Chinese troops FOR UNITED ACTION AGAINST JAPANESE IMPERIALISM AND TO SAVE THE FATHERLAND IN A REALLY NEW FASHION.

In his historic report at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, Comrade Dimitrov pointed out that:—

"In connection with the changed international and internal situation, exceptional importance attaches, in all colonial and semi-colonial countries to the question of the anti-imperialist front."

And when speaking about China, Comrade Dimitrov said:

"In China where the people's movement has already led to the formation of Soviet districts over a considerable territory of the country and to the organisation of a powerful Red Army, the predatory attack of Japanese imperialism and the treason of the Nanking government have brought into jeopardy the national existence of the great Chinese people. Only the Chinese Soviets can act as a unifying centre in the struggle against the enslavement and partition of China by the imperialists, as a unifying centre which will rally all anti-imperialist forces for the national defence of the Chinese people.

"We therefore approve the initiative taken by our

courageous brother party of China in the creation of a most extensive anti-imperialist united front throughout the whole country. This movement must be conducted under the slogan of the national-revolutionary struggle of the armed people against Japanese imperialism and their Chinese henchmen. The Soviets must become centres around which the whole of the Chinese people will centre in the struggle for emancipation."

Only the Communist Party of China, which includes all the best sons and daughters of our fatherland, a party equipped with the doctrine of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, the party which to-day relies upon the Soviet Government, the mighty Red Army, and the direct support of many millions of the people, which has trained such famous national leaders as Mao-Tse-Dun, Chu-De and other legendary, immortal national heroes like Fan Chi-Min, Tsui-Tsui-bo, and others, the party which is a section of the Leninist Communist International, to which the great party of Bolsheviks belongs which is victoriously building up a Socialist society upon one-sixth part of the earth—the Communist Party of China alone, which organically links up its struggle with the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the people of Japan, of the whole of the East, of the whole world, and enjoying their support and sympathy, only a party like this, which fears no difficulties, which is confident of the road it has to take and the goal for which it is fighting, can set itself such a mighty, historic task, and be firmly convinced that its cause is right and that victory is assured!

The new policy of the Communist Party of China is one that mobilises and unites 400,000,000 of the great Chinese nation and leads them into the sacred, undaunted struggle against the gendarme of world imperialism in the Far East, not only in defence of national independence, terri-

torial integrity, the union of China as a state, and the human rights of the Chinese people, but, in addition, in the interests of the liberation of the toilers of Japan, of the entire East, and of the whole world. It is not a simple task to realise this policy: it is a task that is complicated and very important. In order to do so, we must exert all our efforts, use all the energies, not only of the whole of our party and all our party cadres, but of all fighters for the national-revolutionary movement, all honest patriots and our entire nation of 400,000,000 inhabitants.

But it is not difficult for all who are really acquainted with the situation in China and the position of Japanese imperialism to realise that this new policy of the Communist Party of China, the policy which aims at organising the whole of the Chinese people for a struggle against Japan and to save the Chinese fatherland, will inevitably triumph over the famous new "policy" of Japanese imperialism in China—the policy of imperialist plunder and the colonial enslavement of the Chinese people. The manifesto of the C.C. of the Communist Party of China and of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic to the whole nation has good grounds for saying that:

"The Soviet Government and the Communist Party of China is firmly convinced that if our people, numbering 400 million, are given a united political leadership in the form of the Chinese people's government of national defence and its united fighting vanguard in the shape of the Chinese joint anti-Japanese army, and moreover with the million-strong forces of the armed people at its disposal, and with the support of the proletariat and the peoples of the entire East and throughout the world, it will inevitably conquer Japanese imperialism, hated by its own Japanese people and isolated on an international scale!"

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# GROWTH OF SOVIET AND PARTISAN DISTRICTS AFTER CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S 5TH AND 6TH CAMPAIGNS.

## MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

OLD DISTRICTS

NEW DISTRICTS

 SOVIET  
 PARTISAN  
 TERRITORY IN THE PROCESS OF OCCUPATION BY JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

 SOVIET  
 PARTISAN



# A HEROIC TREK

By SHEE PIN.

## Our Goal Achieved.

THE Red Army carried through a heroic trek from Kiangsi province into Western China under the most difficult conditions. Over what kind of roads did we travel? Not asphalt or metalled roads, of course. In the majority of cases our trek took us into almost impenetrable places and over narrow footpaths, and we traversed the highest mountain ranges of China, which, between Szechwan and Sinkiang, reach a height of over 16,000 feet. In May, when the most terrible heat blazes over China, the snow lies thick upon the mountains.

We crossed over 20 well-known rivers, including the Yangtse, the Wukiang, the Sinkiang, the Tsingsuikiang, and the Tatungho. What means did we have at our disposal for crossing the rivers? None at all.

A period of 8½ months elapsed from the moment when our forces left the former Central Soviet Region in Kiangsi province until they joined forces with the Fourth Army. We covered over 11-12,000 li — 3,000 miles. We crossed the frontiers of 12 provinces: Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwantung, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechwan, Yunnan, Sikang, Kiangsi, Chinghai and Shensi. We passed through 12 of the 18 provinces of China proper. (See map.)

What was our aim, and why did we undertake this heroic trek?

The question of establishing a territorial base for the Soviet Revolution has been one of the most important questions confronting our Party in recent years. We realised that the Red Army needed a stable and permanent territorial base and that the absence of such a base was giving rise to tremendous difficulties preventing the further conduct of civil war. Even since 1930 the Communist Party had been exerting every effort to carry out this primary and most important task, which to-day still remains one of the most important. And when, in 1934, the enemy surrounded our former central Soviet region, and drove us into a comparatively small stretch of territory, our Party, so as to save the living forces of the Red Army, evacuated our main forces from the former central Soviet region, in order to set up a new territorial base on the vast stretches of Western China. It was for this purpose the Chinese Communist Party organised the famous heroic trek of the Red Army from Kiangsi province to Western China.

All our plans in preparation for the trek were to be fulfilled within three months, but in view of

the serious situation which had arisen, our commanders were forced to reduce the time limit to two months. In spite of this, the preparation work was performed excellently.

How did we prepare for our trek? Firstly, before our main columns moved out of the Central Soviet Region to Western China, the Party sent part of our military forces beyond the confines of the Soviet region, into the rear of the enemy. In particular, the Party organised the march of the 7th Army Corps, the vanguard of the anti-Japanese army, in the direction of Fukien and to the border-line between Kiangsi and Fukien. In this way our forces were placed in the rear of the enemy, in the North-East.

The second operation was that forces were despatched from the eastern region of Hunan, far into the interior of the province. This was done by the Sixth Army Corps under Siao Geh, which joined forces with Ho Lun under the command of the Red Army, so that our forces were situated in the rear of the enemy, to the north-west as well.

In addition, we performed still other preparatory operations for the further advance of the main forces of the Red Army, viz., we reinforced the main units of the Red Army with new young recruits. Over 30,000 volunteers were recruited.

Secondly, our main cadres, the backbone of the army, were put through an accelerated course of training and drilling. They passed through three military schools: infantry school, the Kun Lo school and a special military school, where the men were trained in anti-aircraft and anti-gas defence, etc. The majority of the regulars in our army passed through these three schools.

Thirdly, 600,000 pickuls\* of foodstuffs were set aside to supply the Red Army during the first part of the campaign. The production of ammunition, bullets, shells, etc., was increased from six to thirty times the former output. Special uniforms were provided for the men, etc.

What was the position as regards food?

In the main, we lived on supplies provided by the population voluntarily. Then we confiscated food for the Red Army from the enemy, the landlords, the gentry and the tukhao.†

To-day we can lay it on record that the aims of our trek have been achieved, namely:—

1. We have really saved the living forces of the Red Army.

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\* Approx. 1 cwt.

† See p. 39.

2. We have joined forces with the 4th Red Army.
3. After joining of the forces of the two armies, we have established a big, new, Soviet territorial base which is stronger and wealthier than the former one.

#### **How We Fought.**

The first stage of our trek was from the province of Kiangsi to the frontier of Kweichow. This stage must be considered a triumphant one, because we fought our way, through four lines of defence of the enemy, though they were covered by concrete defences, and protected by nests of machine-guns.

In general this territory was held to be impenetrable, but we broke through all the four lines of defence, swept aside all obstacles in our path, routed the enemy troops out of their concrete defences, and broke through their chain.

The enemy's first line of defence followed the banks of the River Kankiang, in Kiangsi province. The second passed between Chenchua in the north of Kwantung province, and the South of the Kiangsi province. The third—along the Chansa-Canton railway (this railway is not yet finished, but there is a metalled road alongside which concrete defence works have been built). The fourth line followed the southern part of the Hunan province to the north of Kwangsi.

Along these lines the enemy had their nests of machine-guns, which raised a complete firescreen. Despite the fact that we had a powerful enemy pressing upon us from both flanks, we very rapidly broke through the first three lines, crossed the river Kankiang and occupied Chenkow, i.e., forced the second line and then took possession of the town of Ichang, i.e., forced the third line. Between the third and fourth lines lay a huge chain of mountains, and it was here that Chang Kai-shek intended to destroy us.

We immediately occupied six districts: Linyu, Kiaho, Lanshan, Kianhua, Taochow, Yunmin. Thus we rapidly forced a way through the fourth line, as well, which actually meant the failure of Chang Kai-shek's plan, the complete breakdown of his attempt to surround and destroy us. We escaped from this locality contrary to all the expectations of the enemy.

However, we must mention a number of our mistakes and shortcomings.

The first mistake was that the requisite explanatory work had not been carried on in the Party, in the army, and among the masses, to explain the position on the eve of the troops departing on their trek. Preparations for the trek were seriously encumbered by the fact that work had not been done in the Soviet regions to explain the position. And this fact also led to some of the younger

fighters, who were unaware of the aim and prospects of our trek, as well as a number of other elements, not being fully steadfast during our march. This was especially noticeable in the southern part of the Hunan province.

Why did we make this mistake? Because we had a mechanical conception of the question of military secrets. We thought that members of the Party, the army men, and the masses, etc., must not be told about the tasks of the trek.

The second mistake was that we took too much transport with us, too many heavy machines, and heavy loads. We dragged with us machines from the arsenal, printing machines, machinery for the mint, etc. Of the total, 5,000 men were occupied exclusively with the transport of this load.

Experience has taught us that the horses, mules and donkeys were a hindrance to us, especially when crossing the rivers. This heavy transport seriously impeded our military operations. In a number of cases the rearguard lagged ten days' march behind the vanguard.

How difficult our advance was can be seen from the fact that there were times when during a 12-hours march in torrents of rain, and thick mud, we only moved over a distance of 2½ miles.

In the main we advanced in three columns: the right flank and the left flank, and our main military forces in the centre. But we had, in addition, a vanguard and a rearguard.

This, in the main, was the order in which we advanced. But, of course, the roads did not always permit us to adhere to this scheme. We were sometimes compelled to advance in two columns. But we never advanced in one column.

Having occupied Ichang, we should have immediately occupied Kwangchow as well, so as to force the river at that point, which was a very important one. But our cumbersome transport hung like a millstone round our necks, and so we were unable to occupy Kwangchow in time. The enemy outstripped us and occupied Kwangchow before we could. Had it not been for the transport our rearguard would have moved more rapidly and we would not have been forced to engage in so many battles. On the frontier of Hunan and Kweichow, we lost about 100 days in overcoming the resistance offered by the enemy.

As a result of the mistakes we made, our main forces became transformed into guards for the transport, and we had not enough forces with which to manoeuvre freely. The vanguard marched ahead and the rearguard lagged behind at a distance of 200-300 li, i.e., 60-90 miles. All this weakened our fighting strength, and not infrequently made it possible for the enemy to attack us in the flank.

Why did we drag such heavy transport with us?

This was the result of a naïve and politically incorrect idea, namely, that the establishment of a new Soviet base is simply a matter of removing from one place to another, and that it does not require big efforts and a new and persevering struggle.

The third mistake of the first period of our trek was of a purely military character. We advanced all the time along a straight line, that might have been drawn by pencil across the country. As a result the enemy lay in wait for us everywhere, for they knew in advance where we would be and in what direction we were marching. This meant that we became an object of attack instead of ourselves taking the initiative and the offensive. We should have marched forward more rapidly and occupied the different places more quickly. Instead, we had to take these points in battle, under conditions where the enemy was in possession of automobiles and other means of transport. And we moved forward in a straight line, stubbornly refusing to change our direction, and as the places were frequently indicated incorrectly in our topographical maps, we frequently found ourselves in impasses from which we had to make our way back. Once we had to fight for three days over a distance of 2½ miles. For three days on end our comrades on the staff and the commanders of the corps neither slept nor ate. We wasted time trying to find the right road. And the Commissar in charge of the rear units whose work it was to hurry along the rearguard did not sleep for six days on end.

What did we do with the wounded in cases like this?

If we were unable to take them along with us, we billeted them among the population. Sometimes we formed partisan detachments to keep them safely in hiding. And we must say that the population adopted a very good attitude towards our wounded and despatched them on to us when they recovered.

In Lipin we corrected the mistakes we had made. On the frontier of Hunan and Kweichow the enemy lay in wait for us with 5-6 times as many troops as we had, expecting that we would follow the old route taken by the Sixth Army Corps. The Kwangsi troops attacked our rearguard from the south, while a big enemy army was following us up.

The whole of the Red Army was of the opinion that the weak link should be broken, i.e., that we should advance in the direction where the enemy's line was weakest and where we could get new reinforcements. A decision was made to change our direction. And here ended the first stage of our trek, which lasted approximately 100 days. When we reached Kweichow province the Red Army had ceased to be a shifting object of attack and had

in turn become an active force, capable of attacking the enemy.

\* \* \*

The second stage of our trek lasted from the time we left the frontiers of Kweichow to the time we occupied the town of Tsun Yi.

The Red Army men by now knew the immediate prospects and the goal of the march. We had explained to them that we were going to Kweichow in order to "take General Van Tsa-li alive." This was the immediate aim, which our fighters were pursuing.

Instead of the former method of marching "in a straight line," we began to resort more to manoeuvres in our march. The change of tactics enabled us to advance successfully, to enter the province of Kweichow and take the town of Tsun Yi. Here we routed two divisions under the command of General Kui Tsi-dan. We performed this operation comparatively easily. We occupied nine districts to the south of the river Wukiang, and forced our way across this river, which is a most difficult obstacle in the strategic sense. Comrade Lu Peicheng, who had finished our military academy, was in charge of this operation. He had one division and one regiment at his disposal. But continuously pushing ahead he occupied the enemy foreposts at the bridge extremely rapidly. He transferred his units across the river so rapidly that the enemy had no time to blow up the bridge. On the opposite bank he occupied the town of Tsun Yi, which is a very big centre, and also the town of Meitan.

Our second big victory was that we reinforced our ranks with fresh local forces. In Tsun Yi the Red Army men rested for 12 days, while our chief political workers recruited new fighters there. We were successful in recruiting 3,000 new young fighters. Now we no longer dragged heavy transport after us. The Red Army men, bathed, reclothed themselves, and set forth proudly again.

Here we organised a revolutionary committee from the local forces, and established armed forces and a partisan detachment under the leadership of the revolutionary committee. We mobilised the masses to confiscate the property of the landlords, the gentry and the militarists, and distributed the confiscated property among the population. Our actions evoked the enthusiasm of the population.

\* \* \*

The third stage of our trek was from the time we occupied the town of Tsun Yi right up to the time we came out at the river Yangtse. Here also we met with a number of big successes. During this period we, and not the enemy, took the initiative in attacking. Here we forced the river Tsinsha, a tributary of the Yangtse.

We decided to move towards Szechwan, first retreating to the north and then turning to the west, did not know how strong the forces of the enemy were, but on approaching the borders of Szechwan, we saw that the enemy forces were many times superior to our own. We then occupied the town of Huankiang, concentrated our military forces there, and altered our line of advance. The enemy discovered that we intended forcing the river, and began therefore to concentrate their forces on the border between Kweichow and Szechwan. If we had gone straight to the west, from the position we occupied, we should have met with very serious resistance, as the enemy had prepared their defence there. We therefore turned to the east. And only when the Red Army approached the town of Tungtse did the enemy discover that we were marching eastwards and not westwards. But by that time we were far away. That was a fine manoeuvre.

The second extremely important point about this stage was that we occupied the gates to Kweichow province, which are of great military and strategic importance, 20 miles away from Tungtse. Two divisions commanded by General Van Tsa-le attacked us on the way to these gates. But we defended the gates by especially strengthening our flanks on both sides of the gates. And when General Van Tsa-le's troops came closer, we surrounded them and routed his principal units; only a small number of his people succeeded in getting away. That evening we again occupied the town of Tsun Yi.

The second day General Lun Tsi-vei once again made an attack upon the town of Tsun Yi from the other side. But after the victory over Van Tsa-le our army had had time to make preparations. Having camouflaged our flank, we waited for the enemy to attack. At 8 o'clock in the morning the battle began, and by 12 o'clock General Lun was already surrounded. The majority of the General's soldiers were disarmed, and only a small section retreated to Huivan on lorries.

Thus, between Tungtse and Tsun Yi, we were successful in completely demolishing four of the enemy's divisions. This victory still further strengthened the fighting spirit of the whole of the Red Army. The authority of the Red Army among the population of four provinces (Hunan, Szechwan, Yunnan and Kweichow) rose high. The population felt that we represented a strong force. Moreover, this victory lightened the position under the command of the second army, Ho Lun, and the sixth army, led by Siao Geh, which had first been attacked by these four divisions of the enemy. The enemy were forced to cease their offensive against these armies, and to turn their forces against us.

Having weakened the forces of the enemy, our second army corps rapidly destroyed a whole enemy brigade, which gave the 2nd and 6th corps an opportunity of fortifying themselves in the district. This was at the end of April and the beginning of May, 1935. The following was our third success during this period: during the battles we seized many uniforms and much ammunition, machine-gun bullets, pack animals, etc. We must say that our men don't like fighting the local generals very much, but much prefer to fight against the Nanking generals, for after we have demolished one of the Nanking generals, we usually obtain a large quantity of foodstuffs, uniforms and ammunition. The local generals are considerably poorer.

The other positive side of this stage of our trek was that we executed flexible manoeuvres, and so it was difficult for the enemy to discover the direction we intended to take; they lay in wait for us, say, in the west, and we were in the east, and vice versa.

Why did we do this? Because war at home, in the Soviet regions, against an enemy attack, and war in the white regions are two different things. If the enemy attacks us in the Soviet regions we sometimes retreat, in order the better to concentrate our forces and prepare for a very heavy blow, and then the enemy do not know where our main forces are situated. We force them to give up their plans all the time and to reject original intentions. In the Soviet regions, it is impossible for the enemy to find out exactly how the main forces of the Red Army are situated, for the population in the Soviet regions will not tell the enemy. But conditions are quite different in the white regions, where the enemy move freely against us in several columns, and from different directions, and if there is any weakening of a column, it can obtain reinforcements the same day.

Therefore, since we had not the necessary forces to demolish 4-5 columns at a time, we could not engage in long battles with the enemy. If the enemy attacks us from different sides, and we have not sufficient forces to engage in battle, i.e., if we are unable to make a counter-attack, then we resort to some manoeuvre that will get us out of the encirclement. That is why we had to advance and retreat in the districts of North Kweichow four times. We were convinced that it was difficult to force the Yangtse at that point, and so we decided to find another point at which to cross.

The second time we crossed the river Wukiang, and it was the most difficult business in the history of our trek. Had we approached the river directly, according to our original line of march, we would never have been able to cross it. When we occupied the town of Tsun Yi for the last time

the enemy was preparing to attack in the north-east of Kweichow, being of the impression that we were marching to join the 2nd and 6th armies. And we actually did send part of our troops in that direction in order to create the impression that we were marching to join the 2nd and 6th armies. But our main forces took the opposite direction. In the course of one night we built three bridges and despatched all the forces of the Red Army across them. It should be said that the Wukiang is a very rapid-flowing river, with very strong currents and big cataracts. It flows at the rate of 10 feet a second. There was not a single boat to be found there, neither had we the military technical knowledge to build pontoon bridges. And yet we crossed the river: we made floats of bamboo and transported the whole of the Red Army across the river on them.

We have worked out a special method of building bridges: we take ordinary wire, twist it into thick cables, the ends of which we attach to both banks of the river, lay boards across and thus arrange the crossing.

By despatching a section of our forces to the east, we misled the enemy. The Hunan generals received orders to go in the direction of Kweichow, i.e., to concentrate all their forces against us in the east. But we moved our main forces to the south, and avoiding Kuyan, rapidly turned to the west, along the southern part of Kweichow. Thus all the enemy's troops from Honan, Szechwan and Nanking remained behind us.

By experience we knew that there is nothing to fear from an army which is behind, because there are extremely few roads; the enemy cannot hurl many forces into the attack at once, and it is difficult for him to develop a broad front.

We occupied Dinfan, Kuanshun, Kuihua, Chanchai, Chenfu.

At the same time, in order to extend our front, we despatched another column parallel to this direction. This column demolished five regiments of the Yunnan enemy, and seized a tremendous amount of ammunition. We entered the territory occupied by the Yao tribe, where we recruited over 10,000 young fighters. In the same region we confiscated the property and money of the local landlords, loading over 40 mules with silver coins.

Then we occupied Kweikiang, and to the west of the town crossed the river Kiansha. Having occupied a position in the frontier between Yunnan and Kweichow, we wanted to turn in the direction of the river in order to cross it. But if we had gone there directly the enemy would very quickly have overtaken us. Consequently we turned off at first into the heart of Yunnan, to the south, and occupied a number of points near to Kunmin — the

capital of the Yunnan province. Thus we cut the enemy off the river. And even then we were not confident that we would be able to cross the river.

We were fortunate in seizing the topographical maps of the enemy, but they were only a little better than ours, which did not excel in accuracy. But still, the places where the river could be crossed, of which there were three, were marked on these maps, and it was indicated that there was a ferry at one point.

It should be mentioned that General Lun Yun involuntarily did us a great service in Yunnan. He had intended despatching topographical maps and a large quantity of medical supplies to one of the Szechwan generals by aeroplane. But the pilot fell ill, and the general decided to despatch everything by motor car. A chauffeur was found to do the work. After we had occupied one of the towns, a group of our comrades from headquarters went out on to the high-road. They saw a motor car coming towards them at full speed. They succeeded in getting possession of the car, and in it found dozens of copies of topographical maps and the finest medical supplies. We were in great need of all these things.

We found indicated on these topographical maps nine points where the river could be crossed; we also discovered that at some points there was one ferry, at others—three ferries each. This inspired us with confidence in the success of the operation which faced us of crossing the river.

We must say that the stupidity of the Yunnan generals got us out of difficulties on more than one occasion. Once our division was approaching a town in Kweichow. Our men were all in Red Army uniforms. With a proud front, we approached the wall of the town. The district sheriff popped his head out of the window and looked at us in surprise. He decided that since these people were so well dressed they could not be the Reds. In their minds the Red Army are so many bandits. They took us for the central Nanking troops, for the uniforms of the Yunnan and Szechwan troops were worse than those of the Nanking troops and worse than ours.

When we had occupied the town mentioned, we were well uniformed: steel helmets, tunics with four pockets, good belts, leggings and breeches. Each of us had a leather despatch case, seized from Chang Kai-shek's troops. Every commander from the battalion commanders downwards, had field-glasses. We had light and heavy machine-guns, whereas neither the Yunnan nor the Kweichow army had as many of these.

Seeing that he was not dealing with bandits, the district sheriff opened the gates of the town to us, and greeted us politely. They entertained us

well and we rested. After that we asked: "Have you prepared food and money for our army?" He replied: "Yes, we have it." We asked for a dozen guides. All the city chiefs came out to us, each of them hastening to recommend himself: "I am the chief of the garrison guards," "I am the chief of police," "I am the district sheriff," etc. After they had themselves told us who they were, we knew how to deal with them.

Indeed, it was not for nothing that Mao Tse-dun once said that if all our enemies were as stupid as the Yunnan generals, the Chinese Revolution would have been victorious long ago.

After the event with the topographical maps, our commanding officers indicated definite points where we were to cross the river. In order to cover up the fact that we were crossing, we despatched one unit in another direction. After we had occupied the town, the enemy burnt the rafts at one crossing. In order to distract the attention of the enemy, we especially started building a bridge at that spot. It was one-third built. Chang Kai-shek's air-force immediately concentrated its attention upon this district. They discovered that we were building a bridge, and all the troops which were following us up advanced in this false direction. By this time all our other units had made the crossing in other places.

It should be mentioned that the enemy used to have four, six, and even eight aeroplanes flying overhead at the same time.

We rapidly turned to the real crossing place. We found six rafts by the river. The main forces had to cross over by means of these six rafts, and this was no easy matter. The reader should know what the river Chansa is like. It is not particularly wide, but the current is much stronger than that of other rivers. On both banks the cliffs rise to a height of a thousand feet. It is not such an easy thing to build a bridge here. On both banks of this river, for a stretch of land of about six miles, there is no plant life whatsoever. Chinese history tells us it was just at this spot that the fabulous hero of the epoch of the wars of the three kingdoms suffered defeat. The air currents on the banks of this river are so strong that they can lift a man off his feet. All the six rafts at this point of the river were broken. They had to be patched up if they were to be used at all.

The crossing lasted for nine days, night and day. We did not lose a single man or horse. The horses were tied to the rafts and made to swim across. We were forced to make haste, otherwise the enemy would overtake us. The work required tremendously good organisation.

For the better execution of this task the Central Committee of the Party and the Revolutionary

Military Council organised an authoritative committee to guide all operations connected with the crossing. All the units without exception were subordinated to this committee. The units were to cross the river in definite order. A watch had to be kept that the men did not jump on to the floats, otherwise they might overturn. We required skilled lightermen, because, the current being so strong, there was danger of the floats capsizing. We paid the local skilled workers and lightermen very well. The local population adopted a very good attitude towards us. The workers voluntarily came to assist us, and after crossing, many of the boatmen left the district together with the Red Army.

This river crossing once more confirmed the degree of discipline, organisation and consciousness possessed by our fighters.

After crossing the river we occupied the town of Kuili. The enemy discovered this, but the river had been crossed by then. We took nine days to cross, while the enemy arrived only on the 11th day. Chang Kai-shek was too late to catch us.

In this connection, our fighters composed a play in which the men mock at Chang Kai-shek, who gallops from the one province to another in pursuit of us, and arrives at the river Chansa, only to find a pair of worn-out straw shoes on an empty float.

When Chang Kai-shek tried to cross the river, we arranged to meet him with machine-guns. He was forced to turn to the north and find a place at which to cross there. His divisions starved, and consequently demoralisation was rife among his troops, and the soldiers deserted in large numbers.

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After we had crossed the river Chansa, we became masters of the situation. We were able to prevent the enemy from crossing the river. Our position had changed for the better, and from that moment the fourth stage of our great trek began.

We rested five days in the town of Kuili.

It was decided to move in a northerly direction at a more rapid pace, so as to join the 4th Red Army.

We succeeded in reinforcing the Red Army with 5,000 young fighters, and in addition organised a large number of partisan detachments in these districts. Here also we drew up a plan for establishing corresponding supplies and foodstuffs. All the plans were fully carried out.

Five days later, having rested in the town, we moved northwards to the river Tatungho. Travelling at the rate of 20 miles a day, this would have needed 29 days, but we had still to reckon with the enemy on our way. In many parts the bridges

were burned down to hinder our crossing. We moved extremely rapidly without attempting to occupy towns on the way. Still, we successfully organised partisan detachments in the different localities. Here we met with "wild" party organisations, which had been out of contact with the provincial committee of the Communist Party for three years. In one of the district centres we found a local committee leading the movement. The next day over a thousand men were mobilised there, and an army to boycott taxes was organised. This committee is now continuing its work and has strengthened its ranks.

From this spot two roads ran to Tatungho: a big one and a small one. We estimated that we would probably meet the enemy on the big road, and that they would endeavour to destroy our food supplies. And so we despatched part of our troops along that road in order to distract the attention of the enemy while we moved our main forces along the other road.

We arrived at a mountainous district where the native tribe of the Mantsi lived. This is a tribe of Turkish origin, which has suffered particularly from the oppression of the Chinese landlords and militarists, and is consequently hostile towards the Chinese. A short time before our arrival, a Chinese anti-red chief was killed by the natives while trying to cross their territory, and his detachment was annihilated.

When our units came up, they were surrounded on all sides. Comrade Lu Pei-cheng, the chief of the Red Army staff, was in personal command of our units. He proved that he was not only capable of fighting well, but that he could set up a united front. He made use of the contradictions within the tribe, and before the eyes of the assembled tribe, tore apart a chicken and drank its blood. This was to signify that henceforth he was a blood relation of theirs. After this, one section of the tribe observed strict neutrality, but the other half still wanted to fight against us. We began to agitate, persuading them that we wanted to help them. Our attitude towards them created a profound impression upon them, and their friendliness increased. They gave us horses, cows, sheep and brought us different presents, while we in return gave them money and presents.

After this we arrived at the banks of the river Tatungho. This is a somewhat historical spot. It has been famous since the time of the Taiping uprising. It was at this spot that Shi Da-kai (the general in command of the Taiping army) perished while retreating from Nanking into Szechwan. We met an old man of ninety who had been an eye-witness of these events and who had personally seen Shi Da-kai and the Taiping army. The old man told us that the Taiping army and Shi Da-kai

perished because there were differences of opinion in the army, because the Taiping army was not a band of "long-haired men." Somebody asked him: "Grandfather, what do you think? Is our attitude to the population better than that of the Taipings?" To which he replied that the Taipings behaved well towards the population, but that our attitude was much better.

We found only two ferries on the banks of the river. On the opposite bank there was a battalion of the enemy. The Commander of this battalion, fearing our advance, gave orders for the two ferry-boats to be moored to the opposite bank. That same night our army reached the river bank. In the morning, at dawn, we realised that the river was very wide and difficult to cross. The river Tatungho is somewhat bigger than the Chansa, but its current is still stronger. It takes no less than fifty minutes to cross and re-cross the river, at this spot. Consequently, at that rate, we would require one-and-a-half months to transfer all our main forces to the other side of the river on two ferry-boats. And, of course, such delay was out of the question. We could not find any local ferry-men. So we selected nineteen brave stalwarts from our party members and young Communists, equipped them with bombs, rifles, and light machine-guns. On our part, we stood prepared in machine-gun emplacements on our side of the river, opened fire from our bomb-throwers, and utilised our experienced snipers. Under cover of our fire, our nineteen comrades landed safely on the other bank, and disarmed one of the enemy's units. The fire from our bomb-throwers compelled the enemy to constantly change the position of their machine-guns, and while this was being done, our comrades climbed higher and higher up the mountain. Then covered by these nineteen stalwarts, we began to cross the river. In two-and-a-half days we had landed our whole division on the other bank.

During this attack only five of this group of nineteen courageous comrades were wounded. The political department gave high awards to these stalwarts. They were given the title of Heroes of the Red Army.

But the fact that one division had crossed did not decide the question, because the main forces of the Red Army still remained on the other bank. So we turned westwards, in order to cross the river by the only existing suspension bridge. The division which was on the opposite bank, also turned westwards. Our main forces moved along the near bank. The enemy retreating on the opposite side stubbornly clung to the place, defending line after line. In spite of this, our units on the opposite side safely arrived at the appointed place.

We attacked from three sides, and although the

enemy obtained strong reinforcements, they could not withstand our pressure. There were many new soldiers among the troops of the enemy who knew that the Red Army had no desire to kill them. These men threw down their rifles and waited for us. We took them with us and reinforced our own forces with them.

When we approached the suspension bridge, we found that it was partly destroyed. The boards had already been removed from the chains. The bridge was over 1,000 feet long. It consisted of thirteen spans, of link chains. Above there are four chains like bannisters, and nine chains covered with boards. The chains of the bridge are anchored to high cliffs. To approach the bridge a rock tunnel had to be passed through first.

Chang Kai-shek's aviation bombarded the bridge for three days. However, they failed to destroy a single chain, since both banks are very high and from such a height the aeroplane could not aim accurately.

From the other side of the river, however, the enemy kept us under constant fire. We sent out one company, the best, to go in advance. Holding on to the chains, the Red Army men moved across the river, hand-over-hand, like acrobats. Finally, we managed to find the boards. Covered by the advance company, we crossed the bridge on hands and knees.

The most courageous and heroic men in the history of Chinese wars inevitably perished at this river. Chang Kai-shek expected the same fate to await us. He told his troops that the Reds would inevitably perish at this spot. But contrary to the expectations and calculations of Chang Kai-shek we overcame this bridge. There can be no doubt that this was a very great victory in the history of our trek.

A good road runs from the place where we crossed the river to the town of Yachow. But the enemy had set up strong fortifications and it was of no advantage to continue along this road. We decided not to use this big road, but to advance by small footpaths. We had to surmount a most difficult mountain pass, but we succeeded in doing so, and when we descended to the inhabited parts, the people were thoroughly astounded. They could not understand where we had come from, for, although the stories of their forefathers told of passes existing up in the mountains nobody had crossed these heights for centuries. It was as though we had dropped from the skies. We crossed this pass on hands and knees, often up to our knees in mud and clay.

In making the descent into the valley, we came up against the enemy's defences which we

attacked for a whole day, but could not drive the enemy out, and it was only after we had successfully crossed the next mountain range, 16,000 feet high, that we occupied the town of Tankwang.

To unite with the Fourth Red Army, we had the choice of two roads. On one of them we would have met with big defences and large forces of the enemy. On the small road difficulties awaited us as regards food supplies. Nevertheless, we decided to take the small road.

By this time the Fourth Red Army had occupied the town of Lifang. We gradually moved northwards, and the Fourth Army came to meet us from the north towards the south. Thus it was that the historic meeting of two big forces took place, namely, between the Fourth Red Army and the Red Army from the Kiangsi province.

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What was the political significance of this historic meeting?

FIRSTLY. Chang Kai-shek's plans were to surround the Central Soviet Region, to set up block-houses, and to capture our forces. The fact that we broke through their ring and transferred the main units of the Red Army on to fresh territory, meant that the plans of Chang Kai-shek to clear the Red Army out of China had broken down. The Chinese Red Army became still more steeled in these battles, while its fighting capacity became still stronger. Every rank and file fighter who took part in that trek passed through a fine school. The army that performed the march is an army of regulars. Every Red Army man is not an ordinary fighter, but a trained regular army man with high qualifications.

The Red Army successfully maintained its forces, and that is one of the greatest victories of our trek.

SECONDLY. The Red Army was formerly scattered and divided over different territories. After the Fourth Red Army had joined the main forces of the Red Army, we established a mighty base of the Red Army and created a force hitherto unknown in the history of the development of the Chinese Red Army. Thanks to this, it became possible for us to carry on still greater battles against the enemy.

THIRDLY. A very great victory achieved by our trek is the fact that the Red Army is now situated in more favourable conditions than before, from a military and strategic point of view. In Kiangsi, the enemy could surround us on all sides, but now that is impossible. To-day the Red Army is situated in the region of North Szechwan, Shensi, Kansu and Tsinhai. Thus, the enemy cannot get at us from the North-West.

Chang Kai-shek can attack us only from the

east in a westerly direction and from the south in a northerly direction. But he cannot surround us on all sides. This advantageous strategic position is one of the most essential conditions for the further victorious conduct of the civil war.

Finding ourselves in such favourable conditions from a military and strategic point of view, we were able to achieve two important measures.

Firstly, the main forces of the Red Army, together with the Fourth Army, were despatched to the north, to Kansu and Shensi. After uniting, they had two months in which to rest, reinforce their ranks and consolidate their forces.

Why could they rest and consolidate there? Because Chang Kai-shek had first to bring up auxiliary forces from Central China in order to advance against us. What is more, his troops had to undergo certain military training, and this also took some time.

And after such a tremendous trek, the Red Army was, of course, tired and needed a breathing-space. The fact must be emphasised once more that this was not merely a breathing-space, for this rest gave us the opportunity of reinforcing our ranks with fresh forces, and of fortifying ourselves. In Kuili we were able to recruit 5,000 young fighters in the course of only five days. Hence it is easy to imagine the extent to which the Red Army increased in the course of two months. We had wide opportunities here of really reinforcing our ranks.

Secondly, and this is of great importance, after our armies had united, we occupied the town of Sunpan, and wiped out twelve regiments, of the model divisions under General Hu Tsu-han. These were Chang Kai-shek's best military units. After we had demolished Hu Tsu-han's divisions, we were able to press forward to the North-West.

#### **Why Were We Victorious?**

Why was our Red Army able to achieve its aim in spite of all such difficult conditions?

Firstly, because we have truly heroic, self-sacrificing Red Army fighters. We have already mentioned a few episodes to illustrate this fact. We could give a host of facts which testify to the heroism of our army.

Our Red Army has been educated and has grown up in the fire of the civil war. It knows how to attack and how to make an offensive. It can undertake big marches. Our ranks are very solid, so that it is impossible to smash us.

When, in Tsun Yi we attacked the two divisions of General Van Tsa-li, the latter's army retreated along the high road. We, however, took to the footpaths, and advanced on foot, by night, without any opportunity even of lighting our way with torches. We covered thirty-two miles in eight

hours. When we reached the river Wukiang, the last regiments of the enemy had not yet managed to cross. We first began to destroy the bridge, and then demolished the remaining regiments of the enemy. Is this not a sign of the extremely great mobility of our Red Army and its ability to attack the enemy?

On the borders of Szechwan and Kweichow, the enemy threw up three-tier fortifications and concentrated his guns there. The enemy had his guns situated on the slopes of the mountain ranges, the upper tier being at a height of 4,000 feet. In the course of ten minutes we had occupied the first two tiers of defences and were rapidly moving forward. That day we began our offensive not from the foot of the mountains, but from a starting point which we arrived at after marching for 20 miles. We marched into battle with songs on our lips. This is an illustration of the tremendous enthusiasm which inspires the Red Army.

But the Red Army knows not only how to attack, but, where necessary, how to retreat in organised fashion.

For example, near Chishui, where we had been fighting all day long, we learned at 10 o'clock in the evening that the enemy had received reinforcements. We decided to retreat. A bridge was prepared. We built it overnight, and at dawn the main forces of the Red Army were already 15 kilometres away from the river. It should be mentioned that during this retreat there was not a sign of discontent or bad humour displayed by a single Red Army man. The enemy always retreated in panic, in disorder; but the Red Army knows how to retreat in good order and in an organised fashion.

During the eight months of our march we kept up a daily average of 100-120 li, i.e., 30-35 miles, in mountainous country and frequently by night. On an average our army covered a distance of two miles an hour. If any unit or group found itself cut off, it retreated in an organised fashion, and later linked up again with the Red Army.

There was one occasion when a boy of 13, secretary of the Young Pioneers' Bureau, working among the local population, found himself cut off from the main forces of the Red Army. For three days he crawled over the mountains. He was exhausted for want of food, suffered from thirst, and with no opportunity of quenching it, he drank his own urine. Finally he found his comrades and his detachment.

These individual facts illustrate the solidarity in our Red Army, the tremendous heroism of our fighters, their ability to act in an organised fashion, whatever the conditions in which they find themselves.

There is a better mastery of military technique. Seven groups have graduated through our various military schools of commanders. We have a special military-technical school. There is a special school which trains leaders for guerilla detachments.

We have succeeded in accumulating tremendous practical, *military* experience during the many years of the civil war, and it is on the basis of that we train our fighters, and are training the fighting capacity of the whole of the Red Army.

The technical units of the Red Army have also considerably raised their level. For example, although we have no good means of crossing rivers, we have to some degree mastered the technical side of this job, and know how to arrange crossings.

Never for a single moment during our trek did we forget about the political and educational work to be performed among the Red Army men. In the mornings, before we set out on the march, and when we performed our physical exercises, or later in the evenings, we held little talks with the men. We use every opportunity for training our Red Army men. We teach the young fighters how to use the rifle, and read topographical maps, etc. We carry on this work first and foremost with the help of the comrades who have been trained in military schools. These comrades play a big rôle in the army.

The heroism of the Red Army is great because our fighters possess a high degree of political consciousness. Our Red Army in Kiangsi knew that it was called upon to defend the agrarian revolution. To-day it knows in addition that its task is to struggle for national liberation, and for the Soviet Revolution throughout the whole of China. And the Red Army is trained not only in the spirit of the struggle for the victory of the Soviet Revolution in China, but also in the spirit of the struggle for the international revolution.

The Red Army fighters are very much interested in international events, and in the struggle of the international proletariat. The Party press, the Soviet newspapers and the Red Army newspapers, the *Red Star*, constantly give facts about the struggle of the international proletariat for the world revolution.

We have organised a fund in aid of political prisoners, and have carried on a campaign in defence of Thaelmann, just as we organised a fund to help release Dimitrov, and carried on a campaign for his release. We organised a collection to help the insurgent proletariat of Spain. This was all of tremendous educational importance, especially in connection with the training of cadres for the national-liberation movement in the Eastern countries. It should be mentioned that

Koreans, natives from Formosa, Annamites, and other peoples of the East, are trained in our Soviet schools.

The Red Army is distinguished for its heroism, because workers constitute an enormous percentage of it, amounting to as much as 20 per cent. in the Red Army. We have swelled the ranks of the Red Army with fresh forces, and we must say that our young fighters display the same heroism as their older comrades. Why? Because every fighter in the Red Army is class-conscious.

The Red Army possesses such heroism because it has good, strong cadres. The main cadres of the Red Army grew up in the fire of civil war, springing from the heart of the anti-imperialist and agrarian revolution. They enjoy tremendous authority among the rank and file Red Army men and are truly loyal fighters for Communism. Many of our commanders are very young in years, for example, Comrade Lin Piao, commander of the 1st Army Corps, is only 28 years old, the commander of the 2nd division is 24 years old, while Cheng Tsan-hao, the commander of the 4th Army Corps, is 25 years old.

All these cadres have grown up in the years of civil war. Our cadres are not only military specialists of a higher order, but are splendid politicians, who operate the line of our Party. They display initiative, raise questions before the Party leadership about future plans, about the tasks facing our Red Army, and about the prospects for our development. They always bear in mind the state of our forces. They are very versatile, and know how to apply flexible tactics. When the Party entrusts them with a task, they are capable of fulfilling it independently. They use their own initiative in adopting various manoeuvres, but they fulfil the task to perfection. It is just because we have such leading cadres that we achieved such tremendous victories during our great trek.

The second guarantee of our success in this trek was the fact that our Party has grown ideologically and organisationally, and this is true of our Party leadership particularly. It has become steeled in the fire of the civil war, and really proved itself capable of standing at the head of such a mighty undertaking as our glorious trek.

The success of our trek was also assured, because there are many Party members in our Red Army. In some of our units as many as 40 per cent. of the men are Party members and Young Communists. All commanders higher than the rank of company commanders are exclusively Communist, while the majority of platoon commanders are also either Party members or Young Communists. The Communists in the army, both among the Commanders and among the rank and file, set

examples of courage and loyalty to the Party and the cause of the working class.

We are also proud of our non-Party Bolsheviks, our commanders and rank and file fighters who compete with the Party men in the army, in heroism and loyalty to the revolution.

On the eve of every battle, the Party members of the companies select from their numbers as reserve commanders about four or five men.

If the company commander is killed or wounded at the front, the detachment does not disperse, but the first reserve commander immediately takes his place, and in case of need, his place is taken by the second, etc. Wounded party men try not to upset their comrades, but encourage them by saying, "It's nothing, go ahead." It must be said that the Communists in the Red Army are the best members of our Party.

Our Communists, whether they work in the trade unions, or in the Young Communist League, or whether on mass work, always pay attention to training cadres to swell the ranks of the Red Army. The Party sends its best comrades into the Red Army units. Thus, actually our best Party forces are concentrated in the army.

Our Communists set examples of excellent work, not only in the Red Army units, but also in the rear; in ensuring supplies for the army, in swelling its ranks, collecting foodstuffs, etc.

We advance the following slogans: "For the victory of the Chinese people over Japanese imperialism! All for the struggle for the agrarian revolution, and freedom. For the victory of the Chinese Revolution. Join the Red Army" We have Red Army reserves, which include the youth organised in the Young Guard, the Red Guard, and other auxiliary detachments. All these youths are gradually transferred into the ranks of the Red Army.

Through the network of mass organisations under our guidance, we can mobilise the masses. The population willingly give us food. During the trek we had no difficulties as regards supplies. It was only in the mountains, where the population is sparse, that there were one or two days when food was scarce. In spite of the economic blockade we were able to supply our fighters with new uniforms and other essential things.

The Party always leads the army, its plans and tactics. We have been conducting a civil war against the Kuomintang for many years now, but if we had not received really correct leadership from the Party, we would not have achieved such success. Of course, there have been individual mistakes and failures in the leadership, but our strength lies just in this, that we can discover and correct our shortcomings in time. The success of

our great trek into Western China was achieved first and foremost because of the correct, strong, Party leadership we had.

The third guarantee of our victory was that we met with support from the masses on all sides. Wherever we occupied new regions we rallied the masses to confiscate the property and food supplies of the local generals, landlords and gentry. This property and food was distributed among the poorest of the population. Wherever it was possible to do so, we set up local revolutionary authorities, revolutionary committees. Part of the ammunition taken was set aside for organisation of partisan detachments in the locality. We organised a boycott of taxes, etc.

When General Kun Chui from Szechwan passed through the villages where the population were starving, he engaged in incendiaryism for the express provocative purpose of spreading rumours to the effect that the Red Army burns everything down in its way. Actually our troops helped to put out the fires, and in general did everything within their power to help the population. We formed mass organisations to struggle against the payment of land-rent, etc., and this was why we met with so much support among the population.

During our trek we also acquired experience in connection with work among the national minorities, as, for instance, the Yao Tsi in Kwangsi, the Maotsi in Kweichow, and the Mantsi in Sinkiang and Szechwan. In our leaflets and slogans we raised the question of national emancipation for these small peoples, and we supplied them with weapons to organise partisan defence detachments. In the Red Army there are not a few representatives of these tribes, and also Moslems.

It was just because we had close ties with the masses that we utilised the support they offered us, and successfully recruited volunteers into the Red Army. The workers helped us everywhere with our transport, and we found it possible everywhere to billet the Red Army men among the population.

It is worth while dwelling briefly on the methods of work which the Red Army carried on among the population. We could not stay for a long time in any one place, and had to push forward all the time: in the evening we arrived in a village, and the next morning we were gone again. Nevertheless we did much work among the population.

Every Red Army fighter knows three rules regarding discipline, and eight rules regarding behaviour. Very fine traditions are included in these rules, and we demand that each fighter should observe them. Every Red Army man billeted with a family is expected to arrange a meeting of the family together with the family head. He has

to explain the nature of the Red Army, the aims for which it is fighting, and strive to make his agitation penetrate to the widest section of the population. Every Red Army fighter carries a piece of chalk with him and is obliged to write no fewer than three slogans a day in the places through which he passes.

The Political Department of the Red Army, and the political departments in the divisions and units, as well as every company, have special departments for work among the population. All the best local forces of the Party, the Young Communist League, the trade unions, and the mass organisations, are responsible for work among the population along the route taken by the Red Army. And yet we still do not do enough of this work. But it is a fact that every Red Army man carries on work among the population, and this work brings its results.

A few words about our shortcomings. Have we made any mistakes? Of course, we have. If we had not, our successes would have been greater.

We did not have a correct political line as regards the establishment of the anti-imperialist people's front. Had we adopted the new line of tactics during our trek westwards we should have received big successes. But even now it is not too late to do so. To-day, the united front is absolutely essential, and is the only correct line.

The offensive of Japanese imperialism against North China is calling forth more and more indignation and discontent among the broad masses of the Chinese population. Serious contradictions exist between the different militarist cliques. We must make use of these contradictions among the militarists. On the other hand, what is undoubtedly more important, a mighty anti-imperialist wave is mounting up among the broad masses of the people. This is an extremely favourable moment for organising the national anti-imperialist united front.

After completing such a brilliant trek we must give an appraisal of our army and of our Party. After so many years of civil war the Red Army has become an efficient fighting body, and has really grown considerably. Of course, during our

trek we had to overcome a multitude of difficulties and obstacles. We suffered certain losses in the ranks of the Red Army, and the former Soviet regions, and in the North-East region of Kiangsi. On the other hand, the 2nd and 6th armies met with no small successes. We can record big successes in North-West China—in Shensi, Szechwan and Kansu.

In spite of its losses, the total numerical composition of the Red Army to-day has not decreased, but, on the contrary, has increased. During the trek north-westwards, the Red Army organised local partisan detachments all along the line of march, and we established armed detachments in various regions.

In the regions which we have now occupied we are trying to carry out the slogan of building up a Red Army, one million strong. We shall carry out this slogan.

What should be the appraisal of the work of our Party? After the 4th Plenum of our C.C., our Party really gained big successes. The authority of the Communist Party in the Soviet regions is high. The Party is defending tens of millions of the inhabitants of the Soviet regions. Of course, our Party has made a number of mistakes, but these have been rectified by the Party's own forces. There has been no repetition of the position which arose after the treachery of Chen Du-sui, or when the mistakes of Li Li-sian and Tsu Tsu-bo were current. In the new situation, our Party knows how to raise new tasks itself.

Our Party is capable of leading the civil war, and does so correctly and flexibly. Political and military leaders like Mao Tse-dun and Chu de have now grown up—these talented military and Party leaders of ours, tried in hundreds of battles. We have really heroic Communist cadres, who are fighting self-sacrificingly for the fundamental interests of the Chinese people.

Our Party must carry out the new tactics: it must in the new situation and on the basis of the positions we have already won, build up a real anti-imperialist people's front, and through this people's front gain victory over the enemies of the Chinese people, and first and foremost over Japanese imperialism.

# THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE IN THE KUOMINTANG REGIONS OF CHINA

By SIAO GEH.

**T**HE Kuomintang regions are most important centres of the economic and political life of China: the basic masses of the Chinese proletariat are concentrated there. To-day these regions are the object of Japanese imperialist aggression, and are of decisive importance for the victory of the Soviet revolution in China. The most important task facing the Communist Party is, therefore, on the basis of the decisions of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, to achieve a further turn in the tactics and daily work of the Communist Party in the Kuomintang regions, with a view to setting up an anti-imperialist united people's front and, first and foremost, the anti-Japanese united people's front. It is a serious mistake to underestimate our work in the Kuomintang regions or to ignore it under the pretext that sooner or later these regions will be occupied by the Chinese Red Army. It is precisely in order to fulfil the new policy that the anti-imperialist movement in the non-Soviet regions must be linked up in the closest possible fashion with the agrarian revolution in the Soviet regions; moreover, in defining the policy of the Soviet regions, our starting point should not only be the internal situation, but account should be taken of the general situation throughout China, and even the internal situation.

In dealing with the question of the anti-imperialist struggle and the anti-imperialist united people's front, we must first and foremost bear in mind the concrete situation prevailing in the Kuomintang regions, i.e., take into account the relations between the objective possibilities and our own forces. Only if we take correct account of the actual situation will it be possible for us to correctly define the tactics, slogans, and organisational forms and methods of our work. In his speech at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, when dealing with the anti-imperialist united people's front, Comrade Dimitrov stressed above all that:

"In forming a wide anti-imperialist united front of struggle in the colonies and semi-colonies, it is necessary above all to recognise the variety of conditions in which the anti-imperialist struggle of the masses is proceeding, the varying degree of maturity of the national liberation movement, the rôle of the proletariat within it and the influence of the Communist Party over the broad masses." (See "Communist International" Special Congress Number, 17-18, p. 846.)

What is the general situation in the Kuomintang regions? In the main, as follows:

1. The broad masses of the Chinese people, including not only the toilers, but also broad sections of the

petty bourgeois, and even a section of the national bourgeois with their political groupings, and certain officers — are fully aware of the fact that Japanese imperialist aggression will not stop at the rapacious seizure of Manchuria and North China, but threatens the direct seizure of the remaining part of China, and is a menace to the life of every Chinese citizen.

2. The indignation of these broad masses is growing stronger and stronger in connection with the further aggression of Japanese imperialism and the treacherous policy being pursued by the Nanking Government. The struggle against Japanese imperialism and its agents is assuming various forms.

3. The absence of civil rights among the people, the riot of white terror and the demagogy of the Kuomintang leaders have reached unheard-of dimensions, while the forces of revolution in these regions are for the time being still very poorly organised.

4. The political influence which the Soviets, the Chinese Red Army and the Communist Party of China have among broad masses of the Chinese people is spreading and assuming more definite forms.

## 1.—Further Aggression on the Part of Japanese Imperialism.

The Japanese imperialists to-day are staging incidents in a number of towns in the Kuomintang regions of China, which are to serve as an excuse for the armed seizure of the provinces situated along the Yangtse and the Chunkiang rivers. For example, not so long ago, the Japanese lodged a protest with the municipal authorities of Shanghai concerning an alleged attack of Chinese upon a Japanese motor-lorry, and used this as a pretext for demanding that a new Japanese concession should be established in Shanghai, hoping to give rise to a new conflict on the lines of the Shanghai events in 1932.\*

In Amoy (Fukieng province) the Japanese suddenly demanded that the Fukieng Government pay the debts on loans obtained by the Fukieng authorities from Japanese banks and Formosa businessmen before the Northern Expedition in 1926. These extremely dubious loans amount to a sum of money exceeding 5 million Chinese dollars. In this connection the Japanese have concentrated 9 warships on the Amoy river.

In Hankow (Hupeh province), the Japanese Consul-General lodged a serious protest against the Commander of the Wuhan guard, concerning the appearance recently of posters with anti-Japanese slogans in the barracks of the Wuhan garrison. This was the pretext for increasing the number of Japanese warships on the river Yangtse.

\* The invasion of Shanghai by imperialist Japan and the devastation of one of its largest districts, namely Chapei.

The Japanese are openly and energetically striving to establish the so-called "Independent State of the Five Provinces of Northern China," to include Hopei, Shansi, Shantung, Suiyuan and Chahar, and the "Autonomous Government of Inner Mongolia"; in other words, they want to establish a second and third "Manchukuo."

Japanese imperialism is increasing its economic aggression against China. Recently the Nanking Government concluded a secret agreement with Japan for "Sino-Japanese Economic collaboration," according to which all economic measures taken in China must be by agreement with Japan, i.e., must actually come under the complete control of Japan. The agreement also provides for representatives of states which, in the racial and cultural sense are connected with Japan and China, i.e., Manchukuo, participating in this economic collaboration. The agreement aims at obtaining complete control of the key positions of Chinese economy. Actually in Northern China, economic life is already under the complete control of Japan. Now Japanese imperialism is striving to gain possession of sources of raw materials and the railways in the North of China, to develop cotton-growing there so as to become independent of American and Indian cotton, and to secure control over the cattle-rearing regions in the Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, with a view to freeing itself of Australian woollen imports. Japan is also pushing ahead its plan to seize the salt regions of North China, in order to cover the present lack of salt hitherto imported from Abyssinia. By peaceful or violent means, the Japanese imperialists are trying to obtain possession of the mines in North China which are for the time being under the control of the Chinese banks. For example, a short time ago the Japanese seized the Lutsian coal mines and the railway branch line which lies in close proximity, dismissed all the workers and office staff, and arbitrarily sold up all the coal reserves from these mines amounting to 60,000 tons. The Japanese imperialists intend to hand over the main railway lines of North China to the management of the South Manchurian Railway, and thus establish complete Japanese control of all lines of communication in North China. The Japanese are forcing the Chinese textile owners to sell the five largest textile factories in North China at very low prices, having in mind the building up of a big textile centre in Shantung as a counter to the one in Shanghai. This, at bottom, is the essence of the Japanese plan of the economic development in North China.

The Japanese have forced the Nanking Government to introduce new reductions in the import

duty upon Japanese goods, and have obtained permission to organise an exhibition of Japanese machinery in China and to import these machines free of duty. The Japanese are pursuing a policy of increased dumping in China, and are protesting against the stamp duty law passed in July of this year by the Nanking Government, being extended to include Japanese citizens. An increase in capital invested in Japanese enterprises is to be observed in Shanghai, Tsindao and other towns. The Chinese textile exchange, which ceased operations with Japanese textiles 10 years ago (in connection with the events which took place on May 30, 1925\*), has now renewed operations. This means a daily loss to the Chinese textile industry of 30,000 Chinese dollars. Similar operations have been renewed on the wheat exchange in Shanghai. In consequence of the Italo-Abyssinian war, the Japanese have monopolised the artificial silk market in Shanghai, which was previously in the hands of Italy and Japan.

At the same time, in a number of towns of China, Japanese agents are buying up silver for export to Japan. In Tientsin alone the Japanese have exported over 5 million dollars of silver in the last three months. This is leading to a decline of the silver reserve in China, a depreciation of paper money and ever more frequent cases of bankruptcy among the Chinese banks. In Shanghai alone 85 banks have gone bankrupt during the last 8 months.

All this testifies to the further breakdown of the whole of Chinese national economy. There was resumption of work in 31 silk-spinning factories in Shanghai, and an increase in the price of rice. The export of silk cocoons from China during August of this year amount to 3 million Chinese dollars, i.e., over a million dollars more than in August of the preceding year. There was a passive balance in foreign trade to the extent of 18,000,000 dollars for July of 1935, while for 7 months of 1935 there was a passive balance of over 300 million dollars. Still, none of these isolated facts in any way point to an improvement of the situation, but only represent the efforts of the Chinese employers to find a way out of the deadlock in which the economic situation is placed to-day. This, with the aid of foreign capital and by increasing the exploitation of the working-class. The journey to Japan undertaken by a group of textile manufacturers led by Yun Tsun-tsin, the king of the Chinese textile industry, and Yun Tsun-tsin's agreement to participate in Sino-Japanese economic collaboration, is just such a desperate

\* On May 30, 1925, a mass demonstration was held in Shanghai which ended in the demonstrators being shot, and which served as the starting point for the rise in the tide of revolution in China.

attempt. Actually, however, this only makes Chinese industry even more dependent upon foreign capital, and is leading to a further shrinking of the home market and the further breakdown of Chinese national economy.

The meetings organised by the Japanese in Shanghai, Daren and Tientsin to draw up Japan's "new policy" towards China adopted the decision that all anti-Japanese movements in China must be suppressed, that Japan and China must collaborate in the fight against Communism in China, and first and foremost in the North-West provinces, that the Nanking government must recognise the need for adopting measures against the anti-Japanese movement and Communism in China, and that assistance must be afforded for the conduct of these measures. Not satisfied with the struggle of the Kuomintang butchers against the anti-Japanese movement and the drives against the Chinese Red Army, the Japanese robbers intend to begin open military intervention with their own forces, so as to wipe out the Chinese Red Army and suppress the anti-Japanese movement. Having gained the approval of the Nanking government for their measures, the Japanese are using the "struggle against Communism" as a pretext for seizing the remaining part of Chinese territory, and are using the slogan of the "struggle against the Communists" so as to draw certain sections of the population away from the anti-Japanese struggle, and to seize Chinese territory under the guise of helping China to "destroy Communism."

There are favourable grounds for the realisation of the Japanese plan for seizing the whole of China in the information concerning the proposed Sino-Japanese "collaboration in combating the bandits along the Great Wall," in the public refutation in the press of rumours concerning the resumption of normal relations between Chang Kai-shek and Nanking, on the one hand, and the Communist Party of China, on the other, in the public declaration made by General Yan Si-shan to the effect that "first Communism must be liquidated, and then measures undertaken to save the country," and in his "plan to struggle against Communism."

These decisions are only the beginning of the "new policy" which Japan intends to pursue.

All these facts lead us to the following conclusions concerning the next steps which Japan will take in pursuance of her "new policy."

Firstly, "henceforth Japan will not have any dealings with a Chinese government created by "one party," but will try to establish direct connections with the actual authorities in the different localities." This means that Japan is not only

striving to establish a second "Manchukuo," in the North of China, but has the intention of establishing direct contact with the actual authorities in the different localities, in order to set up new states in the valley of the Yangtse and the Chuwkieng, on the lines of "Manchukuo."

Secondly, through her so-called "Sino-Japanese collaboration," Japan intends not only to obtain complete economic control of North China but, in addition, to gain possession of the key positions of the whole of Chinese economy.

Thirdly, Japan is endeavouring to bring about "Sino-Japanese collaboration in the struggle against Communism," so as to begin open, direct military intervention against the Chinese revolution.

Fourthly, Japan is seeking to subject China completely to her own influence in consequence of her refusal to have any connection whatsoever with America and the European powers. Thereby Japan intends to bring her plan for a "Pan-Asia" to its culmination.

Actually, there is nothing new in the so-called "new policy" of Japan: it is merely a continuation of the policy which Japanese imperialism has been consistently pursuing in China, especially since the occupation of Manchukuo. The "new policy" is merely a component part of Tanaka's long-standing plan.\*

As a result of all this, China is to-day passing through a still more acute national crisis than in 1931, when the Manchurian events began. The social crisis in China (economic ruin, mass unemployment, poverty, starvation, death, etc.) has reached unheard-of dimensions.

The indignation of the whole of the Chinese people has considerably increased in connection with the bestial acts of the imperialists and the treachery of the national traitors. This has led to a still further extension of the social base of the Chinese revolution, and has created favourable conditions for establishing the anti-imperialist and, first and foremost, the anti-Japanese united people's front.

#### 11.—The Anti-Imperialist Struggle of the Masses and the Anti-Imperialist United People's Front.

The anti-imperialist struggle of the Chinese people is becoming broader and deeper in consequence of the further offensive of the Japanese aggressors, the further capitulation of the treacherous Nanking Government and the growing influence of the Soviets and the Chinese Red Army among the masses of the people. This is also illustrated by the acute ideological struggle

\* See "Japanese Imperialism Stripped." Modern Books, Ltd.

which is taking place in the press of the Kuomintang regions in China around the question of the anti-imperialist front. The discussion is taking place mainly around the following questions: Shall we resist Japan or capitulate? What methods should be used to save the state? What should be our attitude towards the Chinese Soviet Government and the Red Army? What position should China adopt in the event of a second imperialist war? In this connection the question of the attitude towards the U.S.S.R. is also touched upon. The overwhelming majority of authors, except a few Japanophiles in the camp of the Nanking Government are not only in favour of resisting Japan, but unanimously appeal for action, and propose concrete measures of fighting against Japan.

An article by Dr. Din Ven-tsiang entitled "The history of the revolutionary foreign policy of Soviet Russia and its lessons," published in a Tientsin newspaper, the "Ta Kungpao," on July 21, 1935, resulted in a heated discussion in the whole of the press, which is going on to this day. Dr. Din refers to Lenin who, he says, even agreed to pay contributions and grant annexations in order to obtain peace with Germany during the Brest negotiations and, allegedly, agreed to retreat to Kamchatka; from which the author draws the conclusion that the Chinese people should capitulate before Japan and retreat to Chinese Kamchatka, namely to Yunnan and Kweichow.

This appeal for capitulation to Japanese imperialism called forth different responses. Articles by Hu Shi, Den Tsi, Sui Gun-da and others were published to reply to Din's article, taking a line against Din and calling for resistance to the offensive of Japanese imperialism. For instance, Sui Gun-da writes:

"The situation in which we find ourselves to-day is objectively and subjectively quite different from the situation in Russia before the Brest Peace."

Den Tsi refers to Dr. Din's article, where he declares that "North China is our Ukraine, the provinces of Honan, Kiangsi and Szechwan are our Urals and Kuznetsk, while the Yunnan and Kweichow provinces are our Kamchatka," and writes:

"The territorial losses we have sustained in the last three years alone very considerably exceed the territories of Esthonia and Latvia, and we have not fired a single shot in resistance. To-day 'our Ukraine' is ours only formally, and there is no guarantee whatsoever that our 'Urals and Kuznetsk' will not be seized. 'Our Kamchatka' is also liable to be seized. I am not saying all this to cause a sensation, but because this is the actual state of affairs."

Sui Gun-da stresses the following point in his article:

"We have now a great opportunity of offering resistance to Japan, and it is absolutely essential that a

struggle be waged against Japan . . . If the Kuomintang decides questions of state importance against the will of public opinion, then public opinion will make the government answer for it."

In their article entitled "How to interpret the lessons of the Brest Peace," written at the request of the editors of the newspaper, "Kiukuopao," published in Paris, Comrade Waw Ming and Kon Sin drew attention to the following:

"Mr. Din Van-tsiang's viewpoint is wrong . . . His theory can only be of assistance to those who betray our people, and weaken the vigilance of the people and their desire to fight, which will in turn let loose arbitrary acts on the part of Japanese imperialism in China and give freedom of action to the traitors. And then the Chinese Republic will perish."

Further on in their article they write the following:

"Although the line taken by Hu Shi, Sui Gun-da and Den Tsi is in the main correct, it nevertheless contains many shortcomings. It does not, on the basis of the contrast between two viewpoints, show what should be adopted to fight against Japanese imperialism. . ."

The Italo-Abbyssinian war which has now broken out and which coincides with the 4th anniversary of the Manchurian events,\* and the 24th anniversary of the 1911 revolution,† has called forth a new wave of lively discussion in the press in connection with the Sino-Japanese problem.

In an article entitled "An appeal to the Chinese people on the occasion of the 4th anniversary of the Manchurian events" in the evening newspaper "Damei," Mr. Chang Nai-tsi, famous in the banking world and financial circles of China, writes:

"It is with profound sincerity that I stress the following three points: (1) there must be no hesitation, (2) there must be no cowardice, (3) there must be no pessimism . . . A number of revolutionary wars in history have shown that the power of the masses can force the strongest opponent to lay down his arms. We must recognise the importance of material forces. We must deprive our opponent of these material forces, and in addition we must obtain them, for ourselves in some other way. Only in this way can we bring the revolution to its culmination and free China from its position as a colony. Young men! Have more faith in victory, develop your forces, resist the enemy without, and uproot the traitors within the country!"

And the "Min Kuo Jeh Pao," the daily organ of the Kwantung group, wrote the following in a leading article entitled "Bravo, Abyssinians":

"At a moment which was critical for their state, during the offensive of a foreign enemy, the Abyssinians rallied their forces, unanimously prepared to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their country. They will not surrender in spite of the advance of an enemy armed to the teeth, They will not surrender, despite the weakness of their country . . . They are stubbornly fighting to the bitter end. There is a great difference between what is taking

\* The occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese troops on September 18, 1931.

† In 1911 a revolution broke out in China, as a result of which under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen the monarchy was overthrown and China officially declared a republic.

place in Abyssinia and what is going on in China, which resigns itself submissively like a lamb and has given up a number of provinces without a fight. It is the difference between courage and cowardice. The difference is as great as the distance from earth to sky. If we make a comparison between Abyssinia and China, where traitors make their appearance one after another, and serve the enemy and betray their national interests, what a tremendous distance lies between the national feeling in China and in Abyssinia! . . . How courageous are the Abyssinians, how cowardly are we! I respect the Abyssinians and am ashamed of the Chinese."

In another leading article, headed "Cries of a Wounded Heart," we find:

"A tremendous country like China, with a culture of its own 4,000 years old, with a population of over 400 million, can fight even though it possesses worse armaments than the enemy, as the experiences of the Shanghai fighting showed."

We find more concrete proposals for organising the struggle against Japanese imperialism and for saving the fatherland, in the following appeal published by Wu Kan, Professor of the Sun Yat-sen University in Kwantung:

"Unite all the armed forces of China, form them into an army of national defence . . . immediately cease the offensive against the Red Army, and unite all the forces of China to fight against Japanese expansion. Organise all the generals in China into one headquarters' staff occupied exclusively with the task of defending the country against Japan. If China is compelled to declare war on Japan, then a government of national defence must be organised which will absolutely and entirely answer the requirements of the affairs of the country at home and abroad and the defence of the nation."

Many people share the view expressed by Professor Wu Kan to the effect that the internecine war inside the country must stop, and that a united front must be formed for joint struggle against Japan.

The feeling of the Chinese people in relation to the struggle against Japan is well depicted in General Ven Chao-van's "Reminiscences of the Shanghai Battle":

"I was at one time staying in a hotel," he writes. "I was in army uniform, but nobody knew who I was. One of the waiters asked me: 'Why have you not gone to fight against Japan?' And I could not answer the question. In the train I met with a similar occurrence. The guard said to me: 'The Chinese troops are no good at all, they fight desperately against each other, but as soon as they encounter the Japanese they behave like mice in front of a cat. They are absolutely no good at all.' Then he asked me: 'Why haven't you gone to fight against the Japanese?' After that I seldom ventured to walk the streets in army uniform. My colleagues frequently met with the same thing and were very much embarrassed. When soldiers go to market to buy food, the people often jeer at them. And this makes the soldiers want more and more to fight against the Japanese army. This explains why the Chinese soldiers displayed unprecedented courage during the fighting against the Japanese units in Shanghai."

Now that the national crisis in China is much more serious than the 1932 crisis, this feeling is still more widespread among the masses of the people.

As a result of the growth of revolutionary feeling, the activity of the masses of the people and the sharpening of imperialist contradictions, the movement in favour of resisting Japan, and the struggle against the capitulation of the Nanking government have now spread even to the Kuomintang organisations, partly to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, and to a certain section of the Blueshirts. In connection with the Hupeh events, the South-West grouping of the Kuomintang published a protest in the summer of 1935 against the capitulatory policy of the Nanking government, wherein it declared that the Chinese territory has its bounds, but that the demands of Japan are boundless. Even the Hupeh organisation of the Kuomintang made the following declaration in its manifesto against Chang Kai-shek and Wang Cheng-wei:

"Japan considers itself the leader of Asia, and China, a country under its protectorate. It insults our people and puts them in a degrading position. The so-called Sino-Japanese rapprochement is actually only so much treachery on the part of a few representatives of the Nanking Government. The Chinese people will protest determinedly against any unequal agreements concluded which do not observe the principle of respect for mutual interests."

In connection with the Hopei events, twenty members of the Chamber of Control\* accused Huan Fu, Chen Yi, Tao Shan-min, Yin Ju-gen and Ven Lan of betraying the interests of the people, and demanded that they be punished; they also accused Wang Cheng-wei, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and, indirectly, Chang Kai-shek himself. In their appeal to the Second Plenum of the Kuomintang, Chao Bin-tsyn described the Kuomintang as a "filthy swamp, a bloc of feudal groupings . . ." Many similar facts could be quoted.

There is no need to refer to the existence of anti-Japanese feeling among the broad masses of the workers, peasants and soldiers who are directly engaged in the practical struggle for their national existence, for the independence and integrity of their country, and for human rights and freedom. This unanimous demand for a struggle against Japan is of serious political importance to-day.

Firstly, it signifies a protest against the treacherous policy of the Nanking government, and smashes to bits its demagogic assertion that "there are no forces in China to resist Japan," that "China must first become strong and then take revenge," that "China must wait for a second imperialist war," or that "first the population inside the country must be pacified, and then resistance offered to Japan," etc.

\* One of five chambers which constitute the Kuomintang Government.

Secondly, it inspires the whole of the people to fight against Japanese aggression and imbues them with confidence in victory. If this potential power of the masses of the people is embodied in action, it is difficult to imagine the tremendous scope which the anti-Japanese movement would acquire.

Thirdly, it increases the authority of our party, the Soviet Government and the Red Army among the population throughout China, and provides our party with the chief conditions necessary for organising the anti-imperialist people's front, for conducting a mighty national-revolutionary struggle.

Despite the fierce white terror, the masses of the Chinese people have displayed innumerable examples of heroic struggle against the Japanese robbers, for the salvation of the fatherland.

During the three months which have passed since the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, the struggle of the masses of the people to save their fatherland has developed tempestuously in the Kuomintang regions. The Chinese proletariat have always occupied the front ranks in this anti-imperialist struggle. Here are a few examples:

A short time ago the Nanking Government accepted all the oppressive conditions put before it by Japan, concerning North China. The Shanghai sailors were the first to protest. At a meeting of the yellow Seamen's union, "led" by Yan Hu,\* a Kuomintang official, the sailors beat up the traitors and threw them out, destroyed counter-revolutionary Kuomintang posters and banners, tore up the portrait of Chang Kai-shek and threw it down the lavatory, and marched in organised fashion to the building of the Kuomintang committee, where a meeting was in progress. The sailors demanded that the question of the struggle against Japanese imperialists be discussed and that punishment be meted out to the treacherous leaders of the Kuomintang. The demonstration was surrounded by a large detachment of gendarmes and police armed with machine-guns. Sixty people including 8 women were arrested. This caused such tremendous indignation among the whole of the population, that the Shanghai municipal authorities found it necessary to declare martial law.

A short time previously, a strike of rickshawmen, which spread to 100,000 men, broke out on the territory of the French concession in Shanghai. The rickshawmen were protesting against the newly introduced, insulting, regulations that all rickshawmen should be registered (18 finger-prints on different documents, and all kinds of malicious provocation during registration). The rickshaw-

men organised a demonstration and beat up the blacklegs. Committees to help the strikers were formed in many factories in China. The French imperialists shot down a demonstration of rickshawmen, heavily wounding 12 men, and arrested over 100. Although this strike was defeated owing to the treachery of Du Yue-shen, who led it, and of the blacklegs, it increased the determination of the Shanghai rickshawmen and workers to conduct the anti-imperialist struggle. The refusal of the dockers in Chapei to load Japanese goods also met with profound sympathy among the rest of the population of Shanghai. The Chapei dockers who had taken part in the defence of Shanghai in 1932 conducted a persistent struggle against the dissolution of the workers' co-operative organisations by the Kuomintang authorities.

We can judge of the broad scope of the anti-imperialist movement among the peasantry from the measures adopted by Sino-Japanese collaboration alone, and directed towards uprooting the "bandits" in "the demilitarised zone."

Let us mention in particular one of the outstanding episodes of the struggle of the peasants—the armed uprising of peasants in the Hupeh province. The uprising took place in connection with the collection of funds organised by the authorities for deepening the bed of the river, and the subsequent embezzlement of 60,000 Chinese dollars by the District Chief. Over 30,000 peasants marched to the town and besieged it for three days. The insurgents disarmed the guards on duty and smashed up the police station. The uprising was suppressed, but it had a strong effect upon the development of the peasant movement in the so-called "demilitarised zone." In the districts of Yuityan and Luansan, the peasants frequently organised raids upon detachments of the police guards, organised by the Japanese from among Chinese traitors. It is especially necessary to mention the heroic fight carried on against the Japanese by a volunteer detachment commanded by Sun Yun-shin. Of all the peasant activities, the one most clearly anti-imperialist in character was the recent uprising under Chao De-huai in the district of Damin (Hopei province). The uprising took place under the following slogans: "Keep the lands for the peasants," "Save the state!", "Down with the foul traitors!", etc. The insurgents organised an autonomous people's army of 4-5,000 men to defend the peasant lands. For over 20 days they besieged the county town of Damin, and isolated it from all communication with the outer world by cutting the telegraph and telephone wires. The District Chief and his garrison were confined to the town and dared not offer resistance to the insurgents. Chao De-huai rejected the proposal

\* Yan Hu is a well-known Japanese agent, executioner of the Chinese toilers, who led the shooting during the events of April 12, 1927.

of the District Chief to settle the conflict "by peaceful means," and disarmed several hundred **MINTUAN**\* from the Veisan district. In connection with the establishment of Sino-Japanese collaboration "for combatting the bandits," the autonomous people's army has organised itself officially of late, and its fighters are conducting guerilla warfare, having established connections with the insurgent peasants of the Shantung province.

Similar action by the peasantry has been taking place in other districts on Kuomintang territory, especially in North China, in the districts of Chenhua, Tsanyan, Yunchen, Chanpin, Yuitian, Luansan, Susyan, Basyan, Chuansan, Siunsan, etc. Some detachments have established connections with the partisan movement in Manchuria, Jehol and other parts.

Besides the openly anti-Japanese activities of the peasantry, demonstrations have been taking place in connection with the refusal of the peasants to pay taxes and other contributions, and starve.

The peasant masses who take part in these activities represent a mighty army on the anti-imperialist fighting front. Now as never before the words of Comrade Stalin are especially appropriate:

"The anti-imperialist front in China will become all the stronger and mightier to the extent that the Chinese peasantry are drawn more rapidly and fundamentally into the revolution." (Stalin: "About the Opposition," page 431, Russian, 1928 Edition.)

Ever since the Hopei events, the anti-imperialist movement has begun to gather strength in the Chinese army. There is an ever louder demand for a cessation of the internecine warfare inside the country and for all forces to be united for the struggle against the enemy from abroad. There are ever more frequent demands made by the Kuomintang army units that the struggle against the Red Army be stopped: and more and more open sympathy is being expressed towards the Red Army. In Hankow, in the Wuhan headquarters of the defence units, posters bearing sharply anti-Japanese slogans have frequently appeared, and during the shooting-practice in Hankow, targets were set up with the inscriptions: "Let us revenge ourselves on the enemy," and "Japanese Imperialist." There have been reports in the press of a number of cases where army units refuse to fight against the Red Army, for example: units of the 25th corps of the Kweichow army, with other units of the same army numbering in all 20,000 men, refused to obey Chang Kai-shek's orders and march into the province of Szechwan to fight against the Red Army; or the

\* Mintuan are hired bands in the service of the landlords who carry on the struggle against the revolutionary movement in the village, and fulfil police functions in extracting arrears from the peasants.

case of General He Chu's regiment (former troops of the North-East Army), situated on the Shensi border, which refused to go into action against the Red Army. There have been cases of suicide as an expression of protest against the aggression of Japan and the treacherous policy of Nanking. The Chief of the Sonin district (Kwangsu province), Nui Hun-min, committed suicide, leaving a letter in which he said:

"Our country is on the brink of ruin. I do not want to see our great people enslaved. I have therefore decided to sacrifice myself so as to raise the spirit of the people to enter the struggle against the enemy and save the fatherland."

In September, 1935, the entire 85th division of General Si Pin, part of General Shu Yuan Tsuan's troops, went over en bloc to the side of the Reds. This division, whose commander perished in battle, occupied the districts of Chande, Shimyn and Tsyli, thus forcing General He Tsian (president of the Honan provincial municipality) to appeal immediately for assistance to Chang Kai-shek. The latter, seeing the instability of his own armies, and taking account of the fact that the appeal of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese Soviets for the formation of an anti-imperialist united front was meeting with warm support among the people, was forced to spread rumours to the effect that when it spoke of the united anti-imperialist front and joint struggle, the Red Army was prepared to come to agreement with anybody, but not with Chang Kai-shek. It is in this way that Chang Kai-shek is trying to stop the army from wavering. Our party declares openly that it is prepared to enter into agreement with any army units which cease the offensive against the Soviet regions and agree to fight against Japan. If the united front tactics are correctly applied, it is inevitable that there will be further cases of Kuomintang military units passing to the side of the revolution.

In the recent period, the anti-imperialist movement among the intellectuals has also been acquiring more and more scope, taking on different forms. The incident with the magazine "Sinshen" is characteristic. On the pretext that a certain article published in the anti-imperialist magazine, the "Sinshen," contained an "insult" to the Japanese Emperor, the Japanese imperialists lodged a protest with the Chinese authorities and put forward a number of demands which were wholly accepted by the Kuomintang. The Central Committee of the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang government issued an order that the "Sinshen" should be closed down and its editor Du Chun-yuan arrested, giving as their motive the excuse that the magazine "sharpens" Sino-Japanese relations. At first the editor of the

magazine was sentenced to three years' imprisonment, but its view of the protest made by the population, the Kuomintang authorities were forced to reduce the term of imprisonment to 14 months, denying the right of appeal to the prisoner, which is against existing regulations. Du Chun-yuan made the following firm declaration at the trial:

"The aim of my magazine is to fight against imperialism, against policies of aggression. I was born in the North-East provinces, now seized by the Japanese. How can I fail to protest and fight against the aggressors?"

His declaration secured the warm support of all those present in court, who displayed their indignation with cries of: "Down with Japanese imperialism!", "Down with the Chinese traitors!" Numerous anti-imperialist leaflets were hurled into the court, and as a result, the judge and the representative of the Japanese consulate were forced to leave the court.

This incident elicited a mighty movement for the release of Du Chan-yuan and for personal immunity, both inside the country and abroad. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines sent 2,000 dollars to Du Chan-yuan's wife to cover the cost of the appeal, and Chinese emigrants in America, Holland, and other countries sent telegrams of protest to Nanking against the scandalous sentence. Not only the toiling masses, but organisations like the Shanghai Union of Lawyers, the City Chamber of Commerce and prominent industrialists like Mo Ni-chu and others, were drawn into the movement.

The incident with the "Sinshen" magazine strengthened the movement against the new press law published by the Nanking government which severely restricts freedom of the press, especially in relation to anti-imperialist literature. As a result of the new law, only 54 different periodicals are allowed to be published instead of over 200 which were published previously. The publication of over 100 different books was prohibited, and they were burned. The first to utter a protest against the new law was the Shanghai Union of Journalists. The press workers of Tientsin, Peiping, Nanking, Canton, and other towns, followed their example. The protest against the closing down of the "Sinshen" developed into a movement against the new press law, and now, in addition, into a protest against the severe measures adopted against journalists who violate the press law and are consequently prosecuted. Under the pressure of mass protest however, in connection with the verdict against Du Chuan-yuan, the Kuomintang government was forced to declare through the supreme court, that "the

former sentence is wrong and is therefore rescinded," and Du Chuan-yuan was released.

A big movement arose in connection with the sudden death of Ni Er, a young revolutionary composer and fighter for the emancipation of China. He was the first to compose extremely popular anti-imperialist songs in a new form which expressed with great force all the exploitation and national oppression of the toilers of China, and aroused millions of people to fight for the salvation of their fatherland and for a new personal existence. He was the author of a number of revolutionary songs, including the "March of the Volunteer Army," the "Miners' Song," the "Song of the Bullet," "Want," "Arise, Slaves!", the "Twelve-hour working day," "The Dockers," "The Wounded Soldier," and others. In the form of gramophone records, these songs, full of national feeling, have become most popular among masses of the Chinese people. Naturally they could not fail to bring down all the hatred of the Nanking Government and the Japanese imperialists upon the head of Ni Er. According to the official version, Ni Er was drowned while bathing in the sea, in Japan, but among the masses of the people it is said that the Japanese are involved in his death. One of the biggest Shanghai theatres, where the funeral meeting devoted to the memory of Ni Er was held, was not large enough to hold all those who wished to be present. The newspaper "Chunhua-jih-pao" reported:

"The speakers at this meeting noted the importance of Ni Er's songs and made appeals that the work begun by Ni Er of composing militant anti-imperialist songs, should be continued. Those who participated in the meeting shouted anti-imperialist slogans, and all present loudly expressed their sympathy, as a result of which the president decided to close the meeting."

The tremendous popularity which Ni Er's songs enjoy among all strata of the population, the crowded funeral meetings in connection with his death, the fact that all the people recognise Ni Er as the first Chinese revolutionary composer, is no accident at all, for the voice of Ni Er is the voice of the 400 million people of China, and the songs of Ni Er are an expression of the feelings and desires of the whole of the Chinese people.

In Shanghai, Tientsin, Peiping, Canton, Hankow and other towns, meetings took place on the occasion of the 4th anniversary of the Manchurian events, despite the prohibition of the authorities. A meeting of the students of Shantung University ended in bloody conflicts with the Japanese. The Canton students organised propagandist "save the fatherland" groups and conducted a competition for the best article on how to save the fatherland. The anti-Japanese feeling among the school-children is illustrated, for example, by the following fact:

"The school-children in one of the Shanghai schools," a paper reports, "refused to use the atlases distributed among them for their studies, in which Manchukuo figured. The teacher thereupon cut out the word "kuo" (state), leaving "Manchu" (Manchuria), and though the maps were spoilt, the scholars were then satisfied."

On October 10, a Chinese sports festival took place in Shanghai attended by hundreds of thousands of visitors. The newspaper "Ta Kuw-pao" describes the opening in the following words:

"During the parade, representatives of the five North-Eastern provinces were dressed in mourning and carried flags of mourning in their hands. In this way they desired to express that their fatherland was dear to them, and that they carried its memory. The spectators were deeply touched: many even wept. In his speech, the captain of the sports group from the Five North-East provinces declared: 'The representatives of the territory which has been seized by the Japanese are taking part in the sports not in order to break records, but to remind the Chinese people once more of the lost five North-Eastern provinces and that a fight must be conducted to win them back.'"

Besides the anti-imperialist movement, a struggle is being launched against Chang Kai-shek's campaign for a "new life," against the Kuomintang regulation that young men and women must not study together, against the teaching of Confucian literature in educational institutions, and against the Kuomintang system of examinations. One of the characteristic features of the growth of the anti-imperialist movement in China is the expression of profound solidarity with the Abyssinian people who are fighting for their independence.

The Revolutionary Military Council of the Red Army has issued an appeal to the Abyssinian people in a special manifesto, calling upon them to conduct a self-sacrificing armed struggle for their national independence.\*

The Kwantung seamen's union, the Chinese mechanic's union, the Kwantung Chamber of Commerce, and other organisations, have also published their protests against the action of Italian fascism.

A mass demonstration took place in Shanghai outside the Italian Embassy, against the offensive of the Italians in Abyssinia and against the hiring of Chinese workers for despatch to Africa.

\* \* \*

The slogan of the national-revolutionary struggle put forward by our party from the very first day

\* See page 80 of the present No. "Address of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Red Army to the Abyssinian People."

of the occupation of Manchuria, met with the support and sympathy of wide masses of the Chinese people. The organising rôle of the party in the anti-imperialist movement is still far from sufficient, but in spite of this, and the mistakes made, the political influence of the party is, without doubt, great.

The chief mistake of the work of our party on Kuomintang territory is, first and foremost, its sectarianism. In the struggle for a united anti-imperialist front, the Party has not been successful in rallying and using all the anti-imperialist forces: it has not been able flexibly to link up the slogan of the struggle against imperialism with current events; it has not been able to link up the anti-imperialist struggle with the daily demands of the broad masses; it has not been able to use all the legal and semi-legal opportunities which present themselves, it has not been able to give organisational form to its political influence over the masses; it has not been able to re-organise its forces to correspond to the changing situation; it has not paid proper attention to safeguarding its cadres and putting them in their right places.

The resolutions of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, and the appeal of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese Soviet Government to all the people of China concerning the struggle against Japan to save the fatherland, are the chief fundamentals of the whole policy of our party in Kuomintang territory. In our future work on Kuomintang territory we must, first of all, adopt the line which will collect together, strengthen, properly train and make use of all the revolutionary forces available, for a further, more tremendous, and more determined revolutionary struggle; secondly, we must display wide initiative and the maximum activity in setting up a united front with all political groupings, all military units at the front, with mass organisations and individual politicians, and for an all-round struggle, beginning with the struggle for separate daily demands which at first are even of a passive character, and ending with the struggle for the creation of a government of national defence and a united anti-Japanese army; thirdly, we must make the maximum effort to secure the lead of all spontaneous activities, by converting scattered, passive and isolated efforts into more organised, more powerful activities, and securing them the support of the broad masses.

# THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' RED ARMY OF CHINA AS IT IS

By LI HUAN

(Notes of a Political Worker)

THE workers' and peasants' Red Army of China has a brilliant fighting eight years' history. Its heroic struggle, and especially the victories it has gained in battles against the sixth drive of the Kuomintang, as well as the mighty trek of the main forces of the Red Army from Kiangsi province into the West, have attracted the tremendous interest and attention of the whole world.

The Chinese Red Army, unlike the hired Kuomintang militarist army, is wholly built upon the principle of voluntary military service. From top to bottom it is one united whole, inspired with a single aim. Fighting unity, revolutionary class-consciousness, mutual service, the spirit of solidarity is manifested everywhere and in everything. Profound comradely relations exist between the commanders and the men; there are, and can be, no insults, no floggings or jeering at the Red Army men. The Red Army are welded together in boundless loyalty to the struggle for Soviet Power and to save the Chinese people.

The following is the social composition of the Red Army units of the Central Soviet region: \* Workers, 30 per cent.; peasants, 68 per cent., clerks, 1 per cent., others, 1 per cent.; under 16 years of age, 1 per cent.; between 16 and 24, 51 per cent.; between 24 and 40, 44 per cent.; over 40 years, 4 per cent. Of the total, 77 per cent. of the Red Army men are from the Soviet regions, 12 per cent. from Kuomintang China, 4 per cent. from soldiers of the white army, who have mutinied and come over to our side, and 6-7 per cent. prisoners who have voluntarily joined the Red Army.

All the new fighters have preliminary training in the recruits' division. Prisoners are trained in this division for six months, and only then are sent to the front as reinforcements to the regular troops. Usually, the entire local toiling population gather together to see the new fighters off to the front. To bring the older Red Army men closer to the young ones, and ensure that the experience of the former is passed on to the latter, the older men are made the patrons of the young ones: some train the young fighters to shoot at a target,

others teach reading and writing, others still—how to throw hand-grenades, etc.

Of the total composition of the Red Army, 28 per cent. are Communists and 10.6 per cent. are Young Communists.

According to their rank the Communists and Young Communists in the Red Army are distributed as follow:

<i>Of the Communists</i>	<i>Of the Young Communists</i>
27%	20% are commanders
10%	3% are Party workers
40%	60% are rank and file fighters
23%	17% are others (clerks, medical staff, etc.)

From the figures given above, it is clear that the Communist Party plays a leading rôle, in so far as the leading workers are distributed throughout the Red Army.

Tremendous work is carried on in the Red Army as regards the training of cadres. In 1931, a Central Red Army Military-Political School was organised, but later, as the Soviet movement developed and the Red Army became stronger, new educational institutions were established. These include the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Academy, which trains regimental commanders, chiefs of staff, regimental commissars, etc.; the "Huang Gun-Line" infantry school, the "Pyn and Yan" infantry school, a special school to train machine-gunners, artillery men, sappers, and others, a school of communications, medical school, a supply service school, a school for the training of forces for local armed units, a school for training forces for the young guard; moreover, in each military area there is an educational battalion; while each army corps has an educational regiment, and each division has its educational detachment. They all train cadres to be middle and junior officers.

All the commanders—from the company commanders and political leaders to the highest ranks—are trained in the military schools, while squad and platoon commanders are trained in the military detachments. The social composition of the commanders of the Red Army is noticeably improving. Here are some figures on the social composition of the 1st and 6th groups of graduates

\* Data from the Organisational and Statistical Sector of the Political Board of the Red Army of China, for April, 1934.

from the infantry schools in the Red Army (in percentages):

	1st Group of Graduates.	6th Group of Graduates.
Workers ... ..	7.5%	24.4%
Coolies ... ..	50.0%	56.4%
Poor Peasants ...	0.4%	7.2%
Middle Peasants ...	19.0%	4.5%
Others (including intellectuals, teachers, clerks, students)	23.1%	7.5%

Of every hundred Red commanders, beginning with squad commanders and ending with army corps commanders, on the average, 60 are Party members and eleven Young Communists. Among the army corps political workers, 50 per cent. are workers, while 90 per cent. among the political workers are comrades who have undergone special advanced political education.

During the course of the civil war, the Chinese Red Army has forged numerous steeled commanders who are greatly loved by the Red Army men and enjoy the sympathy of the Chinese people. These cadres have covered themselves with glory throughout the world for their militant qualities. Among them are leaders of the Soviets and of the Red Army like Mao Tse-dun, Chu de, Pen De-huai, Ho lun, Hsui Hsian-chiang, Lin Piao, and others. There are thousands of heroes in the Red Army from among the junior commanders and rank-and-file fighters.

Here are a few examples: during the battle waged by the 1st Red Army Corps in Wutsan, Comrade Tsa Lun-shen with eight rank-and-file fighters demolished two companies of the enemy, and Comrade Diu Shi-de alone captured ten rifles. Comrade Chow Van-san, although sick, went into the firing line without a rifle and also captured nine rifles. Comrade Chao Bu-gao, by throwing a hand grenade into one of the enemy's fortified points, demolished an entire squad of the enemy's troops, and captured nine rifles and one Mauser.

When the enemy was attacking the 15th regiment of the 3rd Red Army Corps, which was defending its position in Hulosae, the secretary of the Young Communist nucleus of the 4th company, Comrade Lu Jen-lu led his company into hand-to-hand fighting against the enemy, using his knife and hand grenades. As a result, there were over forty killed and wounded on the enemy's side. Then the company commander was seriously wounded, Comrade Lu Jen-du took his place and declared to the men: "Our company commander is wounded, I will take his place. We shall not retreat as long as we still have a man, rifle and cartridge. We shall die rather than give up our position." As a result the enemy was

wiped out, but our fearless Lu Jen-du perished heroically in action. During this battle, Comrade Lu Bo-shen, of the 5th company, captured two machine-guns and two Mausers from the enemy, single-handed.

During a battle near Huanpo, when the enemy were trying to begin a desperate counter-attack, Comrade Van Fa-hai, assistant commander of the 2nd company of the 7th Red Army corps, hurled himself upon the enemy, sword in hand, and killed eight men. The enemy was thrown back. Comrade Van, though wounded four times, did not leave the line of fire until the political leader of the company forced him to do so.

There are thousands and tens of thousands of heroes like this in the Chinese Red Army. Their names are widely known among the Red Army men and the population of the Soviet regions.

"Our army possesses the same sort of weapons as the Chang Kai-shek troops have at their disposal," declared Comrade Chu-de, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Red Army. These weapons have been captured from the enemy; they were secured at the price of the blood and lives of our courageous fighters. Not a single Red Army man can be found in the ranks of the 1st Red Army to-day using an old-fashioned rifle, or rifles made locally. Every regiment, every division, has infantry rifles of Japanese make, infantry rifles from the Mukden and Hanyan arsenals, artillery guns, light and heavy machine-guns, sub-machine-guns, Mausers, etc.

In 1930, it was the custom in the 3rd corps to award five silver dollars to every Red army-man who captured a rifle in battle, and fifty dollars for the capture of a machine-gun, etc. There were cases for example, of Comrade Yan Min-shen, a fearless fighter of the Red Army, who during one battle captured several rifles; he kept only part of the award he received, and presented the remainder to the mutual aid commission, to the funds established to aid the unemployed, to aid peasants suffering from the results of natural catastrophes, and wounded Red Army men and their families. By the time Changsha was taken, the Red Army was capturing several thousand rifles in each battle, with the result that the men soon demanded that awards should be abolished.

To-day the Red Army is technically on a much higher level, of course, than in 1930; at that time, for example, when we captured Changsha we were unable to make use of the wireless station which fell into our hands. Nevertheless, the Red Army has not sufficient equipment even to-day, and its fighters have not sufficiently mastered the technical side of their work.

\* \* \*

The uniform of the Chinese Red Army has con-

siderably improved of recent years. Individual units of the army are dressed and shod as well as the selected units of Chang Kai-shek's army.

In the spring and autumn, each man wears lined uniform, in the summer, uniform without lining, and in the winter—wadded lining. Moreover, each squad possesses from four to ten quilted or woollen blankets. The type of uniform is similar to the summer uniform of the Red Army men in the Soviet Union: red, green, blue or black collar tips, distinguish the different categories of troops; their caps bear the five-pointed star; on their feet and legs are socks, straw sandals and puttees, and they wear leather belts. When a large number of new Red Army men are recruited, the shortage of uniforms results in some of the men remaining in civilian clothes. When there have been prolonged marches and exhausting battles, there are cases when the Red Army men go into battle barefoot.

The pack carried by each man is as follows: On the left shoulder his flask, a sack of rice (usually two days' ration), two or three pairs of straw sandals, a woollen scarf, and a "hold-all" (containing tooth-brush, tooth-powder, soap, rifle oil, linen, needles and cotton, paint-brush, China ink, song-book, spoon, mug, elementary reading book, some silver money and food); on the right shoulder—cartridge-belt (linen or leather containing 150 cartridges), blanket, rain-hat or umbrella, bag (containing provisions for dinner), gas-mask (in the majority of cases hand-made), knapsack or bag containing two or three changes of clothing, boots, books, etc., knife, spade, axe, one or two hand grenades and rifle. Every man carries about 48 lbs.

The weight carried by a company commander is almost the same as that of the rank-and-file Red Army man, with the addition of a field case (containing notebook, pencil, rubber, scale, compass, map, infantry rules, etc.), binoculars, Mauser, leather cartridge-belt containing 200 cartridges.

The weight carried by battalion commanders and by those in charge of larger units is the same as that carried by company commanders. Many staff commanders have no horses as yet, and carry their things themselves. Formerly, the commanders, beginning with company commanders, had their own orderlies, but this system has been abolished throughout.

During the sixth drive, the Central Soviet Government, with a view to mobilising funds for military expenditure, called on the masses of the workers and peasants of the Soviet regions and Red Army men to economise, and the following ration of food was fixed for the Red Army man: 600 grams of rice, 40 cents for pork or butter, 35-40 cents for other foodstuffs. Thus, the Red Army

men receive better supplies than do those engaged in Soviet and Party organisations in the rear, and considerably better than do the soldiers in the Kuomintang army, although worse than the small partisan detachments and individual small units of the Red Army did. The latter, who carried on most of their operations independently and frequently on Kuomintang territory, would confiscate the property of the tukhao\* and counter-revolutionary leaders, and while distributing the confiscated property among the local population of workers and peasants, would keep a definite portion of it for themselves.

The masses of workers and peasants in the Soviet regions take good care of the Red Army, and supply them with fresh and dried vegetables, pork, fowl, eggs, smoked meat, straw sandals, linen shoes, tooth brushes and tooth powder, hoods, etc. If, during battles, the Red Army succeeds in capturing the enemy quartermaster's supplies, but is unable to carry them away in view of transport difficulties, these supplies are usually distributed among the local population.

The order of the day for the Red Army man is as follows: Reveillé at five o'clock in the morning; then cleaning up; washing, morning roll-call, exercises (callisthenics, gymnastics, sometimes rifle-drill, marching, singing), every morning military drill and mountain climbing are obligatory; breakfast at 7.30 and at eight o'clock studies (military or political); at twelve o'clock studies end, then dinner follows, newspapers are read, and rest; from two to six o'clock, gymnastics or field studies (if there are gymnastics in the morning, then studies, after mid-day, and vice versa). After this they return home, have supper, rest and set out for evening roll-call. The Red Army men have three meals a day. Collective walks are often arranged, the men meet the local population, there are Red Army evenings of questions and answers on political subjects, and other meetings.

Every Saturday after dinner, the Red Army men clean their rifles or hold physical culture competitions. Some of the Red Army men help to cultivate the fields, bringing the harvest, or collect fuel, for the families of other Red Army men. The political department of the unit, together with those working in the local Soviet bodies and Commissions for providing special facilities for the families of Red Army men, establish the number of families of Red Army men in the given locality, the size of the land they hold, the labour power required to assist them, the amount of agricultural implements and cattle at their disposal, the situation of the various plots, and make investigations

\* Tukhao—big peasants, the capitalists of the countryside.

regarding families who have no fuel, whose supply of drinking water is inadequate, and whose houses need repairing. After all these points have been investigated in detail, the Political Department explains to the men the importance of the work of granting facilities to families of Red Army men, and invites the men to sign on voluntarily to do this work. After which, the Red Army men take with them a supply of food, gather together in the Commission for providing special facilities to families of Red Army men, and then set out accompanied by children or old people, to the addresses indicated; there they cultivate the gardens of the families of the Red Army men, others go into the fields to till the soil, to do weeding, or to collect the harvest. Some of the Red Army men repair the houses. Generally, the Red Army men enter into socialist competition to see who best and quickest can perform the work. The work is done to the accompaniment of singing folk or revolutionary songs. Here is a verse from one of the favourite songs of the Young Communists: "The Song of the Young Communist subbotnik."\*

We, Young Communists, are out for a subbotnik,  
The farms of the Red Army men to help cultivate.

In severe fighting in the revolutionary war,  
We give of our best at the front and in the rear,  
Felling our enemies with bullets well-aimed,  
That our fighters be not troubled at the thought of native heath;

Plough ye, and hoe—in the service of the Soviets!  
Lively, then, to work, let no one lag behind!

In the fields, the men work with the same energy with which they hurl themselves into the attack against the enemy under fire. While the men work spiritedly to the strains of their songs, the women from the families of the Red Army men bring tea and nuts. Here is one of the popular songs of the women:

Listen here, brother Red Army man,  
Come to the river bank and talk.  
Let us drink tea and eat our nuts,  
Your wearied muscles will gain new strength.  
'Tis true, you fight the enemy fearlessly.  
Brother Red Army man!  
Victory to the Revolution, speed on!

When their work is finished, the Red Army men have to report to their political leaders on the work they have done (frequently, political workers, including even divisional commissars themselves take part in the work). The names of the men who show the best results are placed on the Red board of honour, and this stimulates activity among the men as regards helping the families of Red Army men.

\* Subbotnik—A day of Voluntary Labour.—Ed.

On Sundays some of the old fighters help the Young Guards' detachments by engaging in field operations with them, teaching them to shoot, to undertake patrol duty and scouting, and show them how to build anti-gas shelters or to undertake sanitary and hygiene measures (cleaning the streets, etc.).

\* \* \*

The political and cultural work in the Red Army is conducted exclusively under the leadership of the political departments.

There is a Lenin Corner in each of the primary units (company, detachment, headquarters), where the most varied circles are organised.

According to the rules, the weight of the equipment of the Lenin Corner for each company must not exceed 55lbs. After prolonged marches or battles, frequently only half of the property of the Red Corner is left. Sometimes it all has had to be left behind, since everything has to be carried on the backs of the men. Usually the following books are to be found in the Red Corner: "The Communist Manifesto," Lenin: "Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder," "The State and Revolution," "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism"; Stalin: "On the Opposition" and "Questions of Leninism," the most important decisions of the Communist Party of China, the Fundamental Laws and Decisions of the Soviets, the Five-Year Plan of Socialist Construction in the U.S.S.R., the most important reports and resolutions of the C.P.S.U., the infantry rules of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of the U.S.S.R., and a number of other books and newspapers as well as portraits of Lenin, Stalin, Voroshilov, Mao Tse-dun, Chu de. Various musical instruments, etc., are also to be found there.

It is required of every Red Army man that he takes part in at least one circle. The majority of the Lenin Corners have achieved this. Choir circles are particularly popular in the Red Army. Even when in action, songs are sung, provided they are not detrimental to the needs of camouflage. These songs make a great impression upon the soldiers of the white army. Here are two songs of this kind:

#### Red Army Song.

Comrades, hasten to battle! Worker and Peasant Fighters are we!

Boldly, to the storm, the Kuomintang to overthrow,

Away, too, with the yoke of the foul imperialists,  
So we a union of Soviet lands may build.

Death holds no terrors, for Red fighters all are we.

Victory awaits us,  
Victory shall be ours,

In the final battle of the world revolution!

### Song of Those On to the Front.

Rumble of cannon, the watchword of struggle . .  
In the morning, decisive battle.  
Armed for the battle, the young guard is off to  
to front  
In the self-sacrificing struggle we will lay down  
our heads, and shed warm blood!

Every illiterate man has first of all to learn three hieroglyphics: "da-chun-fyn" (To the Storm!).

The Red Army men write up or paste up this battle-cry, even when on the march or in the trenches.

It is characteristic that of the young men who came into the army for the first time in January, 1934, and who joined with the next detachments of recruits, each knew an average of twenty hieroglyphics. A month later they all knew over fifty.

Sometimes there are not enough brushes, paper and China ink. But each man then takes a stick and writes the hieroglyphics on the ground. Every literate Red Army man must write three posters or slogans daily. Chalk or charcoal is used for this. The posters are drawn on the walls or on boards or bamboo tablets. While on the march, bamboo boards, bearing posters and slogans are fixed on both sides of the road, at a distance of not more than 120 yards apart; slogans are also written on the trees, or picked out in small stones. If the units of the Red Army are situated on the banks of a river, and the units of the white army are situated lower down, the slogans are written in large numbers on wooden boards and sent floating down stream. The enemy soldiers draw in the wood for fuel, and so read these slogans, despite the fact that their officers prohibit and punish anyone caught reading them. This is one of the most widespread forms of agitation.

The Red Army teaches its men to read and write, steels them in the struggle against the white armies, educates the Red Army men in the spirit of loyalty to the Soviet Government and the Communist Party. Dozens of important army commanders and political workers have grown up and received their education in the ranks of the Red Army. For example, Comrade Siun Huai-chow, Chief of Staff of the 7th Red Army Corps, was a pioneer when he joined the Red Army and knew very few hieroglyphics. During his eight years in the Red Army, Comrade Hsiun Huai-chow advanced from assistant squad commander to squadron commander, then to the position of company commander, battalion, regimental and divisional commander, and is now chief of the headquarters' staff of the army corps. He displayed courage, wisdom and energy in battle on several

occasions, acquired a wealth of fighting experience, and grew up and became strong politically. The Central Revolutionary Military Council entrusted him with the leadership of the valiant fighters of the 7th Red Army Corps during the trek northwards for purposes of defence against the Japanese. In August, 1934, he surrounded the provincial town of Fukien and then marched into the heart of the country, to the regions of Szechwan and Anhwei, where he perished heroically in battle against the troops of Chang Kai-shek. Then there is Comrade Shao Hua, who is divisional commander. He also came to the Red Army from a pioneer detachment, and hardly knew any hieroglyphics. Now he is a leading Red Army worker.

A number of newspapers are published in the Red Army, including *Red China*, *The Red Star*, *The Young Truth*, *Struggle*, and *The Soviet Worker*. There are, in addition, corps newspapers and divisional bulletins. The newspapers are read in circles arranged in the units. Almost all the Red Army men who have been in the Red Army for three months or more, can read the newspapers independently. There is one newspaper correspondent to every company, who sends items concerning the life of the company when in action, its work among the local population, etc., to the corps newspaper or the *Red Star*.

There is a pretty wide network of dramatic circles and physical culture circles in the Army. Special training in climbing mountains, throwing hand-grenades, crossing a log bridge, jumping barriers, ditches, etc., is of great practical importance.

Hand-grenades are thrown a distance of up to 140 feet, and some men even up to 180 feet. Red Army units were successful in one part of Juchen in surrounding over 800 men from Hu Fan-chang's regiment. The enemy had taken up their position in a temple with very thick walls, and defended themselves stubbornly. The battle lasted for thirty-six hours (one day and two nights). Finally, Van, one of the squad commanders, was selected to stand at the edge of the moat and throw three hand-grenades at the windows of the temple. Several dozen of the enemy troops were wounded, and the remainder threw down their arms. Another example was during the siege of the town of Lean by the 3rd Red Army Corps, when Comrade Huan Hun-fyn, from Company No. 1, took eight hand-grenades with him, ran up to the wall of the enemy fortifications, tied the hand-grenades into a bundle and threw them into the embrasure. The enemy suffered many losses in killed and wounded, and Huan Hun-fyn, using an automatic rifle, seized

the fortifications with the help of a few other Red Army men.

\* \* \*

It is truly impossible to describe the love which the toiling masses feel for the Red Army. When the Red Army undertake marches across Soviet territory in the hot weather, men and women, old and young, line the roads and warmly greet the men, singing songs, dancing, and bringing them tea, warm food and fruit.

Groups of women, young and old, patch the clothes of the Red Army men, wash their linen, and prepare their food. When in action the local toiling population do much of the scouting for the Red Army, provide it with guides and bearers, help to discover the leaders of local counter-revolutionary groups, confiscate their property, etc. For example, immediately upon the arrival of the Red Army units in Jucheng (South Hunan), the local population set about capturing counter-revolutionary leaders whom they brought to the Red Army unit, at the same time confiscating their property and distributing it among themselves.

The local population take care of the sick men left behind by the Red Army units until they have completely recovered, or carry them on stretchers in the train of their units. In the Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi region, and in many other parts, the local people themselves eat millet and put aside the white rice for the Red Army. When the Red Army units arrive, they bring the rice to the men.

\* \* \*

How does the Red Army of China treat its prisoners?

All prisoners, rank-and-file and officers, are disarmed and their documents confiscated, and marched away under convoy of armed Red Army soldiers. The ordinary soldiers and junior officers are allowed to live freely within definite boundaries. The Red Army men conduct political work among the prisoners. In April, 1933, the 2nd, 54th and 59th divisions of the enemy's troops were routed, and over 20,000 men were taken prisoners. It was essential at the same time to prepare a blow against another group of enemy troops. We therefore selected one man to manage supplies and another to be responsible for the

military and political leadership of each 200 prisoners, and despatched them to the Soviet regions to study in the recruits' division. Every prisoner taken with a rifle was at the same time given five dollars, and every wounded prisoner, eight dollars. Every prisoner was given the choice of joining the Red Army or returning home, money being set aside for the journey. The Commander of the 59th enemy division, Chen Shi-Yi, and the Brigade Commanders, Chow Shi-da, Pen Ben-jen and Go Yan-tsun, who had been taken prisoners, remained in the Red Army as teachers. Many white army soldiers did not want to return home and asked to be left in the Red Army. In spite of all the systematic demagoguery carried on by the militarists, who call the Red Army men bandits, and spread foul calumnies about how the Red Army men cut out the hearts of every white army soldier who hands over his weapons, these soldiers are becoming more and more convinced by actual experience that the Red Army is their real liberator.

\* \* \*

Leagues for the struggle against imperialism and in defence of the Soviet Union exist in the Red Army units, all the men being members of this League.

Every member of the League must fulfil certain duties; he must carry on propaganda among the masses, and extend the organisation of the League; help the masses living in non-Soviet regions, organise anti-Japanese committees and anti-Japanese volunteer detachments, collect money to help those who take part in anti-imperialist strikes. The members of the League pay a monthly subscription of two tunzers\* into the fund for covering the cost of anti-imperialist work. The task of the League is to muster all armed forces and fight against Japanese imperialism in order to win territorial integrity for China and freedom and independence for the Chinese people.

Under the strong leadership of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese Red Army has become a great and invincible force which enjoys the sympathy and support of the whole Chinese people and has at its disposal courageous, fearless fighters who will fulfil the task which the Party has entrusted to them.

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\* Coppers.

# THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST UNITED FRONT IN MANCHURIA

By YAN SUN.

The Occupation of Manchuria and the Anti-Japanese National Liberation Movement.

**F**OR a period of four years of occupation, the masses of the Chinese people who inhabit Manchuria have been subjected to unheard-of colonial oppression. The Chinese people are waging a just national defensive struggle. The Japanese invaders stigmatise the struggle of the Chinese for their national independence as a "hun-huz"\* movement, and under this pretext cruelly suppress the defensive struggle of the masses. The Japanese robbers use tanks and heavy guns against the partisan detachments and the peaceful population, and bombard towns and villages from the air. The system of collective responsibility is practised on all sides, and peaceful citizens are deprived of the right to move freely from place to place.

The working-class are subjected to two-fold oppression: exploitation at the hands of the capitalists and national-colonial oppression at the hands of the invaders.

The Chinese soldiers in the Manchukuo army are in constant terror of being shot.

Not infrequently the Japanese invaders rape Chinese girls and women, and the victims of such barbarian violence are compelled in the majority of cases to remain silent for fear their near ones will be cruelly punished.

Children are buried alive in the ground before the eyes of their parents for being "connected with the hunhuz." At the cross-roads and on hoardings hang the victims of the Japanese occupation—the heads of the best fighters for the cause of national liberation.

The ferocious acts of Japanese imperialism in Manchuria have evoked a colossal indignation and resistance among the Chinese masses. Very wide masses are directly and indirectly brought into the anti-Japanese struggle. In spite of the fact that the Japanese imperialists maintain an army of occupation in Manchuria of over 100,000 men, armed according to the last word of modern military technique (aviation, tanks and armoured cars) and possessing modern means of transport, they have not only not succeeded in wiping out the anti-Japanese partisan movement, but they are not even able to check its growth.

New anti-Japanese partisan detachments are constantly being formed, relations between the

partisans and the population are improving, while the military and political leadership of the partisans is gathering strength. There are over 100,000 men to-day in different anti-Japanese partisan detachments. The social composition and organisational forms adopted by these partisan detachments are very varied. Anti-Japanese societies and political departments have already been organised in some detachments. Many thousands of partisans are now under the influence of the Communist Party of China.

THE CHIEF WEAKNESS OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL-LIBERATION MOVEMENT IS THAT NO WIDE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED PEOPLE'S FRONT HAS YET BEEN ORGANISED: The detachments are extremely scattered, there is no united military-political leadership, the discontent of the masses has not yet developed into anti-Japanese action on a wide scale, and the existing anti-Japanese forces are still not in a position to drive the imperialists out of Manchuria.

Under these circumstances, therefore, the tactics of the Communist Party of China in Manchuria ARE TO SET UP A BROAD ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED FRONT TO INCLUDE ALL THE PEOPLE, TO GIVE BETTER TRAINING TO THE MASSES, TO ACCUMULATE FORCES, TO MAINTAIN AND EXTEND THE ANTI-JAPANESE DETACHMENTS, AND TO TRAIN MILITARY-POLITICAL CADRES FOR THE COMING STRUGGLE.

The Anti-Japanese United Front in Manchuria.

The anti-Japanese united front covers not only the working-class, the peasantry and the urban petty-bourgeoisie, but also includes a considerable section of the national bourgeoisie and part of the landlords.

How are we to explain the fact that a considerable section of the national bourgeoisie and part of the landlords are participating in the anti-Japanese liberation movement to-day? By the fact that the national trade and industry of China in Manchuria are being squeezed out on all sides by Japanese finance capital, and that Chinese national capital is threatened with being completely seized by Japanese imperialism. A section of the landlords are expressing the discontent they feel towards the Japanese invaders because the latter are depriving them of the documents giving them the right to cultivate the land, and are transferring them to Japanese military settlers, and because they make the landlords give up their weapons. For example, the Japanese

\* More correctly "hung-hutze": Brigands.

invaders have deprived the landlords and peasants in 7 counties in the north-east province of Kirin and in the counties close to Harbin, of the documents giving them the right to cultivate the land. Before the Manchurian events, 1 san\* of land cost 150-200 dollars, and to-day the Japanese invaders are forcing its sale at 28 dollars per san, and fallow lands, suitable for sowing, at 3 dollars a san. This rapacious policy is causing tremendous discontent both among the peasants and among the landlords. This, in particular, explains the armed anti-Japanese uprising which broke out in the spring of 1934, under the leadership of Se Vendun in Yinan, Boli, and other countries.

At present the Chinese bourgeoisie and landlords do not want to become the colonial slaves of Japan, and are striving to win back all that they have lost as a result of the occupation of Chinese territory. And so, in spite of the fact that they are allies, who are not trustworthy and are always wavering—for the Chinese national bourgeoisie and the landlords† will of course try to restore their positions and obtain the monopoly to exploit the masses of workers and peasants, as soon as the army of occupation has been driven out of Manchuria—the Communists are prepared at the present time to conclude an agreement with them for joint resistance to the Japanese invaders.

A spontaneous anti-Japanese national movement has been developing for several years in Manchuria. As far back as during the armed defence of Shanghai, in the Spring of 1932, an anti-Japanese national-liberation movement broke out in Manchuria. At that time already General Ma Chansan raised the banner of the struggle against Japan in the province of Heilungkiang, and his call to arms against Japan mustered tens of thousands of students and workers, peasants and petty-traders, who joined the volunteer anti-Japanese detachments. In December, 1932, Van De Lin raised the banner of the struggle against Japan and organised an "army to save the Fatherland" in Eastern Manchuria. At that time he had only one battalion at his disposal, but six months later his army numbered over 80,000 men and occupied over 13 counties in the eastern part of the Kirin province. General Tan Tsi-wu raised the banner of the struggle against Japan in South Manchuria; six months later he already had an army of several thousand men, and his detachments were in occupation of over 20 counties in the Eastern part of Mukden province. At the same time the peas-

\* 1 San = 10 mu. 1 mu =  $\frac{1}{3}$  acre.

† The Chinese merchant bourgeoisie and part of the landowners, state officials and militarists are now on the side of the Japanese invaders, since their interests coincide.

ants, workers, traders, sons of landlords and even peasant women and children joined the anti-Japanese detachments *en masse*. This was indeed an anti-Japanese national-liberation movement on a truly national scale, and was of a spontaneous character. Despite the fact that in the beginning of the Manchurian events, the Central Committee pointed to the necessity of launching a national-revolutionary war to drive out the Japanese imperialists, the leading organs of the Communist Party in Manchuria prematurely issued the slogan of the establishment of Soviets and the organisation of a Red Army, denied the need for establishing a common anti-Japanese united front, and did not fight to convert the spontaneous movement of the masses into a conscious anti-Japanese national movement having its own clear political programme. As a result, a section of our Party organisations became circumscribed propagandist groups, isolated from the masses. The partisan detachments (numbering over a thousand men) in the county of Bayan (Heilungkiang province) under the leadership of the "Left" sectarians, suffered defeat.

It was only after the receipt of the letter dated January 26, 1933, containing instructions from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, that the Party organisations began to correct their "Left" sectarian mistakes and to build up a broad anti-Japanese front.

#### The Partisan Detachments in South Manchuria.

In the county of Banshin (South Manchuria) before the receipt of the letter from the Central Committee, partisan detachments were in existence which called themselves "the Red Partisan Detachments of the 32d Corps of the Chinese Red Army." But these detachments did not set up a united anti-Japanese front with other anti-Japanese volunteer detachments which were led by the Kuomintang, or with the anti-Japanese "hunhuz." In fact the relations existing between these detachments and ours were very strained: they even went so far as armed conflicts and a number of detachments were demolished. When the Japanese army and the Manchukuo troops attacked our detachments, the anti-Japanese volunteer detachments and the "hunhuz" gave us no support. Consequently our detachments were isolated and the operations they undertook were extremely difficult.

However, from the moment that the letter was received from the Central Committee, and Bei Yan and Yan Tsi-yui arrived from Inner China in the summer of 1933, and explained the Party's new line of tactics, the partisan detachments began to build up a common front with the volunteer

detachments and the "hunhuz," and also to undertake the formation of a general staff of the anti-Japanese united army. Thanks to the partial realisation of the united front, our detachments not only repulsed the punitive expedition sent against them in the winters of 1933 and 1934, but also increased in numerical strength. New partisan detachments grew up, and our detachments became the 1st corps of the People's Revolutionary Army of Manchuria. To-day this army has 2 divisions, and carries on partisan operations in over 20 counties in the Eastern part of the Mukden province. The Commander of the 1st corps is our beloved comrade and national hero, Yan Tsin-yui.

#### The Partisan Detachments to the East of Harbin.

Because of the sectarian mistakes committed by Comrade Chang Shan-shi and other leaders, the partisan detachments in the county of Bayan suffered defeat in 1932. After this Comrade Chang Shan-shi joined the anti-Japanese detachment of Sen Caho-yan in the county of Juhe. First he was a rank-and-file partisan, but after the death of Sen Chao-yan, Comrade Shan-si took over the leadership of the detachment. At first there were only 11 men in the detachment, but as a result of the fact that Chang Shan-shi made contacts with the local Party organisation and pursued the line of the Central Committee, his detachment grew to 6,000 in the course of a year, and in the summer of 1934, it captured the county town of Binsan, the town of Fanchi and other towns in the Kirin province.

How are we to explain the defeat of Chang Shan-si in Bayan and his victory in Juhe? The only explanation is that in Bayan he did not fight to set up a united anti-Japanese front, while in Juhe he succeeded in forming a united anti-Japanese front, fought together with the masses, took over the leadership of the masses, and in the course of the struggle against the Japanese showed himself to be a real national hero; this is also the explanation of his victory in Juhe. All the anti-Japanese partisan detachments in the regions to the East of Harbin have now been formed into the 3rd corps of the People's Revolutionary Army, the Commander of which is Comrade Chang Shan-shi, who enjoys great popularity.

#### The Partisan Regions in the Eastern Parts of the Kirin Province.

Ever since the Manchurian events in January, 1933, the Eastern part of the Kirin province has been the base of the self-defence army under General Li Du, and of Van De-lin's "Army for the Salvation of the Fatherland." In this region favourable conditions had been created for extend-

ing the anti-Japanese partisan movement. But actually it had not been possible to set up the anti-Japanese united front there, and a number of local Party organisations and individual leading comrades even hindered the united front. Our comrade, Commander Chang Bao-chun joined the "army for the salvation of the fatherland" and very rapidly won enormous authority for himself. There was not a single soldier in the "army for the salvation of the fatherland" who did not know him personally. Comrade Chang Bao-chun led more than 5,000 men. Was it right for him to take part in the "Army for the salvation of the fatherland"? There can be no doubt that it was right. It was the line of the Central Committee of our Party. We must form the united front with the troops of Van De-lin, from the top and from below. However, "wiseacres" were to be found in the ranks of our Party who accused Chang Bao-chun of Right opportunism and bureaucratism. Chang Bao-chun left the "army for the salvation of the fatherland" and as a result a split occurred between our detachments and those under the command of Wu Ni-chen and Kun San-chun. The "Left" sectarians considered the existence of a general staff headquarters of the united anti-Japanese army to be superfluous, and regarded it as a "combination from above." The united anti-Japanese front which was already established, was broken down. It was only in the summer of 1934 that the leading Party bodies corrected these leftist mistakes and once more restored the anti-Japanese united front, and six months later our anti-Japanese partisan detachments increased tenfold and more. The struggle against the Japanese punitive expedition in the winter of 1934 and the spring of 1935 has shown that the anti-Japanese volunteer detachments and the anti-Japanese "hunhuz" as re-organised by us act in a united anti-Japanese front, not in mere words, but on the field of battle, that they fight shoulder to shoulder with us against the Japanese invaders. The hostility and misunderstanding which previously existed between our detachments and other anti-Japanese detachments are completely eliminated to-day. All the anti-Japanese partisan detachments (the volunteer army, the "army for the salvation of the fatherland," the anti-Japanese "hunhuz" and our own detachments) have all united on the common basis of the anti-Japanese united front, and have thus formed the 5th corps of the Anti-Japanese army, the commander of which is Comrade Chang Bao-chun.

It was in approximately the same way that the 4th Corps of the anti-Japanese united army was formed in East Kirin, but here also serious sectarian mistakes were made.

Regulations governing admission to the army were too strict: all persons who were not workers or peasants were expelled from the army. Instead of using methods of persuasion and education, disciplinary measures, alone were adopted towards partisan opium-smokers. Instead of taking steps to solve the most difficult, most complicated tasks of the present stage of the anti-Japanese national movement, attempts were made to jump over the present stage of the development of the revolutionary movement. Instead of building up an anti-Japanese people's revolutionary army, an attempt was made to form the army on the same principle as the Red Army.

It was only after the "Left" sectarian mistakes had been corrected in December, 1934, that the anti-Japanese united front began to be restored here. In the winter of 1934 and spring of 1935 all the anti-Japanese partisan detachments were reorganised into the 4th Corps of the anti-Japanese united army, a general staff for the 4th Corps was set up, and Comrade Li Yan-lau appointed to the post of commander of the corps. In September, 1935, units of the 4th corps together with units of the 5th corps of the anti-Japanese army by their joint efforts captured Linkow—one of the military bases of the Japanese army in East Kirin. This fact shows that in the less than one year that it existed, the 4th corps not only grew numerically (6 to 7 times), but also raised its fighting efficiency.

Besides the 4th and 5th corps, the newly formed 6th corps of the anti-Japanese army operates in the Eastern part of the Kirin province, led by Commander De Ven-dun, leader of the peasant uprising in the region of the lower waters of the river Sungari.

#### The Partisan Detachments in Eastern Manchuria, "Tsandao."

The Party organisations in Eastern Manchuria pursued a "Left" sectarian line, mechanically applying the experiences of work in the Soviet regions of China to Eastern Manchuria and formed Soviets and Red partisan detachments, and even organised "collective farms" on the principle of "joint labour and equal distribution." This Leftist line put a check upon the development of the partisan movement in 1932 and in the spring of 1933. However, after the receipt of the letter of the Central Committee of the C.P. of China dated January 26, 1933, the Red partisan detachments began to be reorganised into a people's revolutionary army, and the anti-Japanese united front was partially established. As a result, the anti-Japanese partisan detachments increased in numbers, their fighting power increased, and the region over which they carried on their operations

increased. However, in the autumn of 1934, the anti-Japanese detachments in Eastern Manchuria split once more into two camps: one camp was the people's revolutionary army (consisting chiefly of Koreans), the units of the anti-Japanese volunteer army, and the anti-Japanese "hunhuz" who were under the influence of the Communist Party: the other camp consisted of volunteer detachments and the anti-Japanese "hunhuz" (the detachments of Wu Ni-chen, Kun San-yun, Pin Er-tsiun, Chung Ho, Lao Tsin-chang, and others), who were under the influence of the Kuomintang. Hostility existed between these two camps, which even went as far as armed conflicts. This objectively helped Japanese imperialism and isolated our detachments.

In the spring of 1935, the Party organisations in Eastern Manchuria began to correct their Leftist mistakes and to restore the anti-Japanese united front. As a result, the Japanese punitive expedition in the spring and summer of 1935 was repulsed, and the region over which partisans carried on their operations was extended. The 2nd corps of the People's Revolutionary Army under the command of Comrade Van de-tai is operating in this region.

#### For the Consolidation and Extension of the People's Anti-Japanese United Front.

The new line of tactics indicated in the letter of the C.C. of the C.P. of China is being resisted by the "Left" sectarians. They reject the united front from above, they object to the formation of a united general staff along with other anti-Japanese detachments, on the grounds that only after the united front has been formed from below can the united front from above be created. They set the united front from above against the united front from below, failing to understand that there must be a combination of the united front both from below and from above.

Instead of bringing to the forefront slogans directed against Japanese imperialism, the "Left" sectarians advance the slogan of "confiscation of the lands of the landlords" before the time is ripe, and in the partisan regions of the Chuchow county the slogan of "equal distribution of the land." The relations existing between our peoples' revolutionary army and a section of the volunteer detachments and the anti-Japanese "hunhuz" (the detachments under Van Fyn-go, Lao Chan-tsin, under the influence of the Kuomintang) have not been regulated in the partisan regions of South Manchuria, and an armed conflict is even possible between them.

Our Party must exert itself to the utmost in order to consolidate and extend the anti-Japanese united front which has already partially been set

up at once, and to overcome the resistance of the "Left" sectarians, and at the same time to forestall the danger of Right opportunism.

The already existing 1st, 2nd and 3rd corps of the people's revolutionary army, must, on the basis of the new line of tactics of the C.C. of our party, unite all anti-Japanese partisan detachments (such as, for instance, the volunteer detachments, the "army for the salvation of the fatherland," the self-defence army, the detachments of the anti-Japanese "hunhuz," and others), irrespective of what parties the members of these detachments belong to, or their convictions, professions, place of birth, nationalities, etc.

#### The Establishment of the Anti-Japanese United Front in the Towns.

During the four years of the occupation by the Japanese we have acquired greater experience in the establishment of the armed anti-Japanese united front among the partisan detachments than in the establishment of the united front in the industrial centres. The work of our Party in the towns is our weak spot.

We must carry on work in all the legal and semi-legal organisations, and use these organisations to defend the economic and political interests of the masses and as a covering for our illegal anti-Japanese work.

In the industrial centres, the Party must, on the one hand, muster its forces to establish the united front of the working-class and trade union unity, and, on the other hand, must carry on work among the urban petty-bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, and the national bourgeoisie and try to bring them into the united anti-Japanese front. With this end in view, the Party must put forward demands which correspond to the interests of these sections of the population (the struggle against the compulsory study of the Japanese language, against the prohibition of the teaching of the history and geography of China, against the restrictions put upon Chinese trade and industry and in defence of free trade for Chinese traders).

What characterises the sentiments of the urban petty-bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and the traders is that, on the one hand, these people hate Japanese domination, and on the other hand, they are very much afraid of the "hunhuz," and tremble for the safety of their lives and property. We must show these sections of the population that it is the Japanese invaders who are a menace to their lives and property, while the anti-Japanese armies are defending them and guarantee immunity to their property and their lives. If the anti-Japanese partisans behave in precisely this way when they capture towns, this will help

us to build up the anti-Japanese front in the towns.

#### The Establishment of the Anti-Japanese United Front in the Villages, and Our Tactics as Regards the System of All-Round Responsibility.

The Japanese invaders, as is known, operate the system of all-round responsibility ("baotsia") in the villages of Manchuria. Why is this done? Firstly, in order to create local armed detachments in every "tsia" and every region, which on the pretext of combatting the "hunhuz," kill their own compatriots; secondly, to deprive the village population of freedom of movement and choice of dwelling-place, and thus to establish an exact record of the population, thus making it difficult for the local inhabitants to make contacts with the anti-Japanese partisans, and to join the partisan detachments, and so to help isolate the anti-Japanese partisans from the population; thirdly, to concentrate the population of mountainous and forest regions in big villages, and thus try to make it difficult for the partisans to obtain food supplies.

What tactics do the Communists advance to counter these tactics of the Japanese robbers? Our tactics are to establish the anti-Japanese united front and ISOLATE the Japanese invaders in the village. With this end in view, we must adhere to the tactics of neutrality or alliance with the local armed detachments, and on no account regard them as our enemies as we do the Japanese army. It must not be forgotten that the local armed detachments were set up by force by the Japanese invaders after the Manchurian events. The soldiers in these detachments, and even some of the commanders are not people who are loyal to the Japanese. They are loyal peasants and sons of kulaks who have no desire at all to become the colonial slaves of Japan, and consequently display extremely little activity in the struggle against the anti-Japanese partisans. The slogan we offer to them should be: "Chinese must not kill Chinese, but should get together to resist the Japanese invaders," or "The anti-Japanese army is only directed against the Japanese invaders and does not fight against the local armed detachments." If some members of a local armed detachment refuse to enter into an alliance with us, or even to observe neutrality, but, on the contrary, fight against us or fight side by side with

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\* This system divides the population of the villages into groups, at whose head people are placed, appointed by the police. The tsia is the most elementary organisation, composed of 10 families headed by a Tsiachau who is appointed by the district or country police office. A Pao is composed of 10 Tsias headed by a Paochang who is appointed.

the Japanese troops against us, we must enter into an alliance with or maintain neutrality towards the other part of the local armed detachment, in order to concentrate our forces and destroy these reactionary forces. Tactics of this kind will undoubtedly meet with sympathy and support among the broad masses.

**The Anti-Japanese United Front of the People and the Manchukuo Army.**

Can we regard the Manchukuo Army as our mortal enemy as we do the Japanese army? No, certainly not.

First, the Chinese soldiers in the Manchukuo army are subjected to two-fold oppression: on the one hand, the oppression of the Chinese officers, on the other—the oppression of the Japanese officers and military advisers; moreover, in existing circumstances, the Japanese advisers even restrict the rights of the Chinese officers, and keep a check on all their actions. In consequence of this, not only the Chinese soldiers, but even some of the Chinese officers are filled with hatred for the Japanese invaders.

Secondly, a large part of the Manchukuo army is composed of the old armies of Chang Suie-lan and even of the former anti-Japanese self-defence armies, the “army for the salvation of the fatherland,” anti-Japanese detachments, “hunhuz,” etc.

Thirdly, the development of the anti-Japanese national-liberation movement is evoking the sympathy and support of the Chinese soldiers and some of the officers in the Manchukuo army.

Hence our general tactics towards the Manchukuo army are to draw the Chinese soldiers and some of the officers into the people's anti-Japanese united front as far as possible. In this connection, the Communists put forward the following slogans for the Manchukuo army: “The anti-Japanese army is not composed of ‘hunhuz,’ but represents a real army fighting against Japanese imperialism for the salvation of the fatherland,” “Chinese must not kill Chinese,” “the anti-Japanese army is only fighting against the Japanese invaders, and is not fighting against Chinese soldiers.”

**The Anti-Japanese United People's Front and the Chinese Youth.**

The attitude of the Japanese invaders in Manchuria is one of special hatred towards the Chinese youth. The essence of their policy towards the Chinese youth in Manchuria amounts to the following: on the one hand, they mercilessly annihilate and kill the anti-Japanese national revolutionary youth; on the other, they do their utmost to try to split and demoralise the Chinese youth, in order to smash the anti-Japanese united

front of the youth. Thus, for example, the Japanese are forming “The Manchukuo Youth Alliance,” a “Manchukuo Boy Scout” organisation, they spread the fascist racial theory, the “pan-asiatic” theory, etc. Besides this, they organise opium dens, and brothels, and do their utmost to try to draw the Chinese youth away from the struggle and demoralise them.

During the four years of the occupation by the Japanese, the Chinese Young Communist League has taken an active part in the anti-Japanese national movement. Volunteer detachments of the Chinese youth have been formed in the partisan regions of South and East Manchuria, in Chuhow. The youth detachments, side by side with the adult partisans, have been fighting against Japanese invaders, having been fighting for national independence and the unification of the Chinese people. However, despite certain individual successes in Manchuria, it has not yet been possible to form an anti-Japanese united front of the youth. The Y.C.L. organisations, with the exception of a number of partisan regions, represent narrow sectarian Communist groups which are still divorced from the masses. The Y.C.L. is an exact replica of the Party in its methods of work and in its structure.

The Chinese Y.C.L. in Manchuria must be radically reconstructed on the basis of the new line of Party tactics and the decisions of the Sixth Congress of the Y.C.L.

The Y.C.L. must cease to be a narrow Communist group divorced from the masses, and become an anti-Japanese, national-revolutionary non-Party mass organisation of the youth. In other words, broad sections of the young workers and peasants, and also of the petty-bourgeois patriotic elements and all the anti-Japanese elements, must be drawn into the League.

A new programme is already being drawn up on the basis of this new line, and the Manchurian Young Communists have already begun to form a broad anti-Japanese united front along with all anti-Japanese youth organisations.

**The Anti-Japanese United People's Front and the Chinese Women.**

The Chinese women in Manchuria are subjected to two-fold oppression, namely, semi-feudal oppression and national-colonial oppression of Japan. The Japanese invaders force the Chinese student girls in Harbin to arrange “liaisons” with the Japanese army, in spite of the protests of the girls themselves and of their parents. The women in this province are frequently violated by the Japanese troops. Moreover, the Chinese women in Manchuria still suffer from the old marriage system of the “purchase and sale” of wives.

Four years' of experience of the struggle against the Japanese occupation has shown that the women have played, and still play, a big rôle in the anti-Japanese national-liberation movement. We must use all our efforts to bring the women into the anti-Japanese united people's front, by fighting against the insults and violation practised by the Japanese invaders, and the Manchukuo troops ("the army of pacification"), and on behalf of respect of human rights for Chinese women.

#### The Anti-Japanese United People's Front and the National Minorities in Manchuria.

The essence of the Japanese policy towards the national minorities (Koreans, Manchurians, Mongolians) is to break down the united anti-Japanese front between the Chinese people and the national minorities, to deprive the Chinese people and the national minorities of mutual support in their common struggle against Japanese imperialism. The Japanese invaders incite the national minorities to fight against the Chinese people.

In Tsindao, the Japanese invaders cynically declare that they are the defenders of the Koreans in Manchuria, that the aim which the Japanese army pursues in occupying Manchuria, is to free the Koreans from the yoke of the Chinese militarist, Chang Siue-lan, and they put forward the slogan of "creating a Korean national autonomous region in Tsindao."

What should our Party's policy be in relation to the national minorities in Manchuria?

Two and a half years ago, the slogan was put forward in the letter of the C.C. of the C.P. of China, of "the creation of a united front of the oppressed Chinese, Korean, Manchurian and Mongolian nationalities in Manchuria, for joint resistance to the common enemy—Japanese imperialism." The correctness of this policy has been fully justified in practice. However, we cannot now limit ourselves to this slogan alone, to-day; our policy must be more concrete.

Our Party organisations in Manchuria must work for the formation of a Korean national autonomous region in Hankow. BUT BY WHAT MEANS CAN THE DOMINATION OF THE JAPANESE INVADERS BE OVERTHROWN IN MANCHUKUO AND TSINGTAO? Only by the formation of the united anti-Japanese front of the Korean and Chinese peoples. And so the Communists put forward the following slogan: "Unity between the Chinese and Korean peoples to overthrow the domination of the Japanese invaders in Manchukuo, and to establish a Korean national autonomous region in Tsingtao."

Of course, we cannot limit ourselves to this

general political slogan alone. On the basis of the conduct of the united front between the Chinese and Korean peoples, the Communist organisations are adopting a number of measures to reorganise the existing 2nd Corps of the People's revolutionary army and other anti-Japanese partisan detachments in the Chinese-Korean anti-Japanese united army, the aim of which is to fight for the independence of Korea.

Besides the consolidation and augmentation of the existing organisations of the C.P. of China, the present situation in Hankow demands the creation of a Korean anti-Japanese national-revolutionary party, and the drawing of still more revolutionary Korean and Chinese workers and peasants into the Party. The most important task facing this new party is to fight against Japanese imperialism ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF KOREA. The initiators of this party can and must be Communists. This party will be a PARTY OF THE KOREAN ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED FRONT IN HANKOW. Its ranks must be open to all Koreans who do not want to be the colonial slaves of Japan and who want to fight for their own national independence.

Other national minorities (Mongolians, Manchurians, Mahomedans) must also be drawn into the anti-Japanese united front. In working among the masses of the national minorities, their national peculiarities, customs, language, etc., must particularly be taken into account. Experiences of work during the last four years have shown us that they also have no desire to be the colonial slaves of Japan, and that they are beginning to take part in the movement against Japanese imperialism and to save their fatherland.

#### The Anti-Japanese United Front Government in Manchuria.

In a number of partisan regions to-day (South Manchuria, East Manchuria, the regions to the east of Harbin and the eastern part of Kirin) the anti-Japanese societies or peasant committees have in fact become the local bodies of the anti-Japanese power and represent the embryo of an anti-Japanese government, fighting to save the fatherland.

But are there any opportunities or prospects of setting up a government of the anti-Japanese united front? Yes, there are. Such a government will not yet be the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants in the form of Soviets, but will be an anti-Japanese people's revolutionary government. The fundamental task of this government is to organise and guide the anti-Japanese national-revolutionary war of the Chinese people, to drive the Japanese imperialists out of the country, to unite the four North-Eastern provinces with China, and to fight for the

national independence and unification of China. Not only the Communists, but other anti-Japanese political organisations and representatives of the army as well, can and must take part in the establishment of this government. This government is inseparable from the movement for the anti-Japanese united front, it arises out of this movement and constitutes its highest form.

This year already our Party has put forward a programme for this government. In accordance with the actual state of affairs, new points can be included in this programme, as, for instance: the fight against restrictions on Chinese trade and industry imposed by the Japanese, for free trade for Chinese traders, for participation by the anti-Japanese local government of Manchuria in the Chinese united government of national defence, etc., and subordination to its leadership.

During the four years of the occupation, the

Party organisations of the C.P. of China in Manchuria have grown numerically and gathered strength ideologically and politically. However, we should not let things rest at that. Inside the Party we must FIRST OF ALL overcome the "Left" sectarianism which is hindering the establishment of the anti-Japanese united front, and also mistakes of a Right opportunist character.

The Communist Party of China is not only the vanguard of the working-class, but also the leader of the Chinese people.

The Party organisations in Manchuria are an organic part of the Communist Party of the whole of China, and the national-revolutionary movement in Manchuria is a part of the Chinese Revolution. The anti-Japanese national-revolutionary movement in Manchuria is growing, it will flow into the revolutionary movement of the whole of China and will overthrow the domination of Japanese imperialism and its agents in China.

## IMPERIALIST CONTRADICTIONS IN THE FAR EAST

By VAN DEH.

**J**APANESE aggression against China has been developing incessantly and unhindered for over four years. It could not fail to lead to a colossal sharpening of the contradictions between Japan and its imperialist rivals.

IN SPITE OF THIS FACT, the Japanese offensive in China, as we know, has not encountered any open and effective resistance from the other imperialist powers. During the FIRST stages of the offensive it was accompanied by noisy verbal protests on the part of America, while England gave Japan a free hand, and limited itself to playing upon the American-Japanese contradictions. When, in the spring of 1933, Japan openly defied the League of Nations (her exit from the League after the final resolution had been passed refusing to recognise the seizure of Manchuria), it did so backed by a virtual agreement with England concerning Manchuria.

During the LAST stages of this offensive, beginning with the invasion of North China by Japan in the spring of 1933, Britain's policy of non-interference remained unchanged in the main, while America, isolated and ignored by England's conciliatory manoeuvres, also adopted a passive line.

Instead of the bellicose protests and declarations of Hoover's time, the Roosevelt government adopted a restrained position of wait-and-see.

It is very obvious that this new phase of American policy is in the nature of a manoeuvre, a means of bringing pressure to bear upon England with a view to putting a stop to American isolation in the Far East, for, firstly, it is accompanied by a fresh acceleration of the feverish armaments by the United States in the Pacific Ocean, and, secondly, with all its newly-manifested quasi "disinterestedness" in Chinese affairs, America still adheres, as hitherto, to the position of categorically rejecting Japanese acts of aggression, and equally categorically cutting across all the efforts of Japan to force it to make some sort of political concessions on the Far-Eastern question (the Japanese draft pacts of non-aggression, "the pact for the division of the Pacific Ocean," etc.). Nevertheless, it is a fact that since 1933, America, like England, has also been avoiding open anti-Japanese action in China. In addition, America's silver policy, which has drained all the silver out of China and helped to bring about a catastrophic intensification of the crisis in China, has dealt a blow to American political influence in that country, made the Chinese bourgeoisie still more dependent upon Japanese imperialism, and directly encouraged the offensive of the latter. But the fact which determined the passivity of English and American imperialism in the face of the Japanese offensive

against China, have been undergoing considerable changes of late. Let us dwell on a few of them.

(1) **ANGLO-AMERICAN ANTAGONISM.** The Washington compromise, in the long run, was determined to a certain degree by the presence of a united front of England and America against Japan, at the Washington Conferences of 1921-22. The unhindered development of Japanese imperialist aggression in China during the last few years was determined by the breakdown of this united front as a result of Anglo-American contradictions, which grew especially sharp under the conditions of the world capitalist crisis.

However, during the course of the development of the Anglo-American antagonisms, a situation arose in which England was deprived of the opportunity of defending its own interests, menaced as they were by Japan, by playing upon American-Japanese contradictions, while refraining from undertaking independent action against Japan. This position which was an extremely difficult one for British imperialism, led to a *crisis* in British Far-Eastern policy like the one which had previously befallen the corresponding policy pursued by the U.S.A. The Japanese menace gradually assumed a more and more serious character for both Anglo-Saxon powers. Meanwhile, the position of England in the Far East was complicated to a tremendous degree by the fact of the armament of Germany in Europe and, quite recently, by the African adventure undertaken by Italian imperialism. We can say that British imperialism sensed the need to activate its own Far-Eastern policy, just at a time when its freedom of action in China proved to be especially restricted. This position increased the tendency in British policy to come to an agreement with America in the Pacific Ocean, to an agreement which in the past was particularly and persistently sabotaged on the British side.

(2) **THE FACT THAT BOTH ENGLAND AND, IN PARTICULAR, AMERICA, ARE UNPREPARED FOR WAR IN THE PACIFIC, BOTH FROM THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL POINTS OF VIEW,** a fact which has compelled them to halt before the prospect of sharpening a conflict with Japan, which rendered possible an armed conflict directly with the latter.

But during recent years feverish military preparations have been afoot, designed, it is true, for a long period ahead, but obviously directed against Japan. Thanks to the growth of its naval and especially air armaments, America has objectively strengthened its position in the Pacific during these years. As for England, although generally speaking her position has grown weaker in the military sense in the Far East, as a result of the European-African situation (the forced withdrawal of the

British Far-Eastern flotilla to the Red Sea may serve to illustrate this point), nevertheless British imperialism has successfully used the Abyssinian conflict at home in such a manner as to ensure the operation of a tremendous new programme of war construction which, in the future (and in respect of air armaments, even in the near future) will strengthen England's strategic position in the Far East as well.

(3) **THE FEAR OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION EXPERIENCED BY THE IMPERIALISTS** has during the course of the last decades been one of the most important foundations of their Chinese policy. By force of the fact that it is deeply interested in exploiting China, by force of its geographical proximity to China, and its military power on the Chinese theatre of war, Japan is the most suited to fulfil the function of gendarme in relation to China, and in this capacity IS A USEFUL WEAPON OF WORLD IMPERIALISM. The desire not to weaken Japanese imperialism is its struggle against the Chinese revolution and the fear of letting loose the revolutionary forces of China have been, and still are, of great importance in the policy both of American and British imperialism towards Japan.

These motives are still in full force. However, the following must be taken into account as new, though secondary factors: (a) that the front of the civil war against the Red Armies of China has now been shifted to regions which are more removed from the most important centres and bases of imperialist domination in this country; (b) that the enthusiasm felt in connection with the rôle of Japan as gendarme is cooling down considerably in view of the fact that this rôle is an indissoluble part of Japan's own imperialist, aggressive plans in relation to the WHOLE OF CHINESE TERRITORY .

(4) Since the very beginning of Japan's invasion of China, Japanese propaganda has connected it up with the prospect of an attack on the U.S.S.R. For the purpose of weakening the U.S.S.R., the bourgeoisie in a number of countries (especially in England) were prepared to remunerate Japan by consenting to the latter strengthening her position somewhat in China.

This original view of the question about the anti-Soviet character of Japanese policy in China has now changed. First, no justification has been forthcoming for the expectation that Japan would soon begin war against the Soviet Union, a war which at any rate temporarily would paralyse Japan's drive against China; war with the Soviet Union has not come about yet, but Japan already dominates almost half the territory of China. Secondly, under the conditions which exist to-day, the very CHARACTER of a possible Japanese-Soviet

war has changed—as a result of the changed relations of forces between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world in general, and between the U.S.S.R. and Japan in the Far East, in particular, and also in consequence of the colossal importance of all the changes in the international situation (the menace of German fascism which hangs over Europe). What might have been considered an isolated conflict in the past, turning the forces of Japan in a direction “least dangerous” for the other imperialists, has to-day turned out to be indissolubly linked up with the military plans of German fascism in Europe, and is a threat not merely to the Soviet Union alone, but is the possible and probable centre of a NEW WORLD WAR.

This does not alter the fact that as hitherto the imperialists are interested in Japan as a factor counterbalancing to the U.S.S.R. in the Far East.

Added to these fundamental changes it should be noted that in the process of the development of events in recent years a number of estimates have been undermined and overthrown which were originally widespread throughout the imperialist world and which considerably helped to belittle the seriousness of the Japanese menace even among the best informed circles of the British and American bourgeoisie. We have in view the following two important points in particular:

FIRST, during the early stages of Japanese aggression, the conviction was current that the financial and economic weakness of Japanese imperialism would itself serve as a sufficient check to the successful drive of Japan, and would either lay down a natural boundary or force the Japanese capitalists, even within the confines of the Chinese territory captured, to act objectively as the agent of the more powerful British and American capital.

In actual fact Japan's financial weakness in no way alters the clearly monopolist character of its desires in China. Japanese military and political aggression has met with considerable success in undermining the interests and the policy of the other imperialists, although as regards economic power, Japan cannot even be compared with them.

SECONDLY, originally the conviction was current (especially on the British side) that, in view of this financial weakness and, in general, of the fact that Japan's resources do not correspond at all to the extent of its booty in China, it would be easy in the long run to come to some compromise agreement which would limit Japanese acquisitions to Manchuria, perhaps to include the neighbouring North Chinese regions, and that Japan would not seriously threaten the semi-colonial status of the rest of China. But the hopes entertained by

British imperialism that the Japanese offensive would be localised have by no means been justified. The whole trend of events during the last few years has testified to the fact that every part of Chinese territory seized by Japan immediately becomes a base for the further development of the Japanese offensive and for new acquisitions, and that no artificial boundaries can be thrown up inside China beyond which the Japanese offensive will not proceed, and that Japanese imperialism has set itself the concrete aim of securing control OF THE WHOLE OF CHINA IN ITS ENTIRETY. Proof of this fact was provided by the famous Japanese declaration concerning a protectorate over China (April, 1934), by Japan's preparations to proclaim the “independence” of North China (which is on the eve of being fulfilled to-day), by Japan's fierce pressure upon the Nanking government, by the energetic attempts made on the Shanghai International Settlement, and the preparations to seize Shanghai, by Japan's intrigues in the South of China, and, finally, by the whole tone of its noisy declarations, pretensions and demands.

It is precisely this fact that constitutes a most important new FEATURE in the development of Japanese aggression in recent years. To-day the entire imperialist world is brought face to face with the fundamental question of whether China is to be maintained as a SEMI-COLONY of imperialism or whether Japan is to be allowed to convert it into its own monopoly COLONY? The question arises in a situation which does not allow of any hope that any TERRITORIAL DIVISION of China can be possible, which would secure sufficient compensation to the other imperialist powers, and in particular to England — not to mention America — from their own point of view.

All this was bound to make itself felt concretely first and foremost in the policy of BRITISH imperialism. It should be emphasised that the conciliatory line of the latter towards Japan on no account signified either the possibility of stable agreement, or mitigation in general of the most acute, and insoluble contradictions between England and Japan in the Far East. It must not be forgotten that it is England that possesses the colonial monopoly in Asia and that the extensive programme of Japanese expansion with its “Monroe doctrine for Asia” is consequently aimed directly against British imperialism. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE TREND OF THE LATEST EVENTS IN THE FAR EAST HAS BEEN HIGHLY instructive to the latter for the following reasons:—

(1) As regards the extent of its capital investments in China proper, and of its whole “calculations” there, England up to now is, indeed, ahead of the other imperialists and, in particular, ahead

of the United States. The Japanese advance, not to mention the complete fulfilment of Japan's plans to dominate China, is taking place primarily at the expense of England.

(2) The menace already created of naval expansion by Japanese imperialism (the breakdown of the Washington Naval Pact and Japan's demand for naval parity are tantamount to the confirmation of Japan's rule over a large part of the Pacific) is widening or threatens to widen the geographical sphere of the Far-Eastern conflict to confines including the most important colonial possessions and "spheres of influence" of British imperialism which Japan is menacing to-day (Hongkong, Straits Settlements, Dutch East Indies, the Pacific Dominions, and finally India itself, the political fate of which is closely connected with that of China).

(3) Finally, let us remember that up to now the relations which existed between the positions of the leading imperialist powers in the Pacific were CHARACTERISED BY PRECISELY THIS CONCILIATORY ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND, SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE IRRECONCILABILITY IN PRINCIPLE OF AMERICA, though not displayed in action. Britain's conciliatory attitude was the chief prop of the whole of Japan's policy in China. Meanwhile, in Washington, account is taken of the fact that the more restrained the American attitude is towards Japan, the more energetically will England be forced to act. Therefore, American imperialism will be in no hurry at all to help its English partner in the game.

From the moment it became clear that Japan was openly encroaching upon the semi-colonial status of China in an attempt to replace it by its own undivided colonial rule, England was faced with the necessity of making a definite CHOICE. It had to be one of two things: either England would remain passive—in which case it would have to reckon with the prospect of gradually losing all its most important positions in China and of its forced "exit" from that country, or it would have now at the present stage to put up an active struggle for its positions and take such steps as would at any rate SECURE THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF CONDITIONS FOR A NEW ANGLO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE BRITISH BOURGEOISIE. In spite of the fact that the British bourgeoisie have not at all entirely rejected the prospects of an agreement with Japan on the Far-Eastern question (the influential group, for example, represented by the "Round Table" continues to point out "that the economic interests of England and Japan in the Far East at bottom coincide"), this question, in the way it has been raised, must actually be considered predetermined, for the interests of England in China are of themselves great, and in addition

are closely linked up with the fact of British rule in India. We must make our starting-point the fact that neither England nor America can "leave" the Chinese market, which is the most important reserve market of world capitalism, without undermining their rôle on a world scale, but will continue to fight for China as long as they remain monopolist capitalist countries. It is for precisely this reason THAT THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE MONOPOLIST COLONIAL ENSLAVEMENT OF CHINA IS INCAPABLE OF FULFILMENT IN THE LONG RUN, EXCEPT AT THE PRICE OF A NEW WORLD WAR. But in a situation where English policy in the Far East is more than ever before CONNECTED with the situation in Europe and North Africa, England, obviously, will not at the moment OPENLY risk changing its policy and sharpening it against Japan. This is to be explained by the fact that (1) England, as hitherto, is striving to avoid an open conflict with Japan; (2) the immediate task of British policy is to strengthen British positions in China on the basis of defending the semi-colonial status of that country; and (3) the action of England is proceeding not so much along the lines of offering direct political resistance to Japan as along the lines of "indirectly" counteracting it with the help of pressure upon Nanking and the South-West grouping of the Kuomintang, of using all kinds of Chinese militaristic forces against Japan and, what is more important, by adopting corresponding economic and financial measures. This is why the action of England against Japanese aggression has taken the form of a PLAN OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INTERVENTION IN CHINA.

Profiting by the very serious economic and financial position of China, the British Government in the beginning of 1935 already offered a draft plan to America and Japan for a proposed joint loan to China, in particular aiming at improving the money circulation, credit and finances of the latter. This draft plan pursued definite political aims. Its fulfilment would have produced the following result: (1) It would have ADDED STRENGTH TO THE NANKING GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO OTHER militarist groupings in China and in relation to Japan: the loan would make Nanking more able to resist Japanese pressure than before; (2) it would have led to THE INCREASE OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OVER CHINA AS A COUNTERPART TO THE EFFORTS OF JAPAN TO SUBORDINATE CHINA TO ITS OWN UNDIVIDED CONTROL. The English proposal was welcomed by influential organs of the American press (particularly by the *New York Times*) as testifying to the success of Roosevelt's "new tactics," which aim precisely at putting a stop to the isolation of the U.S.A. and at activating Great Britain's own anti-Japanese policy. However, while striving to maintain the

advantage gained from these tactics, Washington did not believe that the change in British policy was a serious one, and did not hurry to the assistance of the English initiative, while Japanese imperialism naturally adopted, and continues to adopt, A SHARPLY NEGATIVE POSITION ON THIS QUESTION.

Thus, diplomatic negotiations did not lead to the required results. Then in the autumn of 1935 the British Government despatched its chief economic adviser, LEITH ROSS, to the Far East. As far as can be judged, his task was to come to an agreement with the Japanese government concerning Anglo-Japanese "collaboration" in China on the basis of the English draft plan for an international loan with the participation of Japan. But LEITH ROSS met with an extremely unfavourable reception in Tokio. Judging by the officially inspired, stereotyped commentaries published in the Japanese press, one of the essential conditions for any form of agreement with England put forward in the negotiations with LEITH ROSS WAS NOT ONLY RECOGNITION BY ENGLAND OF JAPAN'S SUPREMACY IN CHINA, BUT ALSO ENGLAND'S AGREEMENT TO THE "OPEN DOOR" FOR JAPANESE TRADE AND JAPANESE CAPITAL WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF THE WHOLE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

Having received this rebuff from Japan, Leith Ross took independent steps in China, the result of which was the currency reform published by the Nanking government at the beginning of November, the essence of which is the following: China abandons the silver standard and transfers to unexchangeable paper currency; all the silver in the country to be "nationalised" in exchange for bank notes, the emission of which is controlled by the Nanking government, first through the three existing semi-governmental Chinese banks, and later through one, single, Central bank; the rate of exchange of Chinese currency is considerably reduced, approximately to 1s. 2½d. as against 2s. previously, which at the present price of silver represents the value of the silver in the Chinese dollar. Actually, if not formally, China is fixing this rate of exchange to correspond definitely with the pound sterling, and, in consequence, is joining the sterling bloc.

The reform adopted by Nanking is a MEASURE TAKEN BY BRITISH IMPERIALISM IN AGREEMENT WITH, AND HAVING THE DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE ENGLISH BANKS, WHICH ARE STILL SUPREME IN THE SPHERE OF CURRENCY AND CREDIT IN CHINA, AND IS DIRECTLY AIMED AT JAPAN. The reform was PRECEDED by unequivocal comments in the English press, and also by the creation of a special influential committee by the Bank of England "to defend the interests of English holders of Chinese loans." The

reform was immediately FOLLOWED by unanimous approval in the English press and on the part of so-called business circles, by a sharp rise of Chinese bonds on the London market, by direct support on the part of the British government in the form of the immediate application of criminal punishment for any violation of the new law by Englishmen resident in China, and finally—side by side with the formal denial that Leith Ross was involved in the affair—by a significant reminder to Japan by England of the very draft plan of an international loan, previously proposed. There is nothing surprising in the fact that Japanese imperialists are foaming at the mouth not only because of Nanking, but also of London.

The financial reform immediately makes Nanking much more dependent upon foreign, financial "assistance," and first and foremost upon England, i.e., it strengthens English political influence in comparison with Japanese. It can be affirmed, however—and this is clear from the utterances of the English press itself—that at the present stage, at any rate, the English bourgeoisie have no intention of risking big individual investments of capital in China, in particular because the latter (a) would create the danger of a sharpening of the isolated Anglo-Japanese conflict; (b) would not give the English imperialists sufficient economic and political guarantees. The task is to bring about international financial intervention with the participation of Japan. British imperialism, as stated before, is striving to counter the individual military and political control of Japan by setting up international control, in which London, as a result of its own initiative and thanks to its rôle as the world centre of finance, is to play the most active part.

Nanking's currency reform is not only the continuation of the foregoing efforts of British imperialism in this direction, but is an important step forward along the road to the realisation of British desires. It is clear that a violent struggle is raging around the operation of the reform.

THE REFORM STRENGTHENS THE POSITION OF ENGLAND and weakens the position of Japan in the struggle to bring about this international financial intervention in China behind which lies the struggle to maintain the semi-colonial—as against colonial—status of China, the struggle for the joint possession, and division or re-division of China among the imperialists as against Japan's efforts at individual supremacy. There is nothing surprising in the fact that the Japanese imperialists are straining every effort to break down this reform and the English plans connected with it, and that as a result a considerable denuding and

SHARPENING OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE CONFLICT IS TAKING PLACE IN THE FAR EAST.

Further factors in the sharpening of the conflict are the retaliatory measures of Japanese imperialism, in particular the fact that a menacing situation has been created in Shanghai and that the Japanese plans to cut off North China are being gradually realised. The North China question is important for England not so much even in relation to the British interests in that region, as because the "manchurisation" of this region will represent a big step forward towards converting China into a Japanese colony. And indeed, the seizure of North China and the removal of the frontiers of Japanese supremacy to the Yellow River will result in the creation of a gigantic jumping-off ground for further Japanese aggression along the Yangtse valley and further into the South, will mean a colossal increase in the effect of Japanese pressure upon the Nanking government, and, finally, will paralyse to a considerable degree the political effect of the currency reform and all England's efforts to support the Nanking government against Japan. Although up to now England has refrained from interfering OPENLY in the North China question, there is no doubt that British diplomacy will take an active part in the struggle behind the scenes, which is waging around the Japanese attempts to create an "independent" North China.

Thus, the changes that have taken place recently in the Far East may be reduced in the main to the following:—

(1) The most important of these is the very fact of the activation of British policy in the Far East, directed against Japan. In perspective this fact offers new possibilities of an anti-Japanese combination between British and American imperialism.

(2) We must, however, make the following reservation that though England has delivered a counter-blow AT THE PRESENT MOMENT, it undoubtedly has no intention of changing the general conciliatory line of its policy towards Japan, and has no intention of forcing a conflict with the latter. On the contrary, the tone of the English press is profoundly restrained and conciliatory, when it emphasises the fact (even on the acute question of Shanghai, see the leading article in *The Times* of November 9), that England recognises the "justice" of Japanese claims to certain advantages in China and even to a guiding voice in Chinese affairs (though not to Japanese monopoly), and points out that England will continue to maintain the line of CONCILIATION AND COLLABORATION with Japan, on the indispensable condition, of course, that China remains a semi-colony in the common possession of the imperialists.

(3) But although England for the time being has set itself only limited tasks, it may be compelled in the future to adopt more decisive changes in its Far-Eastern policy. If Japan does not agree to make considerable concessions, if it carries its plans in North China to their culmination, and if it continues its expansion in the zone of British influence, then a further sharpening of British policy against Japan will fundamentally become inevitable, in spite of all the wavering to-day by the British government and the difficulties which await England on the way. In particular, it can be established even now, that decisive action by Japan to seize Shanghai will, without doubt, inspire British imperialism to adopt further anti-Japanese measures. At bottom, the fact is that the boundary to which British imperialism is prepared to retreat on the Chinese question is one which Japan will not be able to traverse with impunity.

(4) To all appearances American imperialism has for the time being adopted a position of benevolent neutrality towards the currency reform. Later on, American policy will find itself under the influence of the contradictory factors: (a) direct interest in the formation of a new consortium to establish financial control over China; (b) mistrust towards England and apprehensions as regards the agreement being prepared by the latter with Japan; (c) the financial losses, as yet incalculable in the event of the success of the currency reform which in the general opinion of bourgeois economists is undermining America's silver policy.

The chief factor in the Far-Eastern policy being pursued by America remains, of course, its complete irreconcilability towards the monopolist desires of Japan in China and the Pacific.

(5) Recent events in the long run signify that preparations are being made for new efforts at dividing and redividing China between the imperialists. Quite independent of their concrete outcome, they signify a new serious sharpening of imperialist contradictions in the Far East. The following general conclusion is of the greatest importance: the creation in China of a united anti-imperialist people's front on the basis of a decisive struggle against Japan is favoured not only by the position which has arisen inside the country, but also by the serious changes in the international situation; the sharpening of the contradictions between the imperialists and the prospects of a further intensification of the conflict between them can and must be utilised by the Chinese Communist Party in the interests of the revolutionary struggle, the immediate aim of which is to save the existence of China as a nation directly menaced as it is by Japanese aggression.



MAO TSE-DUN

# MAO TSE-DUN\*—LEADER OF THE TOILING PEOPLE OF CHINA

By H.

"Revolution is not a ceremony where you invite guests to dinner, nor the writing of literature, the painting of pictures, nor is it embroidering on satin; it cannot be achieved with such finesse, so easily, and without spoiling all kinds of beautiful decorations; it cannot be achieved gently, gradually, carefully, respectfully and compromisingly . . ." (Mao Tse-Dun, "The Peasant Movement in Honan," 1927.)

**S**HANGHAI, 1921. The First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is in progress. Ardent, agitated speeches. A few dozen people are gathered together in the little hall: workers, peasants, coolies, intellectuals. Passionate appeals to struggle, to build up Communist organisations in the towns, in the factories and workshops, in the armies, in the villages. A tall, slim young man takes the floor. Outwardly he is a typical student, a modest village teacher. His face calm and severe, with eyes deep-set and mocking. He is sharply to be distinguished from all the others by the sickly pallor of his face. He raises his hand, asks for the floor, stands up and begins:

"Comrades! I am the delegate from Hunan. I have formed a Communist organisation in Hunan. We have organised the revolutionary workers, peasants and students. We are developing our work without losing a single day . . ."

The man lets himself down carefully into his chair, draws a long notebook from his inside pocket, and makes notes in it with a stump of pencil, fixed into a black iron tube. Other delegates approach him—old workers, and a respectable professor. They ask him questions. He replies. The workers amicably shake him by the hand and pat him on the back. The professor† shakes hands somewhat coldly and says:

"Very interesting, your experience in Hunan deserves much attention, and, without doubt, study."

"It is not a question of interest," he replies. "The point is that the masses are beginning to rise up to the fight. These masses need a real revolutionary organisation. The Party must go to the masses now and organise them. This is the main thing now."

"Quite right, the delegate from Hunan is right," exclaim the worker delegates.

The delegate from Hunan province is unanimously elected a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. He returns to Changsha (the capital of Hunan), where he leads the provincial committee of the Communist Party, and edits the *New Hunan*, a weekly revolutionary paper.

Usually a man of few words, he became completely transformed when making speeches at

meetings of the Party organisation, and became a fiery orator, defining the ways and means of carrying on the struggle at the given stage, with the skill of a marksman. His speeches fired his audience and inspired them. He welded together his Party organisation with an iron hand. He found the road to the human heart, and skilfully and opportunely corrected mistakes and trained true Communists—real revolutionary fighters.

"To be a Communist," he said to one comrade, "is not merely to belong to a political party. We are not political intriguers. We are the Party of the toiling people who are cruelly oppressed; we are the Party of revolution which is sweeping all that is rotten from the face of the earth. Death is only the physical exit from life. And if a man, the more so a Communist, can bring some good by dying, by his brains and his courage, then he should not think twice about it. He must boldly and proudly fulfil the will of the Party and the people. A Party that lives for the interests of the people, which suffers with them and fights to make them happy, is an invincible force. There is no force that can conquer the Party of the Communists—the militant vanguard of the toiling masses."

These words, clear, simple and indomitable as the oath of an iron Bolshevik, bring to mind the figure of the legendary leader of the Chinese people—Comrade Mao Tse-Dun.

Comrade Mao Tse-Dun was born in a Hunan village in a poor peasant family. His hard, hungry childhood has left indelible marks upon him: it has undermined the health of Comrade Mao Tse-Dun for the rest of his life. In the village he worked as a farm labourer for the landlords and kulaks. In the throes of this hard labour he made a deep study of the entire system of cruel and inhuman landlord exploitation and of the overbearing oppression which ground down the people. This hard labour educated in him an unconquerable spirit of hatred towards the parasites and exploiters. Having fled from bondage as farm labourer, he found himself a mercenary soldier in the army of one of the militarists. He patiently underwent all the military drill and the insults. His inflexible will and rebellious spirit could not be broken even by the barrack butchers. As a result of tremendous exertion, he learned to read and write the complicated Chinese language. All the shapes and ideas which had swam before his eyes in the thick fog of ignorance, began to take definite shape and acquire definite meaning. His insatiable, unbounded curiosity widened his outlook, enriched his mind and steadily developed it. He fled from the barrack imprisonment as once

\* Or Mao-tse-tung.

† Professor Chen Du-su.

before he had fled from the hard labour on the farm.

Life had no mercy upon this man. It tried to turn him aside and throw him back to the slavery of the landlord, to the bondage of the militarists; it tried to smother, to suppress the indignation that was growing up in him against the social system which generates barbarism, slavery, oppression and starvation. And out of this incredible, almost unexampled struggle, this man came out on top—it did not break him. He never asked for mercy; he defended himself with tremendous obstinacy, and never surrendered.

In Changsha, a new man appeared among the crowds on the streets, in the working class districts, in the heart of the poor and destitute of the town. Mao Tse-Dun, thin and emaciated, wandered through the streets, talked with the workers, performed the heaviest kind of work, and carefully collected scraps of newspapers lying on the roads and pavements. He greedily read everything he could lay hands upon. He feasted on reading matter until his head spun round. New friends helped him to study. By incredible exertion he leapt ahead and became a student. A new world opened up before him. His hard and tremendous experience of life helped him in everything. In a short time he became an outstanding student in a teachers' training school. Revolutionary pamphlets fell into his hands, and he plunged headfirst into the study of "rebel" literature.

He became enthusiastic about the formation of different circles and handicraft workshops. Hungry himself, he organised aid for his comrades among the students, his friends among the workers, and his brother peasants. He attended meetings of workers and mass meetings, unmasked the exploiters and spoke in a language remarkable for its simplicity and clarity. The "pale student Mao" became a "prominent figure" in the town. The police began "to watch" this homeless student. Mao became the best guest and friend in the working class districts. All the revolutionary elements among the town workers, students and intellectuals gathered around Mao. He found his way among the most complicated political and economic questions with unusual ease. When preparing for the first workers' strike, he formulated the chief demands as follow: Less working hours, better working conditions, and higher wages.

Under the influence of the Great October Revolution, the revolutionary movement quickly developed in China. All the revolutionary students' and workers' organisations used to meet in the "bookshop" organised by Mao Tse-Dun, and it was here that Mao organised the first circle of worker-agitators. The police kept a vigilant watch over the "shop" which carried on a lively

business which was very far from being of a commercial nature. About this time a new strike broke out in the town. Mao Tse-Dun was really the leader of it. He was a member of the workers' delegation which General Tan Yan-kai, the governor of the province, was forced to receive. The governor, to whom the servile police had presented a "case against the pale student," issued an order for his arrest. However, in a private interview, Mao Tse-Dun persuaded him that he was "not a dangerous person." He so interested and fooled the governor that this general himself wrote out the sign for Mao Tse-Dun's "bookshop," paying tribute to the "new ideas."

Soon Mao Tse-Dun gave organisational shape to the existence of the provincial committee of the Communist Party. A weekly newspaper, the *New Hunan*, was brought out. At first cautiously, but later more and more openly, Mao Tse-Dun and his comrades began to flay the entire social system which reigned throughout the country. The police received the order to arrest the "revolutionary leader." Mao Tse-Dun fled from Changsha to North China. In Peiping he was arrested, but was not identified, and released. He again returned to Central China, at first to Hankow, and then to Yuchan.

The menacing wave of revolution in the years 1925-27 approached. Mao Tse-Dun was always in the centre of the approaching events. He was to be seen everywhere, in the working class districts, in industrial towns, in the most far-flung villages of Hupeh, Kiangsi and Hunan. His name became famous among broad masses of the people. He was loved and well known, this bold and passionate agitator who called upon the people to fight. He was persecuted by the secret service and the police. But he was sheltered by the workers and peasants and so remained elusive.

In Canton, Sun Yat-sen organised a national government which declared war upon imperialism and militarist reaction. The Communist Party joined the reorganised Kuomintang. Mao Tse-Dun, popular leader of the working and peasant masses, was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang. He devoted all his attention and time to the agrarian question, for he understood all the tremendous importance of the rôle of the peasantry in the events which were unfolding. He established mass peasant organisations and led them. The national bourgeoisie, temporary allies in the anti-imperialist struggle, betrayed the revolution and went over to the camp of reaction. The working class movement was suppressed by bloody executions, and punitive expeditions were sent against the peasants. The leaders of the Communist Party, led by Chen Du-su, refused to carry out the instructions of the Comintern, and did nothing to prevent the

counter-revolutionary drive of black reaction against the revolutionary workers and peasants.

Mao Tse-Dun was one of the first to understand the disastrous character of the treacherous policy pursued by Chen Du-su, and openly unmasked his position. He took his place at the head of the masses and led their struggle against reaction. In a pamphlet which he specially wrote on the subject, he once more stressed the tremendous importance of the peasantry, whose rôle the followers of Chen Du-su did not want to understand.

"The present upsurge of the peasant movement constitutes an extremely important problem, since in the near future it must bring about a movement among several hundred million peasants throughout the whole of the rest of China . . . The peasants will break down all that stands in their way and will hasten along the road to emancipation. All revolutionary parties and revolutionaries will be put to the test by these masses." ("The Peasant Movement in Hunan," 1927).

This profound prognosis made by Mao Tse-Dun in 1927, which was brilliantly justified by the whole course of the development of later events, rang out like a sentence on the whole Chen Du-su leadership. To-day, Chen Du-su, this miserable renegade, has attached to himself the counter-revolutionary epaulettes of Trotsky.

The revolution of 1925-27 met with failure. The Kuomintang became the watchdog of imperialism. The unbridled, bloody terror of the most ferocious reaction in the world, swept over the country. The Communist Party was driven deep underground. Mao Tse-Dun courageously continued the struggle. He led the peasant revolutionary organisations which were also driven underground, and maintained and developed connections with the secret soldiers' leagues working among the militarist troops. On August 1, 1927, a number of the units of the Nanchan garrison mutinied, and under the guidance of two Communists, Ye Tin and Ho Lun, they began an advance southwards to Kwangtung. Simultaneously, Mao Tse-Dun carried on operations in the north of Kiangsi. With the aid of Communist soldiers, he carried on successful propaganda among an entire regiment, took the leadership of it, and led the men forward. On the road, detachments of farm labourers, poor peasants, and workers' guards from among the miners, flocked to the banner of Mao Tse-Dun. After long and violent battles in Kiangsi, he led this revolutionary regiment into the Ningang region. Here, close to the famous Tsinchanshan mountain, he met another tried Chinese revolutionary, the Bolshevik Chu De. Together with Chu De, Mao Tse-Dun formed the Fourth Corps of the Chinese Red Army, which covered itself in glory in fierce victorious engagements with the enemy.

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Mao Tse-Dun has passed through a severe, cruel

school of life. He has passed along the difficult road of a true son of the people, with head held high. The adversities of fortune, long years of privation and bitter suffering, the stubborn fight for knowledge, and the fire of revolution have steeled this fearless Chinese Bolshevik, and forged of him a great leader of the people. In bloody battles, face to face with the mortal enemy, there has been born not only a courageous, revolutionary military leader and talented strategist, but also a brilliant statesman.

The first Soviet region of the Kiangsi province was formed as a result of the tremendous, painstaking work of Mao Tse-Dun. He mobilised all the forces of the Party for the struggle to build up soviets. The Fourth Army Corps led by him and Comrade Chu De, was his main field headquarters. Together with his army corps, Mao Tse-Dun marched over the fields, the valleys and mountain paths of Kiangsi, Hunan, Hupeh and Fukiang. Wherever the army corps passed, Soviets sprung up and Soviet regions were formed. Tireless agitator and organiser, Mao Tse-Dun aroused millions of the people. And these masses followed him everywhere. He himself saw to the division of the lands of the landlords and did away with the boundaries in the fields. This weak and ailing man has worked like a mighty machine, breaking down the structure of the old world and building up the new. He has showered all the hatred that has accumulated in him over many years upon the parasites, the bloodsuckers of the Chinese people. He has brought new ideas to the people, has drawn them to himself by his fine speeches, filled, as they are, with sincere passion, and by his own fighting example. A constant stream of coolies and workers from Shanghai, Canton, Hankow, miners from Hunan, Fukiang, Kiangsi, and farm-labourers and peasants, students and teachers, have always sought him out. All the oppressed and enslaved, all class-conscious, bold elements have made their way to him. It was his hands that built up the skeleton of the heroic Chinese Red Army. In the mountains of Tsingansham, he himself trained his fighters to shoot with rifles, and taught them to read and write. He armed them with ideas and with hand-grenades.

In 1931, Mao Tse-Dun was elected president of the Central Executive Committee and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars in Juitsin, the capital of Soviet China, at the First Congress of Soviets, and amid stormy applause from the delegates of the Chinese people. At this new post he displayed his extremely brilliant talent as an outstanding statesman. He penned the Constitution of the Soviet Republic of China and a number of other fundamental laws of the new state. In a number of excellent decrees issued by the Soviet

Government, he expressed the will of the mass of the people, for he is excellently acquainted with their hopes and desires.

He is a resolute man, a true Bolshevik, a real friend of the people. Mao Tse-Dun's right-hand men say of him that:

"He works twenty hours a day, sleeps only four hours. When in the rear, he is always travelling over Soviet territory from town to town, from village to village. He is greeted everywhere as father, brother, son. He does everything to make the life of the people easier and happier."

With a splendid knowledge of the psychology of the people, himself one who has originated from the people, Mao Tse-Dun operates the decisions of the Party and Comintern brilliantly. The people knew of the hard life through which Mao Tse-Dun has passed, and they pay him back in boundless love and loyalty. At the front, Mao Tse-Dun is always in the front lines. He goes into battle side by side with the Red Army fighters, inspiring them with his heroic feats. The rank and file Red Army fighters and commanders know him personally. He has taken part in all the decisive operations of the Red Army. He has trained the principal army commissars. Mao Tse-Dun was the first commissar in the Chinese Red Army.

The *Daven-bao*, a leading Kuomintang newspaper, recently published a report of the interrogation of a Chinese Red Armyman, a rank and file soldier who had been taken prisoner.

"This soldier looks about 35," writes the paper. "He was taken prisoner in the central Red region, in Kiangsi. He was calm and confident during the interrogation. An officer asked him to give information about the forces of the Red Army. The soldier refused to reply. Persuasion had no effect upon him either. The whole of his reply boiled down to 'many.'"

In reply to all the remaining questions, he said: 'I don't know.'

The only question he was willing to answer was that about the Red Army commanders. Here is his reply:

'Yes, I know both Mao Tse-dun and Chu De. And I know Pen De-huai. Mao Tse-dun is our chief leader. He heads the government, the Party and the army. He is a very kind and simple man. He always talks in a way that even the most backward people can understand. It is difficult to tell in words of his authority and popularity. At his call, the whole of the people will follow to the ends of the earth. He always cares for others and never thinks of himself. He is very ill, is always coughing and pale. However, during campaigns he sleeps on the ground alongside the Red Army fighters, and eats what they do.'

"When clothes and boots are brought to him from the supplies, he gives them away to the Red Army fighters or somebody else. When the fighting took place near the Yuidu, he lay on the ground, I saw it myself, and fired from his rifle. And then he stood up and was the first to go into the attack. All the others followed him. That time we won the battle. Then, with the stretcher-bearers, he helped to pick up the wounded men. When the prisoners were brought in, he talked to them for several hours. Afterwards he gave orders for all prisoners to be released, except the officers. There were 600 prisoners,

but not more than 100 of them left him, and the others asked to join our units.'"

"The prisoner was once more asked to tell of the condition, the location and forces of the Reds. Again he refused to reply. The officer then said that he would be shot, and the prisoner replied:

"Well, what of it? I have heard the words of our leader, Mao Tse-dun, who said that a man who is afraid of death while fighting for the cause of the people, is a contemptible coward. I am a Communist."

This document will be a bright page in the annals of history of the Chinese Red Army. This nameless hero showed no cowardice in the face of death, he did not betray or retreat. This fearless fighter, along with many others, was trained by Mao Tse-Dun.


In summing up the results of the successful construction of Soviet China, Mao Tse-Dun formulated the conditions for victory in his report to the Second Congress of Soviets in January, 1914, in the following way:

"The victories we have achieved are by no means accidental," he said. "They have their basis in the correct political line of the Chinese Communist Party, in the concentrated leadership, the correct policy pursued and measures adopted by the Soviet Government, in the courage and valour of the Red Army, and the self-sacrificing help of the broad masses of workers and peasants in the Soviet regions. Moreover, they have their basis in the daily struggle and ever-developing movement of the workers and peasants of the white regions against the Kuomintang and the imperialists. And, finally, they are based upon the assistance and sympathy of the world proletariat and the oppressed population of the colonial countries. All this is the fundamental condition necessary for the victorious war against the enemy. Without these conditions, it would be absolutely impossible to achieve victory."

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Before the march from Kiangsi north-westwards, Mao Tse-Dun and Chu De spent sleepless nights in the headquarters of the Red Army, drawing up strategic plans for the march. Mao Tse-Dun's tremendous military and political experience, and his knowledge of the country considerably facilitated the drawing up of the plans. The main forces of the Chinese Red Army passed out of the hostile ring in Kiangsi, under the leadership of Mao Tse-Dun, and Chu De. The sick leader marched ahead and showed the way to the iron flood of Soviet revolution. This great Chinese revolutionary, whose health had been eaten away by the heavy servitude of farm-labouring, by his life in the military barracks, by years of hunger and privation, yet found within himself sufficient courage to lead the army of the Chinese Soviets fearlessly through battles, over mountains and streams, to the new revolutionary base.

An iron will, Bolshevik perseverance, unparalleled fearlessness, coupled with the tremendous, inexhaustible talent of a brilliant, revolutionary military leader and statesman—these are the outstanding qualities of the leader of the Chinese people, Comrade Mao Tse-Dun.



CHU DE

# CHU DE\*—COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE CHINESE RED ARMY

By H.

**T**HE man is known throughout the whole world. His name is pronounced with surprise, joy, hatred and fear in China, in Shanghai, Canton, Peiping, in the distant mountain villages of Kiangsi and Fukieng, in the Hunan valleys, in the vast stretches of Szechwan. When his name is uttered, it wreathes the faces of the toilers with smiles, and brings spasmodic grimaces of unfeigned animal horror to the faces of the landlords, the bourgeoisie, the Kuomintang generals, the imperialist robbers—all the idlers who live upon the sweat and blood of the great people of China.

The people tell legends full of rapturous love and heroism about the new people who are breaking up the old China and freeing it from thousands of years of oppression, slavery and violence, about the people who are breaking the imperialist chains which fetter the people and the country. These legends sing the praises of courageous people who are building up a new country on the remains of the old, who are leading the people forward to a new, bright life, forward to the government of the workers and peasants. In these legends, Chu De is the legendary military leader, the invincible knight, the healer of the people's sorrows, who rids them of oppression and suffering.

"He came from the farthest mountains," one of the legends runs. "He stands higher than the highest tree. His hands send forth floods of invincible flame, destroying the enemy. And his enemies are the enemies of the people. When he looks around him, he sees for a distance of 100 li on all sides at once. Nothing can hide from his fearless gaze. His army is countless: the whole of the people follow him. And even the foreigners flee in terror from our country to save their lives." He is a simple, kindly man, although there are none to equal him in strength, courage and wisdom. He sleeps in the mountains and in the fields, and the whole of the people keep watch over him. He awakens and once more leads the people onward, ever onward. There is no force that can restrain him. He marches throughout the whole of our land, liberating all the poor, the destitute, the good people. He is loved in Fukieng, Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, he is loved everywhere. He was born of our people, and the people have given him a strong and simple name.—Chu De."

In this artless, truthful legend of the people, there arises before us the clear vision of a great leader of the people, of a talented revolutionary military leader, of the fearless Commander-in-Chief of the heroic Chinese Red Army, Comrade Chu De. This legend gives a correct, never-to-be-

forgotten image of this modest, courageous leader and hero of the great Chinese people

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Chu De comes from Szechwan. A considerable part of his life was spent in South China and South-west China. Chu De gave many years of his life to heavy, exhausting labour as a coolie. His hands and shoulders are hardened and marked by proletarian labour. He saw the life of the long-suffering people of China at close quarters. His memory has become indelibly lined with awful pictures of the enslaved Chinese villages, fettered in chains of feudalism, pining away under barbarian exploitation and oppression, and of the poor working people in the towns, torn to pieces by the two-fold grip of imperialism and the "native" bourgeoisie. With tremendous strength of will, he restrained the storm of indignation which surged in his brain. Stupendous courage was combined in him with a clear, analytical mind. He understood perfectly that "one man by himself on the battlefield is not a warrior." He knew that a spark which fell among the millions of the people, would blaze into a great revolutionary fire.

He has experienced the severe school of life, full of unusual revolutionary feats, of deepest privation and of patient training of the will. HE TOOK AN ACTIVE PART IN THE 1911 REVOLUTION, and participated in the movement which broke out in Yunnan against the restoration of the imperial house of Yuan Shi-kai in China. He sees an emancipated people in the mists of the future. The bright sun of revolution sheds generous shafts of golden rays upon the free lands, the land where the real masters of life—the workers and peasants—stand at the helm of the state.

Chu De is a true son of the people. Coming from the very heart of the masses of the people, he has been able not only to maintain connections with these people, but has also deepened and strengthened them for all time, and has given his whole life to the service of the people. He has shared all his wonderful abilities with them. In all kinds of conditions, in every situation that has arisen, Chu De has always been distinguished for his remarkable intellect, and his most subtle understanding of the psychology and feelings of the masses. And at the same time he has worn the tremendous modesty of a real national leader,

\* Or Chu Teh.

right through the whole fifty years of his life. He undergoes the suffering of the masses as his own personal tragedy. And at the same time, he bears with unusual ease, unconcernedly, all the heavy blows that life has hurled at him in the course of gigantic events. Everywhere, at all points of the struggle, he has always first of all secured advantages for the people who are fighting for their national and social emancipation.

He first came into contact with military affairs in the military school of the Yunnan militarists, and immediately understood the tremendous importance of military measures in the struggle of the people. From this time onwards he became such a capable student that the hard-baked generals who were his teachers feebly shrugged their shoulders; they could not tell him what they themselves did not know, the student advanced far ahead of his teachers. And when, many years later, Chu De returned to the province of Yunnan, he went back to the same school, but as a teacher. He taught the dull-witted offspring of the generals, watching them and himself studying these people to whom in the near future he taught such astonishing practical lessons of revolutionary warfare.

In Chinese military circles he enjoyed fame as an excellent military specialist. The big militarists fought among themselves for the honour of having him in their armies. And the silent Chu De watched these quarrels and smiled: he had long ago chosen the road he intended to follow.

The roar of the waves of the Great Proletarian Revolution in October, 1917, met with a sharp echo in China. The masses of the people began to stir, the advanced and revolutionary section of the intellectuals took heart again. Soon the Chinese Communist Party was formed; Chu De became a Communist. The revolutionary movement in the country grew at a rapid pace. Broad masses of the toilers in the towns and villages established their revolutionary organisations.

Chu De was a regimental commander. His military unit distinguished itself among all the other troops of South China for its excellent organisation, for its discipline and its excellent knowledge of military affairs. It never entered anyone's head that there was a revolutionary organisation in this regiment, led by the Commander himself. The soldiers and the commanders were carefully selected by Chu De, and were people devoted to the revolution. Chu De painstakingly hammered out cadres of revolutionary fighters.

At the will of the party, Chu De left China. For a number of years he was in Europe, studying new lands, the art of war, and foreign languages. He displayed extraordinary capabilities: in a short time he mastered the French, German and English

languages. His close friends called him a revolutionary linguist when he studied the Russian language as well. But he paid most attention of all to the theory and practice of revolutionary wars, as elaborated by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. He plunged head first into the study of the wealthy experiences of the Great Proletarian Revolution in October, 1917.

On returning to China, he said to a close circle of comrades:

"Now I have matured. I have acquired new knowledge. I shall devote it to our cause."

The Party once more sent him to South China, among the troops of the militarists. Chu De took command of his old regiment and was soon given charge of a brigade. General Fan Shi-shen, the famous Yunnan militarist, to whose army this brigade belonged, appointed Chu De his adviser and shared with him his dreams of conquering the provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, Kwantung, the whole of South China; Fan Shi-shen would be the master, and Chu De the military governor.

Smiling inwardly, Chu De gave his agreement to this plan, but did not lose a single day in organising and preparing his first revolutionary detachments. Chu De enjoyed unquestionable authority among the Yunnan and Kwangsi generals. He is far superior in military knowledge to all these generals put together. And so, when rumours began to be spread that Chu De was a Communist and his brigade a Communist brigade, General Fan Shi-shen refused to believe it and decided that Chu De wanted to become an "independent general." It meant political and military death for Fan Shi-shen, if he were deprived of Chu De so he asked Chu De not to leave him, but at the same time saw that it was beyond his power to keep this brigade in his own hands.

The Chinese bourgeois press gave the following report at the time of the relations between Chu De and Fan Shi-shen:

"It has become universally known that Chu De is a Communist, and intends departing for the regions where peasant uprisings are taking place in the provinces of Kiangsi and Fukieng. If Fan Shi-shen were to hinder Chu De from doing so, he would be immediately crushed, since Chu De is in command of the best fighting units. Having made use of Fan Shi-shen's arsenal, Chu De has left him. All Fan Shi-shen's friends demanded that Chu De be shot, but the General had too much respect for the latter and was too much afraid of him."

Chu De left with his detachment for Kiangsi, to meet the units of Ho Lung and We Tin, who had raised the banner of revolt in Nanchang, in August, 1927. This date was the beginning of a new brilliant stage in the life and activity of Comrade Chu De.

Chu De's detachment went through heavy battles in its march through the north part of

the Kwantung province into South Hunan. Detachments of peasant artisans, individual units of soldiers from the militarist troops who had heard of "Red Chu De," joined him on the way. In April, 1928, the historic meeting took place in the province of Kiangsi, Ningang county, in the region of the inaccessible mountains of Tsinganshan, of the two main fighting detachments of the great Chinese revolution.

In Ningang the detachments of Chu De and Mao Tse-dun came together and joined forces. Henceforth the ideological and militant friendship of two revolutionary leaders of the people, cemented with the blood shed in countless battles, serves as an example of human singleness of purpose, of iron collaboration. Mao Tse-dun brought the partisan detachment of Hunan miners and workers, of Kiangsi farm labourers, and of revolutionary peasants to Ningang. From all corners of Kiangsi and Hunan, Fukiang and Kwantung, partisan detachments of peasants and workers flocked to Ningang. With pikes and swords, knives and sticks, the national fighters collected together under the banner of the revolution. Here in Ningang, the foundation of the heroic Chinese Red Army was first laid down. Under the leadership of Chu De and Mao-Tse-dun, the famous 4th corps of the Red Army was formed — the first big combination of troops in Soviet China. The C.C. of the Communist Party of China appointed Chu De, Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Army Corps, and Mao-Tse-dun its political commissar.

The Corps commanders were given the task of developing the formation of new army units. This extremely complicated military and political task was fulfilled in incredibly difficult conditions. The regions occupied by the 4th Army Corps were overrun with counter-revolutionary Kuomintang troops. The 3rd Nanking division, numbering about 35,000 soldiers, and armed with the latest military equipment, was sent into action against the 4th Red Army corps, which consisted of 8,000 men, with a total of 2,000 rifles, a number of machine-guns and an extremely limited supply of cartridges at their disposal.

This was the first, and one of the most serious, tests for the young army of the Chinese Soviets. Chu De was called upon to display exclusive strategic skill, self-sacrificing courage, and true revolutionary heroism. By a brilliant manoeuvre, Chu De brought his corps out of the encirclement of the hostile troops and dealt them a blow in the rear, i.e., from an angle where they least expected to be attacked. One division of the enemy was completely crushed, and two others retreated in panic. This brilliant operation immediately brought 3,000 rifles and a tremendous

amount of additional war munitions to the 4th Corps.

This first big victory made it possible for Chu De to accelerate the work of forming new detachments of the Chinese Red Army. By the beginning of 1930, the 4th Army corps numbered about 20,000 Red Army men. Simultaneously other corps of the Red Army were formed and developed: those under the command of Comrades Ho Lung, Pen De-huai, Fan Chi-min and others. However, the historic service of creating the present Chinese Red Army, unquestionably belongs to the 4th corps, led by Chu De and Mao Tse-dun, who correctly fulfilled the line of the Communist Party on military questions.

The life of Chu De is indissolubly linked up with the origin and further growth of the heroic army of Soviet China. When we speak of Chu De, we involuntarily speak of the Red Army, and vice versa, when we speak of this glorious army, we cannot but speak about Chu De, its militant leader. The enormous force which the 4th corps has now become under the leadership of Chu De can be clearly seen from one of the first orders of the Red Army, an excerpt from which we give below:

"Order No. 3. March 10, 1930.

1. The 4th corps (Commander—Comrade Chu De) is ordered within the course of 3 months from the receipt of this order to enter the confines of, to free from counter-revolutionary hostile forces and to capture the following counties and border regions of the provinces Kiangsi-Fukiang: Tsannan, Tsansan, Tsandu, Yushan, Huichang, Nankan, Sinfyn, Anwan, Tungku, Wuhua and Sinnin, and also the following regions: Pin-yuan, Tsaolin and Fan-wu, Changtin and Ninhua . . ."

In a short report dated May 5, 1930, we read:

"The 4th corps has completely fulfilled Point 1 of order No. 3 dated March 10, 1930. In the regions indicated in the army order mentioned, the toiling population have been afforded full support in the organisation of organs of Soviet power and in the annihilation of enemies of the people . . . (Commander of the 4th corps, Chu De; Political Commissar, Mao Tse-Dun.)"

In 1930-1931 the Chinese Red Army was gradually reconstructed: the 4th corps became part of the composition of the 1st army, and Chu De was appointed Commander of the Army. In November, 1931, after the First Congress of Soviets, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Chinese Soviet Republic appointed Comrade Chu De Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army and President of the Revolutionary Military Council. Chu De has multiplied his strategic experience in constant battles, testing in actual practice the correctness of the complicated, lightning decisions taken in circumstances of hostile environment. Chu De

\* See "Manmo Jijio" for January, 1931, Dairen.

† Ibid.

has not met with a single serious defeat during the whole of his military experience. Only the fact of the extreme numerical superiority of the forces of the enemy has forced him sometimes to withdraw his units, in order to save the Red Army men.

Chu De is not only a talented commander of the army: he is a most courageous fighter, one who knows no fear. During moments of attack, the Red Army men see the tall, somewhat stooping figure of their fearless leader, far ahead in front of the first ranks. He is always the last to retreat, carefully safeguarding his men, and never forgetting to organise help for the wounded Red Army soldiers.

When a halt is made Chu De seats himself among the tired men, and tells them of the extraordinary, inspiring history of the land in which the Red Army has already been victorious, where the people are already free, and where the sun of a new world pours down floods of bright rays upon the land. When on the march, he sleeps and eats with the Red Army men. In hours of leisure he reads lectures to the commanders on the tactics and strategy of revolutionary warfare, saturating his lectures with the rich experience of civil war in Russia. This usually silent man compels the audience to live through moments of high tension when delivering his speeches. His firm, somewhat husky voice is well known throughout the Red Army, to the toilers of Soviet China.

Former officers and colonels of the Nanking armies who have voluntarily transferred to the side of the Chinese Soviets, declare that this is the first time in their military lives that they have met with a commander of an army who possesses such keen strategic acumen, a commander of an army who can so clearly solve the most complicated theoretical military tasks, in practical battles against an enemy so excellently supplied with technical equipment. In 1933, Chu De, who clearly understands the extreme need to train cadres of commanders for the Red Army formed a military academy attached to the headquarters' staff. He himself trained the tutors and read the first lectures on military art, the principles of revolutionary warfare and manoeuvring, and the colossal experiences of the civil war in Soviet Russia.

We involuntarily call to mind the foul calumny of Chen Du-su, the renegade, who made the following assertion:

"The Chinese Red Army is not of great importance. When the ruling classes of China cease their internecine warfare, it will be crushed, or bought over, or, thanks to internal strife, it will crumble away itself and

vanish. . . . It may also happen that it will become a white army . . ."

The historic trend of events has crushed these foul dreams of the man who has turned traitor to the Chinese people. The Chinese Red Army has grown into a powerful, menacing force. This army, created by the people, has hammered out wonderful fighters and talented commanders. Comrades Chu De and Mao Tse-dun, iron Chinese Bolsheviks, true national leaders, have moulded this army.

\* \* \*

At the end of 1934, the Chinese Red Army began its historic trek from Kiangsi to Szechwan. Gigantic hordes of white troops were located on the borders of the Central Soviet region of Kiangsi. Chang Kai-shek's army of almost 600,000 men was sent against the main base of the Chinese Soviets. Over a hundred foreign military specialists in the staff headquarters of Chang Kai-shek drew up a "plan to liquidate the Red Army."

The overwhelming superiority of the enemy's forces compelled the Chinese Communist Party to save the main units of the Chinese Red Army, which was inferior in technical equipment to the armies of Chang Kai-shek, by withdrawing them from the hostile encirclement they were in, into the open spaces where a war of manoeuvres could be conducted.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Red Army and President of the Revolutionary Military Council, Comrade Chu De, drew up his plan for the trek and for the withdrawal of his units from the enemy ring that surrounded them. But this was not a retreat: having broken through the Nanking cordons, the army headed by Chu De and Mao Tse-dun came out into the open spaces where manoeuvring was possible, on to the gigantic battle-grounds of South-west China. By a deeply planned operation, they crushed the plans of the Kuomintang command of its foreign advisers, headed by the German fascist general, Von Sekt. On the road to Szechwan, in the provinces of Hunan, Kweichow and Yunnan, the Red Army crushed Chang Kai-shek's "army in pursuit."

Chu De led his army across rivers and over mountains, through deserts, and through traps laid by its mortal enemies. He brought it to Szechwan, after an unexampled, historic trek during which the men and their commanders covered the gigantic distance of 2,500 miles. The Red Army marched, an iron, all-devastating flood, through Central and Southern China. And along

\* See Chen Du-su's article in the Japanese magazine, "Sanhai Siuho," No. 844, Shanghai, 1931.

the whole length of the road they traversed, they did not meet with a single defeat.

\* \* \*

Even the mortal enemies of the Chinese Soviets are unable to remain silent about the fact that real national leaders stand at the head of the millions of China. Of the countless comments in the press, we will give only one, which gives a sufficient characterisation of Chu De and Mao Tse-dun:

"Actually, the Red Army left Kiangsi without sustaining any losses. On the other hand, the Nanking troops suffered a number of cruel blows. Particularly was this so, when the army of Chu De destroyed a number of selected divisions near Kweiyang . . ."

"The fact must be recognised that Chu De and Mao Tse-dun, these 'Red Dragons,' as they are called in China, possess wonderful strategic talents. The foreign military specialists fling up their arms. They were convinced that Chu De and his army had been caught in a trap in Kiangsi from which there was no way out . . ."

"The successes of the Reds can also be explained by the fact that people like Chu De and Mao Tse-dun possess a gigantic magnetic force; the common people are drawn to them. Therein lies the greatest danger . . ."

This is what the true blue organ of British imperialism in China—the "South China Morning Post"—has to say.

Chu De is now extending the front in South-west China. He has returned to his native Szechwan, which he left so many years ago. Fifty million inhabitants of Szechwan awaited his return. He came. And the legend of the people,

\* The chief town in the province of Kweichow.

which outstripped him says: "Chu De has come to us, to Szechwan. He is ours." On the high hills, near to the counter-revolutionary fortress of Chengtu,\* stand Chu De and Mao Tse-dun. Chu De looks at the walls of the town through his field-glasses and as the popular legend says, can see "for a distance of a 100 li on all sides at once."

These walls will fall when the legendary commander of the army of the Chinese Soviets—Chu De—leads his fearless iron fighters to storm them. Comrade Chu De is the national hero of the Chinese people, who, for nearly 30 years, beginning with the revolution of 1911 up to the present day, has been firmly and unwaveringly fighting against imperialist oppression for the national independent of the Chinese people, and for a better life for the workers and peasants. From the moment that Manchuria was occupied, he has constantly been calling upon all armies and the people to offer resistance to the Japanese offensive. Recently, on behalf of the Red Army, Comrade Chu De made the proposal to all the troops in China that all forces should unite immediately for the struggle against the enemy from without, and should organise a united army for war against Japanese imperialism.

Comrade Chu De is a true national hero of the Chinese people, who enjoys the love of the teeming toiling masses of the whole of China.

The vast masses of the people call him the "Chinese Voroshilov."

\* The chief town in the province of Szechwan.

## NOTE TO OUR READERS

Our periodical is a really international journal, appearing simultaneously in six languages; its contributors are distributed throughout the entire globe. But this fact involves the technical disadvantage that between the issue by the International Editorial Board and the publication of the English edition a long period elapses, and our readers, therefore, only receive the issue some weeks after the nominal printed date of publication.

To guarantee uniformity of time and agreement with the various editions we date and number the magazine according to the closing date of the International Editorial Board. It is often only possible, however, to print at a later date. Attentive readers will have noticed that issues contain articles which are only written after the nominal date of issue and deal with the very latest events.

We therefore ask our readers not be misled by the nominal printed date of publication.



FAN CHI-MIN

# FAN CHI-MIN—HERO OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

By H.

EVERYONE in Nanchang knew this strongly built man. At meetings in the working class districts, his passionate speeches called upon those who listened to join in the fierce, stubborn fight against the bourgeoisie, the landlords, the militarists and imperialists, who are squeezing the blood out of the Chinese people. The inexhaustible energy of the revolutionary agitator tossed him from town to town, to the far-distant villages of mountainous Kiangsi, among the rank-and-file soldiers of the enemy's troops. He was to be found everywhere where revolutionary struggle was rife, where the people were stirring. He was always with the masses, at their head. Ten years ago, on instructions from the Communist Party, he organised a group of propagandists from among the workers for the first time, and lovingly reared them into courageous fighters for the revolution.

The people of Kiangsi loved this tireless, fearless Communist. In the workers' barracks in the towns, and in the village tea-shops, tales were told with great respect about the "wonderful life of our Fan."

Fan Chi-min was born and brought up in the countryside. Before his eyes there passed the awful life of the Chinese peasantry, crushed by feudal exploitation and the yoke of the landlords, oppressed by the arbitrary licence of the generals, and by taxation and extortions. Fury and hatred seized young Fan Chi-min; he tried to change the situation in the village, to lighten the burden of the peasantry. But not knowing the fundamental laws of the class struggle, he met with bitter disappointment. Leaving the village and his family, Fan went to the town. His friends advised him to study, in order to learn about the structure of modern bourgeois society, built upon the cruel exploitation of the toilers by a handful of parasites.

A few years later, Fan had left behind him the technological institute. He was an engineer. But not only did he study. While still a student, he joined the Communist Party of China. Only then did he understand the reasons why his own first attempts to tear the destitute peasantry from the clutching grasp of slavery and violence, had met with failure. Revolutionary hatred, combined with a splendid understanding of the needs and hopes of the oppressed village, made him a fiery Communist agitator, a leader of the masses. The best representatives of the Chinese intelligentsia followed Fan Chi-min, the "revolutionary fanatic." The urban poor listened with delight to the fiery appeals of the young Communist for revolutionary struggle.

After the first mighty wave of the Chinese Revolution (1925-1927), there followed a period of fierce, bloody reaction. The treacherous Kuomintang engaged in savage reprisals against all that was revolutionary, against all that was dear to the great, long-suffering, people of China. Hundreds and thousands of the best representatives of the people were thrown by reaction into gloomy dungeons, and were subjected to unbearable medieval tortures. For hundreds and thousands of Communists and young Communists, the "mildest" sentence was to be shot!

In the night of August 1-2, 1927, the famous Nanchang uprising took place. The military units, led by Ho Lung and Yc Tin, raised the red flag of struggle against counter-revolution. Ho Lung's units moved towards the province of Shantung. Fan Chi-min, the most active participator in the Nanchang uprising, remained behind in Kiangsin at the most dangerous section of the revolutionary struggle, in the heart of millions of the people. During these days the whole of the workers and peasants of Kiangsi listened to the fiery voice and flaming speeches of Fan Chi-min. On all sides Fan called upon the workers and peasants everywhere to undertake decisive action, and to begin an armed struggle. In Yian (Fan's birthplace) he organised one of the first revolutionary artisan detachments, led the work of seizing the lands of the landlords, and destroyed the rent agreements which enslaved the peasantry. He himself divided the stretch of land which belonged to his family equally among the village farm labourers. In the farthest villages, where rumours about the revolutionary events were already current, the name of Fan became a symbol of emancipation from the age-long yoke. Fan Chi-min was a true friend of the people.

From all corners of the province of Kiangsi, armed workers and peasants flocked to Fan's detachment. News of the organisation of partisan detachments aroused the toilers of the neighbouring provinces. In ones and in groups fighters from North Fukieng, South Anhwei, and Western Szechwan found their way to him.

**Then came the end of 1928.** For the first time Soviets were set up on the territory of the frontier regions of the three provinces: Kiangsi, Szechwan, Fukieng. Fan Chi-min was elected president of the Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies of the frontier region. A witness for many years of the barbarous exploitation and yoke of slavery which weighed down the masses of the peasantry, he had a splendid knowledge of the entire mechanism of the apparatus

of bourgeois-landlord oppression and violence. Passionately and tirelessly Fan Chi-min broke down this robber apparatus of the parasites and idlers.

The freed lands were returned to their real owners—the toiling peasantry. But they had to be defended in a stubborn, violent struggle against mortal enemies. The ranks of the partisan detachments—defenders of the emancipated people—swelled rapidly. The toilers of Hunan, Kiangsi, Fukieng and Hupeh, marched side by side, shoulder to shoulder, and hurled themselves in a fierce devastating avalanche upon the counter-revolutionary hordes. The Soviet regions in China arose and grew up at a stormy pace in Central China. It was with fixed attention that the entire world watched the unfolding of a gigantic picture of the majestic struggle of millions.

**Then the years 1929-1930.** Aided by the imperialists, the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang organised its first drive against the Soviet regions in the provinces of Kiangsi, Honan and Hupeh. The numerous armies of the Nanking generals advanced against Soviet territory. The Chinese Red Army was formed out of the first partisan detachments and units of Chu De and Mao Tse-dun. Badly equipped and insufficiently armed, the units of the Red Army and the partisan detachments not only fought heroically, but also successfully beat off the attacks of the Kuomintang hordes. In this stubborn and severe struggle, the partisan detachments of Fan Chi-min defended the borders of the Soviet regions, fearlessly and passionately maintaining every clod of Soviet soil. By its devastating counter-attacks and skilful strategical operations, the Red Army not only threw back the enemy, but armed itself at the expense of the Kuomintang army units which it routed. The heroic Red Army of the Chinese Soviets, and its glorious, courageous commanders, were forged in the furnace of fierce civil war.

**The year 1931.** The scattered partisan detachments of Fan Chi-min were united into big regular units of the Chinese Red Army. A gigantic wave of revolution aroused millions of the Chinese people to the struggle for the Soviets. In Kiangsi, Hupeh, Shansi, Hunan, Kweichow and Anhwei, Fukieng and Szechwan—in all parts of the country, Soviet regions grew up at a stormy pace, partisan detachments were organised, and new regular units of the Chinese Red Army were formed. This year will go down for ever in the history of Soviet China. The heroic, glorious battles for Dungu, Nindu, Singo, and Soviet Kiangsi are bright, fiery pages, which tell of the

struggle, of the new history of an emancipated people. This year, for the first time in the history of the Chinese people, its fully empowered and plenipotentiary delegates came together at the First Congress of Soviets in Jui-Din, a town hidden far away in the Kiangsi mountains. The best units of the Red Army stood guard over the whole of the Jui-din region, where the Congress of Chinese Soviets was working. Fan Chi-min's detachments, among others, honourably fulfilled this extremely important task of honour.

The counter-revolution, bestial with fear, organised constant drives against the Chinese Soviets. The Kuomintang headquarters staff, Japanese, German and American military advisers, drew up extensive strategic plans for the "destruction of the Red Army" and the "wiping out of the Red Government." The struggle between the forces of revolution and counter-revolution took on an all-Chinese and international character.

**The year 1933.** The growth of Fan Chi-min's popularity among broad masses of the toilers was indirectly proportionate to the growth of the bestial hatred felt towards him by the Nanking generals. The reward offered for the delivery of Fan, alive or dead, rose by leaps and bounds.

In Nanchang, Fuichow, Anking,\* the walls of the houses in the squares and streets were plastered with thousands of enormous placards, on which was the following notice in thick black paint:

"50,000 dollars will be paid to whomsoever will deliver the red bandit Fan Chi-min, alive or dead, into the hands of the general staff."

But quite recently, in 1932, similar placards announced the fact that Fan Chi-min's head was valued by the general staff in Nanking at 80,000 dollars. But the general staff of the Kuomintang reaction waited in vain for their adventurous proposals to be fulfilled. Not a single foul traitor was to be found in the villages and towns through which Fan Chi-min's units passed, in the Soviet territories.

**The year 1934.** Six drives launched by the Kuomintang armies, equipped out of the funds raised by foreign loans, ended in severe defeat in the struggle against the Red Army and the people of Soviet China. The country groaned under the heel of the imperialist robbers. The Japanese army of occupation marched through the fields of Manchuria, Jehol and North China, bringing devastation to the towns and villages, and annihilating the population. Expressing the will of millions of the people, the government of the Chinese Soviet Republic of 1932 declared war upon imperialist Japan. The 10th Army corps of the Red Army, under the command of Comrade Fan

\* The chief towns of the Kiangsi, Fukien and Anhwei provinces.

Chi-min, was reorganised into the First Popular Vanguard anti-Japanese Army. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Revolutionary Military Soviet appointed Comrade Fan Chi-min as the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army.

By this time the Kuomintang generals were offering 80,000 dollars for Fan Chi-min's head. The Shanghai newspapers demanded "the immediate destruction of the Red Leader." Chang Kai-shek's best guard divisions were hurled against Fan Chi-min's troops. But Fan Chi-min dealt his blows boldly and with lightning speed, and remained elusive as hitherto. The units of the First People's Army were everywhere. The woe-begotten Nanking army leaders trembled with fear at the idea of meeting Fan's army. Moved by fear and the knowledge of their own impotence, they spread lies and foul calumny on all sides. Here are a few statements taken at random from the Shanghai newspapers:

MAY 23, 1934. "The detachments of the notorious Fan Chi-min have been discovered at a point 65 miles from Nanchang (the capital of Kiangsi province). The governmental troops, in the absence of reinforcements, avoided a conflict. However, Fan's detachments are surrounded on all sides."

MAY 25, 1934. "... The 41st brigade of the government troops are successfully attacking the remains of a big band under the command of Fan Chi-min, the Red General. Hurled back to the river Han, close to the town of Yunfyn (a few miles from Nanchang), the band has been routed. Fan Chi-min himself took his life, not wishing to be taken prisoner . . ."

MAY 26, 1934. "... Numerous bands commanded by Fan Chi-min, known as the First People's Revolutionary Anti-Japanese Army, have been surrounded in a locality situated 50 miles south of Anking (the capital of the Anhwei province, a few hundred miles from Yunfyn in Kiangsi). It is reported from Staff Headquarters (Chang Kai-shek) that this time Fan Chi-min and his troops will be finally wiped out . . ."

In May of 1934, these statements and dozens of similar reports embellished the pages of the Kuomintang press. And in June, like a bolt from the blue, there came the telegram published in the *South China Morning Post* (Hongkong), a reactionary British newspaper, which ran as follows:

"A large detachment of the Chinese Red Army headed by Fan Chi-min unexpectedly attacked the government forces situated in the region of the frontiers of the Kiangsi and Anhwei provinces. The battle which lasted for twenty-four hours culminated in the complete rout of the government forces. Fan Chi-min personally led the raid and took part in the fighting. The reports published in various newspapers regarding the destruction of Fan Chi-min and his detachments are to be discounted . . ."

At the end of 1934, there began the historic trek of the main forces of the Chinese Red Army from the province of Kiangsi to the new stronghold of Szechwan-Shensi. By holding off the onslaught of the Kuomintang hordes Fan Chi-min's units secured the concentration and departure of the

main forces of the Chinese Red Army. It was in extremely difficult circumstances that Fan Chi-min led the military operations against the superior forces of the enemy. Over the course of several months (September, 1934, to January, 1935) Fan Chi-min's units conducted successful operations almost every day against the enemy forces. Actually Fan Chi-min's troops, together with other units of the Red Army offered stubborn resistance to the Nanking Army, which was 500,000 strong. Even this tremendous superiority of the armed forces of the enemy was not in a position to shake the iron ranks of the Chinese Red Army fighters.

Fan, the army Commander, never left his position in the vanguard of his units. Cheerful and overflowing with good spirits, beloved by his soldiers, the Commander of the Army not only led the fighting operations personally, but took the most energetic part in the engagements with the enemy, infecting all the men, the whole army, with his courageous behaviour. There was no danger that could hold back Fan Chi-min, that could shake his courage.

In the beginning of January, 1935, Fan Chi-min, accompanied by a small detachment, undertook a scouting raid far into the territory occupied by the enemy. On the mountain of Huayu, in the neighbourhood of Desin, surrounded on all sides by officers' units, after being bombarded from the air, and after violent engagement with the enemy, Fan Chi-min was taken prisoner.

Here is a description of the event written by the correspondent of the English newspaper, *The North China Herald*:

"A large number of bombers appeared above the munitions. An enormous number of bombs were dropped over all suspicious-looking places. Fan Chi-min with a small detachment succeeded in getting away from the region being bombarded. However, in a short time he was surrounded on all sides near the mountain of Huayu. This small detachment defended itself, for an incredibly long time, causing astounding losses to their enemies. The Nanking officers for a long time could not credit their success, so elusive was this famous Red General."

"The joy of the Kuomintang generals knew no bounds. The 'greatest leader of the Reds' had fallen into the claws of the most ferocious reaction. In Nanking, Shanghai, and Nanchang official celebrations were organised on the occasion of the fall of the legendary Red Commander. Fettered in chains, Fan Chi-min was cast into an iron cage and drawn through the streets of the Kuomintang towns, to demonstrate the "decisive victory over the Reds."

But the iron will of this revolutionary was not to be broken by the most refined moral and physical torture. A man of tremendous courage and fearlessness, he remained true to himself to the end. Scraps of information appeared in the Kuomintang newspapers concerning the interrogation of Fan Chi-min. "Interrogation," in Kuomintang prisons, means a nightmare of medieval tor-

ture. And even the enemy press was forced to admit that "Fan Chi-min displayed his usual firmness during the interrogations."

On February 6, 1935, the Kuomintang leaders organised a "popular rejoicing on the occasion of the seizure alive of Fan," in the Yuchan park in Nanchang. The authorities issued a strict order that each institution in the town could send not more than ten representatives. But tens of thousands of people came to the park. All the streets adjoining the park were crowded with people. This is how American correspondents described the "rejoicing":

"Cordons of police, gendarmes and troops surrounded the park. Machine-guns were drawn up on the pavements. Nobody dared to step off the pavement on to the road. Fan was brought in fettered on an armoured car. Surrounded by a strong guard, he was displayed to the public. Not a sound of rejoicing was heard. Deep silence was maintained, even by the officers of Chang Kai-shek's headquarters. In this silence there was displayed all the respect and sympathy felt towards the man who stood upon the platform, with head held high and fearless eyes. He was immediately driven away, for the silence of the crowd was too menacing for the authorities. As soon as the armoured car moved away, the crowd began to show signs of agitation. The people were quietened by the machine-guns, which were trained on them."

The correspondent of the *North China Herald*, already mentioned above, writes the following about his conversation with Fan Chi-min, while confined in the cage.

"He is 37 years old. He is a man of exemplary behaviour and a fine individuality. He said to me: 'All people have the right to their own convictions, and I am glad that my life will be sacrificed to them.' I was not surprised at this reply. I had expected that he would maintain his dignity and courage to the last minute. I had often admired his ability, his courage,

his energy and strategic gifts. He told me that he has a father and mother, that he was married and had four sons and a daughter. The imminence of death could not shake this fearless man. In parting he declared with extreme self-possession:

"There is one thing of which I am confident in my mind, that is the confidence of the need to fight, without sparing one's life, against imperialist aggression in China and for national independence, and for the emancipation of the entire oppressed Chinese people."

At subsequent "interrogations" Fan was promised his life in exchange . . . for the betrayal of the interests of the Chinese people. In reply, he gave the following, in the words of the official Kuomintang agency, the *Central News*:

"Fan rejects all proposals. He is still incredibly adamant. He will presumably remain so until his death. He gives scanty evidence and refuses to reply to questions concerning the condition of the Red Army."

Fan Chi-min, the legendary hero of the Chinese people, was executed by bloody reaction in Nanchang, in the town where every worker, every student, every poor man, every intellectual knew this courageous revolutionary fighter personally. The death of Fan Chi-min is a tremendous loss to the closely-welded fighting family of rank-and-file men and commanders of the Red Army and the Chinese Soviets. But the rejoicings of the cowardly butchers have been overshadowed by the new victories of the Chinese Red Army in Kweichow, Szechwan, Shensi and Hunan. Miracles of courage and fearlessness are being displayed by thousands of legendary Fan Chi-mins in the advance posts of the revolutionary front.

The man, confined in the iron cage, had a frank countenance that was both clever and bold. He was a real revolutionary, an iron Bolshevik of the great Chinese Revolution.

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## REPORT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE E.C.C.I.

W. PIECK

## THE WORK OF THE SEVENTH CONGRESS

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# THE LAST TESTAMENT OF COMRADE FAN CHI-MIN, WRITTEN BEFORE HIS EXECUTION

**I**N consequence of mistakes made by its political leaders and of the indecision of its military command, the 10th Army Corps of the Red Army fell into the region fortified by the enemy's blockhouses. In the locality of Huaishan, we were surrounded by enemy forces seven times stronger than our own. Our last supplies of food and ammunition were spent, our men were extremely exhausted, and we suffered a tremendous defeat. We were hurrying to return to the Soviet region of North-East Kiangsi, in order to obtain an estimate of our work in the southern part of Anhwei province, to receive instructions from the Central Committee, and to put our units in order. Despite the danger, the cold and hunger (we had no food for seven days and nights), we made constant efforts day and night, to break through the line of the enemy's military blockade, but in consequence of the treachery of renegades and of our own lack of caution, we were taken prisoners by the 43rd brigade of the white army at 1 p.m. on January 24, 1935.

After taking us prisoners, the enemy despatched us to Nanchang and confined us in the prison of the military tribunal, first putting us in chains. We met thirty-five of our comrades among the prisoners in this prison, including Chow Tsium, Li Shui-bin, Chang Hu-tan, and others. Lin Tao-si, Van Ju-tzi and Chao Yan-shan were imprisoned in the same cell as I was, and had all been wounded before being taken prisoners. They were ill for over a month in prison. Their sickness so wasted them that they began to look like skeletons. In general, about 90 per cent. of the prisoners are sick. I myself was ill for over ten days. I wrote during all the time that I was sick. I knew that we would be shot, quite irrespective of our illness.

We, Communists, die without fear — for the revolution. We have made some mistakes in our time, but we have always tried to correct them immediately, in accordance with the line of the Party. We are the true defenders and executors of the correct line of the Party, and are convinced that the time is not far off when the revolution, under Marxist-Leninist leadership, will be brought about in China and throughout the world. We are convinced that the Kuomintang system will be replaced by the Soviet system, which will save China from final ruin. We are further convinced that the capitalist system will give way to the Communist system, which will save the proletariat and the whole of mankind from ruin. With the

establishment of Communism, freedom and happiness will reign throughout the whole world.

We go to our death in the hope that all members of our Party will rally still more determinedly around our Central Committee, and that under its leadership they will intensify their Bolshevik energy, determination and initiative, as our comrade, the genius, Lenin, did during his lifetime, will devote all their strength and abilities to the cause of revolution.

To-day the working class movement in the towns is one of the weak links in our work. We must exert ourselves to the utmost to develop this movement. We must work untiringly among the soldiers of the Kuomintang army (unrest is growing in the ranks of the white army), and extensively develop the peasant movement in order to win the masses in their millions. We must immediately put into practice the Party's slogan: "Hammer out an iron Red Army a million strong"; we must launch peasant, partisan warfare throughout the whole of China, and render it impossible for the Kuomintang army to concentrate its troops with a view to crushing the main forces of the Red Army. We must also work energetically to build new Soviet regions where the main forces of the Red Army will find the defence and support they require to smash the enemy. We must launch a counter-offensive by the Red Army throughout the whole of China, and merge all the forces of the Soviet movement into one whole so as to overthrow the bloody domination of the Kuomintang Government and to set up an independent, free, workers' and peasants' Soviet Government.

And if in our time we still meet with comrades whose attitude towards the decisions and instructions of the Party is passive, then we have the right to call these comrades not revolutionaries, but pseudo-Communists. Only such people can forget that tens of thousands of Party members are languishing and suffering torture under inhuman conditions in the Kuomintang prisons, only such people can forget the bloody horror of the execution of our comrades by the Kuomintang butchers, the fierce struggle that is being waged by the main forces of our Red Army; only such people can forget the millions of workers and peasants who are suffering perpetual want and are dying of starvation.

Dear Comrades! We met with defeat because of our own mistake, and we were taken prisoners. Sooner or later we shall be shot by the Kuomin-

tang hangmen. Dear comrades! We are parting from you for ever!

The fascist Kuomintang has done its utmost to buy us over to the side of the enemy with bribery and threats. But what is the Kuomintang? It is a band of the foulest robbers, of traitors to the national interests of China, the bloody butchers of the Chinese workers and peasants. We or they? The Kuomintang people may cut off our heads, but they cannot shake our Communist convictions. Our convictions are strong and firm as iron.

We are now trying to escape from prison. If we are successful, well and good; if not, we shall meet death without fear. And so we, who are

perhaps at death's door, cry aloud with all the class hatred that is in us: "Down with imperialism, and first and foremost, Japanese imperialism!" "Down with the treacherous Kuomintang!" "Long live the final victory of the Chinese Red Army!" "Long live the Chinese Soviet Republic!" "Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!" "Long live the Chinese Communist Party!" "Long live the Communist International!" "Long live the Soviet Union!" "Long live the mighty leader of the world proletariat, Comrade Stalin!" "Long live the victory of Communism throughout the world!"

Written in secret in the prison cell of the Military Tribunal in Nanchang, June 29, 1935.

## DOCUMENTS

# MANIFESTO TO THE WHOLE PEOPLE OF CHINA CONCERNING RESISTANCE TO JAPAN AND THE SALVATION OF THE FATHERLAND\*

**C**ITIZENS all! All sons and daughters of our fatherland!

The new increased offensive undertaken by Japanese imperialism, and the further unexampled capitulation of the Nanking Government have led to a position where many of the Northern provinces, in the train of Manchuria and Jehol, have now, once again, been amputated, in fact, from the living body of our country.

Peiping and Tientsin — towns with a history and culture thousands of years old; Hopeh, Shantung and Shansi—provinces containing inexhaustible riches and natural resources; Chahar and Suiyuan—regions which are of tremendous strategic importance; the Peiping-Mukden, Peiping-Hankow, Tientsin - Pukow and Peiping-Suiyuan railways, which link up all the political and economic centres of the country, are all now in fact under the iron heel of Japanese militarism. The Headquarters' Staff of the robber Kwantung army is now energetically pursuing its previously drawn up plan of creating the states of the so-called "Monkukuo" and Hua Bei-kuo." Less than four years have passed since the events of September 18, 1931, but how far advanced are the dismemberment and seizure of the most important regions in China by the Japanese militarists! After Manchuria — Jehol, after Jehol — the zone around the Great Wall and Shanghaiuan, after Shanghaiuan and the strategic points of the Great Wall—the so-called "Nandung demilitarised

regions"—the actual occupation by Japanese armed forces of Hopeh, Chahar, Suiyuan and others of the Northern provinces—almost half of our country is partly occupied, and partly in fact occupied by Japanese imperialism. The plan for the complete destruction of China as a state, drawn up in the Tanaka memorandum,\* is being systematically put into operation. If this state of affairs continues, then it is clear that all the rest of our provinces situated in the basins of the Yangtze River, the Chutsian River, etc., will be gradually seized by the Japanese imperialist robbers. And so our fatherland, which possesses the oldest culture on earth, one which has a history 5,000 years old, will be finally converted into a colony, and the greatest people in the world, with its 400 million population, will be completely reduced to the level of slaves.

During the last few years our country and our nation have been experiencing a growing, deepening crisis. We are face to face with the direct question: EITHER WE RESIST THE JAPANESE OFFENSIVE, WHICH MEANS LIFE, OR WE RENOUNCE RESISTANCE TO THE FOREIGN INVASION, WHICH MEANS DEATH. IN THIS CONNECTION THE STRUGGLE TO ORGANISE RESISTANCE TO JAPAN AND TO SAVE OUR FATHERLAND HAS LONG SINCE BECOME THE SACRED DUTY OF EVERY CITIZEN, OF EVERY SON AND DAUGHTER OF OUR FATHERLAND!

But to our misfortune, individuals have been discovered among our own great people who are

\* See "Japanese Imperialism Stripped." Modern Books, Ltd.

\*Originally published in the "Tsigobao," Issue Number 10, 1935.

the shameless scum of society—individuals with human faces, but with the hearts of beasts. During the last few years, Chang Kai-shek, Wang-ching-wei, Chang Siue-lan and other national traitors, Kuan Fu, Yan Yun-tai, Van Yi-tan, Chang Chium and other Japanese agents of the policy of “non-resistance” have sold one Chinese province of ours after another; they have pursued the tactics of “toleration,” and accepted one Japanese demand after another, hiding behind demagoguery about the “necessity of first creating calm at home, and then resisting the enemy abroad”; they are conducting a bloody war against their own people, suppressing every kind of anti-imperialist movement, and behind their demagoguery about “waiting for a new world war” actually forbid the adoption of any sort of national action directed towards resisting Japan and to saving our fatherland. And yet these people, traitors to our fatherland have latterly, under slogans calling for “collaboration between China and Japan” and for “Panasiatism” been pursuing a frankly predatory, disgraceful, capitulatory policy, one hitherto unknown in Chinese or world history.

The Japanese robbers demanded the withdrawal from the north of the troops of Yui Suie-chung, Sun Che-Yuan and others—and many of these troops were immediately withdrawn southwards and westwards so as to conduct internecine warfare against their own people. The Japanese robbers demanded that numerous Chinese political and military leaders be removed—and all the persons mentioned were immediately removed from their posts. The Japanese robbers demanded that the Hupeh provincial government should be removed from Tsientsin, and the whole of its apparatus was immediately transferred to Baodin. The Japanese robbers demanded that all Chinese newspapers and magazines which did not suit their pleasure should be closed down and prohibited, and all the newspapers and magazines indicated were immediately closed down and banned. The Japanese robbers demanded the arrest and punishment of the editors and correspondents of the “Sinshen” and other Chinese newspapers and magazines to which they objected, and the editor of the “Sinshen” and a number of correspondents were immediately arrested and thrown into prison. The Japanese robbers demanded that slavish, Japanophile education be introduced into Chinese schools and universities, and all advanced, progressive Chinese literature was immediately burned, while any honest young men and girls, who refused to be made the slaves of a foreign state, were arrested, many of them being shot. The Japanese robbers demanded that Japanese advisers be invited to all Chinese state

institutions, and Japanese spies were immediately invited to take part in the military, political, and financial institutions of the Nanking government. And even when the Japanese robbers demanded that organisations of the Kuomintang itself be disbanded, its local organisations in North China and Amoy were immediately dissolved. The Japanese robbers demanded that the Blueshirts’ Union be disbanded, and its leaders, Tsin Kuan-chin and Tsian Siao-san immediately fled from North China.

The Chinese Soviet Government and the Communist Party of China consider that all the above-mentioned deeds perpetrated by Japanese imperialism and its agents in the shape of Chang Kai-shek are a tremendous national disgrace to the Chinese people. The Soviet Government and the Communist Party of China declare with all due gravity: “We not only make a determined protest against any sort of forcible seizure of our lands whatsoever, and against all interference in our own Chinese affairs by the Japanese imperialists, but we equally categorically protest against the Japanese demand that the Kuomintang organisations and the Blueshirts be disbanded, since from the viewpoint of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party of China, ALL THE AFFAIRS OF THE CHINESE MUST BE DECIDED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE CHINESE THEMSELVES. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the Kuomintang and the Blueshirts’ Union have committed innumerable crimes against our people and our country, the question as to whether these organisations shall exist further or be destroyed is our own Chinese affair, concerning which Japanese imperialism has no right to express a single word.

Our provinces have been over-run by foreigners one after another, our people—tens and tens of millions of them, have been enslaved by foreigners, whole towns and villages, one after another, have been drowned in bloody warfare, by foreigners, our emigrants, group after group, have been forcibly expelled from other countries, and every step in our home and foreign policy has been subjected to interference on the part of the imperialist powers. What sort of a state is this? What sort of people are we?

China is our native land!

We all of us, sons and daughters of our native land, are the Chinese nation.

Can we tolerate this sort of enslavement of our people, of our nation? Can we do other than fight to save ourselves and our fatherland?

No, absolutely no! See how Abyssinia, a land with a 12 million population, is ardently preparing to undertake a heroic armed struggle against Italian imperialism, in defence of its lands and its

people. Can, then, China with its population of 400 million, fold its hands and await its ruin? The Soviet Government and the Communist Party of China are deeply convinced that besides the very, very few national traitors and Japanese agents who have the desire to fulfil the disgraceful rôle of Li Van-yun, Chen Siao-sui, Chang Tsin-gua, Pu Yi, and others for Japanese imperialism, the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people can on no account agree to give themselves into slavery to the foreign murderers. The Soviet Government of China long ago declared a war of national defence war against Japanese imperialism. The Red Army has on more than one occasion appealed to all army units proposing a joint armed struggle to save our fatherland. The anti-Japanese vanguard detachments of the Red Army have long been conducting a stubborn, hard struggle to win the roads to Northern China. The 19th army and the masses of the people carried out the heroic defence of Shanghai against the Japanese. Together with the masses our troops offered self-sacrificing armed resistance to prevent the Japanese penetrating into Chahar, into the region of the Great Wall and Nandun. The Fukieng people's government at one time accepted the proposal of the Red Army for joint struggle against the Japanese imperialists and their agent—Chang Kai-shek.

Lo Den-san, Sui Min-hun, Tsi Hun-chan, Jen In-tsi, Den Te-mei, Tun Chan-yun, Tsiu Tsiu-bo Bei Yan, Pan Hun-shan, She Tsan-tan, Sun Yun-tsin, Fan Chi-min and other national heroes have sacrificed their young lives for the sake of their fatherland. Liu Tsun-wu, Tian Han, Du Chun-yuan and other heroic fighters have suffered arrest and prison tortures for their indomitable loyalty to the struggle for the liberation of their own people. The military units of Tsai Tin-kai, Tsan Huan-nai, Ven Chao-yun, Fan Chei-wu, Chen Mintsui and other anti-Japanese figures continue to wage the struggle. Sun Tsin-lin, Ho San-in, Li Duma, San Bo and other prominent politicians have issued "A fundamental programme for the organisation of a national war of the Chinese people against Japanese imperialism" bearing thousands of signatures of the best people in our country. For several years our workers, peasants, students and many traders have been constantly waging, and are still waging, a heroic struggle in the form of a boycott of Japanese goods, in the form of anti-Japanese strikes, demonstrations, etc. And, finally, the fact is particularly important that under the guidance of such national heroes as Yan Tsin-yui, Chao Shan-chi, Van De-tai, Li Yan-low, Chow Bao-chun, Se Ven-dun, Wi-chen, Li Hua-tan, and others—our anti-Japanese partisan detachments, numbering hundreds of thousands of

fighters in Manchuria and Jehol, in spite of all difficulties and at the cost of tremendous sacrifices, are carrying on an uninterrupted, stubborn and heroic armed struggle against the Japanese occupants, for the national liberation of our people. All the facts enumerated not only clearly illustrate the enthusiasm and energy of our people in the struggle for their national existence, but also the inevitable victory in this sacred struggle for national-liberation, over their enemies.

If our national-liberation struggle has as yet not achieved the successes it should, it is because, on the one hand, the anti-Japanese forces have been subjected to the united blows of Japanese imperialism and the Nanking government of Chang Kai-shek while, on the other hand, all the forces hostile to the Japanese and Chang Kai-shek are still not united for common action.

In this connection, in the present most grave situation, when the national existence itself of the Chinese people is being threatened, the Soviet Government and the Communist Party of China once again make a sincere appeal to all our native people: regardless of the differences of political opinions and interests that exist between the various classes and sections of the population, and regardless of the hostile actions which have taken place between the various military units in the past and to-day, all must act in view of Japanese aggression as one man, and recognise the great truth of our most popular national slogan: "to fight jointly against the enemy without, in spite of all the strife within"; and first and foremost all must cease the internecine armed struggle, and in particular the war which Chang Kai-shek is conducting against his own people, and so make it possible to concentrate all our national forces for the sacred work of resisting Japan and saving our fatherland. The Soviet Government and the Communist Party of China once more most seriously declare: if the Kuomintang troops will cease their offensive against our Soviet regions, if they will conduct a struggle against Japanese imperialism, then irrespective of all the long years of military operations which have taken place between the Red Army and the Kuomintang units, and the diametrically opposed views which exist between them on questions of the internal structure of China, the Red Army will not only immediately cease its military operations against them, but will be the first to extend a hand to them for a joint armed struggle to save our fatherland. What is more, the Soviet Government and the Communist Party of China further sincerely call upon:

All sons and daughters of our great peoples who do not want to become colonial slaves; all commanders and soldiers who have any national con-

sciousness; all parties, groups and organisations which desire to take part in the sacred struggle for the national liberation of our people; all the honest young people among the members of the Kuomintang and the Blueshirts; all Chinese emigrants who wish to save their fatherland, all our brothers from among the oppressed national minorities (Mongols, Moslems, Koreans, Tibetans, Mao, Yao, Li, Fan) and others; let us rise up like one man to the fight, regardless of the terror and acts of repression of the Japanese imperialists and the Nanking government of Chang Kai-shek.

FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHINESE UNITED PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, TOGETHER WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THE MANCHURIAN ANTI-JAPANESE LOCAL AUTHORITIES!

FOR THE ORGANISATION OF A CHINESE UNITED ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY, TOGETHER WITH THE RED ARMY AND THE MANCHURIAN ANTI-JAPANESE PARTISAN DETACHMENTS!

The Soviet Government is prepared to take upon itself the initiative in establishing a Chinese government of national defence, it is prepared immediately to enter into negotiations for the organisation of a government of national defence and to take part in it along with all political parties and groups in China, with all prominent politicians and social figures, with all mass organisations, with all local military and political authorities who wish to participate in the struggle to resist Japan and save our fatherland.

The government of national defence which is organised as a result of these negotiations must be regarded as a provisional central organ for the struggle to save China, and it must take measures to convene a really representative body of all the Chinese people, elected on the basis of democratic liberties, which will decide along which roads the struggle for the integrity and independence of China must travel further. The Soviet Government and the Communist Party of China will support the convention of such a representative body and its decisions, with all the means at their disposal, since the Soviet Government of China sincerely and warmly respects the opinion and the will of its people.

The main task facing this people's government will be organising resistance to Japanese imperialism and the salvation of our fatherland. Therefore the following must be the main points in its programme:

(1) Armed resistance to Japanese expansion and the return of all occupied territories.

(2) Assistance to those who are starving, capital repairs to river beds and river dams to combat floods and droughts.

(3) Confiscation of all the property of Japanese imperialists in China and its transfer to a fund to cover the cost of the war against Japan.

(4) Confiscation of all the land, rice, grain and other property in the hands of all national traitors and Japanese agents, and their transfer to a fund to help the unemployed, the poor and those participating in the anti-Japanese struggle.

(5) Abolition of all unbearable taxation and requisitions—regulation of financial policy, the monetary system and the whole of our national economy.

(6) Increase in wages and salaries, and an improvement in the material conditions of the workers, peasants, army men and intellectuals.

(7) Democratic liberties, and the release of all political prisoners.

(8) Universal education free of charge, and the provision of work to young people finishing their studies.

(9) Equal rights for all nationalities inhabiting China, and the defence of the freedom of the person, property, and of the right of domicile, and the right of every inhabitant of China itself and of Chinese emigrants abroad to pursue their occupations.

(10) The establishment of contacts with all the masses of the people whose attitude towards Japanese imperialism is hostile (with the Japanese toiling people, with the Koreans, with the people of Formosa, etc.) for the purpose of joint struggle against the common enemy. The establishment of an alliance with all nations and states who support or sympathise with the national struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people, and friendly relations with all powers and nations who observe benevolent neutrality towards the military operations carried on between Japanese imperialism and the Chinese people.

The united anti-Japanese army must include all troops and armed detachments who desire to fight against Japanese imperialism and its agents. A general staff for this joint army must be established under the guidance of the government of national defence. This general staff will be set up either by means of electing representatives from the commanders and the rank-and-file of all anti-Japanese military units, or by some other democratic means. This question must also be decided by a majority of the representatives of all sides and by the will of the people. The Red Army is prepared to be the first to enter into this anti-Japanese united army for the purpose of fulfilling its sacred duty of saving our fatherland.

In order that the people's government may really fulfil its serious task of national defence, and in order that the anti-Japanese united army may really carry out its great duty of conducting a national war of liberation, the Soviet Government and the Communist Party of China make the following appeal to the whole of the people:

For the national salvation of our people! Let those who have much money give it up; let those who have many weapons—SUPPLY THESE WEAPONS; let those who have much grain and rice—give up their rice and grain; let those who are in good health—not grudge their strength and energy; let those who have specialised knowledge—make use of it. Let the whole of the people be mobilised in this way, let millions and tens of millions of the people arm themselves with all kinds of weapons.

*The Soviet Government and the Communist Party of China is firmly convinced that if our people, numbering 400 million, are given a united political leadership in the form of the Chinese people's government of national defence and its united fighting vanguard in the shape of the Chinese joint anti-Japanese army, and moreover with the million-strong forces of the armed people at its disposal, and with the support of the proletariat and the peoples of the entire East and throughout the world, it will inevitably conquer Japanese imperialism, hated by its own Japanese people and isolated on an international scale!*

*Brothers, rise up to the struggle!  
To save our Fatherland!  
For life as a nation!  
For independence as a state!  
For the integrity of our territory!  
For human rights and liberties!  
Long live the unity throughout all the forces of our Chinese nation for resistance to Japan and for the salvation of our fatherland!*

CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.

## MANIFESTO TO THE MANCHURIAN PEOPLE CONCERNING THE EVENTS IN NORTH CHINA\*

**T**O the 40 million population of the four North-Eastern provinces!

Four years ago, on September 18, (1931—Ed.) the Japanese cut-throats occupied Manchuria. Three years ago, on January 28 (1932—Ed.) they marched their troops into Shanghai, but suffered defeat, after being fiercely resisted by the 19th army, and the workers and population of Shanghai. They were unable to seize Shanghai. Two years ago, in the Spring, the Japanese robbers once more led their troops into the province of Jehol and seized it. On June 6 of this year (1935—Ed.) the Japanese again, using the excuse that China had violated the Tangu agreement,† demanded that the Chinese Government withdraw its troops from Peiping and Tientsin, that Sun Che-yuan evacuate his troops from Chahar, that anti-Japanese organisations be disbanded throughout China, and that the anti-Japanese movement be outlawed. And they put forward a number of other arbitrary demands.

The leaders of the Kuomintang Government—Chang Kai-shek and Wang-Ching-Wei, traitors to their fatherland, accepted in full the demands advanced by the Japanese bandits. On orders from Chang Kai-shek, Yui Sue Chun's troops have been withdrawn from Peiping and Tientsin: Sun Che-yuan has been removed from his post, and his troops have been withdrawn from Chahar; movements of any kind against Japan to save China are prohibited, and those who take the lead in anti-Japanese action are arrested and killed.

*The traitors Chang Kai-shek and Wang-Ching-*

*Wei are striving to keep the government in their own hands at the cost of betraying the Chinese people and the existence of China as a nation. Following in the footsteps of the traitor, Chan Sue-lan, under the pressure merely of bare threats, and without firing a single shot, they handed over Hopeh and Chahar to the Japanese imperialists, and put the provinces of Shansi, Shantung and Suiyun under their control. All Chinese territory to the north of the river Hwanghei has become a sphere of Japanese influence.*

*This is an unprecedented event in the five thousand years of Chinese history. Chang Kai-shek, the traitor, has outstripped Tsin Kuaya\* and Wu Sang-† in betraying the interests of China. By selling Manchuria, Chang Kai-shek and Wang-Ching-Wei tried to satisfy the demands of the Japanese robbers and gain a temporary breathing-space. To-day they are prepared to sell the North of China, and Peking,‡ the capital of China, so famous in history, in order to maintain their power in the Southern provinces.*

*Can anything be achieved in this way? No, absolutely impossible.*

*Yesterday the Japanese robbers occupied Manchuria, to-day they have occupied North China, and to-morrow, very likely, they will want to seize Shantung, Honan, and then Central and South China. The Japanese robbers are unswervingly fulfilling their colonial policy, and will not be satisfied until they have converted the whole of China into a Japanese colony.*

\* Tsin Kuaya, who lived in the 12th century, and gained notoriety by helping the enemies of China to seize North China.—Ed.

† Wu Sang-gu was a Chinese military chief who lived in the 17th century, notorious as a traitor to his native land, by the fact of his helping the Manchurians to conquer China.—Ed.

‡ Now called Peiping.—Ed.

\* Published in the newspaper "Tsnigohao," No. 10, 1935.

† An agreement providing for the cessation of military action, the establishment of a demilitarised zone and the withdrawal of Chinese troops beyond the bounds of this zone.—Ed.

Can we allow China to be converted into a Japanese colony? No, on no account.

WHAT MUST BE DONE? WHERE IS THE WAY OUT?

There is one single means, one single way out:

We must immediately establish an anti-Japanese, anti-Manchukuo, anti-Chang Kai-shek united front throughout the whole of China, mobilise all the anti-Japanese, anti-Manchukuo, anti-Chang Kai-shek military forces on sea, land and in the air, and organise an anti-Japanese, anti-Manchukuo, anti-Chang Kai-shek united army;

We must immediately organise armed resistance to the Japanese imperialists;

We must immediately arm and mobilise the population of China for war against Japan;

We must immediately confiscate the property of the Japanese robbers and of those who are traitors to our fatherland, so as to cover the cost of war against Japan;

We must immediately establish an anti-Japanese, anti-Manchukuo, and anti-Chang Kai-shek government.

A united anti-Japanese front must be formed jointly with all states and peoples in the world who sympathise with the Chinese people, and who also observe benevolent neutrality towards its national-revolutionary struggle against Japan.

The Soviet Government of China, together with the Chinese Red Army has declared a national war of defence against Japanese imperialism. The commanders of the former 19th army, Tsai Tinkai and others, are trying to form an anti-Japanese, anti-Chang Kai-shek government; the commander of the former army mobilised to save the fatherland, Van De-lin, the commander of the army of defence Li Du, and others are also rising up to fight. ALL THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS EXIST FOR THE FORMATION OF A NEW POLITICAL SITUATION IN CHINA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

BROTHERS IN MANCHURIA!

Do you want to remain eternal slaves of Japan, or do you want to obtain your freedom as fighting heroes and soldiers!

Brothers!

For four years the knowledge has rankled us that our native land is perishing. We have suffered enough. Arise! Join the relentless battle against the Japanese robbers!

There is an old proverb which says: "Each and all are responsible for the prosperity or ruin of the state." Can we stand aside and not rise up to save our native land at a time when it is in extreme danger, when the nation is perishing? The memory of our forefathers will not allow it, our sons and grandsons will not forgive us for this after our deaths.

BROTHERS IN MANCHURIA!

WHAT MUST WE DO IN MANCHURIA ITSELF? We must convene an anti-Japanese congress of representatives of the people, and establish a people's government in Manchuria to lead the Manchurian people to the overthrow of the Japanese puppet government of Manchukuo. We must unite with all governments, anti-Japanese troops and organisations inside China.

Six anti-Japanese united armies have now been formed in Manchuria under the leadership of the "united anti-Japanese committee" and there are a number of partisan detachments numbering many tens of thousands. This does not include the detachments which are not under our guidance. The anti-Japanese armies are not hunhuz,\* but are troops conducting the struggle against Japan for the salvation of their fatherland. Their aims are as follow:

1. Resistance to Japan, the struggle against Manchukuo, the return of lost territories, and defence of our fatherland, China.

2. Confiscation of the property of the Japanese robbers and their lackeys.

3. Unification of the people to resist Japan and save China.

Anti-Japanese societies are to be found throughout the whole of Manchuria, and throughout the whole of China. They represent a great force and are organisations which are really conducting a struggle against Japan to save the fatherland.

BROTHER COMMANDERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE VOLUNTEER ARMY AND PARTISAN DETACHMENTS IN MANCHURIA!

Join our united anti-Japanese armies and anti-Japanese societies for joint struggle against the robbers!

BROTHER COMMANDERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE MANCHURIAN ARMY!

Turn your bayonets against your Japanese officers and join with us against the Japanese to save our fatherland!

BROTHER WORKERS!

Throw down your hammers! Go to the front, annihilate the Japanese robbers! Win the 8-hour working day! Fight for your national and social emancipation!

BROTHER PEASANTS!

Throw down your scythes! Go to the front! Settle accounts with the Japanese barbarians! Defend your own fields and fatherland.

BROTHER TRADERS!

Collect funds to help the anti-Japanese army! Act against all taxation imposed by Japan and Manchukuo! Demand freedom of trade for the Chinese traders and do not submit to Japanese restrictions!

\* More correctly "hung-hutze": Brigands.

**BROTHER STUDENTS!**

*Put aside your text-books! Follow the example of Ban Chao\* of old, and go and defend your fatherland!*

**SISTERS:**

*Throw off the yoke of the dark forces of semi-bond slavery! Learn from the legendary Mu Lan† not to lag behind the men in defending your fatherland!*

*All who are against Japan, rise up for the sacred cause and fight against Japan, Manchukuo and Chang Kai-shek! Organise a people's anti-Japanese, anti-Manchurian government! Win back the lost lands in Manchuria and China! Fight for the integrity of Chinese territory and the independence of the Chinese nation! Boldly forward!*

\* Ban Chao lived in the year 100 A.D. and was famous as a fighter against the foreign enemy.—Ed.

† Mu Lan, as the stories go, lived in 400 A.D. and was famous because she saved the life of her father, a military leader who was too sick to go to the front, by taking up arms herself and fighting against the foreign enemy, for twelve years, disguising the fact that she was a woman and fighting in her father's place.—Ed.

*Long live the united front against Japanese imperialism, Manchukuo and Chang Kai-shek!*

*Long live the great Chinese Republic!*

*Long live the sacred anti-Japanese national-revolutionary war!*

*The United Committee for war against Japan, Commander of the 1st anti-Japanese united army, Yan Tsin-Yui.*

*Commander of the 2nd anti-Japanese united army, Van De-gun.*

*Commander of the 3rd anti-Japanese united army, Chao Shan-chi.*

*Commander of the 4th anti-Japanese united army, Li-Yan-lu.*

*Commander of the 5th anti-Japanese united army, Chou Bao-chun.*

*Commander of the 6th anti-Japanese united army, Se Ven-dun.*

*Tanyuany anti-Japanese partisan detachment.*

*Heiluang anti-Japanese partisan detachment.*

*The Great Chinese Republic, 24th year, 6th month, 20th day. (June 20, 1935).*

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# THE ADDRESS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE RED ARMY OF CHINA TO THE ABYSSINIAN PEOPLE

**O**N behalf of the Red Army of China, on behalf of the Chinese people, fighting for their national independence, we send our ardent fraternal greetings to the heroic Abyssinian people.

We are separated by thousands of miles, by rivers, seas and mountains. But in all our thoughts and feelings we are with you in your fearless struggle against the imperialist barbarians. Nobody knows better than we do what intolerable suffering, what incalculable, cruel tortures, what persecution, the imperialists inflict upon the peoples they enslave. Nobody understands better than we do the mortal danger which threatens your people at the hands of the Italian imperialists. These imperialist robbers want, by fire and sword, to deprive you of your national independence and to convert you into abject slaves. They want to drive you out of your own homes, and to doom you to be at their complete mercy, and to the darkest poverty and starvation. All that will be left to you will be to beg at the threshold of the home in which you were born, and which once belonged to you.

The rainclouds had not yet dispersed, when leaden clouds once more gathered menacingly over your country. Maybe, when these greetings reach you, the Italian imperialists will already be setting in motion the machine of destruction, and will have begun their rapacious war against your people. The only road to the salvation of your people is the self-sacrificing armed defence of your national independence. The entire people must rise like one man, under the slogan of a sacred war against the imperialist robbers. And we have no doubt that your people who victoriously resisted the attacks of the Italian imperialists forty years

ago, will to-day force the imperialist robbers to take flight in just the same way.

The fate of our land is also in danger. A calamity has befallen our 400 million people, one such as has never occurred before in the whole long course of its 5,000 years of history. For four years already, the Japanese imperialists have been conducting a robber war against our people. Their troops have occupied a tremendous part of our territory. Their design is to convert the whole of our people into colonial slaves. But they will not be successful!

We have always fought, are fighting, and will continue to fight against the imperialists, whatever the difficulties and sacrifices, until we have won complete independence for our country, until we have driven every single imperialist, Japanese and others, out of our native land.

We also have to fight against the Italian imperialists. The Italian fascists—military pilots—help the enemies of our people, are in their service, and bombard us from military aeroplanes. This still further strengthens our bonds with the Abyssinian people in the struggle against our common enemy—the imperialist robbers.

We are inspired with an indomitable belief in the victory of the Abyssinian and Chinese peoples. Fight like lions for the vital interests of your people. Know that you have on your side, all that is best, most honest, and advanced in the whole of mankind.

Long live the independent Abyssinian people!  
Revolutionary Military Council of the Chinese  
Red Army:

CHU DE  
CHU EN-LAI  
VAN TSA-SAN.